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**Exploring Europe's Future:
Trends and Prospects Relating to Security**

Johan Jorgen Holst

September 1990

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Avoiding Nuclear War:
Managing Conflict in the Nuclear Age**

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PREFACE

This Note addresses the implications of political developments and prospects in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for NATO crisis planning and management. It describes alternative future institutional frameworks for European security, discusses the functions that NATO and other institutions might serve, and suggests a typology of potential contingencies that could strain the carrying capacity of the security order in Europe. It concludes with recommendations and guidelines for NATO contingency planning.

An earlier version of the Note was prepared for a conference on "NATO Crisis Management in a Changing Europe," held in Brussels on April 2-3, 1990, as part of a larger project on "Avoiding Nuclear War: Managing Conflict in the Nuclear Age."¹ The project is being conducted jointly by The RAND Corporation and the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

This Note, along with the other papers from the Brussels conference, will also be published by RAND in a collected volume edited by the conference organizers, Lynn E. Davis and Robert C. Nurick. The analysis presented in this Note should be of interest to scholars and officials interested in European security, crisis behavior and management, and the future of NATO.

¹In revised form, the original conference paper was issued as NUPI-Notat No. 426, "The Changing European Environment: Political Trends and Prospects" (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo).

SUMMARY

The postwar order in Europe has come to an end. The contours of the new order are still vague and in the making. Canonical military threats are disappearing, replaced by the risks that flow from uncertainty. "Managing peaceful change" is replacing "managing deterrence" as the key security task confronting governments in Europe.

The future architecture of European security is hardly discernible; the states of Europe have embarked upon a journey toward a destination unknown. For heuristic purposes we can posit a set of alternative European futures, not as an attempt to predict the unpredictable, but rather to explore the end points of alternative trajectories from the present.

One possible future is a "Europe of the balance of power," characterized by shifting alliances and a clear hierarchy of power and influence. Major European powers constitute the key players; the United States, though not having retreated into isolation, has divested itself of the chains of an entangling alliance. Another possibility is a "Europe of two alliances," essentially a security order based on a reconstitution of the recent past but in a modified form. A third scenario might be a "Europe of regions," in which larger organizational structures are superseded by subregional organizations and groupings, which interact and compete. Fourth is a "collective security Europe," developing out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and encompassing not only military security but economic and environmental matters as well. Finally, there is a "Community Europe," a confederal Europe centering on the European Community. The EC develops a defense component, and NATO remains as a framework for American engagement.

The "real" future is, of course, likely to constitute a melange of these and other scenarios. There are, however, a number of short-term issues that will condition the general direction in which the European political order is likely to evolve. The main ones include: the shape

and timing of German unification; the outcome of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiating process; the scope and timing of Soviet military withdrawals from Eastern Europe; the stability of Central European polities in a period of systemic transition; the impact of nationalism, particularly in southeastern Europe; the future of the "inner empire" of the Soviet Union; and the impact of the maritime competition.

Barring complete disintegration, the Soviet Union (or Russia) will remain for the foreseeable future the single dominant military power in Europe, and a formidable nuclear weapons power. These facts will shape and constrain the institutional framework for European security. Moreover, institutional construction takes time. Europe has entered a period of transition that is likely to be characterized by interlocking and overlapping institutional arrangements.

The European Community is the primary structuring institution in the present political order in Europe. Indispensable for the construction of a minimum order in Europe after the breakup of the Cold War system, the EC constitutes a potential framework for integrating a disintegrating USSR into a European political order. For the foreseeable future, however, it is unlikely to develop a significant defense component.

The CSCE is likely to be converted gradually from a negotiation forum to a permanent institution. Its competence in arms control negotiations will probably expand, and it is possible to envisage its further institutionalization. The CSCE could provide the framework for the construction of a new security order in Europe. But collective security will remain a distant goal, although certain components of such a system could emerge.

An alliance linking the United States to an association of like-minded states in Europe will constitute a necessary condition for security to prevail on a continent that includes a major Russian military power. Containment of Soviet military power will require continued American engagement. NATO is thus likely to remain as security insurance to maintain an American commitment; its continued

existence and future functions relate primarily to the balance of power in Europe and not to the future of the Warsaw Pact. But NATO is not coincidental with the present force structure, strategy, or deployments. In the past NATO designed policies and military arrangements to deal with Soviet strength and proximity. In the future it has to deal with the challenges flowing from Soviet weakness and distance. It needs to change to survive.

The canonical scenario of a major Soviet attack into western Europe seems remote today. Stability in the future will no longer be a function of clearly drawn lines of division and military commitment. Contingency planning in NATO will thus have to encompass a much broader spectrum of potential contingencies, force planning to concentrate on generic capabilities rather than threat-conditioned capabilities, and strategy to concentrate on designs to cope with uncertainty. The alliance will have to develop force postures and crisis management procedures for dealing with a broad spectrum of contingencies, designing around the uncertainties rather than attempting to reduce them.

NATO crisis planning must recognize that political authorities remain skeptical of attempts to institutionalize and constrain choices by procedures and machinery. They will remain skeptical also of a contingency planning that will lock them on to fixed tracks in a crisis, especially in a period of flux when specific threats give way to more diffuse risks and dangers. The task confronting NATO, therefore, is to enhance its ability to improvise in a crisis rather than to develop specific plans for how to cope with a wide variety of contingencies. The focus should be on developing generic guidelines and capabilities which broaden the scope of available options--that is, on providing the instruments for orchestration in a crisis, rather than attempting to write the score to be played.

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I. EUROPE IN TRANSITION: SOME SCENARIOS

The postwar order in Europe has come to an end. The contours of the new order are still vague and in the making. The old threats are disappearing, to be replaced by the risks that flow from uncertainty, from the embrace of the unpredictable. Empires in decline nearly always introduce incalculable dynamics in international relations. Social forces are set in motion that are not subject to diplomatic management and suasion. Popular forces will shape the future more than the diplomats, their interplay will be more complex than in the past. A new *Zeitgeist* is penetrating the political cultures of Europe. The process of re-creating historical Europe, of relinking Central Europe with Western Europe, has transformed the political agenda and outlooks in European capitals and societies. Managing peaceful change is replacing managing deterrence as the key security task confronting governments in Europe. The military factor has moved from the front to the back seat. Military attack has ceased to be viewed as a clear and present danger.

Periods of compressed and rapid change often obscure the permanent features of an international order in that they highlight novelty at the expense of continuity. Vital structures and linkages are ignored as fascinating and captivating change attracts attention and stirs imagination. As societies reclaim state institutions that had been used to suppress and exploit them rather than serve them, state policies may inadvertently collide in the international arena. The removal of barriers and obstacles within national polities, the very process of liberation and revolutionary change, could cause state policies to ignore the structural constraints and competing wills at work internationally. The challenges and opportunities for short-term change may obfuscate requirements for long-term stability. Transformation could erode the conditions for balance.

The future architecture of European security is hardly discernible, although rhetoric and wishful thinking sometimes suggest otherwise. The roads leading from the present platform of departure to possible

destinations lack pavement and signs of direction. The states of Europe have embarked upon a journey toward a destination unknown. We cannot provide roadmaps; all we can do is posit a spectrum of possible destinations on the basis of present trends. These trends are contradictory, often inchoate, and invariably uncertain and conjectural. They coexist and interact in the present situation. Any real future destination will constitute an amalgam of the multiplicity of trends at work. For heuristic purposes we shall posit a set of five alternative European futures, all of which could develop from the present trends, but in which the dominant trends vary. We are not attempting to predict the unpredictable but rather to explore the end points of alternative trajectories from the current starting place. Each end point would pose different challenges to the management of security. We shall be looking back from the vantage point of 1999.

SCENARIO I: EUROPE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

Our first destination is a *Europe of the balance of power*. The "permanent" alliances are superseded by a system of shifting alliances designed to contain the hegemonic aspirations of other powers or to further their own. It is a system with a clear hierarchy of power and influence. A group of principal powers (Russia, Germany, Britain, France, Spain, and Italy) supplies the key players, while the smaller powers attempt to adjust to the changing fortunes of the game and are frequently mobilized into coalitions. The United States has not retreated into "splendid isolation" but has divested itself of the chains of an entangling alliance. It is increasingly concerned with and involved in the international relations of a volatile Latin America and a dynamic but contradictory Pacific basin. Washington retains a special relationship with Britain.

Two structural problems strain the carrying capacity of the system, namely Russian military power and German economic might. The dialectic of their potential combination, or confrontation, causes recurring vibrations in the system at large. Furthermore, two existential conditions constrain and circumscribe the reconstruction of a balance-

of-power system, a return to the "golden age" of cabinet diplomacy: First, the democratization of modern Europe causes society to intervene in the conduct of foreign affairs, making it extremely difficult to conduct diplomacy according to the logic of *raison d'etat* and the perceived imperatives of the balance of power. Second, the existence of nuclear weapons has profoundly altered the traditional equation between power and purpose. In a world of mutual deterrence, nuclear weapons tend to command more dissuasive than suasive power, to promote objectives of denial rather than coercion. They tend to stabilize alignments, making them rigid rather than flexible. In the absence of a stable and fixed arrangement for the containment and denial of Russian military power, particularly nuclear weapon power, the reconstituted balance-of-power system stimulates nuclear proliferation among the major powers of the system, including Germany, Italy, and Spain. Nuclear autarky policies, *tous azimuts* strategies, and shifting arrangements for extending deterrence protection to allies all harbor the seeds of likely catastrophe. These conditions also appear to stimulate nuclear proliferation outside Europe. The fragmentation of NATO into a traditional balance-of-power system also constitutes a break with the trend toward integration in the European Community, stimulating a climate of "every man for himself," causing the Community to regress into a free-trade association frequently strained by political and military rivalries.

SCENARIO II: EUROPE OF TWO ALLIANCES

The second destination is a *Europe of two alliances*. It is essentially a security order based on a reconstitution of the recent past in a modified form. The Warsaw Pact is turned into a voluntary association, motivated largely by the fear of a resurgent, united Germany. Polish reactions to Bonn's equivocation on the Oder-Neisse border are followed by similar Czech concerns in regard to the Sudetenland. Moscow, fearful of the feedback from a noncommunist Eastern Europe on the centrifugal nationalist forces in the Soviet Union, decides to toughen its stance without attempting to turn the

clocks back to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Germany is unified, formally on the basis of the amalgamation of East German *Laender* into the Federal Republic (the Article 23 route), but Soviet insistence on a *droit de regard* creates a structure of limited sovereignty that in fact amounts to a confederation. The community of the German people (*Gemeinschaft*) is not effectively constituted in a single society (*Gesellschaft*).

This system of two alliances exhibits considerable stability at the international level. The sharp edges are cut off the military confrontation by arms control arrangements with a preferential build-down of the capacities for surprise attack and sustained offensive action. The force levels come down, partly through mutual agreement on withdrawal and partly as a consequence of an agreement to a "no real growth in defense budgets" regime. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) functions as an annual European Assembly for security discussion, involving, primarily, a consideration of the annual reports of the Arms Control Verification Authority and the European Non-Proliferation Authority. The Soviet and American troop levels are below 100,000 men. The East European states conclude comprehensive cooperation agreements with the European Community and join a large free-trade area referred to as the European Economic Space (EES). The EC constitutes the economic and political engine in Europe.

This is the most "familiar" of our destinations. However, familiarity should not be confused with probability. The stability of the order may be more apparent than real, rooted as it is in considerations of security and foreign policy rather than the aspirations of domestic society. Memories of the "Second Springtime of Nations in Europe," the revolutions of 1989 and the dreams they engendered, continue to exercise pressure on state authority and policy in Europe. Desires to overcome political divisions and bridge gaps in economic and social developments cause recurring unrest in Eastern Europe, as do ethnic minorities striving for greater autonomy and identity, and the sometimes violent reactions of the dominant nations to communal strife. Nationalism places a constant strain on the established order, particularly after the violent breakup of the Yugoslav federation.

SCENARIO III: EUROPE OF REGIONS

Our third destination is the *Europe of regions*. It evolves out of the reconstruction set in motion by the revolutions of 1989 and the conflicts arising from the process of German unification. France oscillates between two policies: embedding the united Germany in an integrated supranational European Community, or seeking containment through special restrictions on Germany and diplomatic coalitions with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Britain seeks refuge in splendid isolation to avoid entrapment in the affairs of the continent, and in a nostalgic return to the special relationship with the United States. Italy and Spain increasingly turn inward as a result of domestic political realignments, and their security policies tend to focus increasingly on the perceived long-term challenges from demographic pressures, religious fundamentalism, and socioeconomic instability across the Mediterranean.

These complex and unstructured processes lead to a Europe of subregional organizations and groupings. Germany leads a Middle Europe in rapid economic development. The Benelux countries seek to protect their prosperity and urban cultures by continuing the integration of their economies, which is aborted in the larger European Community as the Western organizational structures disintegrate in a mutually reinforcing manner under the impact of the process of German unification and Soviet insistence on a neutral Germany in the end. The Nordic Council deepens to include foreign policy and defense. It is dominated by the Scandinavian peninsula countries of Sweden and Norway; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania join as associate members. The Soviet Union is replaced by a Russian-led federation of autonomous states which in Europe include the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, and Moldavia. France, Spain, and Italy compete for leadership in a loose organization of Mediterranean littoral states. The Balkan states form a Balkan federation, which is haunted by irredentism and ethnic conflict.

The regions interact and compete. The pressure for nuclear proliferation grows as some of the regional groupings show signs of emphasizing military prowess in the conduct of their foreign economic relations. The United States withdraws its troops from Europe,

retaining access only to some airbases and certain fleet support and radar installations in Great Britain. Several arms races are feared to be imminent, and a mood of doom--waiting for the lights to go out in Europe--is spreading.

SCENARIO IV: COLLECTIVE SECURITY EUROPE

The fourth possible destination on our journey into a future unknown is *Collective Security Europe*. It develops out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE is institutionalized by the formation of a Ministerial Council and subsequently by the addition of an assembly of members from the parliaments of 45 participating countries, including all the countries of Europe and North America. Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, and Byelorussia join the CSCE. It establishes a series of functional authorities in the field of security. Authorities for arms control verification and peacekeeping evolve into an enforcement organ based on multinational military units. Grudgingly, the participating states accept the principle of majority voting, and the former great powers do not insist on any right of veto as the role of military force diminishes and the concept of a European peace order based on Kantian principles gains acceptance.

The levels of standing military forces are low, and nuclear weapons are essentially removed from the European countries, with small sea-launched and air-launched capacities remaining as safety links to the minimum levels of strategic nuclear forces maintained by the nuclear weapon states. The latter forces are viewed largely as remnants of a former order, retaining primarily ritualistic rather than operational functions and constituting insurance against nuclear proliferation in the Third World.

The CSCE is not confined to military security, encompassing also the growing fields of economic and environmental security as well as human security in postindustrial societies. Concentration on nonmilitary aspects of security leads to increased awareness of shared interests that cut across territorial divisions and to a growing

marginalization of military force as an arbiter of international relations. The European Community is represented in many of the bodies of the CSCE but does not develop a military component, as the diminishing role of military power and the growing role of economic and political power stimulate concentration on the original agenda of the Community. NATO remains as a framework for military cooperation linking the United States and Canada to the security order in Europe, and as a counterweight to Russian military power.

SCENARIO V: COMMUNITY EUROPE

Our fifth destination is "the hopeful one" of a *Community Europe*. It develops out of the European Community and its successful dialectic interplay of enlargement and deepening following the revolutions of 1989. The former GDR is absorbed into the Community. Austria joins following the establishment of the single European market in 1992. They are followed by Norway and Sweden, and somewhat later by Finland. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary conclude association agreements with the Community and are in the process of becoming full-fledged members. Switzerland overwhelmingly turns down application for membership in a referendum. Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia conclude new forms of cooperation agreements with the Community. However, their economic development is hampered by communal conflict and ethnic strife. Increasingly, membership in the European Community is viewed as the only good alternative to a disruptive re-Balkanization of the Balkans. Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta conclude special cooperation agreements with the European Community. The most difficult and tenuous ties are those forged between the European Community and the Soviet Union. They provide mechanisms for linking the Soviet Union to Europe but also exert a gravitational pull on constituent republics that are seeking independence from the capital of a waning empire. The traditional conflicts between westernizers (*zapadniki*) and slavophiles persist and oscillate in Russian European policy.

Community Europe is a confederal Europe consisting of a tight-knit core--the European Community--surrounded by rings of states that are connected with the Community in varying degrees. It is a centripetal confederation driven by the desire of the states of the outer rings to join those in the core. The major political challenge for the Community is to integrate a dissolving Soviet Union into the broader European confederation, to chart a framework for political and economic association that offers Moscow alternatives to suppression and the nationalist forces in the constituent republics alternatives to secession. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldavia enter into association agreements with the EC while maintaining similar links with Russia. The Soviet Union is transformed into a Soviet commonwealth. The European confederation provides a framework for overlapping and interlocking associations between the European Community and the Soviet commonwealth.

The transnational challenges of environmental protection, the internationalization of economic operations (multinational companies, international banks, joint ventures, etc.), protection of human rights, technological development, and the residual danger from nuclear weapons, all combine to weaken the institution of the territorial state and promote Community solutions and mechanisms. The territorial state is weakened also by devolution processes that transfer power and authority to local communities and institutions. Borders seem less relevant as the idea of the free movement of people, ideas, goods, and services is generally accepted. A pluralistic culture flourishes, and European society seems to have gained strength and inspiration from the traditions of human care and solidarity that had been preserved and nurtured under the veneer of oppressive communism in Eastern Europe.

The EC develops a defense component, absorbing the West European Union into the Community. Multinational European forces replace national forces, and defense industries are organized on a Community basis. A common European command is established and colocated with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). NATO's command structure is reorganized in a manner that makes it possible to merge the European and American commands in the unlikely event of war.

NATO remains as a framework for American engagement in the management of the security order in Europe. American troops are present only in symbolic numbers, but provide the backbone for intermittent exercises of bringing more troops back to Europe. Together with a system of depots with prepositioned heavy equipment, they also provide the infrastructure for a reconstitution capability in the event Russian military power should reemerge as a clear and present danger to peace in Europe. NATO maintains a command structure and a control and information system that also is designed to provide infrastructure for a reconstitution strategy. The former area of the GDR has the same status within the alliance as the Norwegian county of Finnmark, i.e., no allied troops are stationed there nor do allied exercises take place. This, together with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria, constitutes a security zone in the European order, where nuclear and chemical weapons are banned and stationing or maneuvering foreign troops is prohibited. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are established in the Nordic and Balkan areas.

NATO and the Soviet Union agree to abolish all short-range land-based nuclear capable missiles. Nuclear artillery depots are also dismantled in the area west of the Urals in accordance with a "Third Zero" agreement. The residual prestrategic capability deployed in Europe is an airborne capability. It is buttressed by an American capacity for AFAP (Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile) reinforcement of Europe in an emergency. Both Russia and NATO embrace a concept of existential deterrence, and the START agreements bring the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers down to a level of 1500 warheads on single-warhead missiles and a limited number of semimodern bombers (B-1 and "Blackjack").

The CSCE has been converted from a negotiating forum to an all-European security institution. Cultural cooperation and human rights have been largely concentrated in the Council of Europe and economic cooperation in the ECE (Economic Commission for Europe); both institutions are linked to the CSCE. The CSCE has established a General Conference of participating states. In addition, it has established an

Arms Control Verification Authority; a Non-Proliferation Authority; a Security Information Authority, which issues an annual report on the defense budgets, force structures, major research and development programs, and weapon acquisitions, as well as an annual calendar of military activities of member countries; a Crisis Prevention Authority; and a Peacekeeping Authority, under whose auspices member countries have earmarked military units and cooperated in joint training and exercise programs to provide the General Conference with the means to dispatch CSCE peacekeeping forces to trouble spots in Europe. CSCE decisions are still made by consensus.

THE "REAL" FUTURE

Our five scenarios do not involve prediction. They serve essentially heuristic purposes. They are rooted in present trends and reflect the broad range of possibilities inherent in those trends. We could, of course, have tried to pursue the trends through the 1990s, but the trends themselves are so uncertain and the possible combinations so numerous that such an alternative is not practical. We should note that our long-term scenarios are not mutually exclusive: the real future is likely to constitute a melange of these and other scenarios. The determinants of that synthesis are woven into the trends at work in the present period of transition.

II. THE SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE

Having sketched a spectrum of possible long-term (1999) destinations, we shall now explore some of the short-term decision points that may determine the general direction in which the European political order is likely to evolve. In an attempt to link the short-term and long-term scenarios, we shall then suggest a typology of contingencies that could structure force planning and the development of strategic concepts in NATO in the years ahead.

The political order is developing with unprecedented speed, and the scope of development cannot be captured in surprise-free scenarios. Prediction has become highly contingent on uncertain assumptions about social forces, cultural climate, tolerance thresholds, and statesmanship (or the lack of it). Many governments exhibit a stubborn adherence to a business-as-usual approach, a surprising reluctance to deviate from established agendas and priorities, a failure to sense historical winds of change, a preference for the familiar rather than willingness to seize opportunities--in short, a lack of vision and sense of history. The eloquent appeals for a broad view and the recognition of historical moment that permeate the speeches of President Havel of Czechoslovakia have elicited few, if any, equally enlightened responses from the West. Most political leaders appear to have difficulties with "that vision thing," preferring to reduce it to compartmentalized technical issues to be dealt with by experts and bureaucrats. Statecraft succumbs to technocracy.

The trends and policies at work are still wrapped in ambiguity and contradiction. Hence we shall not attempt to map their complex interplay in any systematic manner, but try instead to posit a set of propositions concerning likely outcomes. It is recognized, of course, that our propositions may suffer from insufficient information, wishful thinking, or prejudice. Nevertheless, they are formulated with a view to focusing discussion and empirical analysis. Table 1 lists the short-term issues that will be discussed below.

Table 1

THE SHORT-TERM ISSUES

1. The shape and time schedule for German unification
 2. The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) process of negotiation
 3. The scope and time schedule of Soviet military withdrawals from Eastern Europe
 4. The stability of Central European polities in a period of systemic transition
 5. The impact of nationalism, particularly in southeastern Europe, on the stability of the European state system
 6. The future of the "inner empire" of the Soviet Union
 7. The institutional framework for European security
 8. The impact of the maritime competition on the security order in Europe
-

THE COURSE OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

Although German unification has become a certainty, not a possible contingency, some of its parameters remain uncertain and contentious. It will come about as a kind of *Anschluss* in reverse, as the minor partner insists on being absorbed by the major partner. Unification is driven as much by economic crisis in the East as by a sense of national restoration, as much a desire for *Deutschmarks* as a commitment to the idea of *Deutschland*. It is the result of pressures from civic society rather than the diplomatic architecture of a latter-day Bismarck; society is moving state policy rather than the other way around. In accordance with the Federal Republic's constitution, unification will take place as five reconstituted *Laender* of the eastern parts of Germany join the ten *Laender* that make up the Federal Republic. Unification is not only an international matter: it also affects the nature of German society, German political culture. It may constitute a challenge to the liberal state that has evolved in the Federal Republic as it merges with an area that retains certain authoritarian and xenophobic propensities.

The architectural problem, then, is to create a political framework capable of embedding Germany in a broader community and subjecting it to countervailing influences and community rules and constraints. The four

former occupying powers will work out the removal of the vestiges of four-power rule in Germany, laying the foundation for a series of agreements that will also settle formally the issue of Germany's borders with the interested countries. The most complex issue has been that of Germany's membership in the Western alliance.

Moscow's initial position rejected any solution involving membership in NATO for a united Germany. Hence, a neutral Germany was advanced as a solution. But neutrality must be defined in relation to the parameters of a contest or conflict. What would be the parameters in a post Cold War environment? Who should keep Germany neutral if it were to become a major military power, and who should prevent it from becoming a major military power? The spectre of another Versailles loomed as a possible breeding ground for German resentment and revisionism. A "neutral Germany" most likely would be the leading power of Middle Europe. A strongly controlled Germany would struggle to remove the strictures.

It seemed the more stabilizing solution would be for East Germany to come into NATO without NATO coming into East Germany. The five *Laender* of the present GDR will establish a position similar to the county of Finnmark in Norway, where there are no stationed troops nor any military exercises with allied participation. The arrangement was worked out between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. The German-Soviet accord stipulates that a unified Germany, in exercising its unrestricted sovereignty, will decide freely on membership in alliances, in accordance with the CSCE Final Act. The Germans have made it clear that they want to be members of NATO. Soviet troops will be withdrawn from the GDR within three to four years. The modalities of withdrawal and temporary presence will be regulated in a German-Soviet treaty. The Federal Republic will give a binding declaration that establishes a ceiling on German armed forces of 370,000 men. The special position of the territory of the former GDR will be based on mutual understanding. The understandings also include a German recommitment to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) regime as well as renunciation of biological and chemical weapons. It is possible also

that elements of the declaratory regime of mutual reassurance could be embedded in a future CSCE regime that establishes a security corridor in Central Europe comprising the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and the territory of the present GDR, wherein would apply a set of arms control arrangements including a ban on exercises, movements or stationing of foreign troops, and deployment and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons.

It was suggested by some that Moscow would accept an all-German membership in NATO only if Germany were to assume a French position in the alliance, i.e., outside the framework of the integrated military organization of NATO. There were several difficulties with such a scenario. It could amount to conceding to the Soviet Union a *droit de regard* with respect to the organization of NATO's defenses, and it could spell at least a partial dissolution of the alliance as an effective military organization. Hence, a demand for such rearrangements might constitute an assault on NATO rather than a desire to obtain reassurance about German military power and as such would have been strongly resisted by many NATO members. A Germany integrated into NATO is least likely to constitute a source of military uncertainty and unpredictability in Europe. However, a Germany in a "French position" would, of course, be more available for a future Rapallo. Reassurance of the Soviet Union in general, and the Soviet military establishment in particular, will be achieved most effectively through a bilateral cooperation treaty and a possible Central European arms control arrangement within the framework of CSCE, as indicated above.

Moscow wants to be included in Europe, an interest shared by most countries in Europe--provided that Russian military power is not allowed to dominate or undermine the stability of the political order in Europe at large. NATO will remain important as reassurance against Russian military power: not as a counterweight to a clear and present danger, but as insurance against future mobilization, as a countervailing power. Moscow is interested in economic reconstruction and development, and the European Community in general and Germany in particular hold many keys to that future. Germany is thus in a position to reassure Moscow about

its economic future and its inclusion in Europe by making commitments to economic cooperation. The prospects of expanded Russo-German economic relations undoubtedly helped break the impasse over the question of German unification and provided reassurance on continued Russian involvement--increasingly interdependent involvement--in Europe.

Any attempt to control a united Germany by the nuclear oligopoly of the four former occupying powers could stimulate a new German debate about military nuclear options. However, another trajectory is available: the principle of nuclear nonproliferation in Europe through the establishment of a nonproliferation authority. German strictures could be embedded in a broader European regime to preempt any charges of singularity or discrimination.

A neutral Germany would have stirred fears of German *Alleingang* in West European capitals, which could have broken the momentum of European integration. The breakup of NATO, rather than stimulating compensatory deepening and broadening of the European Community, could easily produce a reinforcing trend of erosion and emphasis on national security insurance and anti-German alignments. A European fear of German *Alleingang* could also feed German frustrations about the limited scope for such *Alleingang*. In the event of a neutral Germany, Britain and France would have been unlikely to abrogate sovereignty, and the integration process in the Community could have ground to a halt.

Europe is in transition. German unification is at the core of the processes of transition. But the transitions in their different spheres will not coincide in time. Soviet troops will remain in the eastern parts of Germany for a short transitional period. The structure of nuclear deterrence in Europe is likely to shift toward some kind of existential deterrence based on low levels of weapons and residual risks, but the transition from the confrontational postures with a heavy warfighting orientation based on selective employment options, etc., will take longer than a couple of years. In the long term, alignment may be superseded by the constitution of an all-European collective security order based on majority voting and the collective means to enforce majority decisions. At present, however, the CSCE is far away

from forming such an order, and the nations of Western Europe will not give up the framework for collective defense symbolized by NATO for a CSCE that is evolving in the direction of another League of Nations. For the foreseeable future, Europe will be characterized by several discrete, overlapping, and unsynchronized time schedules of transition.

The greatest danger in the short run is the chance that suspicions of Germany will translate into self-fulfilling prophecies, that expressed mistrust of German propensities and policies will generate German estrangement and *Alleingang*. In fact, the Federal Republic and a united Germany of the 1990s will not be the German Reich of 1890s or the 1930s. The political culture is different, the national and international structures are different, and the international environment is different. The process of integration in the European provides a framework for integrating Germany into a broader European economic and political order. An enlightened harmonization of developments in NATO and the CSCE can provide a framework for integrating Germany into a cooperative security order.

THE CFE PROCESS

The Vienna-based negotiations on conventional forces in Europe constitute a structuring element in the security process in Europe. They were designed originally to stabilize the military infrastructure by seeking agreement on preferential reductions of elements in the force postures that contribute to the capacity for surprise attack and sustained offensive action. They were predicated on the continued existence of the East-West military confrontation in Europe and sought to reduce the chance that the dynamics of that confrontation might escape political control in a crisis, resulting in a war that no one wants. *Stability* replaced *manpower reductions* as CFE succeeded the stalemated MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) negotiations. It would be the result of a preferential reduction of tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, combat helicopters, and combat aircraft. Moscow remained concerned about troop levels, probably because of an economic need to reallocate scarce resources in favor of the civilian economy in order to contribute to the success of *perestroika*.

The revolutions of 1989 happened on Europe's way to a CFE agreement, and they changed political perspectives and priorities. The military confrontation was effectively dismantled by social upheaval. Changes could no longer be related to a presumption of a forward Soviet presence in Central Europe. Such a presence would constitute more of a threat to the popular revolutions in Central Europe than to the territorial integrity of Western Europe. Consequently, the priorities changed in the direction of deep cuts in Soviet and, as a reciprocal, American stationed forces in the core area of reductions. Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations about Soviet troop presence in Central Europe at the request of the new governments there seemed likely to outrun even the high pace of the CFE negotiations. It seems unlikely that Soviet and American troops will be stabilized at a level of 195,000 men each in Central Europe. The bottom line is likely to be substantially lower.

As the negotiations approach the endgame phase, several important issues emerge that relate primarily to the manpower reductions. The original design envisaged a first-phase agreement that concentrated on Soviet and American manpower reductions. Soviet desires to establish limits on German forces raise the issue of wider reductions, particularly since special limits on German forces create long-term problems of discrimination. In this connection the states of Western Europe are likely to eschew regimes for separate national ceilings, since such a course could prejudice or preempt future options for collective defense arrangements, including the constitution of multinational forces. Another important issue concerns disagreements about the classification of aircraft, as the Soviet Union insists on excluding air-defense fighters--reflecting the continental defense perspective of the "heartland" power--while the "island" power of the United States and the "rimland" states of Western Europe emphasize the multirole configurations and options of modern fighters. Similarly, Moscow wants to include carrier-based aircraft, but the Western powers want to exclude them with reference to their global role while insisting on including Soviet land-based naval aircraft, an advantage Moscow has been unwilling to forgo. In fact, by relocating a regiment of fighter-

bombers from Hungary to the Kola peninsula and reassigning it to the Soviet Navy (the reasons may be bureaucratic and related to available airfields), Moscow has increased Western fears of circumvention and north European fears of regionalization. (Fighter-bombers had not been deployed previously on the Kola peninsula, a restraint viewed as a contribution to the system of low tension in the north.)

The CFE negotiations apply to Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and, it is sometimes suggested, from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has consistently attempted to regionalize arms regulations in Europe by confining reductions and restrictions to specific zones wherein Soviet military preponderance would weigh heavily and which would tend to fragment the security system created by NATO. Other countries have been searching for regional differentiation in order to prevent the heartland power, the Soviet Union, from concentrating its forces in particular areas. The solution to this problem of political geometry is likely to be the NATO concept of dividing the area of reductions into four concentric areas around a core made up of Central Europe, the Benelux countries, and possibly Denmark. The complex CFE regime will be structured around a set of rules concerning collective ceilings, sufficiency, stationed forces, subceilings, and exchange of information. The concept of sufficiency is designed to provide insurance against military hegemony for any single power. No single state will be allowed to possess more than 30 percent of the collective holdings of any item limited by the treaty. Several technical issues must be resolved in relation to the counting rules, particularly the classification of aircraft and the rules of access to controlled depots containing treaty-limited items.

The CFE negotiations are confined to the two alliances in Europe. However, as the negotiations draw to a close, one of those alliances, the Warsaw Pact, is on the verge of dissolution. The concept of collective ceilings could come to collide with the changing political realities and constitute a remnant of a waning order providing the Soviet Union with a *droit de regard* with respect to the distribution of forces among East European countries. The concepts of political and

military stability diverged while the negotiations approached the endgame phase.

The political reconstruction proceeded with particular speed in relation to the unification of Germany. The solution that will be found in the so-called two-plus-four negotiations will determine to a large extent the future role and fate of NATO as well as the role of Germany in the emerging order. Form could here assume considerable substantive importance. If the powers participating in the two-plus-four negotiations agree on limits on stationed forces in Germany, they could adopt a format that would not make the agreement part of the constitutional status of Germany, but rather an understanding among the participating powers. The situation NATO may seek to avoid is one in which such limits are viewed or construed as limits specifically and solely on German sovereignty, a factor that could provide a long-term breeding ground for revisionist pressures inside Germany. Arms limitation agreements could be shaped in a multilateral context. If the two-plus-four negotiations were to be turned into arms control negotiations, they could undermine any multilateral regime in addition to introducing long-term instability into the politics of German security policy.

NATO would probably seek to avoid being maneuvered into a position in which it is asked or forced to pay a price for Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Such withdrawals now seem first of all to be the likely outcome of bilateral negotiations within the Warsaw Pact. The major exception here is the Soviet forces in the present GDR, and their drawdown and withdrawal will be linked to the solution of the modalities for German unification. Any formal agreements could be embedded within a multilateral European framework, to prevent them from becoming a long-term point of friction between Germany and the Soviet Union only.

With regard to CFE-II negotiations, it is difficult to envisage a format predicated on the continued existence of two equal and opposed alliances. Conducting the follow-on talks in the multilateral framework of the 35 CSCE states (or 36 if Albania joins) thus seems a likely outcome. Such a format could, however, reintroduce the issue of

regional disparities and decoupling. It is possible that CFE-II negotiations would shift emphasis to measures of crisis prevention and crisis "management." The real balance of military power in a post CFE-I Europe will be that between the Soviet Union and NATO.

THE SCOPE AND SCHEDULE FOR SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Bilateral negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other lead to agreements about complete withdrawal by the end of June 1991. The memories of Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 continue to linger in the national consciousness of the two Central European countries. Withdrawal constitutes a logical consequence of the choices made in the Kremlin in the course of the fall of 1989 to abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine and adopt the Sinatra Doctrine--letting them "do it their way" in terms of social and economic organization. In addition, the security calculus had changed in Moscow as the marshals of the Great Patriotic War vanished from the scene. The new military leaders had their outlooks shaped by the period of Soviet ascent to the status of nuclear superpower. Security was no longer considered a function of a territorial buffer enabling the Soviet Union to defend against invasion outside the homeland or mount a threat against adversaries from forward positions. The territorial perspective had been altered by the reality of nuclear weapons, which, in combination with long-range delivery systems, had blown the roofs off the territorial states. Security had become a product of the condition of interdependence created by nuclear weapons and constituted in a system of nuclear deterrence. Eastern Europe was no longer viewed as essential to Soviet national security. The geopolitical realities had changed in the eyes of Moscow, and the message spread rapidly throughout Eastern Europe that the scope for national assertion had broadened.

The Soviet military presence in the GDR was a unique commitment. It did not prevent the popular revolution nor its insistent demand for unification now. The Soviet garrisons in the GDR were no longer viewed

as the potential spearhead of a Soviet military offensive into Western Europe, but rather as a tangible staking out of the Soviet claim for influence over the process of German unification. Bonn's equivocation over the issue of Poland's western frontier caused Warsaw to backtrack on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. They were now viewed as constituting, in part, insurance against future German revisionist policies. In any event, the Soviet garrisons in the GDR would be unsustainable in the absence of a system of logistic support and transit arrangements in Poland.

Moscow made a choice concerning Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, and that choice now seems basically irreversible. The Russians could not attempt to roll back the new political forms except at the expense of possibly quite extensive bloodshed and a major disruption of the cooperative trend in East-West relations. However, secessionist pressures in the Baltic republics could force Gorbachev to make concessions to the military, who resent the retreat from established positions, and to toughen his stance in the CFE talks. Moscow could come to emphasize the need to secure and maintain the infrastructure for a rapid reconstitution of forward deployments in Eastern Europe and the conduct of exercises to demonstrate the capability. The military arrangements could amount to a baseline for a possible future reimposition of imperial control.

THE STABILITY OF EAST EUROPEAN POLITIES IN A PERIOD OF SYSTEMIC TRANSITION

The countries of Central Europe have entered a period of basic social and economic transformation, replacing one-party communist autocracy with pluralist democracy, and command economies with market economies. Free elections have changed the political texture of the systems. However, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and the eastern part of Germany, the democratic traditions are very thin. Furthermore, the institutional infrastructure--political parties, a network of voluntary associations that cut across the cleavages in society, and independent judiciaries, press, and bureaucracies--cannot be created

overnight. The new regimes to a large degree will depend on the civil service and executive apparatus of the *ancien regimes*. Opportunities abound for silent and stubborn obstruction and negligence of reforms.

The real challenge in Central Europe is a crisis of expectations. Democracy could be the loser as revolutionary enthusiasm erodes in an encounter with economic hardship. The basic economic restructuring on which the new leaders have embarked, of moving from command to market economies, has never been undertaken before. The task is formidable, as are the obstacles, not the least of which is that of debt, particularly in Poland and Hungary. The short-term problems of debt can be solved through the traditional means of rescheduling. The real problem is the long term, the way in which the shadows from the debt burden may deprive the people of Poland and Hungary of hope for the future. Imaginative and decisive action by the creditor nations will be necessary to create a realistic prospect for safe and sound economies in Poland and Hungary. In the absence of such prospects, societies could prove unable to bear the economic hardship of transition, and the democratic experiment could be in danger. Experience from many debt-ridden developing countries indicates that economic interrelationships create a fine line between requirements for rehabilitating economies and preserving democracies. Novel departures could perhaps involve a partial repayment of the debt by investment in local currencies for cleaning up and renovating industries that pollute the common European environment.

It is possible to imagine counterrevolutionary reactions to the hardships of converting to democracy and a free market. The social safety net is inadequate, and the populations may become estranged from the new system. The imposition of a new autocracy cannot be excluded, for instance by military takeovers. On the other hand, the revolutions of 1989 demonstrated a considerable social resilience, the existence of a vibrant society beneath the veneer of a communist system with few if any roots in society. The social network and basic human solidarity that developed in response to the oppression of the communist regimes could provide the wherewithal to persevere on a slow and arduous journey into the future. It is easy and dangerous to forget the spiritual

resources Central Europe will contribute to the European reconstruction. In the words of President Vaclav Havel, the countries of Central Europe should be able to approach Western Europe "not as a poor dissident or a helpless, amnestied prisoner, but as someone who also brings something with him: namely spiritual and moral incentives, bold peace initiatives, untapped creative potential, the ethos of freshly gained freedom, and the inspiration for brave and swift solutions" (from his speech to the Polish Sejm on January 21, 1990). The changes in Poland and Hungary were not the result of spontaneous revolution but of long-term struggle, organizational build-up, and meticulous creation of workable structures for systemic reform.

THE IMPACT OF NATIONALISM ON THE STABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN ORDER

The potential challenge to security in Europe could be in the process of shifting from large-scale invasion across clearly defined borders to ethnic and communal strife, particularly in southeastern Europe. The ethnic mosaic of that region could create new tensions and bloodshed. However, such conflicts need not constitute a clear and present danger to peace and order at large. The passion and violence of such conflicts nevertheless introduce an element of uncertainty and unpredictability into the European order.

The idea of nationalism, the proposition that state borders should coincide with ethnic borders, has proved its potency as a mobilizing force in spite of its impossible imperative. History has not distributed the peoples of Europe in such neat congregations. The existing mosaic militates against the solution, as do considerations of economic viability. In the past, however, passions have not been easily contained and constrained by such logic. The systemic consequences of the breakups of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires have not been absorbed and contained by the state system in Europe--in some sense, they were put into the deep freeze during the Cold War. The present thaw causes them to reemerge and exert pressure on interstate relations as well as on established state structures. Vestiges are coming to light of the

old division between Western Christendom in the lands of the Hapsburg Empire and those areas that developed under the wardship of the Orthodox Church and Ottoman domination. Yugoslavia straddles that division, and a tenuous federation there could easily come apart at the seams and crumble.

The solidarity expressed in the revolutions of 1989 reflected a move away from chauvinistic nationalism. The revolutions were patriotic upheavals, but patriotism need not augur rigid nationalism. Although recent communal violence between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania points to the delicacy of cohabitation, the distinctiveness of nations need not require separation and autonomy. It is to some degree a question of cultural identity and human rights, and the rights of minorities may have to be spelled out and codified in a European convention parallel to the one on human rights. The congruence of ethnic cultures and political states becomes less compelling in an age when the territorial state is itself losing its contours, outrun and undermined by transnational processes outside and by pressures for devolution and decentralization inside the polity. These trends are in a very real sense the fruits of the advanced stage of the industrialization that caused modern man to strive to make cultures and polities coincide.

THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The last of the European empires--the successor to the Russian empire, the Soviet Union--appears to have entered the phase of dissolution. How the process will unfold and how it will end are questions wrapped in uncertainty and conjecture. The centrifugal forces of nationalism interact with the attempt at reforming Soviet society from the top. Economic *perestroika* requires political reconstruction involving a curtailment of the pervasive structures of party control and abolition of the monopoly position of the CPSU. Restructuring creates voids and tensions that in turn invite and incite nationalist forces.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is faced with irreducible dilemmas. If he slows down or halts the process of *perestroika* to contain and constrain nationalism in the union republics, he runs the danger of moving back to the stagnation of the Brezhnev years. That in turn involves the prospect of taking the Soviet Union out of the league of major powers by the turn of the century, and of eroding the legitimacy of the communist system through its increasing inability to deliver, leaving a regime that could crumble like a paper tiger in confrontations with a restive society. The process of reform can break the forces of lethargy and resistance only by destabilizing the system in order to change it. It is a calculated risk, and the risk is magnified by the time it will take to turn the economy around. The absence of tangible results could undermine the legitimacy of the policy of *perestroika* as it inevitably collides with rising expectations. The tolerance for hardship of the Soviet people may be different from that of most Westerners; Soviet culture and recent history have not nurtured the expectation of instant gratification. However, the absence of improvement and the reality of a deteriorating situation could create an explosive crisis of expectations. Gorbachev is not a popular figure inside the Soviet Union, except in certain sections of the intelligentsia who cherish the new *glasnost* and intellectual freedom. Soviet citizens do not live by bread alone, but they need bread to live.

The real resistance to systemic change will emanate from the *nomenklatura*, the privileged custodians and beneficiaries of the old order, those who control the party machines that in turn control the political system. Gorbachev has therefore embarked on the course of reducing--some would claim marginalizing--the role of the CPSU, substituting the office of President for Party General Secretary as the locus of power. The old guard is fighting back, partly to protect vested interests and partly to preserve a system of governance. *Perestroika* may still turn out to be incompatible with communism. Marxism-Leninism has long since lost its popular appeal. It is now in the process of being dismantled as a system of oppression and social control.

The military burdens of empire have been extremely high for the Soviet Union. Prominent Soviet economists claim that military expenditures amount to 20 to 25 percent of gross national product (GNP). The real costs are the opportunity costs, the costs of allocating vital but scarce resources like skilled workers, engineers, managers, and computers to the defense and space sectors of the Soviet economy. The distance between those advanced sectors and the rest of the economy has become too vast for the former to pull the latter; the spin-off effects may in fact have been negative. The next round in the East-West arms race would be even more intensely qualitative than the previous one, claiming an even larger preferential redirection of scarce resources from a starved economy. *Perestroika* depends on arms control and disarmament. The alternative could be increased militarization of the Soviet economy and external relations. However, the rigidities are enormous, the scope for obstruction vast, and the difficulties of conversion huge. Conversion has many faces, and one of the more frightening ones is that of integrating demobilized military personnel into Soviet society, providing them with housing, schools, jobs, and social security, particularly those who return from service in Eastern Europe.

The military has been a privileged caste in Soviet society, and its privileges are being removed as the institution is reduced. Russians are no longer looking to officer training as an attractive entrance to a career. The non-Russian nationalities are knocking at the gates of the officer schools in increasing numbers, with long-term implications for the role the Red Army might serve as a source of cohesion following the relative demise of the CPSU. The return of a disgruntled officer corps from the outposts of the Russian empire in Eastern Europe could breed antigovernment movements, not so much through Bonapartism as through a Soviet counterpart to the colons who threatened to bring down the Fourth and Fifth French Republics in the wake of Algerian independence. If the Soviet Army must get out of Eastern Europe, including a united Germany as well as the Baltic republics, the USSR would be back to where it was before 1939. The myth could spread that Gorbachev caused the Soviet

Union to lose the Great Patriotic War 45 years after it came to an end.

Gorbachev has been a much more successful political than economic reformer. His economic policies have been erratic and inconsistent. They have exhibited a commitment to old-fashioned Leninist ideas (priority to machine tool industries), which drained Soviet oil revenues, and a penchant for badly conceived social programs: for example, a program to improve the work ethic (*gospriomka*, an attempt to instill quality control) resulted in a disastrous drop in production; another program to improve public health through anti-alcohol programs led to a growing black-market economy and a hemorrhage of government revenues. Inflation is up (estimated at 15 to 20 percent), the GNP is going down (by an estimated 5 percent in the first quarter of 1990), the budget deficit is growing (estimated at 10 to 12 percent of GNP), and poverty is spreading (28 percent of the population was estimated to live below the poverty line in 1988). Most important, *perestroika* and economic regression combine to stimulate economic secession, and as the economic unity of the Soviet Union breaks down, this in turn breeds political secession. Economic policies affect the vested interests of economic managers and party functionaries, the beneficiaries of an extensive patronage network; resistance to change is thus considerable. Stagnation could be a prolonged condition as Gorbachev remains too strong to be ousted and too weak to rule. Prolonged stagnation breeds blue-collar populism and Russian nationalism as well as forces inclined to secede from or reject the system. Growing frustration and polarization could stimulate the old divisions between the westernizers (*zapadniki*) and slavophiles in the Russian political culture.

The Soviet Union is a multinational state encompassing more than 140 nationality groups. Again, the notion that ethnic boundaries should coincide with state boundaries amounts to an unworkable organizational principle. The nations are distributed in a manner that makes such restructuring impossible. Nevertheless, the nationalist flames are likely to cause alarms, violent clashes, and chauvinistic reactions in the years ahead. Empires in decline are inevitably sources of uncertainty in international relations. That uncertainty is compounded

in the Soviet case by the fact that the Soviet Union is a nuclear weapon state with an arsenal of some 30,000 nuclear warheads dispersed in depots throughout the territory of the union, including areas of actual or potential strife and unrest. Here we must distinguish, of course, between the physical security of the special munitions sites and the ability to use the nuclear munitions if unauthorized groups should get hold of them. However, desertion and violence would introduce disturbing uncertainties.

If Gorbachev gives in to secessionist pressures he risks being swept aside by the forces of Great Russian nationalism and a communist counterreformation. If he resorts to the use of force he risks being consumed by the forces of repression in addition to putting in jeopardy his policies of detente and arms control with the Western powers, thus undermining a precondition for *perestroika*. Finally, he is faced with a domino problem: Conceding secession to the Baltic states will kindle separatist forces in other republics more central to the viability of the USSR. If he should decide to let Lithuania leave the union he would have to exact a price high enough to be an effective deterrent to emulation elsewhere, particularly in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, or Moldavia.

Aspirations for independence in the Baltic republics are clearly influenced and excited by the events in Eastern Europe. East European countries will have strong incentives, therefore, to raise the threshold against a reimposition of Soviet tutelage by getting the Soviet troops out and integrating their economies with those of the West. The Soviet Union also needs access to Western credits and joint ventures for *perestroika* to succeed. For Eastern Europe, western banks may provide protection against Soviet tanks.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Barring complete disintegration, the Soviet Union, or Russia, will remain for the foreseeable future the single dominant military power in Europe. It will remain a formidable nuclear weapon power. Such facts will shape and constrain the institutional framework for European security.

It takes much more time to construct transnational institutions than to dismantle domestic ones. In periods of compressed and extensive change, expectations for international readjustment may exceed the bounds of the possible. Europe has entered a period of transition likely to be characterized by interlocking and overlapping institutional arrangements. We are concerned here primarily with institutions relating to security.

The European Community

The European Community is the primary structuring institution in the present political order in Europe. It constitutes the principal point of reference and attraction for the new democracies of Central Europe striving to reenter the mainstream of European history. It is also the pivotal institution in the process of creating a "European Economic Space" comprising all the industrialized countries of Western Europe. It projects a community solution to the problems of human organization in the age of the transnational challenges to the territorial state. It could provide a framework for the integration of multinational states into a stable community order wherein the cultural identity and local autonomy of nations and regions could be preserved without breaking up existing territorial sovereignties.

For the foreseeable future the Community is likely to remain primarily a political and economic organization without a significant defense component. The task of European reconstruction across the old East-West division would seem to be facilitated in the short term by this limitation on the Community's military competence and scope. In the hierarchy of present institutions, the European Community is the most important to preserve and develop. It is indispensable for the construction of minimum order in Europe after the breakup of the Cold War system. It constitutes a potential framework for integrating a fracturing Soviet Union into a European political order via cooperative agreements with a Soviet commonwealth as well as by associating the European republics of that commonwealth with the Community within a broad European confederation. Those republics could also retain similar ties of association with a reconstituted Soviet commonwealth.

The European Community is caught in the dialectic between deepening and expansion, between the need to protect and consolidate its essence and the need to project a framework for a broader Europe. German unification, which is now a political certainty rather than a distant dream, imposes the need to embed that nation in a larger political framework to quell fears of German power and German *Alleingang*. A united Germany will alter the internal balance of the Community, imposing the need to deepen the process of economic integration in order to provide reassurance against German dominance. The European Community hence must be able to absorb the five eastern *Laender* of a united Germany in the context of making further progress toward economic and monetary union, or EMU.

France and Germany have relaunched the project for political union in the EC. The Community now looks toward the parallel and interactive functioning of two intergovernmental conferences, one on political union and one on economic and monetary union. The objective is to complete the work early enough for member states to ratify the new construction before the end of 1992. The Community explicitly recognizes, in the words of the Dublin statement, that "it has become a crucial element in the progress that is being made in establishing a reliable framework for peace and security in Europe." Germany and France envisage the definition and implementation in this connection of common foreign and defense policies.

Logical links and imperatives obtain between the EMU and the constitution of the single internal market, and between the project for political union and the return of Eastern Europe, including eastern Germany, to the European mainstream. Nevertheless, the actual constitution may lag behind the conception. Some states, the United Kingdom in particular, represent a political culture of pragmatic solutions to concrete problems, rather than the programmatic enunciation of architectural projects. In some countries, the word "union" has negative connotations and evokes memories of unwanted subjugation. The more abstract and distant term, integration, may seem more appropriate, particularly since it connotes a process of evolution rather than a final condition.

Nevertheless, the Franco-German initiative responded to the need for reassurance and commitment on a continent haunted by fears of the unacceptable consequences of another carnage, of another European war. It responded to the need for an antidote, an optimistic contrast, to the pessimistic propensity in European political culture and consciousness to espouse the idea that if anything can go wrong it will. The outlook of the Anglo-Saxons traditionally has been broader and more optimistic. In the present circumstances, however, the reluctant British stance would seem to project insularity of vision rather than a sense of historical opportunity. That "vision thing" is actually better understood in Washington than in London. We could come to see a community of *deux vitesses*, but eventually Britain will reconnect with the train to Europe out of pragmatic adjustment rather than idealistic conviction. As in the past, the real engine for European integration is likely to be Franco-German cooperation.

The EC is in fact pursuing a dual-track strategy of expansion and deepening. It will absorb the soon-defunct GDR as a member. It is in the process of negotiating with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) about the constitution of a single European Economic Space, EES. It is preparing negotiations about second-generation association agreements with countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It will develop special cooperation agreements with Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. We can envisage a future Europe with the EC as the central core surrounded by various rings of states, many of which will strive to join the central core, a centripetal European confederation formed by and around the European Community.

The process of confederation will be neither tidy nor easy. Austria has applied for membership, and developments in Central Europe could speed up its consideration. The other countries of Central Europe are eager to join, although they recognize that they will need time for economic adjustment. However, the unpredictable impact of the Soviet Union's internal turmoil on its foreign policy is likely to strengthen their political interest in moving as close as they can to the Community as soon as possible. In the 1990s, Norway, Sweden, and Finland could become Community members.

The Community, in the short term, is likely to be concerned about the disruptive impact of overextension on the process of integration. Hence it is also likely to be reluctant to provide access to EC decisionmaking for the EFTA countries in the context of the EES, so as to avoid inviting similar demands from countries of Central Europe that actually want membership. In addition, integration is motivated by the need to narrow the gap between the economic and political relations in the Community. Narrowing the gap implies reducing the so-called democratic deficit by reinforcing and developing procedures for democratic accountability, particularly through increasing the role of the European Parliament. That process could run counter to a policy of granting nonmember countries influence over Community decisions.

The essence of the Community construction could be threatened also if the economic market is not matched by a social market, if economic competition is not balanced by social care, if deficient social safety nets come to be viewed as competitive advantages in the single market. The reintegration of Central Europe into historical Europe will highlight the dilemmas and the competing ideological visions of European society. The market mechanism constitutes an important condition for democracy, for the open society. But capitalism does not--and a failure to extend the Community construction to encompass the social dimension of the good society, leaving it to the institutions of the territorial states to care for the citizens of a Europe without frontiers, could sow the seeds of protectionism, xenophobia, partisan divisions, and public disenchantment with the very idea of a European community of nations.

European civilization encompasses a multiplicity of cultural, ethnic, social, and economic traditions and trends. Its essence resides in its diversity. The idea of community could, but need not, be viewed as a contradiction of that diversity. Two basic ideas and values permeate European civilization, the idea of the open society, of institutional pluralism and procedures and mechanisms for a transfer of power, and the idea of the integrity and dignity of the individual.¹

¹I am indebted to Ralf Dahrendorf for this insight.

Europe exhibits a variety of institutional and constitutional arrangements across the map of territorial sovereignties. The Community institutions are supplements rather than replacements. The European Community was not conceived as a European replica of the United States of America, and the permanent challenge revolves around the symbiosis of the Community institutions and the diversity of institutions of the territorial states that make it up.

Governments and political parties will differ on how to mold the symbiosis, and crises will arise with the attendant need for compromises to be worked out. Ideas of the good society develop from views of the dignity and rights of the individual, of the role of citizenship and human rights. The social dimension is about how to construct the good society, about social purpose and human relations, about protection and distribution. It is at the essence of politics, affecting the answers to the question of who gets what, when, and how. Views will differ in national polities as well as in the European parliament. The Community is faced with the task of establishing minimum standards while preserving societal choices, of preventing competitive distortions while maintaining diversity of social organization, of making itself relevant to the individual as well as to the firm. The Community is on the threshold of a deepening that will involve the basic and contentious issues of political purpose, issues that are inherently divisive and associated with competition and conflict.

NATO

Containment of Soviet military power, including nuclear power, will require continued American engagement. NATO is likely to remain as security insurance to maintain an American commitment to contain Soviet military power in Europe. NATO's continued existence and future functions relate to the balance of power in Europe and not to the future of the Warsaw Pact. The presumption of symmetry could produce dangerous instability and flux. The two alliances are not symmetrical constructions: NATO constitutes a voluntary association that retains the support of Western societies; the Warsaw Pact is an imposed

association that commands little social support in Eastern Europe. NATO covers the western rimland of the European continent linked to its major protector across the Atlantic. The Warsaw Pact constitutes a westward extension of the major heartland power on the Eurasian continent. A future balance would be one between the Soviet Union and NATO. That balance will remain an indispensable condition for stability in Europe and for the possible long-term construction of a successor system of collective security.

It is far from certain, but still likely--and, we would argue, desirable--that NATO will survive the process of transformation in Europe, particularly in relation to the future of Germany. NATO, of course, is not an end in itself but a means to an end, namely security. An alliance linking the United States to an association of like-minded states in Europe will constitute a necessary condition for security to prevail on a continent that includes a major Russian military power. The alliance is likely to be restructured to adjust to the waning of the military threat in the center of Europe and to provide for a different distribution of labor and influence between Europeans and Americans within the alliance.

The major challenge to NATO's future is the process of German unification. It is possible, of course, that in the absence of a visible military threat the German public could opt for neutrality or nonalignment in order to obtain unification if Moscow should insist on that equation. Alternatively, Moscow could insist on so many strictures on Germany's participation (demilitarization of the five eastern *Laender*, denuclearization, severe limitations on Bundeswehr and equal limitations on stationed forces) that German alignment would lack substantive content.

It has been suggested that NATO and the Warsaw Pact conclude a nonaggression agreement. However, such a construction could legitimate the Warsaw Pact, suggest inappropriate symmetries between the two alliances, and freeze existing institutions. Instead, it is possible to envisage coordinated unilateral declarations and even multilateral undertakings. Such arrangements would serve confidence-building

Table 2

NATO'S FUNCTIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

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1. Provide a stable framework for American engagement in the process of European security
 2. Provide insurance against risks and dangers in a period of increased uncertainty and reduced predictability
 3. Provide insurance against a reconstitution of the Soviet threat and raise the threshold against such reconstitution
 4. Provide insurance against the reemergence of instabilities and tensions in Europe that could threaten the condition of peace
 5. Provide particular insurance for the flanks of Europe bordering directly on the Soviet Union, in the case of the northern flank, directly on Russia
 6. Provide a framework for German alignment without provoking fears of German dominance
 7. Provide implicit support to the countries of Eastern Europe and their policies of securing independence from the Soviet Union
 8. Provide a framework for nuclear security by removing incentives for nuclear proliferation.
-

functions in a period of transition. Apparent similarities with the Kellogg-Briand pact of the interwar years will be mediated by the existence of NATO as a system of security insurance. The Soviet Union and other non-NATO members could be invited to establish diplomatic liaison-missions with NATO Headquarters.

In order to prevent outcomes that could lead to the somewhat unstable long-term scenarios of a "balance of power Europe" or a "Europe of regions," Americans would have to observe the dangers of viewing changes in NATO as slippery slopes to be avoided, and Europeans the dangers of converting pessimistic views of history into self-fulfilling prophecy. NATO is not coincidental with the present force structure, strategy, or deployments. In most countries of NATO the American guarantee is not conditioned by the presence of a large number of American troops or nuclear weapons. The issue of alignment is separable from the issues of military organization and disposition. For the Western powers to reduce their troops in the western part of Germany below CFE-I levels, the Soviet Union may be induced to take its troops

out of East Germany. Geographical asymmetry may translate into demands for asymmetric reductions. The Soviet Union could remove all its nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the residual balance could then be constituted between deployments in Western Europe and the Soviet Union west of the Urals, i.e., the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals) area.

The Soviet Union is not in a strong position and is therefore unlikely to become the "victor" in the two-plus-four negotiations. It needs to slow down the arms race and concentrate on restructuring its own economy, political system, and union, and it needs cooperation with the West. However, the Western states would not serve their long-term interests in European stability by making the Soviet Union the "loser" by excluding it from a role and stake in the broader process of European reconstruction, particularly in view of the tenuous state of the Soviet Union as a political entity. Initial positions are not identical with bottom-line positions. East Germany has paid to keep the 380,000 Soviet troops in the GDR, and the united Germany could inherit that commitment for a transitional period. This will give the German government some financial leverage over the timing of Soviet withdrawal. Arrangements that limit NATO dispositions in the eastern *Laender* of Germany need not amount to a weakening of the Western alliance or of Germany's commitment to NATO. They could constitute a contribution to a new arrangement for stability and security in Central Europe following a Soviet military withdrawal, an element in a system of mutual reassurance.

The stability of the Cold War system rested on a clarity of division and commitment: the lines were clearly drawn. That clarity has been replaced by ambiguity. In the past, NATO designed policies and military arrangements to deal with Soviet strength and proximity. In the future, it has to deal with the challenges flowing from Soviet weakness and distance. The spectrum of scenarios and potential challenges have changed, the thresholds have become uncertain, and the rules of engagement largely undefined. The new "red lines" in Central Europe could be the crossing of Soviet troops into Poland and NATO troops into the territory of the former GDR.² Stability will have to be

²I am indebted to Arnold Horelick for this idea.

secured in new ways. The task is in no way impossible, and the absence of direct confrontation and a clear and present danger of military attack will reduce the role of military force as an arbiter of European politics: it will broaden the scope for changing the paradigm and constructing a more cooperative security order in Europe, for moving from confrontation to interdependence, for providing institutional substance to a concept of common security. NATO's policies and structures could be developed also with a view to strengthening and developing the CSCE. The "red lines" do not amount to automatic response mechanisms, to trip-wires, but they do confine the rules of the game. A Soviet movement of troops into Poland would cause NATO to basically reassess the security situation in Europe, resulting perhaps in a new build-up of forces and economic sanctions.

Policies of deterrence have oscillated between the perspectives of dissuasion and reassurance. As the confrontation winds down and cooperative undertakings expand, the perspective of reassurance is likely to dominate. Warfighting perspectives will be replaced by the perspectives of residual danger, of existential deterrence, of the dissuading effects of the mere existence of nuclear weapons. In NATO and the Soviet Union, conventional deterrence is likely to be viewed as not enough. Policies of deterrence are likely to retain a nuclear component, the modulation of which, however, will be the hard nut to crack. Deterrence is a psychological or perceptual phenomenon, the framework for which changes over time. The choices are in fact very wide. Extended deterrence need not be associated with visible on-land deployments, and off-shore deployments need not embrace SLCMs. The future environment is likely to have only a vague nuclear emphasis and be based on substantially lower levels of forces.

The peacetime presence of U.S. ground troops could essentially constitute lead elements of combat units and combat support units, supplemented by stocks of prepositioned heavy equipment that provide a framework for reconstitution if a Soviet military threat should reemerge. The United States could maintain some tactical air force units in Europe as well as communication and naval support

installation NATO, most likely, would emphasize maintenance of an integrated command structure and an infrastructure for C³I (communication, command, control, and information). The concept of forward defense is likely to be replaced by a new concept of mobile defense, and the concept of deep strikes by a new concept of defensive defense. Military postures and strategy will be tailored to the structure of the emerging political order.

The military force structure and strategy of the alliance need to be adjusted to novel circumstances--to the overriding objectives for the political reconstruction of Europe. The concept of forward defense at a line of confrontation will need to be abandoned in favor of greater mobility and capacity for mobilization and concentration. A strategy that emphasizes attack against follow-on forces in Central Europe collides with the political objective of building confidence in Central Europe and removing incentives for coalescing with the Soviet Union. NATO will need to project a defensive orientation via the new force posture.

Clearly the role of nuclear weapons will also be reexamined. Battlefield nuclear weapons could be removed from Europe (a "third zero"), and a "fourth zero" could apply to short-range land-based nuclear missiles (SNF). NATO's theater nuclear posture most likely would be confined to aircraft systems and, possibly, a U.S. capacity to bring in artillery-fired atomic projectiles in an emergency. The Soviet view of theater nuclear forces has been changing, moving away from the posture of complete abolition to one of retaining a minimum capacity. Moscow appears to be moving toward a policy of existential deterrence rather than forward deployment. NATO and the Soviet Union are likely therefore to coalesce on a concept of existential deterrence constituting a de facto rather than a formal no-first-use regime. An explicit commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons may constitute a necessary Western concession for Moscow's acceptance of Germany's membership in NATO. Referring to nuclear weapons as "weapons of last resort" points in the right direction, but preserves an ambiguity that could hamper rather than facilitate the process of political reconstruction.

The number of airborne nuclear weapons is likely to diminish. Some will push for "modernization" in NATO by the introduction of a new tactical air-to-surface missile, TASM. However, launching another modernization debate could create domestic and interallied ruptures in NATO at a critical juncture of international relations in Europe, and hence is likely to be deemed undesirable on political grounds. The military rationale is not very strong either in the context of a dismantling of Soviet air defenses in Eastern Europe and a move away from an emphasis on warfighting to deterrence. Airborne systems are not like missiles and artillery tied to fixed fronts and targets. Most NATO allies are likely to emphasize the political desirability of maintaining some NATO nuclear weapons in Europe; the Americans could make it a condition for continued troop presence. Such linkages and "conditionalities" would be politically and psychologically unwise in relation to the process of European reconstruction.

The U.S. force level is likely to be cut beyond the 195,000-225,000 ceiling of the emerging CFE-I treaty, probably stabilizing at about 75,000-100,000 men. The major function of the U.S. forces would be to:

- Provide a cadre for reconstitution of a substantial presence in the event of Soviet rearmament.
- Provide enough capacity for U.S. forces to be immediately engaged in combat in the event of attack.
- Protect the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The CSCE will provide a broader framework embracing all the states of Europe as well as the United States and the Soviet Union, extending across the northern hemisphere from Vladivostok to San Francisco. It is likely to be converted gradually from a negotiation forum to a permanent institution. Its competence is likely to expand in the field of arms control. CFE-II negotiations could take place in the CSCE following the constitution of essential parity between the two alliances in CFE-I. The CSCE is likely to establish a Ministerial Conference or Council with

a permanent secretariat. It is possible to envisage the further institutionalization of the CSCE in the form of a Strategy Forum for discussion of doctrine and force structure; an Arms Control Verification Authority; a Crisis Prevention Authority; an Arms Information Authority issuing a CSCE counterpart to the *Armaments Yearbook* of the League of Nations; and a Peacekeeping Authority to coordinate the earmarking and training of troops for peacekeeping in Europe in local conflicts that could ignite larger conflagrations or that pose threats to human rights or the rights of minorities. In the short run, the CSCE itself is unlikely to move away from consensus to majority voting, and the constitution of a CSCE Security Council dominated by a few major powers would be unacceptable to most of the participating nations. Hence, collective security will remain a distant goal, although certain components of such a system could emerge.

The CSCE could form a key element in the new architecture for the future political order in Europe. It could be restructured to provide for an effective division of labor and jurisdiction with the ECE (Economic Commission of Europe) and the Council of Europe with respect to "Baskets 2 and 3." For the CSCE to perform coordinating and integrating functions, and to prevent a system of interlocking and overlapping institutions from draining the essence out of the European Community, which is the key political institution in the new Europe, the EC Commission could be given a seat in the CSCE. It is possible also that the Secretary General of NATO could sit at the table to promote harmonization of developments in NATO and the CSCE.

As we have suggested above, the CSCE could provide a framework for the construction of a new security order in Europe, following the demise of the East-West military confrontation in Europe and the effective dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The CFE-I agreement would provide an important building block, and subsequent agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, could expand and consolidate an arms control regime relating to conventional forces in Europe. The structural and numerical constraints on military forces could be supplemented and buttressed by changes in deployments and doctrine, by a mutual emphasis on defensive

defense. Similar reconstructions are likely to take place in the realm of "sub-strategic" nuclear forces. A system could be developed for reporting to the CSCE agreements on military rearrangements arrived at outside the CSCE framework. Furthermore, it is possible, as noted above, to envisage the establishment of a security zone comprising Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and the former territory of the GDR wherein stationing and maneuvering of foreign troops would be prohibited, as would the placing or stockpiling of nuclear and chemical weapons. The security zone would provide reassurance for the Central European countries against external military pressure, for the Soviet Union against an eastward extension of NATO, and for the NATO countries against Soviet attempts to reestablish an imperial position in Europe. The construction could be formally approved by the CSCE, obliging all the participating nations to abide by the provisions of the agreement.

Similarly, it is possible to envisage the consummation of another scheme that has received attention over the years, namely the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Nordic area. The Nordic states are all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and none of them permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil. They have all insisted that an NWFZ must be embedded in a European arrangement aiming to reduce the nuclear threat in Europe. At the same time they have been unwilling to negotiate the constitution of such an arrangement bilaterally with the Soviet Union or to include the Soviet Union in the zone, for fear of creating an unbalanced arrangement that would in fact be dominated by Moscow. Nevertheless, they have sought a Soviet quid pro quo. It is possible that the idea of an NWFZ in the Nordic area could provide a mechanism for linking the Soviet Union to the new security order in Europe while conceding a special status to the Baltic republics by letting Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania join the Nordic NWFZ. The Nordic NWFZ in this way could become a vehicle for political reconstruction as well as military reassurance, by linking the processes of European and Soviet reconstruction. Such an arrangement should also be approved by the CSCE, obliging the member states to observe and respect the nonnuclear status of an expanded Nordic area.

THE MARITIME COMPETITION AND THE SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE

NATO is a maritime alliance dependent on the sea-lines of communication for the integrity of its security structure. In the years ahead, the scale of the threat to the sea-lines of communication seems likely to diminish as the size of the Soviet submarine fleet decreases because of the block obsolescence of large classes of submarines. For the task of cutting sea-lines of communication, numbers remain important and may be compensated for only to some extent by qualitative improvements. Furthermore, dismantling of the forward confrontation in Europe and the withdrawal and demobilization of large numbers of Soviet ground forces would reduce the *urgency* of early reinforcements via the sea-lines of communication.

In the context of a stable Central Europe with low tension it is possible that the northern and southern flanks could become new flash points of tension and that the naval competition could intensify in these areas. NATO would need to maintain a strategy and capacity for forward defenses at a time when defense budgets are likely to drop to a level at which it may no longer prove possible for the United States to maintain 14 aircraft carriers. In such an environment, the competition for carrier task forces could grow--and NATO may not come out on top. The pressure for naval arms control is likely to increase, and the opposition of the U.S. Navy to this will prove unsustainable in the long run. The process has already started with confidence-building measures, encompassing a series of bilateral incidents-at-sea agreements. Such agreements have been negotiated between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy, Canada, and Norway on the other. It could be followed by a dialogue about naval strategy and force posture, agreements to notify of major exercises or fleet movements, and provisions for mutual observation of exercises. Measures have to combine the interests of the flag states in the principle of freedom of navigation with the interests of the coastal states in preventing political pressure from naval activity. The Americans are primarily concerned about reducing the threat to the sea-lines of communication, the Russians about reducing

the threat to the homeland from the sea. Hence, a possible naval arms reduction agreement could involve a preferential build-down of ocean-going attack submarines and nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles. The latter also ought to be in the interests of the West, as Western nations on the whole are much more exposed to nuclear threats from the sea than is the Soviet Union.

III. LINKING SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FUTURES

Our emphasis on the need for vision does not amount to a call for rhetorical construction, for abstract architectural designs or vague, mystical concepts. It is rooted in the present processes of dramatic change, in a recognition that short-term decisions will shape the long-term future, will determine the destinations for the onward journey, Europe's future scenarios. The call for vision, then, is a call for a conscious attempt to shape the future, to create a framework, project a concept, and chart a course.

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

History is not in the habit of progressing in straight lines. It could still take unexpected turns. The question is not so much whether a return to the old order is possible or likely; history cannot be recaptured. The question is rather what choices will be made among many future alternatives and, particularly, how the choices of many actors will interact and create new realities.

In the short run, as already noted, Soviet policies on Eastern Europe are likely to be heavily influenced by developments inside the Soviet Union. Gorbachev will have to prevent the future of the USSR from being settled through a process of falling dominoes. The struggle over Lithuania is not confined to a conflict about Lithuania, it has become a test of the union. Can Gorbachev detach the Baltic dominoes from the rest? There are also significant military issues. The Soviet Union has created an extensive military structure, including nuclear weapons depots, in the Baltic republics that is of particular significance for the Soviet naval presence in the Baltic. A large part of the naval repair capacity of the Soviet Union is found in the Baltic republics. They also constitute an important staging area for the Red Army. The Soviet 30th Air Army, with numerous nuclear-armed aircraft, has its headquarters in Latvia. Access to the enclave around Kaliningrad, part of the old area around the East Prussian city of

Konigsberg, will have to be resolved in the event of Lithuanian independence. It could mean imposed concessions on Poland. It could also lead to redeployment of troops and relocation of installations to the Leningrad Military District.

Such changes could profoundly affect the security situation in Northern Europe. Desertion of conscripts challenges the authority of the Soviet Army as an institution at a time when morale is at an all-time low. (It experienced an eightfold increase in draft dodgers from 1985 to 1989). For his policy of *perestroika* to succeed, Gorbachev needs the support, and can ill afford the opposition, of the Soviet military. Nationalist ambitions in the Soviet republics are probably stimulated by the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe. Moscow may be compelled to toughen its stance in relation to East European desires to disconnect economic and security ties with the Soviet Union. A hardening of the Soviet position is unlikely to entail reconquest, but it could lead to intransigence over Germany and the conditions for withdrawing troops from Central Europe, thereby altering the present atmosphere of euphoric projection.

The process of German unification could follow complicated tracks. Moscow could, as we have suggested, insist on a choice between alignment and unification in order also to serve notice to the rest of the countries of Eastern Europe that there are still limits on how far they can proceed in their rapprochement with the West. Differences could emerge between the Federal Republic and its Western allies over the parameters and priorities determining Germany's international position. East European countries eager to enter the European Community may react to the message that they first have to qualify--and that such qualification will take a long time--with impatience and anger. A souring of EC-East European relations could affect the ideological consensus on the Community in West European societies. However, the EC Commission has played the key role in coordinating the economic assistance of the G-24 countries to the East European countries. It is in the process of negotiating first-generation trade and cooperation agreements with them and developing second-generation association

agreements. Such agreements could contain development provisions for eventual membership when the countries involved have reached a level of economic development that makes it possible. In the meantime, other broad schemes for a European confederation constructed around an EC based on economic, monetary, and political union constitutes an alternative, or perhaps an intermediate, vision.

The institutional framework is likely to be in flux. The future of NATO is likely to remain uncertain for quite some time. It needs to change to survive, but resistance to change is strong in an extensive institutional machinery. The European Community is entering a period of profound transformation. The establishment of the internal market by 1992 could sharpen the contradictions between enlargement and deepening, raising the question of how the Community can preserve its identity and persevere on its road to integration while at the same time providing a framework for the integration of Central (and Eastern?) Europe into a larger European construction. The construction of a broader European confederation could compete with the plans for economic and monetary union in the Community. The resolution of such dialectics would profoundly affect the future role of Germany in Europe. The future role and development of the CSCE in turn could affect the evolution of NATO and the EC. The short-term future will be characterized by hybrid solutions of overlapping and interlocking institutions in dynamic development and interaction.

SHAPING THE FUTURE

Many of the present trends point in the direction of a community order in Europe. However, competing trends are also at work and interact with the former, constraining and transforming them in a complex and volatile pattern.

The political order could be built up around the European Community, while the security order is likely to be broader and encompass all of the Soviet Union and North America. The Soviet Union could be associated with the political order and constitute one of the key managers of the security order. A possible agenda is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3

CREATING COMMUNITY EUROPE

A. Building the Political Order

1. Deepening the Community
 - a. Establishment of a single internal market in the EC
 - b. Formation of an Economic and Monetary Union in the EC
 - c. Progress toward political integration in the EC
 - d. Development of the social aspect of the EC
2. Expanding the Community
 - a. Embedding a united Germany in the EC
 - b. Constituting an European economic space of EC and EFTA countries
 - c. Building a European confederation by association agreements with East European countries, and cooperation agreements with Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta
 - d. Creating a framework for overlapping and interlocking association for the republics of a restructured Soviet (Russian) commonwealth

B. Building the Security Order

1. Modernizing collective defense
 - a. Remodeling NATO around two pillars
 - b. Fashioning a new strategy, MC 14/4, on the basis of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, mobile and nonprovocative defenses
 - c. Moving toward cooperative deterrence policies, based on a concept of existential deterrence
 2. Constructing Collective Security
 - a. Converting CSCE into a permanent institution, constituting a Ministerial Conference or Council
 - b. Embedding the European political order in a security order extending from San Francisco to Vladivostok
 - c. Establishing functional authorities, or agencies, under the CSCE with the aim of providing substance to the perspective of cooperative security arrangements (Common Security), arms control verification, nonproliferation, arms information, and peacekeeping
-

IV. POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES IN A EUROPE IN TRANSITION

The canonical scenario of a Soviet attack across the line of division in Central Europe with the aim of establishing mastery in Europe seems remote today. It is not impossible that the threat might reemerge some day. However, it could not be launched from forward positions, and it would take a long time to build it up.

Contingency planning in NATO will have to encompass a much broader spectrum of potential contingencies, force planning to concentrate on generic capabilities rather than threat-conditioned capabilities, and strategy to concentrate on designs to cope with uncertainty. The means for flexible response may have to be orchestrated in a novel manner.

A TYPOLOGY OF POSSIBLE FUTURE CONTINGENCIES

For purposes of analysis we shall propose a typology of possible scenarios encompassing eight clusters, or classes, of conflicts with which NATO could be confronted in the years ahead (see Table 4). We are not in a position to assign probabilities to the clusters, nor do we claim that they are equally probable. We shall not attempt to identify any class of contingency as the design case. The alliance will have to develop force postures and crisis management procedures for dealing with a broad spectrum of contingencies, designing around the uncertainties rather than attempting to reduce them.

Our previous discussion has indicated that for NATO the challenges ahead will be twofold: to deter attack and reconstitution of a waning threat, and to provide a framework, including the military infrastructure, for ensuring stability in the political order in Europe. It must be protected against the spillover from conflicts within the Soviet Union and the escalation of internecine conflicts in Europe, particularly in southeastern Europe.

It seems clear that NATO will need a new strategy, 14/4, designed to cope with the new and changing realities. The new strategy will comprise some of the concepts from 14/3, including the concept of

Table 4

A TYPOLOGY OF POTENTIAL CONTINGENCIES

- A. Intimidation scenarios
 - 1. Soviet show of force against NATO countries
 - 2. Soviet show of force against non-NATO countries in Europe
 - B. *Fait accompli* scenarios
 - 1. Rapid Soviet limited military action against NATO countries
 - 2. Rapid Soviet limited military action against non-NATO countries
 - C. Intervention scenarios
 - 1. Soviet military intervention in (former) Warsaw Pact countries
 - 2. Soviet military intervention in neutral countries
 - D. Reconstitution scenarios
 - 1. Rapid overt Soviet remobilization
 - 2. Slow covert Soviet remobilization
 - E. Soviet turmoil scenarios
 - 1. Military suppression of secession attempts
 - 2. Wars between Soviet nations or union republics
 - F. Soviet breakdown scenarios
 - 1. Military takeover (Bonapartist solution)
 - 2. Anarchy (warlord system)
 - G. Internecine warfare scenarios
 - 1. Civil wars rooted in ethnic conflicts in Europe
 - 2. Interstate wars triggered by ethnic conflicts in Europe
 - H. Out-of area scenarios
 - 1. Conflicts threatening to spread to Europe (Mideast, the Mahgreb)
 - 2. Conflicts threatening vital Western interests
-

flexibility and a spectrum of options. The role of nuclear weapons needs to be reexamined, including their possible role in deterring or containing reconstitution, in addition to providing substance to notions of extential deterrence.

The forces will be smaller, the defense levels will change, and the spectrum of possible contingencies will broaden. NATO will need to maintain a flexible and redundant system of command and control, and an

infrastructure to counter reconstitution that contributes to stability rather than stimulating rearmament races. The next great debate may focus on choices and trade-offs between "defensive defense" and mobile defenses. Political and military criteria might suggest different conclusions.

Intimidation scenarios indicate a need for visible forces and sustained consultations about how to show resolve, confidence, and calm without rocking the boat. *Fait accompli* scenarios might constitute a particular danger to the flanks in the context of Great Russian chauvinism as a dialectic response to secessionist pressures inside the Soviet Union. They may require rapid intervention forces and a capacity for rapid consultations. Intervention scenarios may pose some of the same requirements as intimidation scenarios. Reconstitution scenarios indicate a need for a robust command and control system, an effective system of mobilization, a steady research and development effort, and prepositioned equipment. It will require a capacity for continuous consultation and an ability to respond to strategic warning, incremental change, and repeated warning. Soviet turmoil and breakdown scenarios essentially involve requirements for nonprovocative defenses and a capacity for sustained consultations and effective surveillance. Internecine warfare scenarios could create the need for multinational peacekeeping forces, possibly under CSCE auspices. They will require capacities for emergency consultations and access to expert assessment of the dynamics of ethnic animosities and aspirations. Out-of-area contingencies will pose a need for rapid consultation and concertation among the most affected allies and those capable of intervening outside the NATO area. The alliance consensus is unlikely, however, to sustain efforts to act as a collective outside the treaty area.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The very term "management" seems odd when applied to crisis, as it suggests a degree of control and logical conduct that is unwarranted by previous history. If a situation is susceptible to management it hardly qualifies as a crisis. Political authorities remain skeptical of

attempts to institutionalize and constrain choices by procedures and machinery. The latter tend to assume a life of their own; the means threaten to become the ends, to determine policy rather than serve it. From the political vantage point, diplomacy is viewed as the art of the possible, and what is possible must be ascertained in concrete situations and circumstances. Political authorities will remain skeptical also of contingency planning that will lock them onto fixed tracks in a crisis, the contours and context of which cannot be foreseen. Skepticism is likely to increase in a period of flux, when specific threats give way to more diffuse risks and dangers.

The task confronting NATO is to enhance its ability to improvise in a crisis rather than to develop plans for how to cope with a wide variety of contingencies. We have outlined above a spectrum of contingencies instead of attempting to provide a platform or basis for specific planning. In many instances, which do not involve attacks on NATO territory, the first task at hand would be to define NATO's interests and objectives, because they cannot be derived from the North-Atlantic Treaty. Nor does it seem likely that allies will be willing or able to define them before the fact. Such definition could in itself generate tensions.

Withdrawal from the forward line of confrontation in Central Europe could reduce the chance of inadvertent escalation in a crisis. However, a greater separation of forces could result in less cautious behavior in crises, precisely because the dangers of inadvertent escalation are deemed to be less acute, and thus offering more room for miscalculation even if the scope for deescalation would broaden. In ambiguous circumstances allies also run the danger of increasing the ambiguities by uncoordinated action and communication.

Rather than develop plans and machinery for coping with specific potential future crises, the focus could be more on the development of generic guidelines and capabilities that will broaden the scope of available options. The objective of planning would be to provide the instruments for orchestration in a crisis, not to attempt to write the score to be played.

The range of contingencies outlined above suggests a number of general and specific requirements if NATO is to respond effectively. General procedural requirements include collection, dissemination, and assessment of intelligence, coordination of alert measures, political consultation, and communication with the potential adversary. The specific requirements comprise capabilities that are structured and practiced with a view to tailoring them discretely to the challenge at hand.

Our list of requirements (see Table 5) indicates a need to coordinate force planning, strategy, and preparations for crisis management in NATO. Standing forces in a high state of readiness will diminish as levels are drawn down and the potential threat recedes. Stability will no longer be a function of clearly drawn lines of division and military commitments. It will depend on the ability to assemble and organize forces at times and places of NATO's choosing in specific circumstances. Flexible response will remain an essential principle, but the specific options will have to be retailored. Nuclear weapons are likely to play only a residual role as a last resort, contributing to prestrategic deterrence rather than warfighting in the theater of operations. Reassurance will be as important as deterrence, and in fluid situations nonprovocative configurations of military forces and dispositions constitute necessary requirements for crisis management. NATO's ability to control and deescalate crises will depend, furthermore, on not burning its bridges or bombing all those of the adversary--on leaving the adversary opportunities for graceful exits.

THE ROAD INTO THE FUTURE

In considering a spectrum of potential future contingencies and possible generic capabilities that would enhance the capacity to deal with them, attention should be devoted also to how those capabilities might be developed from current capabilities and institutions. In a situation of lower force levels and defense budgets, increased attention will be focused on the task of providing viable and credible military

Table 5

CRISIS MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS

1. Capability to increase surveillance
 2. Capability to increase readiness
 3. Capability to increase force strength
 4. Capability for rapid reinforcement
 5. Capability to reposition forces
 6. Capability for nonprovocative orchestration of dispositions
 7. Capability for rapid and convincing deescalation and termination
 8. Willingness to grant the adversary a graceful exit
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capabilities for reconstitution. The requirements of that task may compete with those for providing flexible and discrete responses to more limited contingencies, leaving NATO with the need to reconcile the conflicts.

Several of the potential future contingencies could require peacekeeping operations. NATO has no experience as an alliance with such operations, although several of the member countries have considerable experience from United Nations operations: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The multinational forces of the alliance--the ACE Mobile Force, STANAVFORLANT (Standing Naval Force Atlantic), STANAVFORCHAN (Standing Naval Force Channel), and NCF (NATO Composite Force)--provide frameworks for training and for peacekeeping. Other constructions are possible, if NATO were to decide to contribute capabilities for peacekeeping missions that may be mandated in the future by the CSCE. In this connection, cooperation, including joint maneuvers and joint training, could also be envisaged with Soviet and with neutral and nonaligned forces in Europe.

As we have noted above, the CSCE is unlikely in the foreseeable future to develop into a security institution based on majority voting. However, the weight of the majority could increase as the institution develops. The availability of a peacekeeping instrument could increase the chance that it will be called upon as an alternative to unilateral or competitive intervention, that the parties to an internecine conflict

would see an alternative to such a destructive prosecution. A peacekeeping instrument would be no panacea, just a useful tool in the assembly of means available to the nations of the CSCE. We should recall in this connection that NATO operates on the principle of consensus. The real basis for credible action by international institutions will always be a confluence of interests. The CSCE and NATO could broaden the basis of common interest by engaging in concrete cooperative undertakings.

V. CONCLUSION

NATO could disintegrate if it fails to reform and adjust to the new times. A basic examination of the purposes and structure of the alliance is required, an even more fundamental assessment than the Harmel exercise of the 1960s. The CSCE could atrophy if nations remain "waiting for Godot"!

A new Europe is in the making. Change may challenge stability. Stability may constrain change. Uncertainty complicates planning. Planning often ignores uncertainty. Military dispositions may constrain political choice. Political choice often ignores military constraints. Defense planning and political assessment are often miles apart; in future the twains must meet. The two cultures must be made one if NATO is to succeed in managing crises that transcend the easy categories of yesterday.

The future of Europe will be determined first of all in the realms of political and economic construction. The military component hopefully will constitute just a background factor and provisions for crisis management only a marginal part of the infrastructure of the emerging order. However, military dispositions, structures, and doctrines could preempt or prevent political constructions unless they are aligned with approaches to the political agenda. They could also constrain choices in ways that could exacerbate tensions and dangers and even spell disaster.