Proceedings
of the
Fourth International Symposium
on the
Interaction of Non-nuclear Munitions
with Structures
(volume 2)

Panama City Beach, Florida
April 17-21, 1989
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Proceedings
of the
Fourth International Symposium
on the
Interaction of Non-nuclear Munitions
with Structures
(volume 2)

Panama City Beach, Florida
April 17-21, 1989
This document is Volume 2 of the Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on the Interaction of Non-Nuclear Munitions with Structures, held at the Edgewater Beach Resort, Panama City Beach, Florida from 17 through 21 April 1989. The symposium was sponsored by the Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Engineering and Services Laboratory, Tyndall AFB, Florida, and endorsed by the American Society of Civil Engineers' Structural Division.

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All manuscripts in this document authored by United States authors have been approved for public release.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

UPGRADE OF "STRUCTURES TO RESIST THE EFFECTS OF ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS" 1 Chester E. Canada and Jerry Ward, DOD Explosive Safety Board


BLAST RESISTANCE OF A POLYCARBONATE WINDOW 25 David L. Tilson and James M. Watt, Jr., US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

FINITE ELEMENT MODELING OF UNPROTECTED STRUCTURES USED IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPON EFFECTS TESTS 29 Mark Amend, MSD/ENY/W, and Carlos Coe, The BDM Corporation

DELAYED VENTING OF INTERNAL BLASTS 33 O. H. Nelson, J. M. Watt, and R. L. Holmes, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station


BACKFILL EFFECTS ON STRUCTURAL RESPONSE 44 S. A. Kiger, F. D. Dallriva, and P. C. Hayes, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

REINFORCED AND PRECAST CONNECTIONS UNDER CLOSE-IN EXPLOSIONS 47 T. Krauthammer and M. DeSutter, University of Minnesota

A NONLOCAL CONTINUUM-DAMAGE PLASTICITY APPROACH FOR RC BEAMS SUBJECTED TO LOCAL IMPULSE 53 David J. Stevens, Clarkson University, and Theodor Krauthammer, University of Minnesota


EXPEDITED METHODS OF PROTECTION TO MITIGATE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND SPALL 65 D. W. Hyde, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

PROTECTIVE CONSTRUCTION DESIGN VALIDATION 71 Robert J. Majka and Walter C. Buchholtz, HQ Air Force Engineering and Services Center

SHOCK ISOLATION FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 76 S. A. Kiger, J. H. Weathersby, and D. W. Hyde, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF DEEP FOUNDATIONS 80 R. Scott Steedman, Cambridge University, UNITED KINGDON, Conrad W. Pellce, USAFE, and Edward S. Gaffney, Ktech Corporation

LIST OF ATTENDEES 85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accession For</th>
<th>NTIS CRA &amp;I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>By</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avail and/or Special</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92-28235
AUTHOR INDEX

Amend, M. - 29
Blouin, S. E. - 7
Buchholtz, W. C. - 71
Canada, C. E. - 1
Coe, C. - 29
Dalliriva, F. D. - 44
Dass, W. C. - 19
DeSutter, M. - 47
Drake, J. L. - 7, 38
Felice, C. W. - 80
Frank, R. A. - 13
Gaffney, E. S. - 80
Hayes, P. G. - 44
Holmes, R. L. - 33
Hyde, D. W. - 65, 76,
Kiger, S. A. - 44, 76,
Krauthammer, T. - 47, 53
Majka, R. J. - 71
Murphy, C. E. - 19
Nelson, D. H. - 33
Slawson, T. - 38
Smith, E. B. - 7
Steedman, R. S. - 80
Stevens, D. J. - 53
Sues, R. H. - 19, 59
Tilson, D. L. - 25
Twisdale, L. A. - 19, 59
Walker, R. E. - 38
Ward, J. - 1
Watt, Jr., J. M. - 25, 33
Weathersby, J. H. - 76,
ABSTRACT

By

Chester E. Canada and Jerry Ward
DOD Explosive Safety Board

UPGRADE

of

"Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions"
(Army TM 5-1300/NAVFAC P-397/AFM 88-22)

For the first 60 years of the 20th Century, criteria and methods based on the results of catastrophic events were used for the design of explosive facilities. The criteria and methods did not include a detailed or reliable quantitative basis for assessing the degree of protection afforded by the protective facility. In the late 1960's quantitative procedures were set forth in the first edition of the present manual, "Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions". The manual was based on extensive research and development programs which permitted a more reliable approach to current and future design requirements. Since the original publication of this manual, more extensive testing and development programs have taken place. This additional research was directed primarily towards materials other than reinforced concrete which was the principal construction material referenced in the initial version of the manual. An upgrade to the manual, describing new design techniques has become essential. Design methods in the proposed upgrade provide required structural protection.

This paper reviews differences and additions between the earlier version and the proposed upgrade. The planned schedule for technical review, Tri-Service coordination, and publication is presented.
"Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions"

- Presents methods to estimate blast loads due to accidental explosions
- Presents design and construction methods for protective structures housing DOD explosive materials operations
- Design principles required by DOD 6055.9 STD
"Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions"
(SHORT HISTORY)

- FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1969
- MODIFIED IN 1971
- NEED TO UPGRADE EVIDENT FROM EARLY 70'S
- PROPOSAL FOR UPGRADE IN 1978
- FUNDING ALLOCATED FOR UPGRADE IN 1980
- REVISION PROCESS (1980–PRESENT)
- OBTAIN TRI-SERVICE APPROVAL IN 1989
- PUBLISH APPROVED MANUAL IN 1990
"Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions"
(AD NUMBERS OF CANDIDATE UPGRADE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOL #</th>
<th>AD #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A187052</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>DEC 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A176675</td>
<td>BLAST, FRAGMENT, AND SHOCK LOADS</td>
<td>DEC 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A148895</td>
<td>PRINCIPLES OF DYNAMIC ANALYSIS</td>
<td>JUN 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A178901</td>
<td>REINFORCED CONCRETE DESIGN</td>
<td>APR 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A180470</td>
<td>STRUCTURAL STEEL DESIGN</td>
<td>MAY 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A154275</td>
<td>SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN EXPLOSIVE FACILITY DESIGN</td>
<td>APR 85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions**

**OLD vs NEW**

- SIX VOLUMES & ABOUT 1800 PAGES vs ONE VOLUME & ABOUT 250 PAGES
- NEW TOPICS:
  - DESIGN WITH CMU AND STEEL MATERIALS
  - BLAST RESISTANT WINDOWS
  - SUPPRESSIVE SHIELDS
  - PRE-ENGINEERED STRUCTURES

**ELECTRONIC (PC-BASED) VERSION TO BE AVAILABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEW REVISION</th>
<th>OLD EDITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VOL 1</td>
<td>CHAPTERS 1, 2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL 2</td>
<td>CHAPTER 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL 3</td>
<td>CHAPTER 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL 4</td>
<td>CHAPTERS 5, 7, 8, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL 5</td>
<td>NEW MATERIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL 6</td>
<td>CHAPTER 10 &amp; NEW MATERIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions"

- THREE TOPICS REQUIRE TECHNICAL REVIEW
  - INTERPRETATION OF SAFETY CRITERIA
  - LACING CRITERIA
  - BLAST RESISTANT WINDOW CRITERIA

- PLANS ARE TO
  - CONDUCT LIMITED PEER REVIEW OF THREE TOPICS
  - CONDUCT CURSORY EDITORIAL REVIEW OF MANUAL
  - RECOMMEND TRI-SERVICE APPROVAL IN 1989
  - PUBLICATION FORMAT TO ALLOW CHANGES
ABSTRACT

This paper presents a procedure that predicts peak particle accelerations, velocities, displacements and stresses on axis beneath bombs exploding on or within the ground. It uses and reconciles the high explosive ground shock data base, results of numerical calculations, and theoretical considerations, including conservation laws, cavity expansion theory and similitude. The method reproduces most observed contained burst explosion data in media ranging from loose soil to hard rock.

BACKGROUND

This paper is an update to a paper entitled "Ground Shock from Penetrating Conventional Weapons" authored by James L. Drake and Charles O. Little, Jr. The original paper presented an empirical method to predict the ground shock environment in soil from conventional weapons as a function of burst position, soil indices and burster layer thickness. The analysis presented here describes certain enhancements to that prediction method especially the prediction of the near source ground shock environment.

SOIL PROPERTY EFFECTS

While no single material property index or combination of indices can be used to fully prescribe ground shock propagation, the seismic velocity \( c_j \), the primary loading wavespeed \( c_0 \) and the crushable air void volume \( \epsilon_c \) are valuable indices for assessing ground shock magnitudes. The seismic velocity is associated with propagation of low amplitude waves through the in situ material and is not always indicative of the behavior of in situ materials at higher stress levels. The primary loading wave velocity is controlled by the in situ material response at stress levels of engineering interest and, as explained below, is generally slower than the seismic velocity and a better indicator of the dynamic in situ response. Unfortunately, the primary loading wave velocity is considerably more difficult to determine than is the seismic velocity. Ground shock attenuation rates with depth are controlled by the compaction of material during the passage of the stress wave. Dry weak rocks such as sandstones and tuff have crushable air voids and attenuate the shock more rapidly than hard rocks that contain few or no voids. Alluvial materials and soil have high crushable air voids and attenuate the shock more rapidly than all but the weakest, most dry porous rocks.

The seismic velocity and primary loading wave velocity provide a fundamental relation between space and time for scaling ground motions. Since the characteristic time for a given event is inversely proportional to the propagation velocity, explosions in strong competent materials (high seismic and loading wave velocities) will produce much shorter duration ground motion pulses than like bursts in soft rock and soils. The primary loading wave velocity provides a measure of the modulus of the medium. Thus, explosions in strong competent materials with high propagation velocities will produce higher accelerations and lower displacements than corresponding explosions in soft media having lower propagation velocities.

GROUND SHOCK ENVIRONMENT

Approximate analytical solutions for an expanding spherical shock wave in a nearly incompressible media, were used as the basis of the near source region analysis. Considering conservation of mass between the expanding cavity and the observation point, it was found that the flow field can be estimated by

\[ v(t) = r_c \left( \frac{v_c}{r} \right)^n \]  

where \( v \) is the particle velocity, \( r_c(t) \) is the expanding cavity radius and \( n \) is a constant of approximately 2. The magnitude of the particle velocity and the attenuation in the high pressure large flow region near the source are controlled by the cavity expansion rate and the geometric spreading of the shock front.

The kinetic energy in the source region can be estimated by

\[ KE = 4\pi \rho_0 \int_{r_c}^\infty r^2 \left( \frac{v^2}{2} \right) dr = 2\pi \rho_0 c_0^2 r_c^3 (1 - \frac{v}{c_0}) \]  

assuming \( n = 2 \) and \( \rho_0 \) is the initial density. Assuming that within the source region the kinetic energy in the flow field is approximately equal to 1/2 of the total weapon yield and also noting that for TNT \( 1 \text{ kg} = 4.6156866 \text{ joules} \), then

\[
\nu_p = 606.2 \left( \frac{\text{W}}{\rho_0^3} \right)^{1/2}
\]

where \( \nu_p \) is the peak particle velocity and \( W \) is the contained yield of the weapon in kg.

For incompressible flow \( n = 2 \). However, it has been shown that \( n \) can be generalized to account for volume changes in compactible materials by the expression

\[
n = \frac{2 + \epsilon}{1 - \epsilon}
\]

where \( \epsilon \) is a constant \( < 1 \), that relates the volume change to the shear strain in the flow field. Attenuation rates observed in the data base show that \( \epsilon = \epsilon_0 \) where \( \epsilon_0 \) is the compaction air voids. For saturated material, \( n \) is less than 2 and depends on the strength of the material.

Empirical fits were made to peak ground motion and stress data obtained from contained HE detonations in soil and to results of finite difference calculations in various soil and rock geologies. The resulting expressions represent the best estimate of the contained explosion data base and are consistent with scaling relationships and near field analysis.

\[
d_p = \frac{2}{g} \frac{\nu_p}{C_r} \quad r > 0.155 \text{ W}^{1/3}
\]

\[
\nu_p = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
606.2 & \left( \frac{\rho_0}{\text{W}^{1/3}} \right)^{3/2} \\
9906 & \left( \frac{\rho_0}{\text{W}^{1/3}} \right)^n
\end{array} \right. 
\quad r \leq 0.155 \text{ W}^{1/3}
\]

\[
d_p = \frac{2.31 \text{ W}^{1/3}}{c_i} \quad r > 0.155 \text{ W}^{1/3}
\]

Terms in the above equations are defined as:

\[ a_p = \text{peak radial acceleration (g)} \]
\[ d_p = \text{peak displacement (m)} \]
\[ d_p = \text{peak stress (Pa)} \\
\]
\[ r = \text{radial distance from the explosion (m)} \]
\[ g = \text{radial distance from the explosion (m)} \]
\[ \rho = \text{peak stress attenuation exponent} \]
\[ S = \text{equation of state factor (1.5 for geologic media)} \]
\[ t_r = \text{rise time (s)} \]

The peak particle velocity in the source region are included in the above equations. The magnitude and attenuation rate are controlled by the cavity expansion rate and the geometric spreading of the shock front. This region extends to a range of \( 0.155 \text{ m/kg}^{1/3} \) which corresponds to the approximate size of the expanded cavity in most rocks. Within this region, the material displacements are large with respect to the initial position, so the material is pushed into a relatively thin shell with an approximately constant kinetic energy density. The resulting peak particle velocity is only weakly dependent on the material properties.

The peak particle velocity depends on the stress and ground motion intensity. It generally starts from the initial loading wave speed and monotonically increases with increasing stress. For most geologic materials, the propagation speed can be approximated by relating it to the initial loading wavespeed and the peak particle velocity through the use of the factor \( S \) which is a function of the overall compressibility of the material.

The material model for all rocks and soils has been simplified to relate the loading wavespeed to the peak particle velocity with the parameter \( S = 1.5 \). This has been done to allow the user to employ this methodology with relatively little knowledge of the actual material model of the geology of interest. If the actual uniaxial stress strain response is known, it can easily be substituted to relate the loading wavespeed to the peak particle velocity.

The magnitude of the stress and ground motion will be greatly enhanced as the weapon penetrates more deeply into the soil. The concept of a coupling factor was introduced in the previous paper and is summarized here. This factor accounts for the effect of weapon penetration on the ground shock parameters and is defined as the ratio of the ground shock magnitude from a partially buried weapon to the ground shock from a fully contained burst in the same media. The coupling factor, \( f \), can be determined from Figure 2 and the acceleration, velocity, stress and...
Figure 1a. Comparison of peak velocity and stress attenuation prediction to explosive data.
Figure 1b. Comparison of peak velocity and stress attenuation prediction to explosive data.
displacement obtained from the above equations should be multiplied by this factor for shallow buried bursts.

\[ \text{Scaled Depth of Burst (m/kg}^{1/3}) \]

![Figure 2. Ground shock coupling factor as a function of scaled depth of burst.](image)

Stress and motion time histories can be characterized by exponential time histories that decay rapidly in amplitude and broaden as they propagate outward from the explosion (Figure 3). The characteristic time for these time histories can be measured in arrival time from the source, \( t_a = r/c_1 \), the time of peak, \( t_p = r/c_L \), and the time of positive phase duration \( t_+ \) where

\[ t_+ = 2.72 \frac{d_p}{v_p} - 0.36 \frac{t_p}{r} \] (13)

Assuming a linear rise to peak velocity, the velocity waveform can be approximated by

\[ v(t) = v_p \left( \frac{t - t_0}{t_r} \right) \quad t_a \leq t \leq t_p \] (14)

\[ v(t) = v_p \left( \frac{t_d - t_0}{t_p - t_0} \right) e^{-\left( \frac{t - t_p}{t_d - t_p} \right)} \quad t \leq t_p \] (15)

where \( t_d \) is the absolute time at the end of the positive phase duration. Since the time domain waveform features are inversely proportional to the propagation velocity, explosions in competent material (high \( c_1 \)) will produce shorter pulses with higher accelerations and lower displacements than corresponding explosions in less competent material (low \( c_1 \)). Consistent scaling relationships also require higher accelerations to be associated with higher stresses and lower displacements. Conversely, low accelerations will be associated with lower stresses and higher displacements.

![Figure 3. Particle velocity time history.](image)

**CONCLUSIONS**

Empirical expressions were derived from a fit to a large body of ground shock data from buried bursts in soil. These expressions were derived using a more sophisticated material model than originally used by Drake and Little. The resulting equations more accurately predict the near source environments. These modifications of Drake and Little's work do not negate the previous study. The extend it over a broader range of peak stresses and over a broader range of geologies.

The method presented here is not necessarily recommended over the previous method but is more valid at regions closer to the source and is based on a more rigorous theoretical approach which closely approximates actual test data in virtually all types of geologic materials. The two methods are in close agreement at farther ranges.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOIL CATEGORY</th>
<th>TYPES AND EXAMPLES</th>
<th>TYPICAL IN SITU DENSITY $\rho_0$ (kg/m$^3$)</th>
<th>TYPICAL SEISMIC WAVESPEED $C_1$ (m/s)</th>
<th>TYPICAL INITIAL LOADING $C_0$ (m/s)</th>
<th>VELOCITY ATTENUATION EXPONENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dense Dry Soil</td>
<td>alluvium</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000 (cemented)</td>
<td>2.5 to 3.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>dense sand</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>Medium Density Dry Soil</td>
<td>sand, loam, alluvium</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Density Dry Soil</td>
<td>loose sand, loam</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2.5 to 3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturated Soil</td>
<td>all types</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1850</td>
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<td>High Strength Rock</td>
<td>quartzite, diabase, basalt, granite</td>
<td>2650</td>
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<td>4500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Strength Rock</td>
<td>shales, porous sandstones and limestones, chlorite</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>3400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Strength Rock</td>
<td>porous tuff, clay, shales, schist</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>1550</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low Strength Rock</td>
<td>very porous and friable weathered rock</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1050</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Generic soil and rock properties.
ABSTRACT:

This paper presents the results of current research aimed at developing an improved single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) analysis model for buried arches. Several refinements in the SDOF analysis procedures for buried arches are derived, including (1) development of a general soil-arch interaction model for defining the structure-media-interaction (SMI) loads on the arch, (2) development of equivalent SDOF response parameters for arches of arbitrary half-central angle, and (3) development of a resistance function that accounts for the moment-thrust load path the arch follows during deformation. The work assumes a cylindrical arch cross-section of arbitrary arch angle subjected to a vertically propagating planar ground shock. The elastic and plastic deformed shapes are derived for a characteristic load distribution and used to define the equivalent parameters for the SDOF model. This characteristic load is replaced in the response calculation by a simplified soil-arch interaction model which more accurately reflects the variation of the interface loads on the arch as it is engulfed. While the present model assumes a planar ground shock from a nuclear burst, the methodology is adaptable to conventional munitions.

INTRODUCTION:

The buried arch is a popular geometry for protective structure design: its curved geometry is capable of resisting high pressures through a combination of bending and thrust while providing a large interior span that can be used to store and protect military equipment such as aircraft. However, because of its geometry, analysis of the ground shock loads acting on the arch and its dynamic response is extremely complex and not well understood. As a result, current methods for analysis and design of buried arches are generally crude, overly simplistic, and inadequate for predicting the dynamic loads and large deformation response of these structures.

One approach to modeling the complex response of buried arches is the finite element method wherein the complete arch geometry and structure-media-interaction can be modeled explicitly. The fast computational speeds and large memory capacity of modern computers allow one to model the arch in great detail without too great a penalty in turn-around time. However, finite element models are still time consuming to prepare and the results are often difficult to interpret. In addition, finite element models are cumbersome to use in preliminary design calculations, survivability/vulnerability assessments, and cost-trade studies. Hence, there is still a need for more simplified analysis procedures that can accurately predict the loads and response of buried structures. Furthermore, the high cpu speeds of modern computers alleviate the need to make many of the simplifying assumptions in SDOF models so that the accuracy of these models can be improved and potentially approach that of more sophisticated finite element models.

The research reported herein is addressing this need through the development of refined SDOF analysis procedures for buried arches. This work attempts to include as much of the appropriate physics as is possible while retaining the simplicity of the SDOF modeling approach. While the work is currently ongoing, the model derivation is complete and is presented in this paper. Comparisons with test data will be presented in a future paper.

SDOF MODEL FORMULATION:

A schematic of the loading and response of a buried arch as it is engulfed by a ground shock wave is shown in Figure 1. As the shock wave impinges on the arch, the ground shock stresses are reflected due to the impedance mismatch between the soil and the structure. Initially, only a small portion of the arch perimeter is loaded by the ground shock. As the ground shock propagates deeper, the perimeter of the arch that is loaded increases, until at engulfment the entire arch perimeter is loaded. Response of the arch is primarily in the first symmetric bending mode and analysis of recent test data and results of finite element calculations [1] show that the peak flexural response occurs during this engulfment phase. These studies have also shown that the response of the arch is not sensitive to the details of the loading and that the primary loading on the arch is due to the normal pressures on the arch. Interface shear stresses developed on the arch interface are generally small and can be neglected [1].
followed uses a simplified SMI model based on linear wave theory to define the interface stresses on the arch. This approach has been used with good success in SDOF models for buried slabs subjected to ground shock from conventional and nuclear munitions [3]. The interface stresses on the arch are determined using a combination of simple wave propagation and rigid body mechanisms to pose the boundary conditions between the soil and the structure. The rate of external work done by the interface stresses is then calculated at each time increment and used to determine the response of the SDOF system and the equivalent \( q \) and \( p \cos 2\phi \) interface stress components.

Figure 1: Planar Ground Shock on a Buried Arch

Crawford, et al. [2], have observed that the ground shock loads on buried cylinders and arches can be described using a characteristic \( q + p \cos 2\phi \) stress distribution. This load distribution, shown in Figure 1, consists of a uniform component given by \( q \) and a nonuniform component given by \( p \cos 2\phi \). However, the magnitude and distribution of the interface stresses on the arch vary as the arch is engulfed so that the characteristic load distribution is not constant in time, rather, the relative magnitude of the two components varies. However, as will be demonstrated in the derivation of the deformed shapes, the \( q \) term does not influence the deformed shape or capacity (except through the moment-thrust interaction diagram) so that the temporal variation of the relative magnitude of the two components is not important to the derivation of the SDOF model parameters. It is important in determining the moment capacity and, consequently, the arch dynamic response.

Based on these observations, an equivalent SDOF model of the arch can be developed as illustrated in Figure 2. The interface loading on the arch is represented by a characteristic \( q + p \cos 2\phi \) load distribution. The response is assumed to be in the first symmetric bending mode and the assumed mode shape is taken as the deformed shape of the arch under this load distribution applied statically. The equation of motion for the equivalent SDOF system is given by

\[
M_o \ddot{w}_o + R_o \dot{w}_o + F_e(t) = 0
\]  

where \( M_o, R_o, \) and \( F_e \) are the equivalent mass, resistance, and applied force for the SDOF system and \( \dot{w}_o \) is the vertical acceleration of the crown. The derivation of these parameters and the loading function are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Loading Function.

While the characteristic \( q + p \cos 2\phi \) load distribution is used to derive the deformed shape and equivalent SDOF parameters, a more accurate description of the loading is desired in solving for the response of the arch. The approach
and the equivalent uniform component (evaluated at the crown) is given by

\[ q_e = \sigma_n (0) - p_e \] (9)

Deformed Shape
Elastic Response

The mode shape for the arch in the elastic response range is taken as the deformed shape for the arch under the characteristic \( q + p \cos 2\phi \) load distribution. The solution for the deformed shape follows the general approach outlined by Timoshenko and Gere in Reference [4] and has been derived for fixed and pinned (2-hinged) support conditions. Referring to Figure 4, the elastic force resultants at any arbitrary angle from the crown are given by

\[ V = \frac{PC}{9} ((A_V) \sin \phi - 6 \sin 2\phi) \] (10)

\[ N = \frac{PC}{9} ((A_V) \cos \phi + 3 \cos 2\phi) - qr \] (11)

\[ M = \frac{PC^2}{9} ((A_M) + 3 \cos 2\phi - (A_V) \cos \phi) \] (12)

where the bracketed terms \((A_M)\) and \((A_V)\) depend on the support conditions and are of the general form

\[ (A) = \left( \frac{A_3 + A_1 \phi + A_2 \phi^2}{D_0 + D_1 \phi + D_2 \phi^2} \right) \] (13)

The constants for Equations 9 - 12 are:

\[ A_{V0} = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: -3} & (\cos 3\phi - \cos \phi) \\ \text{pinned: -7} & \sin 3\phi + 9 \sin \phi \end{cases} \]

\[ A_{V1} = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: -2} & \sin 3\phi - 6 \sin \phi \\ \text{pinned: 6} & (\cos 3\phi + \cos \phi) \end{cases} \]

\[ A_{V2} = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: 0.0} \\ \text{pinned: 0.0} \end{cases} \]

\[ A_{M0} = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: 0.25} & (\cos 4\phi + 8 \cos 2\phi - 9) \\ \text{pinned: sin 4\phi + sin 2\phi} \end{cases} \]

\[ A_{M1} = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: 3 sin 2\phi} \\ \text{pinned: -6 cos 2\phi} \end{cases} \]

\[ A_{M2} = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: 0.0} \\ \text{pinned: 0.0} \end{cases} \]
\[ D_0 \begin{cases} \text{fixed: } -2 - 2 \cos 2\phi \\ \text{pinned: } -3 \sin 2\phi \end{cases} \]
\[ D_1 \begin{cases} \text{fixed: } -\sin 2\phi \\ \text{pinned: } 2 (2 + \cos 2\phi) \end{cases} \]
\[ D_2 \begin{cases} \text{fixed: } -2.0 \\ \text{pinned: } 0.0 \end{cases} \]

\[ K_M = \frac{1}{\phi_0 \omega_0^2} \int_0^{\phi_0} w^2 \, d\phi \]

where \( \omega_0 \) = deflection at the crown (\( \phi = 0 \)).

Note that for both the pinned and fixed arch the work done by the uniform load component is zero. This results in an inconsistency in the case of a semi-circular arch, where \( \phi_0 = 90^\circ \) and \( \sin 2\phi_0 = 0 \). In this case, the load component performing work is normalized to the load component not doing work and the load transformation factor does not have a physical meaning. Due to this inconsistency the more general statement of the equation of motion has been retained.

**Plastic Response**

The limit capacity, deformed shape, and plastic response parameters for the arch are derived using the limit plasticity assuming the five-hinge static collapse mode as shown Figure 4. From kinematic considerations, the relationships between the vertical velocity at the crown and the rotation of the arch segments 1 and 2 are given by

\[ \dot{w}_0 = \rho \left( \sin \phi \left( \frac{1 - \cos \phi_0}{1 - \cos \phi} \right) - \sin \phi_0 \right) \dot{\phi}_2 \]
\[ \dot{\phi}_1 = \left( \frac{\cos \phi_0 - \cos \phi}{1 - \cos \phi} \right) \dot{\phi}_2 \]

where \( \dot{\phi}_1 \) and \( \dot{\phi}_2 \) are the rotation rates of segments 1 and 2, respectively; and \( \phi_0 \) is the angle to the haunch hinge.

The capacity, \( p^* \), of the arch is derived by equating the internal and external work rates (Note: the work done by the \( q \) component is zero as in the elastic case) giving

\[ p^* = \frac{3 M_p}{2 \pi (1 - \cos \phi_0)} \left( \frac{A_0 + A_1 \cos \phi_0}{C_0 + C_1 \cos \phi_0 + C_2 \cos^2 \phi_0} \right) \]

where

\[ A_0 = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: } -1 \\ \text{pinned: } 2 (1 - \cos \phi_0) \end{cases} \]
\[ \phi_0 = \cos \phi \]
\[ A_1 = \begin{cases} \text{fixed: } 0.0 \\ \text{pinned: } 1.0 \end{cases} \]
\[ C_0 = 1 + \cos \phi_0 \]
\[ C_1 = 1 + \cos \phi_0 \]
\[ C_2 = -1 \]

and \( M_p \) = plastic moment capacity of arch cross-section. Minimization with respect to \( \phi_0 \) gives

\[ D_0 \]
\[ D_1 \]
\[ D_2 \]
pinned: \( \cos \phi_0 = (\sqrt{2} - 1) + (2 - \sqrt{2}) \cos \phi_0 \)

fixed: \( \cos \phi_0 = \frac{1}{2} (1 + \cos \phi_0) \) \hspace{1cm} (20)

This solution is a upper bound in that the internal work done by the membrane stresses is neglected. The effect of the existence of membrane forces is, however, accounted for in determining the plastic moment capacity, \( M_p \), as discussed in the following section.

Resistance Function

The resistance of the arch is modeled using an elastic-perfectly plastic resistance function as shown in Figure 5, where the stiffness and maximum resistance are determined using the solutions presented earlier. The major refinement here is that the maximum resistance is allowed to vary depending on the moment-thrust combination existing in the arch at any point in time. Observations from test data [5,6] have shown that the response of the arch is generally in the compression region of the moment-thrust diagram and that the eccentricity (ratio of moment to thrust) decreases as the arch is engulfed by the ground shock. This response is illustrated in Figure 5 and is modeled by allowing the moment capacity of the arch to vary based on the weighted average of the elastic moment and thrust at the arch critical cross-sections (crown, \( \phi_D \) and \( \phi_0 \)), as calculated using the equivalent \( q_e \) and \( p_e \) components. Since as the arch is engulfed the magnitude of the uniform component, \( q_e \), increases relative to the nonuniform component, \( p_e \), this will naturally increase the magnitude of the thrust relative to the moment, replicating test data observations. This can potentially result in the arch yielding at a moment magnitude less than the peak moment due to the decreasing moment capacity above the balance point.

\[
q_{\text{off}} = q_{\text{ff}} + p_{\text{ff}} \cos 2 (\phi + \beta) \\
V_{\text{ff}} = V_{\text{ff}} \cos (\phi + \beta) \] \hspace{1cm} (21)

so that the external work rate is given by

\[
\dot{W}_{\text{ext}} = q_{\text{ff}} \int_{\phi_B}^{\phi_C} \dot{w} \cos \phi \, d\phi + p_{\text{ff}} \int_{\phi_B}^{\phi_C} \dot{w} \cos 2 (\phi + \beta) \, d\phi \\
+ p_{\text{ff}} \left[ V_{\text{ff}} \int_{\phi_B}^{\phi_C} \dot{w} \cos (\phi + \beta) \, d\phi - \int_{\phi_B}^{\phi_C} \dot{w}^2 \, d\phi \right] \\
- \dot{w}_{\text{BB}} \int_{\phi_B}^{\phi_C} \dot{w} \cos \phi \, d\phi \] \hspace{1cm} (22)

Since the angles \( \phi \) and \( \beta \) are related (as determined by the standoff distance), \( \beta \) can be solved for in terms of \( \phi \) giving

\[
\beta = \cos^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{(\xi^3 \sin^3 \phi + 1)}} \right) = \sin^{-1} \left( \frac{-\sin \phi}{\sqrt{(\xi^3 \sin^3 \phi + 1)}} \right) \] \hspace{1cm} (23)

and

\[
\cos (\phi + \beta) = \left( \frac{\cos \phi}{\sqrt{(\xi^3 \sin^3 \phi + 1)}} \right) + \left( \frac{r \sin^3 \phi}{x \sqrt{(\xi^3 \sin^3 \phi + 1)}} \right) \] \hspace{1cm} (24)

Similarly,

\[
\cos 2(\phi + \beta) = \left( \frac{2 \cos 2\phi}{\sqrt{(\xi^3 \sin^3 \phi + 1)}} \right) + \left( \frac{2r \sin \phi \sin 2\phi}{x \sqrt{(\xi^3 \sin^3 \phi + 1)}} \right) \] \hspace{1cm} (25)

Substitution of Eqns 24 and Eq.25 into Eqn 22 for the external work rate results in a radical integral considerably more complex than those for the nuclear case. Nonetheless, closed form solutions for these integrals exist so that a computer efficient model can be developed.

The loading for a conventional weapon is more localized than that for a nuclear weapon so that the deformed...
shape and collapse mechanism may also require modification. This can be modeled by assuming a concentrated load at the crown for the characteristic load distribution. The deformed shape and plastic limit capacity can then be derived for this characteristic loading.

STATUS AND FUTURE EFFORT

The research is currently in the final stages of the model development and programming. In addition to the refinements reported herein, models have been derived for including the effects of rise time in the loading function and for calculating the rigid body response of the arch. The elastic response is currently being expanded to include a three hinge arch (crown, supports). After programming and checkout of the model, comparisons of the model against test data from the AFWL Kachina test series [7] and the DNA/UES Dynamic Arch Test [8]. Comparisons against finite element calculations [1] and other arch SDOF models [5,9] will also be conducted.

Figure 6. Adaptation to Conventional Weapon

REFERENCES


EXPEDITED HARDENING METHODS FOR STRUCTURES SUBJECTED TO THE EFFECTS OF NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS

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ABSTRACT

A study has been conducted to investigate expedient methods for hardening existing structures and exposed assets against the effects of conventional weapons. The expedient hardening methods covered in this paper are soil berms, sandbagging, sand grids, concrete modular revetments, bin revetments, and sacrificial panels. For each of the methods the paper gives a short description of the method including threat protection afforded, a summary of available test results, limitations of the method and special considerations required for deployment.

1. INTRODUCTION

In peacetime or wartime situations, needs can arise to upgrade the hardness of an existing facility in an expedient fashion. This may be due to a change in function of the facility (e.g., relocation of important assets to the facility), an increase in the perceived importance of the facility, or an increase in the expected threat. A study has been conducted to investigate both traditional and newly developed methods of expedient hardening and to develop guidance for designers. The expedient hardening methods covered in this paper are: soil berms, sandbagging, sand grids, concrete modular revetments (aircraft, Bitburg, SIFCON), bin revetments, and sacrificial panels. For each of the methods investigated, the paper presents a short description of the method including threat protection afforded, a summary of available test results, limitations of the method and special considerations required for deployment. The complete results of this study can be found in the expedient hardening addendum to the Air Force Manual for the Design of Protective Structures for Conventional Weapons Effects (ARA, 1988). The addendum includes methods not covered herein, design guidance, and a selection roadmap to aid in making optimal selections.

2. SOIL BERMS

General. Berms are employed as free standing structures or constructed against walls. A bermed wall configuration is shown in Figure 1.

Threat Protection. Berms provide protection against near miss general purpose bombs, high explosive rounds, and ballistic penetration (USOCF, 1941). As free standing walls, berms can be used to deny a direct line of sight to a protected asset or a vulnerable area such as a door opening.

Recent tests on berms include the CHEBS series conducted at Kirtland AFB (Hyndman, 1987) and the NATO tests conducted at Tyndall AFB (Hyde, 1989). The CHEBS tests included free standing, full scale reinforced concrete revetments that were both bermed and unbbermed. The environment was provided by a nose tangent MARK 83 general purpose bomb, statically detonated at a standoff of 50 feet. The NATO test examined the effectiveness of a bermed semi-hardened reinforced concrete wall subjected to the NATO GP bomb threat. In both tests, no damage was reported to the bermed structures, while the unbbermed structures suffered significant front face cratering and backface spall. Significant airblast protection was also demonstrated in these tests. The CHEBS tests showed a reduction of about 99% in peak wall pressures (at the berm-wall interface); the NATO test showed similar reductions in peak wall pressures. Because of the reduced wall pressures, the risk of spall and breach are greatly reduced (even though total impulse delivered remains relatively unchanged). It must be cautioned, however, that if the weapon penetrates the berm prior to detonation, the coupling between the explosion and the surrounding soil can result in wall pressures greater than for an unbbermed wall. Also, in a free standing configuration, a berm provides little airblast protection. This is because the blast wave reforms behind it after passing over the top. This was demonstrated by studies made during the CHEBS tests. The tests demonstrate that berms provide excellent second or multiple attack protection.

Limitations/Special Considerations. The main disadvantage of free standing berms and to a lesser extent bermed walls is their large space requirements. Berms may not be a practical hardening option for structures sited in very rocky terrains or where grading equipment is not available. At air base facilities, berms sited near taxiways and runways may exacerbate problems related to blowing dust and foreign debris. Erosion control measures are particularly important under these circumstances. Typical
facings used to control erosion include sod, sandbags, and asphalt cutback. Generally, structures that were originally designed to withstand loadings associated with weapon effects have ample capacity to support additional dead loads associated with berming. This is not the case for conventional structures and analysis is required to determine the need for additional support.

3. SANDBAGGING

General. Sandbagging is a traditional method of providing effective protection to walls, overhead structures, and revetments (DOA, 1985; Hoot, et al., 1974). Sandbags can also be used to construct free standing walls and wall structures for protection of otherwise exposed assets. Figure 2 shows a sand bag upgrade of an existing structure.

Threat Protection. Several test series conducted by the U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station (WES) have demonstrated that sandbags placed against walls and overhead structures are successful in protecting against near miss and direct high explosive rounds, and direct ballistic impacts (Ho^et al., 1974; Bucci and Mikar, 1976; Hamlin, 1986). Placed against walls, sandbags provide protection similar to that obtained from berming with soil.

In one series of tests (Hoot, et al., 1974), a timber framed roof structure protected by 4 layers of sandbags (16 inches of cover) was not breached by contact detonations of an 82 mm mortar, 107 mm rocket, or a 122 mm rocket. Similar tests of 6 inch thick precast reinforced concrete roof panels also demonstrated the effectiveness of sandbagging. An 82 mm mortar round detonated directly against the slab caused major spalling on the interior surface. A 107 mm rocket round caused massive spalling and breached the slab. With two layers of sandbags covering the roof, the test using the 107 mm rocket was repeated with only minor cracking occurring on the interior face. A 15 inch layer of sandbags stacked against a 6 inch precast wall provided good protection against a 155 mm HE artillery round detonated at a standoff of 5.0 ft. A similar unprotected wall was decimated by the round. Sandbag berms, wall and roof coverings provide multiple attack protection to near miss high explosive threats similar to soil berms or soil covers.

Limitations/Special Considerations. The main limitation of sand bags is aesthetics and for this reason, sandbagging is generally not considered an acceptable approach for more permanent upgrades. Sandbags have had a history of susceptibility to rot, however, newer bag materials made of an acrylic fabric are available and are reported to remain serviceable for over 2 years with no signs of deterioration under all climatic conditions (DOA, 1985). Improved performance against ballistic penetration is obtained by mixing the fill material with dry portland cement (1 part cement to 10 parts soil) or dipping the filled bags in a cement-water slurry (DOA, 1985).

4. SAND GRIDS

General. Sandgrids were originally developed as a soil confining system for use in roadway construction over loose soils. Sandgrids are constructed by filling a prefabricated plastic form shaped like cells of a honeycomb with a granular material such as sand or gravel (Figures 3, 4). The sand grids are available in a standard configuration or a newer, notched configuration. The notched configuration allows for development of a lapped joint between layers that prevents leakage of the fill material. The principal advantages over the more traditional methods of hardening with soil are ease of construction and reduced space requirements. Currently available sandgrids are 38 inches wide in place.

Threat Protection. Testing has demonstrated that sandgrids can provide efficient and effective protection against near miss general purpose bombs, high explosive artillery rounds, shoulder launched rockets, and machine gun fire (White, 1983; Wood, 1985; Hamlin, 1986; Hayes, 1987, 1988; Hyde, 1989).

Recent tests conducted on the NATO test facility demonstrated that sandgrids are very effective in protecting semi-hardened walls from near miss general purpose bomb fragments and airblast (Hayes, 1988; Hyde, 1989). In this test a 65 cm wall protected by a sandgrid shield (Figure 4) suffered no damage from a GP bomb detonation. The same wall, unprotected, suffered severe spall when subjected to the same weapon at the same standoff.

Wood (1985) reports the results of tests on free standing sandgrid revetments against 105 mm flechette artillery rounds, 155 mm HE airbursts, and 155 mm surface bursts. Six 105 mm flechette rounds were detonated 120 ft from the target. None of the flechettes completely penetrated the revetment. Six standard D544 fragmentary HE rounds were detonated at a stand off of 40 ft and an elevation of 20 ft. The revetment remained stable and erect and showed slight deterioration. There was no evidence of fragments passing through the sandgrid. Six 155 mm rounds each were statically detonated, nose tangent, at ranges of 5, 10, and 15 ft from the test revetments. At the 5 ft range, the six rounds totally collapsed the revetment. Good fragmentation protection, however, was provided for the first two rounds. At the 10 ft range, after six rounds, the sandgrid revetment remained intact and erect but the top three layers were significantly damaged. No fragments penetrated through the revetment. The six rounds fired at the 15 ft range caused only superficial damage. Sandgrid revetments have also demonstrated effectiveness in defeating penetration by small arms fire up to 50 caliber rounds (White, 1983).

Gravel filled sandgrid revetments have been tested against U.S. LAW and Soviet RPG-7 antitank weapons (Hayes, 1988). Crushed limestone (3-4 in. diameter) was used for the revetments tested against the LAW, and rounded river gravel (1.5-2 in. diameter) was used for the revetment tested against...
the RPG-7. Two consecutive hits by LAW rounds, in approximately the same location, cratered the front face of the revetment but the revetment was not perforated. The revetment hit by the RPG-7 was perforated by the rocket motor, but the residual velocity of the motor was not sufficient to cause damage to a protected wall or lightly armored assets placed behind the revetment.

Sandgrids filled with sand and gravel have also been tested against a wire guided warhead (TOW) placed against the side of the revetment and statically detonated (Hayes, 1988). The sand filled revetment was breached by the weapon and the steel witness plate behind the revetment was perforated. The gravel filled revetment was breached and fragments from the weapon perforated the revetment; however, the witness plate was not damaged.

Sandgrid revetments provide limited second attack protection from near miss GP bombs based upon evidence from the NATO test facility. The sandgrid form was severely damaged, however, much of the soil remained in the shape of a small berm. In other applications against less severe threats such as near miss HE artillery rounds, the sandgrid revetment provides excellent second attack protection. As overhead protection, sandgrids provide limited second attack protection against direct hit mortar and HE artillery attack but can be repaired with loose soil or sand bags.

Limitations/Special Considerations. The maximum free standing height for use as a protective structure against conventional weapons is about 8 ft.

5. CONCRETE MODULAR REVETMENTS

General. The discussion in this section focuses on several modular designs constructed of conventionally reinforced concrete (R/C) and SIFCON (Slurry Infiltrated Fiber reinforced Concrete) that have been tested. Figure 5 shows one common type of modular unit. The revetments are often bermed by soil to improve overall performance (see Section 2 and Figure 1).

Threat Protection. These revetments provide protection against fragments and airburst near miss general purpose bombs and other lesser threats such as HE artillery rounds, rockets, and mortars. Also, they are often used to deny line-of-sight to doors and other vulnerable openings.

Recent tests on R/C revetments include the CHEBS series conducted at Kirtland AFB (Hyndman and Buluman, 1987; Carson and Morrison, 1986) and the NATO tests conducted at Tyndall AFB (Hyde, 1989). The CHEBS tests included revetments that were both bermed and unbermed (see Section 2). In the CHEBS 9 and 10 tests four standard revetment designs were tested in a variety of configurations: (1) the Bitburg Revetment with a wall thickness of 0.30 m, (2) the 3-meter Aircraft Revetment with a wall thickness of 0.245 m, (3) the 4-meter Aircraft Revetment with a wall thickness of 0.245 m, and (4) the 4-meter Aircraft Revetment with a wall tapering from 0.245 m at the base to 0.085 m at the top. A second series of tests (CHEBS 16) was conducted using similar designs constructed using SIFCON (Carson and Morrison, 1986). The NATO test examined the effectiveness of unbermed Bitburg revetments subjected to the NATO GP bomb threat. R/C revetments have also been tested against a variety of other conventional weapons including HE rockets, mortars, and machine gun fire (Hoot, et al., 1974).

The results of the CHEBS and NATO tests demonstrated that unbermed R/C revetments can provide good first strike protection but limited second attack protection due to their susceptibility to fragment damage and movement (i.e., rigid body shifting). As bermed structures, R/C revetments provide excellent second attack protection.

For the revetments constructed of SIFCON, the general damage characteristics resulting from fragment impact differed significantly from the damage characteristics of the R/C revetments. The damage on the front face of the SIFCON revetments tended to be localized immediately around the impact area and not cratered as was the case with the R/C revetments. Little or no rear spall occurred with the SIFCON revetments. When the revetments were perforated by fragments, the penetrations were clean, nearly cylindrical and easily repaired.

R/C revetment panels 6 inches thick and supported by precast blocks (Hoot, et al., 1974) were demonstrated to be effective against 81 mm mortars and 120 mm rockets detonated at a standoff of 5.0 ft. Against 155 mm HE artillery rounds the 6 inch panel was considered to be effective only for standoffs greater than 30 ft. Against 122 mm rockets, the revetment was considered satisfactory for standoffs of 10.0 ft; and with the addition of a 15 inch sandbag facing, the revetment defeated the fragment effect at a 5 ft standoff.

Limitations/Special Considerations. R/C revetments are limited by the resources necessary to fabricate and deploy them. Their use as an expedient measure requires that they be prefabricated and available for deployment. Bermed, prefabricated revetments require a relatively smooth base surface for deployment. Bermed, R/C revetments have fairly large space requirements and other limitations associated with soil berms or bermed walls (see Section 2). The geometry of the Aircraft Revetment does not allow for the formation of ninety degree turns in the layout of an array of revetments. The base of the Bitburg revetment has corners mitered at 45 degrees which allow for ninety degree turns, but these corners are vulnerable to fragment penetration because the wall thicknesses of the two revetments just meet and do not lap. These corners should be protected with sandbags.
6. BIN REVETMENTS

General. Bin revetments refer to any of a variety of methods used to create vertical walls of sand, soil, gravel, or rock rubble. These systems combine the protective qualities of soil structures with an efficient use of space. The thickness of the soil wall is the primary means of providing protection. The structural system is designed to confine the soil and can be constructed of reinforced concrete, steel, wood, or wire casing. Typical configurations are two parallel walls with fill between them or prefabricated containers filled with soil and arranged into a revetment (Figure 6). In addition, bin revetments can take the form of planters for aesthetic permanent upgrades.

Threat Protection. These revetments provide essentially the same protection as bermed walls or revetments. They can be employed against fragment and airlift threats from near miss general purpose bombs, other lesser conventional munitions, and ballistic threats. They can also be used to deny line-of-sight to doors and other vulnerable openings.

Soil bin revetments with a soil thickness of 12 inches were tested by WES for protection against near miss mortar and rocket detonation in support of the U.S. Army during the Vietnam conflict (Carre, 1969, 1972). Soil bin structures constructed of plywood, 18 gage corrugated metal, and M8AI landing mats were tested. The M8AI soil bin defeated all fragments from 81 to 120 mm mortars and 107 mm rocket detonations at a stand off of 5 ft. The plywood and corrugated metal bin revetments were also effective at a range of 5 ft but suffered greater damage.

As a part of the CHEBS 9 and 10 tests (Hyndman and Bultman, 1987), a soil bin revetment was constructed using two parallel rows of 3 m Aircraft revetments (see Section 5). The soil thickness was approximately 5 ft. The soil bin was positioned 50 ft from a 1000 lb GP bomb. The face of the front Aircraft revetment was severely damaged by the fragment impacts but no damage to the rear revetments forming the soil bin was reported.

C & C Chamber revetments were tested as a part of the NATO facility tests (Hyde, 1989). This soil bin structure makes use of off-the-shelf precast concrete manhole liners (rectangular tubes 3.0 x 4.5 ft in section, 2.46 ft long, with a wall thickness of 3 inches). The tubes allow for a soil thickness of 2.5 ft. Several reinforcing methods were tested including wire mesh, synthetic and steel fibers and various combinations. Revetment walls were constructed by bolting the tubes together with steel straps and filling the units with sand. Walls one, two, and three layers high were tested. The tests demonstrated that this configuration can provide fragment protection against general purpose bombs. If reinforced with steel mesh, multiple attack protection can be expected.

Limitation/Special Consideration. Soil bin revetments generally require significant construction resources. If built of expedient materials, they tend to be temporary measures. Constructed of reinforced concrete or masonry, they are usually part of permanent upgrades or new facility construction.

7. SACRIFICAL PANELS

General. Sacrificial panels are panels attached to the exterior of a main structural wall so that an air space is left between the main wall and the panel. The panels are not expected to survive a weapons blast but still provide significant protection to the main wall (Figure 7). Sacrificial panels constructed of a variety of materials such as reinforced concrete, steel plate, plywood, or a layered combination of materials have been tested. Sacrificial panels are used for both expedient upgrading of existing facilities and as inexpensive hardening methods for new construction.

Threat Protection. Sacrificial panels have demonstrated effectiveness in protecting against fragments and airlift from near miss general purpose bombs and HE rounds. Recent tests include a series of 19 scaled tests on a variety of panel types (reinforced concrete, steel, plywood, and composite) conducted by the AFESC and the WES (McVay, 1988), the full scale NATO tests conducted at Tyndall AFB (McVay, 1988; Hyde, 1989) and a series of tests on concrete panels conducted by WES (Colthorp, 1987).

In all of these cases the damage to the walls protected by the sacrificial panels was greatly reduced from the damage observed for the unprotected walls. For example, for a wall protected by a 6 inch precast panel with a nominal 1 inch air space at the full scale NATO test, only minimal scabbing and cratering occurred on the front face of the main wall and no spall occurred on the backface. The same wall tested bare suffered severe spall damage that would have been lethal to equipment and personnel inside. The mechanism behind the protection afforded is due to the greatly reduced number and momentum of the fragments that impact the main wall and greatly reduced peak pressures on the main wall. This results in a much lower potential for spall and breach even though load duration from airlift may be greatly increased.

Limitation/Special Consideration. The main limitation of sacrificial panels is their single-hit-only capability. If multiple hit capability is required a system must be in place to provide for expedient replacement of the panels.

8. CONCLUSIONS

A wide range of methods may be used to provide expedient structural hardening against the effects of conventional weapons. These methods vary in the degree of protection afforded, multiple strike capability, ease of construction, and ease of deployment. Optimal selection of a hardening method requires careful consideration of each of these factors as they relate to the particular needs of a given situation and...
the resources available. From the test data reviewed, the most effective protection is provided by earth structures. Earth structures can significantly reduce the effects of fragments and airblast and can provide excellent multiple strike protection. Confining the earth through the use of bags, sand grids, or bins eliminates many of the limitations associated with traditional berms. Sacrificial panels and unbermed concrete revetments also provide effective protection but do not provide the multiple hit capability of earth structures.

9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work was supported by a contract from the Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Tyndall AFB, Florida.

10. REFERENCES


Department of the Army, Survivability, FM 5-103, 1985.


Figure 1. Bermed Wall
Figure 2. Sandbag Upgrade

Figure 3. Sand Grid Section

Figure 4. Sand Grid Revetment

Figure 5. Four-meter Aircraft Revetment

Figure 6. Soil Bin Revetment

Figure 7. Sacrificial Panel
ABSTRACT

High explosive threats directed against U.S. facilities throughout the world have identified a need to blast harden these facilities. Loss of windows during blast loading poses a serious threat to personnel and facility security. Research has shown that a blast resistant window is feasible and that a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) analysis can predict the window response.

The WES generic blast resistant window was designed to withstand a peak reflective pressure of 80 psi. This window survived the test with no damage. The SDOF predictions for the 26-inch by 26-inch windows were in good agreement with test data, with the analysis being conservative. This good agreement resulted from the use of a resistance function developed from a static test.

INTRODUCTION

High explosive threats directed against U.S. facilities throughout the world have identified a need to blast harden these facilities. One of the most vulnerable elements in these structures is the window systems. Loss of windows during blast loading poses a serious threat to personnel and facility security. Research has been funded for the purpose of designing a generic window system to withstand high blast pressures. From this research, it was shown that a window system can be designed to resist high blast pressures and that the dynamic response can be predicted with a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) analysis.

WES BLAST WINDOW

The WES generic blast resistant window was designed to withstand a peak reflective pressure of 80 psi. The window was designed in three parts; the anchoring frame, which is cast into the reinforced concrete test wall, a rigid window frame, and 1-1/4-inch-thick polycarbonate glazing. Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the design concept.

The critical element in designing the anchoring frame was to develop a large shear area across the thickness of the concrete test wall. The frame was designed to be positioned in the wall and cast in place, thereby, developing a shear area 1.5 times larger than the thickness of the wall (12-inches thick). The anchoring frame was fabricated using 4-inch by 8-inch by 1/2-inch thick steel reinforcing bars placed 4-inches on center in both directions and in both faces of the slab. The shear stirrups were added in the high shear region of the slab adjacent to the frame.

The test wall consisted of two layers of 5/8-inch-diameter reinforcing bars placed 3-inches on center in both directions and in both faces of the slab. The shear stirrups were added for a distance of 1 foot from the anchor frame. The concrete design used in the test wall had a minimum yield ($f_y$) of 5000 psi at 28 days.
The window frame was designed to be structurally rigid; therefore, the remaining critical elements in the design of the window were the bite placed on the glazing and the type glazing used. The frame was fabricated using 4- by 3- by 1/2-inch steel angle, with the 4-inch edge providing the bite of the glazing. Figure 2 shows the design of the window frame. With this design, a bite of 1-1/4-inches was placed on the glazing.

The glazing selected for the window was 1-1/4-inch laminated polycarbonate (SP-1250). This material was selected for its ability to undergo large deflections and remain undamaged. The SP-1250 contains four layers of polycarbonate consisting of two - 1/2-inch layers placed in the center and two - 1/8-inch layers placed on the outside.

**ANALYSIS**

The determination of the dynamic response of a simple structural system using numerical procedures is presented in detail in References 1, 2, and 3. More complex systems, such as the window system reported herein, can also be analyzed with an SDOF, provided an accurate representation of the load function \( P(t) \), resistance function (load-deflection curve), and mass \( (M) \) can be obtained.

**SDOF Analysis**

The selection of the idealized spring-mass system in Figure 3a is such that the deflection of the mass, \( y \), is the same as the centerline deflection of the window glazing. From the freebody diagram shown in Figure 3b, the equation of motion is derived and then solved numerically.
Fig. 4

This test device allows for the testing of a window as if the test article were installed in a building wall. Once the window is installed, the test wall is positioned on the U-frame base and the hold-down slab positioned on top. The two slabs are then bolted together. In this configuration, a chamber is formed between the window and the bottom of the hold-down slab. It is into this chamber that water is pumped to produce the uniform hydrostatic pressure. A maximum of 300 psi has been achieved with this setup.

By utilizing the U-shaped base, access to the underside of the window is possible and placement of instrumentation can be accomplished. The design also allows clearance for videotape equipment to be used in recording the response of the test article.

Static Testing

The window system was subjected to a hydrostatic pressure that produced failure of the window. Failure is taken to be the point where the glazing or window system cannot sustain additional load. In the test conducted, the failure mechanism for the window was the glazing slipping from the frame bite. With the data collected on the pressure and centerpoint deflection, a load-deflection curve was derived for the analysis. Figure 5 shows the resistance function developed from the test data.

SDOF Code

The procedure used in the SDOF code is described in Reference 1. The procedure is referred to as the constant-velocity or lumped-impulse procedure. The code requires the following information to perform the calculation: mass (m), area (A), load-mass factor (Km), percent of damping (c), time step (Δt), resistance function f(R), and forcing function F(t).

In the analysis of the window system, the mass was determined by weighing the glazing. The area was selected as the clear span area of the window (26 inches by 26 inches). The values for the load-mass factor and percent of damping were chosen to be 0.67 and 0.03, respectively. The numerical iterative time step of 0.0001 seconds was used for the SDOF calculation.

The analysis was performed by using a reflected pressure-time history, with clearing time, for a hemispherical high-explosive (HE) charge producing a peak pressure of 52.6 psi. The negative phase peak pressure was -4.0 psi. Figure 6 shows the calculated pressure-time history.

Fig. 6

Utilizing the input data, the SDOF analysis was conducted.
DYNAMIC TEST

To verify the analysis, a dynamic test was conducted on five WES blast windows. The window clear span openings were two - 26-inch by 26-inch, two - 36-inch by 36-inch, and a 40-inch by 40-inch. The test was conducted and subjected the two 36-inch by 36-inch to an average peak reflective pressure of 49.2 psi and the two 26-inch by 26-inch and the 40-inch by 40-inch windows to an average peak reflective pressure of 57.4 psi.

COMPARISON OF CALCULATED RESPONSE AND TEST DATA

In determining the dynamic response of the three sizes of blast windows, an analysis was performed using the static load-deflection curve generated for the 26-inch by 26-inch window and a theoretical resistance function calculated for the 36-inch by 36-inch and 40-inch by 40-inch windows. The theoretical resistance functions were generated from equations developed in Reference 1.

The analysis predicted a centerpoint deflection of 1.81 inches for the two 26-inch by 26-inch windows, 6.1 inches for the two 36-inch by 36-inch windows, and greater than 10 inches for the 40-inch by 40-inch window. A comparison of the pretest prediction and actual test data is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window Sizes and Type PC</th>
<th>Predicted Deflection with SDOF (in)</th>
<th>Test Data Summary (in)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26x26 New PC</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26x26 Old PC</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36x36 New PC</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36x36 Old PC</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40x40 New PC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From comparison of the results from the test, it appears that revision of the calculated resistance functions will be required. The test data shows that the polycarbonate glazing has a higher stiffness (resistance) than predicted by the theoretical resistance function.

A posttest analysis was performed using the data from the 26-inch by 26-inch window. The pressure-time history used in the analysis was the average of the records from the six pressure gages used in the test. From this analysis the peak centerpoint deflection was calculated to be 1.58 inches. Although this comparison is based on one test, it is concluded that the proposed procedure can be used to verify or determine the blast resistance of a window system. The good agreement between the predicted value and actual test data suggests that the resistance function developed from static testing correctly described the spring (k) of the SDOF system.

The poor agreement of the predicted spring (k) and test response data indicates that the boundary conditions are more complicated than assumed for the theoretical resistance function. This is one area where further studies are needed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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REFERENCES

FINITE ELEMENT MODELING OF UNPROTECTED STRUCTURES USED IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPON EFFECTS TESTS

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MSD/ENYW The BDM Corporation

ABSTRACT

Finite element modeling is an analysis technique which is commonly used in the design and analysis of structural systems. The approach has been applied in conventional weapon effects research particularly in the detailed analysis of structural subsystems and components. Limited studies have been conducted using finite element models to simulate the complete structural system subjected to conventional weapon effects. This paper addresses the analysis of three-story pre-cast and reinforced concrete structures subjected to interior detonations of general purpose bombs.

TEST SERIES DESCRIPTION

In support of OSD tri-service requirements, AFATL and 3246 Test Wing conducted a test series which addressed the effects of general purpose air delivered munitions against standard office building construction. Specifically, the tests involved three-story structures: two of which were constructed using pre-cast concrete panels and the third representing cast-in-place reinforced concrete construction. Figure 1 shows an isometric view of the test structures while Figure 2 illustrates the floor layout and building dimensions. All wall elements consisted of 6-inch thick reinforced concrete. The pre-cast panels were assembled and fastened using standard pre-cast construction techniques including the use of weld plates as the connection type between panels. Figure 2 also shows that each building was constructed in two segments with a dividing wall in the center. The only structural connection between the two building halves was the foundation system. Separating the buildings into two separate sections allowed testing to be conducted on each building section.

The tests were conducted using dynamic and static placement of the test weapon. For dynamic placement tests, a rocket sled track propelled the weapon into the first floor of the structure. The weapon fuzing was designed such that the weapon penetrated the building and detonated in the first room as shown by the weapon trajectory line in Figure 2. In the static tests, the event consisted of placing the munition in the desired room and then remotely detonating the weapon.
In several of the events, the test structures were instrumented with accelerometers and pressure transducers. The transducer array was designed to monitor the weapon loading on the structure, structural response, and the documentation of the interior environment. In addition to the instrumentation array, exterior and interior cameras documented the building collapse/damage and the interior building environment. In selected events, the test structure interior included office furniture, computer equipment, and test mannequins.

ANALYSIS OVERVIEW

A parallel effort to the test series was the finite element modeling of the test structures. The intent of the study was to identify aspects of the finite element modeling that seemed promising and, more importantly, limitations and other areas requiring further development. A second purpose of the analytical study was to support the test instrumentation setup by providing pre-test predictions.

The analysis effort consisted of two general phases: pre-test modeling effort and the post-test analysis. The pre-test analysis centered on providing the pre-test predicting for the instrumentation system and included the development of models for the entire structure, substructure systems, and components. The pre-test modeling effort used COSMOS, a general purpose finite element code. The post-test analysis focused on analyzing selected substructure systems and components using ADINA (Automatic Dynamic Incremental Nonlinear Analysis) finite element code. The post-test analysis included nonlinear material models and direct comparisons with test results.

PRE-TEST ANALYSIS

The primary task in the pre-test analysis was the development of finite element models for the entire structure, substructure systems, and components. Figure 3 shows the first floor segment of the entire structure finite element representation. The models were developed using COSMOS interactive environment and were constructed using wall and floor panels as the basic building blocks for the mesh. Connectivity between the wall and floor panel finite element blocks replicated the connection between the wall and floor panels in the pre-cast test structure. For the cast-in-place structure model, the finite element mesh represented a monolithic structural system. The substructure models represented a series of wall or floor panels while the component models consisted of single wall or floor panels. In each case, the natural frequencies and mode shapes of the finite element models were determined. Figure 4 shows the first three mode shapes of a substructure system consisting of three wall panels.

During the development of the finite element models, free-vibration tests were conducted on the test structures. The free-vibration tests consisted of the static loading of the test structure at a selected location and then suddenly unloading the structure. The free-vibration response of the structure was observed by an accelerometer transducer array. The pull-tests allowed the direct observation of building substructure natural frequencies. The natural frequencies observed compared well with the natural frequencies computed by the finite element model.

The final effort of the pre-test analysis was to predict the structural response for the acceleration transducer array. The analysis consisted of estimating blast loading on the structure caused by the weapon detonation and using the modal representation of the structure to predict peak structural accelerations at the transducer locations. The blast loading were
estimated using an empirical approach which using an initial impulse loading equal to the first three reflections of the blast and a time varying pressure load equal to the pseudo-static confined blast pressure.

WEAPON EFFECTS TESTS

The weapon effects tests conducted on the test structures provided excellent information regarding the general vulnerabilities of the two construction types tested, collapse mechanisms for pre-cast and cast-in-place structures, blast pressure propagation through unprotected facilities, structural response, and interior environment definition. Figure 5 shows the interior detonation of the test munition on the test structure while Figure 6 shows a typical interior pressure time history recorded during the test series. The test data was used extensively in the post-test analysis which is discussed in the next section.

POST-TEST ANALYSIS

The post-test analysis centered on the analysis of selected substructure systems and components monitored during the test series with active instrumentation. The finite element modeling described in this section was accomplished using ADINA. The analysis included linear and nonlinear material models as well as the elimination of structural connections and elements during the loading event. The analysis used the pressure loading measured during the test series (Figure 5) and standard time integration methods to predict the response of structural subsystems, components, and connections. Figure 6 shows a typical response of wall panel section subjected to an airblast loading.

For the pre-cast construction, the weak points or failure modes centered on the panel connections and the collapse of the floor panels. For the cast-in-place construction, the predicted failure mode followed the classic shear and flexural failure. Shear failures are localized near the explosive source while flexural failure is more widespread in the vicinity of the explosive source. The finite element representations in both cases (pre-cast and cast-in-place) quickly exceed the model limitations but the models do approximate when the structural component or connection fails (given the correct failure stresses or forces). Future analytical efforts should focus on ADINA's capability to kill elements and incrementally progress through a collapse event. Reasonable micro- to macro-models could be used to predict and evaluate conventional weapon effects against structures provided that key empirical models are incorporated into the analysis process.
SUMMARY

The study has highlighted the capabilities and limitations of the finite element approach in modeling weapon effects against structures. The advantages include great flexibility in model characterization, generalized loading functions, nonlinear analysis, stability analysis, and elimination of destroyed elements (ADINA capabilities). The disadvantages center on the lack of available information on the material parameters to use, numerical instabilities, no generalized approach to incorporate empirical models, and the appropriate mix of macro-micro models (reasonable analysis with reasonable cost). For this effort, the finite element results compared favorably with the test data. The modeling exhibited the weak elements of the structural system and provided better pre-test estimates for the instrumentation system. The post-test analysis demonstrated failure modes which were not obvious from the test results. It is clear that an appropriate level of finite element modeling enhances conventional weapon tests against structures particularly in the pre-test stages.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. COSMOS is a registered trademark of the Structural Research Corporation.

2. ADINA is a registered trademark of ADINA R&D, Incorporated.

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DELAYED VENTING OF INTERNAL BLASTS


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ABSTRACT: When calculating internal blast loads for chambers having frangible panels covering vent openings, it may be necessary to consider the effect of the panel connections on the venting initiation time. If the panel connections temporarily resist failure, the onset of venting can be significantly delayed. This delay will result in a greater internal loading than would be calculated if the panel connections failed instantaneously. This paper presents a method, coupled with existing analytical computer codes, that will predict the time at which panel connections fail and the resulting internal blast load.

INTRODUCTION

An internal explosion typically produces a complex load composed of highly transient multiple shock pressures and a relatively long duration gas pressure. In a closed chamber, these pressures can be structurally damaging. Therefore, to help reduce internal pressures, openings are sometimes provided to quickly vent the pressures out of the chamber. Normally, these openings are covered with a frangible panel that offers minimal resistance to blast pressures. The effectiveness of the vent opening in the reduction of internal pressures is dependent on the response of the frangible panel.

Frangible panels are typically lightweight and break away without significantly confining the internal blast. The panel connections are usually designed to fail. Movement of the panel is assumed to begin with the arrival of the initial shock pressure. The panel movement produces a variable vent area that increases from zero to a maximum as the panel moves away from the opening. For the particular case in which the panel is recessed within the vent opening, variable venting does not initiate until the panel has moved the distance of the recess. Temperate and Helseth (Reference 1) have presented a method for calculating the internal pressure decay when variable venting occurs, including the effect of a recessed panel. In this method, available from the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory on a microcomputer program called FRANG, the frangible panel is treated as a rigid plate that accelerates under the action of the internal load. Panel connections, which are usually designed to fail quickly, are ignored. FRANG has been shown to produce good estimates of internal blast loads for these conditions.

This paper addresses a condition in which venting is delayed because the frangible panel connections momentarily resist failure. A similar application, not addressed in this paper, is one in which a chamber wall, not specifically designed as a vent area but known to be considerably weaker than the rest of the chamber, may fail as a frangible panel. In both cases, if an estimate of the reaction capacity of the panel or wall can be obtained, then the method presented in this paper would be useful for estimating the internal load. A general outline of the method will be presented first, followed by an illustrated example of the method and comparisons with actual test results.

EFFECT OF DELAYED VENTING ON INTERNAL BLAST LOADS

When panel connections do not fail immediately, venting is delayed. This delay can cause a significant increase in the internal loading by confining the blast and allowing the gas pressure to build up to a higher level before venting is initiated. Note that this is a different type of delay than that caused by a recessed panel as described above. A recessed panel poses no calculational problem for the FRANG code because the panel is still assumed to begin moving under the influence of the initial shock impulses. For the case when panel connections cause the delay, a structural calculation is required to determine the time at which the connections fail and panel movement begins.

Calculating the internal load in these cases involves several steps and cannot presently be done using a single computer code. For discussions in this paper, “delayed venting” will be used to identify cases in which panel connections do not fail instantaneously. Also, “time of failure” will be used to refer to the time at which these panel connections do fail.

CALCULATING TIME OF FAILURE AND THE INTERNAL LOAD

A primary point in calculating internal blast loads for delayed venting is to determine the time of connection failure. Once the time of failure is known, the pressure time-history can be easily constructed using existing computer codes. Calculating the time of failure requires
consideration of the airblast load function and the flexural resistance of the panel, both of which are functions of time. The internal load is calculated in two segments, one before and one after the panel connection failure. The two segments are then joined together to form the total estimated airblast load function.

The method presented employs four computer programs. In addition to the FRANG program mentioned above, the following programs are used: BLASTINW, an internal blast code (Reference 2), SDOF, a single-degree-of-freedom dynamic structural analysis code (Reference 3), and FAILTIME, a code which interfaces with SDOF to calculate the time of panel connection failure (Reference 4).

The method involves five major steps and requires a working knowledge of single degree of freedom equivalent system analytical procedures. A thorough discussion of dynamic structural response and SDOF analysis is found in References 5 and 6. In the steps that follow, no attempt is made to list all of the assumptions and limitations of the four codes used. This information can be obtained by contacting the parties referenced for each code.

STEP 1: CALCULATE INTERNAL LOAD FOR CLOSED CHAMBER

If it is assumed that the pressure time-history prior to the time of failure is identical to the pressure time-history in a closed chamber up to that point in time, then the BLASTINW code can be used to quickly construct the first segment of the load function. The first step is to run BLASTINW for a closed chamber identical to the actual chamber with the exception that venting is not allowed. This calculation produces a pressure time-history, \( P(t) \), for a fully contained explosion without any decay associated with venting. At this point, the venting initiation time is unknown.

This closed chamber pressure time-history, \( P(t) \), will be used to drive the calculations in Steps 2 and 3 until the time of failure is determined. It is necessary to integrate the closed chamber pressure time-history, \( P(t) \), to obtain the impulse time-history, \( I(t) \), for use in Step 4. In Step 4 the FRANG code will be used to calculate the decaying gas pressure time-history, \( P_g(t) \), resulting from variable venting following the time of failure. Finally, in Step 5 the closed chamber pressure time-history will be truncated at the time of failure, and the decaying segment of the pressure time-history from Step 4 will be appended to construct the final estimated pressure time-history within the chamber.

STEP 2: CALCULATE THE DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF THE PANEL

The panel is analyzed using the SDOF code to determine the panel center displacement time-history, \( D(t) \), using as input the closed chamber pressure time-history, \( P(t) \), of Step 1; the flexural resistance function of the panel, \( K(d) \); and the mass of the panel. The resistance function, \( K(d) \), is the variation in panel flexural resistance with displacement. The panel connections are assumed infinitely strong. The SDOF displacement time-history, \( D(t) \), is calculated well past the time of expected panel connection failure. This displacement time-history is used in Step 3 to calculate the resistance time-history, \( R(t) \), of the panel.

STEP 3: CALCULATE THE TIME AT WHICH PANEL CONNECTIONS FAIL

FAILTIME first constructs a resistance time-history, \( R(t) \), using the SDOF displacement time-history, \( D(t) \), from Step 2 and the flexural resistance function, \( K(d) \), of the panel. Then FAILTIME constructs the dynamic reaction, \( V(t) \), by solving

\[
V(t) = a[P(t)] + b[R(t)]
\]  

(Reference 6) using the resistance time-history, \( R(t) \), and the closed chamber pressure time-history, \( P(t) \), from Step 1. In this equation, \( a \) and \( b \) are coefficients that vary according to whether the response is elastic or plastic.

Once the dynamic reaction, \( V(t) \), is known, the time at which the panel connections fail can be determined. The connections are assumed to fail when the dynamic reaction, \( V(t) \), at the ends of the panel exceeds the connection capacity, \( V_{\text{max}} \), of the connections. The connection capacity is the largest dynamic reaction that can be sustained by the panel connections before failure occurs. When one of several modes of failure are possible (for example, bolt failure in shear or tension, anchor pullout, concrete breakout, etc.), the connection capacity is based on the mode of failure requiring the least reaction. The dynamic reaction, \( V(t) \), at one end of the panel is calculated in units of force (pounds). The connection capacity, \( V_{\text{max}} \), must also be expressed in units of force. After entering the connection capacity, \( V_{\text{max}} \), FAILTIME checks to see if the connection capacity was exceeded by the dynamic reaction, \( V(t) \). By plotting the dynamic reaction, \( V(t) \), with the constant connection capacity, \( V_{\text{max}} \), a determination can be made as to when and if the panel connection failed.

FAILTIME is written for simply supported, uniformly loaded, one-way panels. Future revisions of the FAILTIME code will allow treatment of panels having all four sides supported.

STEP 4: VARIABLE VENTING CALCULATION

With an estimate for the time at which the panel connections will fail, the FRANG code can be used to calculate the gas pressure decay. \( P_g(t) \), in the chamber as the panel moves away from the open-end and venting occurs. To do this the impulse acting on the panel at the time the panel connections fail, \( I(\text{fail}) \), must be obtained from the closed chamber impulse-time-history, \( I(t) \), from Step 1. This is the impulse that is used by FRANG to accelerate the panel. (In a standard FRANG calculation, when there is no delay of venting caused by the panel connections, the initial shock impulse is used to accelerate the panel). After additional input, including the equivalent charge weight, the panel weight, and
dimensional parameters of the chamber and vent area, FRANG calculates the gas pressure time-history, $P(t)$, as it decays to zero.

**STEP 5: CONSTRUCTION OF THE TOTAL PRESSURE TIME-HISTORY**

As stated earlier, for delayed venting the FRANG calculation represents only that segment of the pressure time-history consisting of the pressure decay following the time of failure. The BLASTINW calculation, $P(t)$, from Step 1, based on a closed chamber, does not include the effects of venting. Therefore, the final step is to truncate the closed chamber pressure time-history, $P(t)$, at the estimated time of failure and then append the FRANG decaying pressure time-history, $P(t)$, at this point to construct the final estimate of the total internal blast loading.

**COMPARISON OF CALCULATIONS WITH TEST RESULTS**

The following example compares calculations from the five-step method of analysis and actual test results. An explosive charge was detonated inside a chamber having a volume of approximately 2,600 cubic feet and one vent area of 120 square feet. The opening was covered with a panel having an approximate weight of 0.20 psi. The panel measured 10 feet high by 12 feet wide and was connected only across the top and bottom edges. The panel was considered to have one-way action in flexure and simple supports. An 18-inch-wide section of the panel was analyzed. This section had an estimated connection capacity, $V(\text{max})$, at each end of 23,200 pounds based on combined shear and tensile stresses in the panel connections. In the following discussion, reference to the "backwall" will identify the chamber wall opposite the vent area.

Calculations were made, following the five steps outlined above. First, using the actual test chamber dimensions, charge data, etc., BLASTINW calculated the average pressure time-history, $P(t)$, on the backwall as if venting had not occurred; that is, for a closed chamber (Figure 1). Using this closed chamber pressure time-history and the structural properties of the panel, SDOF calculated the displacement time-history, $D(t)$, of the panel. The SDOF input and resulting displacement time-history are shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. FAILTIME then constructed the resistance time-history, $R(t)$, (Figure 4) using the flexural resistance function, $K(d)$, and the displacement time-history, $D(t)$. With the resistance time-history, $R(t)$, and the closed chamber pressure time-history, $P(t)$, FAILTIME then solved Equation 1 for the dynamic reaction, $V(t)$. In Figure 5, the dynamic reaction, $V(t)$, is compared to the connection capacity, $V(\text{max})$, of the panel. The calculated dynamic reaction builds and eventually exceeds the connection capacity about 48 msec after detonation of the explosive. Since the connection capacity was barely exceeded, a conservative estimate for the time of failure was taken as 55 msec.

![Figure 1. BLASTINW closed chamber pressure time-history](image1)

![Figure 2. Resistance function and SDOF input](image2)

![Figure 3. SDOF displacement time-history](image3)
The impulse at the time of failure, $I_{\text{fail}}$, equal to 1,750 psi-msec, was estimated from the closed chamber impulse time-history, $I(t)$, in Figure 1. These impulses and other panel and charge data were entered into FRANG to calculate the decay of the gas pressure, $P_g(t)$, in the chamber after the time of failure. This segment of the pressure time-history is shown in Figure 6. Finally, the closed chamber pressure time-history, $P(t)$, was truncated at the estimated time of failure, and the gas pressure time-history decay, $P_g(t)$, was appended (Figure 7) to obtain the final estimate of the total internal loading.

A typical recorded pressure and impulse time-history on the backwall from the actual test is shown in Figure 6. The gas pressure rise within the chamber is clearly discernable as a long duration swell between 13 and 100 msec on which the highly transient shock pressures are superimposed. Figure 9 is a comparison of the calculated and measured average impulse time-histories on the backwall. The calculated and measured maximum impulses compare well. The calculated maximum impulse (2,075 psi-msec) exceeds the measured maximum impulse (1,830 psi-msec) by a factor of only 1.13. It is interesting to note that the difference in the calculated maximum impulse between the delayed (2,075 psi-msec) and instantaneous (750 psi-msec) connection failure is a factor of 2.4. This observation stresses the importance of carefully considering the time of connection failure when calculating internal loads.

Figure 4. FAILTIME resistance time-history

Figure 5. Comparison of FAILTIME dynamic reaction with estimated reaction capacity

Figure 6. FRANG gas pressure decay time-history

Figure 7. Total estimated pressure time-history
CONCLUSIONS

With good engineering judgment, the method presented can be used to calculate internal loads for a variety of venting situations not treated before. With a good understanding of dynamic structural analyses and internal blast phenomena, the engineer can produce good approximations for internal loads when the initiation of venting is dependent on the delayed failure time of the panel.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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REFERENCES

3. Hyde, D. W., SDOF computer code, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

In addition, high-speed photography shows that panel movement began at approximately 50 msec, which compares well with the calculated 51 msec delay time.

Therefore, the five-step method provided a good estimate of the time of failure and the internal blast loading in the chamber.

Although not presented herein, this method was also used to predict the time of failure and internal load for another test having the same type panel but a lower connection capacity. The method correctly predicted a time of failure of 20 msec. To help put the effect of venting delay in perspective, comparison of the maximum impulse from these two tests reveals an approximate 40 percent increase by delaying the time of failure from 20 to 50 msec.

Figure 8. Typical measured pressure and impulse time-history

Figure 9. Comparison of average backwall impulse calculation with test data
Backfill Effects on Buried Structure Response

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we further investigate the role of Structure Medium Interaction (SMI) on buried structure response. A simple SMI model can be constructed from applying the boundary condition between the soil and structure that requires continuity of both stress and displacement at the soil structure interface. Exploiting these simple boundary conditions, coupled with a simple model of the structural deflection, a set of differential equations that represent the response of a buried structure to explosively produced loading are derived. Limiting cases are developed for flexible, perfectly plastic structures to fully demonstrate the interaction between the incident ground shock loading and the structural deformation. It is shown that deformation is controlled by applied stress and displacement of the soil. For very flexible walls, it is shown that the wall separates from the soil very early in time, and the solution degenerates to the familiar impulsive load response case.

INTRODUCTION

Structure medium interaction (SMI) effects play an important role in the response of buried protective structures when subjected to ground shock loading from conventional weapons. The influence can be profound for highly flexible structures, with the effect diminishing as the structure becomes rigid. Several papers have appeared in the recent literature, for example, Drake, Frank and Rochefort (1), Himma and Weidling. (2) and (3), that have incorporated SMI models in the design of buried structures.

While the application of SMI models has only recently been introduced into the design of protective structures, the role of SMI on the response of embedded structures has been recognized for more than a century. For example, Rayleigh (4) studied the radiation field produced by plane sound waves impinging on rigid and gaseous spherical inclusions. The designs of naval structures (i.e., submarines and ships) have used the Taylor plate models and plane wave interaction models since World War II. Perhaps the most widely used formulation is the Doubly Asymptotic Approximation (DAA) developed by Gears (5) that embodies both the high frequency "plane wave approximation" and the low frequency effects where the motion of the structure and fluid are acting inphase.

It was demonstrated by Drake, et al. (1), that a simple SMI model can be constructed from applying the boundary condition between the soil and structure that requires continuity of both stress and displacement at the soil structure interface. Exploiting these simple boundary conditions, coupled with a simple model of the structural deflection, a set of differential equations that represent the response of a buried structure to explosively produced loading were developed. The equations have direct analogy to the familiar single degree-of-freedom (SDOF) system with damping and are easily solved by analytical and numerical means. A comparison of mid-span deflections measured on buried wall explosive tests and computations using this simple model was within ±30 percent of experiments.

In this paper, we further investigate the role of SMI on buried structure response. Limiting cases are developed for flexible, perfectly plastic structures to fully demonstrate the interaction between the incident ground shock loading and the structural deformation. It is shown that, to first order, deformation is controlled by both the incident stress and the displacement of the soil. For very flexible walls, it is shown that the wall separates from the soil very early in time, and the solution degenerates to the familiar impulsive load response case.

PROBLEM DEFINITION

A formulation of the SMI model is given by Drake, et al. (1) by a combination of simple wave propagation theory in the soil and rigid body mechanisms in the structure. Boundary conditions of continuity of both stress and displacement between the soil and structure are imposed for a SMI model. At the interface,

\[ \sigma_I = \sigma_{IF} + \sigma_F \]  

(1)

where \( \sigma_I \) is the interface stress, \( \sigma_{IF} \) is the incident free-field stress and \( \sigma_F \) is the reflected stress from the structure. Also at the
boundary, continuity of displacements requires

\[ V_{ff} - V_r = \dot{u} \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where \( V_{ff} \) is the particle velocity associated with \( \sigma_{ff} \) and \( V_r \) is the reflected particle velocity and \( \dot{u} \) is the velocity of the structure. The equation of motion for the structural motion is

\[ \sigma_1 = \rho_3 L \dot{u} + R(u) \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where \( \rho_3 \) is the mass density of the structure, \( L \) is the structure thickness, and \( R(u) \) is the resistance per unit area. For an elastic-perfectly plastic structure

\[ R(u) = \begin{cases} Ku & u \leq u_p \\ R_{max} & u > u_p \end{cases} \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Using the relationship

\[ \sigma_r = \rho c V_r \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where \( \rho \) is the mass density and \( c \) is the propagation velocity of the soil and incorporating the boundary conditions, Eqs. 1, 2, and 4, results in the expression

\[ \rho_3 L \dot{u} + \rho c \dot{u} + R(u) = \sigma_{ff} + \rho c V_{ff} \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

which is the equation of motion for the structure that includes the interaction effect. Strictly speaking, Eq. 5 is for a linear soil, but for real soils, the stress and velocity time histories have different waveforms during unloading. Note that the SMI effect manifests itself as a damping term related to the radiation damping provided by the reflected wave from the structure. Also note that

\[ \sigma_{ff, max} = \rho c V_{ff, max} \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

at shock impingement on the structure. Thus the initial reflection factor is two times the incident stress which arises from the tacit assumption that the structure is moving as a rigid body. As pointed out in Reference 1, substituting a reflection factor based on acoustic wave propagation theory in place of the factor of two will not conserve momentum in this model. Also, the reflection factor produced by this model can be as low as one -- depending on the rise time of the incident stress pulse.

Note that during the early phase of the response when \( R(u) = 0 \), then Eq. 3 is \( \sigma_1 = \rho_3 L \dot{u} \), showing the interface stress is simply the acceleration of the structure times the mass. However, the stress quickly decays as the structure is rapidly accelerated to the particle velocity of the soil at the interface. The maximum structural velocity occurs when \( \dot{u} = 0 \),

\[ a_{max} = 2 V_{ff} - \frac{R}{\rho c} \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Thus the maximum velocity that the structure can obtain is twice the free-field particle velocity incident to the structure. It can also be seen from Eq. 3 that the interface stress is reduced to the resistance at the time that the maximum velocity is reached.

The role of the properties of the backfill material can be investigated parametrically by exploring the response of a perfectly plastic system. This solution is easy to obtain and can be used to illustrate the salient features of the SMI problem. Detailed integration of Eq. 3 with complex resistance functions are in good agreement with the simple bounding solutions.

SOLUTIONS FOR PERFECTLY PLASTIC RESPONSE

Consider a perfectly plastic structure with a constant resistance function,

\[ R = R_{max} \]

Eq. 6 is easily integrated to give

\[ \sigma(t) = \frac{1}{\rho c} \int_0^t \left[ \sigma_{ff} + \rho c V_{ff} - R_{max} \right] e^{-\eta(t-t')} dt \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where \( \eta = \rho c/m \) and \( m = \rho_3 L \).

The free-field stress and velocity time histories can be estimated as (for example, see Reference 6)

\[ \sigma_{ff} = \rho c V_0 e^{-\alpha t} \]

\[ V_{ff} = V_0 e^{-\beta t} \]

where \( \alpha = r/c \), \( \beta = 1/2.5 \alpha \) and \( r \) is the distance to the structure from the explosion. Note that a simpler form of the velocity pulse is assumed here to facilitate the integration. Hence,

\[ V_0 = \frac{1}{1-\alpha/\eta} (e^{-\alpha t} - e^{-nt}) + \frac{1}{1-\beta/\eta} (e^{-\beta t} - e^{-nt}) - \frac{R_{max}}{\dot{a}_{max}} (1-e^{-nt}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (11)

where \( \dot{a}_{max} = \rho c V_0 \).

Limiting Case \( \eta > \alpha > 8 \)

For most flexible structures, \( \eta >> \alpha > 8 \). That is, the response time of the structure mass is much less than the duration of the free-field stress duration. For this case, as \( t > 1/\eta \), \( e^{-\eta t} \approx 0 \), the wall velocity becomes

\[ V_0 = e^{-\alpha t} + e^{-\beta t} - \frac{R_{max}}{\dot{a}_{max}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (12)
From this expression it can clearly be seen that the structure velocity simply follows the velocity history of the free-field stress and particle velocity components.

The displacement of the structure can be easily obtained by integrating Eq. 12 as

\[
\frac{u}{a} = \frac{V_0}{\beta} (1 - e^{-at}) + \frac{V_o}{\beta} (1 - e^{-\beta t}) - \frac{R_{\text{max}} t}{\rho c} \tag{13}
\]

Note that the free-field displacement is

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{u_{\text{ff}}}{\beta} &= \frac{V_0}{\beta} (1 - e^{-\beta t}) \\
\text{and that } a &= 2.5B,
\end{align*}
\]

so that the displacement of the structure is following the displacement of the soil, to first order.

Thus for the case of \(R_{\text{max}}/\rho c \ll V_0\), the maximum displacement of the structure is clearly bounded by

\[
\frac{u_{\text{max}}}{\beta} \leq \frac{u_{\text{ff}}}{\beta} (1 + e) \tag{14}
\]

where \(e = B/a < 1\). Of course for very resistant structures the displacements fall below this bound, provided that the resistance is sufficient to maintain contact between the soil and structure at the interface.

Drake, et al. (1) demonstrated this by parametric calculations and plotted the results as shown in figure 1 for \(B = a\). It can be seen that the maximum deflection is proportional to the free-field displacements over a wide range of input conditions. The dashed lines indicate where the structure separates from the soil, as discussed in the next section.

Thus, we note that the structural response for flexible structures is dominated by the motion of the free-field incident to the structure. To first order, the structure velocity quickly obtains and maintains the particle velocity of the soil. The effect of the structure resistance is to reduce this velocity by a constant amount.

From the free-field ground shock equations, it is noted that at a constant standoff distance,

\[
\begin{align*}
V_0 &= \text{constant} \\
\frac{u_{\text{ff}}}{\beta} &\propto \frac{1}{c} \tag{15}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus a tradeoff in the design and backfill properties is suggested. High quality backfill materials will exhibit higher \(c\) values, resulting in lower free-field displacements, but higher incident stresses. As shown in figure 1, varying the resistance provides only a modest decrease in the peak deflection.

**Limiting Case for Cavitation at Interface**

For very flexible structures (\(L/D = 10\)), the structure mass is very quickly accelerated to velocities approaching twice the free-field particle velocity. In these cases, tension can develop at the soil-structure interface, resulting in the structure being spalled or separated from the soil. Rejoining with the soil may occur later in time, depending on the decay characteristics of the incident pulse and the structure resistance. It can be shown from the solutions obtained in Eq. 9-11, that

\[
\sigma_t = 2 \frac{u_{\text{ff}}}{\beta} e^{nt}
\]

for very early times. Therefore, from Eq. 3,

\[
\frac{m}{\beta} = 2 \frac{\rho c V_0 e^{nt}}{R_{\text{max}}} - R_{\text{max}}
\]

and

\[
0 \sim 2 \frac{V_0}{\beta} - R_{\text{max}} \frac{t}{m}. \tag{16}
\]

where \(m = \rho bl\). The peak displacement occurs in this case at a time, \(t = 2 \frac{V_0 m}{R_{\text{max}}}\), and gives

\[
\frac{u_{\text{max}}}{\beta} = \frac{2m}{\rho c} \frac{V_0^2}{R_{\text{max}}} \tag{17}
\]

which is the familiar impulse response of plastic systems.

The expression in Eq. 8 can be improved somewhat by using the peak velocity of the wall as given by Eq. 8, and estimating the time of peak velocity as

\[
\frac{t_{\text{max}}}{\beta} = \frac{1 - R_{\text{max}}/2R_{\text{max}}}{(\rho c/m + a)} \tag{18}
\]
which gives
\[
\frac{U_{\text{max}}}{V_0} = \frac{2 - R_{\text{max}}/a_{\text{max}}}{1 + \alpha m/pc}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (19)

Thus a better estimate of the peak displacement is
\[
U_{\text{max}} = \frac{1}{2} m V_0^2 \left( \frac{2 - R_{\text{max}}/a_{\text{max}}}{1 + \alpha m/pc} \right)^2
\]  \hspace{1cm} (20)

Criteria for the cavitation at the interface can be established from Eq. 12. The interface stress can be calculated from Eq. 3 noting that
\[
\frac{U_{\text{max}}}{V_0} = ae^{-\alpha t} - \beta e^{-\beta t}
\]
resulting in the expression
\[
\sigma_1 = R - m V_0 (ae^{-\alpha t} + \beta e^{-\beta t})
\]  \hspace{1cm} (21)

In order to remain in contact with the soil, \( \sigma_1 > 0 \), which requires
\[
\frac{R_{\text{max}}}{m} \geq V_0 c (a e^{-\alpha t} + \beta e^{-\beta t})
\]  \hspace{1cm} (22)

For purposes of developing an estimate, note that \( a = c/r \) and \( \beta = \alpha/2.5 \) so that
\[
\frac{R_{\text{max}}}{m} \geq \frac{V_0 c}{r} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{R_{\text{max}}}{a_{\text{max}}} \geq \frac{\rho_\ell L}{\rho F}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (23)

Thus to avoid cavitation and minimize the structure deflection, the ratio of the resistance to the incident stress must be greater than the ratio of mass of the structure to the mass of the soil between the structure and the explosion.

Therefore, in the case of very flexible structures where cavitation is the dominant response mode, the maximum deflection is largely independent of the soil medium, increasing somewhat for high velocity soils as the term \( R/pc \) becomes small.

COMPARISON WITH TESTS AND CALCULATIONS

A number of buried structure tests were conducted by the U. S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station in support of the U. S. Air Force Engineering and Services Center (7). The tests, as reported by Baylot, used slabs with length to thickness ratios of 5 and 10, and varied the weapon position to sustain different damage levels. Calculated wall deflections using the SNI model described in this paper were shown to be within \( \pm 30 \% \) of the observed deflections (see figure 2). All of the salient features observed in the tests were successfully predicted by the theory; namely, (a) the rapid decay of the interface stress following the initial peak, (b) peak interface stress that was only slightly higher than the incident peak stress due to the finite risetime of the input pulse, (c) in some cases, separation (i.e., \( \sigma_1 = 0 \)) at the soil structure interface, (d) late time interface stresses that approach the structural resistance, (e) and, most importantly, the deflections were accurately calculated by a simple handbook idealization of the structure.

In these tests, the slabs with length to thickness ratios of 10 were observed to separate from the soil shortly after the shock arrival. Peak rotations at the support calculated by Eq. 20 is shown in figure 3 compared with the observed rotations. It can be seen that the calculations compare favorably with the test results for the charge parallel to the wall. Departure from the theory can be explained on the variation in the weapon effects due to weapon orientation. Lower deformations were observed for weapons orientated in an end-on configuration and larger for a vertical orientation.

Another case that of cavitation dominating the structural response is clearly shown by a parametric study by Weidlinger and Hinman (3). Their
SUMMARY

A SMI model is proposed that accurately models the interface condition between a structure and soil. During the loading phase, continuity of both stress and displacement between the soil and structure was maintained. Resulting equations of motion for this system resemble those of a SDOF system with damping. However, the damping term is the result of satisfying the stated boundary conditions and is not related in any way to viscous or frictional damping effects.

It was shown that interface stress is highly dependent upon the inertial effects and the deflection of the structural section. For many important cases, the interface stress approaches zero within twenty-five transit times through the structural section and then slowly approaches the structural velocity cannot exceed twice the incident free-field particle velocity even for very low resistance structures. In contrast, current design methods which apply the free-field stresses directly as the interface stress violate the basic displacement boundary condition and cause the structure element to be accelerated to velocities far greater than physically possible.

A comparison of theoretical results with buried wall experiments is excellent. Calculated wall deflections were within ±30 percent of those observed in tests. Interface stresses were accurately predicted as well. The theory is easily solved for any structure and incident loading by analytical methods or numerically on desktop or programmable calculators.
REFERENCES


ABSTRACT:

Soil-Structure Interaction is an important consideration in calculating the response of buried structures to blast effects. Results from the Shallow-Buried Structures (SBS) research program, which is sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency, have shown that typical buried command and control type structures can survive as much as tenfold greater peak overpressure from a nuclear weapon than was thought possible. The unexpected hardness of the buried structures resulted primarily because the effects of soil-structure interaction had been underestimated. Data from the SBS research have resulted in significant revisions in vulnerability computational methods and in our estimates of buried structure vulnerability to nuclear weapons.

In attempts to extrapolate the analytical methods developed in the SBS research program to compute buried structural response to conventional weapons, there is a great deal of uncertainty because of the localized loading and response from conventional weapons. For example, the curves shown in Figure 1 indicate about the same predicted structural response in a backfill with low seismic velocity (about 1,000 fps), but show a considerable difference in predicted structural response at higher seismic velocities. There are many structures in backfills with higher seismic velocities, especially in Europe. Also, if backfill type does not affect structural...
response, a considerable cost savings could be realized in future construction projects by not requiring a select backfill.

Unfortunately, there are very little data from conventional weapon tests on buried structures in backfill materials with seismic velocities outside the range of about 800 to 1,500 fps. The differences indicated by the curves in Figure 1 have recently assumed a greater importance, since the analytical methods from the Army Technical Manual 5-855-1 predict increasing structural response with increasing seismic velocity, and analytical methods in a new draft Air Force design manual predict structural response to be very nearly independent of seismic velocity.

This paper will review the applicable theory, evaluate the analytical methods depicted by the curves in Figure 1, and compare predictions using these methods with the limited data base available.
Figure 1. Structural response versus seismic velocity of backfill. (From Hinman, Ewe E., and Weidlinger, P.)
-load connections under the application of close-in detonation effects has been studied. Typical connection details were analyzed by the finite element methods, and their performance under severe short-duration localized loads was evaluated. Observed deficiencies in the behavior were examined, and subsequent design modifications were shown to correct the response. The procedure for evaluating several knee- and tee-joints is presented and discussed. Recommendations are provided for the design of such connections.

Load Definition

The magnitude and time pulse history of the blast load were determined through interpolation of data shown in Coltharp, et al. (1985). A 20" wide strip was superimposed on the proposed pressure grid at the worst case location. The pressure was then converted to a concentrated load which will act on the end of a cantilever beam. The resultant peak load was set at 2451 kips. Based on the same report, the rise time to first peak was set at 0.04 usec. The duration of positive pressure was set at 0.53 usec.

Introduction

Usually, connections are assumed to be rigid systems which allow the adjoining elements to develop their full potential. However, if the connections are not designed adequately that will not be the case, and the structures will fail prematurely. Examples of this type of behavior are many as discussed in (Krauthammer, 1967), where it was shown that floor-arch joints exhibited major damage. Despite the fact that these structures were tested under a simulated nuclear environment, similar modes of behavior could exist under localized detonations. Recent studies on the modeling of concrete behavior under high rate load effects at the University of Minnesota have made it possible to accurately analyze connections subjected to this type of loading.

Load Definition

The magnitude and time pulse history of the blast load were determined through interpolation of data shown in Coltharp, et al. (1985). A 20" wide strip was superimposed on the proposed pressure grid at the worst case location. The pressure was then converted to a concentrated load which will act on the end of a cantilever beam. The resultant peak load was set at 2451 kips. Based on the same report, the rise time to first peak was set at 0.04 usec. The duration of positive pressure was set at 0.53 usec.

Connection Models

Ten connection details were analyzed for their structural integrity under blast loading.

The analysis was completed with a finite element code SAPSON 2 written by Schreyer, et al. (1984). This code utilizes a constitutive concrete damage model written by Stevens and Krauthammer (1988) at the University of Minnesota. In the compression domain the model utilizes a combination of plasticity and continuum damage mechanics theories with a nonlocal definition of a scalar damage variable to model strain softening. In tensile regions a nonasssociated flow rule with associated modification is used. This procedure will accurately predict strength states for tension and shear while holding dilatational strains to a minimum and eliminating the possibility of spontaneous energy generation. The concrete was modeled with a mesh composed of quadratic 8 node rectangular and 6 node triangular elements. The mesh element size was refined until a change in stress of 5% or less was observed between adjacent elements. This mesh was then compared to a further refined mesh with a stress deviation of 5% or less recorded at identical points. The steel reinforcement was modeled using bar elements connected to the midline nodes of the concrete elements.

Abstract

The response of reinforced and precast connections under the application of close-in detonation effects has been studied. Typical connection details were analyzed by the finite element methods, and their performance under severe short-duration localized loads was evaluated. Observed deficiencies in the behavior were examined, and subsequent design modifications were shown to correct the response. The procedure for evaluating several knee- and tee-joints is presented and discussed. Recommendations are provided for the design of such connections.
The adequacy of this procedure was checked by modeling reinforced concrete beams and comparing the results to those measured experimentally by Feldman and Siess (1958).

**MAX. DISPLACEMENT**

(exper) (samson2) C-1
3.0" 3.2" H-1
8.4" 7.2" These results are very good considering the high degree of nonlinearity and erratic impulsive loading.

Below is a brief summary of each connection and its reinforcement details. All connections represent a slice (or thickness) of 20\(^\circ\), reinforcement yield strength of 60 ksi, and concrete strength of 6 ksi as shown in Figure 1.

**Monolithic Knee Joint**

Five different geometries with varying reinforcement were tested.

**Figure 1 (SLAB-WALL)**

The first connection (BL-1A, Figure 2) incorporates an 18" wide by 20" thick column and beam detail. The beam and column are reinforced with 1\% steel (3 - #9 bars, fy = 60 ksi) on each face. Diagonal steel (2 - #8 bars) is placed on the inside corner of the beam-column interface at a 45 degree angle with 2" of cover. The #9 main flexural bars are anchored in the joint with standard 90 degree hooks. Transverse stirrups are tied around the #8 diagonal bars and the outer face flexural bars. The stirrups provide confinement for the joint core, compression resistance for the outside flexural bars, crack control at the interior of the joint, and buckling resistance for the diagonal steel under a closing moment. The size and spacing of the stirrups can be determined by the procedure proposed by Park and Paulay (1975).

The second connection (BSL2A, Figure 3) incorporates a 12" wide by 20" thick column and beam detail. The beam and column are reinforced with 1.5\% steel (3 - #9 bars, fy = 60 ksi) on each face. Diagonal steel (3 - #8 bars) is placed 2" from the exterior face of an 8" diagonal concrete strut located on the inside corner of the beam-column interface. The #9 main flexural bars are anchored in the joint with standard 90 degree hooks. Transverse stirrups are tied around the #8 diagonal bars and the outer face flexural bars.
The fourth connection (BL-6C) is identical to BL-6A with one exception. The diagonal bar steel is increased to $3\#7$s which is equal to the amount of steel used for the main flexural bars.

The fifth connection (BLS6A) incorporates an $18''$ wide by $20''$ thick column and beam detail with sifcon material added in the connection region as shown in Figure 4. The material properties used for sifcon with $12\%$ by volume deformed steel wires are as follows: modulus of elasticity $1200$ ksi; compressive strength $12$ ksi; and a tensile strength of $1.8$ ksi (Homrich and Naaman, 1988). The geometry and reinforcement used in this detail are identical to the BL-6A connection.

Two types of precast details were tested. The first detail (PL-1O, Figure 5) incorporates an $18''$ by $20''$ thick beam and column. The beam is placed on a corbel which protrudes $6''$ from the face of the column. A $1/2''$ cotton duck pad is placed between the bottom of the beam and the top of the corbel. A second pad is placed between the end of the beam and the face of the column. The beam is then postensioned to the column with four $9$ threaded rebar as shown in Figure 6. The $9$ bars are placed in $3'$ long sleeves in the beam and threaded into lenton couplers located in the column. These bars are then stressed to $33$ ksi which will compress the pad and insure a uniform seal. This detail (Figure 6) exhibited the best performance in a test of seven different precast connections.
subjected to severe dynamic loading (Jayashankar, 1987). In addition a continuous steel angle with a 3/8" diagonal strut located at 20" on center is welded to the face of the corbel and the bottom of the beam. The design of the corbel should follow standard practice as set forth by the PCI Design Handbook (1985).

The second detail (BT-6A, Figure 8) incorporates an 18" wide by 20" thick column and beam. The beam and column are reinforced with 0.6% steel (3 - #7 bars, fy = 60 ksi) on each face. Diagonal steel (2 - #6 bars) is placed 2" from the exterior face of a 4.5" diagonal concrete strut located on the inside corner of the beam-column interface. The #7 flexural bars extending from the beam are anchored in the joint with standard 90 degree hooks. The column reinforcement is continuous through the joint.

The second detail (PL-2S, Figure 7) incorporates an 18" by 20" thick beam and column. The beam is placed on a corbel which protrudes 6" from the face of the column. A 1/2" cotton duck pad is placed between the bottom of the beam and the top of the corbel. A 4" gap between the end of the beam and the face of the column will be grouted solid. The beam is then post tensioned to the column with four #9 threaded rebar similar to detail PL-1D.
The second detail (BT-8A, Figure 9) incorporates the same beam and column dimensions with identical steel reinforcement as for BT-6A. However, the diagonal strut is increased to 9" and the diagonal steel located 2" from the face of the strut is increased to 3-#7 bars.

![Figure 9 Connection BT-8A](image)

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

A summary of results for the five monolithic knee joint connection details are shown in Table 1. Peak deflections and stresses are shown for concrete and steel elements at critical locations in the detail. These values are compared to the allowable and a determination is made on the reliability of the detail.

### Table 1 Monolithic Knee Joints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENT</th>
<th>STRESS</th>
<th>ALLOW.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>42600</td>
<td>41300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 bar</td>
<td>42600</td>
<td>41300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The detail with a 12" beam and column (BSL2A) shows values of deflections and stresses which exceed the allowable in all respects. The design of the members in this detail are not sufficient to resist the design load. Detail BL-1A required a large amount of steel to obtain acceptable deflections and large bar stresses were recorded at the center of the connection (element #64). For these reasons a diagonal strut such as shown in details (BT-6A), (BT-6C), and (BSL6A) should be added. Detail BL-6A satisfied all the above criteria with a relatively low amount of steel reinforcement (0.6%). Increasing the amount of diagonal steel from half of the main flexural steel has little effect on the connections performance (see detail BL-6C). The connection which performed the best out of the five, incorporated "Sifcon" material in the joint region. Both deflections and bar stresses in the joint region decreased dramatically.

A summary of the precast knee joint connection behavior is shown in Table 2. Detail PL-1D transfers all compressive loads through a flexible, reinforced fiber pad. Deflections are maintained at an acceptable value, however compressive stress in the top reinforcement is well into yield which may cause buckling. The stress in the tensile reinforcement does not reach yield, however the stress is 20% higher than allowable. Reducing the amount of prestress to 10 ksi should alleviate this problem.

### Table 2 Precast Knee Joints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENT</th>
<th>STRESS</th>
<th>ALLOW.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>psi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>node 146</td>
<td>T-disp in.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 shear</td>
<td>-820</td>
<td>-808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 X</td>
<td>-2700</td>
<td>-1850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 bar</td>
<td>43000</td>
<td>41000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 bar</td>
<td>31600</td>
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<tr>
<td>70 bar</td>
<td>43000</td>
<td>43000</td>
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<tr>
<td>71 bar</td>
<td>43000</td>
<td>43000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 bar</td>
<td>31600</td>
<td>24000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 bar</td>
<td>27000</td>
<td>25000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details PL-2S and PL-4S are grouted in place with a 6000 psi concrete. Compressive stress in the top reinforcement is well within allowable. Tensile stress in the bottom bars is very near yield. Reducing the amount of prestress in (PL-4S) to 10 ksi has lowered the stress to near acceptable values. Stiffening the compressive region of this connection with grout has greatly increased the tension on the continuous angle assembly located at the corbel. The spacing of the stiffeners on this assembly should be decreased to 10" on center.

51
The results for the monolithic tee joint are shown in Table 3. Detail BT-6A uses a 4 1/2" diagonal strut. The tensile reinforcement in the beam is stressed well into the yield range. Therefore we increased the strut size to 9" and the area of the diagonal steel to (0.6%) in detail BT-6A. This reduced the tensile stresses in the joint region and relocated the hinge to an acceptable distance from the joint interface. Both details have shown high flexural shear stresses at the interface and interior of the joint. This is due to a stiff column flexible beam configuration. Correct design of shear stirrups at these regions of concentrated moment and shear is a necessity. The reinforcement in the column was subject to very light stress (20 ksi max.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENT #</th>
<th>STRESS psi</th>
<th>ALLOW.</th>
<th>BT-6A</th>
<th>BT-6A</th>
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<td>-620</td>
<td>-650</td>
<td>-640</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>shear</td>
<td>-620</td>
<td>-650</td>
<td>-620</td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Y-strain</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>bar</td>
<td>21600</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>bar</td>
<td>21600</td>
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<td>19000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>bar</td>
<td>43300</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>bar</td>
<td>43300</td>
<td>88000</td>
<td>61000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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"Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI '18-83)," American Concrete Institute, Detroit, Michigan, 1983, 111 p.


A NONLOCAL CONTINUUM-DAMAGE PLASTICITY APPROACH FOR RC BEAMS SUBJECTED TO LOCAL IMPULSE

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, a rate-independent constitutive model for plain concrete is proposed for application to the analysis of impulse loaded structural members. The model combines a continuum damage approach, using a scalar damage variable, with a pressure sensitive plasticity model. The plasticity model incorporates a nonassociated flow rule in regions of low compressive or tensile hydrostatic pressures and an associated flow rule. The concrete model is combined with a uniaxial steel model and a layered, large strain, Timoshenko beam element to perform the analysis of impulse loaded, simply supported, reinforced concrete beams.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The analysis of the response of impulse and blast loaded structures, buried and above ground, has received a continuous but varying level of attention over the past 40 years. Due to the almost infinite number of permutations of a given structure’s parameters (i.e., geometry, material properties, depth of burial, etc.) and anticipated threats, and, due to the costs of performing full- and small-scale tests on such structures, the amount of available experimental data, while broad, is also scant relative to any particular combination of structure and impulse load. Thus, the development of analytical/computational tools are required in order to: 1) understand the complex nonlinear behavior of the structure (and soil, if buried), 2) perform parametric studies, and 3) develop design guidelines.

One analytical tool is the Finite Element Method, which has been applied with great success to geometrically and materially nonlinear continua and structural problems. The geometric nonlinearities can be modelled with the well known kinematic formulations of large displacement analyses (Lagrangian, Eulerian, Updated Lagrangian); the material nonlinearities are not as easily accounted for. While adequate models exist for the nonlinear behavior of steel, the development of an accurate self-consistent, and unified model for the nonlinear response of plain concrete is still an active area of interest.

In order to achieve a high-quality numerical solution to a given boundary value problem, an improved, rate independent, strain softening, nonlocal Continuum Damage/Plasticity (CDP) model for plain concrete is presented in this paper and certain attributes of this model are developed to facilitate its application in structural elements, such as beams, plates, and shells.

Given the complex behavior of concrete, it is not surprising that a large number of distinctly different constitutive models for concrete have been proposed over the years. Here, only the Continuum Damage Mechanics/Plasticity models and models for strain softening are discussed.

The nonlinear response of concrete is created through the combination of microcrack growth and frictional slip. The theory of Continuum Damage Mechanics accounts for the phenomena of strength and stiffness degradation due to microcracking; the plastic flow and prepeak nonlinearity of concrete can be modelled with the theory of Plasticity. Recently, the two theories have been combined to form a number of successful approaches for modelling plain concrete. One of the first attempts at combining the damage and plasticity phenomena was made by Bazant and Kim ‘79, who merged a conventional plasticity approach with a strain based fracturing theory. Later, Han and Chen ‘87 combined a stress based hardening plasticity theory for the pre-failure response of concrete with a strain based plastic/fracturing theory for the response after failure. Using the internal variable theory of thermodynamics, Yazdani and Schreyer ‘87 developed a Von Mises plasticity surface and a mean pressure sensitive damage surface that accommodates the two modes (shear and tensile) of cracking by taking into account the current stress state at the crack surface as determined by the orthogonal projections of the stress tensor. Also, Simo et al. ‘87 coupled a conventional stress based Cap model with a scalar damage variable that evolves using the rule suggested by Mazars ‘82; this approach yielded excellent results. Lastly, Frantickonis and Desai ‘87 combined a scalar damage approach with plasticity theory and found good agreement between predictions and test results.

The application of softening, rate independent constitutive models in the treatment of initial boundary value problems leads to a loss of hyperbolicity in the governing equations of motion and to mesh dependency, localization of strains, and erroneous predictions of energy dissipation in numerical calculations; thus, the potential for
such negative side effects exists for each of the models mentioned in the previous paragraph. As discussed by Read and Hegemier '84, strain softening in concrete is the direct result of the formation of discrete internal structure due to microcracking. Thus, in the softening range, concrete can no longer be represented as a continuum and some form of representation of the internal structure must be included in the constitutive model. In order to overcome this difficulty in modeling, various methods for enforcing finite energy dissipation over a discrete region of the body and for removing the mesh dependency have been proposed; these include: a composite damage formulation which incorporates a "damage volume" and distinguishes between tensile and shear cracking (Williams, Bicanic, and Sture '84); the introduction of higher order spatial derivatives into the strain displacement relations (Lasry and Belytschko '87); and, the introduction of the strain gradient into the definition of the strength or yield function (Schreyer and Chen '86).

One method of particular interest involves uses of "nonlocal" constitutive laws, in which the dependent variable at a point is not solely a function of the state variables at that point but rather depends on what occurs in the neighborhood of that point. Such an approach was formulated for concrete by Bazant et al. '84, who averaged both stress and strain over the neighborhood of the point and used the nonlocal definitions of the stress and strain directly in the governing equations. Recently, Pijaudier-Cabot and Bazant '87 applied an averaging approach to a nonlocal definition of the damage variable in a Continuum Damage Mechanics model. With this approach, the field equations have the standard form and no extra boundary conditions are needed. Their work is particularly interesting in that they successfully combined their nonlocal approach with a layered beam element to analyze the flexural rotation of a statically loaded beam; they showed that, due to Euler's hypothesis of plane cross sections, the length for damage averaging can not be less than the beam depth. It should be noted that the use of the beam depth for averaging the damage can be validated physically by examining the hinge formations in beams that have been loaded to failure (Corley '66); in most cases, the hinge length is on the order of 85 to 95 percent of the total depth.

As is well known, rotatory inertia and shear effects significantly alter the response of structural elements that are loaded over a very short time period relative to the element's natural period, and, therefore, a layered, large displacement, large strain, Timoshenko beam element is developed. The proposed constitutive model is combined with this Timoshenko beam element and a strain hardening plasticity model for the reinforcing steel to successfully analyze two simply supported, impulse loaded, reinforced concrete beams tested by Feldman and Sies '85.

A NONLOCAL CONTINUUM DAMAGE/PLASTICITY MODEL FOR PLAIN CONCRETE

The concrete model developed herein is a combination of Continuum Damage Mechanics and Plasticity theories and it uses a nonlocal definition of a scalar damage variable to model strain softening. Various researchers have combined plasticity and continuum damage approaches to successfully reproduce test results of material elements; however, without a consistent technique for stabilizing the strain softening calculations, they appear doomed to the same shortcoming discussed above (mesh dependency, unrealistic energy dissipation, etc.) when applied to realistic boundary value problems. The nonlocal approach described in the following successfully incorporates strain softening effects.

The Continuum Damage Mechanics portion of the approach developed herein and discussed by Stevens and Krauthammer '88 (to appear), is based loosely on the approach proposed by Frantzikinakis and Desai '87, in which the strength and stiffness degradation are modeled with a scalar damage parameter. It can rightfully be argued that a complete three dimensional treatment of microcracking effects on the response of concrete requires a higher order definition of the damage variable, and, first, second, fourth, and even eighth order tensors have been proposed. However, in cases where damage directionality is not a dominant feature, such as in the plane strain or plane stress conditions of beams, frames, and slabs, a scalar parameter is sufficient (Rasband '87).

The determination of how the averaging of damage is to be performed (in order to develop a nonlocal damage parameter) is the value of the characteristic length, \( l \), (over which the averaging is to be performed) are based on considerations of the proposed application of the constitutive model. As Pijaudier-Cabot and Bazant '87 show, the use of the Euler hypothesis in a beam analysis requires that the averaging length be greater or equal to the beam depth. Therefore, since this constitutive model will be implemented into a Timoshenko beam element, which is based on the Euler principle and, in which, the shear stress is represented kinematically by a rotation of the cross section similar to the flexural rotation (as discussed later), the damage averaging is performed uniaxially at each layer of the beam element, in the direction parallel to the long axis of the beam, and the characteristic length, \( l \), is taken as the beam depth. This one dimensional averaging scheme restricts the possibility of strain softening through the depth of the beam; thus, while the nonlocal scalar damage parameter does degrade both shear and normal stresses, a monotonic loading path of pure shear at a cross-section of the beam will result in a constitutive response that is elastic/strain hardening plastic in shear, providing damage has not occurred at the integration points adjacent to the cross section. This shortcoming might be overcome through use of two nonlocal scalar damage parameters, representing tensile and shear damage, separately. However, as the results presented later show, this uniaxial damage averaging technique is suitable for the beams that were analyzed.

The next issue is the form of the evolution equations for the local damage parameter; in this approach, the evolution equations will be parameterized using the concept of equivalent tensile strain (Mazzetti '82; Ortiz '85; Simo and Ju '87).

The response of the topical (undamaged)
material is controlled by the plasticity portion of the CDP model, which employs a continuous, smooth yield surface that combines a strain hardening modified Drucker-Prager failure surface with a curved cap; this model was developed by Schreyer and Bean '87, who refer to it as a "Prager-Drucker" cap model to differentiate it from the Drucker-Prager cap model commonly used for modelling soils.

A typical modified Prager-Drucker yield surface in the $\{\bar{F}, \bar{P}\}$ plane is plotted in Figure 1.

Over the majority of the yield surface, the plastic strain tensor evolves through use of an associated flow rule; however, when the model is specialized from the three dimensional state to a plane strain state (as is typically assumed for analyses of structures that are "long" in the direction perpendicular to the plane of loading), a nonassociated flow rule provides more reasonable results in regions of tensile hydrostatic pressures and low compressive hydrostatic pressures. Under plane strain conditions, the associated flow rule generates dilatation, which creates, in turn, an unrealistic confinement stress in the out-of-plane direction; since concrete is a pressure sensitive material, this out-of-plane compressive stress can lead to erroneous predictions of shear and tensile strengths.

In order to obviate this shortcoming, the concrete model proposed herein uses a nonassociated flow rule in regions of tensile or low compressive (less than 0.1 $\varepsilon_r^c$) hydrostatic pressure to reduce the dilatational strain predictions while at the same time allowing adequate predictions of strength.

The nonassociated flow rule is implemented with a plastic potential that is chosen as another modified Drucker-Prager surface as shown in Figure 2.

There are two shortcomings to the use of a nonassociated flow rule. First, nonassociated flow rules lead to asymmetric tangential elastic-plastic compliance tensors, which, in turn, are difficult to accommodate computationally in the typical solution schemes used in Finite Element applications. However, since the central difference technique is used to integrate the equations of motion in the Finite Element approach discussed later, the tangential compliance is not explicitly calculated on the inverted space. This difficulty is avoided on the computational level. Second, and most importantly, the main criticism leveled against the use of nonassociated flow rules is the potential for spontaneous energy generation. This unpleasant fact was first discussed by Il'iuahin '61 (a summary of Il'iuahin's proof is presented by Sendler and Rubin '87).

The modified Prager-Drucker plasticity model has the following advantages: 1) strain hardening is predicted for all paths, 2) more ductility is predicted for paths associated with large mean pressures, 3) the yield surface intersects the hydrostatic axis at right angles for both positive and negative mean pressures so no special algorithm is needed at these intersection points, and 4) the flow surface is continuous and has a continuous derivative everywhere so a corner algorithm is not required (Schreyer and Bean '87). Although the number of required strain constants is large, the values may be deduced directly from conventional uniaxial and triaxial test results; also, Schreyer and Bean '87 and Stevens and Krauthammer '88 present representative values for low, medium, and high strength concretes.

The proposed concrete model (using the local definition of the damage variable) was evaluated successfully, on a material level, through comparisons with three sets of concrete test data; for a full presentation of the results, the reader is directed to Stevens and Krauthammer '88.

**TIMOSHENKO BEAM ELEMENT**

The kinematic relations for the layered Timoshenko beam element are based on the usual assumptions: 1) plane sections originally normal to the neutral axis remain plane after deformation but not necessarily normal to the neutral axis and 2) the shear strain is constant over the beam's cross section and may be defined as a rotation of the cross section. Assuming small to moderate rotations and small axial strains and, using the definition of the Green-Lagrange strain tensor, the nonzero, nonlinear, strain displacement relations may be written as

\[ \varepsilon_{11} = U' - \varepsilon_1 (\sigma' - \gamma') + \gamma'' \]  
\[ \varepsilon_{12} = (\sigma + U'(\gamma + \delta)) \]

where $U = U(\varepsilon_1)$ is the axial displacement of the neutral axis along the beam, $\gamma = \gamma(\varepsilon_1)$ is the shear deformation, $\beta$ is the total rotation of the cross section, $\nu = \nu(\varepsilon_1)$ is the transverse displacement of the neutral axis along the beam, $\xi_r$ are the local beam coordinates (1 = 1, 2, 3 = \nu'), and ($\gamma'$) is derivative w.r.t. the independent variable. In this formulation, the axial displacement and the shear rotation are interpolation functions acting on the nodal variables, and the transverse displacement is interpolated using the standard cubic Hermite polynomials acting on the total rotations, or $\beta_t = \beta_0 - \Gamma_1 \varepsilon_1$ where $\beta_0$ and $\Gamma_1$ are the flexural and shear rotations, respectively, at node $i$ of the beam. The shear rotations are maintained as independent degrees of freedom and continuity of shear across elements is preserved.

In the implementation of the Finite Element method using central difference time integration, the calculation of the internal force vector must be performed. The internal force vector is equivalent, in a virtual work sense, to the internal element stresses created during the deformation of the element and it is defined as

\[ (F_{INT}) = \int \{B\}^T [\sigma] \ dVol \]

where $(F_{INT})$ is the internal force vector equivalent to the element's stress state, $[B]^T$ is the three dimensional strain displacement matrix, and $[\sigma]$ is the Cauchy stress tensor (matrix). For integration through the depth, the element is subdivided into 10 layers and the integration is performed by a summation of the stresses at each layer; the stresses in the steel and concrete are calculated with the models discussed above and a perfect bond is assumed between the reinforcement and concrete. The integration over the length of
the element is performed using three point Gaussian integration. Also, the movement of the neutral axis due to the material nonlinearities is tracked with an iterative technique developed by Puglisi and Krauthammer '87.

BEAM ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The Timoshenko beam element was combined with the proposed CDP concrete model and a uniaxial elastic/strain hardening plastic model for the reinforcement steel (see Park and Paulay '75); the shear contribution of the steel reinforcement is assumed small compared to the shear force resisted by the concrete and, thus, the steel response is modelled as uniaxial. The resulting approach was applied to the analysis of simply supported reinforced concrete beams, which were subjected to large amplitude, short duration loads at midspan (Feldman and Sies '88). Figure 3 presents the dimensions, cross sectional geometry and some of the instrumentation for beams H1 and C1; Figures 4 and 5 present the linear approximations of the applied loadings of beams H1 and C1, respectively. During testing, both beams experienced considerable damage and large permanent deflection. The residual midspan displacements were approximately 3 inches and 2.5 inches in beams H1 and C1, respectively.

Due to the symmetry of the beams, loads, and boundary conditions, only one half of the beam was modeled, using the coarse and refined meshes shown in Figure 6. At the right hand node, the horizontal displacement, shear rotation, and bending rotation are restrained.

As is typical with most test reports, only the compressive strength of the concrete and the yield strength and stress of the steel were reported by Feldman and Sies '88. The concrete compressive strengths of beams H1 and C1 were 5960.0 psi and 5830.0 psi, respectively, so "typical" values for medium strength concrete are used in the analysis, as listed in Table 1. Also, typical values for the reinforcing steel were assumed, as listed in Table 2. The densities of the concrete and steel were taken as 150 pcf and 490 pcf, respectively.

The equations of motion were integrated numerically using a conditionally stable central difference technique; the integration time step was chosen as half the critical time step (which was governed by the flexural frequency).

Comparisons between the experimental and calculated displacement histories of Gages 3, 4, and 5 of beam H1 are shown in Figure 7 for coarse mesh. Mesh-sensitivity was checked by running the model with refined mesh and it was observed that this algorithm is not sensitive to the fineness of the mesh. As this figure shows, there is good agreement between peak displacement, residual displacement and the time when peak displacements occur.

The results in Figure 7 when considered along with the mesh-independence of this algorithm and the fact that a significant amount of strain softening has occurred at midspan, shows that the computational difficulties normally present with strain softening models have been alleviated with the nonlocal CDP model. In order to verify the benefits of the nonlocal approach, beam H1 was reanalyzed using the coarse and refined meshes and the CDP model without the damage averaging; the computed histories of the midspan displacement for the local and nonlocal, coarse and refined mesh analyses are plotted in Figure 8. As shown in this figure, the local strain softening model overestimates the displacement with the coarse mesh, and, with the refined mesh, the displacement appears to continue to infinity. An examination of the output for these local analyses showed that the damage localized into the element directly next to the load; for the refined mesh, this element became a kinematic hinge and hence the increasing displacement.

Comparisons between the measured reaction at the left end of the beam and the calculated reaction using the coarse mesh for beam H1 are shown in Figure 9. Again, there is very good agreement with the peak reaction and the time of peak reaction, as well as the time when the peak reaction force returns to zero. However, after approximately 60 msce, the calculated reaction oscillates with a higher frequency than the measured reaction; this difference is due to the fact that the unloading stiffness predicted with the continuum damage/plasticity model is too large (as discussed in Stevens and Krauthammer '88), resulting in a stiffer beam with a higher natural frequency. A correction to the constitutive model would improve the results for the response after 60 msce; however, the key point is that the peak value is correctly predicted as is the time at which the peak occurs and the time when the reaction returns to zero.

CONCLUSIONS

A nonlocal Continuum Damage/Plasticity model has been developed and implemented for the analyses of reinforced concrete beams. In the development of the model, previously proposed formulations were modified and combined into a comprehensive constitutive relationship. This model has been verified for various stress paths and by the analysis of reinforced concrete beams under impulse loading.

The results of the analyses of the two impulse loaded beams agree quite well with the experimental data. The analyses predicts the displacement, reaction, and strain histories very closely. The observed mesh inependence is particularly pleasing considering the shortcomings usually associated with strain softening constitutive models.

In conclusion, it appears that the combination of the Timoshenko beam element with the nonlocal CDP model and the uniaxial steel model is capable of representing the dynamic behavior of reinforced concrete beams quite accurately.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under Contract No. DNAD01-75-C-0100 with the University of Minnesota. The authors wish to thank Dr. H. Schreyer and Mr. J. Bean of the New Mexico Engineering Research Institute for supplying the Prager-Drucker cap model and for their helpful discussions.
Table 1. Concrete Material Parameters for Beams H1 and C1

<table>
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<th>$E$, psi</th>
<th>$f_c$, psi</th>
<th>$c$</th>
<th>$d$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$q_1$</th>
<th>$e$</th>
<th>$s$</th>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Steel Properties for Beams H1 and C1 ($f_y$ = yield stress, $f_u$ = ultimate stress, $e_y$ = yield strain, $e_u$ = strain at initiation of strain hardening, $e_m$ = ultimate strain)

<table>
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<td>0.0144</td>
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</table>

Figure 1. Modified Prager-Druker Yield Surface

Figure 2. Applied Load History of Beams H1 and C1 (Normalized)

Figure 3. Applied Load History of Beams C1 (Normalized)

Figure 4. Displacement History of Beams C1 (Normalized)

Figure 5. Geometry and Instrumentation of the Feldman and Fliess Beam
APPENDIX I. REFERENCES


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RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN METHODS FOR PROTECTIVE
STRUCTURES SUBJECT TO NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS EFFECTS

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Abstract

This paper summarizes the result of a Phase I SBIR research effort with an overall objective of reviewing and analyzing stochastic process methodologies for their applicability to protective structure design [1]. The research focused on the following tasks: (1) develop an overview of the phases of protective structure design and identify specific areas where probability-based methods are applicable; (2) identify the steps required for the development of reliability-based design methods for protective structures; and (3) illustrate the application of reliability methods to the analysis of an aboveground structure and a buried structure. The Phase I results indicate that fundamental improvements to the design of protective structures can be achieved through research and application of modern concepts of structural reliability. These improvements include: (1) systematic identification of uncertainties and failure modes; (2) development of reliability-based design factors; and (3) development of an analysis tool for survivable structures and facilities.

USES OF PROBABILISTIC METHODS IN PROTECTIVE DESIGN

The protective design process involves a number of activities or phases that interact in various ways over the design life cycle of a facility. Five basic phases were identified: (1) threat evaluation; (2) mission and performance criteria development; (3) design and analysis; (4) construction; and (5) test and operation. These phases cover the entire range of operations of protective design. Following is a brief summary from Reference 1 of each phase with respect to key uncertainties and the potential applications of probabilistic methods.

Threat Evaluation Phase

The objective of threat evaluation is to determine the wartime attack strategy and types of weapons to which the facility/structure would likely be subjected. Three general types of uncertainties are associated with threat evaluation: (1) threat strategies (decision variables such as aimpoints, number of sorties, and weapon types) that the enemy force might employ on a facility; (2) the modeling or prediction errors associated with a model of attack and enemy weapon characteristics; and (3) the random uncertainties (such as CEPs, fuse performance, bomb survivability) about the mean values of predicted performance. Probabilistic methodologies with direct application to treating and analyzing these uncertainties include (1) decision analysis and game theory; (2) Monte Carlo Simulation; and (3) extreme value theory.

Mission/Performance Criteria Development Phase

In the mission and performance criteria development phase, the stated mission is translated into a set of design requirements for each facility, which can be used to develop design criteria for individual structures. General design criteria specify the acceptable structural performance in terms of limiting damage relative to internal equipment or personnel. In addition to the general design criteria, there are often requirements on design performance. These requirements may be treated as constraints that the design must satisfy. Cost, survivability, maintainability, reliability, and constructability are elements that may be expressed as general criteria or constraints on the design performance. These parameters are essentially decision variables that are established during the criteria development phase. These variables specify the requirements of the facility, and as such, there is generally no need to treat uncertainties. However, uncertainties that result from the predicted performance of a design to meet these criteria may be significant and should be treated in the analysis phase.
Design and Analysis Phase

The design and analysis phase is the central activity of protective design and the one with the greatest focus of research activity. It can be subdivided into three elements: design synthesis, system failure mode analysis, and design analysis. Design synthesis begins with the development of a protective design concept based on the specified threats and the general design requirements. Structural form, material, construction method, location, and external protection are attributes that the designer can select in the development of the design concept. Research in this area deals with basic topics, such as improved materials, as well as innovative concepts for protective construction and basing alternatives. In addition, research tools from optimal design theory and artificial intelligence are relevant.

System failure mode analysis involves the identification of potential failure modes of each element and developing the structure and facility failure paths. For quantitative analysis and complex systems, event tree and fault tree methodologies are useful tools to perform system modeling, identify vulnerabilities, and assess consequences of damage and loss of function. The integration of event and fault trees provides an analytic approach for systematic identification and modeling of the sequence of failure and the determination of the critical elements of a complex system. They provide the best available means for identifying and understanding facility design and operation in a manner that leads to a quantification of system reliability.

The design analysis phase follows the development of the preliminary design concept and the identification of all relevant failure modes. The four basic steps are: (1) obtain information on weapon characteristics; (2) assess weapon effects; (3) develop structural loads from specified weapon threats, characteristics and effects; and (4) analyze structural response. This phase is the central activity of many structural analysis/designers for conventional weapon effects.

Reliability-based design (RBD) methods provide a rational method to treat uncertainties in the design and analysis phase. Once these methods are developed and documented in a research phase, the designer would work with design factors (such as load and resistance factors) and is not required to perform “probabilistic” analysis. As summarized by Ellingwood et al. (2), the principal advantages of probabilistic limit state design are: (1) more consistent reliability (survivability) is attained for different design situations because the different variables of the various structural strengths and loads are treated; (2) the reliability level can be chosen to reflect the consequences of damage on structural collapse; (3) the designer achieves a better understanding of the fundamental structural requirements and of the behavior of the structure in meeting these requirements; (4) the design process is simplified by encouraging the same design philosophy and procedures to be adopted for all materials of construction; (5) better judgment can be applied to nonrepetitive situations; and (6) design manuals can be updated in a more rational manner.

Many subdisciplines of structural reliability analysis provide the methods for developing and implementing reliability-based design. These include second moment methods, stochastic load combination, stochastic finite elements, and design code calibration. Common mathematical tools include applied statistics, Monte Carlo simulation, error propagation, and experimental design. Optimization theory has also been applied to structural design to identify designs that optimize performance (minimum cost, maximum reliability) for specified design criteria.

Construction

Permanent protected structures are often constructed in place and are therefore subject to construction errors and tolerances. While research and some data on nonprotected construction errors and uncertainties exist, research has not been performed for protective construction. A general belief is that these uncertainties are small compared to those resulting from the response analysis. It is noted that construction errors associated with field fortification and nonengineered structural upgrades should be treated separately.

Test and Operation

The test and operation phase represents the final activity of the integrated design process and structural life cycle. It can be divided into two time periods: peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, controlled experiments and tests are performed to assess structural performance. Experiment design concepts and methods of statistical inference are useful probabilistic methods for these applications. In wartime, the structures will be subjected to effects from enemy weapons. Many structures will be damaged to different degrees. Damage assessments and analyses of safety will need to be performed, both at a field level, and later, in a more detailed engineering analysis. Useful methodologies are system identification, engineering databases, and expert systems technology.

BURIED STRUCTURE ANALYSIS EXAMPLE

This example compares deterministic and probabilistic analyses of a box-shaped structure buried in sandy clay. The threat is given and the damage probability is to be determined as a function of scaled standoff ($\lambda$) for $0.5 < \lambda < 3.0$ ft/lb $^{10}$. The structure contains critical shock sensitive communications equipment, which has a frequency of 10 Hz in the dominant response mode and is hard mounted to the floor. The structure is assumed to fail to perform its mission if the equipment is damaged.

Deterministic Analysis Methodology

The scope of the deterministic analysis methods for this
example is limited to existing design manual type methods. Two failure modes are evaluated: wall flexural failure and excessive floor accelerations.

**Wall Flexural Failure.** The deterministic method for computing the flexural response of the buried wall is the equivalent single-degree-of-freedom structure-medium interaction (SMI) model [3]. The solution of the equation of motion gives the displacement of the center of the wall. In this approach, the peak free field stress is multiplied by an equivalent uniform load factor given by Kiger [4]. This factor accounts for the nonuniform nature of the loads due to conventional explosives and is a function of the wall aspect ratio and the distance between the bomb and the wall.

Figure 1 shows the center deflection of the structure wall as a function of scaled standoff (\(\lambda\)) predicted by the SMI model. Also shown in the figure is the empirical National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) damage curve for buried reinforced concrete walls. Note that the NDRC curve is for walls with length to thickness ratios (L/D) in the range of 5:1 to 15:1 and face dimensions ratio (a/b) of about 3:5. The example problem wall, however, has an L/D of approximately 2.5:1 and a face dimensions ratio of approximately 0.85. Hence, the flexural model used in the SMI analysis is expected to be conservative in predicting damage for this very thick wall. Based on damage levels as a function of support rotation [5], the SMI model predicts that wall damage is less than or equal to slight for \(\lambda > 2.3\), moderate for \(1.7 < \lambda < 2.3\), heavy for \(1.4 < \lambda < 1.7\), and is at incipient failure for \(\lambda < 1.4\).

Figure 1 shows a sharp transition between predicted damage states for small changes in \(\lambda\). This is due to the steepness of the deflection versus range curve, which is partly a result of the fast attenuation of peak free field stress with range. The steepness of the curve presents a difficult problem to the analyst since, in a deterministic evaluation, it suggests that he is able to predict that small, almost unnoticeable, changes in standoff result in large changes in predicted damage. Since all the uncertainties in the analysis have been neglected, there is no quantitative procedure to assess the margin between the structure capacity and the predicted response.

**In-Structure Shock.** The in-structure shock environment is characterized by estimating the response spectra at the center of the structure floor. This response spectra is obtained from estimates of the maximum floor acceleration, velocity, and displacement, using the procedures in References 6 and 7. For this example, only the horizontal motion resulting from the specified side-on burst is considered.

The response spectra for equipment hard mounted to the floor is estimated by scaling the peak floor acceleration, velocity, and displacement by 2.0, 1.5, and 1.2, respectively, as recommended by Kiger [7]. These factors give the amplified motion in the acceleration, velocity, and displacement regions of the spectra, respectively. The resulting analysis indicates that for equipment capacity of 10 g's (for a short duration pulse typical of a conventional weapon), equipment failure would be predicted for \(\lambda < 1.0\).

![FIGURE 1. Deterministic Prediction of Wall Deflection](image-url)

**Reliability-Based Analysis**

Reliability-based analysis involves the performance of a sequence of steps, including failure mode analysis and quantification of uncertainties, prior to the probabilistic evaluation. These steps are described in detail in References 1. One of the key outputs of this procedure is the quantification of parameter uncertainties and model prediction errors for existing deterministic analysis approaches. For example, Table 1 summarizes the results of the uncertainty analysis for the flexural failure mode, which are based on both direct data analysis and comparisons of model predictions and experiments, where appropriate.

Monte-Carlo simulation was used to propagate these uncertainties through the deterministic structural response models. The following paragraphs summarize the results of the analysis for each failure mode (wall flexural and in-structure shock), the combined failure probability, and sensitivity analysis.

**Wall Flexural Damage.** Table 2 compares the deterministic (nominal) and the reliability-based predictions of the deflection of the center of the wall. The differences in the mean and standard deflections are due to the 15 percent under bias (see Table 1) in the nominal model and the fact that the wall response is nonlinear. Another important observation in Table 2 is the large standard deviations of the reliability-based analysis results.

Figure 2 shows predicted damage as a function of scaled range for the deterministic and probabilistic analysis. Note the so-
The "cookie-cutter" shape of the deterministic approach. This sensitivity presents a problem to a designer in light of the obvious uncertainties associated with the predictions of structural response. The probabilistic approach presents a more realistic picture in terms of a continuous, monotonically decreasing curve of damage probability versus scaled range.

![Graph showing probability of damage versus scaled range.](attachment:probability.png)

**FIGURE 2.** Comparison of Predicted Wall Response

### In-Structure Shock

The probabilistic analysis of in-structure shock considered uncertainty in the free field ground shock, motion of the structure floor, dynamic properties of the equipment, and response of the equipment [1]. The results are compared in Table 3 to the deterministic analysis. In contrast to the wall response failure mode, there is very little difference in the nominal and mean values.

The predicted in-structure shock accelerations can be used to estimate probability of equipment failure. For this example, the uncertainty in the capacity of the equipment (fragility) is modeled using a lognormal distribution with a mean capacity of 10g's and a coefficient of variation of 25 percent. Figure 3 shows the predicted probability of equipment failure as a function of scaled range.

### Combined Failure Modes

The structure mission is compromised if either the wall sustains heavy damage or a critical piece of equipment fails by in-structure shock. These damage modes have been combined exactly within the Monte Carlo simulation. Figure 3 shows the results of this combined failure mode analysis. The probability of failure for the combined modes is equal to or slightly higher than the maximum of either failure

---

**Table 1. Uncertainty Analysis for Buried Structure Example**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uncertainty Type, Model and Parameters</th>
<th>Uncertainty Characterization</th>
<th>Mean/ Nominal</th>
<th>Coefficient of Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prediction Error Wall Flexure Model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Deflection</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/d Outside Data</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Data</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundshock Model Peak Free-Field Stress</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Random Uncertainties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete Density</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete, E</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete, f'</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel, f_y</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Weight</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil Velocity</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free-Field Stress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress-Decay, α</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attenuation Coefficient, N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yield, W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage Criteria (Support Rotation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Buried Wall Center Deflection Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (ft/lb (^{1/3}))</th>
<th>Deflection (in)</th>
<th>Deterministic (Nominal)</th>
<th>Probabilistic</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Wall Collapsed
Table 3. Equipment Response Statistics Due to In-Structure Shock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (ft/lb<strong>0.25</strong>)</th>
<th>Deflection (in)</th>
<th>Deterministic (Nominal)</th>
<th>Probabilistic Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis indicates that uncertainties in predicting structural wall response are dominated by the ground shock model uncertainties in prediction of free-field stress ($\tau = 0.77$). Soil seismic velocity ($\tau = 0.03$) and SMI flexure response model ($\tau = 0.02$) uncertainties contributed to the uncertainty, but were much less important. Uncertainties in structural material properties, strengths, etc., did not significantly contribute to the predicted response uncertainty.

RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN FACTORS

Probability-based analyses are not always expedient for design, particularly when the structural analyst does not have a background in probabilistic methods. For this reason, reliability based design factors (RBDF) are developed as a research product for application by the designer, much as safety factors are used in traditional design.

The RBDF format is based on the concept of a design factor, which is the ratio of the required nominal capacity to the nominal structural response. The use of the term nominal implies that the capacity and response are computed using ordinary deterministic analysis procedures. Hence, the designer computes structural response (say, for example, wall ductility or equipment acceleration), using standard methods, compares this to the capacity (ductility capacity or acceleration capacity). If the ratio of capacity to response does not meet or exceed the required design factor, then the design is modified to increase the capacity or reduce the response. The required design factor is selected from a table that gives design factors as a function of the survival probability. For example, Table 4 summarizes preliminary design factors developed in the Phase I research effort.

Table 4. Design Factors for In-Structure Shock and Buried Wall Deflection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Reliability Goal (Probability of Survival)</th>
<th>Design Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-Struc. Shock*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Required equipment acceleration capacity = design factor x predicted equipment response acceleration

** Required wall deflection capacity = design factor x predicted wall deflection

FIGURE 3. Individual and Combined Failure Probabilities

Uncertainty Ranking. The reliability-based analysis indicates large uncertainties about the predicted mean values. Uncertainty ranking and sensitivity analysis are useful byproducts of a probabilistic analysis. For example, the source of the large uncertainties in the predicted wall deflection can be quantified by rank evaluation, based on partial $r^2$ ($0 \leq r^2 \leq 1$). The rank analysis was performed by applying stepwise regression analysis procedures to the Monte Carlo simulation outputs. This analysis indicates that uncertainties in predicting structural wall response are dominated by the ground shock model uncertainties in prediction of free-field stress ($r = 0.77$). Soil seismic velocity ($r = 0.03$) and SMI flexure response model ($r = 0.02$) uncertainties contributed to the uncertainty, but were much less important. Uncertainties in structural material properties, strengths, etc., did not significantly contribute to the predicted response uncertainty.

FIGURE 3. Individual and Combined Failure Probabilities

Uncertainty Ranking. The reliability-based analysis indicates large uncertainties about the predicted mean values. Uncertainty ranking and sensitivity analysis are useful byproducts of a probabilistic analysis. For example, the source of the large uncertainties in the predicted wall deflection can be quantified by rank evaluation, based on partial $r^2$ ($0 \leq r^2 \leq 1$). The rank analysis was performed by applying stepwise regression analysis procedures to the Monte Carlo simulation outputs. This analysis indicates that uncertainties in predicting structural wall response are dominated by the ground shock model uncertainties in prediction of free-field stress ($r = 0.77$). Soil seismic velocity ($r = 0.03$) and SMI flexure response model ($r = 0.02$) uncertainties contributed to the uncertainty, but were much less important. Uncertainties in structural material properties, strengths, etc., did not significantly contribute to the predicted response uncertainty.
These preliminary factors for design reliability (survivability) goals of 0.75, 0.85, 0.90, and 0.95 range from about 1.3 to 3.0 for in-structure shock and from 2 to 6 for buried wall response. Note that the factors are considerably higher for the buried wall design, quantitatively reflecting the much greater uncertainty in predicting wall deflection response. It should be pointed out that, in addition to design application, the RBDF tables can be used as an analysis tool. For a given structure and a given threat, the analyst need only perform a conventional deterministic analysis and compute the inherent design factor (ratio of capacity to response). By entering the design factor table with this computed ratio the probability of survival is obtained.

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are based on the results summarized herein and presented in detail in Reference 1:

1. The potential uses of probability-based approaches to the analysis and design of protective structures have been identified and the advantages illustrated.

2. There is a significant amount of data in many of the key areas that has not been systematically analyzed for uncertainties and model errors. Preliminary analysis of some of these data and comparisons to design methods indicate that nominal design are not always conservative; i.e., \( P_e < 0.50 \) for the cases considered.

3. Fundamental improvements to the analysis and design of Air Force facilities can be achieved through research and application of modern concepts of structural reliability. These improvements would result from:

(a) development of a reliability-based design methodology that would put all protective structure design on a consistent, cost-effective, and a balanced basis, and would bring protective structure design up-to-date with conventional design;

(b) identification of key uncertainties in protective structure analysis and design that would allow a prioritization of important research areas;

(c) development of a systems analysis tool for structures and facilities to develop improved concepts of survivable structures for escalating threats.

REFERENCES


ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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EXPEDITED METHODS OF PROTECTION TO MITIGATE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND SPALL

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Vicksburg, Mississippi

ABSTRACT

A series of full-scale tests using general purpose bombs was conducted on a hardened reinforced concrete aboveground structure. Several expedient methods of mitigating structural damage due to airblast and fragment impacts were tested, and the response of the walls of the structure was monitored.

Results from these tests indicate that bare reinforced concrete walls will be significantly damaged by the given weapon. On the exterior surface, several inches of concrete cover will be destroyed by fragment impacts, and on the interior surface, high-velocity spall will occur. This damage can be prevented by the use of any number of expedient methods outlined in this paper. The most cost-effective method appears to be a soil berm.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE) is responsible for the design and construction of military facilities which meet the NATO semihardened structure requirements for protection against conventional weapons. NATO requirements and current design procedures have led to the use of heavily reinforced 25.5-inch thick concrete walls to resist these loads. However, tests conducted in 1980-1982 by the German Bundeswehr Infrastructure Staff (References 1 and 2) indicated that these walls were typically over-reinforced and that more economical designs with less steel reinforcement would provide the required protection.

A series of NATO Semihardened Design Criteria full-scale tests were conducted by the Air Force Engineering and Services Center (AFESC) and the U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station (WES) during the summer of 1987 (Reference 3). The objective of this test series was to determine the effects of revetments and sand berms on the response of reinforced concrete walls subjected to the nearby detonation of a casual munition.

TEST DESCRIPTION

The full-scale series was composed of several tests with a nearby detonation of a general purpose bomb located at various positions around the test structure. The bombs were placed at the same range from the test structure for each of the test events discussed in this paper. The test structure was of reinforced concrete construction, approximately 50 feet wide by 50 feet long. All of the tests were instrumented to record airblast pressure loading on the walls, in-structure acceleration, and wall deflection versus time.

Each of the walls discussed in this paper were 25.5-inch thick sections with 0.25 percent steel reinforcement. One bare wall was tested as a baseline; additional protective measures tested included a sand berm, a sacrificial pre-cast panel, sand-grid revetments, and a portable Bitburg revetment.

Each of the 25.5-inch walls had 0.25 percent vertical steel reinforcement in each face consisting of Number 3 bars spaced at 3 inches. Horizontal reinforcement consisted of Number 3 bars spaced at 4.5 inches. Single-leg stirrups fabricated from Number 3 bars provided shear reinforcement. The stirrups were spaced at 18 inches on each vertical bar, and staggered at 9 inches off-center every other bar. Each of the walls had a clear span of about 13 feet-2 inches, and a concrete cover of about 3 inches on the exterior face and 3/4 inch on the interior face.

Several concepts designed to attenuate the airblast and minimize spalling were considered in the full-scale test: (1) a 4-foot-7-inch sand berm with a 2:3 slope; (2) a 6-inch thick lightly reinforced pre-cast panel, anchored to the structure with removable bolts at the top and with a small gap between panel and structure; (3) sand-grid revetments; (4) portable Bitburg revetments.

1. Sand Berr

Previous half-scale tests (Reference 4) have indicated that the addition of a berm to the exterior of the structure will reduce impulse deflections and virtually eliminate spalling. A berm of silty sand (taken from the test site) with a slope of 2:3 was placed against one 23.5 inch wall. The berm extended only part way up the wall since previous tests had indicated that the most severe blast loads and fragment damage occurred near the ground surface. The berm was about 4 feet-7 inches high.

2. Pre-Cast Panels

The German Bundeswehr Infrastructure Staff had previously conducted half-scale tests of 4- and 6-inch pre-cast panels with favorable results. In the German tests, the pre-cast panels were completely destroyed, but they did protect the main structure walls from fragment damage and eliminated spall. The panel used in the full-scale series was...
weapon

3. Sand Grids

Sand-grids were developed at WES as a rapid means of constructing roads on beaches for military vehicles (Reference 5). These sand-grids have since been tested as revetments for artillery emplacements with good results (Reference 6). Sand-grids consist of 8-inch high high-density polyethylene strips connected by ultrasonic or heat welds. They are manufactured and shipped in collapsed 4-inch thick sections that expand to 20 feet during construction. Each expanded grid section is either 4 or 8 feet wide by 20 feet long and contains a honeycomb arrangement of cells.

4. Bitburg Revetments

The Bitburg portable revetments are modular reinforced concrete sections intended to protect items less than 6 feet tall (see Figure 1). Each section was about 6 feet-7 inches wide and 6 feet-7 inches high.

RESULTS

Although each of the test events was unique, a few general observations can be made. For all aboveground tests against unprotected walls, damage to the exterior of the structure was similar. The cover concrete on the exterior face of the lower half of the wall was eroded away by the fragments, exposing the reinforcing steel. Spalling on the interior face of the unprotected walls was limited to the depth of the reinforcement, and was greatest in the lower one-third of the wall span. No spall was associated with the pre-cast panels or sand berm, and there was very little damage with the Bitburg revetments or sand-grid revetments. Direct comparisons of peak pressure measurements made on the exterior face of each wall are given in Table 1, and wall response for each event is given in Table 2. A detailed description of all test results follows.

1. Pre-Cast Panels

The lower half of each of the panels was completely destroyed during the test event, while the upper halves were left intact, but fell to the ground. The panels prevented all but a few fragments from penetrating the wall of the structure (see Figure 2). The average peak pressure behind the panels was about 150 psi, compared to peak pressures of 2000-5000 psi at similar ranges on an unprotected wall. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 5 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 8900 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 1.6 inches. The interior of the test wall sustained minor cracking, but had no spall damage.

2. Bitburg Revetments

The Bitburg revetments were originally designed to protect fuel storage tanks and other items less than 6 feet tall from fragmentation and airblast effects. The Bitburg design was selected for testing because of its ready availability on US Air Force bases and because of its portability. The revetments were placed directly against the wall of the structure, with about 8 inches clearance between the wall and the vertical section of the revetments. The revetments directly in front of the threat weapon were almost completely destroyed by a combination of airblast and fragmentation effects (Figure 3), but the wall behind the revetments was largely undamaged. As in previous test events, there was extensive concrete cracking on the unprotected portion of the wall. The interior of the test wall sustained minor cracking in addition to slight spall damage (Figure 4).

The peak airblast measurements from this event illustrate the benefit of using revetments to shield a structure from airblast: the peak pressure measured 3 feet, 4 inches from the ground surface and directly opposite the weapon was about 232 psi, while the peak pressure 6 feet, 7 inches above the ground surface (just above the top of the revetments) was about 2270 psi. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 5 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 900 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 1.4 inches.

3. Sand-Grid Revetments

The sand-grid configuration tested consisted of twelve layers of 4-foot wide sand-grid sections (total height about 8 feet), placed with a small clearance (about 4 inches) between the revetment and the structure. Construction of the revetment is shown in Figure 5. The sand-grid, as expected, was badly damaged by the test event (Figure 6), but allowed no new fragment penetrations into the structure. Construction of the revetment ranged from about 10 feet, and significantly attenuated the peak pressures measured on the exterior of the structure wall. The peak airblast measurements on the structure and behind the revetment ranged from about 109 psi to 297 psi. The peak airblast measurement on the wall was about 2500 psi, occurring just below the roof, directly opposite the weapon. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 5 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 170 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 0.7 inches. The interior of the test wall sustained minor cracking in addition to slight spall damage.

4. Sand Berms

This test event was designed to evaluate the performance of a sand berm in attenuating the damage to the exterior of the structure. Constructed from a silty sand taken from the test site, the berm was about 6 feet-7 inches high with a 2:3 slope. The berm is shown pretest in Figure 7.

A postcast photograph of the berm is shown in Figure 8. The peak interface pressures measured at the interface of the berm and structure ranged from 74 psi to 512 psi directly opposite the weapon. The peak airblast measurements on the wall and above the berm ranged from 326 psi near the roof of the structure to 1380 psi directly above the top of the berm. The berm proved to be one of the more effective structures evaluated in mitigating structural damage. Cratering of the exterior face of the structure was limited to that portion of the wall above the berm. This area could easily be minimized by increasing the height of the berm. As shown in Figure 8, an added advantage to the use of soil berms is their inherent multiple strike capability: most of the material of the berm was left in place. The peak measured acceleration of the wall about 5 feet from the floor surface was about 1750 g's. There was no spall and only minor flexural cracking associated with this test event.

6 inches thick.

3. Sand Grids

Sand-grids were developed at WES as a rapid means of constructing roads on beaches for military vehicles (Reference 5). These sand-grids have since been tested as revetments for artillery emplacements with good results (Reference 6). Sand-grids consist of 8-inch high high-density polyethylene strips connected by ultrasonic or heat welds. They are manufactured and shipped in collapsed 4-inch thick sections that expand to 20 feet during construction. Each expanded grid section is either 4 or 8 feet wide by 20 feet long and contains a honeycomb arrangement of cells.

4. Bitburg Revetments

The Bitburg portable revetments are modular reinforced concrete sections intended to protect items less than 6 feet tall (see Figure 1). Each section was about 6 feet-7 inches wide and 6 feet-7 inches high.

RESULTS

Although each of the test events was unique, a few general observations can be made. For all aboveground tests against unprotected walls, damage to the exterior of the structure was similar. The cover concrete on the exterior face of the lower half of the wall was eroded away by the fragments, exposing the reinforcing steel. Spalling on the interior face of the unprotected walls was limited to the depth of the reinforcement, and was greatest in the lower one-third of the wall span. No spall was associated with the pre-cast panels or sand berm, and there was very little damage with the Bitburg revetments or sand-grid revetments. Direct comparisons of peak pressure measurements made on the exterior face of each wall are given in Table 1, and wall response for each event is given in Table 2. A detailed description of all test results follows.

1. Pre-Cast Panels

The lower half of each of the panels was completely destroyed during the test event, while the upper halves were left intact, but fell to the ground. The panels prevented all but a few fragments from penetrating the wall of the structure (see Figure 2). The average peak pressure behind the panels was about 150 psi, compared to peak pressures of 2000-5000 psi at similar ranges on an unprotected wall. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 5 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 8900 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 1.6 inches. The interior of the test wall sustained minor cracking, but had no spall damage.

2. Bitburg Revetments

The Bitburg revetments were originally designed to protect fuel storage tanks and other items less than 6 feet tall from fragmentation and airblast effects. The Bitburg design was selected for testing because of its ready availability on US Air Force bases and because of its portability. The revetments were placed directly against the wall of the structure, with about 8 inches clearance between the wall and the vertical section of the revetments. The revetments directly in front of the threat weapon were almost completely destroyed by a combination of airblast and fragmentation effects (Figure 3), but the wall behind the revetments was largely undamaged. As in previous test events, there was extensive concrete cracking on the unprotected portion of the wall. The interior of the test wall sustained minor cracking in addition to slight spall damage (Figure 4).

The peak airblast measurements from this event illustrate the benefit of using revetments to shield a structure from airblast: the peak pressure measured 3 feet, 4 inches from the ground surface and directly opposite the weapon was about 232 psi, while the peak pressure 6 feet, 7 inches above the ground surface (just above the top of the revetments) was about 2270 psi. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 5 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 900 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 1.4 inches.

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The sand-grid configuration tested consisted of twelve layers of 4-foot wide sand-grid sections (total height about 8 feet), placed with a small clearance (about 4 inches) between the revetment and the structure. Construction of the revetment is shown in Figure 5. The sand-grid, as expected, was badly damaged by the test event (Figure 6), but allowed no new fragment penetrations into the structure. Construction of the revetment ranged from about 10 feet, and significantly attenuated the peak pressures measured on the exterior of the structure wall. The peak airblast measurements on the structure and behind the revetment ranged from about 109 psi to 297 psi. The peak airblast measurement on the wall was about 2500 psi, occurring just below the roof, directly opposite the weapon. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 5 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 170 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 0.7 inches. The interior of the test wall sustained minor cracking in addition to slight spall damage.

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5. Baseline 25.5 inch Wall

This test event was designed to test a baseline unprotected 25.5 inch wall. For this test event, the weapon was kept at the same standoff distance from the structure as in previous events. As expected, this test resulted in much more damage to the exterior of the structure than any of the previously mentioned tests (Figure 9). Unlike any of the previous test events, this event resulted in a large quantity of high-speed spall fragments (Figure 10). The interior of the structure was littered with spall fragments located anywhere from immediately inside the test wall to the other side of the structure, about 60 feet distant. The peak pressures measured outside the structure and immediately opposite the weapon ranged from 400 psi to over 2800 psi. The peak acceleration of the wall, measured 3 feet from the floor surface and opposite the weapon, was about 21000 g's, and the peak measured deflection was about 2.5 inches.

SUMMARY

Loading on the exterior face of the structure from the detonation of the criteria threat is due to a combination of airblast and fragment impact. For walls unprotected by berms or revetments, the peak pressures are highest near the ground surface and directly opposite the weapon, and lower on other portions of the wall. The airblast distribution is highly transient, concentrated near the bottom of the wall at early time after detonation and decaying at a fast rate to a lower magnitude later in time. The greatest density of fragment impacts occurs on the lower portion of the wall. These impacts destroy the cover of concrete in this area, exposing the exterior reinforcing steel and weakening the wall.

For walls with berms and revetments, the peak pressures are highest on the upper portion of the wall (just above the berm or revetment), and are significantly reduced on the lower portion of the wall under the cover of the berm or revetment. Both the average blast pressure and impulse are significantly lower for the protected walls. The berms and revetments are also very effective in stopping fragments.

All expedient methods used in the full-scale test to reduce spallation were effective. The use of berms eliminates spall entirely and is the most cost effective solution. The portable Bitburg revetments would work for a single hit only, and are portable and easily replaced. The sand grid is an expedient means of protection for single hits. The polyethylene grid can be compressed for easy storage prior to its use.

Since the primary damage mechanism for the bare wall was spallation, increasing the steel reinforcement from 0.25 percent is ineffective, unless additional shear reinforcement is added and rebar spacing is minimized. Walls protected by a berm or revetment performed the best due mostly to the fact that the berm or revetment reduces the load. They respond in a flexural mode with very little deflection and only minor structural damage.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Tyndall AFB, FL, under the direction of LTC Bob Majka. Permission to publish this paper was granted by the Office, Chief of Engineers.

REFERENCES

Table 1. Peak Pressure Comparisons

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<th>Distance up Wall</th>
<th>Baseline*</th>
<th>Pre-Cast Panels</th>
<th>Bitburg Revetment</th>
<th>Sand-Grid Revetment</th>
<th>Sand Berm</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>7035.</td>
<td>385.</td>
<td>714.</td>
<td>125.</td>
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<td>359.</td>
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<td>6'-7&quot;</td>
<td>1214.</td>
<td>203.</td>
<td>497.</td>
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* Composite from several test events.

Table 2. Wall Response Comparisons

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<th>Pre-Cast Panels</th>
<th>Bitburg Revetment</th>
<th>Sand-Grid Revetment</th>
<th>Sand Berm</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Acceleration, g's</td>
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<td>8900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deflection, inches</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>&gt;2.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 2. Damage to precast panels

Figure 3. Damage to Bitburg revetments
Figure 4. Interior of structure following Bitburg revetment test

Figure 5. Construction of Sand-Grid revetment

Figure 6. Damage to Sand-Grid revetment

Figure 7. Pretest view of sand berm
Figure 8. Posttest view of sand berm

Figure 9. Damage to baseline test wall

Figure 10. Interior damage to baseline test wall
Air base facilities that will resist the effects of a conventional weapons system are expensive. Elements include tons of concrete, tightly spaced heavy reinforcing bars, and costly blast-resistant air valves which prevent explosive overpressures from entering the shelter through heating or air conditioning systems.

Recent validation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft shelter design, conducted by the Air Force at Tyndall AFB, Fla., proved that less costly shelter design could be just as effective.

The test goal was to determine the optimum combination of structural features needed to protect personnel and equipment while reducing construction costs.

Background

Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) is responsible for the design and construction of military facilities that comply with NATO protective structure requirements.

Tests by the German Bundeswehr Infrastructure Staff showed that the typical semihardened facility was overreinforced and that a more economical design was appropriate. Shelters are designed to resist large localized loads from conventional weapon detonations on exterior walls.

Two considerations not satisfied in the German concept were interior wall spall and deflection of walls. Spall occurs when blast pressure loading or the impact of a high energy object (such as a large fragment) cause a stress wave to travel through a wall and reflect off the interior wall surface. The concrete between the reinforcing bars and the surface is spalled at velocities high enough to damage equipment or critically injure personnel inside the structure.

Spalling is related to the rate of deflection. Deflection can also displace the primary shelter structure from its foundations.

Test methods were significant because they were done in two phases. The first utilized scale model structures. After confidence limits were established on concepts being tested, a full-scale test was used. Most earlier shelter testing used costly full-scale shelters subjected to explosive events. This restricted a multiple trial approach.

Values gained from the scale-model effort were then used to design a full-scale facility. Research dollars were saved by incorporating these results into one full-scale test.

The full-scale test offered an opportunity to evaluate several protective blast valves and doors at the same time. These were
previously evaluated only against blast pressures generated in a laboratory and not tested against fragment and blast loadings generated by conventional weapons.

All construction was accomplished in-house by the HQ APESC Operations Support Branch, further saving money. Support in design, instrumentation and photography was received from the Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment Station (WES), Vicksburg, Miss.

The first scaled test series addressed the deflection problem. Walls were constructed with various percents of principal steel reinforcement. Also evaluated to determine the best shear reinforcement and resistance to deflection were the performance of stirrups (concrete shoes which hold walls in place) and dowels (large pins which anchor overstructures to their foundations).

The second scaled test series evaluated various ways to prevent spall.

All tests were conducted at the HQ APESC Facilities and Pavements Test Site.

Subscale Testing

Half-scale, reinforced concrete box structures were used in both scaled test series. Each was designed to model wall, roof and floor slab sections of a typical semihardened facility. Scaled, cased charges at a specified threat distance were used to simulate a conventional weapon detonation.

Fourteen scaled tests were conducted in two series (six in Series I and eight in Series II). In Series I, various percentages of the structural volume occupied by principal steel including high-density, medium low density, and two levels of low density were used in each face. (The current design requires one of the high-density standards). The floor and roof designs were consistent with current semihardened design requirements. Test sections were placed against an L-shaped reaction structure so that movement was minimized (Figure 1). Past testing indicated that shear failure in the wall was possible. Single-leg shear stirrups were used in four tests, while dowels were used in two tests.

The Series II tests evaluated three methods for controlling spall (Figure 2): earth berms, interior spall plates, and thicker walls.

Berms were constructed from silty sand with slopes of 1:1.5 extending partially up the walls.

Series I tests provided blast and fragment patterns and established critical heights for the protective devices. Steel spall membranes were installed halfway up on the interior low-thickness wall. Thicker walls were also tested. Because of reinforcement, the thicker wall had the same flexural capacity as one with a high-percentage of steel reinforcement and low thickness.

Full-Scale Facility Testing

A full-scale facility (15m wide x 18m long, x 7.5m high) was completed in April, 1987. A partial penthouse along the east side (2.7m high by 3.7m wide by 18m long) contained various blast valves.

One set of blast valves was connected to an operational test ventilation system.

![Figure 1, top, and 2, bottom.](image)

The blast valves were placed at three locations to test their performance under different conditions (see Figure 3 on next page) along the east wall of the penthouse, in a protective structure at the north end of the penthouse, and behind a blast wall along the west wall of the facility. This was
the lowest location and subjected the valves to the most critical environment, including bomb fragments, dust, soil, and concrete fragments from the facility components.

The south, east and west walls were 65 cm thick with high principal steel reinforcement at both faces. Because the north wall was 80 cm thick with medium principal steel at both faces, it had the same flexural capacity as the 65 cm wall.

The five blast doors tested included two from WES, and one each from Luwa Ltd. (Switzerland), Temet USA INC., and the United Kingdom Public Services Agency, manufactured by Energy Equipment Co. Four blast valve designs were tested from Luwa Corp., J.P. Sheltec (Sweden), Bately Valve Co. (England), and Temet USA Inc.

The north half of the facility also had a basement constructed underneath it to be tested against buried weapons. Motion data, using standard office furniture and instrumented mannequins, were recorded principally in the basement and on the first floor. In-structure shock or acceleration of the floor was recorded to determine equipment response and operability. A backup power generator bolted directly to the floor, with no shock isolation equipment, was operational during the first two tests. Spall plates inside of the east wall were welded to a steel frame and anchored along the ceiling and floor by angle iron. Anchors extended from the plates and were cast in place when the concrete walls were poured.

Several other protective systems were tested to determine their effectiveness in preventing spall. Full-height precast concrete panels were bolted to the south wall, with 3-inch air gaps between the wall and the panel. Bitburg revetments approximately 2 m high were also tested (see Figure 4). A sand berm (see Figure 5 on next page) constructed along the west wall was tested for spall protection, as was a sand grid system along the south wall. Resembling a corrugated paper packing carton bottle protector, when pulled apart, the grid material forms a honeycomb pattern. Sand is poured into the honeycomb openings until they are filled, after which new sand and honeycomb layers are completed until the sand grid is approximately 2 m high.

Chamber revetments were also
tested against a different weapons threat, because they were located farther from the detonation. These revetments can be tasked to 3 m height and connected inside with steel straps and filled with sand. They are made from standard concrete and are reinforced with steel mesh, steel fiber or polypropylene fiber. The mesh and fibers were also combined for reinforcement in several chambers (Figure 6).

Equipment Test Results

The half-scale tests provided valuable installation data. The anchors, steel frame and angle iron installation were the keys to the successful performance.

All blast doors received damage in different amounts from the bomb fragments. Locking devices, hinges and door frames were weak. Several doors were subjected to multiple detonations. Outer steel surfaces were damaged but no doors were penetrated completely by the bomb fragments. All doors provided adequate blast protection, although one door frame, damaged by fragments, was breached and interior facility damage occurred.

All blast valves functioned adequately when first tested. Location of the valves was critical because dust, soil and concrete fragments affected their operation. After repeated testing, several valves failed to open. The valves are normally installed in banks of several valves each. Overall performance of the valves is still being analyzed.

The ventilation system and power generator functioned properly during the tests, with no damage to system components. The spall plates functioned extremely well, with minimum wall deflection and no spalling.

Structural Test Results

The facility systems performed extremely well against specified weapons threats. There are some additional conclusions: Blast doors must not be in the weapon line-of-sight or severe fragment damage may result. Blast valves must be placed above the facility, in a protective enclosure, to minimize or eliminate blast pressure, bomb fragment damage, and damage from soil or concrete fragments.

Thick walls with sheer stirrups and a reduced percent of reinforcing steel worked extremely well, with deflection low. The unprotected wall experienced spall problems, but when protected by precast panels, Hitburg revetments, sand grid or sand berm, no spall was observed. The sand berm provided the best overall protection.

The chamber revetments combining steel mesh and fiber reinforcement (steel or polypropylene) were effective. Although sections were subjected to six detonations, no fragments penetrated the rear surfaces, demonstrating excellent protection for equipment or facilities against fragment damage. The thickest wall provided no additional protection over the less thick wall, therefore additional construction costs are not justified. Deflection was minimal but spall still occurred.
Conclusion

Limited full-scale testing validated design parameters established in reduced scale tests. The newly developed wall design provided protection and reduced construction costs by reducing the percent of steel used to reinforce the wall. Conducting scaled tests to check a multitude of research areas reduces test costs and saves valuable research dollars.
SHOCK ISOLATION FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

S. A. Kiger, J. H. Weathersby, D. W. Hyde

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Vicksburg, Mississippi

ABSTRACT

A series of full-scale tests using general purpose bombs was conducted on a hardened reinforced concrete above-ground structure with a partial basement. Weapons were placed in both above- and below-ground configurations, and the response of various types of equipment, computers, and instrumented mannequins were monitored.

Results from these tests indicate that any equipment not restrained against movement, i.e., simply sitting on the floor or isolation pads, will undergo significant rigid body displacements. In general the best isolator performance was obtained from the cupmount series neoprene isolators. Results also indicate that the only real danger of injury (from shock) to personnel is from falling equipment, e.g., bookshelves, cabinets, or light fixtures.

BACKGROUND

Shock isolation for equipment in blast-resistant structures can be a costly and uncertain procedure for conventional weapon threats, especially for above-ground structures with combined airblast and fragment loading. The in-structure shock environment is known only approximately at best. Methods for calculating in-structure shock for above-ground structures generally assume plane wave loading on the structure, instead of the highly localized transient loads generated by conventional weapons, and they typically ignore fragment loads. Also, there are almost no data on modern communication and computer equipment fragility. This usually leads to an over-designed and expensive shock-isolation system whose performance is uncertain.

A series of NATO Semihardened Design Criteria Full-Scale tests was conducted by the Air Force Engineering and Services Center (AFESC) and the U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station (WES) during the summer of 1987 (Reference 1). During August 1988, the WES conducted a second series of tests on the same full-scale structure (Reference 3). The 1988 tests were sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) in cooperation with AFESC to further evaluate in-structure shock and shock isolation methods. Equipment tested in this second series included a computer, several pieces of electronic equipment, a large air-handling unit, and a 1,000-kw generator. Shock-isolation methods were evaluated by repeating tests under different isolation conditions, including a baseline test with the equipment hard-mounted.

In the 1987 test series all equipment was bolted directly to the floor in a hard-mounted configuration, or simply unattached, as with some desks and bookshelves. Data from these tests indicate relatively high acceleration levels within the structure, but the generator and air-handling equipment remained operational before, during, and after the tests. In Figure 1 the shock spectra generated from a typical acceleration data record measured near the base of the air-handling unit is compared to a fragility curve for air-handling equipment from TM-835-1 (Reference 2). The measured acceleration levels clearly exceed the allowable limits indicated by the fragility curve. Since the air-handling unit continued to operate, the fragility curve (at least in this case) is conservative. Peak in-structure spectra accelerations from 1000 g's for buried shots to 10,000 g's for above-ground shots were calculated from the acceleration data; however, relative displacements associated with these accelerations were very small (0.01 inch to 0.001 inch). Figure 2 shows a post-test view of pre-positioned mannequins in sitting and standing positions. Data from these tests indicate that the only injury to personnel would have been from falling objects, such as the bookshelf in Figure 2. Data from the test series conducted in 1988 are summarized below.

TEST DESCRIPTION

A series of three experiments using buried general purpose bombs were conducted on the full scale semihardened test structure at Tyndall AFB, FL. The objective of these experiments was to determine the shock attenuating capabilities of four simple shock isolation systems. Several pieces of equipment were placed inside the building, and acceleration measurements made with the equipment both hard-mounted and shock isolated using various shock isolation methods. The equipment varied in weight from 50 lbs. to 2000 lbs. The equipment layout for the three experiments is shown in Figure 3.

The general purpose bombs were placed in the same buried location for each test. Each item of equipment was hard-mounted, i.e., bolted directly to the floor, in at least one test, and isolated from the floor in various configurations for the remaining
tests as shown in Table 1. Horizontal and vertical acceleration was measured on each item of equipment and on the floor near the item in every test. The isolation systems consisted of Cupmount Series Isolators, 500 Series Isolators, and neoprene pads, as shown in Figure 4. The neoprene pads were in some instances simply placed beneath the equipment while in other instances the pads were secured to the equipment and floor slab as shown in Figure 5.

RESULTS

Peak values of acceleration for each item of equipment for the various mounting configurations are tabulated in Table 2. Comparing hard-mounted and isolated acceleration values from Table 2 indicates that the Cupmount Series mounts reduced the peak acceleration in the X (horizontal) direction by about 50 percent, and reduced the peak acceleration in the Y (vertical) direction by about 30 percent. The 500 Series mounts increased the average peak acceleration in the X direction by about 20 percent while decreasing the peak acceleration in the Y direction by about 15 percent. The neoprene pads, when not attached to the floor slab, decreased the acceleration in the X direction by about 15 percent, but increased the acceleration in the Y direction by about 30 percent. Also, larger displacements were seen with the unattached pads than with any other isolators. For example, Figure 6 shows an approximate 11 inch rigid body displacement of the 1000-kw generator when it was placed on two layers (about 1/4 inch thick) of neoprene pads. The neoprene pads, when attached to the equipment and floor as shown in Figure 5, performed very well. They reduced the peak acceleration in the X direction by about 43 percent and reduced the peak acceleration in the Y direction by about 34 percent. These numbers were very similar to those obtained using the cupmount series mounts. All of the data from the 1988 tests are given in Reference 3.

SUMMARY

Relatively high peak in-structure acceleration levels (in excess of 1,000 g's) occurred in these tests. However, relative displacements were very small and no equipment damage or personnel injuries were observed, except due to falling objects. More data are needed on equipment fragility in this very high-frequency, high-shock environment. Rigid body motions of unattached equipment and furniture can be a problem. Positive connections to the floor slab should always be required, and taller items should be prevented from overturning. The commonly used Cupmount Series isolator performed very well, and can be expected to reduce peak acceleration values by about 50% compared to a hard-mounted configuration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Tyndall AFB, FL, under the direction of LTC Bob Majka. Permission to publish this paper was granted by the Office, Chief of Engineers.

REFERENCES


Figure 1. Shock spectra for aboveground detonation

Figure 2. Posttest view of mannequins
Figure 3. Equipment layout

Figure 4. Isolation systems

Figure 5. Attachment of neoprene pads to floor slab

Figure 6. Posttest view of 1,000 kW generator
Table 1. Shock isolation configurations

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<th>Item</th>
<th>Test 1</th>
<th>Test 2</th>
<th>Test 3</th>
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<tr>
<td>1,000 kW generator</td>
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<td>Cupmount series</td>
<td>Neoprene pads</td>
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<td>500 series</td>
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Table 2. Summary of peak acceleration data (in g's)

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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* Denotes average of several readings.
** Neoprene pads were attached to both the floor and the equipment rack as shown in Figure 3.
----- This type of mount not used for the item.
A series of model experiments have been conducted to investigate the dynamic response of pile foundations in a blast and shock environment. The model experiments were conducted at the Cambridge Geotechnical Centrifuge facility, Cambridge UK. Two experiments were carried out on a pair of single piles and one on a group of six piles at 60g, and a fourth experiment on a pair of single piles was conducted at 1g for comparison. The model piles were hollow aluminium alloy tubes, instrumented with strain gauges in the horizontal and vertical planes to measure bending and axial strain. The test bed was a fine grained sand, saturated with water. The blast load on the foundation was provided by a 2 gm charge of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) placed below the surface at a depth of one-half of the pile length and detonated at a distance of approximately one crater radius. The paper describes the experimental techniques employed and presents results from the model tests. The results highlight the differences in pile response, particularly with depth, between the 1g and the 60g experiments and confirm the importance of correctly scaling geostatic stresses.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Evaluation of the response of foundations to blast loads is complicated by the fact that soil properties are sensitive functions of overburden pressure. In order to properly reproduce this effect in a model one must either use a full scale model or increase the rate at which the overburden stress increases with depth. Field testing on a full scale prototype pile foundation is difficult, generally expensive and in some cases not feasible. Therefore, a database from which to develop a rational design method cannot readily be developed using field testing alone. The series of centrifuge experiments reported in this paper were undertaken to determine the feasibility of using subscale models on a centrifuge to collect valid and reliable data on the blast response of pile foundations. Discussion of the use of the geotechnical centrifuge for dynamic modelling and on the necessary scaling relations for 1g and for centrifuge modelling may be found in the literature, Schofield (1981), Schofield and Steedman (1988).

The objective of these experiments was to show that the centrifuge is an appropriate means to gain an understanding of pile foundation response under blast loading. The design parameters were selected to be representative of a typical hollow reinforced concrete pile in a sand foundation but not a precise model of a specific prototype. This approach was selected because the authors believed that there was more to be learned at this stage from a study of a generic problem which identified phenomena, rather than from models which attempted to reproduce details of a site specific problem. Hence the results are more readily extended to other systems.

The paper describes the design and instrumentation of the model piles, and aspects of model construction. Results are presented in terms of deformations and bending moments as a function of length for two isolated single piles fixed at ground level. The cratering and ground motion data collected are presented in a companion paper, Gaffney et al. (1989). Results from the initial experiments were reported by Felice et al. (1988).

2.0 EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMME

2.1 Model charge

Four experiments were conducted on single piles and a line of piles forming a pile group as described above. The charge was selected to simulate the detonation of a 1000 lb conventional munition. At 1/60th scale, 2 gm of explosive was required (scaling relations are shown in Table 1). This was accomplished by packing 1.6 gm PETN inside a plastic sphere. The remaining 0.2 gm was made up by the detonator. The average density of the PETN powder was 0.9 gm/cm³. The detonator, a Reynolds RP-80 exploding bridge wire was placed in the sphere to initiate the explosion from the centre. The charge was coated with a thin film of epoxy to protect it against moisture.

2.2 Model piles

The model piles were constructed from 6.35 mm outer diameter aluminium alloy (dural) tube with an inner diameter of 5.0 mm. Prior to instrumenting, the piles were turned down to an outer diameter of 5.8 mm. Each pile extended 147 mm below its top fixity. The elastic Young's modulus and density of dural are 69 x 10³ MPa and 2.83 gm/cm³, respectively. The manufacturer's specification set the elastic limit as 255 MPa and
Selected piles and the ground beam were instrumented with full bridge strain gauge circuits to record bending or axial strain. To protect the gauges and wiring from moisture, they were coated with a polyurethane varnish and covered with a heat shrink plastic tubing.

2.3 Model construction and layout

Fig. 1 shows the containment system used for the latter two of the four experiments. Two circular tubes were used, one sitting on a rubber mat inside the other, with an air gap of approximately 24 mm separating them around the perimeter. This was a development from the containment used for the earlier experiments (RSS.130 and 131, which used only a single tub) following concerns raised over the level of safety that a single tub provided.

Breeze block (a porous concrete patio block) was placed at the base of the model to simulate an underlying bedrock. The model was then constructed by pouring a uniform dry sand layer to a depth of 130 mm (9 m at prototype scale). The sand used in the model was a Leighton Buzzard 100/200 sand with a nominal grain size of 0.12 mm and specific gravity of 2.65. 100/200 denote the British Standard sieve sizes through which the sand should pass/be retained.

Prior to the sand-pouring the piles, which had been clamped at the top into a heavy steel gantry, were fixed in position by locating the gantry onto the model chamber. In each case the gantry spanned across the tub, and was securely bolted to the stiff rim of the outer tub. For the pile of piles experiments, one pile was positioned to be just inside the crater with the second near the crater lip, about 90° further round the crater perimeter. A small clearance existed between the piles and the breeze block beneath to avoid unpredictable axial bearing forces in the piles.

Sand was rained from a hopper suspended above the tub using a constant height of drop. Pouring was interrupted to allow the placing of transducers in the free field (see companion paper for a description and discussion of the free field instrumentation). The sand was levelled and the model saturated by sealing the chamber with a heavy lid and drawing in a calculated volume of water under vacuum. In the second series of experiments, RSS.140 and 141, \( \text{CO}_2 \) was flushed through the chamber prior to the introduction of water.

For all four experiments, the charge was placed at a depth of 74 mm (half the pile length) immediately prior to mounting the package on the centrifuge swinging platform. A short thin walled brass tube which had been placed in the sand bed during sand pouring to mark the location of the charge was excavated to the correct depth where the charge was placed at the bottom of the hole. The brass tube was then backfilled with the excavated sand and then extracted by gently vibrating the tube and pulling it upwards. The water level inside the tube was maintained at a constant level during the process.

The completed model was then mounted on the centrifuge and accelerated to 60 g. The FS-10 firing control unit, which had also been mounted on the centrifuge, was triggered remotely from the control room.

The procedure for the 1 g experiment was identical in all respects except that it was detonated on the laboratory floor instead of on the centrifuge. Care was taken to ensure that the model was level and that the ground water level was exactly at the ground surface.

Table 2 summarises the model parameters for each of the model tests.

3.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Bending moments

All results are plotted in terms of prototype dimensions. Fig. 2 shows time histories of the development of bending moment from a typical isolated single pile in a 60 g experiment. A rapid build-up of bending moment is followed by a slower decay, with the duration of plastic straining being about 0.6 seconds (10 macc ‘real time’ in the model). The records, which are from strain gauge bridges at different depths on the same pile, show strongly consistent data, and this enables detailed consideration to be given to the profile of bending moment with time along the pile.

In contrast, Fig. 3 shows the equivalent data from a 1 g experiment. There is a longer period at or near the peak bending strain at each depth, and a less rapid build-up to the peak strain. The magnitudes of peak strain are comparable between the 1 g and the 60 g model as would be expected since in both cases peak strains are limited by the plastic moment capacity of the pile.

It is clear from the plots of displacement profile shown below that all piles developed plastic hinges and failed, with large lateral permanent displacements. The peak bending strains recorded by the strain gauges are large and in excess of the manufacturer's stated elastic range. On a few occasions the local bending strains were so large (2-3%) that the gauges broke down and the signal from that circuit was lost. Clearly as strains in the outer fibres of the dural piles exceed a yield point the relationship between moment and measured
bending strain is no longer linear. Thus although peak moments are of great interest, the development of moment as a function of time and depth may provide more significant clues to the response of the pile from an analytical viewpoint. Furthermore, in the design of the model piles correct scaling of the bending stiffness was chosen at the expense of the correct yield characteristics.

Fig. 4 compares the development of bending moment with time from an isolated single pile in a 60g experiment to the development of moment in a 1g experiment.

Time intervals have been chosen to be shortly after the first significant build-up of strain and then at equal time intervals of 46.9 msec until the peak strain was reached, or shortly thereafter. A 'best fit' fourth order polynomial has been drawn through the peak data of both 1g and 60g experiments.

One clear feature of the data is the marked similarity between the strain distributions at the early (t1) stage, in contrast to the later build-up towards a peak. At the t2 or t3 stage the peak moment is clearly at a shallower depth in the 60g experiment than in the 1g experiment (which consistently shows a peak near shot depth). The 60g model, however, has a distribution biased upwards, towards the ground surface.

This is likely to be due to the increased stiffness of the sand bed in the 60g experiment in comparison to the 1g model (a factor of 8 under static load conditions). However, this factor may have been considerably reduced around the time of the maximum moments (t2 or t3 in Fig. 4) because of the large negative pore pressures in the 1g experiment which followed the peak pore pressure 'wave'. In the 60g experiments, the pore pressure wave lasted longer and decayed considerably more slowly.

The early time data of bending strains is enlarged in Fig. 5 together with a polynomial which follows the general trend of the data. At this time in both the 1g and the 60g experiments, the pore pressure around the pile was approaching a peak, with a corresponding reduction in stiffness.

The polynomial in Fig. 5 was used to deduce the general trend of the pressure distribution, by differentiation. A check was made, by integrating the polynomial, that the slope at the pile top and the displacement at the pile bottom were minimised or zero. It is clear that the trend of the pressure distribution at this time is as shown in Fig. 6, in which a high load at the pile top decays to near zero around the central portion of the pile together with some restraint near the pile bottom.

Preliminary conclusions are that the central portion of the pile moves with the liquefied soil, without load or resistance. Near the top of the pile, the soil is being driven past the stationary pile head, imposing very substantial loading and this is the most likely location of the first plastic hinge.

3.2 Displacements

Fig. 7 shows the profile of displacement with depth for piles (1) and (2) (range 7.5m and 9.5m) in both a 1g (141) and 60g (140) experiment. Measurements were made using an image analyser at AFWL.

The initial slopes of the piles are very consistent, but the increased restraint caused by the higher overburden stresses at the base of the 60g model limits the outward movement of these piles. Clearly these displacements are much more closely linked to the distribution of soil strain in the sand beds, which is discussed in more detail by Gaffney et al. (1989).

The depth of the central plastic hinge is less in the 60g than in the 1g experiments, which is in agreement with the observations of bending strain in Fig. 4.

A critical element in the prediction of the range of damage to piles in the field is the nature and magnitude of the pore pressure wave. The fast decay of the pore pressure wave in the 1g model is likely to be due to the strong dilation front which followed immediately behind. Although at high g a dilation front will recover the full field (or prototype) strength in the soil, at 1g the strength of the sand is small and large strains can take place.

The high g model can correctly scale the pattern of ground strain and the character of a pore pressure wave, whereas the response of a pile in a 1g experiment, close in to the charge, will be determined by the strength of the pile and the proximity of the charge.

4.0 Conclusions

4.1 The time histories of bending strain in model tests have provided valuable data towards the development of analytical techniques. In particular, it is clear that a data-base of soil-structure interaction under blast loading can be developed using centrifuge modelling.

4.2 In particular, the build-up towards a peak strain is initiated as the wave of pore pressure arrives at the pile, softening the soil around the pile. High loading is observed near the pile top with a minimum of load around the central section. The peak strain is reached as the pore pressure wave decays, both radially and with depth. Larger bending strains are then invoked as the deeper soil consolidates more rapidly and provides restraint against lateral movement.

5.0 Acknowledgements

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5.0 References


Table 1

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Table 2

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Fig.1 Plan and cross-sections through the 60g centrifuge model test RSS.140
2.6 Bending moment recorded on Pile 1, model RSS.140 (60g)

Fig. 2

2.6 Bending moment recorded on Pile 1, model RSS.141 (1g)

Fig. 3

Compared to Fig. 2, the bending moment is more pronounced at shallower depths.

Fig. 4

Fourth order polynomial through early time data

Fig. 5

Interpreted pressure distribution

Fig. 6

Comparison of 1g and 60g single pile data: piles inside crater

Fig. 4

A comparison of pile deflections from 60g and 1g experiments

Fig. 7
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