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PEACEMAKING: THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF BRITISH STRATEGY IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
1969-1972

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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by

DANIEL M. WILSON, JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PEACEMAKING: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BRITISH STRATEGY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-1972 by MAJ Daniel M. Wilson, Jr., USA, 155 pages.

Peacemaking is the use of national power to separate belligerents and compel a peaceful settlement of a conflict. This study examines peacemaking using the British experience in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1972 as a case study. This study examines why British strategy failed to bring peace to Northern Ireland, proposes what Britain should have done, and identifies lessons for future planners of peacemaking operations.

This study uses an analytical model synthesized from three existing models to structure the investigation. It identifies the problem and the strategy, and uses the U.S. military's doctrinal imperatives for low intensity conflict to analyze them.

This study concludes that the military successfully separated the violent sects and created an opportunity, but the British government failed to seize it and adequately address the problems. Britain was drawn into the conflict by forfeiting its neutrality, thereby losing legitimacy as a peacemaker. Among the lessons drawn by the study is that peacemaking is not primarily a military operation, but a political and social endeavor enabled by use of the military

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nationalities, ethnic groups and sects clash within many countries throughout the world. Currently, Croats and Serbs are engaged in armed conflict in Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union is troubled by the clash of many different ethnic groups within its republics. Several of our allies are troubled by such conflicts, to include Turkey with an armed Kurdish population, and Spain with violent Basque separatists. The resurgence of nationalism is a trend throughout the world. Should these problems flare in regions vital to our national interest, the United States may be called upon to act as peacemaker or to participate in an international peacemaking effort.

Separating groups in open conflict and bringing about a peaceful settlement is one of the most difficult and unusual missions the United States military may be called on to perform. It is a mission we have little recent experience of, and for which little doctrine has been developed. One of our closest allies and defense partners has considerable experience with this difficult mission. Great Britain used its army to separate violent sects in Northern Ireland in 1969, and has been struggling to bring about peace ever since. A study of Britain's strategy and approach to the problem during the crucial beginning of the operation should yield lessons and planning considerations for future such missions.

Peacemaking is the use of national power to stop a violent conflict and compel a lasting settlement through political and diplomatic methods. A successful peacemaking operation will likely transition rapidly to a peacekeeping operation, and terminate with prompt withdrawal upon reaching a settlement. An unsuccessful peacemaking operation may trap the force in a situation it can not extract itself from, or cause the force to be withdrawn leaving matters worse than before the intervention.¹ In this thesis I will examine the British attempt at peacemaking in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1972.

Overview of Events

In August 1969 the British government gave the Army responsibility for police and security in Northern Ireland. What began as a peaceful civil rights movement by members of the Catholic minority had degenerated into sectarian violence, and the police were unable to control it. Entire neighborhoods had become "no-go" areas for the police. The British Army was initially welcomed by both sides in the conflict. By 1972, however, both communities had spawned terrorist groups, and the Army found itself embroiled in a bloody struggle that continues today.

The British army was able to stop the open rioting, and reassert government control over all of Northern Ireland. Open civil war was prevented. The violence, however, merely changed form. Incidents of terrorism increased dramatically during the period of 1969-1972 (see table 1). Rather than making a rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation, the British Army itself became a target, and found itself embroiled in a growing struggle against terrorism.

¹Department of Defense, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Army Field Manual 100-20/Av Force Pamphlet 3-20, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 3-2.

Table 1. Rise of Terrorism

Year	Deaths from Terrorism			Injured from Terrorism		
	Police	Army	Civilians	Police	Army	Civilians
1968*	---	---	---	379	---	---
1969	1	---	12	711	22	---
1970	2	---	23	191	99	---
1971	11	43	115	317	279	1,799
1972	17	129	321	466	707	3,998

* From 5 October 1968.

Source: Royal Ulster Constabulary, reported in Peter Janke, *Ulster: A Decade of Violence*, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979), p. 18.

Today more than twenty years later, the British government has still been unable to compel a lasting settlement of the conflict through peaceful means. The violence continues, and while primary responsibility for internal security has been handed back to the police, the army still plays a large role in combating the violence. Despite the best efforts of the army in extremely difficult circumstances, British peacemaking strategy has certainly failed.

Purpose of Thesis

Why did the British peacemaking effort during this period fail? It may not have been adequate and appropriate to the problem. It may have been poorly executed. The strategy may have been unfeasible, or the problem itself may have been unsolvable. There is little to be gained from an exploration of the latter possibility. The execution of the military aspects of British strategy has been well explored. This thesis will explore the adequacy and appropriateness of the strategy, and look for lessons that may be applied by planners of future peacemaking operations.

Primary Research Question

To conduct this exploration, the primary research question will be: Why did British peacemaking strategy in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1972 fail to compel a lasting settlement to the conflict?

Secondary Questions

Some secondary questions that must be answered are: What was the strategic problem for Great Britain? What was the British Strategy? How well did the British Strategy address the problem?

Definition of Terms

Several terms will be key to this study and require early definition. Other important or peculiar terms will be defined as encountered.

Ireland: In this thesis, I will use the term "Ireland" when referring to the entire island (and its associated smaller islands) currently divided into Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. (Figure 1 portrays the current political boundaries.)

Northern Ireland: The official name of that portion of Ireland that is part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. During the period 1969 to 1972, it was a semi-autonomous province within the United Kingdom. The terms "Ulster" and "the six counties" are also frequently used to refer to Northern Ireland, but such usage is associated with particular perspectives on the conflict. I will use Northern Ireland throughout this thesis.

Ulster: In this thesis I will use the term "Ulster" when referring to the northernmost of the traditional four provinces of Ireland. This encompasses the three counties of the Republic of Ireland, as well as all of Northern Ireland.




Figure 1. Current Political Boundaries

Strategy: I will use the definition of strategy taught in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Strategy is the coordination of power to accomplish ends and objectives.² At the national level then, national strategy is the coordination of national power to accomplish national objectives.

Peacemaking: I have already defined peacemaking as the use of national power to stop a violent conflict and compel a lasting settlement through political and diplomatic methods. This definition is derived from the discussion of peacemaking in the U.S. Army field manual on low intensity conflict.³

Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict to maintain a truce and facilitate a diplomatic solution.⁴ Consent is important in peacekeeping missions, while a peacemaking operation may be conducted without the consent of one or more of the parties. Peacekeeping also requires that some form of peace, or at least a break in the fighting exist prior to the insertion of the peacekeeping force.

Sect: The struggle in Northern Ireland to a large extent is one between two sects. A sect is a group forming a distinct unit within a larger group by virtue of certain distinctions of belief or practice.⁵

Sectarian: Sectarian is an adjective meaning adhering or confined to the dogmatic limits of a sect; partisan; parochial.⁶

²U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, "Joint and Combined Environments" CGSC C500 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: USA Command and General Staff College, 1991), lesson 4.

³DOD, *Low Intensity Conflict*, p. 5-1.

⁴Ibid, p. 4-1.

⁵William Morris, ed., *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., INC., 1975), p. 317.

⁶Ibid.

Limitations

This study is limited by the material available about British strategy during the period concerned. I do not have access to first hand accounts of strategy development discussions in the British government. I do not have the opportunity to interview the decision makers to elicit their intentions, motivations, and rationale for the decisions they made. I must rely on reports of programs actually enacted, political statements, and government studies to identify British strategy.

Delimitations

It has been said that once you are confused about Northern Ireland, you are making progress in understanding the problem. I will not presume to solve the problems of Northern Ireland in this thesis; nor even to definitively explain the conflict. This study is confined to the British strategy of the years 1969 to 1972 and the events that led up to that period. I selected the period of 1969 to 1972 because it was the crucial initial period of the peacemaking operation. The operation began in 1969 when British troops were introduced to restore order. In 1972, the British imposed direct rule over Northern Ireland, clearly marking a change in strategy.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Northern Ireland is much written about. Many books, periodicals, and scholarly works examine aspects of the continuing conflict. While largely fallen off the pages of American newspapers, Northern Ireland is almost a daily topic in the British and Irish press. Little is written, however, about the initial British peacemaking strategy during the crucial period of 1969 to 1972.

In this chapter, I will briefly summarize existing research. I will begin with a discussion of current U.S. doctrine applicable to peacemaking. Next I will discuss works addressing the British experience with peacemaking in Northern Ireland, starting with those explaining the nature of the problem, to include the historical development of the conflict, the conditions existing in 1969, and the events of 1969 to 1972. In the next section, I will discuss works examining the interests and objectives of relevant actors. I will then discuss works examining British strategy and policies, and their effectiveness. Finally, I will summarize the state of existing research and the contribution of this thesis.

Doctrine

U.S. doctrine for peacemaking operations is contained in the Army Field Manual/Air Force Pamphlet entitled *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. It is discussed briefly in a chapter on peacetime contingency operations. The manual

emphasizes the political-military nature of the operation, and points out some of the conflicting demands and constraints. It lists five requirements: consistent mission analysis; clear command and control relationships; effective communications facilities; joint and combined force liaison; and effective public diplomacy and PSYOP (PSYchological OPerations). Success is defined by stopping the violent conflict and forcing a return to political and diplomatic methods. It is best terminated by prompt withdrawal after a settlement, or rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation.

As a type of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), the doctrine identifies five imperatives:

Political dominance - ...political objectives drive military decisions at every level...commanders and staff officers...must adopt courses of action which legally support those objectives even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox...

Unity of effort - Military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC.

Adaptability - ...the skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations.

Legitimacy - ...the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions.

Perseverance - ...the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of rational goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them.⁷

The discussion of peacemaking is extremely brief, covering less than one page. The discussion is limited largely to stating how difficult the mission is, and some broad requirements. The manual presents no clear guidance for planners.

⁷DOD, *Low Intensity Conflict*, pp. 5 - 6.

History Leading to the Conflict

A great deal has been written about the history of Ireland and the development of the conflict. Some particularly useful, detailed works include: Gearoid MacNiocaill's *Ireland before the Vikings* for ancient Ireland; Marianne Elliot's *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France* for the period of English conquest to union; F.S.L. Lyons' *Ireland since the Famine* for the period leading to independence; and Tim Pat Coogan's *Ireland since the Rising* for modern Ireland. Some very useful works on the development of the current armed conflict are: Andrew Boyd's *Holy War in Belfast: A History of the Troubles in Northern Ireland*; Padraig O'Malley's *The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today*; Conor Cruise O'Brien's *States of Ireland*; Peter Gibbon's *The Origins of Ulster Unionism* for the development of the Unionist agenda; and J. Bowyer Bell's *The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1979* for the development of the radical republican agenda. These works show that history is very important to the development of the conflict. Much of the sectarian hatred manifested in 1969 can be traced to the evolution of the Northern Irish state. The conquest of Ireland by England and the English plantation system created the Protestant "haves" and the Catholic "have-nots" that continue to largely define the sectarian problem today. A history of penal laws and legal discrimination served to institutionalize the Catholic distrust of the Protestant government. Catholic reaction to those policies is responsible in large part for the nature of the government established in the Irish republic, particularly the special position afforded the Catholic Church. The actions and policies of the Irish republic after it was created have, in turn, contributed to a fortress mentality on the part of the Protestants in Northern Ireland.

Conor Cruise O'Brien argues convincingly in *States of Ireland* that the problem is a religious one, though not a theological war. Dr. O'Brien, a delegate to the United Nations and Labour (a minority party not aligned with either faction of the conflict) member of the

Irish parliament in the 1960s, presents the most convincing portrayal of the nature of the conflict. He argues that to call it a conflict of nations, as the Provisional Irish Republican Army does, denies the unique nature of the Northern Irish Protestant community. Calling it a question of allegiance goes straight back to religion, with allegiance determined by the victory at the Battle of the Boyne not of an English king over an Irish king, but a Protestant king over a Catholic king. Class also does not describe it: poor and well-to-do alike identify themselves not by economic class but by Protestant or Catholic. Calling it a conflict between settlers and natives tells only part of the truth. Northern Ireland began as a Reformation settlement in Counter-reformation territory.

What has kept alive the difference over the centuries, over a major change of language (among Catholics), and over the vast changes brought about by the industrial revolution - taking so many 'settlers' and 'natives' alike from the land they had fought over - was the factor of religion, inseparably intertwined with political allegiance.⁸

John A. Little, in his Masters Thesis "Conflict in Ulster", argues unconvincingly that the conflict in Northern Ireland "is a class conflict aligned along religious differences."⁹ The conflict is not between economic classes, as there are actually a large number of poor Protestants in Northern Ireland. In fact, as Little himself points out, it is the poor Protestants that fill the ranks of Protestant terrorist groups, just as it is largely poor Catholics that swell the ranks of republican terrorist groups. People's view of the conflict in Northern Ireland is usually defined by their religious affiliation, not their class.

⁸Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 307.

⁹John A. Little, "Conflict in Ulster" (MA thesis, Wichita State University, 1976), p. 1.

Conditions and Events, 1969-1972

The most valuable work detailing conditions in Northern Ireland in 1969 is the Report of the Cameron Commission. Lord Cameron's commission of inquiry, though sponsored by the British government, presents an even-handed summary of the problems, grievances, fears, and abuses at work leading up to the fall of 1969. *Barricades in Belfast: The Fight for Civil Rights* in Northern Ireland is an eyewitness account of the civil rights movement and the events of 1969 by Max Hastings, a reporter for the London *Evening Standard* newspaper. *Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives* published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict also presents the political and social conditions of 1969, as does Jonathan Bartlett's *Northern Ireland* and Alan Dures' *Modern Ireland*. M.V. Maloney's study "Northern Ireland: The Time and Place for Urban Terror" focuses on how the events of this period led to the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. John Sankey's study "Northern Ireland: A Case Study" outlines essential elements of the problem that must be addressed to achieve progress toward peace.

Two particularly valuable books recounting the events of 1969 to 1972 are *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, edited by Richard Mansbach, and *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, by the London Sunday Times Insight Team. The book by the Insight Team is a journalistic, rather than historical, effort; however, the Team conducted extensive interviews with key participants shortly after events. Newspapers of the period, particularly *The Times* (London) are also valuable in tracking the events of the period, and judging public opinion and concern. These works depict a majority government openly discriminating against the minority, serious and unbalanced unemployment, political gerrymandering, and abuses by the security forces. It is interesting to note that the British government itself, through the Cameron Commission, acknowledged the extent of the discrimination. They show that the government attempts to

address the legitimate grievances of the Catholic minority angered and alienated the Protestant majority that formed the power base of the government. The government's inability to protect the Catholic minority from the Protestant backlash that ensued caused the minority to lose all faith in the Stormont government.

Interests and Objectives

In his book *Battle for Ulster*, Tom E. Baldy presents a good summary of the major actors in the conflict and their interests and objectives. Timothy Patrick Coogan in *Ireland Since the Rising* discusses in detail the political parties and their interests during the 1960s. A wide variety of groups were pursuing conflicting interests. The government of Northern Ireland wanted to maintain power, making some concessions to the minority. Most of the Protestant groups were intent on maintaining the status quo. Most Catholic groups wanted economic and political equality, with many of them wanting an end to Northern Ireland and the formation of a single Irish state. The interests of the Republic of Ireland are presented in Conor Cruise O'Brien's *States of Ireland*. He concludes that moderation of both the Protestant and Catholic views, and a peaceful movement toward reconciliation was in Ireland's best interest, despite calls by some Irish politicians for southern military intervention. The Republic also had an interest in helping the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland achieve political and social equality and in their protection from violence and abuse by the Protestant majority. The interests and objectives of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are discussed in Timothy M. Collins' thesis "The IRA: An Examination of a Terrorist Organization" and in J. Bowyer Bell's *The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916 .. 1970*. The official IRA wanted to bring about a single Irish state, but had been dormant since 1962. Seán MacStiofáin's book *Revolutionary in Ireland* is an autobiography of the man who was Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA until 1972. His book provides insight into the motives and interests of the Provisionals, as well as the influences on MacStiofáin's

development as a revolutionary. Bew and Patterson's *The British State and the Ulster Crisis* contains an excellent discussion of British interests and objectives in Northern Ireland. They conclude that Britain's strategic interest is to ensure a stable, friendly government throughout Ireland. They believe British objectives have become tangled and confused with changing British governments.

British Strategies, Policies, and their Effect

Most works dealing with British strategy, policies, and their effects concentrate almost exclusively on military programs. Desmond Hamill's *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, Kenneth S. Hahn's "A Case Study: The Effects of the British Army Against the Irish Republican Army", and Maura K. Naughton's "Government Actions to Control Terrorist Violence: A Case Study on Northern Ireland" are all examples. These conclude that the army can prevent civil war and contain violence to an extent, but can not solve the problem alone.

Very few works address the use of other elements of power. P.J. Finneran, Jr. examines the efforts to cut off funding for violent groups in Northern Ireland in "The Irish Connection." Bew and Patterson discuss some political and social policies and programs, and Tom Baldy presents a good discussion of the political-military programs enacted and their effect.

Tom Baldy, in *Battle for Ulster*, examines British strategy in Northern Ireland as it evolved in the mid 1970s to early 1980s. This strategy, which he calls internal security, consists of three pieces: security operations; criminalization; political initiatives. Mr. Baldy argues that this strategy did not work because it was based on an invalid assumption. He believes Britain viewed the sectarian differences as "... a complicating irritant in an

otherwise normal society. They are at the very core of the dilemma..."¹⁰, and thus Britain had not recognized the real problem. Criminalization does not work because no one really believes republican and loyalist prisoners are ordinary prisoners, and Britain does not in fact treat them as such, using special courts to try them. Finally, the political initiatives rely on a move toward moderation while Mr. Baldy believes the trend is actually toward increased polarization. Mr. Baldy does not, however, address the initial British strategy. I believe it was the failure of this initial strategy that set the conditions that Mr. Baldy argues Britain's strategy in the mid 1970s failed to address.

My thesis will contribute to understanding the British experience with peacemaking by examining all the elements of national power that were applied to the problem during the crucial initial peacemaking operation. I will discuss whether the correct elements of power were used, and whether the policies used to apply each element of power were adequate and appropriate.

Summary

While a great deal has been written about the conflict in Northern Ireland, most focus on the historical development of the problem or the effectiveness and performance of the military. Few works examine British use of elements of power other than military, or overall British strategy and policy toward Northern Ireland. This thesis will contribute to understanding the conflict by specifically examining British strategy in 1969 to 1972 toward the problem of Northern Ireland, what elements of national power were used and how, and why that strategy failed. This thesis will also contribute to an understanding of peacemaking operations by deriving some planning considerations from the British experience.

¹⁰Tom F. Baldy, *Battle for Ulster*, (Washington, DC: National University Press, 1987), p. 77.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I will describe the research procedure and analytical model used in this thesis. I will describe how I developed the model, and point out the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology.

Research Procedure

My research is phased. Initial research focuses on identifying the problem facing British decision makers in 1969, including historical development and social and political forces and conditions. The next phase concentrates on determining the interests and objectives of the major actors, and their ability to influence events. The final phase focuses on identifying British strategy, policies, and the effects of that strategy.

Analytical Models

I developed the analytical model used in this thesis from three existing models. Two of these existing models are intended to analyze a strategic problem and assist in developing a solution to that problem. The third is a model for analyzing failure. Elements of each model are synthesized to provide a model for analyzing strategic failure.

Strategic Analysis Model

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has developed the "CGSC strategic analysis model." This model is focused on identifying a strategic problem and developing a recommended strategy for the coordinated use of national power to pursue U.S. interests.




Figure 2. CGSC Strategic Analysis Model
Reprinted from US Army CGSC, "Joint and Combined Environments," p. 11

This model does not lend itself directly to this thesis. It must be modified to facilitate analyzing past decisions rather than analyzing current decisions. This model is also based on an assumption of rationality on the part of all the actors. I believe the problem of Northern Ireland in 1969 was such that rationality can not be assumed.

Insurgency Analysis Model

Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict contains a model for analyzing an insurgency or counterinsurgency. This model focuses on understanding an existing insurgency or counterinsurgency leading to the development of courses of action to achieve a desired end state.

This model is not directly useable. When Britain made the decision to use troops to restore order in 1969, an active insurgency had not yet developed. The task facing the British at that time was not primarily (yet) countering an insurgency. This model must also be modified to facilitate analyzing past decisions rather than making current decisions.

Failure Analysis

Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch provide a model for analyzing failure in war in *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. This five step model leads to a matrix showing who failed to do what, and how these failures tie together to provide the larger cause of the failure in question.

This model seeks to explain failure by identifying deficient performance by various levels of organization. It analyzes action or lack of action. This model also does not lend itself directly to this thesis, as I am not concerned with fixing blame at varying levels of organization.

Synthesized Model

I have synthesized an analytical model from these three models that I will use in this thesis. This model provides the framework for answering the research question, and the structure for the remainder of this thesis. My model has four broad steps: identify the problem; identify the strategy used; analyze the strategy against the problem using the doctrinal imperatives for Low Intensity Conflict; and draw conclusions. I will accomplish Step 1 in Chapter 4, The Strategic Problem; Step 2 in Chapter 5, The Strategy; Step 3 in Chapter 6, Analysis; and Step 4 in Chapter 7, Conclusions.

The critical step in understanding the success or failure of any strategy is identifying the problem. In the CGSC model, the problem is identified first, and then the interests of all involved are defined. This works well when solving a current problem or formulating future strategy. Trying to define a past problem, however, requires a different approach. The context of the problem must be defined, and the actors and their interests are part of that context. Therefore I will first explore the historical background of the conflict, leading to an examination of the situation at the time the strategy was formulated. Secondly, I will identify the interests of the decision maker - the government of Great Britain. Next, I will identify the relevant actors and their interests. This step culminates in the identification of the strategic problem facing the decision maker.

During step 2, I will identify the strategy chosen, along with its effects. I will deduce British strategy by examining British policies, programs, and actions initiated in Northern Ireland and identify the impact of those initiatives.

In step 3, I will analyze the strategy against the problem using the doctrinal imperatives for Low Intensity Conflict. I will conclude during step 4 by drawing conclusions from this analysis. I will answer the primary research question of why British strategy failed, and draw lessons learned for future planners to consider.




Figure 3. Law Intensity Conflict Strategy Analysis Model

Conclusions

The strength of this methodology is its methodical, deliberate approach. It uses the applicable parts of proven models, and adapts them to the problem. The weakness of this methodology is in the subjective nature of the analysis required. There is no clear standard against which a strategy can be evaluated. This methodology relies on a subjective evaluation of the strategy based on the visible effects of its implementation.

CHAPTER 4

THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM

In this chapter, I will identify the strategic problem facing Great Britain in 1969. I will begin with a discussion of the historical development of the conflict, leading to a description of the situation in Northern Ireland in 1969. I will then examine Great Britain's interests at the time. Next, I will identify the other relevant actors on the stage in 1969 and their interests, and the actors that emerged between 1969 and 1972 and their interests. Finally, I will summarize the strategic problem facing Great Britain in 1969.

Historical Development

But when dominions are acquired in a province differing in language, laws and customs, the difficulties to be overcome are great, and it requires good fortune as well as great industry to retain them; one of the best and most certain means of doing so would be for the new ruler to take up his residence there. ... The other and better remedy is to plant colonies in one or two of those places which form as it were the keys of the land, for it is necessary either to do this or to maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will cost the prince little; with little or no expense on his part, he can send and maintain them; he only injures those whose lands and houses are taken to give to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the state, and those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do any harm to him, and all others are, on the one hand, not injured and therefore easily pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending lest they should be treated like those who have been dispossessed.

Machiavelli, *The Prince*¹

¹ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*. Translated by Luigi Ricci, revised by E.R.P. Vincent. (New York: New American Library, 1952) pp. 36-37.

Conor Cruise O'Brien suggests the problems of Northern Ireland in 1969 were rooted in a misapplication of Machiavelli's advice by Britain in the seventeenth century.¹² Ireland at that time certainly did differ from England in "language, laws, and customs," and Britain's plantation of Ulster by grants and sales to immigrants from Scotland and England helped lay the foundation for the problems of 1969. Conflicts and hardships fill Irish history, and feed the problem facing Britain in 1969. (For a brief chronology, see Appendix) I believe there are five key periods in Irish history that lead directly to the problems of 1969: the plantation of Ireland culminating with Cromwell's campaign in 1649-50; the Jacobite War of 1689-91 culminating with the imposition of the Penal Laws in 1695; the rise of Orangism and the famines of the nineteenth century; partition, beginning with the Rising of 1916, the Anglo-Irish War, and its aftermath; and the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

Plantations

St. Patrick's mission in 432 A.D. established Catholicism in Ireland. Ireland remained largely isolated from Britain until the twelfth century. Ironically, it was a papal bull issued to Henry II of England in 1154 that enabled him to possess Ireland as part of the crown inheritance. The Normans invaded and declared Henry II King of Ireland, dividing the country into four provinces: Leinster, Munster, Ulster, and Connacht. They also introduced the county, by combining several existing territorial divisions used by the natives. Ireland was formally part of the realms of the English crown, but English influence was largely limited to a small area around Dublin called "The Pale." The Irish were uncooperative with English attempts to rule them, and Irish history through the sixteenth century is a series of rebellions, and attempts to control the island by Britain.

¹² Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 34.

By the late sixteenth century, the cost of maintaining an army in Ireland had become unacceptable. In 1551 it cost £24,000.¹³ Queen Mary decided to cut costs by reducing the size of the army in Ireland and implementing plantations. The Crown confiscated land in Counties Laois and Offaly, and provided it to loyal Englishmen willing to settle and pay rent for the land. The settlers set up the English system of local government in these counties. This first plantation was small, and troubled by repeated attacks from local Irish.




Figure 4. The Plantations

Sources: D.G. Pringle, *One Island, Two Nations? A political geographic analysis of the national conflict in Ireland*, (London: Research Studies Press LTD, 1985), p. 90; M.E. Collins, *Conquest and Colonisation, A History of Ireland series*, ed. Margaret MacCurtain, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969), p. 3.

¹³M.E. Collins, *Conquest and Colonisation, A History of Ireland series*, ed. Margaret MacCurtain, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969), p. 3.

Queen Elizabeth I began the next plantation in Munster in 1586, after defeating yet another rebellion. This plantation prospered until 1598. During this time Hugh O'Neill was fighting successfully against Queen Elizabeth in Ulster. His ally Owen O'More invaded Munster, causing the native Irish to rise against the unprotected colony and forcing the English to flee. Once England crushed the insurrection, the plantation settlers returned, this time well armed and prepared to defend themselves.

Queen Elizabeth's successor, James VI, King of Scotland, determined to begin new plantations in the area of Ireland that had caused the most trouble - Ulster - and to use settlers from Scotland to do it. The plantation of Ulster began in 1609 with a Commission of Inquiry traveling throughout the six counties selected for plantation mapping the ownership of the land. All land not belonging to the Church of Ireland was at the disposal of the crown. The Church of Ireland was the official church (Protestant). It was basically the Church of England transposed into Ireland, and practiced primarily by the English landlords. Most of the native Irish remained Catholic. The Scottish immigrants that soon flocked to Ulster, building new towns and settling the confiscated lands, brought a new religion to Ireland. These were followers of John Calvin. They had no bishops; instead the elders or 'presbyters' of each congregation appointed the ministers.

Ireland, and particularly Ulster, continued to rebel through the end of the English Civil War when Cromwell sailed to Ireland and finished the war there. Cromwell began a new plantation. He banished the Irish to a small barren area of Connacht (see Figure 5), while the rest of Ireland was settled by peaceful English settlers. His initial idea was to remove all the Irish and give the land over entirely to English people. When it became difficult to get ordinary Englishmen to come to work the land, Cromwell modified this to allow "ploughmen, husbandmen, labourers and artificers" to remain.¹⁴

¹⁴M.E. Collins, *Conquest and Colonisation*, p. 110.



Figure 5. The Cromwellian Plantation

Note the small strip of coastline along the Irish area reserved for British settlers.

The effect of Cromwell's plantation was the virtual destruction of the Irish middle and upper classes. Most of Ireland became estates owned by English Protestants and worked by Irish Catholics. The exception to this was Ulster, where the Presbyterians outnumbered Catholics as tenants.

The Ulster Presbyterians during this time occasionally experienced religious persecution at the hands of the English Protestants (members of the Church of Ireland), but fearing Catholic attacks, they mostly allied themselves with the English. This marked the beginning of the Protestant siege mentality, with the Ulster Presbyterians fearing the Catholics, and not completely trusting the British. It also began the inseparable intertwining of religion with politics in Ireland.




Figure 6. Changes in Land Ownership, Seventeenth Century
 Data is from M.E. Collins, *Conquest and Colonisation, A History of Ireland series*, ed. Margaret MacCurtain, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969), p. 127.

The Jacobite War

In 1685, King James II, a Catholic, became King of England. English and Irish Protestants accepted him for a time as his heir was his daughter Mary, a Protestant married to William of Orange, ruler of the Netherlands. In 1688, however, James had a son, establishing a potential line of Catholic rulers. This, coupled with James' attempts to rule without consulting Parliament, prompted some members of Parliament to invite William and Mary to become rulers of England. William landed in England in 1688, and James fled to France without contesting the throne.

The Irish parliament announced support for James. Protestant gentry in Ulster opposed this decision, and began to arm and drill their tenants. In Europe, France was at war with a coalition of states led by William of Orange. While James was King of England, England supported France, but with William and Mary on the throne, England changed sides. France hoped to offset this by keeping William busy in Ireland, and sent James with men and money to Ireland to hold the country. This spread panic among the Protestants of Ulster, and many fled to Scotland or to the walled Protestant cities of Derry and Enniskillen. James' first defeat came at Derry. As James approached the city unopposed, thirteen Derry Apprentice Boys shut the gate, locking out James and his army. James' siege was broken 12 August 1690 when William's forces landed near Belfast. Northern Irish Protestants celebrate this event every 12th of August with marches through Derry.

The defeat of James by William at the Battle of the Boyne ended the war. To this day Protestants in Northern Ireland celebrate this with parades every 12th of July. The Treaty of Limerick provided for religious toleration of Catholics and a guarantee that those who agreed to acknowledge William as king would not forfeit their lands. The Irish parliament, however, had to ratify the treaty. The English parliament, associating Catholicism with the Jacobites, passed a law in 1691 prohibiting Catholics from sitting in either the English or Irish parliaments. As a result, the Irish parliament that met in 1692 to consider the Treaty of Limerick was exclusively Protestant. They rejected the Treaty of Limerick and passed a series of discriminatory laws between 1695 and 1727 which became known as the Penal Laws. Their purpose was to exclude Catholics from political and economic power in order to protect the position of the Protestant landlords. Catholic bishops were banished; Catholics were prohibited from voting and holding public positions, Catholics were not allowed to teach or open schools, carry arms, or own a horse

worth more than £5. The most important and rigidly enforced laws concerned land ownership. Catholics could not buy land. A Catholic already owning land had to divide it between all the heirs upon death (rather than keeping the estate intact under a single heir) - unless one of the heirs became a Protestant, in which case he could claim the entire estate.¹⁵

The impact of this period on 1969 is great. Protestants had their siege mentality cemented, never again trusting the large Catholic population surrounding them and believing they could survive only through force of arms, allegiance to England, and subjugation of the Catholics. Catholic land ownership declined to less than five percent, and many Catholic land owners converted to avoid the Penal Laws.

Orangism and Famine

Goodwill between Protestant and Catholic during the late 1700s and early 1800s was surprisingly good. In 1784 Father Hugh O'Donnell built the first Catholic church in Belfast - St. Mary's. The Episcopalian Vicar of Belfast paid for the pulpit of St. Mary's out of his own pocket, and the largely Protestant Irish Volunteers paraded in full uniform and provided an honor guard at the opening.¹⁶ During the rebellion of 1798 (aided by French troops), Ulster Presbyterians joined, alongside Catholics, in a group called the Society of United Irishmen that fought English rule.

After defeating the rebellion, England dissolved the Irish Parliament and enacted the Act of Union in 1800, making Ireland part of the United Kingdom. The Ascendancy, land owners of mostly English descent and members of the Church of Ireland, recognized the danger of continued Presbyterian - Catholic alliance to their rule of Ireland.

¹⁵D.G. Pringle, *One Island, Two Nations?* (London: Research Studies Press Ltd), p. 117.

¹⁶Andrew Boyd, *Holy War in Belfast: A History of the Troubles in Northern Ireland* (Dublin, Kerry, Ireland: Arval Books Ltd., 1969), pp. 2-3.

Catholic emancipation granted by Britain in 1829 increased their fear of losing power. The Orange Order provided the Ascendancy a tool to bring the Presbyterians into alliance with them against the Catholics.

The Orange Order began in 1795 in County Armagh by descendants of English settlers, most of whom were members of the established Church of Ireland. After Catholic emancipation, the Orange Order actively pursued Presbyterian membership. This began the Second Reformation in Ireland. Fears of the economic and political effects of Catholic emancipation drew Ulster Presbyterians increasingly toward the Ascendancy, and hatred of Catholics. By 1835, Orange celebrations produced riots in Belfast in which the military sabred several people, and two people were shot dead. Serious riots occurred in 1843, 1857, 1864, 1872, 1880, 1884, 1886, and 1898.¹⁷ By 1886, the threat of violence by the Orange Order was an effective tool for the Ascendancy to maintain control over Ireland and keep it in the United Kingdom.

Between 1845 and 1850, crop failure, absentee landlords, and governmental incompetence or neglect resulted in famine. A million Irish peasants died from hunger and disease, and another million fled to America or Australia; yet throughout the famine, Ireland continued to export food to England. The rural counties of the south suffered more than the counties of Ulster (see Figure 7). Farms in Ulster were mostly small, and many owners farmed their own land. These farms fared much better than the large tenant farms in the south.

¹⁷Andrew Boyd *Holy War in Belfast*, pp. 8-9.




Figure 7. Population Decrease, 1841-1851

Source: D.G. Pringle, *One Island, Two Nations? A political geographic analysis of the national conflict in Ireland*, (London: Research Studies Press LTD, 1985), p. 194.

Famine, the rise of the Orange Order, and the opportunities created by emancipation, gave new life to Irish nationalism. The Tenant League formed in 1850, beginning the move toward land reform and restoring Home Rule. The Fenians, forerunners of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), rose during this period, actively supported from America by many of the recent Irish immigrants there. The Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League formed, pressing for a Gaelic cultural revival. The disparity of the impact of the famine between Protestant Ulster and the rest of Ireland, and the rise of Orangism furthered the split between the North and South of Ireland.

Partition

In the late 1800s, Charles Stuart Parnell, a Protestant land owner in Ireland and member of Parliament, led a strong movement for Home Rule for Ireland. The fortunes of the Home Rule advocates rose and fell with the fortunes of the Liberal Party in Britain, as that party depended upon the Irish Party for office. The Tory Party increasingly used the "Orange card" against the Liberal Party, trying to bring down the government and gain power. Ireland and Home Rule became weapons of British party politics.

In 1892 a Liberal government voted for Home Rule for Ireland, but the House of Lords vetoed it. By 1911, the House of Lords no longer held veto power (only the power to delay an act over three sessions), and a Liberal government dependent upon the Irish Party was again in power. Home Rule for Ireland seemed imminent, and Protestant Ulster prepared to resist it, encouraged by the Tory Party. A large majority of the Protestant population signed Ulster's Solemn League and Covenant, stating they would use "all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule parliament in Ireland."¹⁸ Ninety-thousand Ulster Volunteers armed themselves with weapons from Germany, and prepared to fight.¹⁹ In March 1914, a group of British Army officers declared they would not obey orders requiring them to act against the Ulster Volunteers.²⁰ The British government declared in May 1914 that it would amend the Home Rule Bill to provide for the "temporary exclusion" of certain counties. Irish politicians from the south had always assumed Home Rule would be for a united Ireland, ignorant of the desires of the Protestant population in the north. Supporters of a united Ireland began flocking to the Irish Volunteers, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.).

¹⁸ Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, p. 86.

¹⁹ Andrew Boyd, *The War in Ireland*, pp. 115-116.

²⁰ Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Disappearance of the Irish* (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 11.

and the Irish Citizen Army in response. Ireland seemed ripe for civil war, but World War One brought about a suspension of the Act.

On Easter Monday, 24 April 1916, a small group formed from the Fenians, Volunteers, and the Irish Citizen Army seized several strong points in Dublin. This group set up "Revolutionary headquarters" in the General Post Office, hoisted the green, white, and orange flag²¹, and issued the Proclamation of the Irish Republic. The general rising of the population hoped for by the revolutionaries did not materialize. In fact, most people looked upon the event with shock, particularly with World War One raging. The *Irish Times* editorial 28 April said, "Sedition must be rooted out of Ireland once and for all." The *Irish Independent* claimed those responsible for the "insane and criminal rising of last week were out, not to free Ireland, but to help Germany." The British army quickly put down the rising, but the execution of fifteen of the participants changed public opinion toward the Easter Rising, and the rebels became heroes. Éamon de Valéra, the last commandant of the Rising to surrender, was sent to Dartmoor prison where the Irish prisoners chose him as their leader. Britain released most prisoners by the end of 1916, although de Valéra and other hard core remained in prison until June 1917.

By the time marshall law was lifted in November 1916, public opinion had lost interest in achieving Home Rule. Instead, attention focused on the prisoners in English jails, and the idea of a republic independent of Britain caught fire. Recruiting for the war in Europe (World War One) dropped off sharply and talk of conscription began. Sinn Féin attracted a wide variety of nationalist and republican minded people. When British Prime Minister Lloyd George set up an Irish Convention to draw up proposals for Irish self government, Sinn Féin boycotted. Northern and southern Unionists did attend and

²¹This tricolor is today the flag of the Republic of Ireland. The colors stand for peace (white) between nationalists/Catholics (green) and unionists/Protestants (orange). It is illegal to display it in Northern Ireland.

opposed Home Rule (saying Home Rule is Rome Rule). Southern Unionists also opposed partitioning Ireland, not wanting to be trapped in an almost completely Catholic south. Northern Unionists' only concern was whether six or nine counties were to be excluded from the new Irish state. Sinn Féin held its own meeting in Dublin, elected de Valera President of Sinn Féin, and vowed to resist conscription.

When Westminster passed a Conscription Act 16 April 1918, the Irish Party withdrew in protest. Sinn Féin and others drew up an anti-conscription pledge, and with the support of the Catholic Church hierarchy large numbers signed. De Valera and many leaders of Sinn Féin were arrested in May, on the grounds of preventing what proved to be a mythical "German plot."²²

The British general election of December 1918 was a triumph for Sinn Féin (see Table 2). Sinn Féin entered the election under very difficult conditions: forty-seven of its seventy-three candidates were in prison; all sympathetic papers were banned, and all others censored; and finally its election manifesto was blacked out by censors. Sinn Féin saw its victory as a national plebiscite on independence. The Sinn Féin deputies elected to Westminster convened a revolutionary parliament of their own 21 January 1919 - the first Dáil Éireann - claiming to be the parliament of all Ireland. All Irish Members of Parliament (or Teachta Dála: Member of Dáil Éireann, TD) elected in the 1918 election were invited, but only Sinn Féiners attended. Only twenty-four could actually attend: two were in England helping Éamon de Valera escape from prison; the rest were recorded as "Ué ghlas ag Galluibh" (imprisoned by the foreign enemy).²³ The Dáil declared a republic, elected de Valera as president, and appointed delegates to the peace conference at Versailles. Britain, of course, refused to recognize the Dáil.

²² Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, p. 24.

²³ Diana Norman, *Terrible Beauty: The Life of Constance Markievicz*, (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, Ltd., 1987), p. 193.

Table 2.- Irish Results, UK Election of December 1918

Party	# Seats
Sinn Féin	73
Unionist	26*
Irish Nationalist	6
Labour	did not run
total possible	105

* All but three Unionists were elected from the north-east; one for Rathmines, a Dublin suburb, and two for Dublin University.

Source: Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 24.

The Irish Republican Army, formed from the Fenians, Volunteers, and Irish Citizen Army, began its guerrilla campaign against the British. Unable to suppress the guerillas, the British government passed the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. This Act set up two parliaments in Ireland, the Parliament of Southern Ireland in Dublin and the Parliament of Northern Ireland at Stormont (in Belfast), and a Council of Ireland to tie the two together. Stormont was given jurisdiction over six of the nine counties of Ulster (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Derry, Tyrone). Elections were held in 1921, but the Dáil refused to recognize the elections for the Southern Senate since the Act entitled the Crown to nominate some members. It regarded the elections for the lower house as being held for the Second Dáil, and Sinn Féin won an overwhelming majority. (The Dublin parliament opened with only the Trinity representatives and the Crown-nominated senators attending. They met for fifteen minutes and adjourned for good.) As the Dáil refused to recognize the Government of Ireland Act, the Council of Ireland never formed. In the North, forty Unionists and ten Nationalists were elected. Sectarian riots marked the campaign across the North.

In Belfast, between July 1920 and June 1922, a total of 455 people were killed - 267 Catholics and 185 Protestants.²⁴

When Stormont opened, the British government began negotiations with the Dáil to get it to agree with the substance of the Government of Ireland Act. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 agreed to by the Dáil in a narrow 66 to 56 vote, did just that.²⁵ The Treaty also provided for a Boundary Commission to recommend adjustments to the border. The Commission's recommendations were never enforced, and the border remained the county borders.

A minority republican faction led by Éamon de Valéra, argued the Treaty was not true to the ideals of the Rising of 1916 because it accepted partition and required an oath of loyalty to the British Crown. In elections held in 1922, pro-Treaty candidates won fifty-eight seats, while anti-Treaty candidates won only thirty-five.²⁶ The republican faction of the IRA was not willing to compromise, however, and the Irish Civil War ensued. During the Civil War, June 1922 to May 1923, more people were executed than in the previous six year struggle with Britain. The pro-Treaty forces won, with a cease fire called by de Valéra. This split in the Republican movement created the political parties Fianna Fáil (Warriors of Fal²⁷), led by de Valéra, which accepted the treaty, and Sinn Féin which still regarded the treaty as illegal.

The two Irish states developed quite differently. The Saorstát Éireann (Irish Free State) lasted until 1937, when de Valéra implemented a new constitution and changed the name to Éire (Ireland). This constitution claimed to be the constitution of the whole island.

²⁴ Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, pp. 31-32.

²⁵ D.G. Fringle, *One Island, Two Nations*, (London: Research Studies Press Ltd.), p. 222.

²⁶ D.G. Fringle *One Island, Two Nations?*, p. 223.

²⁷ Fal is a poetic name for Ireland, derived from the "Lia Fáil" or "Stone of Destiny"

The constitution of 1937 states,

Art.2 The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial seas.

Art. 3 Pending reintegration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann (literally, free state Ireland) and the like extra-territorial effect.²⁸

In practice, however, Eire did nothing to further this claim. Eire remained a member of the British Commonwealth until 1949, when it declared itself a republic. The 1937 Constitution remained in effect, along with the claim of jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. Eire developed as a decidedly Catholic and Gaelic state in seeming reaction to its sense of suppression under Protestant Britain. The Constitution officially recognized the special role of the Catholic Church, and installed Irish as the official language. (The Irish government makes a great effort to revive the almost dead language of Irish to this day.)²⁹ Eire remained neutral during World War Two, despite an offer from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1940 of Irish national unity in exchange for entering the war.³⁰ The Republic continues today to hold neutrality as a central element of national policy. The Catholic state has not caused problems in the Republic, as approximately ninety-five percent of the population is Catholic. Protestants do not seem to be discriminated against. Despite making up only four percent of the population, twenty five percent of the Republic's top businessmen are Protestant.³¹

²⁸Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, *Ireland: A Positive Proposal*, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985), p. 24.

²⁹The indigenous language is properly described in English as Irish, not 'Gaelic' which is a Scowash derivation. Today it is spoken daily only in small areas along the west coast called the Gaeltacht. In Northern Ireland, many IRA members learn Irish in prison, jokingly called the *Iniacht*.

³⁰Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. II, *Their Finest Hour*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 564.

³¹Tom F. Bakly, *Bath for Ulster*, p. 172.

In the North, there was trouble from the beginning. The population was approximately two thirds Protestant and one third Catholic. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 (under which Northern Ireland is still governed) prohibits the Northern Ireland parliament to "give a preference, privilege or advantage, or impose any disability or disadvantage, on account of religious belief..."³² In fact what developed was a secularist society overtly discriminating against the minority. Catholics were presumed, with good reason, to be disloyal to Northern Ireland and Britain. Catholics could not be trusted, and therefore measures had to be taken to protect loyal Protestants. Northern Ireland dropped proportional representation laid down by the Government of Ireland Act in 1922 for local elections and 1929 for parliamentary elections, and began a system of gerrymandering. This ensured a Unionist majority in elections even in Catholic nationalist areas. Local government controlled such things as public employment, contracts, and housing, and the Protestant councils took care of their own. Discrimination in the private sector reinforced local government discrimination. As Sir Basil Brooke, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1943 to 1963 said in 1933:

There are a great number of Protestants and Orangemen who employ Roman Catholics. I feel I can speak freely on the subject as I have not a Roman Catholic about my own place. Catholics are out to destroy Ulster with all their might...I would appeal to loyalists, therefore, wherever possible, to employ good Protestant lads and lassies.³³

To combat the continuing struggle with the IRA, the British created the Ulster Special Constabulary, drawn naturally from loyalists. Britain handed this Constabulary over to Northern Ireland control in 1921, and the part-time reserve of this force - the

³²Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, p. 129.

³³B. Probert, *Beyond Orange and Green*, (London: Academy Press, 1978), p. 62.

"B-Specials" - remained an important part of the security structure until 1969. Unlike the police force in every other part of the United Kingdom (or Ireland), the police in Northern Ireland were all armed. The members of the "B-Specials" kept their weapons in their homes. The Civil Authorities Act of 1922, usually called the Special Powers Act, (made permanent in 1933) gave the government great power in using its security forces, to include imprisoning suspects without trial. This practice, known as internment, was thought to be a regrettable requirement to deal with the IRA, and was in fact used by the Republic in its own campaign against the IRA. It was viewed by the Catholic community as another means of subjugating them.

The IRA continued its campaign after the Civil War in both the North and the South. When de Valéra became Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of the Free State in 1932 he banned the IRA and set out to destroy it. By World War Two, only a few hard core members remained active. World War Two gave new life to the IRA, with German help. Fearing the IRA attacks on British interests in the North threatened Eire's neutrality and invited British intervention, de Valéra effectively crushed the IRA in the south by 1947. The IRA nursed its wounds, however, and in 1956 launched a new campaign against the Northern Ireland government. This campaign consisted mainly of terrorist attacks and raids along the border. Northern Ireland invoked the Special Powers Act, and the Republic began internment itself, denying the IRA their safe haven. More significantly, the Catholic population of Northern Ireland did not support the IRA. The IRA campaign ended in 1962 with the "Irish Republican Publicity Bureau" citing the failure of anti-partition Sinn Féin candidates in the elections of October 1961 in the Republic. Britain granted a general amnesty 20 April 1962, and the last IRA prisoners held in Northern Ireland were released 16 December 1963 (all were serving 14 year sentences which none had completed).

The period I have labeled partition had the greatest impact on the strategic problem of 1969. It translated the social, religious, and political differences within Ireland into political reality. The effect of partition was to create two very polarized states within Ireland at odds with each other. Each was dependent on Britain in some way, and yet wary of Britain's motives. The Republic developed as a Catholic, gaelic state still claiming the whole island yet dependent on Britain for trade. Northern Ireland developed as a state in which the majority feared the minority and distrusted its benefactor. As a result, that majority developed systematic discrimination against the minority to protect their survival. Though a majority in Northern Ireland, the Unionists were a minority within Ireland as a whole. The Unionists saw the Catholic minority as a dangerous inside element loyal to a hostile foreign government. Catholics within Northern Ireland reinforced this view by initially refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state. The statements of politicians in the Republic (notably the Constitution), and the continuing struggle with the IRA also reinforced the Unionists' view. The Unionists did not originally want Home Rule for themselves or any part of Ireland, and had accepted it as the best they could do. Unionists were never completely comfortable that Britain might not abandon them out of convenience, and so were wary of Britain's commitment to the survival of Northern Ireland. Unionists saw themselves as an embattled people, and developed a political and social system that reflected that view. Unionists also misread the lessons of the IRA's defeat in the early 1960s. They saw it as reinforcing the effectiveness of internment, and the need for strong security forces. Unionists failed to recognize the significance of the lack of support for the IRA among the Catholic community.

The Civil Rights Movement

In 1963 began a promising period of reform and progress in Northern Ireland. The Education Act of 1947 providing free education for all in Northern Ireland had contributed to the development of a Catholic middle class for the first time. The social policies of Britain provided benefits people in the Republic did not enjoy. Despite high unemployment of seven and one half percent across Northern Ireland, people in the North were generally better off than those in the Republic. With a growing middle class, Catholics shifted their efforts from fighting partition to improving their condition within Northern Ireland. The 1960s held promise of a better Northern Ireland; instead they ended in violence.

Lord Brookeborough (Basil Brooke) resigned in 1963 after twenty years as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and was succeeded by Captain Terence Marnie O'Neill. Captain O'Neill appeared disposed towards ending the antagonisms among the people of Northern Ireland. He attempted to liberalize the Stormont government's approach to Catholics, initiate economic policies to benefit all, and establish an economic and diplomatic relationship with the Republic. His meeting with Taoiseach Seán Lemass of the Republic in Belfast 14 January 1965 was the first meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two states since partition. Captain O'Neill hoped to find areas of cooperation with the Republic and take Ireland past the issue of partition. Northern Ireland's status as a separate state was not subject for discussion. Extremists within his own party, however, viewed any contact with the Republic as selling out and eventually brought him down.

O'Neill's policies gained mild support from some Catholic leaders. The Nationalist party had consistently refused to accept the title of Loyal Opposition in Stormont. In 1965 they agreed to take the title, thus taking a small step toward cooperating with the ruling Unionists. O'Neill took no steps to help the political situation of Catholics, however. Gerrymandering of local areas remained unchanged, as did the voting qualifications.

Limited companies were entitled to nominate up to six extra voters. As most businesses in Northern Ireland were Protestant-owned, these extra voters tended to be Protestant. Residents and "general occupiers" could vote, but sub-tenants, lodgers, servants, and children over twenty-one living at home could not.³⁴ Since Catholics were disproportionately renters, this had a serious impact on their ability to have any voice in politics. The National Conference for Civil Liberties in London helped form the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1967. NICRA's aims were election reform, and the elimination of discrimination in housing and employment.

The first civil rights demonstration arose over a case of housing discrimination in Dungannon, County Tyrone, publicized by Austin Currie, a Nationalist Member of Parliament (M.P.). Currie had been trying unsuccessfully to help a Catholic family get public housing. When the local council gave the next available house to the nineteen year old unmarried Protestant secretary of a Unionist politician, Currie decided he had his case. Stormont refused to intervene, saying it had no jurisdiction over local housing matters, so Currie organized a "squat-in" at the house 20 June 1968. The police ejected the squatters, and the publicity generated by the event led to a civil rights demonstration 24 August 1968 in Dungannon. This march was peaceful.

NICRA announced the next march would be 5 October 1968 in Derry. One of the Protestant Apprentice Boys' clubs announced it would march along the same route on the same day. They also passed word to the Home Affairs Minister that if all marches were banned in Derry that day, they would make their ceremony private. When Mr. Craig, the Home Affairs Minister did ban the march, the appearance of a Protestant conspiracy to deny the NICRA march won increased support for NICRA from Stormont Opposition

³⁴London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 35

M.P.s, and also attracted militant Catholics. NICRA defied the ban, and the peaceful march was broken up by police with batons and water cannons. Among the first victims of clubbing were two Opposition M.P.s. When word reached the Catholic neighborhood called the Bogside, youths with no connection with the march decided this was a Protestant attack that justified revenge. Armed with bottles and rocks, they moved to the Protestant working class area of the Diamond looking for a fight. When Protestants obliged them, the police hastily moved in to break it up. As the Protestants melted back into their houses, police pursued the rioters into Bogside, and the encounter increasingly became Catholic versus police. The violence lasted for two days, off and on, and caused shock throughout Britain.³⁵

The Derry march was the beginning of the end for O'Neill's government. Westminster began pressuring him for reform, and demanding inquiries into police conduct. O'Neill began work on a limited crash reform program that would answer some of the charges of discrimination and yet still be palatable to the Unionist Party, and summoned a Housing Conference to establish a fair housing allocation program. He also staunchly defended the actions of the police, refused suggestions of an inquiry by Westminster. He also condemned the organizers of the Civil Rights movement, saying they had attempted a "...march by Nationalists into a Unionist area...".³⁶

O'Neill was trying to appease the Civil Rights movement while holding onto support from his Unionist Party and their Protestant power base. Instead he lost both. The Civil Rights Association felt O'Neill was giving them too little and much too slowly. Many Protestants believed O'Neill was being too soft on the marchers.

³⁵This account of events is summarized from Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast: The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland* (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

³⁶Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, p. 60.

Civil Rights demonstrations continued, despite government bans, and were increasingly met by violent Protestant extremists. By the end of 1968, civil rights demonstrations regularly degenerated into violent three-way confrontations between civil rights marchers, Protestant extremists, and police. In November, O'Neill agreed to a point system of housing allocation, an ombudsman to hear grievances against the Stormont government, and withdrawal "as soon as possible" of the government's power of internment. In December, he stated that Protestant extremists had taken Northern Ireland to "the brink of chaos" and particularly singled out the "bully-boy tactics" of Ian Paisley and his followers.³⁷ O'Neill still rejected NICRA's primary demand of "one-man one-vote," and warned Catholics his government would not tolerate violence.

Civil rights marches and demonstrations continued in the beginning of 1969, frequently led by leftist students from Queen's University (Belfast) calling themselves People's Democracy. These marches met increasing violence from Protestant extremists and required ever larger numbers of police to quell the resulting rioting.

O'Neill called general Parliamentary elections in February, seeking a mandate for his moderate reform program. The Unionist election platform pledged to settle the dispute between Catholics and Protestants, and consider reviewing election rules to meet Catholic grievances. The Unionists lost only one seat, and voted confidence in O'Neill and his policies.

The bombing of a power station south of Belfast on 30 March 1969 began what became widespread sabotage. Northern Irish police officials blamed the IRA. IRA spokesmen in Dublin claimed the police had carried out the bombings as part of a Northern Irish government plot to unify the ruling Unionist Party against Catholics. Some Catholic

³⁷Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1991), p. 39.

leaders in Northern Ireland blamed Protestant extremists. Beginning 21 April 1969, some of the British troops garrisoned in Northern Ireland began guarding public works and government installations. Meanwhile, Catholics and Protestants continued to attack each other and police in the streets of Belfast and Derry.

O'Neill proposed legislation in Stormont to abolish property qualifications for municipal voting. Unionist members upheld his proposal by only a twenty eight to twenty two vote on 24 April. Major James D. Chichester-Clark, agriculture minister and leader of the House of Commons resigned in protest. Chichester-Clark claimed instituting a one-man one-vote system at that time would not satisfy Catholics and might provoke further Protestant violence. O'Neill resigned as head of the Unionist Party 28 April, and as Prime Minister 30 April. Chichester-Clark was elected in his place by a seventeen to sixteen vote over right wing candidate Brian Faulkner.

Relative calm set in after the election. On 6 May, Chichester-Clark declared an amnesty for one hundred thirty three persons accused of offenses related to the rioting in "a bid to wipe the slate clean." The next day he won a unanimous vote of confidence in Stormont after pledging universal suffrage in local elections. Chichester-Clark met with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London 21 May, and told Stormont the next day that Wilson had accepted Northern Ireland's reform program as "a sustained momentum of social reform." Chichester Clark said reduction of unemployment and improved housing were Northern Ireland's greatest needs.¹⁶

The calm was short lived, the traditional Protestant marching season approached. The Derry Apprentice Boys would march in Derry 12 July, and the Orange Order would march 13 August in Belfast. These annual marches had always been a catalyst for trouble.

¹⁶Richard Mausbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Division*, p. 47.

A British government commission investigating the riots of 1857 reported:

The Orange system seems to us to have no other practical result than as a means of keeping up the Orange festivals, and celebrating them, leading as they do to violence, outrage, religious animosities, hatred between classes, and, too often, bloodshed and loss of life.³⁹

A similar commission in 1864 reported, "Belfast is liable to periodic disturbances on occasions well known as the Orange anniversaries."⁴⁰ Despite this history, the events of the past year, and the uneasy calm recently achieved, Chichester-Clark allowed the marches to take place as usual. A member of the Orange Order himself (as were all but two members of his cabinet⁴¹), he may have believed these were important commemorations that should go on. He may have believed banning them would only provoke more violent Protestant reaction. The result was disaster.

The Orange Day marches in Belfast 12 July 1969 touched off rioting, looting, and burning. Civil Rights and government leaders tried in vain to keep peace, but civil rights was no longer the issue. The conflict had degenerated into pure sectarian, Catholic versus Protestant fighting, with the police caught in the middle. For the most part, the police behaved with restraint, but were hopelessly outnumbered and under attack from both sides. The violence continued for over two weeks, finally quieting from exhaustion on all sides.

In Derry, rumors were flying throughout the Catholic working class neighborhood of the Bogside that the Protestants had chosen this day to "harass" them.⁴² The Derry Citizens' Defence Committee formed, their declared aim was to defend the Bogside against

³⁹United Kingdom, *Report by the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Origins and Character of the Riots in Belfast in July and September 1857*, quoted in Andrew Boyd, *Holy War in Belfast*, p. 43.

⁴⁰United Kingdom, *Report by the Commissioners of Inquiry Respecting the Magisterial and Police Jurisdiction Arrangement, and Establishment of the Bow-Street in Belfast, 1864*, quoted in Andrew Boyd, *Holy War in Belfast*, p. 87.

⁴¹Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, p. 170.

⁴²Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, p. 137.

incursions by Protestants or police. Despite this, moderate Catholic leaders had succeeded in convincing most Catholics to remain at home during the march, and it began peacefully. During the parade, some Catholic youths threw rocks at the marchers, and Protestant youths retaliated. The police moved in to break it up, and began driving the Catholics back toward the Bogside. When the police entered the Bogside, the residents mobilized to oppose them with paving stones and petrol bombs. The police were stopped, and a full scale battle ensued, with the police determined to crush the Catholics and the Catholics determined to keep the police out. Behind the police lines, Protestant extremists began attacking Catholic property; some joined the police lines. Stormont mobilized the "B-Specials." Stormont assured Westminster they would be used for routine police duties to relieve the R.U.C. for riot control, and would not be used in sensitive areas. In fact, they joined the cordon around Bogside as well as patrolling the rest of Derry. Some were seen watching idly as Protestants attacked Catholics outside the barricades, reinforcing the Catholic perception of the police as a Protestant force.⁴³ Despite these reinforcements, the police could not subdue the Bogside. On 14 August 1969, Stormont asked for assistance from the Army. Westminster agreed, and troops entered Derry at 5 p.m. that day.

In Belfast, on the evening of 13 August, the Civil Rights Association decided to deliver a protest to their local RUC headquarters about the conduct of police in Derry. A crowd of about two-hundred people showed up at Springfield Road station, but the RUC District Inspector refused to accept the protest because it was not the proper place. The local headquarters had moved to the Hastings Street station, and they should deliver the protest there. The crowd became disgruntled, and when they arrived at Hastings Street station a few began to throw stones at the station. When a petrol bomb was thrown, the District Inspector called out police armoured cars. This outraged the crowd, who then

⁴³Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, p. 132.

attacked the armoured cars. The RUC opened fire from the station, and some in the crowd produced weapons and fired back, but the armoured cars eventually scattered the crowd. When Stormont called out the "B-Specials" on 14 August, the Catholics began erecting barricades to isolate their neighborhood out of real fear. Open conflict broke out between Protestant and Catholic rioters, and the police were unable to control the violence. An entire Catholic street, Bombay Street, was razed and another twenty-three Catholic homes in the Ardoyne were burned out before troops could arrive.⁴⁴

Situation in 1969

The rioting in the streets of Belfast and Derry were the most visible conditions in Northern Ireland in August 1969; however, only a fraction of the population engaged in the fighting. The internal security problem was only one of the challenges facing Britain in Northern Ireland. There were also economic and social problems, as well as an external threat from the Republic of Ireland.

Geography:

The Northern Ireland Tourist Board described Northern Ireland in the 1960s as 1200 golf holes with a number of towns and villages scattered among them. The countryside was mostly small farms and villages, with many small roads. Of the population of 1.5 million, 400,000 lived in Belfast (almost 700,000 including suburbs) and 68,000 lived in Derry (97,000 including suburbs).

The north east coast of Northern Ireland is only thirteen miles from Scotland. The border with the Republic of Ireland in 1969 was often difficult to recognize. No passports were required, and many roads weaved back and forth across the border. It snaked along traditional county boundaries and ignored natural boundaries. Many parishes and even

⁴⁴This account of events in Belfast is summarized from London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 126-142.

houses straddled the border, so that, as an old joke has it, a man may sleep with his head in the United Kingdom and his heart in the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland do not even agree on the length of the border. Northern Ireland claims it is 303 miles long, and the Republic claims it is 280 miles long.⁴⁵



Figure 8. Cities and Towns in Northern Ireland

⁴⁵Brian Peil, ed., *Ireland*, Insight Guides series (Singapore: APA Productions Ltd, 1986), p. 198.

Political Situation

Northern Ireland was a semi-autonomous province of the United Kingdom. Westminster controlled navigation, defence, trade, foreign policy, air and postal links. In practice, Westminster had left Northern Ireland's internal affairs to Stormont. A Governor, Lord Grey of Naunton, represented the Crown. The Governor could "reserve" a bill passed by Stormont, and the bill would lapse unless royal consent (in practice consent of the British Cabinet) was granted within one year.

The Northern Ireland Parliament consisted of a House of Commons with fifty-two members and a Senate with twenty-six. Twenty-four members of the Senate were elected by the House of Commons; the other two being the lord mayors of Belfast and Derry. The Senate acted much as the House of Lords in Britain. The Unionist Party held the majority, as it had since partition. The party makeup of the Stormont House of Commons in 1969 was: thirty-nine Unionist, two Northern Ireland Labour, seven Nationalist, two Republican Labour, and two Independents.⁴⁶ Northern Ireland elected twelve members of parliament to Westminster by the British electoral system, and these usually took the Conservative whip.

In local elections, change to a one-man one-vote system was promised, but not yet in effect. Local government was something of a cottage industry in Northern Ireland.⁴⁷ A population slightly smaller than Philadelphia (1.5 million) had a parliament with two houses, six county and two county borough councils, and below them, 65 local district councils. District boundaries were drawn to ensure Unionist control even in those areas

⁴⁶*The Times* (London), 26 February 1969, p. 9.

⁴⁷James Callaghan, British Home Secretary in Harold Wilson's Labour government said in 1970, "It's absurd. Here they are, with all the panoply of government - even a prime minister - and a population no bigger than four London boroughs. They don't need a prime minister, they need a good Mayor of Lewisham." (Callaghan's wife was a councillor in Lewisham.) *London Sunday Times Insight Team, Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 223.

where Catholics were the majority. As an example, Table 3 shows the voting patterns in Derry in 1967.

Table 3.- Voting Patterns in Derry, 1967

	Catholic Voters	Other Voters	Seats
North Ward	2,530	3,946	8 Unionists
Waterside Ward	1,852	3,687	4 Unionists
South Ward	10,047	1,138	8 Non-Unionists
Total	14,429	8,781	20: 12 Unionists & 8 Non-Unionists
23,210			

Source: United Kingdom, *Report of the Commission on Disturbances in Northern Ireland*, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Cmd. 532, 1969, p. 59.

The Unionist Party still controlled the government, but the government had lost control. The Catholic community no longer viewed the government as legitimate. A strong faction of Protestant extremists led by the Reverend Ian Paisley opposed the government for advocating concessions to Catholics.

Economic Situation

The single largest industry was farming, with 46,000 farms employing 101,000 people. Northern Ireland's productivity was £59 per acre, compared with £19 per acre in the Republic. The two traditional industries of linen and shipbuilding had been declining since World War Two, but incentive programs had attracted several new industries to the province. The tourist industry was worth an estimated £20 million per year (figure is from 1965).⁴⁸

⁴⁸Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, pp. 284-295.

Personal income averaged thirty-eight percent higher per person than in the Republic,⁴⁹ but twenty-five percent lower than the average in Britain.⁵⁰ Unemployment was high in both Protestant and Catholic communities, and had been historically higher than the United Kingdom as a whole. In 1922, registered unemployment was twenty-two percent of the insured population, versus fourteen percent for all of the United Kingdom.⁵¹ Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the rate was much higher than Britain, though comparable to the Republic (see Table 4).

Table 4.- Comparative Unemployment Rates

	1954	1964
Northern Ireland	7.0 %	6.6 %
Great Britain	1.3 %	1.7 %
Republic of Ireland	8.1 %	5.7 %

Source: Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 294.

Northern Ireland's economic needs were greater than it could gather from local revenue. In fact, Northern Ireland had received a net inflow of funds from Britain since the 1930s. Due to Northern Ireland's semi-autonomous status, Britain transferred a sum called the subvention to its account each year. In 1965 the subvention was £48 million, and rose to £94 million for 1970. This amounted to a third of Northern Ireland's gross domestic product and almost half of its public expenditure.⁵²

⁴⁹Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, p. 295.

⁵⁰Geoffrey Bell, *The Protestants of Ulster*, (London: Pluto Press Ltd., 1976), p. 25.

⁵¹Simon Jenkins, "The Trouble with Ulster," *The Economist*, 2 June 1984, p. 52.

⁵²Simon Jenkins, "The Trouble with Ulster," p. 52.

Social Situation

People in Northern Ireland enjoyed the same social services as the rest of the United Kingdom. These were much more generous than those offered by the Republic. For example, in 1965 unemployment and sickness benefit for a married couple in Northern Ireland was about £6; in the Republic it was £3. Retirement age in Northern Ireland was sixty-five, with a pension benefit of £10 for a married man; in the Republic retirement age was seventy, with a pension benefit of £4 for a married man.⁵³

The three major religious groups in Northern Ireland were Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, and the Church of Ireland. As a general rule, these were made up of the descendants of the native Irish, Scottish settlers, and English settlers respectively. Other religious groups were insignificant (see Table 5). The relative numbers of these groups had been stable for decades, despite a higher birth rate among Catholics, due to disproportionate emigration by Catholics.

Table 5.- Religious Population of Northern Ireland

	# in 1961		%
Roman Catholic	498,031		35 %
Presbyterian	413,006	29 %	58 %
Church of Ireland	344,584	24 %	
Methodist	71,912	5 %	
Other	97,929		7 %

Source: Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 249.

⁵³Timothy Patrick Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, p. 296.

In terms of social practice, there were only two, highly polarized groups - Protestant and Catholic. Protestant and Catholic interacted only at work, and that was rare given the discrimination in the work place. Neighborhoods were clearly defined as Protestant and Catholic, particularly among the working-class. Sociologist James Russell in a survey of interaction between the two communities, found a pattern in which the two communities deliberately choose not to interact.⁵⁴ Figure 9 shows the religious distribution in Northern Ireland. Figures 10 and 11 show the neighborhoods of Belfast and Derry.




Figure 9. Population Distribution in Northern Ireland by Religion

Source: Tom F. Baldy, *Battle for Ulster*, (Washington, D.C.: National University Press, 1987), p. 45.

⁵⁴James Russell, "Northern Ireland: Socialization into Political Conflict," *Social Studies: Irish Journal of Sociology*, IV, (Summer, 1975), p. 432.




Figure 10. Belfast Neighborhoods




Figure 11. Derry Neighborhoods

Education was segregated in fact, though not by law. Public schools were free and open to all. The original act creating the schools in 1923 prohibited teaching religion. Lord Londonderry, the designer of the act, reasoned:

all the quarrels between Roman Catholics and Protestants arose out of the teaching of the Bible and as he wished the children of different denominations to meet in the same school and grow up in a friendly atmosphere, he thought this could only be achieved if there was no Bible instruction and if Roman Catholic and Protestant children mixed in the same schools.⁵⁵

Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches opposed this philosophy. The Education Act of 1930 bowed to the pressure, and allowed Bible instruction in public schools if at least ten parents of children in the school asked for it.⁵⁶ Not wanting their

⁵⁵Very Rev. William Corkery, as quoted in Alan Duras, *Modern Ireland*, (Evanston Sussex: Weyland Ltd, 1973), p. 71.

⁵⁶United Kingdom, Government of Northern Ireland, *Education Act of 1930*, as quoted in Alan Duras, *Modern Ireland*, p. 91.

children taught Protestant Bible classes in the public schools, most Catholic families chose to send their children to Catholic parochial schools. This left the public schools overwhelming Protestant, creating in effect a segregated education system.

The shortage of new housing had been a continuous problem since before World War Two. German bombing of Belfast during World War Two had made the problem even worse. In 1969, twenty-two percent of the province's houses were classified as unfit for habitation. Some 100,000 houses had no baths, hot water or inside toilets, or lacked all three.⁵⁷ Catholic areas tended to have the worst housing, but Protestant working-class areas were not much better (see Table 6).

Table 6.- Living Standards in Belfast

Area of Belfast	Working Age Males that are Catholic (%)	No Fixed Bath (%)	No Hot Water (%)	No Toilet (%)	Have Indoor Toilet (%)
Dock	62.86	57.8	38.1	1.2	44.0
Falls	79.02	50.6	32.9	0.6	46.6
Pottinger	11.64	37.8	24.4	0.1	59.4
Shankill	7.84	48.0	28.0	0.4	51.6
Victoria	3.78	29.9	18.6	0.1	66.5

Source: 1971 census, Northern Ireland, as reported in Alan Duras, *Modern Ireland*, (East Sussex, England: Wayland Ltd, 1973), p. 87.

External Situation

Fianna Fáil, a rather conservative party, controlled the government of the Republic. This government directed the Irish Army to set up field hospitals along the border near Derry, and intimated it was considering intervention.⁵⁸ The Irish government proposed a combined British-Irish or United Nations peacekeeping force, and mobilized 2,000

⁵⁷Alan Duras, *Modern Ireland*, p. 86.

⁵⁸London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 181 reports a British Army officer covertly visited these hospitals and found "They're just a lot of dirty tents."

reservists 15 August 1969. It also moved about 120 regular troops to the border near Cavan and set up two refugee centers. Several ministers demanded an invasion of Northern Ireland by the Irish army, and the Irish Army did actually have an invasion plan.⁵⁹ In a television speech 13 August 1969, the Taoiseach, Mr. Jack Lynch said:

The Irish Government can no longer stand idly by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse. It is obvious that the R.U.C. is no longer accepted as an impartial police force. Neither would the employment of British troops be acceptable nor would they be likely to restore peaceful conditions - certainly not in the long term....Recognizing, however, that the re-unification of the national territory can provide the only permanent solution of the problem, it is our intention to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with the Irish Government to review the present constitutional position of the Six Counties of Northern Ireland.⁶⁰

Conor Cruise O'Brien reports that when he met with the Citizen's Defence Committee in Derry after the deployment of British troops, the members were still convinced Irish troops were going to intervene.⁶¹

The Labour government of Mr. Harold Wilson governed Britain. Mr. Wilson had made several arguments during his election in favor of Irish unity, causing alarm among Unionists. Prime Minister Wilson had been pressuring Northern Ireland for reform throughout the civil rights movement, and had made several conciliatory gestures toward the Republic. Wilson was reluctant to intervene in Northern Ireland, however, and had taken O'Neill's optimistic appraisals of the prospects for reform at face value.⁶²

⁵⁹London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 180. Among those calling for military intervention was Minister of Finance Mr. Charles Haughey. Mr. Haughey was also implicated in attempting to run guns to the IRA in Northern Ireland. He was tried in the Republic for this in 1971 and acquitted, successfully arguing the government knew what he was doing. Married to Seán Lemass' daughter, Mr. Haughey later became Taoiseach in the 1980s.

⁶⁰Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, p. 179.

⁶¹Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, p. 180.

⁶²Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *The British State and the Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher*, (London: Verso, 1985), p. 11.

Actors and Their Interests

A great many groups have participated in the saga of Northern Ireland throughout history, and particularly in the years since 1969. I will focus first on those actors on the stage prior to the start of the British peacemaking operation in 1969. I will discuss these actors and their interests as they were immediately prior to the beginning of the British peacemaking operation (not necessarily their interests today), and then discuss actors that emerged between 1969 and 1972. Even with these restrictions, a host of actors were relevant to the conflict. These include security forces, paramilitary actors, social actors, political actors, and governments.

Governments

Great Britain: Located across a narrow stretch of sea west of Britain, Ireland had always been a strategically important location for Britain. The Republic's neutrality during World War Two, and withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1949 presented Britain with danger and uncertainty. Control of Northern Ireland, the part of the island closest to Britain, served to safeguard the western approach to Britain. As Lord Rugby, British representative in Dublin, told Taoiseach Éamon de Valéra, 16 October 1947:

If he desired to work towards a solution (of partition) here and now his best plan would be to make it clear that Eire was not blind to the strategic lessons of history which had been re-emphasised in the last war and that she was prepared to play her part. Mr. de Valéra as usual attempted to rebut the argument that any portion of Ireland could involve the United Kingdom in any danger. I said that we were not taking any risks about that. The last war had taught us a lesson. He then asked whether, if the North were prepared to come willingly into Eire, we should allow them to do so. I said that most certainly we should, though presumably the strategic factor of our narrow seas should have to be covered by some specific arrangement unless some wider understanding made this unnecessary. We should not forget our jugular vein.⁶³

⁶³Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *Sean Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland*, (Dublin, 1982), pp. 48-49.

By 1969, however, the strategic significance of Ireland was of far less concern. As early as 1949, the Irish Foreign Minister told the American envoy to Dublin there was "no question" but that Ireland would join the Atlantic alliance if partition was eliminated.⁶⁴ More recently, R.J. Raymond noted that, in 1961, had North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership been a pre-requisite for acceptance into the European Economic Community (EEC), the government of the Republic "would have swallowed hard and abandoned neutrality."⁶⁵ The understanding with the Republic Lord Rugby spoke of was certainly achievable. Britain was the Republic's largest trading partner, which provided Britain with leverage for influencing events in Ireland, as did Ireland's EEC membership. There was no real strategic security need for Britain keep Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, but Britain did have an interest in maintaining influence over Ireland.

Northern Ireland had become a serious economic drain on Britain by 1969. With a population of only 1.5 million, Northern Ireland was costing the British government some £94 million per year.⁶⁶ It would certainly have been in the best economic interest of Britain if Northern Ireland were no longer part of the United Kingdom.

The existence of a publicly acknowledged discriminatory government, and violent civil disturbances, within the modern democracy of the United Kingdom was no doubt a source of international embarrassment (much as the civil rights conflict in the southern states was to the United States). As subjects of the Crown, Britain had an interest in improving the civil rights of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. Britain also had an interest in honoring the desire of the majority of the population in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. With violence out of control in the streets of Belfast

⁶⁴Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *The British State and the Ulster Crisis*, p. 141.

⁶⁵R.J. Raymond, "Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism?", *International Affairs*, vol. 60, No. 1, 1983/4, p. 40.

⁶⁶Simon Jenkins, "The Trouble with Ulster," p. 52.

and Derry, Britain also had an interest in restoring order and protecting the lives of British subjects.

Britain's immediate interests were to restore order in Northern Ireland, and implement political and social reform to improve civil rights. Britain's long term interests were to reduce the economic burden of Northern Ireland on Britain, and find a lasting solution to the problem of nationalist versus unionist, and maintain sufficient influence over Ireland to protect Britain's security.

The Republic of Ireland: The Republic's interests in the conflict in 1969 were complex. Officially, the Republic still laid claim to the territory of Northern Ireland. The Irish Republic had never energetically pursued this claim, but unifying all of Ireland remained a goal of the government in 1969. Éamon de Valéra, still President of the Republic, had stated in the Dáil Éireann in 1925, "If this generation should be base enough to consent to give them (the six counties of Northern Ireland) away, the right to win them back remains unimpaired for those to whom the future will bring the opportunity."⁶⁷ Some in the government believed the conflict in the North in 1969 was that opportunity. After the events of August 1969, some radical republicans called for immediate military intervention in Derry, and failing this at least the supply of weapons and training for the Catholic resistance in the North. Cooler heads prevailed; however, some Southern politicians tried to run arms into Northern Ireland. The Republic viewed the conflict as an international problem in which it was intimately involved, and tried to involve the United Nations.

The Republic felt an interest and obligation in trying to protect the Catholic population of the North. The Republic certainly sympathized with and supported the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. Although the Republic itself had fought against the IRA, its attitude changed when the IRA appeared to become protectors of Catholics in the

⁶⁷Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, p. 187.

North during the violence of the late 1960s. The Protestant backlash against the civil rights movement prompted overt and covert support to the IRA from the government and businesses of the Republic.

On the other hand, the Irish government could hardly be excited about supporting a group (the IRA) that advocated their overthrow as well. Also, the prospect of gaining a large, armed, and angry Protestant population was not appealing. The economic and social problems of Northern Ireland were also not something the Republic wanted to take on. The Republic did not have the strength, militarily, economically, or diplomatically, to directly oppose Britain. In fact, the Republic was largely dependent on Britain for trade. The real interest of the government of the Republic of Ireland was for the civil rights movement to succeed, peace be restored, and the radical Catholic and Protestant groups to fade away. It could then hope for peaceful progress toward unification.

Security Forces

Royal Ulster Constabulary: The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) is Northern Ireland's police force. It was formed in 1922, is armed and largely Protestant; eleven percent of the force was Catholic.⁶⁸ Prior to reorganization in 1970, it was under the direct control of the Unionist government in Stormont and was responsible for both police duties and protection of the state from armed subversion.

"B-Specials": The "B-Specials" was an auxiliary force drawn from the local community and used to supplement the RUC during emergencies. The British Government created the "B-Specials" in 1920, and handed over control to Northern Ireland in 1921. Approximately 8,000 strong, both its friends and enemies saw it as the Orange Order under arms.⁶⁹ Britain disbanded the Specials in 1969.

⁶⁸Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, p. 29.

⁶⁹Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, pp. 29-30.

British Army: The regular British Army garrison in Northern Ireland at the beginning of 1969 was 3,000 strong. It had no police or internal security duties. In April, the army began guarding some key public facilities against sabotage, but still had no policing function.

Paramilitary Actors

Irish Republican Army: The oldest of the paramilitary actors is the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Formed in 1916, the IRA helped bring about Irish independence. After partition and the defeat of the anti-Treaty forces in the Irish Civil War, the IRA continued to fight to unify Ireland. This brought it into conflict with the governments of Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland. Defeated in 1962 after a badly conceived campaign against the border, the IRA had disarmed and embraced political action during the 1960s. In 1968 the IRA decided to sell its weapons to the Free Wales Army to raise money to maintain its newspaper, *United Irishman*.⁷⁰

The IRA's political views were largely Marxist. It was not active in the civil rights movement, but supported the movement's goals. The IRA saw the civil rights movement as a means of bridging the gap between the Protestant and Catholic working-class. Once unified, the working class would overthrow the governments of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and unite the island in a single socialist state.

Ulster Volunteer Force: The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was formed in 1966 as a loyalist vigilante group. It was active in sectarian assassinations, and because it claimed responsibility for them, was illegal. The UVF saw itself as protector of Protestant society. Once the IRA and the Provisionals became active, the UVF tried to attack

⁷⁰Richard Mairsbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 78.

suspected members as well as any Protestant they believed to be "selling out" to the Catholics. The UVF wanted no compromise.

Social Actors

Roman Catholic Church: The Roman Catholic Church is extremely influential among the Catholics of Northern Ireland, and in the government as well as the people of the Republic of Ireland. Article 44 of the constitution of the Republic recognizes "the special position of the Holy Catholic and Roman Church as guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens,"⁷¹ and in the Republic the Church's reach extends throughout society. The Church runs most schools, the Angelus still sounds over the radio every day, and particularly out in the country villages, people presume those not in mass on Sunday have gone Saturday evening. In Northern Ireland, the Church was the most powerful organized Catholic force. Again, most Catholic children are educated in church-run schools. Clergy throughout Ireland traditionally receive deferential treatment, and the Primate of All Ireland (responsible for the entire island) is a powerful man, particularly in the Republic.⁷²

The Catholic Church had an interest in maintaining its influence. It officially condemned the violence used by both sides of the conflict, and tried to use its position to facilitate talks. Clergy were active in the civil rights movement, and the Church supported the movement.

⁷¹Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland*, p. 120

⁷²Interestingly, the Catholic Primate of All Ireland is in Armagh, in Northern Ireland. The headquarters of the Protestant Church of Ireland is in Dublin, in the Republic.

Gaelic Athletic Association: Founded in 1884, the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) was the first organization seeking to revive Irish culture after the Penal Laws were relaxed. The GAA brought back the old Irish games of Hurling and Football, and strengthened Irish nationalism. All signs in GAA parks are in Irish, and "English" games such as soccer are strictly forbidden from these parks. GAA members can also be suspended or banned from the GAA for participating in any "English" games. The GAA is active throughout Ireland, with teams from Northern Ireland competing along with teams from the Republic for the All-Ireland Championships. With no real professional sport in Ireland, this amateur league is a staple of Irish life and a source of pride for communities.

Though not active politically, the GAA exerted a strong nationalist influence on the Catholic communities. It clearly advocated a united, Irish-speaking Ireland, and the preservation of Irish culture to the exclusion of others.

The Orange Order: The Orange Order takes its name from William of Orange, the victor at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Founded about 1780, the Orange Order began as a sort of vigilante group to intimidate landlords into keeping rents in line with other landlords. As the Penal Laws eroded, the Orange Order became an anti-Catholic vigilante group. When they entered the United Irish Rising in 1798 on the side of the British, they became respectable. They molded themselves into a sort of Masonic structure. The founding principles were allegiance to the Crown, upholding the Protestant Ascendancy, and hatred of Catholics. The Orange Order soon became the power base of Ulster, and failure to join made employment very difficult for a Protestant. The Unionist Party was born out of an Orange hall. It is still a powerful organization. It is the Orange Order that conducts the marches and parades that have sparked so many violent confrontations. The phrase "not an inch; no surrender," summed up the Orange Order's interests.

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association: The Civil Rights Association (NICRA or CRA) was formed in 1967 as a "non-sectarian" organization (it was in fact Catholic with a few Protestant sympathizers). Its announced aims were:

1. A universal franchise in local government elections in line with the franchise in the rest of the United Kingdom, abandoning Ulster's proprietorial voting qualification.
2. The re-drawing of electoral boundaries by an impartial Commission to ensure fair representation, e.g. to eliminate situations where Protestants could command disproportionate influence on councils.
3. Legislation against discrimination in employment at local government level and the creation of machinery to remedy local government grievances.
4. A compulsory Points System for housing to ensure fair allocation.
5. The repeal of the Special Powers Act.
6. The disbandment of the 'B' Special Police Reserve Force.
7. The withdrawal of the Public Order Bill.⁷³

It began as a peaceful movement, then attracted radical students and violent reaction from Protestant radicals.

Political Actors

The Unionist Party: The Unionist Party held power virtually uncontested in Northern Ireland for nearly fifty years. Gerrymandering, block voting by Protestants, and a simple plurality electoral system assured the Union Party of firm control. It was an ally of the British Conservative Party, and its members at Westminster sit with the Conservatives. The civil rights movement caused a split in the Unionist Party, with the more liberal Unionists wanting to grant minimal reforms and hard liners demanding no concessions.

The Unionist Party's interest was to maintain power. It wanted military help from Britain, but not political or social help. The Unionist Party wanted to maintain the status

⁷³Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast*, p. 62.

quo as much as possible, and make the minimum concessions required to end the violence to quiet the civil rights movement.

Northern Ireland Labour Party: The Labour Party came into being in 1924, and had little influence. Labour supported remaining in the United Kingdom. It tried to appeal to the working classes of Northern Ireland, but was not radical enough to pull Protestant workers away from the Unionist Party, and its stand on union made it unacceptable to Catholic workers.

Liberal Party: The Liberal Party was unable to win a seat in Stormont until 1961. It advocates religious toleration and has little influence.

Sinn Féin: Sinn Féin means "we ourselves" in Irish. It is a republican party, and the political wing of the IRA. Sinn Féin's political agenda was that of the IRA: establishing a single, socialist, united Ireland. Sinn Féin's interests mirrored those of the IRA. Anything which could discredit the British and Unionists benefited Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin tried to portray itself as the protector of the oppressed, with local party representatives working in the poorer communities to trouble shoot welfare and housing problems with the authorities.

Nationalist Party: This party was more a protest movement than a political party until the Lemass - O'Neill talks in 1965. Thereafter its leader became the leader of the official opposition in Stormont. Its support is almost exclusively rural and Catholic. It espoused a unified Ireland of the sort proposed in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act with a Council of Ireland over the Northern and Southern parliaments.

Republican Labour Party: This is the Catholic version of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, and advocates a united Ireland. It was not influential.

People's Democracy: Led by Bernadette Devlin, People's Democracy began as a student movement in Queen's University, Belfast, supporting the civil rights movement.

People's Democracy saw the problem in Northern Ireland as a class conflict, and believed the Protestant workers could be won over to an alliance with Catholic workers. People's Democracy was the most radical element in the civil rights movement. Bernadette Devlin, who won a seat in Westminster, actively participated in the fight against the police in the Bogside, August 1969. People's Democracy wanted Direct Rule from Britain, withdrawal of the Northern Irish police from Catholic areas, and negotiation on the unification of Ireland.

Actors Emerging Between 1969 and 1972

Ulster Defense Regiment: The Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) was formed in 1969 to replace the "B-Specials." It is a reserve component of the British Army made up of recruits from the province and under military control. It was overwhelming Protestant.

Provisional Irish Republican Army: Formed in December 1969, this group was not active prior to the start of the British peacemaking operation. They quickly became the most formidable security threat to the British and part of the strategic problem during the period of 1969 to 1972. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (commonly called the Provisionals) split from the IRA (commonly called Officials) by members who disagreed with the political orientation of the IRA. They drew their name from the 1916 proclamation of the "Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." The Provisionals believed the IRA had left Catholics unarmed against the Protestant backlash from the civil rights movement, and called for a renewal of the armed struggle.

It was in the Provisionals' interest to portray the conflict as one against a colonizing power. Anything that could be done to paint the British Army as a foreign occupying army, and Great Britain as the problem aided the Provisionals' cause. The Provisionals

stated their aims as,

to end foreign rule in Ireland, to establish a 32-county Democratic Socialist Republic, based on the Proclamation of 1916, to restore the Irish language and culture to a position of strength, and to promote a social order based on justice and Christian principles which will give everyone a just share of the nation's wealth.⁷⁴

The Provisionals used terrorism in an attempt to make Northern Ireland ungovernable, provoke extreme reactions from the government that will further alienate the Catholic population from the government, and wear down the will of the British.

Ulster Defence Association: Formed in 1969, this group also was not active prior to the start of the British peacemaking operation. The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was a legal organization that usually did not claim responsibility for violent acts. Largely made up of working-class Protestants, the UDA was well financed, well organized, and well armed, though not up to the standard of the Provisionals. It claimed to be a counterterrorist organization.

The UDA was a loyalist organization which wanted to maintain Northern Ireland's union with Great Britain. The UDA viewed any policy or program which it could construe as compromise with the Republic of Ireland or the Catholic population of Northern Ireland as betrayal. Though loyalist, the UDA attacked security forces, and in fact declared war on the British Army in 1972.⁷⁵

The Democratic Unionist Party: This party formed in 1971 around Ian Paisley from the hard liners in the Official Unionist Party. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was based on fundamentalist Protestantism, anti-Catholicism, and Protestant supremacy. The DUP wanted to maintain the status quo, with no concessions at all.

⁷⁴Institute for the Study of Conflict. "Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives," p.10.

⁷⁵Baldy, *Battle for Ulster*, p. 56.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party: The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), led by Gerald Fitt, was formed 21 August 1970 by six members of the Northern Irish Parliament.. The SDLP's principle purpose was to work for a united Ireland. It also advocated a minimum wage for all workers, equal pay for equal work, civil rights, and proportional representation. The SDLP rejected violence, and preached political compromise.

Summary of the Problem

Northern Ireland was an economic problem for Britain. Unemployment and poor housing were serious problems, and Britain was sending a large sum of money each year to Northern Ireland. Economics was not, however, that much more of a problem in Northern Ireland than the rest of the United Kingdom. It was certainly the most depressed area in the United Kingdom, but conditions in the peaceful Republic were worse.

The discriminatory practices of the Northern Irish government were a problem for Britain, both internally and internationally. Britain was clearly committed to reform, and had consistently pressured Stormont to meet the demands of the civil rights movement. While the pace of reform was not fast enough for Catholic leaders (and too fast for Protestants), most demands had already been met when the riots of August 1969 broke out.

In August 1969, Britain faced a complete breakdown of government in Northern Ireland. Catholics in the two major cities of Northern Ireland had openly fought the most visible instruments of that government, the police, to a standoff. The government no longer ruled in these areas. Instead, "Citizen's Defence Committees" ruled them. Catholics thought they were defending themselves from unwarranted attack by Protestants, the RUC, and the "B-Specials." Outside the Catholic areas, armed bands of Protestant extremists roamed the streets. Protestants were already upset with their government for giving in to Catholic pressure for reform. The failure of the police to breach the barricades

and put down what they believed to be a nationalist rebellion further frustrated Protestants. Protestants, and members of the government, believed the riots were an IRA led rebellion by Catholics seeking to unite Ireland. The government had lost its legitimacy in the eyes of a significant portion of the population.

Britain also faced an external security threat from the Irish Republic, though unlikely. The Republic still claimed jurisdiction over Northern Ireland, and the government was resurfacing the issue. The Irish army was certainly no match for the British army, and it was very unlikely the Republic would risk such an encounter. If Britain did not act to restore peace and Catholic fatalities mounted, however, the Republic may have intervened. This was particularly possible in Derry, close to the border and where Catholics were the majority. The Republic's aggressive public statements, and covert support and encouragement for those they saw as defending the Catholic minority, reinforced both Catholic and Protestant fears and misperceptions of the conflict. Even if the Republic did not actively intervene in the conflict, its passive support to the IRA was a threat should the IRA resurge.

The civil rights conflict, internal security threat, and external security threats were the immediate problems facing Britain. British strategy had to address these issues quickly. Each of these, however, were only symptoms of the real strategic problem for Britain. The problem was the continued existence of two polarized sects within Northern Ireland, each fearing and hating the other, and willing to use violence to pursue its aims.

CHAPTER 5

THE STRATEGY

In this chapter, I will identify Great Britain's strategy for Northern Ireland and its effects between 1969 and 1972. The British government did not publicly identify its strategy. Government officials announced various programs and actions, but nowhere did the government publicly state its strategy for solving the problem of Northern Ireland. I will deduce the strategy from the programs and initiatives enacted by the government.

Britain introduced programs and initiatives in three distinct time periods. The first time period was August 1969 to March 1970, which I call Intervention. The next period, April 1970 to March 1971, I call Get Tough. The final period prior to suspension of Home Rule, April 1971 to March 1972, I call Internment. I will identify the British government programs and actions during each of these periods, and the impact these had on the situation in Northern Ireland.

Based on British policy during the period, I will deduce the British strategy. I will deduce their desired goal or end state, the elements of national power they applied, and their intent for each of these elements. This will be the strategy "in effect."

British Actions and their Effects

Intervention, August 1969 - March 1970

The British Army assumed responsibility for internal security in Northern Ireland 19 August 1969. Catholics welcomed the intervention, seeing the army as their protector from Protestant mobs and the Protestant-dominated Stormont government and RUC. Many Protestants saw the intervention as pro-Catholic and an imposition on their rights of self-government.

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Northern Irish Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark announced the army intervention after meeting in London 19 August 1969. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Northern Ireland, Lieutenant General Ian H. Freeland, was given command of the "B-Specials" and that portion of the RUC assigned to riot duty. They asserted the conflict was purely an internal affair, and that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland was not an issue. Britain rejected any United Nations or Republic of Ireland involvement in Northern Ireland.⁷⁶ The two Prime Ministers also announced after their meeting that:

- Northern Ireland agreed to establish an impartial investigation of the violence.
- Britain would "temporarily station two senior civil servants in Belfast to represent the increased concern" of the British government. (On 22 August, J. Oliver Wright, deputy undersecretary of state in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office was assigned to Chichester-Clark's office. A.S. Baker, assistant secretary at the Home Affairs Office, was assigned to the home affairs minister.⁷⁷)

⁷⁶"Seven-point Declaration," *Times* (London), 20 August 1969, p. 1.

⁷⁷"Whitehall's Men for Stormont," *Times* (London), 23 August 1969, p. 3.

- Stormont would appeal to the public to surrender unauthorized weapons under an amnesty.

- "In order that British troops can be withdrawn from the internal security role at the earliest possible moment, the two governments will discuss ... the future of the civilian security services of Northern Ireland which will take over when those troops withdraw."⁷⁸

Prime Minister Wilson stated later that day he believed the "B-Specials" should be phased out of riot control, and that disarming them as the Catholics demanded would be General Freeland's decision. He said the British government expected Stormont to proceed with "full momentum in putting into effect civil rights programs dealing with housing, jobs and local voting. There is no good sending troops if the cause of riots are not dealt with."⁷⁹

Stormont formed the advisory board to reorganize the police and re-examine the role of the "B-Specials" on 21 August. This commission was headed by Lord Hunt, with Sir James Robertson, chief constable of Glasgow, and Robert Mark, deputy commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police Force.⁸⁰

The impartial investigation of the violence promised by the two Prime Ministers was in fact already underway. Stormont had ordered the inquiry in March 1969. This three member commission was headed by Lord Cameron, a Scottish High Court judge, with Sir John Biggart and James J. Campbell, both faculty members of Queen's University, Belfast.

The army quickly separated the Catholic and Protestant mobs. The army initially made no attempt to tear down the Catholic barricades. Instead, the army simply separated

⁷⁸"Ulster Talks Communiqué," *Times* (London), 20 August 1969, p. 2.

⁷⁹Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁰"Lord Hunt for Inquiry on Ulster Police," *Times* (London), 22 August 1969, p. 2; and "Whitehall's Men for Stormont," *Times* (London), 23 August 1969, p. 3.

the two groups, dispersed crowds and prevented violence. On 22 August, General Freeland ordered the "B-Specials" to turn in their weapons. The Specials had been permitted to keep their weapons at home. He emphasized they were not being disarmed, but that their weapons were being brought under control.⁸¹

Catholic leaders in Northern Ireland saw the Wilson - Chichester-Clark announcement as a victory. Catholics welcomed the army as an impartial, professional force that would protect them. Citizen's Defence Associations in the Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast expressed willingness to negotiate with the army to eventually remove their barricades. They continued to deny the Stormont government's legitimacy, however, and demanded more be done to control the "B-Specials." An announcement by an underground radio calling itself Radio Free Belfast said Catholic barricades would remain in place until the "B-Specials" were disbanded, and the Stormont government was taken over by Westminster.⁸²

Protestant reaction was mixed. Ian Paisley said Stormont had "capitulated to the Roman Catholic Church."⁸³ In August, an entire platoon of "B-Specials" resigned in protest of the order to turn in their weapons.⁸⁴ On 25 August, many members of the RUC submitted a petition to Stormont protesting what they called Prime Minister Wilson's implication that the RUC was not impartial. The petition said, "We are greatly perturbed at the ever-increasing amount of anti-police propaganda and demand that steps be immediately taken by the appropriate authorities to insure that the truth be propagated to the public."⁸⁵

Stormont officials tried to reassure everyone that they were still in control. Prime Minister Chichester Clark said the decision to turn security over to the army was his

81 "Specials' Guns are Called In." *Times* (London), 23 August 1969, p. 1.

82 Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 53.

83 "Decisions Get a Mixed Reaction," *Times* (London), 20 August 1969, p. 1.

84 "Platoon of B Specials Quit to a Man," *Times* (London), 25 August 1969, p. 1.

85 Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 53.

proposal. Development Minister Brian Faulkner said 20 August that despite Britain's increased role, "there is absolutely no diminution in the powers of the Northern Ireland government." Faulkner also vowed the "B-Specials" would not be disarmed nor dissolved.⁸⁶

The Republic of Ireland continued to press for United Nations action. On 20 August, the United Nations Security Council adjourned without a vote on the Republic's appeal to place the dispute on the Council agenda. External Affairs Minister Patrick J. Hillery said this was not a defeat for Ireland, and that the Security Council action "left the question open." He added, "I have opened with U Thant (Secretary General) and the United Nations the whole question of trying to do something about the situation."⁸⁷

Taoiseach Lynch said 20 August that British troops should be withdrawn and replaced with a United Nations force. His government predicted the policies announced 19 August would do little to solve "the political, social and economic injustices from which the minority in the six counties have suffered so grievously and for so long." The government statement of 21 August reaffirmed the Republic's claim to Northern Ireland, and rejected the British-Northern Irish assertion that responsibility for Northern Ireland was an internal British affair. Lynch also condemned any IRA interference in Northern Ireland.⁸⁸ On 28 August, Taoiseach Lynch proposed negotiations with Britain to merge the Republic and Northern Ireland into a single federal state. He said he recognized there were problems standing in the way of creating such a state, but that they were not insurmountable.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ "Police Specials Will Stay - Faulkner," *Times* (London), 21 August 1969, p. 1.

⁸⁷ "Irish Defeat in UN on Ulster is Denied," *New York Times*, 22 August 1969, p. 12.

⁸⁸ "Lynch Gives a Warning to IRA," *Times* (London), 20 August 1969, p. 1.

⁸⁹ "Miss Devlin: No Action by Speaker," *Times* (London), 29 August 1969, p. 1.

On 29 August 1969, Westminster and Stormont issued a joint program for civil rights in Northern Ireland. This plan was the result of talks between British Home Secretary James Callaghan and Stormont officials in Belfast 27 to 29 August. The proposals dealt with abolishing bias in employment, housing, and local voting rights. The announcement also said:

- A community relations board, composed of Protestants and Catholics, should be formed to promote good relations.

- Stormont would introduce legislation to create a mechanism to investigate citizen's grievances against local authorities, in addition to the Parliamentary commissioner already approved.

- Britain would provide £250,000 in relief money for victims of the summer violence.⁹⁰

Mr. Callaghan said that the Catholic barricades in Belfast and Derry should be removed in light of these reform proposals, but they would not be dismantled forcibly.⁹¹

Catholics refused appeals to remove the barricades. The executive committee of the Derry Citizen's Defense Association said 31 August it would maintain the barricades until it saw concrete evidence the reform program would be carried out. It said it would discuss the eventual removal of the barricades with British military authorities. They rejected a British request to station military police in the Bogside to stop an outbreak of thefts, saying they would use their own volunteer force to patrol the area.⁹²

Ian Paisley denounced the reform proposals, saying Callaghan had given Catholics "a charter for revolution and violence," and Chichester Clark had been "coerced, cajoled

⁹⁰"Text of Communiqué on Ulster Crisis," *Times* (London), 30 August 1969, p. 4.

⁹¹"Pledges Broken Over Barricades," *Times* (London), 11 September 1969, p. 1.

⁹²Richard Maassbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 96; and *Times* (London), 15 September 1969, p. 1.

and bullied."⁹³ Protestants in Belfast and Derry built barricades of their own in protest of the government refusal to remove the Catholic barricades. The Ulster Volunteer Force, in a letter delivered to the Belfast office of the British Broadcasting Corporation 1 September, threatened it would act if Catholics did not remove the barricades.⁹⁴

The issue of the barricades provoked a series of violent incidents involving British troops 4-14 September in Belfast. On 4 September, Protestants overturned trucks and cars to set up barricades of their own. On 5 and 6 September, Ian Paisley was brought out by police to successfully calm his followers and prevent them marching on the Catholic Falls Road area. British troops used tear gas on 7 September for the first time to disperse about three-thousand Catholics and Protestants confronting each other across a barricade. Protestants attacked three British army trucks on 12 September when troops intervened in a clash between Protestants and Catholics. Two British soldiers were shot to death in separate incidents 14 September.⁹⁵

On 9 September, Prime Minister Chichester-Clark announced the construction of the "peace line" in Belfast. This barrier of 7-foot-high iron-railing fence was erected by the British army between the Protestant Shankill Road district and the Catholic Falls Road area to replace the barricades. The "peace line" was completed 15 September, and that day the British government demanded all barricades be removed and rejected Catholic pre-conditions. The demand was issued by Home Secretary Callaghan after meeting with Prime Minister Wilson, Defense Secretary Sir Geoffrey Baker, and General Freeland. The Central Defense Committee, claiming to represent seventy-five thousand Catholics, issued a list of conditions for removing the barricades: adequate military protection; suspension of the Special Powers Act; and assurance that Britain would act if Stormont failed to

⁹³ Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 60.

⁹⁴ Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 60.

⁹⁵ *Times* (London), 5 to 15 September 1969.

implement promised reforms. Catholics dismantled their barricades in Belfast beginning 15 September after negotiations between General Freeland's Chief of Staff, leaders of the Central Defense Committee, and the local Catholic priest Father Murphy. By morning of 17 August, all the barricades had been taken down. Protestants promptly burnt out three Catholic houses, and Catholics rebuilt the barricades. Father Murphy and General Freeland negotiated directly, and the Catholics again took down the barricades.⁹⁶

Lord Cameron's report, made public 11 September 1969, upheld Catholic and civil rights leader's charges of government discrimination and police misconduct. The report disagreed with contentions that the civil rights movement was a pretext for subversion. It praised the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, but criticized People's Democracy as a group "dedicated to extreme left-wing political objectives." The report found some policemen were guilty of assault and malicious damage to property in the Catholic Bogside district, and had used batons and water cannons indiscriminately in Derry in October 1968. The report confirmed Catholic charges of gerrymandering and abuse of power by local Unionist officials, but praised Stormont for promising to implement reforms.⁹⁷

Stormont praised the Cameron Commission's report "for widespread public study and reflection."⁹⁸ Bernadette Devlin, singled out by the report as one who would support violence, claimed the report "fails to deal with basic social problems of housing, low-wages, unemployment and self-interested government."⁹⁹ The report had little real effect on the conflict. The report only confirmed what all in Northern Ireland knew to be true, and the Unionist leaders in Stormont believed their reform proposals would correct the problems well enough to satisfy the Catholic minority. The findings were somewhat

⁹⁶*Times* (London), 10 to 16 September 1969; and London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 156-159.

⁹⁷*Times* (London), 12 September 1969, p. 4.

⁹⁸*Times* (London), 12 September 1969.

⁹⁹"Cameron Blames Ulster Militants," *Times* (London), 12 September 1969, p. 1.

shocking to the Westminster government, and the British people who had long left Northern Irish internal affairs to Stormont. Westminster seemed to believe the reforms already promised were adequate to address the problems found by Lord Cameron. Westminster advanced no new initiatives in response to the report.

Publication of the Hunt Report on 10 October 1969, however, did have an immediate impact on the conflict. The report recommended the RUC be disarmed and relieved of all military duties. It recommended the "B-Specials" be disbanded and replaced by a smaller, locally recruited, part-time police force under the control of the commanding officer of British troops in Northern Ireland. The report also urged more Catholics be recruited for the RUC. The report was published in a joint Westminster-Stormont announcement that also promised a new work program under which the government would provide £2 million and create twenty-five hundred new jobs in the coming winter.¹⁰⁰ Prime Minister Chichester-Clark immediately accepted the recommendations in principle, prompting the resignation of Anthony Peacocke, inspector general of the RUC.

Reaction to the Hunt Report was immediate and violent. Ian Paisley called the report a "complete and absolute sellout to the Roman Catholic civil rights movement."¹⁰¹ Protestant riots in Belfast the night of 11 October killed three persons, including one policeman. A Protestant crowd of about fifteen hundred attempted to storm a Catholic apartment building. A combined force of British troops and policemen stopped the crowd and cordoned off the apartments. The Protestant crowd opened fire with guns and gasoline bombs. Police responded with tear gas, and troops returned fire. The battle continued until 5 a.m. on 12 October. Afterward, British troops raided Protestant homes in the Shankill Road district and seized weapons and ammunition.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ "Disarm RUC & End B-Specials Committee Says," *Times* (London), 11 October 1969, p. 11.

¹⁰¹ "MPS: Clash of Views," *Times* (London), 11 October 1969, p. 2.

¹⁰² "More Troops go to Ulster After Deaths," *Times* (London), 13 October 1969, p. 1.

Britain and Stormont initiated police reform in November 1969, implementing some of the Hunt Report's recommendations. A White Paper issued in London 12 November announced the formation of the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) to assist the regular British army in Northern Ireland. The UDR would form 1 January 1970 as a six thousand man regiment, and take over all paramilitary duties from the "B-Specials" on 1 April 1970. The UDR was to help British troops protect the border with the Republic of Ireland, and guard key installations.¹⁰³ A White Paper issued by the Northern Ireland Home Affairs Ministry on 12 November announced the creation of a new Royal Ulster Constabulary Reserve (RUCR), which would also become operational 1 April 1970. The RUCR would be a fifteen hundred man, unarmed force to assist the regular police.¹⁰⁴

In December 1969, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or "Provos") formed from a split in the IRA in Belfast. The IRA was discredited by its inability to defend Catholic areas in August 1969. The Provisionals broke with the Dublin-led "Official" IRA which had shifted away from violence toward political action. This split had been developing for some years. When the IRA was unprepared for the violence in August 1969, and unable to supply weapons to defend Catholic neighborhoods, they were discredited. "IRA - I ran away" appeared in graffiti on walls in Belfast.¹⁰⁵

The IRA leadership in Dublin established a nine-county Northern Command, and decided to end the long practice of abstentionism, in which IRA/Sinn Féin candidates refused to take their seats if elected. They decided to form a united, "national liberation front" to try and unite the traditional Republicans with the sort of leftists Bernadette Devlin was attracting. The IRA Convention held in Dublin in December 1969 voted to recognize

¹⁰³"New Ulster Force," *Times* (London), 13 November 1969, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 66.

¹⁰⁵London, Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 177.

the Stormont, Dublin, and Westminster governments de facto, and end abstentionism.¹⁰⁶ Dissenters believed the IRA had abandoned a moral principle, and withdrew to form a Provisional Army Council. This Council denounced the IRA's emphasis on politics, failure to maintain the basic military role of the IRA, and inability to defend Catholics of Belfast. The Provisionals proclaimed:

We declare our allegiance to the 32-County Irish Republic proclaimed at Easter 1916, established by the first Dáil Éireann in 1919, overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the existing British-imposed Six-County and 26-County partition states. ... We call on the Irish people at home and in exile for increased support towards defending our people in the North and the eventual achievement of the full political, social, economic and cultural freedom of Ireland.¹⁰⁷

The Belfast IRA had grown from about one hundred fifty members in August 1969 to more than six hundred by December. The Provisionals attracted about four hundred of these at the time of the split, and began attracting republican purists in the Republic that had been out of the IRA for some time. The Provisionals spent the winter organizing and arming, but emphasized their hard line military policy was not a return to an open campaign or pointless provocation; it was a determination to "defend the people of the north from the forces of British imperialism."¹⁰⁸

A small working group under Northern Ireland Attorney-General Basil Kelly recommended ending the Special Powers Act in January 1970. Kelly's group said the act was despotic, and much of it meaningless or unenforceable or both. He believed only the power of internment was of use, and recommended a new Act eliminating everything else.

¹⁰⁶Sean Mac Stóilain, *Revolutionary in Ireland*, (Edinburgh, Scotland: R&R Clark, 1975), pp. 133-138, provides a first hand account of this Convention and the development of the split.

¹⁰⁷*Irish Times*, 29 December 1969, quoted in J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA from 1916 to 1972* (2nd edition) (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1979; reprint Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1983), pp. 366-367 (all page references are to the reprint).

¹⁰⁸J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA from 1916-1972*, p. 36.

This new Act should also require prior consent of Parliament to introduce internment, rather than only the signature of the Minister of Home Affairs, as in the current Act. This extensive redesign of the Special Powers Act would also meet one of the Catholic demands in a fashion Protestants could accept, but required Westminster approval. Home Minister James Callaghan rejected the proposal. He believed it would be better "to let the old Act fall into disuse" rather than draft a new one deliberately re-introducing the power of internment.¹⁰⁹

Violence resurged in January 1970. It started 4 January when soldiers dispersing a Protestant crowd in the Catholic Bogside district of Derry were pelted with rocks and bottles. There was scattered violence through January, with Protestant extremists trying to break through the "peace line" into Catholic areas. Throughout February, civil rights activists defied the Public Order Act by conducting sit-ins, but there was little violence. In March, civil rights parades protesting unemployment ended in a rock throwing confrontation with police in Derry.¹¹⁰ Mostly, early 1970 was calm in Northern Ireland. Westminster seemed to believe they had the problem under control, and undertook no new initiatives nor made any real progress toward reform. Oliver Wright, the first UK representative sent to establish the "political presence" in Northern Ireland, said on leaving in March 1970, "Cheer up! Things are better than you think."¹¹¹ His replacement, Ronald Burroughs, was not so optimistic as the Orange Parade season approached, but his warnings were dismissed.

During this period, Britain used the army to separate the combatants and prevent violence. The army was used as an impartial force, with more violent confrontations with Protestants than Catholics. In fact, Britain's Ministry of Defence agreed in March 1970 to

¹⁰⁹London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 199-201.

¹¹⁰Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, pp. 66-68.

¹¹¹London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 201.

set up a full scale military intelligence unit in Northern Ireland, primarily to investigate Protestant extremists.¹¹² Politically, Britain stood by the Stormont government as the legitimate government of Northern Ireland, and pressed it to reform itself. All reforms and the few economic and social measures announced were announced jointly with the Stormont government, and were to be implemented by Stormont. Britain also refused any outside participation in resolving the conflict.

The army restored a semblance of order, and swiftly put down outbreaks of violence. The Provisional IRA formed, but was relatively inactive. Most violence was caused by unorganized crowds or small groups of extremists. The announced reforms, however, angered Protestant extremists and Catholics were not satisfied with the pace of the reforms. Catholic areas were still controlled by the Citizen's Defense Associations, not the Stormont government. Britain did not try to bring these areas under Stormont control, nor did Britain recognize any legitimacy for these Associations or involve Catholic leaders in the reform process.

Get Tough, April 1970 - March 1971

The first conflict between British troops and Irish Catholic civilians since partition broke out 1 April 1970. A Junior Orange band preparing for an out of town rally marched up and down a road overlooking the Catholic Ballymishy district of Belfast, practicing their traditional Orange music. When they returned from their rally in Bangor that night still playing, a Catholic crowd threw bottles and hurley sticks (ash sticks resembling hockey sticks used to play the Irish game of hurling) at the marchers. The British army, anticipating more trouble when other sections of the parade returned, set up road blocks and deployed about seventy troops to keep the groups separated. A Catholic mob of about

¹¹² London Sunday Times, "Eight Years of Stormont: A Review," 16 Dec. 1969.

four-hundred youths throwing bottles and stones built up on one side, with an excited crowd of Protestant marchers on the other. Twenty-five soldiers were injured that night.

When rioting started again the next evening in Ballymurphy, the Army responded with six-hundred troops, armored cars, and tear gas. The Provisional IRA and members of the Official IRA actually tried to restrain the Catholic youths, and were caught between the mob and the soldiers. One of the Provisionals present in Ballymurphy told reporters later, "The Provos had been in existence only four months at that time. Our full-time active strength was no more than thirty. The last thing we wanted was a confrontation with the British Army or the Protestants."¹¹³ Seán MacStiofáin, Chief of Staff of the Provisionals, wrote later, "At that stage we were not seeking a confrontation with the British army."¹¹⁴

In response to this violence, General Freeland announced 3 April 1970 a "get tough" policy. He said that rioters throwing petrol bombs were "liable to be shot dead" if they ignored soldiers' warnings. An IRA spokesman in Belfast responded on 5 April that if civilians were killed by British troops, the IRA would shoot British troops in reprisal. General Freeland said on 6 April the Army might not be able to remain in Northern Ireland if it did not get more cooperation from the people. He said he was not optimistic, and warned the IRA not to fire on British troops, saying his troops had the firepower to win. General Freeland's intimation that troops might be withdrawn frightened both Unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland, and Prime Minister Wilson stated 7 April British troops would remain as long as they were needed to keep the peace.¹¹⁵

As the Orange marching season approached, Ronald Burroughs argued the marches should be banned. The Westminster government was preoccupied with general elections at

¹¹³London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 204.

¹¹⁴Seán MacStiofáin, *Revolutionary in Ireland*, p. 152.

¹¹⁵*Times* (London), 4-8 April 1970.

this time. Based on the relative quiet of the first few months of 1970, Westminster decided not to force Chichester-Clark to ban the marches.

The first march in Belfast on 3 June 1970 passed along the boundary of one of the most militant Catholic areas, the Ardoyne. The RUC had not informed the British Army Colonel in charge of the local area of the route. When he saw the marchers approaching, he tried to divert them a few hundred yards before the Ardoyne. In response, Protestants rioted for two days.

On 18 June 1970, the Conservatives defeated the Labour party in the general election. The new Prime Minister was Edward Heath. The Conservatives were allied with the Unionist Party, and had run on a manifesto declaring support of Stormont. The Unionist Party kept eight of the twelve Northern Irish seats in Westminster. Protestant extremist Ian Paisley won the seat for Antrim North as a Protestant Unionist. People's Democracy gained a second seat, with Frank McManus from South Tyrone joining Bernadette Devlin from Mid-Ulster. Gerard Fitt of the Republican Labour Party was reelected from West Belfast.

The Joint Security Committee met at Stormont 24 June to consider how to handle the next Orange marches scheduled for 27 and 28 June in Belfast. Ronald Burroughs thought the marches must be banned. Burroughs' contacts in the Catholic community had warned him the IRA would attempt to repel the marchers from Catholic areas. Arthur Young, head of the RUC, agreed. Chichester-Clark, however, believed banning the marches would destroy his position in the Unionist Party. General Freeland believed the Protestants would march even if the parades were banned, and legal marches would be easier to control than illegal ones. Freeland believed the experience of 3 June showed forcible interference with the marches was not practical. According to accounts of the meeting, he said, "It is easier to push them through the Ardoyne than to control the

Shankill." He did argue for re-routing the marches away from sensitive and more militant Catholic areas voluntarily. General Freeland recommended the RUC negotiate with the Orange Order to re-route the parades.¹¹⁶

The Orangemen did not agree to re-route their marches. The Joint Security Committee decided on 26 June that it was too late to do anything except permit the marches. Burroughs strongly disagreed, and exercised his option to appeal directly to the British Prime Minister. He reached the Prime Minister at midnight, and told him bloodshed was inevitable unless he stepped in and banned the marches. Mr. Heath consulted his new Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, and decided not to intervene.¹¹⁷

The march on Saturday, 27 June caused riots all over Belfast throughout the day. The arrest of Bernadette Devlin that evening to begin serving a six-month sentence for her participation in the August 1969 Derry riots further aggravated the situation. (Devlin had finally lost her appeal. General Freeland called her arrest that evening, "A ridiculous piece of timing.")¹¹⁸ The Provisional IRA was involved in two significant shooting incidents. The first was in the Ardoyne, where Protestants and Provisional IRA members exchanged gunfire for thirty minutes, leaving three Protestants dead. Each side insisted the other started the shooting.

The second shooting engagement was in the Short Strand in east Belfast. This small Catholic enclave of six thousand is among sixty-thousand Protestants along the east shore of the Lagan river. Shortly after 10 p.m., a group of Protestants tried to set fire to the Catholic Church in this area, St. Matthew's. They failed, but did set fire to the sexton's house. Stormont MP Paddy Kennedy, who was at St. Matthew's, went to the near by

¹¹⁶This account of the meeting is from London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 206.

¹¹⁷London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 207-208.

¹¹⁸London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 208.

Mountpottinger RUC station to ask for protection for the church. He was told the army and RUC were already over taxed, and nothing could be done.

The Belfast Brigade Commander of the Provisional IRA, Billy McKee, the Third Battalion Commander, Billy Kelly, and some armed locals moved into the churchyard to defend the church. Kelly claimed later he asked both RUC and an army patrol for help, but was turned down. Kelly was particularly concerned that the army had blocked all the bridges leading from west Belfast. Kelly saw this as trapping the Short Strand between the river and the Protestants armed with petrol bombs. (The army had blocked the bridges to prevent Protestants from the Shankill from moving into the area.) When the Protestants resumed their attempt to set fire to the church around 11 p.m., the Provisional IRA men engaged them in a gun battle. The battle lasted until 5 a.m., when the army arrived. During the battle, the army had been completely engaged in west Belfast. The one platoon General Freeland attempted to send to the Short Strand was turned away by Protestants. Two Protestants were dead on the scene, two died later from wounds, and several more were wounded. One Provisional IRA man was killed, and McKee was seriously wounded.¹¹⁹ Once again, the Orange parades had been the catalyst for violence in Belfast. Commenting to a friend, Ronald Burroughs said of the decision to allow the Orange parades of June 1970, "That was the greatest single miscalculation I have ever seen made in the course of my whole life."¹²⁰

Stormont passed two bills on 1 July to provide for tougher action against rioters. The Criminal Justice Bill provided mandatory jail terms for various riot offenses. Sir Authur Young thought the bill unnecessary. He saw it making his job even more difficult, but he was not consulted. General Freeland, whose troops would make the riot related

¹¹⁹This account of the shootings is from London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 208-211.

¹²⁰London, Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland A Report on the Conflict*, p. 212.

arrests, saw no problem, but thought it was too little too late. The most immediate impact of the bill was chaos in the courts. The required a six month minimum jail sentence for anyone convicted of "riotous behaviour", "disorderly behaviour" or "behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace." The last two charges, however, were those routinely used by the RUC to deal with every day pub brawls and other non-riot related disturbances.

The Criminal Justice Bill remained in force 1 July to 17 December 1970, when it was repealed. Under this bill, two hundred sixty nine people were charged with riotous or disorderly behavior, and one hundred nine were tried and convicted. The *Sunday Times* (London) wrote, "Predictably, too, the new Act in operation, so far from expunging bias, became in Catholic eyes the second most repressive piece of legislation (after the Special Powers Act) at the Unionists' command. *And the Army was the instrument which enforced it.*"¹²¹

The second bill passed 1 July was the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Bill. This bill made it illegal :

- (a) to use threatening, abusive or insulting language to incite or foment ill-will toward or arouse the fear of any section of the community on account of religious belief, color, race or ethnic or national origin;
- (b) to publish spurious statements or reports known to be false with intent to provoke a breach of the peace likely to stir up hatred or fear on the basis of religion or race.¹²²

This Act accomplished nothing. The first prosecution under it was not brought until December 1971. Three men were charged with trying to stir up hatred against Catholics by publishing a song, "I was born under the Union Jack." They were defended by Stormont

¹²¹London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 229.

¹²²Richard Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, p. 83.

MP Desmond Boal and acquitted. The Attorney-General had earlier acknowledged that intent was almost impossible to prove.

The Joint Security Committee met again 1 July 1970 to discuss the violence of the previous weekend. The committee concluded that the trouble had spread because the army had not responded with enough toughness to the initial outbreak of violence. The committee decided on a show of force to restore the appearance that the army was in control. The army would put down the very next incident with maximum force. Lord Balneil, British Defense Minister, agreed to this policy on 2 July.¹²³

That next incident occurred 3 July. Acting on intelligence from police raids in London, the army sent a small contingent into Balkan Street, in the Lower Falls, to seize an arms cache around 4:30 p.m. The Lower Falls was a Catholic area in the center of Belfast. The IRA in the Falls was the Officials, rather than the more radical Provisionals. During the arms raid, a crowd gathered at either end of the road. When the soldiers tried to get back to their vehicles around 5:30 p.m., the crowd blocked them. Trying to maneuver their armored personnel carriers through the crowd, one of the vehicles backed up and crushed a man to death against a railing. The crowd began throwing stones; the soldiers dismounted to face them. Three companies of troops were sent to rescue the trapped soldiers. Some of the rescuers became trapped themselves. They used CS gas to try and break out, and as the gas drifted into adjacent streets, the crowd grew. More troops were sent in to rescue the rescuers. The confusion, army presence, and the size and anger of the crowd grew. By 6:00 p.m., the crowd was throwing nail and petrol bombs at the soldiers. Around 6:30 p.m., Provisional IRA leader Billy McKee telephoned one of the Official IRA leaders in the Falls and asked if he needed help. McKee says the Official told him they were going to

¹²³London Sunday Times insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 215.

take on the British army, and McKee told him he was mad. The Provisionals did not join in the fighting.

By about 7:00 p.m., the army had withdrawn from the Falls and cordoned it off. At 8:20 p.m., the army moved in again, with troops of the Black Watch and Life Guards, to bring the area under control. These troops were so new to Belfast that they had driven straight from the ferry when it berthed at Belfast docks. The local IRA fired on the soldiers, and they returned fire and deluged the area with CS. At 10:00 p.m., General Freeland declared a curfew over the Falls area, and did not lift it until thirty-five hours later. (General Freeland's authority to declare such a curfew was dubious, and for that reason no one arrested for breaking the curfew was prosecuted. Ironically, General Freeland had argued against curfews 18 August 1969, saying, "What do you do if people disobey it? Shoot them?"¹²⁴) During the curfew, the army conducted a house to house search of the whole area. The search netted twenty-eight rifles, two carbines, fifty-two pistols, twenty-four shotguns, one-hundred incendiary devices, twenty pounds of gelignite, and twenty-thousand rounds of ammunition. Four civilians were dead: one run over by the army, and three shot. None of these four were alleged to be connected with the IRA.

The arms seizures came only six days after the failure of the army to defend Catholics in the Short Strand. The quick escalation of troop strength, extensive use of CS gas, and curfew led the Falls residents to believe the army action was a politically motivated invasion. This view was reinforced when the army drove two Unionist ministers, Captain William Long and Captain John Brooke, on a tour of the subjugated Falls.

On 13 July 1970, the Orange Order marched throughout Northern Ireland without incident. On 26 July, Chichester-Clark banned public parades for six months to give the security forces a break. During the remainder of 1970, there was no political movement.

¹²⁴London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 219.

Without public pressure from Westminster, Chichester-Clark could not convince his Unionist colleagues of the need to institute reform. The only consistent voice for reform was Ronald Burroughs, and as he was a Wilson appointee, he had little influence on Prime Minister Heath or Home Secretary Maudling. Little progress was made. Derry was still largely controlled by the IRA, as were most Catholic areas of Belfast.

Membership of the Provisional IRA soared from less than a hundred active members in May 1970 to about eight hundred by December 1970. The Provisionals still did not want to confront the army directly. When Catholic youths began rioting in Ballymurphy in January 1971, the Provisional leadership worked to stop it, actually placing some youths under armed arrest. The British army then opened negotiations with the Provisionals, seeking to enlist their help in maintaining order in Ballymurphy and Clonard. The Provisionals believed they had a deal with the army to stay out of these areas and let the Provisionals control them. This tentative peace between the army and the Provisionals was broken when the army made searches of these areas. This elicited new riots. In the midst of these riots, on 5 February, Major General Farrar-Hockley, General Officer Commanding Land Forces under General Freeland, appeared on Ulster television and named as Provisionals the very people he was negotiating with. The Provisional leadership felt betrayed, and began taking on the army. On 6 February, the first British soldier was killed. He was shot, along with four companions who were wounded, in an ambush. This marked the beginning of the Provisional IRA's policy of deliberately killing British soldiers. The next morning, Chichester-Clark announced, "Northern Ireland is at war with the Irish Republican Army Provisionals."¹²⁵

As the army increasingly became a target of violence, some soldiers began rough treatment of the populace. Allegations of abusive behavior by the army grew, beginning in

¹²⁵London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 245.

January 1971. Doctors, lawyers, and reporters began documenting cases of people being beaten while in army custody. When some filed suit for damages, criminal charges were filed against them (these were usually dismissed). London *Sunday Times* reporters noted "that the magistrates' courts were so clogged with cases hinging upon military testimony that the court building in Chichester Street looked daily more like a barracks than a hall of justice."¹²⁶

Chichester-Clark pressed Westminster for more troops and tougher action in the Catholic areas. Among his demands were block searches, total curfews in Catholic areas, punitive reprisal raids against Catholics, and permanent stationing of British troops in Catholic areas. Burroughs and Farrar-Hockey submitted a memorandum to Westminster calling Chichester-Clark's requests unacceptable. Prime Minister Heath refused, and Chichester-Clark resigned 20 March 1971. He was replaced 23 March 1971 by Brian Faulkner.

Throughout this period, Britain's policy changed subtly from the August 1969 to April 1970 period. Its external policy remained complete rejection of any role for anyone outside the United Kingdom. Britain still insisted Northern Ireland was a purely internal problem. Britain increased military pressure on the population, and decreased political pressure on Stormont. This policy significantly changed the army's role, and its relationship with the community. Britain introduced no new political, economic, or social initiatives, and relaxed pressure on Stormont to implement reforms already promised.

The army's changed role was the most significant result of British policy during this period. The army had been generally viewed by both Catholic and Protestant as relatively neutral and fair. The army had been trusted, and even the most radical Republican leaders were willing to negotiate with the army. The get tough policy severely

¹²⁶London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, p. 288.

weakened that trust among the Catholic community, and increased the attractiveness of the IRA and the Provisionals. Well publicized incidents such as the attack on St Matthew's Church where the army could not respond in time, and the IRA or Provisionals defended Catholic areas from violent Protestants, had already convinced Catholics they could not rely totally on the army for their safety. Now Catholics began to question the army's desire to protect them. Use of area control measures such as CS gas and curfews hurt innocent people at home as well as the rioters in the street. "CS gas did more for the Provos than all the legends of heroes and all the patriot graves."¹²⁷ The outcome of the get tough policy was that the army became an instrument of the Stormont government, particularly in Catholic eyes. Since the Catholic community regarded Stormont as a discriminatory, sectarian government, the British army had become part of the problem rather than a potential solution. Membership of the Provisional IRA grew, and the Provisionals began attacking the army.

Internment, April 1971 - March 1972

Faulkner tried to bring the non-Unionist opposition into the process of government without alienating his Unionist power base. He appointed a member of an opposition party, David Bleakley of the non-sectarian Northern Ireland Labor Party, to his cabinet as minister of community relations. On 22 June 1971, he proposed adding three new powerful committees to the existing Public Accounts Committee. These would consider government policies on social services, industrial development, and environmental matters. He proposed that the opposition provide salaried chairmen for two of these committees. This was a radical proposal in Northern Ireland. SDLP members sitting in opposition saw this as a promising effort at power sharing. Faulkner then made a symbolic gesture to

¹²⁷J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA from 1916-1979*, p. 376.

Unionists by making a visit with five members of his government to Brownlow House, home of an important Orange Order. Meanwhile, Faulkner began preparing to introduce internment.

Faulkner had been advocating internment each month in the Joint Security Committee for six months prior to becoming Prime Minister. Chichester-Clark opposed internment, as did the army and police. Faulkner was Minister of Home Affairs from 1959 through the end of the IRA campaign of 1956 to 1962, and was convinced internment was crucial to that defeat of the IRA. Under his direction, the Director of Military Intelligence and the RUC Special Branch set up a "joint internment working party" in April 1971. The working party began developing a list of persons who should be interned.

Violence continued to build. At the beginning of April, General Farrar-Hockley wrote a paper predicting the Provisionals would use bombing as their main weapon, as gun battles were too risky for them. He was proved right - from Faulkner's election in March until the introduction of internment 9 August there was an average of two bomb explosions a day. During one twelve hour period in July, there were twenty explosions. Sectarian rioting and violence continued as well, set off by funerals and marches. During one of the first Easter marches on 13 April, two thousand Protestants again stormed St. Matthew's Catholic Church. Several soldiers defending the church were set on fire by petrol bombs. The next day, thirteen Protestants appeared in court. Three faced the charge of riotous behaviour that carried a mandatory sentence. A man who struck a sergeant with a rock was given a suspended sentence. A student who stoned the police was fined £15. A man who took a soldier's rifle was fined £10. That same day, a Catholic named Joseph Patrick Downey received a one year sentence for shouting "You shove 'em bastards up the IRA" as the Orange parade passed by. A psychiatrist testified Downey had a mental age of ten and a half. Five days later, Protestant Robert Kane, a former "B-Special," was found

guilty on four charges of unlawfully supplying arms. He received a one year sentence, suspended for three years. Whether these three cases were part of any intentional pattern or not, they convinced Catholics there was no real reform of the law in Northern Ireland.

Faulkner's political balancing act collapsed after a series of accidents in Derry. Relations between the Catholics and the army had deteriorated in Derry almost as badly as in Belfast. Rioting broke out in July 1971, with the army being fired upon sixty times in four days. The night of 7 July, Seamus Cusack, an unemployed twenty-eight year old, was shot by a soldier after ignoring a warning to stand still. Cusack was immediately carried away by the crowd and taken in a car across the border to Letterkenny Hospital in the Republic, where he died. Cusack was not known to belong to any Republican organizations, and his death caused further rioting. Around 3:00 p.m., an army vehicle was rammed by a hijacked truck, and a patrol attempting to help was attacked with nail and petrol bombs. A soldier fired at a man who, according to the army log, fired at him. Desmond Beattie, an unemployed nineteen year old was killed. Forensic scientists found no traces of explosives on Beattie's body, and no sign he had fired a gun.

These two incidents occurred in SDLP member John Hume's district. He was concerned about his constituents, and concerned about maintaining his political support. Ruairí O Brádaigh, political chief of the Provisional IRA, came to Derry that weekend and attracted about two thousand well wishers. John Hume called an emergency meeting of the SDLP, and drafted a statement to the British Government. The statement gave the British Government until 15 July to establish an independent public inquiry into the deaths of Beattie and Cusack, or the SDLP would leave Stormont and set up an alternative parliament. Westminster refused to respond to the ultimatum, and Gerry Fitt led the SDLP out of Stormont 15 July. This walk-out strengthened the hand of hard line Unionists, who said Faulkner's hand of friendship had been bitten.

Faulkner telephoned Prime Minister Heath 19 July and said internment was now necessary. The next day, General Harry Tuzo (who had taken over as GOC Northern Ireland in February), in London to be knighted, met with Defense Minister Lord Carrington. Carrington told him that unless the army came up with an alternative, Faulkner would be allowed to implement internment.

On 23 July, the army and police raided houses in ten towns across Northern Ireland. This raid was to collect intelligence to finalize the internment list. Both Provisionals and Official IRA were very careful to avoid documenting their activities; but each kept excellent records on the other. By the beginning of August, the internment list was complete. The list had more than five hundred names: 120-130 gunmen or officers of the IRA and Provisionals; 300-350 sympathizers; 8-10 active politicians who might cause a disturbance after internment, such as Michael Farrell of People's Democracy. The list targeted only IRA, Provisional IRA, and Catholic Civil Rights members and sympathizers - Catholics. Protestant paramilitary groups were not targets of internment.

Faulkner's Cabinet met 3 August, with internment the main topic. The Cabinet reached no consensus and made no recommendation, nor did Faulkner ask them for one. On 5 August, the Joint Security Committee met. Graham Shillington, new RUC Chief Constable, said only a minority of police favored internment, and most of those were from the border areas rather than Belfast or Derry. General Tuzo was also against internment.

The afternoon of 5 August, Faulkner and Tuzo secretly left Belfast for London and met Lord Carrington. General Tuzo repeated his objections to internment, but could offer no other alternative. Faulkner and Carrington then met with the British Cabinet. Faulkner convinced the Cabinet to let him try internment. General Tuzo was called in to answer technical questions, but not to give his views.

On 9 August, Northern Ireland imposed internment. The army had wanted to arrest only the 100-150 people they considered irreplaceable by the IRA, but could only advise. As Minister of Home Affairs (he had dual-hatted himself), Faulkner made the decision of who to arrest, and decided on a clean sweep of the whole list. By the evening of 9 August, 342 people were arrested by the army and police, and placed in three holding centers.

There are reports that word of the arrest sweep leaked out about eight hours before the start of the operation. The Provisionals had been expecting it, and had warned their men that the families of any caught home could expect no subsequent help. The border with the Republic was still open, and the Republic was not simultaneously imposing internment as it had in 1959. The Provisionals held a press conference 13 August and claimed their command structure was still intact. The figures for continuing terrorist activity support their claim. August was the first month in which there were over one hundred bomb explosions, mostly in Belfast. There were thirty-five violent deaths during August, after only four in July.

Table 7.- Violent Impact of Internment

	Deaths		
	RUC & UDR	Army	Civilians
April - July 1971	0	4	4
Internment	---	---	---
August - November 1971	11	30	73

Source: London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, (New York: Random House, 1972).

Catholic reaction to internment was violent and sustained. Sectarian rioting as bad as anything in August 1969 followed, with two hundred houses burned, and refugees pouring south into the Republic. As Table 7 shows, violence increased dramatically, with the army suffering particularly heavy casualties.

By mid-December, 1,576 people had been arrested by the army under the Special Powers Act. Virtually all of them were Catholic. Many received rough treatment, and left detention with more injuries than they went in with. Of those arrested, 934 had already been released by mid-December. To the families and friends of those released, this only showed internment was being used carelessly. The released people were certainly more unhappy with the Stormont government than before their arrest.

The willingness of the army to arrest people on anonymous tips, and the rough treatment they gave some of those arrested, provided an opportunity for the Provisionals. (There were cases of people being arrested based on nothing more substantial than rumor.)¹²⁸ The Provisional IRA would select several people in a village generally known not to be IRA sympathizers. They would select prominent citizens, handicapped people, or British Army veterans. A Provisional IRA member would then make an anonymous telephone call implicating these people as IRA members, and the army would dutifully arrest them. The arrest of these sort of people would anger the local residents against the army and the government.

One such documented case of the Provisionals using the army against itself in this way occurred in Ardoyne in September. An anonymous call to the headquarters of the Green Howards (an army unit) gave six names at five addresses that might be sheltering

¹²⁸Cases of the army arresting on rumor or tips are reported in London Sunday Times Insight Team *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 271-272; cases of mistreatment were widely reported in the press, and documented in the *Addendum to Report of the Compton Committee, 17 November 1971*, quoted in London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 292-293.

Provisional gunmen. At dawn the next morning, a squad of troops drove up in armored vehicles, sealed off the streets, and arrested six men. In full view of the growing crowd, they tied the men's hands behind their backs and placed bags over their heads. Within a few hours, the army realized it had made a mistake, and all were released. By then the damage had been done. Angry people were out in the street, and rumors were flying about the crippled condition of those arrested.

The anonymous caller to the Green Howards was a Provisional IRA member. The six victims were carefully chosen. James McCann was in his fifties, suffered from a heart condition that kept him off work, and had to be helped to the army vehicle. McCann's son Seamus was mentally handicapped. Hugh Martin was a former British Army regular who had been a prisoner of war in Germany for four years; his wife had had several nervous breakdowns, and was screaming at the door as troops took him away. One local described the arrests as "like a bloody procession to Lourdes."¹²⁹

Internment brought the army into direct conflict with the Catholic community. Predictably, allegations mounted of unwarranted violence and abuse by the army. There was evidence that some of those arrested, particularly young men, were treated roughly. Reports of abusive treatment within the detention centers brought international attention, and Westminster appointed a committee (the Compton Commission) to investigate. This committee confirmed that detainees, citizens of the United Kingdom not convicted of any crime, were forced to prop themselves against a wall by their fingertips, wear black hoods, listen to frightening and deafening sounds, and go without food and sleep. The common perception among Belfast Catholics was that treatment by the army was brutal and focused on Catholics. Coupled with the belief that even the most innocent were subject to arrest,

¹²⁹London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, pp. 223, 228. The Insight Team claims to have interviewed the Provisional IRA member who made the call.

this completely alienated the Catholic community from the army and the government who employed it. By the end of 1971, the alternative parliament threatened by the SDLP had met twice at Dungiven - a deliberate sign that Catholic leaders saw no chance of being governed from Stormont again. Over 20,000 Catholics were participating in a civil disturbance campaign, refusing to pay rent and taxes.

On 5 January, the British Army changed the rules of engagement in Northern Ireland and allowed machine gun fire to be used on city streets. The commander on the spot could order machine gun fire against identified targets, rather than the single, aimed shots previously authorized. On 18 January, Faulkner ordered a one year extension of the six month ban on all parades imposed in August 1971. Catholic defiance of that ban by conducting anti-internment marches led to the famous Bloody Sunday incident on 30 January 1972. Thirteen civilians were shot to death by the army, and fifteen demonstrators and one soldier were wounded. Whatever actually happened (still a controversial subject), Catholics were convinced the army had fired first and killed thirteen innocent civilians participating in a peaceful march. Both the Official and Provisional IRAs promised reprisals, and a one hundred pound bomb exploded in a Belfast department store 31 January, critically injuring a policeman. Hundreds of shops, offices and factories were closed across Northern Ireland as Catholics began a general strike that was to last until the victims of 30 January were buried.

Bloody Sunday, the controversy surrounding it, world opinion, and the violent and angry reaction of the Catholic community convinced Westminster drastic action was needed. On 30 March 1972, Great Britain suspended Northern Ireland's government and Parliament, and imposed direct rule.

British Strategy

The United States Army Command and General Staff College breaks national power into five elements: political, economic, national will, military, and geographic. Successful strategy coordinates and integrates these elements of power appropriate to the problem to achieve a desired end state.

Throughout the period of 1969 to 1972, British policies changed subtly. During the initial Intervention phase, Britain used the army to separate the groups in conflict, provided some economic assistance, and pressed the government of Northern Ireland to reform. During the Get Tough period, Britain used the army more aggressively against groups opposing the government of Northern Ireland, continued economic assistance, and reduced the pressure on Stormont to reform. During Internment, Britain again increased military pressure against groups opposing Stormont, continued economic assistance, and further reduced pressure on Stormont to reform.

These policies indicate a consistent strategy toward Northern Ireland. Britain's evident goal was the survival of the Stormont government, with the minimum effort required from Britain. Britain wanted to return to the pre- August 1969 status quo. Britain made no real attempt to eliminate the rift between the Protestant and Catholic communities, only to eliminate the violence between them. Even the most radical reforms advocated by Britain would not endanger Unionist political and social dominance of Northern Ireland. Reforms were only intended to make living under Unionist rule more palatable for Catholics.

Towards this end, Britain applied political, economic, and military power in Northern Ireland during the period 1969 to 1972. The primary element used was military, with some political pressure and minor economic incentives.

Military

The primary and most visible element of national power Britain used in Northern Ireland was military. Britain initially used military power to separate the rioters and prevent violent conflict between the two Irish sects. Once the army accomplished this, Britain began using the military to enforce the rule of Stormont. Rather than simply separating the rioters and deterring violence, the military began pursuing those believed to be potential troublemakers. As the conflict continued, Britain applied increasing military force, culminating in the internment policy of using the military to arrest all potential troublemakers in one quick sweep.

Political

Britain used political power inside Northern Ireland in varying degrees to pressure the Stormont government to reform itself enough to appease moderates among the minority. Britain dispatched two senior civil servants to Northern Ireland to "represent the increased concern" of Westminster. The British Home Affairs Minister made several trips to Northern Ireland, meeting with both Stormont officials and Catholic leaders. The British Prime Minister met several times in London with the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, and made numerous statements that Westminster expected Stormont to proceed with "full momentum" with civil rights reform. Britain also set up commissions to investigate and make recommendations on civil rights concerns and police reform (Cameron and Hunt commissions). These commissions' findings and recommendations, made early in the conflict, clearly identified many of the problems facing Britain.

It used political power internationally to reject outside interference (or assistance), particularly from the Republic of Ireland. Britain consistently announced that the problem was purely an internal British problem. Britain was able to prevent even discussion of the

conflict in the United Nations, using their position on the Security Council. Britain simply rejected publicly the statements made by leaders of the Republic of Ireland as inflammatory.

Economic

Britain used economic power only within Northern Ireland to shore up the government. Britain funnelled funds through Stormont for some humanitarian aid, and creation of jobs. Each announcement from Westminster of government action in Northern Ireland included a promise of some economic aid. On 29 August 1969, Britain promised relief money for victims of the previous summer violence. Westminster's release of the Hunt Report on 10 October 1969 was accompanied by a promise of £2 million to create twenty-five hundred new jobs. In each case, Westminster provided funds to Stormont to execute the programs. Stormont and local government councils completely controlled the disbursement of these funds.

Summary

British strategy was to use the minimum military, political, and economic power required to ensure the survival of the Stormont government and return the situation to reformed pre-August 1969 conditions. Military power was to enforce the rule of Stormont and prevent violence. Political power was to prevent foreign interference and pressure Stormont to reform itself. Economic power was to assist Stormont in relieving some of the economic conditions contributing to dissatisfaction in the working class communities.

This strategy was only a minor change from British strategy toward Northern Ireland throughout the 1960s. Westminster had left the internal affairs of Northern Ireland to Stormont, despite the fact that Westminster was ultimately responsible for those affairs. From 1964 to August 1969, only one British minister, Home Secretary Sir Frank Soskice,

visited Northern Ireland, and his visit was only for an afternoon.¹³⁰ As the civil rights movement gained strength, and Britain recognized the legitimacy of many of its goals, Britain began pressuring Stormont to reform. The British government relied on Stormont, however, for information about the progress of reform. The economic aid Britain provided Northern Ireland was part of the overall effort to reform the economic situation throughout the United Kingdom. The addition of military force was the only significant change in strategy.

¹³⁰Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, *The British State & the Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher*, p. 13.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I will evaluate Britain's strategy. I will first analyze the strategy using the imperatives for Low Intensity Conflict. I will then discuss whether it addressed the strategic problem using all appropriate elements of national power.

Imperatives for Low Intensity Conflict

Political Dominance

Britain adhered well to this imperative. All army actions were clearly subordinated to the political objectives of Westminster and Stormont. Rules of engagement were restrictive, and designed with the political impact of military force in mind. The only exception was the saturation of Catholic neighborhoods with CS gas. Militarily, the gas broke up rioters with a minimum use of physical force applied by troops, and enabled a smaller number of security forces to deal with a riot. The political impact of using this gas in congested neighborhoods was very counterproductive. Gas is an imprecise, area weapon. Used in congested urban neighborhoods, the gas attacked even good citizens staying at home.

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort was a problem for Britain, complicated by a change in leadership early in the conflict. The conflict began during the Labour government of Prime Minister Wilson, who emphasized reform. Mr. Wilson, with a substantial Irish population in his constituency, had also made several statements during his election favorable towards eventual unification of Ireland. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Heath that took power in Britain in June 1970 was aligned with the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland. This government emphasized military and security programs over reform. The timing of this government change was unfortunate. After months of quiet brought about by the army, the Orange marching season was beginning. Mr. Burroughs, a Labour appointed representative of Westminster in Northern Ireland, argued strongly to ban the marches. Westminster was caught up in the election, and did not want to take any controversial actions. The first march brought two days of riots. With the election over and more marches approaching, Burroughs again argued for a ban, supported by Arthur Young, head of the RUC. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, decided not to side with these Labour appointees over his political ally, Prime Minister Chichester-Clark of the Unionist Party. The result was the renewal of open rioting that brought the army into direct conflict.

Particularly under Prime Minister Wilson, Westminster's goals of reform were much more ambitious than Stormont's. Throughout the period, Stormont wanted to use more force, and Westminster wanted to use less force and more political reform. These differences in goals and methods were a problem because Westminster did not clearly take charge, nor did it clearly step out. Westminster tried to let Stormont handle the conflict, with support and direction from Westminster. Westminster, however, did not provide clear direction.

Britain also did not actively seek any unified international support. Instead, Britain rejected any international participation. This ignored the fact that the Republic of Ireland was a major actor in the conflict. Instead of using the Republic's influence as a positive force, Britain's rejection left the Republic as an influence against British policies. The Republic provided a safe haven, money and weapons, for the IRA and Provisionals. It was a major source of anti-British propaganda, and focused world opinion on Northern Ireland. This was especially significant in the United States, where the large Irish-American population was easily swayed to anti-British feelings. The United States later became a source of revenue for the IRA.

Adaptability

The British army in Northern Ireland proved very adaptable. Within a very short time, they modified their organization, tactics, training, and equipment to handle the difficult role they were given. British strategy as a whole, however, was not adaptable. As discussed under Unity of Effort, Britain tried to work through the existing Stormont government. No major structural changes were made politically, economically, or socially. The few changes that were made, such as housing reform, were done piecemeal. The same methods for dealing with trouble in Northern Ireland were used, and the same relationship between Westminster and Stormont maintained. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 does give Stormont responsibility for internal affairs in Northern Ireland, but it also clearly gives Westminster overall responsibility for Northern Ireland. Westminster's investigations found the government in Northern Ireland to be unfair, yet Westminster did not act decisively to correct the problems. Instead it worked through existing structures using existing methods.

Legitimacy

The struggle for legitimacy is the key to any low intensity conflict. "Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern...."¹³¹ In Northern Ireland, three key actors struggled for legitimacy: Stormont, Westminster and the army, and the IRA and Provisional IRA. Stormont had already lost legitimacy in the Catholic community by August 1969. Westminster had legitimacy with both sides, but lost it in Catholic eyes when it aligned itself with Stormont. The IRA had no legitimacy to start with, and gained legitimacy in the Catholic community as Westminster and the army lost it.

Catholics had traditionally viewed the legitimacy of the state as questionable, seeing partition as the ultimate act of gerrymandering, but only a small minority felt compelled to resist the government. The most recent IRA campaign had failed in 1962 due to lack of popular support. By August 1969, however, many Catholics were openly resisting Stormont's authority. It is significant that Catholic leaders behind the barricades were willing to negotiate with British army officers, but not Stormont officials or the RUC. Catholic leaders recognized the British army as a legitimate force, but saw Stormont and its RUC as illegitimate.

Westminster's (and the army's) legitimacy in Catholic eyes was based on its perceived neutrality and fairness. Even the most radical republicans in Northern Ireland, who viewed Britain as an occupying power, saw Britain and the army as fair. Catholics saw Westminster as their best hope for civil rights reform, and protection from violent Protestant mobs and what they saw as sectarian police forces. Westminster had legitimacy in Protestant eyes simply because it was the government of the United Kingdom. Although

¹³¹DOD, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, p. 1-7.

worried they might be abandoned by Britain, Protestants were predisposed to accept the legitimacy of Westminster and the army.

Britain failed to recognize Stormont's loss of legitimacy, and the basis of its own legitimacy. Britain designed all its actions to work through and in support of the Stormont government. By supporting a Stormont government that had already lost legitimacy, the British government undermined its own legitimacy. As Westminster's most visible instrument of power in Northern Ireland, the army, increasingly became an instrument of Stormont in Catholic eyes, Westminster forfeited its neutrality. This created an opening for the IRA to exploit, and attempt to recast the conflict as Irish versus British. The more the army came in conflict with Catholics, the more legitimacy the IRA and Provisional IRA gained as the only groups Catholics believed could be trusted to protect Catholic neighborhoods from Protestant violence.

The army managed to preserve its image of neutrality during the initial period (August 1969 - April 1970). Lack of decisive government action to address the problems of Northern Ireland, and the decision to allow the Orange marches of 1970, provided an opportunity for radicals in the IRA to seize the initiative. The IRA and Provisionals were able to convince Catholics during the summer riots that the army could not or would not protect them. The well publicized shoot out at St. Matthew's church was one such incident. The army was not able to arrive for several hours, and IRA gunmen held off a Protestant mob, saving the church from being burned. Of course, once the army arrived they quickly secured the church, and in later riots soldiers actually defended the church from a Protestant mob. Still, the IRA were able to boost their status by pointing out the army did not protect the Catholic neighborhood. By pointing out the army barricades that trapped the Catholics in the neighborhood (intended to keep Protestants from the Shankill out), the IRA could even claim the army did not want to protect them. Arms raids after the

riots provided another incident the IRA used to increase its own legitimacy. Again, the IRA was able to portray the army as anti-Catholic, since the army was trying to disarm them after they had been attacked by Protestants. Thus, by supporting a government that had already lost legitimacy in the eyes of a significant part of the population, Britain undermined its own legitimacy and contributed to the legitimacy of radical groups like the IRA.

The army was careful to operate within the law, in the interest of preserving its legitimacy. The law itself, however, was (and is) extraordinary, and a source of disaffection in Northern Ireland. Laws in effect in Northern Ireland would not have been tolerated in any other part of the United Kingdom, and were out of character with a modern democracy. The Special Powers Act was a particular problem. To Catholics, this Act was a symbol of sectarian repression. Repealing this Act was a central demand of the civil rights movement. Britain did not repeal this Act, despite the recommendations of its own study. In fact, Britain allowed its security forces to be used as an instrument under the Special Powers Act. This, along with highly publicized cases of questionable sentencing in courts, severely damaged Westminster's image of fairness among Catholics and played into the propaganda of the IRA.

Perseverance

Britain has certainly displayed a willingness to persevere in the protracted struggle of Northern Ireland. During this initial phase of the struggle, however, British strategy focused on short term goals. Internment was an example of seeking a quick solution. Britain made no real attempt to address the long term problem of the sectarian split in society. Britain also ignored the long term problem of the relationship between the two Irish states.

Strategy vs. Problem

I believe the British government did not formulate its strategy as a conscious decision to deal with the problem of Northern Ireland. When Britain introduced troops in August 1969, the government fully expected them to be back in their barracks within six months. Army strength and government policy changed in response to the changing situation in a purely reactive fashion. Internment was Britain's one attempt to seize the initiative, and it was initiated by Stormont (with British Cabinet approval) over army objections with disastrous results. The British government did not formulate a coherent, comprehensive strategy at the beginning of the period. The government made what it thought to be the minimum effort required initially, and slipped gradually deeper into the conflict. As a result, Britain did not deal adequately with the three immediate problems, and the underlying, long term problem facing it in 1969.

Civil Rights Problem

Britain acknowledged the civil rights problem, and promised reform. Britain allowed the Stormont government, however, to dictate the pace and extent of reform. All civil rights reform was enacted gradually and by Stormont. Britain seemed to believe the reforms already promised by Stormont were sufficient to satisfy the majority of Catholics. The problem with this strategy was the government enacting reform was put in power by the very discriminatory practices Catholics were protesting. At best, Catholics might have been suspicious of Stormont's motives. In fact, Catholics viewed the reforms as too little too late, and as desperate attempts by Stormont to maintain power. Significant reform was enacted by Stormont, however any real power sharing was not considered. Even after Stormont enacted election reform, they did not correct gerrymandered boundaries and did not promptly hold elections under the new system (elections were scheduled for 1971).

Protestant supremacy was the reason Northern Ireland existed. The boundaries are meaningless except that they enclose the largest area in which Protestants could hold a majority in 1920. Any reform that endangered Protestant supremacy was therefore a philosophical dilemma for Unionists - eliminate the apparatus of Protestant supremacy and you bring Northern Ireland's very reason for existence into question. It was unreasonable to believe Stormont would reform itself in any meaningful way.

Britain needed to take visible and decisive action to convince the Catholic community their best interests lay with support of Westminster, and preclude the IRA from gaining any legitimacy. Catholics already knew they were economically better off as British citizens than Irish citizens. Westminster need to quickly convince them they were also better off socially and politically as British citizens. Immediately after release of the Cameron and Hunt commissions' reports, Britain held the moral high ground. Westminster was responsible to ensure Catholics in Northern Ireland enjoyed the same rights and privileges as all other British citizens. The commissions' reports revealing the inadequacies of the Stormont government provided Britain an opportunity to seize the initiative. Westminster needed to take decisive actions such as immediate imposition of direct rule, followed by redistricting, election reform, and new elections, or the quick implementation of some sort of power sharing system.

Internal Security Threat

Britain concentrated on the internal security problem. The army achieved great initial success. The army quickly brought relative peace to Belfast and Derry. Britain brought about much needed police reform, and disbanded the controversial "B-Specials." The initial period was crucial. The IRA was splitting, and neither branch was prepared to oppose British troops. Both IRAs lacked weapons and a strategy - they were no better prepared for the events of 1969 than the British government. More importantly, the IRA

enjoyed public support only in defending Catholic neighborhoods from the perceived threat of Protestant mobs and the RUC and "B-Specials." It was for this defensive mission alone that groups and politicians in the Republic supplied the IRA with weapons, training, and money. As long as British troops maintained their neutrality in the eyes of the Catholic community, the IRA could not launch a campaign against British rule. It was only after the British army forfeited its neutrality in Catholic eyes that it became a target, and the Provisional IRA bombing campaign began.

Once the IRA and Provisional IRA began attacking British troops and detonating bombs, Britain focused even more on the security problem. Britain seemed to believe the IRA was the problem, rather than recognizing them as a symptom. Even if Britain could have defeated the IRA militarily, it would only have been a temporary reprieve. The IRA had been defeated before several times - most recently in 1962 - and each time successors rose up again to trouble the governments of Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland. Britain certainly had to deal with the IRA once it had failed to prevent its resurgence, but only as one step in a coherent strategy addressing the long term problem.

For approximately eight months after introduction of the army, Northern Ireland was relatively peaceful. Westminster and the army enjoyed the support of both communities, and radicals on both sides had not yet gained any real legitimacy. Thus, Britain's initial strategy to deal with the internal security threat facet of the problem was very successful. The army initially provided Westminster an opportunity. Once this opportunity was squandered, the internal security threat became even more difficult to deal with. As the violence resurged, the army was not able to provide a presence in all conflict areas and react rapidly. The gun battle over St. Matthew's church in June 1970 lasted some six hours before the army could arrive to stop it. This incident provided valuable

propaganda to those trying to undermine British legitimacy by convincing Catholics the army could not and/or would not protect them.

Internment was a terrible misuse of the army, and against the recommendations of army and police leadership in Northern Ireland. Only Catholics were targeted for arrest, and the list included civil rights leaders and suspected sympathizers as well as known IRA members. Protestant terrorists such as the UVF were not targeted. While the IRA was certainly the greater threat, arresting at least a few Protestant terrorists would have lent some measure of fairness to the program. Poor intelligence and information security resulted in failure to arrest the leadership of the IRA and Provisionals. Poor intelligence and inadequate control also made the army susceptible to arresting completely innocent people, both by mistake and through manipulation.

External Security Threat

Britain's reaction to the external threat was to ignore it. Britain openly and often stated that the Republic of Ireland had no role in the conflict. This was not true. The Catholic population of Northern Ireland clearly felt some connection with the Republic, and leaders of the Republic felt some morale responsibility toward Catholics in the North. De Valéra, a leader of the 1916 rebellion and author of the 1937 constitution that claimed all of Ireland, was still President of the Republic. The party he founded, Fianna Fáil, held power. It was extremely unrealistic to believe they might just be swept aside and not involve themselves in some way. By denying the Republic a positive role, Britain left it as a safe haven for IRA and Provisional IRA members, and a source of economic and political support for the IRA, as well as an effective opponent in the public relations battle.

The de Valéra led Republic had cooperated with Britain twice before in combating the IRA—during World War Two and the campaign of 1956-1962. Westminster likely could have convinced the Republic to cooperate again, as long as they could satisfy the

Republic Britain intended real reform and protection of the Catholic population. If such an appeal had failed, Britain could certainly have coerced the Republic into at least passive cooperation. Britain enjoyed enormous economic and diplomatic power over the Republic of Ireland. Britain was the Republic's largest trade partner, while only a small portion of Britain's trade was with the Republic. Britain could have applied a great deal of economic pressure on the Republic. Diplomatically, Britain enjoyed the power of a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, and close relations with the United States. Britain could have undermined the Republic's attempt to join the European Economic Community (EEC) by discrediting it internationally. Republican rhetoric aside, EEC membership was the Republic's primary goal at the time. The threat of a concerted public relations campaign portraying the Republic as supporters of Marxist terrorists might have convinced the Republic's leaders to support Britain.

Polarized Sects

Britain did not attempt to address the long term strategic problem: the continued existence of two polarized sects within Northern Ireland, each fearing and hating the other, and willing to use violence to pursue its aims. Britain did not attempt any social or political program aimed at reducing the polarization of these two groups or changing their basic relationship with each other. Socially, the two sects remained almost completely segregated. Britain did not attempt to mobilize social groups and forces such as the churches and the education system, to depolarize society and break the cycle of hatred. Catholic children continued to be educated in Catholic schools, and compete in GAA sponsored Irish games such as hurling and Irish football. Protestant children continued to be educated in public schools, and compete in "English" games such as soccer and rugby. Each lived in their own segregated neighborhoods and shopped in local shops.

Britain did not interfere with the most visible symbol of polarization: the Orange Order. The Orange Order fostered hatred and celebrated the subjugation of Catholics. Its annual series of parades and celebrations had caused violence since the 1800s. During these celebrations, Orangemen pass through or near Catholic neighborhoods, and the lyrics to their songs are openly provocative. "Republican clubs" were banned in Northern Ireland, but the Orange Order was not only legal, its members controlled the government. It was violence resulting from Orange parades that brought British troops into the conflict in August 1969, yet Britain did not ban them. Orange parades in 1970 proved the turning point in the army's relationship with the Catholic community. Still, Britain did not interfere with the organization.¹³²

Summary

British strategy was aimed only at restoring the pre-1969 status quo, with some reform. This was not in Britain's own long term interest. Even if the strategy had succeeded, Northern Ireland would have continued to be a problem area from which Britain derived no real benefit. Northern Ireland would have continued to be an economic drain on Britain, a source of international tension with the Republic of Ireland (and sympathizers in Britain's critical ally, the United States), and an internal security problem with a continuing possibility of a resurgent IRA and periodic violence associated with sectarian celebrations like the Orange parades.

British political leaders did not understand the real nature of the conflict in northern Ireland in 1969, and the challenge they faced. The only key government personality during the period that seemed to understand the problem facing Britain was General Freeland.¹³³

¹³²The Orange Order is still legal and still conducts its provocative celebrations annually.

¹³³General Freeland was well qualified by education and experience to deal with the political-military nature of his duties. He led the Second Royal Iniskillen Fusiliers in Cyprus in 1954-55, and was commander in East Africa during the Zanzibar rebellion and the Kenya Army mutiny in 1964.

A statement he made in August 1969 proved prophetic:

"If something more constructive and helpful does not come out of tomorrow's meeting between the two Prime Ministers [Chichester-Clark and Wilson], then the honeymoon period we are having could end in a few hours. The soldiers may come under attack from both sides."¹³⁴

Unionists in Stormont thought the conflict was just another IRA led rebellion. Westminster believed the conflict was merely civil unrest. Neither seemed to realize the extent to which the Catholic population had lost faith in the government of Northern Ireland. As a result, British strategy did not address the strategic problem nor pursue Britain's long term interests.

Britain stumbled into the conflict, consistently applying the minimum effort they believed necessary. Britain did not formulate a comprehensive, coherent strategy to address the problem. It threw the army into the conflict, with some political and economic measures, and expected the army and Stormont to solve the problem. When the army created an opportunity, Britain squandered it through inactivity and ceded the initiative to the IRA and Provisionals.

Britain's strategy had major weakness with three imperatives: unity of effort, adaptability, and legitimacy. Britain failed to maintain a strong unity of effort, both between Stormont and Westminster, and gathering international support. While the army proved very adaptable, Westminster was unable to adapt its other elements of power to address the problem. In the critical struggle for legitimacy, Britain forfeited its neutrality and supported a Stormont government that had already lost legitimacy. In doing so, Britain

¹³⁴"Commander in Ulster," *New York Times*, 22 August 1969, p. 12.

undermined its own legitimacy and provided the IRA and Provisional IRA an opportunity to gain legitimacy.

British strategy did not address all three immediate problems, and ignored the long term problem. Britain concentrated its efforts against the internal security threat, applied minimal effort towards solving the civil rights problem, and ignored the external security threat. Britain did not address the long term problem of polarization at all.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

In the previous three chapters, I completed the first three steps of my LIC Strategy Analysis Model. In this final chapter, I will answer the research question, suggest what Britain should have done, and draw lessons for future planners. I will also discuss the relationship of this work to other studies, and suggest areas for further study.




Figure 12. Step 4, LIC Strategy Analysis Model

Why the British Strategy Failed to Make Peace

Britain made several mistakes in Northern Ireland, either by omission or commission, and I discussed these in Chapter 6. Mistakes are predictable in an operation as complex as peacemaking, and they need not be fatal. Britain did make several key mistakes which caused their failure to bring peace to Northern Ireland during the period 1969 - 1972:

- Britain did not formulate a comprehensive strategy early in the operation.
- Britain did not adequately address each immediate problem. Britain only concentrated on the internal security problem using military force.
- Britain did not attempt to solve the long term strategic problem of societal polarization.
- Britain lost legitimacy by forfeiting its perception of neutrality and fairness.

Of these mistakes, the failure to address the long term problem, and the loss of legitimacy were fatal. These mistakes turned opportunity into disaster, and Britain found itself involved in a violent conflict that continues even today.

Britain failed to make peace in Northern Ireland because it did not formulate and execute a comprehensive, coherent strategy applying all appropriate elements of national power to solve the problem. Britain used the military element of power almost exclusively, using only minimal political and economic power, and concentrated its efforts against the internal security threat. It did not adequately address the civil rights and external security problems, and made no attempt to solve the underlying long term problem of societal polarization. Thus Britain only treated the most troublesome symptoms, rather than attempting to cure the disease.

What Should Britain Have Done?

Looking at the problem with the benefit of hindsight, what should Britain have done? Ideally, Westminster would have recognized early in the civil rights campaign the extent of Catholic disaffection with Stormont, and Stormont's inadequate response. I believe Lord Grey, who represented the Crown as Governor in Northern Ireland, might have kept the British government better informed of the problems. Had Westminster recognized the seriousness of the building problem, the violence of 1969 might have been prevented. I believe, however, it is unrealistic to assume the political decision to intervene could have been made prior to August 1969. At that point, Britain clearly had to intervene, and the only viable force it could use was the army. Britain inserted the army to stop the violence, and established commissions to investigate the grievances of the Catholic community. From that point on, I believe Britain should have acted differently.

The critical period of the operation was August to December 1969. Britain needed to act decisively during that period to have a chance of bringing peace to Northern Ireland. I have defined three immediate problems facing Britain in 1969: internal security, external security, and civil rights. All three of these problems had to be addressed during the critical initial period.

I believe Britain was correct in bringing in the army. The army was very effective in stopping the violence and restoring order. Britain should also have immediately established a joint army - police intelligence operation and began gathering intelligence on Catholic and Protestant extremists. The IRA were certain to try and take advantage of the situation, as were Protestant extremists like the UVF. Britain should have planned for that contingency, and started gathering the intelligence needed to effectively combat those groups.

Britain should have convinced the Republic of Ireland to cooperate. De Valera, the President, had fought the IRA himself. I believe Britain could have convinced him and his government that it was in their interest to help prevent the resurgence and rearming of the IRA. Britain should have met with the Republic's government and assured them of their commitment to protecting the rights of the Catholics in Northern Ireland, and their desire to moderate the polarization of the society. The Republic had cooperated against the IRA in the late 1950s, they may have been convinced to cooperate again. If Britain could not convince the Republic to cooperate, they could have privately threatened them economically. Economic sanctions would have been devastating for the Republic, as most of their trade was with Britain. Britain could also have threatened to try and stop their admission to the European Economic Community, and have them labeled as supporters of terrorism.

When the Cameron and Hunt commissions released their reports in September and October 1969, Britain should have used their findings to suspend Stormont. I think it is significant that those purporting to be the Catholic leadership in the fall of 1969 were willing to meet and negotiate with army officers, but not Stormont officials. By taking to the streets, erecting barricades and battling the police, the Catholic community displayed by extraordinary means they were unwilling to be governed by Stormont. When the commissions confirmed the validity of many of their grievances, Britain should have taken extraordinary action. Britain should have suspended Stormont, established a commission to redraw voting boundaries, and imposed the same election laws as used in the rest of the United Kingdom. They should then have scheduled new elections within one year. The goal of this would be to establish an effective local government that could rule by consent.

Britain should have repealed the Special Powers Act. This act was a symbol of repressive government in Catholic eyes. Its mere existence provided fuel for IRA

recruiters. It was also of little real use. Mr. Callaghan's own advisors said the only useful provision was internment. I believe that provision also was counterproductive. It suggested that Britain required extraordinary measures to keep Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, and its use would almost bring international protest. (The issue had already been embarrassingly placed in front of the European Court.)

Britain did implement police reform, and disband the "B-Specials." Their efforts to attract Catholics into the police force failed because Catholics did not want to be an instrument of Stormont, or were intimidated by the IRA. By suspending Stormont and implementing rapid reform, Britain would probably have been more successful.

Britain should have established some sort of civil rights commission empowered to hear and redress discrimination complaints. The ombudsman Stormont established was not effective because he was connected to Stormont. This commission should have been made up of qualified people from outside Northern Ireland. A few well publicized cases of discrimination being corrected by the commission would have convinced people Britain was serious about reform.

Britain should not have allowed the Orange marches, nor any other marches until after the new elections had been held. Orange marches in particular had always been a source of tension, and triggered violence throughout history. They should certainly not have been permitted during the crucial stages of the peacemaking operation. Likewise, civil rights demonstrations would also have been counterproductive during this period.

I believe these actions, if initiated before December 1969, would have addressed the immediate problems and set the conditions for Britain to address the long term problem. Many of these actions may have provoked a Protestant backlash, but I believe that could be anticipated and dealt with. Protestants could be reassured that they were still part of the United Kingdom, and still in the majority. They would still be allowed to govern

themselves. Once the newly elected government was in place and operating effectively, the army could be withdrawn.

Only once the immediate problems were under control could Britain begin to address the long term problem of polarization. To solve this, Britain would have to change the very nature of Northern Irish society. I believe they should have three goals: integration, discredit of extremists, and economic growth.

The Protestant and Catholic communities must interact peacefully. They must come to know, understand, and trust each other to break the cycle of violence. One method of forcing integration is through education. The segregated system of education in Northern Ireland should be effectively integrated. Religious instruction should be removed from the public schools, and any public support or subsidy for Catholic schools eliminated. Enforcing civil rights, and perhaps even implementing some sort of affirmative action will integrate the work place.

Both Catholic and Protestant extremists must be discredited. Organizations such as the Orange Order, IRA, and UVF foster hatred. They should be systematically attacked, and the leaders exposed to discourage membership. Religious leaders could be effective in helping with this effort.

Britain has attempted many incentives to attract business and economic growth to Northern Ireland. These have mostly failed because the internal security problem has not been solved. If the security problem were solved, these incentives would likely promote growth, reduce social tension, and reduce the economic burden Northern Ireland places on Britain.

Lessons for Future Peacemaking Operations

U.S. military doctrine asserts that "peacemaking is difficult and unusual."¹³⁵ The British experience in Northern Ireland certainly illustrates this. Anyone contemplating such an operation should approach it mindful of General Freeland's warning of the potential for being attacked by both sides. Peacemaking is a high risk operation. The U.S. should only attempt peacemaking when vital national interests are at stake. Britain's failure from 1969 to 1972 suggests several lessons for both political and military leaders planning future peacemaking operations.

Lessons for Political Leaders

Develop a Comprehensive Strategy Early

This statement seems obvious, yet applying it is very difficult. The violence a prospective peacemaker intends to stop is not the problem, merely the most visible and immediately dangerous symptom. The real challenge for the peacemaker is to properly identify the real problem behind the violent conflict, and design a strategy aimed at solving it. This strategy must deal with the immediate problems quickly, and then address the real problem. Ideally, the peacemaker would formulate this strategy prior to intervening, but the nature of the political process in a democracy makes this unrealistic. By the time the decision is made to intervene in a violent conflict, the need to quickly stop the bloodshed will probably outweigh the desire to first formulate a comprehensive strategy.

Peacemaking is not primarily a military operation. It is a political and social endeavor enabled by the initial use of military power. The military's role is to stop the violence, and provide an opportunity to apply other elements of power. It is these other elements of power that must address the real problem underlying the conflict. The

¹³⁵DOD, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, p. 5-7.

peacemaker must be ready to act quickly, as the window of opportunity provided by the military will be open only briefly. If the peacemaker does not act decisively during this window, he will become vulnerable to being forced into the conflict. Radical elements within each of the belligerents may seize the initiative if the peacemaker does not. Thus, the peacemaker must develop a comprehensive strategy early, so that he can implement it as soon as the military creates the opportunity.

Involve or Neutralize All Influential External Actors

The belligerents may have connections, moral or material, to external actors. The peacemaker must either convince these actors to support the peacemaking effort, or neutralize their influence. If the actors cooperate, the peacemaker can take advantage of whatever influence they enjoy to support the peacemaking strategy. If an external actor will not cooperate with the peacemaker, he must be prevented from interfering. This will isolate the belligerents and force them to look to the peacemaker and within themselves for the solution to their problem.

Intervene with Credible Military Force

To separate two groups fighting with each other, the peacemaker must intervene with a force large enough to deter both groups from attacking him. The force must also be large enough to provide a presence in all likely areas of conflict, and have a reserve mobile enough to react quickly to any outbreaks of violence. If the peacemaking force can not immediately quell any violent outbreaks, the belligerents will be reluctant to reduce their readiness, and will continue to arm and prepare to "defend" themselves.

Maintain Perception of Neutrality and Fairness

All belligerents must view the peacemaker as neutral and fair. This perception is the key to the peacemaker's legitimacy. The peacemaker must maintain this perception, and carefully avoid any actions which might damage it. This is particularly important for the

military, as the most visible and intrusive representative of the peacemaker. By its very presence, the military will impose on the local population and create opportunity for misunderstanding and disillusionment.

Of course, the peacemaker is not disinterested or he would not involve himself in the conflict. The peacemaker likely has some idea of the form he would like the peace to take. The peacemaker can not, however, openly side with one of the belligerents or he is no longer conducting a peacemaking operation. He must maintain the perception of neutrality, even if he actually favors one side over the other.

Maintaining the perception of fairness is most difficult. Simply operating within the law is not sufficient, as the law itself may be unfair. In fact, suspending existing law and government may be the fairest course the peacemaker can take. As with neutrality, the key is not necessarily for the peacemaker to be fair. The key is for the belligerents to view him as fair. Thus, the peacemaker must understand the thinking of the belligerents, and what each believes is fair.

Lessons for the Military Leader

U.S. military doctrine states that peacemaking requires: forces appropriate to the environment, consistent mission analysis, clear command and control relationships, effective communications facilities, joint and combined force liaison, and effective public diplomacy and PSYOP. The British experience in Northern Ireland validates all these requirements. Broaden perspective

Forces Must Be Large, Strong, and Mobile

Unlike peacekeeping, all belligerents may not have agreed to the intervention of the peacemaking force. The peacemaking force must be large and strong enough to deter all belligerents from attacking it and dragging the peacemaker into the actual conflict. Once the

fighting has been stopped, the peacemaking force must maintain a strong, visible presence in all potential flash points.

The peacemaker must also maintain a mobile reserve capable of reacting quickly to any outbreaks of violence and prevent them from escalating. If each outbreak of violence is not quickly stopped, the peacemaker will lose credibility and tensions will increase. The peacemaker must carefully plan this reserve if operating in an urban environment. Rumor, tension, and violence can spread quickly through urban streets. The peacemaker must quickly detect and react to any outbreak of violence. Mobility is particularly challenging in an urban environment, so the military planner must carefully consider how to accomplish this.

Establish Strong, Agile Command and Control

The command and control system must be agile and responsive, so that potential problems can be quickly diagnosed, and a decision made and implemented to deal with them. The system must be centralized enough so that the political and psychological impact of military operations can be carefully evaluated, and flexible enough to allow those on the scene to act quickly.

Effective Intelligence is Critical

Intelligence is crucial to most military operations. This is particularly true in peacemaking. All parties to the conflict may not be apparent, their intentions may not be clear, and new actors may emerge during the operation. Intelligence must:

- Identify and anticipate potential flash points and events.
- Identify and analyze the leadership of the belligerents and their intentions.
- Anticipate and monitor the emergence of extremists and their intentions.
- Identify and analyze the intentions of any external actors and their influence.
- Identify potential troublemakers.

- Provide feedback on the effectiveness of peacemaking operations.

Information will likely come from many different sources, and many different agencies. As the peacemaker gains the support of the civilian population, locals may provide information and anonymous tips may be received. All this information must quickly be collated and interpreted. It must also be reliably confirmed, to prevent the peacemaker from being manipulated. The peacemaker should establish a single cell to collate and interpret all incoming information, and build a reliable database. This intelligence must then be quickly disseminated to the political leadership and other agencies participating in the operation, as well as the military commanders.

Build an Effective Relationship with the Press

Legitimacy is the key to Low Intensity Conflict, and the perception of fairness and neutrality is key to the legitimacy of the peacemaker. Forming and maintain this perception must be a primary concern of the peacemaker, and the media is a powerful force in forming public perceptions. The majority of the population will likely form their opinion of the peacemaker based on events as reported in the news media. As the most visible, intrusive instrument of the peacemaking effort, the military must form an effective, open relationship with the media.

The military commander should establish procedures for keeping members of the media informed of operations, and provide safe access for the media to as wide an area as possible. Releasing prompt, accurate official statements, while useful, is not enough. In a situation that has deteriorated far enough to require peacemaking, the public will probably be reluctant to trust official statements. Any attempts to manipulate, or coerce the media would be disastrous if discovered and reported. Honest, accurate reports from independent media correspondents describing the peacemaker's good faith efforts to improve the situation will be a valuable tool in gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Those trying to

undermine the peacemaking effort will undoubtedly try to use the media to their own advantage. The military must form an effective relationship with the media to counter this and present a fair, balanced view of all events.

Integrate PSYOPS into the Operation

The military commander should develop and execute a psychological operations campaign as an integral part of the operation. This campaign should be aimed at forming and maintaining a positive perception of the peacemaker, and discrediting extremists and those trying to undermine the peacemaking effort.

Anticipate the Emergence of Extremists and Plan to Deal with Them

Extremists may try to use the presence of an outside military force to build support for their cause. They may also use the relative calm created by the peacemaker to organize and arm themselves. They may then use any action they can claim as provocation to attack the peacemaker or their opponents. The military leader should anticipate the emergence of extremists. He should focus his intelligence collection effort on identifying potential troublemakers and their intentions, and try to prevent them from gaining any support. The military should also be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations should an extremist group emerge that threatens peace.

Foster and Enforce Strict Individual and Unit Discipline

Strict discipline on the part of all members of the military peacemaking force is crucial to maintaining the perception of fairness and neutrality. A single breakdown of discipline can undo all the good will developed by the peacemaker. Even the appearance of maltreatment is devastating to the peacemaker's legitimacy. It will alienate the civilian population, and provide an opportunity extremists can exploit with their own public relations and recruiting campaign. All members of the force must be trained to act with restraint, and avoid provoking or inflaming an incident. They must know what to expect,

what their purpose is, what their authority is and how much discretion they can exercise. A polite, professional appearance and manner in the face of provocation reinforces the good intentions of the peacemaker.

Relationship to Previous Studies

This thesis is relevant to two areas of study: the conflict in Northern Ireland, and peacemaking operations.

Northern Ireland

Conor Cruise O'Brien and Bew and Patterson, among others, describe the British neglect of Northern Ireland through the 1960s. Tom Baldy, in *Battle for Ulster*, examines British strategy in Northern Ireland in the mid 1970s to early 1980s. This thesis contributes to understanding the conflict in Northern Ireland by linking these two time periods. It examines the crucial transition period, when Britain moves from largely ignoring Northern Ireland to ruling it directly. This thesis sets the conditions for the situation and British strategy Mr. Baldy examines.

Peacemaking

U.S. doctrine is very sparse on the subject of peacemaking, dedicating less than one page of the LIC manual to the subject. This thesis analyzes a case study using the broad imperatives for LIC. Based on this analysis, this thesis proposes additional guidance and requirements for successful peacemaking operations.

Suggestions for Further Research

I recommend additional research into both Northern Ireland and peacemaking operations.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement

What is British strategy in Northern Ireland since the agreement? Has the agreement helped or hindered chances for a lasting settlement in Northern Ireland?

EC Integration and Northern Ireland

Analyze the impact of European integration on Northern Ireland. Pay particular attention to the European Community movement toward federalization. What impact will that have on the conflict in Northern Ireland. Will the governments and policies of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom move so close together that the question of Irish unification becomes moot?

Peacemaking Operations

Syrian Peacemaking Experience in Lebanon

Examine the Syrian experience with peacemaking operations in Lebanon. Lebanon had degenerated into anarchy, with a myriad of armed militias controlling small areas and fighting with each other. Syria intervened with its military, and greatly reduced the violence in areas under Syrian control. Though still underway, this appears to be a successful peacemaking operation to this point. What has been the Syrian strategy, and what lessons does their experience contribute?

Military Force and Civil Rights Movements in the U.S. vs Northern Ireland

Compare and contrast the initial use of British troops in Northern Ireland with the use of troops by the United States during the conflict over civil rights in the southern states.

Both conflicts happened during the same time frame, and both were triggered by civil rights movements seeking improved conditions for a disadvantaged minority. In both cases, the higher government (Westminster and Washington) intervened with its military, with the U.S. evidently enjoying more long term success. What were the similarities and differences in these conflicts, how did the government strategies differ, and why was Washington more successful?

Doctrinal Imperatives

Evaluate the validity and adequacy of the doctrinal Imperatives for Low Intensity Conflict. Using case studies, explore whether there really five, or if legitimacy is the single goal, supported by the other four imperatives?

Summary

The British experience in Northern Ireland in 1969 to 1972 demonstrates that peacemaking is indeed "difficult and unusual."¹³⁶ Peacemaking requires a clear understanding of the problems underlying the armed conflict and the legitimacy of each actor. The peacemaker must formulate a comprehensive strategy to address the strategic problem, and execute it promptly and vigorously once the military creates the opportunity. Otherwise the temporary break in fighting achieved by inserting the military will be squandered and, as General Freeland predicted, "The soldiers may come under attack from both sides."¹³⁷

¹³⁶DOD, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, p. 5-7.

¹³⁷"Commander in Ulster," *New York Times*, 22 August 1969, p. 12.

GLOSSARY

Ascendancy: The landed aristocracy. Most members of the Ascendancy are descendants of the English landlords and members of the Church of Ireland.

B-Specials: This was a part-time reserve force used to augment the Royal Ulster Constabulary. After the Government of Ireland Act creating Northern Ireland, the British government created three reserves for the police - A, B, and C Special Reserves. The A and C Specials were short lived, but the B Specials lasted until the British Army disbanded them in late 1969. About 8,000 strong, the B Specials were armed and kept their weapons and ammunition at home. They were completely Protestant, and seen by both Protestant and Catholic communities as the Orange Order under arms.

Civil Authorities Act (Northern Ireland), 1922: Commonly called the Special Powers Act. It was renewed annually from 1922 until 1933, when Stormont made it permanent. This act could be invoked at any time by the Northern Irish Home Affairs Minister. It permitted indefinite internment without trial. It permitted the government to suspend any and all of the basic liberties - they could arrest on suspicion, search people and buildings without warrant, restrict movement, reverse the burden of proof, and dispense with the holding of inquests on any dead bodies found in Northern Ireland. Until 1968, the Act also allowed punishment by whipping for a number of lesser offences such as making menacing demands. Two additions in the late 1960s outlawed membership in "Republican clubs" and banned the IRA

newspaper *United Irishman*. The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland demanded the repeal of this act.

CS gas: A riot control agent designed to produce temporary irritating or incapacitating effects in people exposed to the gas. CS is a white solid that causes a blinding flow of tears and involuntary closing of the eyes. In heavy concentrations it irritates moist skin and the respiratory tract. CS is normally disseminated in grenades that carry the solid by smoke.

Dáil Éireann: The lower house of parliament in the Republic of Ireland.

Derry: The name of both a county and the second largest city in Northern Ireland. The city of Derry was renamed Londonderry by Protestant merchant colonists from London in the early seventeenth century. Catholics never accepted the change. In 1985, the name was officially restored to Derry. The siege of Derry during the Jacobite War made Derry a Protestant shrine. The majority of the population is Catholic. Unemployment during the 1960s was so bad 20% of men were out of work.

Direct Rule: Governing directly by the British Government. By the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Parliament in Britain and the Crown retained ultimate sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Britain has at times suspended the Northern Irish Parliament and ruled Northern Ireland "directly" from Westminster.

Éire: Ireland in Irish. The Irish Free State changed its name to Éire in 1937, and it remains the official name of the Republic of Ireland.

Fenians: Members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood; forerunners of the Irish Republican Army. The Fenians formed during the famine, and were supported by funds earned in the United States by Irish immigrants.

GAA: The Gaelic Athletic Association. This is the amateur athletic association in Ireland.

The GAA promotes and administers Irish sports (hurling and football) throughout Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Gerrymandering: The fixing of electoral boundaries to give one particular party an unfair advantage.

Home Rule: A form of limited independence, with ultimate control exercised by Britain.

The extent of the independence has varied at times.

Internment: Imprisoning suspects without trial. This policy has been used in both the Republic of Ireland in 1956, and Northern Ireland in 1956 and 1971.

IRA: Irish Republican Army.

Jacobite: Supporters of King James II in his struggle against William of Orange.

LIC: Low Intensity Conflict. This is a U.S. military doctrinal term used to describe a type of conflict. "Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. ...Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force."¹³⁸

Londonderry: See Derry.

No-go Areas: Areas in Belfast and Londonderry where police were unable to patrol because the inhabitants had put up and manned barricades to keep them out.

Oireachtas: The parliament of the Republic of Ireland. It is composed of the Dáil and the Seanad.

Orange card: The threat of violence by Protestants in Northern Ireland. This term was first used around the turn of the century when home rule for Ireland was a subject of

¹³⁸DOD, *Low Intensity Conflict*, p. 1-1.

party politics in Westminster. Politicians opposing home rule would threaten to play the "Orange card" if home rule was enacted, and thereby block any attempt.

Orangism: Following the tenets of the Orange Order. Orangism is characterized by anti-Catholicism and fundamental Protestantism.

Partition: The division of a country into two or more political units. In Ireland this occurred in 1920 with the Government of Ireland Act, which created an Irish Free State and a Northern Ireland.

Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict to maintain a truce and facilitate a diplomatic solution.¹³⁹

Peacemaking: The use of national power to stop a violent conflict and compel a lasting settlement through political and diplomatic methods.¹⁴⁰

Penal Laws: Various laws passed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries against Catholics. Their purpose was to exclude Catholics from economic and political power, and protect the privileged position of Protestant landlords. Catholic bishops were banished; the intent being that since new priests could only be ordained by bishops, Catholicism would eventually die out. Catholics were prohibited from: voting; holding public positions; teaching or opening schools; carrying arms; owning a horse worth more than £5; leasing land for more than 33 years; or buying land. Catholics that already owned land had to divide it among all the heirs upon death, ensuring the size of individual Catholic land holdings became ever smaller and smaller. The exception to this inheritance law was that if one heir was a Protestant, he could claim the entire estate.

¹³⁹Ibid, p. 4-1.

¹⁴⁰Ibid, p. 5-7.

P.I.R.A.: Provisional Irish Republican Army. A violent paramilitary group split off the Irish Republican Army in December 1969. They advocate the use of violence and terrorism to bring down the governments of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and the establishment of a single socialist state.

Plantation: In the context of Ireland, this was a system of settlements in Ireland by the British to subjugate the Irish and bring them under control. Land was confiscated from those disloyal to the Crown and provided to loyal subjects, mostly Scottish and English, who would then settle the land. The most effective of these was the Plantation of Ulster. It is the descendants of these settlers that make up the Protestant Loyalists in Northern Ireland.

Proportional Representation: An electoral system designed to give minorities a fairer representation than a "winner take all" voting system. It elects the least objectionable candidate, rather than the most popular. The most common form is that of a single transferable vote. A voter can state his first, second, and third choices of candidate. If no candidate gets more than 50% of the vote (first choice) on the first count, the last candidate is eliminated and the votes cast for him are redistributed according to the second choices on those ballots. This continues until a candidate accumulates enough votes to be elected. The candidate receiving the most first choice votes may not be the eventual winner.

R.U.C.: Royal Ulster Constabulary. The police force of Northern Ireland.

Saorstát Éireann: Irish Free State. This was the name of the present Republic of Ireland until it left the British Commonwealth in 1949.

Seanad Éireann: Senate of Ireland. The upper house of parliament in the Republic of Ireland. It represents vocational interests, and its powers and functions are similar to the House of Lords in the United Kingdom.

Sect: A sect is a group forming a distinct unit within a larger group by virtue of certain distinctions of belief or practice.¹⁴¹

Sectarian: Adhering or confined to the dogmatic limits of a sect; partisan; parochial.¹⁴²

Special Powers Act: See **Civil Authorities Act (Northern Ireland), 1922.**

Stormont: Common name for the government of Northern Ireland. Stormont Castle in Belfast is the site of the parliament of Northern Ireland.

Strategy: Strategy is the coordination of power to accomplish ends and objectives.¹⁴³

Taoiseach: The Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland.

Teachta Dála: Dáil Deputy. Member of the lower house of parliament in the Republic of Ireland.

The Pale: That area around Dublin controlled by England during the early years of the English conquest of Ireland. This area today still has the largest Protestant population in the Republic of Ireland.

The Six Counties: Phrase used for Northern Ireland by the IRA and others denying the legitimacy of Northern Ireland.

U.D.A.: Ulster Defense Association. A Protestant working-class group formed in 1969 to counter nationalist armed groups. The UDA does not claim responsibility for violent acts, and is legal.

Ulster: Traditionally one of the four provinces of Ireland; the others are Connaught, Leinster, and Munster. Ulster contained nine counties. Six of these now make up Northern Ireland, and three are part of the Republic of Ireland. Ulster is frequently used to refer to Northern Ireland, much to the irritation of Irish nationalists.

¹⁴¹William Morris, ed., *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., INC., 1975), p. 1173.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³CGSC, "Joint and Combined Environments" CGSC C500, lesson 4.

Ulster Volunteers: A Protestant paramilitary group founded in 1911 to resist Home Rule for Ireland. The Volunteers were armed with weapons smuggled from Germany, and vowed to fight Home Rule.

U.V.F.: Ulster Volunteer Force. A Protestant vigilante group formed in 1966 to suppress the civil rights movement; traces itself to the Ulster Volunteers.

Westminster: Site of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The British government is often referred to as Westminster.

APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY

- 432 St. Patrick's mission to Ireland establishes Christianity in Ireland.
- 700 Brehon Laws define the ranks of kings, nobles, and commoners, and rights and status of each in Ireland. These laws remain until the plantation of Ulster in the early 1600s.
- 1154 Henry II of England obtains a papal bull enabling him to possess Ireland as part of the crown inheritance.
- 1169-1162 Norman invasion of Ireland sealed by Strongbow coming from Wales.
Henry II declared King of Ireland.
- 1366 The Statutes of Kilkenny. Fearing the Normans are becoming too Irish, the Statutes are adopted, forbidding Normans to take on the manners, fashion, and language of the Irish. Intermarriage is declared illegal. The Statutes remain in effect for two centuries; punishment could mean confiscation of land.
- 1510-1550 The Reformation in Europe. Ireland remains Catholic.
- 1534 Rising by Silken Thomas Fitzgerald, Lord Offaly; defeated in two years by an English army of Henry VIII.
- 1553-1558 Queen Mary restores Catholicism.
- 1556 Plantation of Laois and Offaly established.
- 1560 Elizabeth I restores Protestantism.

- 1565-1567 Shane O'Neill Rising.
- 1569-1603 Desmond Rising and series of risings in Munster.
- 1586 The Munster Plantation established.
- 1588 Spanish Armada wrecked off the Irish coast.
- 1594-1603 Nine Years' War with risings of O'Donnell and O'Neill in Ulster, supported by Spanish troops landing in Kinsale.
- 1602 Irish and Spanish defeated by British at Kinsale.
- 1603 Belfast founded.
- 1603-1609 English law is extended over the whole of Ireland for the first time.
- 1607 O'Neills (most powerful Catholic clan in Ulster) flee to Europe in the "Flight of the Earls."
- 1609 Ulster Plantation established on former O'Neill lands by Scots and English.
- 1641 Peasant Rising begins in Ulster. By 1642, all Ireland except Dublin, east Ulster, and scattered garrisons, was in rebel hands. Scotland sends 10,000 soldiers to help defend the settlers.
- 1642 English Civil War between king and parliament broke out. In Ireland, the rebels, "Confederate Catholics of Ireland", establish a General Assembly and Supreme Council in Kilkenny. Confederates support King Charles.
- 1646 King Charles captured by Parliamentarians.
- 1649 King Charles is executed. Ulster Scots turn royalist, leaving only Dublin in Parliamentary control. Oliver Cromwell lands in Ireland with an army of 12,000.
- 1650 Cromwell leaves Ireland after conquering most of the east; leaves his son-in-law, Henry Ireton in command.
- 1652 Galway, the last royalist fortress, falls to Ireton.
- 1652 The Cromwellian plantation begins.

- 1658 Cromwell dies.
- 1660 Charles II restored to the throne.
- 1663 The English Cattle Act prohibits the import of Irish cattle into England.
- 1685 Charles II dies; James II, a Catholic, becomes king.
- 1688-1691 Jacobite War. Catholic King James II defeated by Protestant King William of Orange.
- 1695-1725 Penal Laws
- 1759 English Cattle Acts repealed.
- 1778 First Catholic Relief Act repeals some of the Penal Laws.
- 1779-1780 Restrictions on Irish trade removed.
- 1782 Second Catholic Relief Act.
- 1791 The United Irish movement begins in Belfast.
- 1795 Orange Order begins in Armagh.
- 1798 Rebellion of the United Irishmen, aided by French troops. Defeated by British Army under Lord Cornwallis.
- 1800 Act of Union dissolves the Irish parliament and makes Ireland part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
- 1829 Catholic emancipation.
- 1835 Orange parades produce riots in Belfast. British Army restores order.
- 1845-1850 Famine in Ireland. Estimated one million die and another million emigrate.
- 1850 Tenant League formed.
- 1892 Home Rule Bill for Ireland passed in House of Commons; vetoed by the House of Lords.
- 1914 British Army mutiny in Ulster, declaring the Army would not act against the Ulster Volunteers. British government declares Irish Home Rule Bill would be amended to temporarily exclude certain counties in Ulster.

- 1916 Easter Rising declares Provisional Republic of Ireland. Crushed by Britain.
- 1918 Sinn Féin wins majority in Ireland in UK general election.
- 1919 First Dáil Éireann convenes; declares a Republic. Britain does not recognize the Dáil; guerrilla campaign against Britain begins.
- 1920 Government of Ireland Act passed by Britain. Ireland is partitioned into Northern Ireland, and the Irish Free State, with a Council of Ireland to tie the two together. Dáil does not recognize the Act. Guerrilla campaign continues.
- 1921 Northern Ireland parliament forms. Sectarian riots across the six counties of Northern Ireland. Anglo-Irish Treaty narrowly agreed to by the Dáil de facto recognizes the substance of the Government of Ireland Act.
- 1922-1923 Irish Civil War fought between pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces. Pro-treaty forces win after de Valera calls a cease fire. The republican movement splits into Fianna Fáil (accepting the treaty) and Sinn Féin (against the treaty).
- 1922 Civil Authorities Act, often called the Special Powers Act, gives the government great power in using security forces, to include imprisoning suspects without trial.
- 1922 Northern Ireland replaces proportional representation in local elections with simple majority system.
- 1929 Northern Ireland replaces proportional representation in parliamentary elections with simple majority system.
- 1932 Irish Free State bans the IRA and begins a determined campaign to eliminate it. Only a few hard core members remain active by 1935.
- 1937 Irish Free State adopts its constitution; changes its name to Éire (Ireland); asserts claim to "the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial seas."

- 1939-1945 Éire remains neutral during World War II. IRA begins new campaign with German help. Éire crushes the IRA by 1947 to protect its neutrality.
- 1956 IRA begins campaign of raids and terrorist attacks along the border.
- 1962 IRA declares an end to its campaign, citing the failure of Sinn Féin candidates in Oct 1961 elections in the Republic. Britain grants a general amnesty.
- 1963 Last IRA prisoners held in Northern Ireland released.
- 1963 Captain Terence M. O'Neill becomes Prime Minister of Northern Ireland; begins policy of moderate reforms.
- 1964 Campaign for Social Justice founded in Northern Ireland.
- Jan 1965 Captain O'Neill and Taoiseach Seán Lemass of the Republic of Ireland meet in Belfast. This is the first meeting of the leaders of the two Irish states since partition.
- Feb 1965 Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland accepts the title Loyal Opposition in the Northern Irish Parliament. Lemass and O'Neill meet again in Dublin.
- Dec 1965 Anglo-Irish free trade agreement signed.
- Jun 1966 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) forms as a Protestant vigilante group; commits three sectarian murders.
- Nov 1966 Jack Lynch replaces Seán Lemass as Taoiseach of the Republic.
- 1967 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed, advocating civil rights for Catholics.
- 1968 IRA sells its weapons to the Free Wales Army to raise money to maintain its newspaper, *United Irishman*.
- Oct 1968 Civil rights march in Derry results in violent clashes between Protestants and Catholics for the first time during the civil rights campaign.
- 1968-69 Civil rights marches meet increasing violence.

- Mar 1969 Sabotage of public facilities begins.
- Apr 1969 British army begins guarding key facilities.
- Apr 1969 O'Neill resigns. Major James D. Chichester-Clark is elected as Prime Minister by one vote over Brian Faulkner.
- July 1969 Orange Parades in Belfast touch off two weeks of rioting between Catholics and Protestants.
- Aug 1969 Orange Parades in Derry result in open warfare between Catholics and Protestants and police. Stormont asks for and receives help from the British army on 14 August 1969. Catholics in Belfast begin erecting barricades in reaction to the violence in Derry and the mobilization of the "B-Specials." Riots break out and an entire Catholic street is razed and another 23 Catholic homes burned out before the army can intervene. Republic of Ireland mobilizes its army; calls for UN peacekeeping force. British army is given responsibility for security in Northern Ireland 19 August 1969.
- Sep 1969 British erects "peace line" in Belfast separating Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. Cameron Report published upholding civil rights leaders' claims of government discrimination and police misconduct.
- Oct 1969 Hunt Report published recommending police reform, including the elimination of the "B-Specials." Protestants react by rioting for two days in Belfast, killing a policeman and two other people.
- Nov 1969 Police reforms implementing some of the Hunt Report recommendations is announced in Stormont and Westminster. Ulster Defense Association (UDA) forms as a Protestant "counterterrorist" organization.
- Dec 1969 IRA splits into "Officials" and "Provisionals" after IRA Convention in Dublin votes to end policy of abstentionism.

- Jan 1970 Northern Ireland Attorney-General Kelly recommends ending the Special Powers Act and replacing it with one only authorizing internment with prior consent of Parliament. British Home Minister Callaghan rejects the proposal, preferring to let the old act "fall into disuse."
- Mar 1970 British Ministry of Defense sets up full scale military intelligence unit in Northern Ireland to investigate Protestant extremists.
- Apr 1970 First conflict between British troops and Irish Catholic civilians since partition broke out in Belfast after a Orange practice parade, injuring 25 soldiers. In response, General Freeland announces "get tough" policy, threatening to shoot dead anyone throwing a petrol bomb.
- May 1970 Ministers Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney are dismissed from the government of the Republic and arrested for conspiracy to import arms illegally. Blaney is discharged 2 July, and Haughey is acquitted 23 Oct.
- Jun 1970 Conservative Party unseats Labour government in Westminster in general election. Protestant extremist Ian Paisley wins a seat, and People's Democracy wins a second seat. Orange Parades result in riots and gun battles between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast. Provisional IRA for the first time actively participates, defending St. Matthew's from extremists trying to burn it in a six hour gun battle until the army arrives.
- July 1970 Stormont passes poorly worded bill requiring mandatory sentences for "disorderly behaviour." This becomes the second most repressive legislation in Northern Ireland, in Catholic eyes. It is repealed in December. Army arms raid in Falls, Belfast, results in battle between Catholic residents and British army. Chichester-Clark bans public parades for six months.
- Aug 1970 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) forms as a moderate, nationalist party under Gerald Fitt.

- Sep 1970 Britain announces Major General Vernon Erskine-Crum will replace General Freeland as GOC Northern Ireland. General Erskine-Crum reports in February 1971.
- Feb 1971 General Harry Tuzo takes over as GOC Northern Ireland after General Erskine-Crum suffers a heart attack.
- Mar 1971 Chichester-Clark resigns as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, and is replaced by Brian Faulkner. Provisional IRA begins bombing campaign. An average of two bomb explosions a day occurred until August 1971.
- Apr 1971 Orange parades again produce violence in Belfast. Several soldiers defending St. Matthew's Church from Protestants are set on fire by petrol bombs.
- Jul 1971 SDLP walks out of Stormont after their demand for an independent inquiry into two Catholic deaths is rejected. SDLP sets up an alternative Parliament in Dungiven.
- Aug 1971 Faulkner begins internment, targeting the IRA, Provisional IRA, sympathizers, and Catholic Civil Rights leaders. Violence dramatically increases. Riots break out and refugees pour into the Republic of Ireland.
- Oct 1971 Ian Paisley founds the Democratic Unionist Party.
- Jan 1972 British troops shoot dead 13 civilians in highly publicized "Bloody Sunday" incident. IRA and Provisionals both promise reprisals, and bombing campaign intensifies.
- Mar 1972 Britain suspends the Northern Ireland Parliament and imposes Direct Rule by Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, over Northern Ireland.

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