U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

THE ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM
AND LAND BASED PREPOSITIONING ALTERNATIVES

by

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A paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Operations Department.

This paper's contents reflect my own personal views and are
not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or any other
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18 April 1992

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92-20215
The Army Strategic Mobility Program and Land Based Prepositioning Alternatives (U)

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Supplementary Notation
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Subject Terms
ASMP, Deployment, Mobility, Mobilization, Prepositioning, Tomus, Sealcit, Strategic Mobility/Lift, Transportation

Abstract
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Threat and based on recent experience in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, the U.S. Army is developing a strategic mobility plan (ASMP) to provide a comprehensive program for deploying its forces from the Continental U.S. to military contingencies worldwide. The program is based on deploying a tailored corps of up to five divisions; the lead brigade to be on the ground in 4 Days and the lead division in 12. The divisions (mechanized, armor or air assault) must be deployed in 30 days and the entire corps with its Support Command in 75. To support these requirements, ASMP promotes shipbuilding and procurement programs, airlift improvements (particularly C-17), select prepositioning of one heavy brigade and theater support equipment and supplies, containerization and documentation/automation initiatives, RRF improvements, and many improvements in ports, transportation infrastructure, and reserve component structure. But the ASMP fails to address the potential of land based prepositioning. Prepositioning of divisional equipment at SPOEs, pre-planned and

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THE ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM
AND LAND BASED PREPOSITIONING ALTERNATIVES

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Threat and based on recent experience in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, the U.S. Army is developing a strategic mobility plan (ASMP) to provide a comprehensive program for deploying its forces from the Continental U.S. to military contingencies worldwide. The ASMP proposes a program to deploy a tailororable Corps of up to five divisions; the lead brigade must be on the ground in 4 days and the lead division in 12 days. Two divisions (mechanized, armored or air assault) from CONUS must be deployed in 30 days and the entire Corps with its Support Command in 75 days. To support this requirement, the ASMP promotes shipbuilding and procurement programs, airlift construction (particularly the C-17), afloat prepositioning of a heavy brigade and theater support equipment and supplies, containerization and documentation/automation initiatives, Ready Reserve Fleet improvements, and a number of improvements in ports, transportation infrastructure, and reserve component structure. But the ASMP fails to address the potentials of land based prepositioning. Prepositioning of divisional equipment at SPOEs, pre-planned and pre-documented for seaborne deployment and reconfiguring European POMCUS for deployment rather than local employment would expedite the deployment of forces by eliminating the fort-to-port phase of movement and provide a flexible responsive strategic asset for worldwide deployment and sustainment of future forces. Adding such an initiative to the SMP would make the program comprehensive and enable it more easily to meet the ambitious timelines envisioned in the program.
INTRODUCTION

An old axiom of the Army Transportation Corps goes, "Nothing happens until something moves." Recent U.S. combat experience has once again proven the validity of this saying and has clearly underscored our need to be able to deploy our forces rapidly to wherever they may be needed. Even the best trained, led and equipped forces in the world are of no value if you can't get them to the fight or if you can't get them to the fight quickly enough to be of value to the operational commander. Recent world events and the American response to them provide a confluence of challenges as well as the opportunity for the U.S. to make meaningful changes in its strategic mobility.

The replacement of the Soviet threat with ill-defined worldwide regional risks; the reduction of U.S. military strength, particularly forward-based forces (by 1995, sixteen of the Army's twenty divisions will be based in the continental United States [CONUS]); and the reduction of U.S. flagged and effectively controlled merchant ships have combined to add more problems to the already thorny Army problem of getting its forces to the fight. In response to these challenges and based on the experiences of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, the Army is developing the Army Strategic Mobility Plan (ASMP), an ambitious and comprehensive fort/depot-to-foxhole program to enhance the deployability and sustainability of its forces in any future conflict. The program addresses not only the airlift and
sealift legs of the strategic mobility triad, but it also provides a framework for improvements in CONUS rail and seaport capabilities as well as the Army watercraft program. Its handling of the prepositioning leg of the triad, however, only addresses afloat prepositioning for a heavy brigade, selected service support units and sustainment supplies sufficient to continue operations until the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) are established. The issue of land-based prepositioning in CONUS and in Europe under the POMCUS (Prepositioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) program is overlooked. A reconfiguration of POMCUS to be optimized for strategic sealift and the relocation of some POMCUS to CONUS sites at or near Sea Ports of Embarkation (SPOE) would expedite deployment of heavy division equipment in support of contingency operations, support the goals of the ASMP, provide an enhanced reconstitution and sustainment capability and possibly achieve economies over current ASMP proposals.

THE ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PLAN

In order for the Army to perform its crisis response function, the ASMP posits six tenets of power projection:

- Rapidly deployable forces
- Tailorable forces
- Early arrival of armored forces in the theater
- Phased, timely Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS)
- Sustainability of forces
- Forces with a forced entry capability (Airborne or vertical insertion)

Based on these tenets and the need to deploy forces for a major
regional contingency, the ASMP-developed Army position is that the Army must provide a tailorble corps of up to five divisions with a forcible entry capability. The lead brigade must be in the theater by C+4, the lead division by C+12, two heavy divisions from CONUS by C+30 and the full corps and its Corps Support Command (COSCOM) by C+75. Supplies sufficient to sustain the force until the establishment of the SLOC must be prepositioned afloat and properly sequenced for arrival as required.\textsuperscript{3}

A light infantry or airborne brigade is the C+4 unit which is airlifted to the theater along with elements of a Transportation Terminal Group to provide clearance and onward movement from the APODs (Aerial ports of Debarkation) and SPODs (Sea Ports of Debarkation). The balance of the light infantry/airborne division and a Corps Support Group along with a brigade of the first deploying heavy division (equipment of which is prepositioned afloat) arrive in theater by C+12. By C+30, two divisions (armored, mechanized or air assault) along with the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) arrive. Finally, by C+75, two additional divisions and the balance of the COSCOM as well as Echelons Above Corps (EAC) are deployed, the theater is in full operation and the SLOCs are established for sustainment of the force.\textsuperscript{4}

To achieve these ambitious goals, the ASMP envisions the first units for deployment arriving at the SPOE at C+2 and being fully loaded on ships by C+4 followed by a 17-day voyage to the SPOD from CONUS.\textsuperscript{5} Though the sailing time appears to be realistic, the fort-through-port timeline seems to be far too short for
the program being designed, based on recent experience from Desert Shield/Storm even though many of the deploying were not prepared or trained for sea deployments of unit equipment.

The ASMP supports the acquisition and construction of Fast Sealift Ships (FSS, also known as "surge" sealift), each capable of deploying heavy forces (the equivalent of a battalion-size task force) 8700 nautical miles in no more than 15 days port-to-port and, as a second priority, acquisition of new shipping for a theater reserve of afloat prepositioned equipment (both combat and CS/CSS), stores and supplies which would have universal utility for multiple CINCs and contingencies. The Army plans to actively participate with the U.S. Navy in the design and acquisition of surge sealift capabilities (envisioned as 20 Large Medium-Speed RORO, or LMSR, ships, with the prepositioning ships having extensive temperature/humidity control), and it intends to assure that Navy acquisition funding for strategic sealift remains separate and distinct from funding for Navy warships under a "National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF)." The Army will also work closely with Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) to increase the numbers of RORO ships in the Ready Reserve Fleet up to a total of 36, to enhance the readiness status, military utility, reliability and responsiveness of all current and future RRF ships and to position them in CONUS ports consistent with ASMP requirements. Additionally, the ASMP proposes an Army Strategic Seaport Plan to arrange for dedicated strategic seaports to support specified CONUS-based
deploying Contingency forces and to preposition dedicated ships in the appropriate ports (i.e. 2-3 FSS at Savannah, 3 FSS at Jacksonville and 2-3 FSS at Beaumont or Galveston).''

For the early deployments and for critical supplies, the ASMP strongly supports acquisition of the C-17 aircraft. The C-17, in conjunction with existing C-5 and C-141 airlifters as well as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), provides the responsive, flexible strategic mobility envisioned by the ambitious ASMP timelines. On the domestic front, the ASMP envisions major programs to expedite the flow of deployment and support from bases and depots through SPOEs:

--Construction of warehousing and enhancement of rail capability at numerous forts, depots and ammunition plants.

--Maximization of preloading/prestocking of basic loads (7 days of all classes of supplies/munitions) to achieve ASMP ready to load dates.

--Selected enhancements of military SPOE facilities including deep draft dredging, improved container facilities, rail offload facilities, maintenance shops and hardstand areas for PSA operations.

--A program of sea deployment exercises to train Contingency Forces.

--Increasing Army use of containerization for unit equipment, ammunition and supplies and improving Army management of Army-owned and leased containers. This includes procurement of 4200 new containers over the next six years.

--Procuring an additional 233 DoD heavy lift rail cars and prepositioning the resultant rail car fleet at key ASMP installation outloading facilities (i.e., 180 at Ft. Hood, 100 at Ft. Stewart, and 49 at Ft. Benning).

--Improving the CONUS fort-to-port link in deploying Army Contingency Forces. Included are improvements to outloading facilities; highway and rail networks; and port reception, staging and loadout facilities (at both APOEs and SPOEs).
--Establishing full time presence at all strategic seaports and expanding/updating existing port planning orders and facility use agreements for both CONUS and foreign seaports.

--Reorganizing reserve component units which operate strategic seaports, providing them up-to-date automation and other required equipment, and upgrading their readiness so that they can have initial capabilities at the SPOE within 24 hours of notification.

--Improving deployment procedures and continuing development and fielding of key mobility automation systems.

In addition to all of the above initiatives, the ASMP aims to update the Army watercraft Requirements Master Plan and develop a marketing and education program to explain this comprehensive program to senior leadership in both the Army and Defense community as well as congressional leadership. The program is anticipated to extend over at least the next six years and is expected to cost $2.46 billion more than currently programmed in the budget.

Few would dispute the contention that the initiatives contained in the ASMP are much needed and long overdue, particularly when they come together under the umbrella of a well thought out and coherent program. But are these changes sufficient to provide the rapid deployment that the program espouses and that the CINCs need? Are there any other concepts which could help improve the program?

SEABORNE DEPLOYMENT OF HEAVY DIVISIONS

Deploying a mechanized or armored division, with its 16,724-17073 soldiers and its equipment and supplies which take up approximately 1,320,000 square feet and weigh approximately 75,000 short tons (243,000 measurement tons), is a major under-
taking requiring careful coordination and synchronization and the concerted efforts of the whole division and numerous supporting elements to accomplish effectively. When a division is alerted for deployment, it must prepare its supplies and equipment for combat as well as for movement by highway, inland waterway and/or rail to the SPOE. It must prepare shipping plans and documentation for each link and mode of the movement as well as tentative stow plans for the ships to be loaded, and it must prepare its personnel for aerial deployment and plan the airlift necessary for them and essential airlifted equipment. It provides equipment operators and material handlers to stuff containers, load and unload equipment on railcars, drive wheeled vehicles to the SPOE and augment the Port Support Activity (PSA) for loading of ships. All of these activities are conducted simultaneously and sequentially within the subordinate commands of the division under strict schedules and significant time constraints. The administrative headquarters on the divisional installation and non deploying units, if there are either, assist in this effort. Once a unit has completed loading its equipment for sealift, the personnel usually return to their base to await airlift to the theater to meet up with their equipment and prepare for operations.

Depending on the type of division (Armored or Mechanized), the move from home station to the SPOE by rail will require 807-810 68-foot flatcars, 900-906 89-foot flatcars and 322-330 20-foot containers. The same move by highway would require 322-330
20-foot containers, 603-606 40-foot flatbed trailers with commercial tractors, 398-438 Heavy Equipment Transporters (HETs), 2784-2851 divisional self-propelled vehicles with 2347-2408 towed vehicles, creating the additional wear on the vehicles normally to be expected from an administrative road march of that distance. A combined highway and rail movement would involve some or all of the division's wheeled and towed vehicles self-deploying to the SPOE, saving railcars at the expense of the same wear and tear on organic divisional vehicles as in an all-highway move. The sealift of the division's equipment from the SPOE to the SPOD requires from 8+ FSS (Fast Sealift Ship) type to 28+ C-3/C-4 type ships, depending on ship mix.

The deployment times for divisional units during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm averaged 1-3 days preparation at home base, 1-3 days from home base to SPOE in CONUS and 1-9 days in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), 2-5 days loading in the SPOE in CONUS (2-7 days in USAREUR), and 13-24 days sailing time from CONUS (9-10 days from USAREUR) to Southwest Asia (SWA). The longer times experienced in USAREUR movements to and through the SPOEs is attributable the fact that, for the first time, these forward deployed units were required to redeploy to another theater for operations, and these forces had neither the plans nor the training and experience in conducting or supporting USAREUR unit deployments for out of sector operations. The significantly reduced sailing time from Europe to SWA, however, more than made up for these surmountable delays and underscored
the value of using Europe as a forward staging base for U.S. military operations in the Middle East.

**POMCUS AND EUROPE**

The POMCUS program in USAREUR is the Army's largest, oldest and best-developed overseas prepositioning program. Its efficient operation has proven its worth in annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercises by rapidly linking airlifted heavy division soldiers from CONUS with prepositioned equipment ready for issue in unit sets, thereby reinforcing forward-based forces in much less time than a seaborne deployment of the same force's equipment from CONUS would take. As POMCUS demonstrates the payoff potential for such forward prepositioning and should serve as a model for future such programs, it also shows the drawbacks and limitations of forward prepositioning.

POMCUS has been a capstone element of the U.S. commitment to reinforcement of NATO's Central Region since the 1950's. Before the Persian Gulf Conflict. POMCUS contained more than six heavy division sets of equipment at issue sites in temperature and humidity controlled warehouses, constructed with NATO Infrastructure funding, in western Germany and in the BENELUX. Operation Desert Shield reduced stockage in the sites to between three and four division sets, and the eventual size of the POMCUS stocks has not yet been determined.

In a heavy division deployment to USAREUR, divisions from CONUS deploy by air with individual and pre-designated (not in POMCUS storage) equipment only, leaving behind most of the
divisional operating set of equipment at home base. Upon arrival at the APOD, the division advanced parties move, usually by commercial surface transportation to the division POMCUS issue sites (usually three or four sites configured for a brigade-size unit, approximately fifty kilometers apart).2 The advanced parties draw the sets of equipment and move it to nearby assembly areas where they meet the unit main bodies of personnel and receive their basic loads of rations, fuels, ammunition and other supplies and prepare for combat. The equipped and supplied divisions then move by rail and/or highway to tactical assembly areas, usually two to three hundred kilometers away, to await tactical employment.2 The issuing process for division equipment is accomplished in a matter of hours and the entire division deployment in six days rather than the weeks required to prepare, move, stow, ship, unload, and move again required by a seaborne deployment. Indeed, forward prepositioning such as POMCUS is the fastest way to provide a CINC with heavy forces as long as the equipment is prepositioned in the right place.

In addition to being the fastest method of providing heavy divisional forces to reinforce USAREUR, POMCUS offers several other advantages which are appealing for any prepositioning option:

--It shows a strong U.S. commitment to defense of the region with less expense and visibility than forward basing of the same number of troops.2

--It provides the deploying division with a set of like-new equipment which has not undergone the rigors, wear and tear normally placed on the equipment used in routine training. The equipment left at the CONUS provides a ready source of equipment.
for mobilization of reserve cadre units, replacement equipment for the logistics pipeline or a reconstitution resource.

--It allows the host nation or Alliance to participate in the defense effort by funding the construction and upkeep of the POMCUS sites.

--It promotes internationa. goodwill and understanding by hiring host nation personnel to participate in operating the sites.""

--It provides flexibility in that CONUS based heavy divisions can be employed elsewhere, if needed, by more conventional deployment of their organic equipment without having to rely on the POMCUS stocks.

POMCUS or any forward land based prepositioning program carries with it a number of significant drawbacks:

--Planners must be reasonably sure of the likely location of future military operations. Although having a forward base in USAREUR worked to American advantage in Desert Shield by shortening the sailing time to reach SWA, a wrong decision in where to preposition equipment for a threat can be worse than having no prepositioning at all.

--To be effective, POMCUS requires a friendly host nation with a stable government; relatively well-developed aerial reception facilities and highway/rail infrastructure; issue sites relatively close to anticipated tactical employment areas yet secure enough to allow for the issuing of equipment without the threat of attack; and friendly neighboring nations who would not feel threatened by the presence of U.S. equipment in large quantities (e.g. Israel may object to prepositioning of modern U.S. equipment on the Arabian Peninsula).

--The host country or security organization would have to be consulted in regard to any deployment of POMCUS out of the country or region.

--Each POMCUS division requires two sets of equipment, one at home station which is used for training and the other stored at the overseas POMCUS site. This requirement means that each POMCUS division has twice the equipment cost of a normal heavy division. In a downsizing force structure, the equipment costs are negligible because of the excess equipment available after fully equipping the smaller force, but any future equipment modernization will require double procurement to equip both the divisions and their POMCUS stocks. This two set requirement is, however, an advantage as stated above as well as a disadvantage, as long as the Army has the funds to afford it.
The Europe of today and tomorrow is not the Europe for which POMCUS was designed. A reunited Germany and a defunct Warsaw Pact creates a situation in which prepositioning exists for a threat which, if it materializes at all against the NATO Central Front, will come with much more warning and will require forces to be employed much further to the east, perhaps in territory of the former German Democratic Republic or even in other Eastern European nations such as Poland. Today's much more likely threat to NATO is on the flanks, particularly the southern flank along the Mediterranean basin. Additionally, NATO discussion is focusing more and more on the possibility of the Alliance conducting out of sector operations should the need arise. The U.S. commitment to the Alliance, our ability to influence European security policy, a residual but significant Russian military capability and the instability in eastern Europe, however, all argue strongly for a continued forward U.S. presence in the region, and POMCUS is a relatively inexpensive way to enhance that presence. Additionally, as our Desert Storm experience has shown, USAREUR is an excellent forward staging base for deployment to operations in Africa or the Middle East. But a POMCUS along the Rhine River which issues equipment for relatively local tactical employment is ill suited for the most likely security threats of the future.

A MODEST PROPOSAL

The Army needs to reorganize and redistribute its land based prepositioning programs as part of the ASMP in order to increase
the speed with which heavy forces deploy and the responsiveness to contingencies worldwide. Land based prepositioning, not mentioned in the Draft ASMP program, still provides significant advantages in a changed defense environment in which the location of the threat is uncertain and regional contingency operations are the most likely force employment activities of the future.

The first consideration is where to preposition equipment. As stated above, USAREUR will continue to be a focus for some POMCUS sites for the foreseeable future, both for political reasons and as a forward staging base for contingency operations elsewhere. The ultimate number of division sets to remain in the POMCUS program has yet to be decided, but because of the declining threat to the Central Region it should be less than the six-plus sets previously held in POMCUS storage, perhaps no more than two or three. The balance of equipment returning from USAREUR as well as resulting from unit inactivations which are the inevitable result of downsizing the Army should first be redistributed to bring all the divisions in the active and reserve force structure up to full required levels of the most modern equipment. Remaining equipment should be used for prepositioning in division sets at SPOEs, perhaps those designated under the ASMP's Strategic Seaports Plan, under a program similar to a CONUS-based POMCUS (or "USPOMCUS"). The number of heavy division sets to be maintained in USPOMCUS should be no less than the two sets required by the first two deploying divisions envisioned by the ASMP, but could include additional sets located at west coast.
SPOEs. USPOMCUS sites could be constructed on existing military facilities at the SPOEs, additional real estate could be procured, or, least desirably, facilities could be constructed on military installations as near as possible to the designated SPOEs. Any remote location for such a site would result in significant time and resource penalties in strategic mobility.

Equipment and divisional supplies/spares stored in both USAREUR and USPOMCUS would need to be reconfigured for deployment rather than immediate issue to units. In USAREUR the equipment would be prepared, stored and pre-documented for rail/highway/inland waterway deployment to operational areas to the east or the flanks of NATO as well as contingency sealift to regional conflicts worldwide. USPOMCUS would be prepared, stored and pre-documented for sealift to contingency operations worldwide. Equipment can not be optimized for movement because such shipping configurations would produce tremendous problems of sorting out the equipment in the operational area. Unit set integrity must be maintained in any reconfiguration. Careful coordination between divisional unit commanders; military transporters, storage and documentation experts and sealifters; and representatives of MARAD and commercial carriers should result in standard storage and shipping configurations which should provide an optimal mix of rapid deployment and readiness for operation at the destination. These solutions would have to be evaluated and practiced in exercises. As forces are modernized and transportation capabilities change, shipping and storage configurations
would have to be updated.

In peacetime, the USPOMCUS site would be manned by a relatively small cadre, largely civilian, of warehousing, storage, security, transportation, documentation and port operations personnel. The site could serve dually as a Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) outport.

The USPOMCUS site would serve as the focus of a number of ASMP programs:

-- Preloaded/prestocked supplies would be stored at USPOMCUS rather than divisional bases or depots.

-- The Port enhancement program would focus on USPOMCUS sites.

-- The Army Strategic Seaport Program would collocate with USPOMCUS, achieving some efficiencies of administrative manpower.

-- Reserve component port operating units would affiliate with the port and USPOMCUS site they would operate in a contingency, thus gaining expertise and experience in their wartime mission.

-- Training exercises and programs would have a venue for conducting realistic training at the port/USPOMCUS complex.

-- Most of the container acquisitions would be stored at the USPOMCUS site, pre-stuffed and/or pre-documented for deployment.

-- Some of the rail car acquisitions could be stored at USPOMCUS sites for dispatch in times of crisis.

In a contingency operation through USPOMCUS sites, the cadre of the port/USPOMCUS site would immediately begin preparing the equipment, documentation and locally-based FSS/LMSR ships for deployment. Within 24 hours, the reserve component PSA unit and equipment operators from the deploying division(s) arrive and begin loading equipment and stores on the ships. Each ship should be loaded and ready to sail within two days or less and divisional equipment operators return to their home station to
prepare for airlift to the area of operations to meet their equipment at the SPOD. PSA, port operations and USPOMCUS personnel the begin preparation for reception, documentation and onward movement of follow-on forces and sustainment supplies. Equipment left at home station by the deploying division is handled as in a current POMCUS deployment, but the USPOMCUS site at the port provides a valuable resource to expedite the movement of this equipment.

Similarly, a USAREUR POMCUS deployment would involve the advanced party from the division moving to the POMCUS site mostly to assist in the loading of equipment for onward movement to the area of operations and for unloading the equipment at the destination.

The obvious advantage of the proposed prepositioning program is the significant time saving afforded by having the divisional equipment ready-to-load at the SPOE. Savings of 2-9 days of fort-through-port preparation could reasonably be expected. These time savings would make the ASMP time-line goals possible and may with practice be able to beat them. There are of a number of other advantages which accrue from this program:

---It creates standard loads and shipping configurations. This affords operators, commercial carriers, documentation personnel and deploying unit personnel economies and efficiencies as well as the opportunity to train and systematize the standard procedures for deployment.

---It unburdens the deploying divisions from much of the detailed planning and activity required in deploying its own equipment.

---It saves the expense and coordination involved in conducting the fort-to-port movement of the initially-deploying heavy forces. Follow-on forces requirements then become the initial
focus of the fort-to-port planning, and these can be planned under fewer time constraints and perhaps more economically.

--It provides a single focus for many of the ASMP programs.

--It saves deployment time and provides standard loads and procedure for USAREUR deployments in the NATO Central Region, the NATO flanks, and out of sector (retaining the sailing time savings of using USAREUR as a forward staging area).

--It provides the ability to respond to crisis worldwide without the liability of guessing wrong for forward land prepositioning of equipment.

--It is more economical than afloat prepositioning for the same amount of equipment.

The proposed program’s drawbacks include:

--Like any prepositioning alternative, a double issue of equipment is required.

--High construction costs for USPOMCUS warehouses and other facilities. This cost can be minimized by converting structures and facilities no longer needed in force downsizing activities in DoD.

--Scarce and expensive real estate in the vicinity of SPOEs. Again, space on existing military installations may be available to offset this disadvantage.

--Host nation or NATO infrastructure funding will not be available for construction or operation of USPOMCUS sites.

--US forward presence and commitment are not as visible as in forward prepositioning options (this can also be construed as an advantage under certain circumstances).

--It does not provide the same rapid reaction time as a properly placed forward prepositioning option would.

On balance, the reconfigured USAREUR POMCUS and USPOMCUS options provide valuable enhancements to the ASMP, make its goals and timelines realistically achievable and provide the nation with a valuable strategic asset as the focus and hub of strategic sealift.
CONCLUSION

The ASMP provides a much-needed umbrella program and structure for addressing the shortfalls, needs, and programs required for strategic mobility for the Army in a future filled with threat uncertainty, force reductions, and increasing CONUS basing. To be truly comprehensive, however, the ASMP needs to address the issues and potentials of land-based prepositioning, and an innovative approach, such as USPOMCUS and reconfigured USAREUR POMCUS, may provide significant benefits in strategic mobility and rapid response of heavy forces to worldwide contingencies.
NOTES


2. ASMP Information Briefing, p. 6.

3. ASMP Information Briefing, p. 6.

4. ASMP Information Briefing, p. 7.

5. ASMP Information Briefing, p. 15.


8. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 23.


10. ASMP Information Briefing, p. 12.

11. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 31.

12. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 31.

13. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 32.


15. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 25.

16. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 28.

17. ASMP Draft Master Plan, p. 29.


25. Glosup, p.5.


27. Glosup, p. 6.


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