





AD-A252 793



The Professional Journal of the United States Army

JULY 1991



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Professional Bulletin 100-91: MILITARY REVIEW, appears monthly in English, bimonthly in Spanish and quarterly in Portuguese. Second-class postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66048-6006, and additional entry offices. This publication presents professional information; but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. MILITARY REVIEW reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers of the Active Army, and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. MILITARY REVIEW is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, and is indexed by the PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) Bulletin. Postmaster: Send change of address information to MILITARY REVIEW, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-0910. Telephone: (316) 624-3130. For advertising and subscription information (316) 624-3130.

MILITARY REVIEW (ISSN 100-91-7)
US ISSN 0228-4148

Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Prepared by
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
VOLUME LXXI - JULY 1991 - NO 7
Professional Bulletin 100-91-7

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Seeing Both Sides: The Media and the Military

During Operation Desert Storm, the media charged often and loudly that "truth is the first casualty of war," but the specifics of the complaints were never clarified. Reporters wanted "go anywhere, see everything" privileges and grumbled that the use of media pools restricted access to an unprecedented and unconstitutional degree. Due to the shortness of the war, the recoil against the pools did not fully occur, but this one source of contention highlights the overall media-military tension that tinted coverage of the war and will affect the media-military relationship for years to come.

This conflict is natural in a democratic society, the product of the journalist's competitive urge for information and the military's abiding interest in operational security. In expressing and often overstating their positions, both sides frequently generalize the Machiavellian intent of the other, often using anecdotes rather than principle in their arguments. The bottom line is that both freedom of the press and responsibility in government are served when there is a certain degree of tension.

These new skirmishes continue to undermine this symbiotic relationship without really settling anything. If conditions are now reaching a low ebb, both institutions should, in the interest of serving the American public, renew efforts to improve them.

An underlying problem is that many Army officers, including senior officers and military public affairs officers, do not know enough about the media—how a story is put together, the elements of a good story, deadline requirements, and so on. What they don't know, they don't trust. Likewise, the media know little about the military and trust less.

In an attempt to remedy this, senior service colleges since the early 1980s have sponsored "media days." Prominent reporters, national editors, military leaders and war college students participate in group discussions aimed at bringing the two groups closer together. Former *New York Times* military reporter Richard Halloran, in the Spring 1991 issue of *Parameters*, dismisses these as a "waste of time." These sessions end in "mutual bloodletting, no one's mind changed, and more ill will when the antagonists are pulled apart," he writes.

Currently, the precommand course for brigade and battalion commanders at Fort Leavenworth includes a 1-hour block on public affairs by the Army chief of public affairs. Similar blocks are given at many branch command courses, but it may be too little too late. Halloran recommends that the real work needs to be done at officer basic and advanced courses. Some practical experience at giving interviews could be useful to an officer facing his first media interview.

Another means of fostering understanding would be to establish a "Media Chair" at staff and war colleges. Both the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College have visiting professorships in history. A similar position occupied by a working military reporter or opening a few staff or war college student slots to working journalists could be done at a small cost to both sides. The return on such an investment could be a deeper mutual understanding of operational security played within the framework of the public's "right to know."

In their indispensable role in our American democracy, the media are the link between the government and the people. The public has a right to see the performance of its soldiers, weapons and leaders. Similarly, we must understand the judgments and pressures that affect getting the Army story to the public and realize that when we speak through the media to the public, we are speaking first to our own troops.

Understanding the words "support and defend the Constitution of the United States" as it relates to freedom of the press is essential. Having the practical skill and taking every opportunity to act on this understanding are no less vital. Someday, when things have not gone as well as they did in the Gulf War, our efforts now to improve the media-military relationship may be the only thing that will allow the Army story to be told at all.

SFR

The Challenge of PEACE

**Brigadier General
James R. Harding,
US Army,
and John A. Pitts**

As the US military begins to implement the significant reductions that had been planned before its massive deployment and successful operations in Southwest Asia (SWA), the authors call for a reassessment of plans to draw down US forces in Europe. They cite 400 years of strife in Europe, instability in the Soviet Union and the successful use of Europe as a staging base for US contingency operations in SWA and North Africa as justification for maintaining significant force levels forward deployed in NATO.



ON 9 NOVEMBER 1989, as Germans prepared to observe the 51st anniversary of that quintessential symbol of totalitarian repression and terrorism, *Kristallnacht*, the world was stunned and elated as a more recent and concrete symbol of totalitarianism, the Berlin Wall, crashed to the ground—in consciousness, if not in fact. This so-called “fall of the wall,” which symbolized the collapse of monolithic communism throughout Eastern Europe, presaged the subsequent demise of the Warsaw Pact military threat. In the remaining months of 1989 and the first half of 1990, multiparty political systems and democratic governments displaced communism in every Eastern European country except Albania. This occurred while the Soviet capability for militarily reimposing its hegemony over Eastern Europe diminished amid growing internal economic chaos and nationalist independence movements that threatened the very integrity of the Soviet Union itself. A great victory had been won.

The American response to these developments was swift and predictable. Americans, long known for their reluctance to connect wartime military objectives to postwar political objectives, set an apparent course of military retrenchment from Europe. US goals in wartime have always been simply to win the war, bring “the boys” home as fast as possible and let the postwar politics take care of themselves. With the apparent end of the Cold War, defeat of the Soviet bloc threat to Western Europe and growing rapprochement between East and West, this attitude resurfaced in “peace dividend” and “end of an era” discussions. The thrust of both discussions has been that the war in Europe has been won, the primary enemy has been defeated, and there is no longer any need for a US military force presence in Europe.

Although Europe had apparently gained a new peace, the United States had not. In August 1990, a major threat to US and other Western interests emerged in Southwest Asia (SWA) when Iraq, without warning or provocation, invaded and occupied Kuwait. Though the United States had no military obligation to Ku-

wait, this aggression could not be tolerated. It undermined the stability of the region, it gave Saddam Hussein control of the Kuwaiti oil resources that were vital to the West, and the


***US goals in wartime
have always been simply to win the war, bring “the boys” home as fast as possible and let the postwar politics take care of themselves. With the apparent end of the Cold War . . . this attitude resurfaced in “peace dividend” and “end of an era” discussions.***

Iraqi aggression exposed Saudi Arabia, which has the largest known oil reserves available to the West, to Iraqi conquest.

The United States acted swiftly both militarily and diplomatically. Within several months, the United States had positioned a significant percentage of its military resources (ground, air and sea) within striking distance of Iraqi forces, obtained United Nations sanctions to use this military power and demonstrated a firm national resolve to take military action if necessary to force the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait.

The US Army in Europe, for more than a decade, had received priority for personnel and modern equipment. European-based US units, because of their modern equipment and high level of training, became primary sources of men and equipment to build up the required US forces in SWA. To this end, more than half of the US ground forces stationed in Europe, with the most modern equipment in the US military inventory, deployed from Central Europe to Saudi Arabia to provide the multinational coalition the heavy maneuver forces necessary for offensive operations.

After peaceful efforts to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait failed, in January 1991, the United States initiated a multinational military offensive against Iraq and its forces in Kuwait. The availability of trained, equipped and combat-ready maneuver forces in Europe proved to be an



Military Review USACGSC
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MILITARY REVIEW

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A strong US military presence for the foreseeable future would provide a structure of security that would reduce, if not preclude, a recurrence of old patterns. Moreover, the emerging US role as guarantor of stability in SWA, which benefits both the United States and Europe, would be enhanced by using European bases for staging forces for contingency operations in SWA.

essential ingredient in the US capability to respond in the manner required by the SWA crisis.

These developments by themselves provide compelling justification for a continued strong US military presence in Europe. But equally important to the "challenges of peace," as we address postwar missions for the nation's Armed Forces, are the emerging realities in Europe. The dynamics of European history over the past 400 years, the rapid pace of change in Europe, the destabilizing effect of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from Eastern Europe all threaten to create the power imbalances and vacua that have historically frustrated efforts to achieve genuine peace in Europe. A strong US military presence for the foreseeable future would provide a structure of security that would reduce, if not preclude, a recurrence of old patterns. Moreover, the emerging US role as guarantor of stability in SWA, which benefits both the United States and Europe, would be enhanced by using European bases for staging forces for contingency operations in SWA.

Historical Perspective

The assumption that the end of the Cold War marks the end of European conflict betrays an ignorance of the historical forces that have made Europe a seedbed of conflict for nearly four centuries. During the 327 years from 1618 to 1945, Europe was the arena for 15 major wars that consumed a total of 123 years. In that span, the periods of peace between major wars averaged 20

years. Clearly, victories in war did not eliminate enemies or enmities; they simply changed the shape and distribution of power within the international order. Repeatedly, the victors failed to meet the challenge of creating, in their postwar environment, a consensually validated structure of security that would discourage the rise of new enemies and the resurrection of old enmities. At best, postwar decisions suppressed, for a time, ancient antagonisms; at worst, they laid the basis for emerging new antagonists.

The context in which European history has unfolded over the past 1,000 years, particularly the past 400, has been shaped by events occurring on three separate, but interrelated, levels. On one level, speaking prosaically, the history of Europe has been determined by unabated sibling rivalry between the sons of Charlemagne as they sought to reestablish (or prevent the other from reestablishing) the Carolingian Empire. The Frankish custom of dividing property equally among all legitimate sons led to breaking up the Carolingian Empire and the hegemony it entailed and to basically dividing continental Europe into Western (Frankish) and Central-Eastern (Germanic) realms. Conflicts between the Frankish and Germanic descendants of Charlemagne, interrupted by brief periods of peace, have been ongoing since the 10th century and have been central to every major European war since the 17th century.

In the best of times, the two sides managed an elementary balance of power that divided Europe into spheres of influence—French and Germanic—allowing for varying periods of peace. Hallmarks were the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Concert of Europe (1815), both of which ushered in more than 40 years of peace. In the worst of times, one side or the other disrupted the balance of power and precipitated warfare through its efforts to expand its power and/or extend its own hegemony over the Continent.

This rivalry and its frequent disruption of the European balance of power contributed directly to 108 years of major power warfare from 1633 to 1945 (roughly, one year of war for every two

US forces crossing the Allier River in Germany during a REFORGER exercise.



European-based US units, because of their modern equipment and high level of training, became primary sources of men and equipment to build up the required US forces in SWA. To this end, more than half of the US ground forces stationed in Europe, with the most modern equipment in the US military inventory, deployed from Central Europe to Saudi Arabia.

years of peace). In 1633, France, with aspirations to increase its power at the expense of the Holy Roman Empire (Austria) and fearing a Swedish-Austrian agreement to end the then 15-year-old conflict, waded into the Thirty Years' War in midstream and caused it to continue for an additional 15 years. From 1688 to 1748, a continuing series of dynastic wars, pitting French and Austrian alliances against one another, resulted from French efforts to extend control into Central Europe at the expense of Austria.

In 1757, Prussian aspirations to great power status precipitated the Seven Years' War when France and Austria, both fearful of a reunified German kingdom, set aside old enmities and allied themselves against Prussia. In 1792, Austria and Prussia mounted an anti-France military alliance to stifle the French Revolution. In 1799, Napoleon, with visions of uniting continental Europe under the banner of republican France, changed the direction of the wars of the French Revolution from defending France to conquering all of Europe. In 1870 and 1914, Germany invaded France as "preemptive measures"; the former to remove French opposition to German

unification and the latter to preempt an anticipated French invasion of Germany. Adolf Hitler's invasion of France in May 1940 followed but reversed the direction of Napoleon's earlier vision to "unite" Europe under the hegemony of a single people.

While the children of Charlemagne have been the primary belligerents in the European wars of the past 400 years, they have not lacked for allies. Indeed, on a second level, modern European history has been shaped by the efforts of peripheral powers—England, Sweden, Russia and Turkey—to contain or exploit events in continental Europe. Since the late 17th century, England and Russia have been the principal peripheral powers. England's role was principally one of containment; that is, applying diplomatic influence backed by military force against the attainment of continental hegemony by a single power.

In playing this role, England involved itself as part of many alliances formed to preserve existing balances of power. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it was aligned generally against French expansionism (the War of the League of Augsburg,

the War of the Austrian Succession, the Napoleonic Wars and the diplomatic restructuring of Europe via the Concert of Europe). But England

The course of modern European history has also been influenced by . . . repressed nationalities and minor powers aspiring to gain independence from, or parity with, the great powers. The primary arena for playing out these aspirations was Eastern Europe, an ethnically diverse (Slavic, Germanic, Magyar and Turkic) region of . . . frequently contested borders.

aligned itself with France when necessary to preserve a balance of power (the War of Spanish Succession and the Seven Years' War). Since the 1850s, England's role has been primarily containing, in alliance with France, the expansionism of Germany (1871–1945) and of Russian-Soviet interests (1850s and 1945–1990).

Russia played a comparable role in the East, joining alliances to contain Prussia (the Seven Years' War), France (the Napoleonic Wars) and Germany (World Wars I and II). It also played an exploitative role by seizing control of areas of Eastern Europe during the decline of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman (Turkish) Empires (1870–1918) and again in the wake of World War II.

The course of modern European history has also been influenced by events on a third level; that is, repressed nationalities and minor powers aspiring to gain independence from, or parity with, the great powers. The primary arena for playing out these aspirations was Eastern Europe, an ethnically diverse (Slavic, Germanic, Magyar and Turkic) region of constantly shifting and frequently contested borders. Divided into more than 20 independent and constantly warring kingdoms for 800 to 1,000 years, the region came under the dominance of Austria, Turkey and Russia in the late Middle Ages and was the focus for conflict and tension among these three em-

pires from the 16th to the early 20th centuries.

Foreign domination and repression failed to stifle nationalism, the craving for independence or ancient antagonisms. While chafing against their great-power overlords, the various nationalities were as likely to fight among one another as they were to revolt against the powers repressing them. The result was a region characterized by constant instability, frequently shifting alliances, and ongoing tensions that periodically drew the major contesting powers into conflict and continuously kept them on the brink of war. Instability and tensions intensified through the 19th century as the Ottoman Empire's decline and the Austrian Empire's weakening encouraged increased assertiveness among nationalities and created a power vacuum that encouraged Russian influence to expand in the region.

The aspirations of repressed nationalities in Eastern Europe contributed directly to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 and were a primary factor in the virtually continuous warfare between the Austrian and Ottoman empires of the 17th and early 18th centuries. Nationalist unrest during the last half of the 19th century generated constant turmoil in Eastern Europe. Nationalist uprisings in 1848 rocked both the Austrian and Ottoman empires, contributing significantly to their subsequent decline. They nearly precipitated war between Austria and Russia, and attracted Russian expansionism into the region that led to the Crimean War (1853–1856). This war arrayed a British-French-Austrian Alliance against Russia.

In the last two decades of the century, waning Ottoman and Austrian influence in the region allowed some nationalities to achieve independence and opened the way for a resurgence of ancient ethnic animosities. In this context, virtually continuous Balkan warfare ensued which culminated in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. In 1914, in the most famous expression of repressed nationalism, a Serbian nationalist assassinated the Archduke of Austria. Because of the complexity and secrecy of extant treaties and diplomatic agreements, this action precipitated World War I.

Russian Cossacks attacking French forces during Napoleon's Ulm-Austerlitz Campaign, 1805.



While the children of Charlemagne have been the primary belligerents in the European wars of the past 400 years, they have not lacked for allies. Indeed, on a second level, modern European history has been shaped by the efforts of peripheral powers—England, Sweden, Russia and Turkey—to contain or exploit events in continental Europe. Since the late 17th century, England and Russia have been the principal peripheral powers.

The interplay among Franco-Germanic rivalry, peripheral power intervention in continental affairs and nationalist aspirations in Eastern Europe, which together made Europe a seedbed for conflict for 400 years, were altered by political and military decisions made in the wake of World War II. The alteration occurred because two peripheral powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, divided Europe into separate spheres of influence and imposed security structures in their respective spheres by stationing major military forces there and forming major military alliances.

Although the two powers were antagonistic to one another and, several times, went to the brink of war and though they each took radically different approaches to restructuring within their spheres of influence, they forged a balance of

power that deterred a major-power conflict in Europe for the longest period since the 16th century. Together, the separate security structures reduced the potential for conflicts by suppressing and stifling the expression of historical enmities and by forcing traditional enemies to evolve mechanisms for resolving differences peacefully and to learn to share rather than compete for power resources.

Since 1945, the United States has played England's traditional peripheral power role and has striven to keep Europe conflict free through a combination of economic, political and military influence. While the US role has been similar, in the main, to England's traditional role—namely, preserving the balance of power by containing expansionism—it has been unique in European history. It entailed direct, continuing

involvement in continental economic and political affairs and long-term stationing of external military forces in Europe. Through the former, the United States ensured the economic revitalization and political stabilization of Western Europe. Through the latter, and in conjunction with the NATO Alliance, the United

Direct Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe precluded a resurgence of Prussianism and its attendant aspiration for expanding into the East and guaranteed the political integrity (if not independence) of countries formed by the Treaty of Versailles. Soviet control stifled nationalist uprisings in the historically incendiary Balkans.

States forged a security structure for Western Europe that both deterred aggression and/or expansion by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies and precluded renewed conflict between France and Germany.

This US-engineered security structure has allowed the Western European community of nations to evolve mechanisms for economic and political cooperation and conflict resolution without war. With France and Germany freed from mutual suspicion and England freed from the need to play its historical role as arbiter of continental conflicts, the major Western European powers have directed their economies toward meeting domestic rather than defense priorities. The resulting prosperity has been the most important stabilizing factor in Western Europe and the most effective agent against revolution, anarchy and antidemocratic ideologies. Indeed, it could be argued that, in the absence of this US-orchestrated security structure, Western European nations would not have achieved economic success and a Common Market, let alone be poised on the brink of European integration.


The US presence in Western Europe has been only half of the European equation. The other

half has been the security structure imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet military presence and the Warsaw Pact Alliance. Though we may not approve of the methods used or the mechanisms employed, we must acknowledge that, in terms of conflict prevention (although certainly not in terms of political and economic developments), the Soviet presence did for Eastern Europe what the US presence did for Western Europe. Direct Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe precluded a resurgence of Prussianism and its attendant aspiration for expanding into the East and guaranteed the political integrity (if not independence) of countries formed by the Treaty of Versailles. Soviet control stifled nationalist uprisings in the historically incendiary Balkans and prohibited historical ethnic antagonisms from erupting into national conflict.

The significance of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was evident in the stabilizing influence it had on a country outside of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia. An artificial nation with no historical precedents, Yugoslavia was formed by the Treaty of Versailles through amalgamation of seven traditionally antagonistic nationalities. The fact that this entity survived and that its nationalities managed to live in peace with one another was, in no small part, due to Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces stationed across their borders. In effect, Yugoslavians of every ethnicity had to cooperate in maintaining internal unity or risk being incorporated into the Soviet orbit.

Current and Future Challenges

Lost in the peace dividends and end-of-history discussions are two uncertainties. First, it is uncertain that the forces that made Europe a seedbed of conflict for four centuries have been eliminated and not simply repressed by the weight of the Soviet and US-imposed security structures. Second, given the historical trends discussed, it is uncertain that withdrawing US forces from Europe will permit continued peace and stability. Thus, the fundamental question may not be whether we *can afford* or *want* to maintain a military presence in Europe but, rather, whether we can afford *not to*.



A 2d Armored Division tank at the junction of the US and British occupation sectors in Berlin, Potsdamer Strasse, 4 July 1945. The sign left by the sector's former occupants reads: "The Red Army is free from any feeling of race hatred. It is free of such degrading feelings because it has been educated in the spirit of equality of the rights of races and the respect of the rights of other peoples.—Stalin"

Two peripheral powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, divided Europe into separate spheres of influence and imposed security structures in their respective spheres by stationing major military forces there and forming major military alliances. Although the two powers were antagonistic to one another and, several times, went to the brink of war . . . they forged a balance of power that deterred a major-power conflict in Europe for the longest period since the 16th century.

Our response to this question may be crucial to the future of Europe, as well as of the United States, for this is not the first time we have faced these uncertainties. In 1919, in the aftermath of the "war to end all wars," we saw no further need for US involvement in Europe and rapidly removed all US troops from Europe. In the wake of World War II, we again faced these uncertainties. Though we involved ourselves in Europe's economic and political recovery, we intended to withdraw all US forces in about five years and rapidly reduced our military forces from 3 million in 1945 to 80,000 in 1948. Two years later, following the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, we embarked on a renewed build-up, raising our troop strength to 250,000 in 1952.

A continued strong US military presence in Europe is as essential to ensuring peace in the post-Cold War as it was to deterring war during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War in Eu-

rope has disrupted the balance of power and created a power vacuum in Eastern Europe. It has bestowed a political setting that is risk-filled, uncertain, and rife with the potential for civil disorders and ethnonationalistic conflicts. In the West, German reunification aggravates balance-of-power uncertainties. It portends a rebirth of German nationalism with its potential for disrupting momentum toward European integration. It may revive ancient Franco-German suspicions, as well as raising fears of German eastern expansionism into the vacuum created by the Soviet departure from Eastern Europe.

In the East, the severe economic problems and nationalist aspirations that undermined the communist governments in Eastern Europe endure and continue to plague democratic governments. The collapse of the communist political order and the withdrawal of Soviet military influence in the region eliminated the security

The UN Security Council voting to use "all necessary means" to uphold its resolutions against Iraq, 29 November 1990.

United Nations Photo



World peace and world economic stability are today linked to political stability in SWA and to unimpeded distribution of the region's oil resources. Since August 1990, the United States has assumed, with the agreement of the United Nations, a major role in guaranteeing stability in the region. . . . To fulfill this mission effectively, the United States must be able to deploy forces to the region rapidly.

structure that previously prevented economic discontent, traditional ethnic rivalries and nationalistic enmities from erupting and generating wider conflicts.

Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the prospects for disorder and conflict have steadily increased. Yugoslavia teeters on the brink of national disintegration and open conflict among the major nationalities. Czechoslovakia struggles to make permanent its new multiparty democratic system while revived Slovak nationalism and antipathy toward Czechs threaten both the endurance of the new political system and the integrity of the union itself. Romania faces the same ethnic Hungarian discontent that fueled the country's anticommunist revolution and that threatens the precarious stability of the noncommunist government. In Poland, the democratic Solidarity government faces growing public discontent after failing for more than a year to resolve the economic problems that undermined the communist government.

On the eastern periphery, the Soviet military threat has weakened substantially but has not disappeared. For nearly a year, the Soviet Union has teetered on the brink of economic collapse and political disintegration. Recent events, epit-

omized by Soviet military actions to stifle independence movements in the Baltic republics, indicate the potential for restoring hard-line, militaristic leadership—a reactionary movement that could lead to renewed Soviet interest in Eastern Europe.

This uncertain, potentially unstable environment demands a security structure that will guarantee stability while Europeans continue working toward integration, the economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe, and the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. Specifically, stability is needed as Europeans focus on creating a framework of enduring peace that has eluded them for 400 years. In the current environment, the only force capable of maintaining such a security structure—not only in Western Europe but also in Eastern Europe—is the US military force that anchors the NATO Alliance. That force, which carried out a war-deterrence mission so effectively during the Cold War, is also the only existing bulwark against resurgent Soviet militarism, if such a war.

In the past year, in addition to justification for a strong US military presence in Europe, has arisen World peace and world economic stability are today linked to political stability in SWA and

to unimpeded distribution of the region's oil resources. Since August 1990, the United States has assumed, with the agreement of the United Nations, a major role in guaranteeing stability in the region. In carrying out this role, and in assuming the primary military burden, the United States protects not only its own political and economic interests but the Europeans' as well.

To fulfill this mission effectively, the United States must be able to deploy forces to the region rapidly. Political, religious and cultural sensitivities preclude permanently stationing sizable US military forces in the region. Stationing these forces in the United States would impede timely deployment. Europe, as the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations proved, provides an ideal location for staging SWA contingency operations. Thus, a strong US military force stationed in Europe would support NATO in maintaining a war-deterrence security structure in Europe and support out-of-sector contingency operations.

Mutual Benefits

The United States is inexorably tied to Europe—economically, socially, culturally and to a significant degree, politically. While our nation has benefitted immeasurably from the manifold contributions of immigrants from many cultures, the foundations of our political, economic and legal institutions are European. We share with Europeans common languages, cultural norms and value systems.

This commonality provides a framework within which mutual advantage can be obtained from the United States and the European nations each producing and contributing, as Adam Smith said, in its area of comparative advantage. In this regard, continued US military presence in Europe will be mutually advantageous—economically, politically and militarily. US investment in the form of continued military presence in Europe will contribute to economic stability and growth on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the near term, our investment will enable the prosperous nations of Western Europe to invest in economically revitalizing and restructuring Eastern Europe, a revitalization that is crucial



The end of the Cold War in Europe has disrupted the balance of power and created a power vacuum in Eastern Europe. It has bestowed a political setting that is risk-filled, uncertain, and rife with the potential for civil disorders and ethnonationalistic conflicts. In the West, German reunification aggravates balance of power uncertainties.

in attaining political stability in that region. At the same time, it will allow the Common Market nations to focus on promoting economic growth in those Common Market countries with marginal economies and long histories of internal political turmoil (such as Spain, Greece and Ireland). In the absence of a US military presence, the Western European nations would be forced to divert substantial monetary resources toward military expenditures.

Clearly, a US investment of military force in Western Europe to enhance Eastern European development would be unacceptable without a commensurate return. The United States would derive substantial dividends from its investment in European economic growth by enhancing existing and opening new markets for its own goods and services. In the short run, US interests would gain opportunities to sell to nations investing in European economic expansion, and/or the United States could itself participate in these investments. In the long run, a healthy European economy would provide the United States expanded markets within which to compete. Conversely, economic stagnation or decline in

US military strategy is edging from a "forward-deployed" strategy to a "forward-presence" strategy, and the premise that US forces will continue to get smaller over the next 5 to 10 years grows more probable. As a global power with global interests, however, the United States needs representation on [NATO] councils, and the price of membership includes military forces.

Europe, not only would limit market expansion but also would reduce existing markets.

Continued US military presence in Europe also would contribute to European political stability by discouraging the rise of new belligerents and the resurfacing of ancient sources of antagonisms. It would abet the process of European integration by providing a mechanism for ensuring that traditional antagonisms do not lead to conflict and by reducing the potential negative impacts of German reunification. As in the past 45 years, the US-anchored security structure would preclude ancient Franco-German antagonisms resurfacing, help allay concerns about a reunified Germany and encourage continued Franco-German cooperation in attaining mutually beneficial goals. In addition, such a security structure could discourage renewed Soviet military interest in Eastern Europe, reduce Eastern European concerns about German unification and provide military security in Eastern Europe should renewed hostilities among traditionally antagonistic nationalities threaten European stability.

In short, a US military presence would ensure the United States a key role in influencing the political and diplomatic developments that will determine Europe's future stability. It would provide a capability for rapid military response to disorders that threaten to disrupt peace and stability in Eastern Europe. Finally, it would provide a "check" against the rekindling of traditional intra-European antagonisms, including the historical tendency of the Soviet "Bear" to

reawaken to the scent of opportunities in Eastern Europe.

Militarily, there are two important mutual advantages to continued US military presence in Europe. First, within the framework of the NATO Alliance, it ensures against the uncertainty of the future Soviet role. The USSR is still a major military power with tactical, theater and strategic nuclear systems. The euphoria that accompanied Mikhail S. Gorbachev's rise to power may be short-lived if he is unable to keep the reins of leadership in the Soviet Union. The Soviet military remains a highly regarded institution within the Soviet Union. It retains the capability to hold nations hostage to coercion and military threats, and this capability should not be quickly discounted within the European context.

Additionally, and also important, NATO is a pillar of the US security posture and should remain such. Within the coalition of member nations, it provides a forum for military expression and, to a degree, for political expression as well. Admittedly, US military strategy is edging from a "forward-deployed" strategy to a "forward-presence" strategy, and the premise that US forces will continue to get smaller over the next 5 to 10 years grows more probable. As a global power with global interests, however, the United States needs representation on such councils, and the price of membership includes military forces in its defense arrangements.

Second, the United States and Europe share a common interest in, and critical requirement for, unimpeded access to energy resources, the most important source and largest concentration of which is in SWA. In the past year, the United States has emerged as the world's guarantor of unimpeded access to, and equitable distribution of, these resources, and the European Community of nations has endorsed this role. US forces stationed in Europe provide an ideal platform for operations to support this consensually validated mission.

Geography and politics are the two clear advantages in launching contingency operations to the Middle East or North Africa from Europe.

Europe is closer to both areas than the United States, and Europe has a proven transportation infrastructure to move either forces in being or attendant supplies and equipment quickly to ports for shipment. Politically and geographically, access to European facilities is critical to launching any rapid contingency operation to either the Middle East or North Africa. Foremost in rapidly deploying personnel to these areas is access to airports or bases for en-route refueling and maintenance. While aerial refueling is possible, US dependence on civilian aircraft for significant personnel movements requires access to en-route facilities, and Europe lies astride most usable air routes.

The forward stationing of US military forces in Europe for these contingencies also reinforces an already strong political link between European and US interests. Logistic support to US deploying forces makes a statement of European interests and commitment, while forward basing in Europe of US contingency forces serves as a potential deterrent to mischief by others.

For the past 45 years, there has been peace, political stability, economic growth and significant prosperity in Western Europe. This success has been the single most effective weapon against communism and other antidemocratic ideologies. It can also be claimed that this success was, in large measure, responsible for the dramatic and significant political and social changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The United States can be proud of the major role it played as a peripheral power in contributing to this victory in Central Europe. A carefully

developed and well-executed security structure, backed with a US military force presence in Europe, is largely responsible for preserving the existing balance of power and containing Soviet expansionism.

Europe is poised on the brink of European integration and continued peace, but it is not there yet. The historical seeds of conflict may remain, waiting to germinate. The contributions of a peripheral power to preserve what has been earned is still needed. England can no longer play this role; it is no longer peripheral but at the heart of the European Community. Other nations, such as Japan, may have the economic power and inclination to perform this function, but they have not been "accepted." Only the United States has the military power, economic capability and political ties to carry out this role.

A new era has dawned, and it is, as pundits would say, a high-stakes game. The cost of a seat at the table is high, and the winnings, which could be substantial, are not guaranteed. Should the United States continue to play in the game or not? We chose not to play after World War I, and the costs were very high. We chose to play after World War II and continued to ante up in spite of repeated demands that we get out of the game. The payoffs of US participation were substantial—the longest period of uninterrupted peace in Europe in 400 years, the highest level of economic prosperity and sustained economic growth in the history of the Western World, and the defeat of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. A new hand is already being dealt. Can we afford *not* to buy into the game? **MR**

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Werner J. Feld

The heady optimism in Europe of early 1990 is now tempered by the serious considerations of redefining European security requirements. The issues of this issue now appear open to debate and consideration, including the future role of NATO. The author identifies major concerns, such as a unified Germany and a reduced US presence, and discusses the military, political and economic issues that are on the European agenda. He finds that NATO's role and missions will certainly change and that several European nations are interested in expanding the security responsibilities of the European Community, Western European Union and other existing political structures.

DURING the last 18 months, the nature of the European security and defense system has been in considerable flux, and these uncertainties have been further exacerbated by the problems in the Persian Gulf crisis. Although Iraq was defeated rapidly and the crisis is moving toward a settlement, there will be changes and, likely, new developments in the structures of the European security and defense policies. This article will examine and analyze these developments and policies.

While in the face of the extraordinary political and economic shifts in Eastern Europe, NATO is anxious to maintain its premier position in the Atlantic Community security framework which would enable the United States to

continue its influential role in Europe. Yet, for a number of reasons, the long-term prospects for NATO are unsure. The sharp decline in threat perception of a Soviet attack, especially on the part of the West Europeans but also as far as the Americans are concerned, has reduced the need for defensive action by NATO forces and has diminished Europe's military dependency on NATO and the United States.

Another reason is that Soviet opposition to a united Germany's NATO membership was overcome by an agreement between German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev and acknowledgment by US Secretary of State James A. Baker of the necessity to provide assurance to the Soviet leader-

ship that the security needs of the Soviet people will be safeguarded.¹ This may be done through a series of nonaggression pacts between individual East European states and NATO since the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist on 31 March 1991.²

If this were to be done, NATO's function as the active defender of Western Europe and North America would be even less justifiable. Consequently, NATO forces stationed in western Germany may be viewed as increasingly unnecessary by German federal and *Laender* authorities and be asked to withdraw eventually. This view coincides with cries about the burden of hosting US troops heard during the last few years by Germans who were anxious to see sovereignty over their country fully restored.³

There have been suggestions to give NATO new missions such as ensuring and supervising the implementation of the arms control treaties that either have been concluded (such as the Conventional Forces in Europe agreements) or may be in the process of concluding (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). Another suggestion is to assign NATO economic planning activities. While the former idea may be feasible, for NATO to move into the economic field makes little sense considering the existence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and, of course, the European Community (EC). Perhaps Strobe Talbott is correct when he says:

"The trouble is, NATO is broken, at least conceptually. Its reason for being was to deter the Soviet Union from launching an invasion through West Germany to the English Channel. With that danger diminished to the vanishing point, NATO is already undergoing its own deconstruction, more subtle, dignified and gradual than that of the Warsaw Pact, but in the long run just as relentless."⁴

However, even if Talbott's scenario should eventually be played out, this may take considerable time. The long-term impact of the Persian Gulf crisis cannot be foreseen, and dispatching 42 NATO planes to Turkey in January 1991 represents the alliance's first military involvement in the gulf crisis which may be followed by other

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NATO activities.⁵ A discussion of the impact of the Persian Gulf crisis on European developments will follow later in the article, but it seems certain that the military alliance's primary cause for existence has been diminished.

Alternatives to NATO

A possible alternative to NATO, which has been discussed widely in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union, is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as based on the Final Act of Helsinki that concluded in 1975. It deals with security and cooperation in Europe and includes most European states, as well as the United States and Canada. However, CSCE does not have the structural framework of NATO or the integrated command structure of the alliance. Nevertheless, CSCE has been, for several years, the basis of confidence-building measures among the member states. In 1986, it provided that these states notify each other of major military activities in Europe in advance and subject themselves to observation.⁶

A summit meeting of heads of government of CSCE members was held in Paris on 19 November 1990. It became a useful vehicle for organizational plans to strengthen CSCE that may enable it to meet its expanding responsibilities for security.⁷ Annual meetings of the foreign ministers of the 34 members are anticipated, and every two years, meetings of the heads of state or government will be held. The first foreign ministers' meeting will be held in Berlin in 1991 and the first summit meeting in Helsinki in 1992. A

secretariat will be established in Prague which is likely to be expanded rapidly if new missions are assigned to CSCE.

Another organ of potentially great significance for CSCE's task performance is a conflict prevention center to be located in Vienna. An office to collect election data may be established in Warsaw, and there is also the possibility of setting up a parliamentary wing that may be called the Assembly of Europe.⁶ But whether, with all of these institutional improvements, CSCE could become a viable alternative to NATO in the future is far from sure and will depend on the interests and views of the leaders and the in-

formed public in the participating countries.

Another alternative to NATO is the Western European Union (WEU) that originated from the Brussels Treaty in 1948, was mildly active in the 1950s and entered a period of inactivity from 1973 to 1985 when the members decided to reactivate the union. It contains, at present, nine members—Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries and, more recently, Spain and Portugal. Norway and Turkey have also applied for membership. The WEU, which has a modest institutional framework, has been dealing with defense matters on a limited basis for some time but would require a major expansion of operational and administrative missions to become the formulator and implementor of European security and defense policies.

There are indications that the WEU's leadership (whose current secretary-general is Willem van Eckelen, a former member of the Dutch foreign service), as well as its upper-level bureaucracy, is very interested in playing a much more significant role in the European security system. These objectives are encouraged by some of the member states of the EC, especially Great Britain and Germany. In this connection, we must bear in mind that the members of the WEU are also members of both NATO and the EC. This may be an important advantage in attempting to upgrade the WEU's operational and management capabilities.

A third, potentially powerful alternative to NATO, being discussed with increasing interest, is using the EC to build its own security and defense policy, perhaps side by side with a common EC foreign policy. Such developments would follow the prospective economic and monetary union in the EC and would add the necessary military muscle for an evolving political union.

The Single European Act

The Single European Act (SEA) offers an initial legal basis for establishing security and defense policy-making institutions which could eventually lead to creating a joint command of the member states' military establishments. The

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Security relations with France have always had the highest priority for West German governments beginning with the Franco-German Friendship Treaty signed by General Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1963. This emphasis was reflected again by a very recent statement by Kohl . . . when he referred to the great importance of the "German-French pillar" of the Federal Republic's security.

key article of the SEA is Article 30, Section 6, which reads as follows:

"(a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on questions of European Security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.

"(b) The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at the national and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies.

"(c) Nothing in this Title [III] shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security be-

tween certain High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance."¹⁰

A beginning of transnational security and defense policy coordination among EC member states was made when, in 1988, the Franco-German Council on Defense and Security was established. It now meets every six months and sometimes involves participation by the French president and the German chancellor. The preamble to the protocol setting up the council states that European unification will remain incomplete if it does not encompass security and defense.¹¹ The council's missions are to coordinate defense and disarmament policy, stimulate recurrent joint maneuvers and promote cooperative weapon production. A

secretariat in support of the council has been set up in Paris.

A practical application of the defense council's activities can be seen in the organization of a joint brigade of French and German troops in

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1988, which has a strength of 4,200 men, equally divided between two countries. Its headquarters is located near Stuttgart in southwest Germany, and it is commanded initially by a French brigadier general with a German colonel as its deputy commander. These roles are to be reversed every two years.¹² The Franco-German brigade continues to operate successfully as confirmed by a statement of the deputy chief of staff of NATO, German Lieutenant General Wolfgang Malcha, in June 1990.¹³

It should be noted that following the creation of the French-German brigade, Great Britain also seemed to be interested in working out a similar arrangement with Germany. However, no final agreement was reached although the German government may well have been willing to move ahead on such a plan. Nevertheless, security relations with France have always had the highest priority for West German governments beginning with the Franco-German Friendship Treaty signed by General Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1963. This emphasis was reflected again by a very recent statement by Kohl in an interview with *Time* magazine, when he referred to the great importance of the "German-French pillar" of the Federal Republic's security.¹⁴ This close military cooperation between the two countries

persists today as can be seen by the continued consultation between President François Mitterrand and Kohl on European security and defense issues.¹⁵

There have been suggestions in Germany advocating the creation of multinational armed forces under integrated commands beginning at division or corps level. If such ideas, which arouse memories of the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC) structures, could be realized, some of the problems facing NATO in the near future might be overcome. However, conceptualizing and implementing such forces would require the planning and implementation capabilities of NATO management.

Views in the European Parliament

When in the early 1980s the members of the European Parliament were debating the draft for a new legal basis of the EC (which eventually was approved in 1982 by a substantial majority in the Parliament but rejected by a number of EC member governments), the concept of the EC handling its own security policy was debated and supported by a number of members of the Parliament. However, the final text of the draft treaty did not contain any EC institutional competence for European security or defense policy making. Nevertheless, the interest of Parliament members in this subject matter has continued and indeed has been strengthened as threat perceptions in Europe regarding Soviet aggression have fallen substantially during the last two years.¹⁶

During the June 1990 session of the European Parliament, several resolutions on European security were introduced by various party groupings with perhaps the resolution of the center parties being the most significant as it represents the thinking and interests of the largest number of representatives. This resolution demanded that European Political Cooperation (the foreign policy coordination mechanism of the EC member states) must involve itself in all aspects of security policy, especially with regard to common positions on developments generated by



US troops check their deployment to Saudi Arabia in 1990.

When the United States responded to the invasion of Kuwait on 4 August 1990 by rushing increasingly large military forces to Saudi Arabia, the European NATO allies were informed promptly. But they were not really consulted in the sense that their opinions would, or could, have made any difference in Washington's decision. Over the decades, the issue of true consultation among the alliance partners has, on occasion, been a sore subject for West Europeans.

the CSCE. It also stipulated that a working group be established to develop a future framework for European security with the CSCE as a special consideration.

Other resolutions filed by smaller party groupings had similar thrusts as one prepared by the Rainbow Group, calling for phasing out the military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact).¹⁷ All resolutions passed on 14 June 1990 with varying majorities.¹⁸

It should be noted that the power and influence of the European Parliament are quite limited, although the passage of the SEA has provided some improvement in the Parliament's authority, especially vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers. Members of the Parliament enjoy making speeches in support of important resolutions, such as the ones mentioned above, and the speeches are televised. But full realization of the

resolutions requires extensive support by the Council of Ministers, the commission and the national governments, and perhaps most essential, they must reflect congenial public opinion in the EC member states. An examination and analysis of such opinions regarding European security and defense policy will provide further clarity.

Public Opinion

In 1987 and 1988, opinion surveys were taken in the EC member states to find out whether their populations were prepared to go farther in the construction of Europe than a "single common market," in which directions they would like the community to move and which policy areas should become the responsibility of an evolving European government. The surveys included questions on "security and defense." It is

Going Farther Than a Single Common Market? In Which Direction?*

| | Belg. | Den. | Ger. | Greece | Spain | Fz. | Ire. | Italy | Lux. | Neth. | Port. | U.K. |
|-------------------------|-------|------|------|--------|-------|-----|------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|
| External Relations | 75 | 77 | 86 | 81 | 85 | 88 | 85 | 85 | 86 | 77 | 74 | 83 |
| Third World Cooperation | 67 | 72 | 82 | 86 | 89 | 86 | 95 | 87 | 85 | 80 | 85 | 84 |
| Security and Defense | 69 | 65 | 68 | 81 | 71 | 84 | 69 | 72 | 66 | 75 | 80 | 77 |

*Percentages of those who provided an answer to the first question. Data based on Eurobarometer, No. 28, June 1988, table 10.

Figure 1

For or Against a European Government Responsible to the European Parliament?

| | Belg. | Den. | Ger. | Greece | Spain | Fz. | Ire. | Italy | Lux. | Neth. | Port. | U.K. | EC | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | 1987/1988 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For | 55 | 56 | 41 | 43 | 39 | 42 | 49 | 52 | 60 | 62 | 39 | 44 | 70 | 68 | 52 | 46 | 45 | 45 | 42 | 42 | 31 | 31 | 49 | 49 | | |
| Against | 12 | 25 | 64 | 67 | 28 | 30 | 21 | 18 | 10 | 14 | 19 | 16 | 23 | 18 | 11 | 10 | 21 | 32 | 25 | 30 | 14 | 9 | 45 | 44 | 24 | 24 |
| No Answer | 33 | 19 | 23 | 22 | 31 | 28 | 41 | 39 | 40 | 34 | 21 | 22 | 38 | 38 | 19 | 22 | 28 | 22 | 29 | 25 | 44 | 49 | 24 | 26 | 28 | 27 |

*Percentages. Source: Eurobarometer, No. 28, June 1988, table A-16.

Figure 2

Policy Areas That Should Become the Responsibility of a European Government?

| | Belg. | Den. | Ger. | Greece | Spain | Fz. | Ire. | Italy | Lux. | Neth. | Port. | U.K. |
|-------------------------|-------|------|------|--------|-------|-----|------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|
| External Relations | 49 | 50 | 58 | 33 | 39 | 42 | 36 | 37 | 51 | 48 | 24 | 53 |
| Third World Cooperation | 40 | 48 | 51 | 37 | 52 | 37 | 43 | 34 | 45 | 48 | 39 | 50 |
| Security and Defense | 60 | 69 | 57 | 49 | 58 | 72 | 50 | 53 | 60 | 54 | 40 | 64 |

*Percentages of those who provided an answer to the first question. Data based on Eurobarometer, No. 28, December 1987, table 12.

Figure 3

A Responsible European Government—A Sociopolitical Profile by Those in Favor

| | Sex | | Age | | | Education | | | Value Orientation | | | Political Self-Placement | | | EC |
|-------------------------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-----------|-------|-----|-------------------|-------|------------|--------------------------|--------|-------|----|
| | Men | Women | -24 | 25-55 | 56+ | -15 | 16-19 | 20+ | Mat.* | Mixed | Post-Mat.* | Left | Center | Right | |
| In Favor Generally | 52 | 45 | 49 | 51 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 53 | 47 | 50 | 53 | 56 | 49 | 45 | 49 |
| External Relations | 44 | 44 | 47 | 44 | 43 | 38 | 46 | 53 | 38 | 44 | 59 | 46 | 43 | 46 | 44 |
| Third World Cooperation | 44 | 41 | 41 | 44 | 41 | 39 | 42 | 51 | 37 | 41 | 55 | 46 | 39 | 42 | 42 |
| Security and Defense | 59 | 60 | 53 | 58 | 67 | 60 | 61 | 56 | 61 | 63 | 45 | 55 | 60 | 59 | 60 |

*Materialists. Excerpted from Eurobarometer, No. 28, December 1987, table A-11.

Figure 4

most interesting that, among the respondents who wanted to see the EC move beyond the single market, a strong minority of 48 percent in the EC and a majority in all member states, except Greece and Portugal, felt these activities should indeed be included in the functions of the EC institutions. In Ireland, which is neither a NATO nor WEU member, 50 percent favored this option. (For details, see figures 1 through 3.)

Breaking down the overall EC data by sociopolitical factors shows that few differences exist in the support for shifting European security and defense policies to the management of the community when analyzed on the basis of sex, age, education, incomes, opinion leadership, value orientation and political self-placement. Older

respondents favor this option more and those with a higher education somewhat less (fig. 4).

As for value orientations, it appears the "post-materialists" are least in favor of this option, although this may not suggest a stronger support of either NATO or the WEU. With respect to political self-placement, it is the center that is most strongly in favor of a "European" security and defense policy.

Another survey conducted in 1989 seeks to determine attitudes in the EC member states, first, about the current need for strong national defense and the level of confidence in NATO decisions, and second, whether in the future the EC should make decisions about the security of Western Europe or whether NATO should con-

Need for Strong National Defense and Confidence in NATO Decisions




Figure 5

tinue to be the most important forum for making such decisions. As for the need of the member states to have a strong national defense, opinions are split, but overall for the community, 65 percent of the respondents consider such defense necessary. In Greece, 90 percent feel this way; in Britain, 80 percent; in France, 73 percent; and Ireland, 40 percent. In Belgium, 54 percent consider national defense unnecessary, with only 43 percent taking the opposite position, while in the Netherlands, the views are equally divided. Luxembourg, for understandable reasons, was not surveyed (fig. 5).

With respect to NATO, we should first state that 54 percent of all interviewed in the EC have a favorable opinion. But there is considerable divergence between EC member states. Above the average are Great Britain (69 percent), Denmark (68 percent), the Netherlands (65 percent), Germany (61 percent) and Italy (56 percent). The least positive are Spain (33 percent), Greece (39 percent), Portugal (42 percent), France and Ireland (45 percent each).¹⁹

With respect to confidence that decisions made by NATO will be in the best interest of their countries, we find a positive response by less than half of the EC public (46 percent). However, different EC member states vary in their replies to this question. The northern countries show more confidence—Great Britain, 61 percent; Denmark, 59 percent; Germany, 53 percent; and the Netherlands, 49 percent. The other countries are below the EC average, especially Greece with only 22 percent. Not surprisingly, France is also below the EC average with 42 percent expressing confidence in NATO decisions, but it should be noted that 31 percent of the French respondents were unable to give any response. Indeed, one EC respondent out of five did not answer this question.

The next question, dealing with which organization should make the decisions about Western Europe's security in the future, obviously has crucial implications reaching far beyond the Continent. Responses reveal that 36 percent of the public in the member states wants this

Western European Security—NATO or EC?




Figure 6

decision to be made by the EC, while 30 percent wants NATO to continue to be the forum for such decisions (fig. 6). The figures are the result of clear-cut EC preferences in Greece, Spain, France, Ireland and Italy. Again, we note a North-South split with large preferences for NATO shown in Denmark, Germany and Great Britain. Also, in some countries, there were high percentages of "no reply." Portugal led this field with 40 percent, followed by smaller percentages in France and Ireland.²⁰ The total of "no reply" was 19 percent. It should also be mentioned that 5 percent of the responses went to the WEU, 8 percent to other organizations and 7 percent of the respondents simply said "We should make our own decisions."²¹

Impact of the Persian Gulf Crisis

When the United States responded to the invasion of Kuwait on 4 August 1990 by rushing increasingly large military forces to Saudi Arabia, the European NATO allies were informed promptly. But they were not really consulted in

European public opinion was strongly supportive of the US effort in the Persian Gulf, especially in Great Britain, Germany and France (80, 70 and 73 percent). However, when it came to reasons to justify stationing forces in the gulf region, there were significant differences among the three countries.

the sense that their opinions would, or could, have made any difference in Washington's decision. Over the decades, the issue of true consultation among the alliance partners has, on occasion, been a sore subject for West Europeans and has created, in their minds, feelings of undue dependency on the United States. However, with President George Bush having been on the phone frequently with European leaders regarding the crisis and soliciting successfully their military support, wherever possible, no negative effects on US-West European relations are

German and Dutch officers at
a 1st Netherlands Corps field
training exercise, September 1988

Michael Jorchtel

Expanded Eurogroup activities within NATO, the possibility of a European general becoming supreme commander, forthcoming changes in NATO's nuclear strategies, the reduction, as well as redeployment, of US forces in Germany, plus a possible new multinational character of NATO's troops may satisfy much of the EC public's desire to have its own coordinated military defense system.

apparent, although some subtle "cracks" seem to be emerging.²²

As for public opinion, it is interesting to note that support for greater EC involvement in its security and defense was strengthened. In October 1990, 61 percent of EC citizens stated that a common defense system was necessary for the community, 29 percent expressed a contrary view, and 10 percent did not know. As to the impact of the crisis on the progress toward political union, 33 percent of the respondents believed it had enhanced this progress, 25 percent thought it had become more difficult, and 32 percent did not attribute any difference.

In sum, more people believe the crisis has been helpful than believe it has been a hindrance to the movement toward political union.²³ At the same time, European public opinion was strongly supportive of the US effort in the Persian Gulf, especially in Great Britain, Germany and France (80, 70 and 73 percent). However, when it came to reasons to justify stationing forces in the gulf region, there were significant differences among the three countries. In Britain and France, restoring Kuwait's independence evoked 57- and 48-percent positive responses but, in Germany, only 38 percent.²⁴

The Next Steps

A congenial public opinion favoring the construction of European security and defense policies is an important factor in strengthening similar efforts in the European Parliament, especially since these public opinion data reflect a change away from NATO support (as expressed in a 1982 survey taken in selected EC member states). Even so, powerful initiatives by the commission, the Council of Ministers and the members of governments would be required, as mentioned earlier, to establish the necessary institutional framework within the EC to formulate and implement appropriate policies.²⁵ A first step has been to convene two intergovernmental conferences at the end of 1990, dealing with the modalities of economic and monetary union and the concepts of political union in Rome. In the latter conference, the EC leadership decided to combine the consideration of security and defense policy with that of a common foreign policy; external relations for the community have the advantage of already having institutional facilities in Directorates General I and VIII of the EC.

It is difficult to judge at this time how strongly individual EC member governments would push

toward establishing a European security defense policy facility. Kohl has repeatedly expressed his strong support for continuing NATO, and the British government is clearly in favor of a continued NATO membership.²⁶ The attitudes of these two leaders are also matched by public opinion in their own countries, as seen in figure

German unification will entail some obligations as has become clear in the Kohl-Gorbachev agreement in July 1990 on a united Germany in NATO. These obligations include ceilings on German military forces, reaffirming existing German pledges not to acquire nuclear weapons and recognizing Germany's western frontiers with Poland.

6. Moreover, expanded Eurogroup activities within NATO, the possibility of a European general becoming supreme commander, forthcoming changes in NATO's nuclear strategies, the reduction, as well as redeployment, of US forces in Germany, plus a possible new multinational character of NATO's troops may satisfy much of the EC public's desire to have its own coordinated military defense system.²⁷ Nevertheless, for Kohl, the EC's goal of establishing joint foreign and security policies is seen as a "decisive turning point" in security policy and a "special achievement," but at the same time, his foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, states that NATO was "indispensable."²⁸ Hence, the situation remains confused.

If eventually the leadership of the EC were to move forward on formulating and implementing a European security and defense policy system, the United States most likely would oppose such a development. The main reason would be that withdrawing US forces from Europe would greatly diminish US influence on the Continent both politically and economically. Therefore, a major US policy goal is retaining NATO, and for this purpose, Washington is prepared for major changes in NATO's missions. Of course, the

outcome of all of these developments cannot be foreseen at this time. Indeed, the full evolution and extent of the extraordinary changes in Europe at large may not be clear for several years. Meanwhile, German unification will entail some obligations as has become clear in the Kohl-Gorbachev agreement in July 1990 on a united Germany in NATO. These obligations include ceilings on German military forces, reaffirming existing German pledges not to acquire nuclear weapons and recognizing Germany's western frontiers with Poland.

On the other hand, CSCE, when further institutionalized, may offer opportunities for the United States to play a significant political, and perhaps military, role in this expanding organization and, through it, in all of Europe. As Karsten Voight, a German and chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, points out, the long-term goal is a European security treaty among all CSCE participant states. In it, the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union will play important roles and act as guarantors by placing military forces at Europe's disposal.²⁹ Perhaps even Great Britain and France could offer their nuclear deterrents to such an enterprise.

Taking into account the various possibilities that present themselves for the future security and defense of Europe and looking forward to perhaps five years from now, some very tentative conclusions can be drawn. The viability of NATO will suffer as long as the Soviet threat continues to diminish. However, while the disintegration of Soviet governmental and political structures and the difficulties of the Soviet economy may contribute to this outcome, a return to Soviet dictatorship would raise danger flags, especially considering the large existing Soviet arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. NATO's involvement in the gulf crisis, through dispatching European planes to Turkey in January 1991, may strengthen the alliance's staying power temporarily, but it does not guarantee its long-term future.

A united Germany will continue to build its economic and political power. It will not long

Withdrawing US forces from Europe would greatly diminish US influence on the Continent both politically and economically. Therefore, a major US policy goal is retaining NATO, and for this purpose, Washington is prepared for major changes in NATO's missions.

want to be singled out as being limited in its sovereignty both in terms of the nature of its weapons (for its own armed forces) and in stationing foreign troops on its soil—unless such actions are founded on a contractual, and perhaps, mutual basis.

For the EC to be considered as the basis of a security and defense policy structure, it would require institutional expansion beyond the competencies existing now in the EC to coordinate the current national military establishments in the member states and increase the interoperability of weapon systems. All of this would greatly depend on the progress made toward po-

litical union; indeed, such progress could be accelerated through acquiring "military muscle" that would make political integration desirable. In the meantime, some thought is being given to eventually integrating the WEU into the EC framework while, during the interim, having the WEU serve as a conduit between NATO and the community.

An EC security and defense structure could possibly offer a welcome symbiosis to and enhancement of CSCE. It would thereby aid in strengthening Pan-European relations and peace with favorable global implications.

The United States has significant interests for retaining substantial influences on the European continent, and it matters to Americans how Europe organizes itself. However, the European idea is also very powerful and will persist. Although Germany, at present, is anxious to foster the closest relations with the United States, the German leadership in the years to come is likely to focus its most pertinent national concerns on Pan-Europe and the globe. *MR*

NOTES


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14. *Time* (25 June 1990):26.
15. Interview of the author with officials at the Franco-German Council on Defense and Security in Paris, France, 9 October 1990. See also German Information Service, *The Week in Germany* (14 December 1990).
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27. *The European Role in NATO-Eurogroup* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1988); and *New York Times*, 3 July 1990.
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Building a NATO Corps

Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr., US Army,
and Major Alan T. Carver, US Army

As force reductions in Europe become a reality, significant changes will be forthcoming in NATO's operational plans and structures. The authors see the single-nation corps as a luxury that cannot be retained. They offer several insights into effectively forming, training and employing a multinational corps based on extensive VII Corps experience in multinational operations.



During World War II, the US Army employed the corps as a strictly tactical headquarters. The field army provided the necessary administrative and logistic support for the subordinate divisions. This gave the field army the flexibility to rapidly concentrate the combat power. . . . In the early stages of the Battle of the Bulge . . . VII Corps headquarters [was] quickly extracted from combat, assigned new divisions and placed in a reinforcing position.

situation developed. General Pierre-Joseph de Bourcet's treatise, *Principes de la guerre de montagne*, also recommended subdividing armies deployed in mountainous terrain into "divisions" to move dispersed, concentrating to fight. These theories provided the outline for a unique solution to the problems facing the new French armies that ultimately introduced an entirely new genre of operational maneuver to Europe.⁷

Multiple columns divided the logistic burden between several routes of march and increased the operational flexibility of the larger formation. To reduce the risk to any division of the army, careful march planning kept separated columns within supporting distance. Separations, from a few hours to as much as a full day at a forced march, generally provided adequate protection. By merely delaying its own defeat, a column that stumbled on a larger, undispersed enemy force could expect a steady progression of reinforcements as the battle evolved.

When the French combined arms division proved too small for the required degree of semi-independent action, the larger corps d'armée replaced it as the basic operational building block. Under Napoleon, corps varied in size to suit the mission, available forces and the appraised skill of each corps commander. The corps structure merged cavalry, artillery, engineers and logistic support with the assigned number of divisions to forge the link between tactics and operations.

At the army level, reserves of infantry, cavalry and artillery completed the makeup of the imperial *Grande Armée*.

"Each corps d'armée was a self-contained combat team, or miniature army, with its own staff. It could fight alone against superior numbers for up to 36 hours, and was able to march semi-independently thereby increasing the overall speed of movement. The corps d'armée's flexible organization could be expanded or contracted and therefore confused enemy intelligence. A series of semi-independent corps in a strategic web could cover a vast area at the start of a campaign, but could rapidly concentrate on a single point when battle loomed."⁸

As Napoleon demonstrated, an expert commander could disperse the corps of the army in a wide net or web to locate and fix the opposing army. Once fixed, the more distant corps received instructions to march to the sound of battle, falling on the enemy's identified flanks and rear. In a more defensive configuration, one or several corps could delay one wing of the enemy army in an economy-of-force effort while the bulk of the *Grande Armée* defeated another. Using interior lines secured by either central position or superior mobility, the French army would then mass for battle against the remaining enemy forces, by then denied reinforcement.

Preceded by a peacetime training program that standardized tactical and operational procedures in the imperial French army, the corps system proved itself during the Ulm-Austerlitz Campaign in 1805 and the Jena-Auerstedt Campaign in 1806. Opponents stung by defeat at the hands of the French and spectators equally awed by Napoleon's record of successes adopted the basic pattern. Its use in modern armies today proves its continued conceptual value.

During World War II, the US Army employed the corps as a strictly tactical headquarters. The field army provided the necessary administrative and logistic support for the subordinate divisions. This gave the field army the flexibility to rapidly shift divisions from one corps to another and allowed it to rapidly concentrate the combat power needed on the mobile, mechanized

Napoleon directing the movement of his army.



As Napoleon demonstrated, an expert commander could disperse the corps of the army in a wide net or web to locate and fix the opposing army. Once fixed, the more distant corps received instructions to march to the sound of battle, falling on the enemy's identified flanks and rear.

battlefield. In the early stages of the Battle of the Bulge, for example, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery directed VII Corps headquarters, detached from combat, to move northward to be placed in a key position on the flank of the widening penetration.

This sort of agility was essential then and is no less necessary today. Even so, US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-15, *Corps Operations*, notes a significant evolution:

"Today's corps" . . . is no longer simply a tactical headquarters. It is now responsible for providing administrative and logistic support for its subordinate units. The additional responsibilities provided the corps with more control over the allocation of combat service support (CSS) but it also poses a challenge to commanders and staffs at division, corps, and echelons above corps. The logical link between the divisions and the corps support command must be considered and the implications weighed before a division is shifted to another corps.

Still, the operations of most of the corps units of its earlier pattern. It is a combined

tactical unit with sufficient supporting elements to provide for semi-independent movement and combat as part of a larger operation. The corps is the last of a number of echelons of command, with the maximum available forces. During operations, the headquarters should control, coordinate, and support a flexible array of subordinate units. The corps should receive its battle plan from the field army or army group commander, intent and the overall campaign plan. The corps headquarters can expect to conduct combat operations in the form of divisions, brigades, and battalions. It is responsible for the containment, elimination, and recovery of the enemy.

Why Multinational Corps?

The concept of a system of regional single-nation corps under multinational army groups is well known. US doctrine describes the approach as the most flexible option. It is a concept that is being tested by the corps boundaries of the US Army's 11th Airborne Army, 11th Airborne Corps, and 11th Airborne Division, and the 11th Airborne Corps, 11th Airborne Division, and 11th Airborne Division.



A British Scorpion light tank during a reconnaissance patrol in Germany

Conventional wisdom suggests that corps boundaries can and should somehow isolate allied formations from the uncomfortable strain of multinational operations and the heaviest demands of genuine interoperability whenever possible. . . . Significant conventional force reductions in Europe guarantee an evolution away from . . . the Central Region's "layer cake" array of corps defensive sectors.

national corps on a battlefield with reduced troop-to-space ratios.¹³ During its peacetime exercises, VII Corps planners routinely address the problems of frontages exceeding doctrinal norms and the difficulties associated with major multinational reinforcements. At echelons below corps, VII Corps divisions and brigades have an equivalent base of experience with cross-corps and cross-division attachments. During many NATO exercises, VII Corps units sharpen their teeth on the complexities of working with non-US subordinate units and higher headquarters. Perhaps the most recent and productive sources of insight were the annual REFORGER exercises conducted in late 1988 and early 1990.

During REFORGER 90, the 72d Field Artillery Brigade acted as force field artillery headquarters to the 12th (GE) Panzer Division, al-

ready task-organized as a multinational division. With the 36th (GE) *Panzer*grenadier Brigade and the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) defending in sector and reinforced with a US intelligence task force formed from corps assets, 12th Panzer confronted challenges in interoperability at every turn.

During the first week of CENTURION SHIELD (REFORGER 90), 12th Panzer supported the primary VII Corps deception effort in its sector. The dedicated deception forces included the 56th Field Artillery camouflage and deception platoon, the 3d Infantry Division deception element and a reinforced infantry company from 10th Mountain Division. Late in the same week, 12th Panzer Division contributed its German brigade to an extremely successful and decisive coordinated attack across the Danube River into the 1st Armored Division sector.

VII Corps exchanges permanent liaison offices with several allied formations. These offices facilitate war planning and support participation in a unique number and variety of multinational exercises. . . . FSOPs and other interoperability documents are updated constantly to ensure understanding, predictable responses and a common approach to combat situations.

While a good liaison team can smooth command and control, a permanent or semipermanent multinational planning cell at corps level is better insurance that corps operations are rapidly integrated and fully synchronized. . . . [This] cell can anticipate difficulties and provide a "multilingual pool of spokesmen" for the corps commander's intent.

During the second week of the same exercise, the 12th Panzer attack, initially assigned to an economy of force effort, made the greatest progress crossing on the Lech River and pushing the US and German battalions across to secure the bridgehead. Once across, 12th Panzer skillfully defended its gains against repeated attacks by the 24th Armored Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and still managed to contain an isolated 24th (GE) Panzer Brigade far to the south. Eventually, VII Corps committed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment under the command and control of the German division to ensure tactical success in the sector.

Aggressively integrating division operations with corps operations was instrumental in achieving the weight of fires VII Corps poured down on units of the 12th Panzer penetration in the tight sector around the Donauwörth crossings. The tactical superiority of the V Corps opposing forces committed against 12th Panzer were evident in the respect the division earned as a multinational formation.

Similar experiences in REFORGER 88 proved that identifying US assets in support did not guarantee the supported division was American. The appearance of a Leopard or assault tank battalion could mean the command was of either a German or US division. In REFORGER 88, Canadian forces cultivated the multinational character of VII Corps staff. In both REFORGER exercises, French long range reconnaissance augmented existing assets. The two REFORGER experiences together demonstrate the fallacy behind any notion that multinational operations include limited tactical flexibility.

On a smaller scale, divisions assigned to VII Corps participate actively in multinational exercises involving US, German and French formations. VII Corps also practices employing man home defense regiments as tactical forces against rear area threats. A recently completed series of deep attack training exercises involves allied units in planning and execution. One objective of the program is to determine and evaluate the communications and data links required for a multinational solution to deep attack requirements. With the easing of East-West tensions, VII Corps expects future exercises will continue to break new ground, test more radical concepts and exercise greater flexibility under a wider range of employment options.

Due to the scope of its non-US relationships, VII Corps exchanges permanent liaison offices with several allied formations. These offices facilitate war planning and support participation in a unique number and variety of multinational exercises. Tactical seminars, study days, staff college visits and terrain walks enhance the exchange of ideas and address a host of identified challenges.

Field standing operating procedures (FSOPs) and other interoperability documents are updated constantly to ensure understanding, predictable responses and a common approach to combat situations. In 1980, VII Corps wrote Part 3, "Corps Control of an Allied Division," for the six-part *Central Army Group (CENTAG)*



An M109 crew operating a self-propelled howitzer. The crew is visible in the open-topped vehicle. The image is high-contrast and grainy.

Decades of peacetime war planning around fixed sectors of terrain have also promoted a habitual relationship with a fixed collection of subordinate units. This tends to reduce even further the flexible mind-set so central to the corps concept. It is time to escape the mental time capsules in tactical thinking promoted by long years in the same corps footprints.

...volved must precisely define all command relationships and identify communications requirements and shortfalls. Differences in doctrine, equipment, and communication capabilities are demanding liaison. Liaison officers at all levels quickly learn to appreciate differences in doctrine, map symbols, graphics, equipment capabilities, movement norms and planning cycles. During the learning process, liaison officers and noncommissioned officers spell the difference between the two headquarters. Members of the liaison team are highly qualified functional area experts with driving, proactive personalities. There is no substitute for long-term familiarity with the two headquarters they serve. Access to rapid, reliable, redundant communication systems completes the package.

While a good liaison team can smooth command and control, a permanent or semipermanent liaison planning cell at corps level is a much better insurance that corps operations are fully integrated and fully synchronized.

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If the corps can plan in a 72- to 96-hour cycle and strictly enforce the "one-third, two-thirds rule," lower echelons have sufficient time to forge multinational teams. Unfortunately, a fluid situation often forces a shorter planning cycle unsuited to forming multinational divisions and brigades.

strain was... detailed cooperation...

Against... planned plan...

The... units... fy... und... ch... of... fic... la... ne... flow... que... m... S... between... do... spe... po... com... man... com... light... ba... em... On... pos...

... challenges... limited... it's... and procedures...



Gazelle HOT launch during a French live-fire exercise.

The more defensive army aviation orientation held by our European allies contrasts with the US deep battle employment of massed attack helicopters. Procedures for integrated multinational attack helicopter operations can merge the two doctrinal approaches, but the procedures must be worked out and rehearsed well before the operation.

threat data bases, communications and analysis doctrine can disrupt the continuity of the threat picture between adjacent units and from higher headquarters to subordinate headquarters and back.

During REFORGER 90, the intelligence task force provided the 12th Panzer Division was vital to an integrated and effective exchange of information. The decision to form the task force demonstrates adhering to the principle that non-US subordinate units must receive the equivalent support provided to US units whenever possible. Implementing this principle is neither easy nor cheap. The price includes equipment systems, data links, technically skilled personnel and liaison parties. Again, bilingual personnel are invaluable assets.

CSS is another source of tension in multinational operations. Tasked to sustain highly fluid operations and a variable force structure, VII Corps logisticians need extensive and regular multinational peacetime train-up sessions to ensure adequate support for the major subordinate

commands. Peacetime training must accommodate the full exercise of wartime and emergency mutual support capabilities and procedures and support "slices" must offset the more alien CSS assets common in allied formations.

Decontamination support and unit reassignment operations still leave many questions unanswered, but movements and base change capability in VII Corps have improved with practice and with the opportunity to consider differences in doctrine and capabilities. Rear operations and the web of host nation support, as a whole, have become a more coordinated effort between defense forces and other host nation support agencies.

Since allied units arrive in the corps with a host of unique needs, dismissing the problem with the catch phrase, "logistics a national responsibility," poorly serves the needs of a multinational corps. Relegating logistics to national responsibility will clearly not survive wartime demands and will too easily create animosities between allied formations when a cooperative effort is critical. Key CSS personnel with multinational units and headquarters must have minimum retainability and minimal language skills including technical vocabulary before assignment. Even medical treatment units have identified language proficiency as a critical skill, and all CSS units benefit from cross-training exercises.

Training for Multinational Operations

The crux of multinational operations is solid staff work, translated into timely, concise orders, passed by a reliable, redundant web of communications systems and liaison teams. Error problems left unresolved at the headquarters inevitably translate into trouble in the trenches. Consequently, the command post is the obvious focal point for training to meet the challenges involved. Fortunately, modern computer simulations offer an economical method to train commanders and staff, using simulations to resolve the outcome of battles and engagements without employing large troop formations on

the ground.

REBORGER 90 demonstrated that training corps and division headquarters was possible without major logistic, computer, language and crew differences. Training tasks were broken down into smaller, more manageable and achievable tasks. Substrategies for the task were developed and the tasks were performed in a long, arduous march through heavily populated areas. Personnel and equipment requirements for units were met, and the overall performance was excellent.

Although the economics in terms of dollars, equipment wear and tear, host nation good will, time and personnel are conspicuous, there are many advantages to computerized operations. The difference between what is known at the command post and what is known on the ground is a major concern of exercise designers. The difference between what is known at the command post and what is known on the ground is a major concern of exercise designers.

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Faced with a reactive, computer-generated opponent, units have few choices, few alternatives, and few options. Computerized models reduce the time to decision and the time to action. Units and staffs can work to reduce the time factors created by differences in language, doctrine and equipment during operations. Moreover, computer-aided exercises, which can be reset and more readily alter the battlefield during the exercise, can be used to accomplish established training objectives. Compared to actual maneuver forces, simulated units can most easily return to the line of departure to repeat operations

The crux of multinational operations is solid staff work, translated into timely, concise orders, passed by a reliable, redundant web of communications systems and liaison teams. Errant problems left unresolved at the headquarters inevitably translate into trouble in the trenches. Consequently, the command post is the obvious focal point for training.

under the same or different conditions. Training techniques long recommended to company and battalion commanders, the choice to go back and try again, is now available to army group, corps, division and brigade commanders.

Still, a comprehensive and continuing update of existing computer models is essential to more accurately reflect the factors unique to multinational operations as well as other decision-making considerations. Too frequently, factors that should remain invisible to commanders and staffs are visible due to flaws in the model, the design or the design. The weight of some factors is often unrealistic or fails to vary appropriately over time. Most important, as anticipated troop-to-terrain ratios decrease, the validity of heavily attrition-based models is increasingly open to question. In attrition models, force-to-force relationships matter most. On a porous, near-parity battlefield, force-to-space relationships tend to dominate during many phases of the battle.

Despite all of the inherent shortcomings in computer models, however, as better models appear, the training value for decision makers improves. Where the temptation to use computer-generated outcomes for predictive analysis is resisted and where commanders and staffs escape the danger of learning the wrong lessons in the pursuit of "winning" solutions (gamesmanship), the advantages are overwhelming.

Multinational military organizations present singular challenges. Once identified and

earnings, and the costs of the program are unmountable. The Central Region army groups must have a framework available to forge the link between tactical and operational levels of war. Driven by the need to respond to organizational changes, the multinational corps remains the best instrument for higher echelons of command to conduct maneuver at the operational level. With the operational force reductions currently envisioned in Europe, multinational corps will have to replace single-nation corps. Both General John R. Galvin, supreme commander, Allied Command Europe, and General Croabe E. Saint, commander, US Army Europe, have voiced their support for the multinational corps concept.

Since the NATO force structure will vary between conventional and crisis times, the multinational corps concept must provide for flexible tailoring.

Integrating multinational contributions to a corps structure will force the greater standardization and interoperability allied forces have struggled to achieve until now. As a result, some national differences in doctrine and equipment will no longer be affordable luxuries.

Whatever its mission or composition, the multinational corps must be the focal point on the Airland battlefield where combat power is synchronized to achieve tactical and operational advantages over the enemy. The VII Corps experience demonstrates the viability of the multinational corps concept and identifies productive paths for continued conceptual and practical developments. Given the imperatives of the parity or near-parity battlefield and the uncertain and still-emerging strategic and operational conditions in Europe, no other alternative offers as much promise. *MFF*

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Operations 2000

Future Employment of the German Army

Colonel Axel Bürgener, German Army, and
Lieutenant Colonel Norbert Stier, German Army

The rapidly changing political scene in Europe's Central Region poses significant challenges to the leadership of NATO and its member nations. This is especially true for united Germany and its armed forces. This article identifies several of the most daunting challenges facing the German military and the principles that will guide it as it changes to meet the new political realities and the changing role of NATO.

DURING the present phase of fundamental political change, a thorough review of strategic and operational thoughts on the future role of military forces in Europe is necessary. The primacy of politics demands that military roles adjust to meet the changed political maxims. To address this task, operational-level leaders will face several challenges presented by new political and military realities that must include the following.

The confrontation between the two military blocs in the Northern Hemisphere is obsolete.


The political situation in Europe is characterized on one hand by sophisticated cooperation between traditionally democratic states, including their stable systems of political, economic and military relations. On the other hand, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, after dissolving the Warsaw Pact, are developing democratic-pluralistic societies and are striving for independence and close cooperation with Western states.

This situation demands that old patterns of thinking be abandoned. Consequently, modern thinking at the operational level must depart from the traditional fixation on the former Cold War East European adversaries. This is the crucial test of our declared will to abandon former enemy perceptions.

Nevertheless, we must not disregard the fact that certain security risks continue. The political and military importance of the Soviet Union, combined with its possible future claims, will continue to pose a situation of risk. Western security policy has to consider the military potential of the Soviet Union, which will remain the strongest national military power in Europe, as well as its unpredictable internal developments.


In addition, there are other risks our security policy and force structures must address. Nationalistic or ethnic conflicts could pose a risk for German and European security. These might not be encountered in the European Central Region but on the flanks of or beyond NATO territory. These risks could rapidly become a serious threat for all NATO nations that depend heavily

Defense



Tomorrow

*Concentrated blocking,
decisive defeats,
emphasis on OpRes*



on natural resources and reliable sea lines of communication. To cope with these risks, resulting from the geostrategic location and importance of Europe, we need a sound and effective system of political, economic and military options.


Our aim to develop an even more defensively oriented armed force structure in Europe, corresponding to Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and confidence- and security-building measures, is the essential result of the changed political situation.

This second challenge finds its expression primarily at the strategic level. That is, it abandons prevention, preemptive strikes and strategic surprise, as well as offensive capabilities. This is not at all contradicted by the capability to conduct operational counterattacks because these operations are easily recognized as being restricted to a nation's or the alliance's own territory. The most reliable indicators of a defensive orientation are the size and strength of armed forces, combat readiness and dependence on mobilization. These must be oriented on the capabilities

of possible opponents and their reductions conducted in a parallel manner.

However, even if stability was based on the lower strength of conventional forces and even if there was a defensive orientation, nuclear forces will remain weapons of last resort. History teaches us that war is possible even between powers of equal military potential and that a war can be started with numerically inferior forces, as was amply demonstrated in World War II. In the changed political situation, we have to define, with the Soviet Union, the common strength and structures of nuclear forces in and intended for use in Europe that are necessary to maintain the security and stability of this Continent.

One of the consequences of such a process will be the mutual elimination of nuclear-capable artillery. In view of the changes that are now taking place in Europe and in view of the near parity of conventional forces, the existence of such systems simply no longer makes any sense. Increased emphasis on defensive orientation will bring about a shift from the importance of deterrence toward a strategy focused on dissuading any possible aggressor from employing its forces.



A Pershing rocket motor being destroyed by a hydraulic press in compliance with the INF Treaty. Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Karnack, Texas, 8 September 1988.

Arms control begins with reducing military disparities. It continues with confidence-building measures and structural changes in the dispositions, and it continues on toward the objective of attaining strategic and operational stability. This objective will be achieved when it becomes fact that no single nation or alliance has any chance of successfully attacking or impairing another side militarily.

It should be achieved by minimal nuclear and sufficient conventional potentials that can be considerably smaller than today and must be well-balanced.

The principle of "secure defense capability," which was emphasized in a report by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel in 1967, will retain its validity. In the future, however, this principle will be expressed in such elements of structure and equipment that favors the defender while not posing a potential threat.

Closely related to the operational challenge of establishing defensive force structures that are effective according to professional criteria, it is also necessary to provide operational expertise to accompany the developing disarmament process.

The programs that will accompany this process of establishing defensive force structures must further, not hinder, the disarmament developments, in keeping with the political intention of providing more security at even lower armed forces levels. Planning at the operational level

and the disarmament process are not opposites; rather, they are interdependent elements of a strategy designed to make peace in Europe more secure.

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
From this perspective, arms control is primarily a field for strategic and operational thinking. The principle of parity between blocs, which formed the basis for the CFE negotiations, must be adjusted to the new situation resulting from German unification and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. It is now no longer possible to define parity in bipolar terms.

Once the bipolarized confrontation between the opposing blocs is overcome and

a multipolarized orientation is achieved, the "strategic direction" of planning at the operational level must also change.

This is true particularly with respect to a future security structure in Europe and the crisis areas located at the periphery of the alliance area. A new definition must be given to the politico-strategic principle of "forward defense" which, until 1990, was implemented as a barrier of adjacent corps defense sectors along the inter-German border from Lübeck to Passau. The conditions that will provide the new foundations for future operational thinking are militarily and politically dissolving the Warsaw Pact organization and withdrawing Soviet forces to their own territory, German unification and its continued membership in NATO, and an emerging belt of democratic nations along the eastern borders of NATO territory in Central Europe.

Main Elements of Future Operations



The geographical area will stay nearly the same but will adopt a new strategic structure. The total number of forces in Europe will decrease through unilateral and mutually agreed reductions. There will be new force ratios, and the interdependencies between the factors of area and forces will be altered. Time, as the third operational factor, will no longer be dominated by the traditional 48-hour scenario oriented on the most unfavorable situation and probably will be measured in months rather than days.

All of this will require us to abandon completely our traditional fixation on "the one case."

It will require readiness and capability levels to redefine leadership and planning efforts, focusing at the operational level in a changing employment spectrum for armed forces. This can be expected to lead to the discovery of new fields of activities and missions for armed forces at the operational level.

New operational fields of activity, particularly for multinational forces, might be the following:

- Peacekeeping and security missions.
- Crisis-management operations.
- Operational options at the periphery of Europe.
- Many diverse tasks in verifying arms-control treaties.

Defense in its broader sense must respond increasingly to risks other than purely military threats. Therefore, disaster control and environmental protection missions also might become future challenges for planning at the operational level. Public acceptance of armed forces may well depend on our readiness to fulfill such missions. However, our attention should not be drawn away from the fact that, ultimately, the purpose of armed forces is to secure political freedom of action in peacetime, as well as in times of crisis and war. This results in the necessity to maintain secure defense capabilities.

All of this implies that, even in a changing and probably more peaceful world, operational planners will continue to have to think about the possible conditions of a future war. The war in Southwest Asia demonstrated that increased security in Europe does not necessarily lead toward worldwide peace and stability.

As long as armed forces are a constitutionally based element of a nation, professional military expertise is required to properly use those forces if needed and to guard against outdated political thinking. However, if operational thinking is not adjusted to the changing political realities, the military may justifiably be accused of being incapable of giving up its old ways of thinking.

During this period of change, the greatest challenge to thinking at the operational level will be to find a new orientation for

Joyous West Berliners welcoming residents of East Berlin after the opening of the Wall, December 1989.



The conditions that will provide the new foundations for future operational thinking are militarily and politically dissolving the Warsaw Pact organization and withdrawing Soviet forces to their own territory, German unification and its continued membership in NATO, and an emerging belt of democratic nations along the eastern borders of NATO territory in Central Europe.

operational planning without having any clear guidelines and standards.

To face this challenge, our nation and our military must be prepared to leave our comfortable, well-trodden trails. Moreover, we will need reliable allies who will go along these new paths with us and will agree with us on the direction we should follow and the aims we want to achieve. One important aim will be to secure our defense capability for as long as it is required as an expression of our political sovereignty and freedom of action.

We largely agree with our allies in evaluating the new situation. This makes it easier for us to think about the possibility of establishing multinational organizations for an integrated military defense within the scope of the process for the political integration of Europe. Such organizations, which also will depend on the essential participation of the United States and Canada, will probably go beyond the current types of cooperation.

In developing such new organizations, it will be important to prevent any form of regression toward a nationally organized defense. Even if, because of international law or other reasons, initial defensive efforts might be conducted primarily by armed forces of a single nation, the changed future NATO force structure and the basic principles for employing NATO forces must truly embody the solidarity of the alliance partners. On the other hand, we must assure that these new NATO structures do not become a hindrance in developing more cooperative security structures for all of Europe. The legitimate security interests of our neighbors in the East, including the Soviet Union, must be respected.

From an operational point of view, we must ensure that a possible gain in military and political freedom of action will not be countered by a loss in military effectiveness that may result from operational and tactical deficits. It is almost impossible to foresee now the full range of future conditions for security in Europe. At the same

time, during the present transition period and beyond, we need to strengthen the solidarity within NATO. This suggests that the future military structures of the alliances should be based on the already-proven multinational types of military organizations of NATO ground forces. This also would provide sufficient flexibility to integrate these forces into a future security system for Europe.

Future Operations

An essential characteristic of possible future operations in the Central Region will be well-balanced forces at lower levels and conditions allowing alternative options for their employment. This will considerably pressure the attacker to concentrate his forces in one or just a few sectors. Even if those force concentrations will be less threatened by (tactical/substrategic) nuclear weapons, which could be seen as an advantage for the attacker, he will have to abandon the idea of heavily tying down the defender's forces on a broad front. On the other hand, the defender can possibly establish and maintain the operational reserves necessary for successful conventional operations within the framework of a defensive strategy.

The opponent's ability to launch an unexpected, large-scale strategic offensive will be eliminated. Therefore, our own forces will be able to establish main points of effort within a concept of "counterconcentration" by taking calculable risks in other areas of the theater/battlefield. Rapid reaction forces will be necessary to reinforce our "Guard forces" at an early stage and to close gaps. Their purpose will be to avoid a decisive engagement favoring the opponent and to contribute to our own decisive operations.

As the defender, we will have to thwart the initially granted initiative of a possible attacker at an early stage, and we should be able to save

the bulk of our ground forces for the decisive mobile and offensive operations against the main thrust of the opponent. Modern command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) equipment; modern barrier equipment; and enhanced surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems will be essential to this type of operation. Also, interoperability of equipment and doctrine, and logistical systems suited for large-scale mobile operations will be required for NATO forces defending the European Central Region. Finally, close cooperation with the Air Force will remain important, and coordination with naval forces will complete the operational planning in a Central Region defense.

Key elements of future land forces missions in the Central Region will be:

- Defense at borders in areas of main efforts.
- Surveillance of wide, less-threatened areas.
- Security of sustaining operations.

Operations are to be started immediately after an aggressor has violated a border and should be conducted as close to the border as possible. The principles of limiting damage and quickly terminating conflict will remain valid.

The next few months require coordinated efforts by NATO headquarters and nations contributing to the defense of the Central Region to replace the outdated "layer cake" defense concept with a new and flexible perspective for its future defense. Force structures and military equipment must enable armed forces to fulfill the increased requirements in the fields of interoperability, mobility, flexibility and effectiveness. Improvements of C³I, precise long-range fire and logistics will result in technologically advanced armed forces. However, the doctrine, structure and equipment of future armed forces must contribute to the development of a peace-preserving "security architecture" for Europe. **MR**

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Lieutenant Colonel Norbert Stier, German Army, is a staff officer in the Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Germany. He was previously responsible for army operations with Fü H III 1.



We... has to... ward de... which... arrive at...

The key... if the op... care, the... force... field...

HL... ass... in... new... guide... Central... just... Europe... on... will... ed... in... mo... reg... sep... a... is... re... cent...

... on... CFB... bec... cept... succes... win... nais... with... the... he... acc... at... ble... er... ta...

JPI... mobile

control system (AWACS) manages the air battle. You disperse, you mass, you fight a short, synchronized fight and then you disperse again. The focus from beginning to end is on the enemy force rather than on terrain.⁴

The biggest threat to JPI is not military, but economic. Changing military and political conditions in Europe, some argue, cast doubt on

When resources were scarce and large conventional forces could not be afforded, more reliance was placed on nuclear weapons. The FOFA evolution brought something new. . . . Improved technologies allowed the extension of the battlefield by allowing accurate non-nuclear fires beyond the FLOT.

whether JPI and its associated technology will be necessary in the future. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* have resulted in Soviet military policy that stresses "reasonable sufficiency" in sizing forces and a doctrine of "defensive defense" for military operations. Debate is hot on the implications and definitions of these terms, but "civilian advisers to Gorbachev advocate the principle of 'reasonable sufficiency,' which they believe would involve structuring forces for a defensive-oriented defense on a strategic and operational scale. This would permit repelling an aggressor but would preclude offensive operations in an enemy's territory!"⁵ Critics of continued funding of military technology are quick to point out that the Cold War is over, but in fact, the highly touted "easing of tensions" has yet to come to pass.

There are numerous studies, groups and professionals attempting to ascertain the implications of the current and future situations in Europe and its periphery. NATO and US planners are likewise attempting to answer some tough questions. A central question is, "Will NATO's current operational concept remain viable, and if not, how should it change?" To get a clearer view of the road ahead, it is useful to review the

evolution of NATO's operational concept to determine how its current position was developed and whether it will remain viable.

Evolution of Current Operational Concept

The NATO strategies of forward defense and flexible response rely on an operational concept based on an area defense in Central Europe supported by a follow-on forces attack (FOFA). Forward defense has evolved through several successive stages over a period of years (fig. 1).

- *Fallback*—where sparse conventional forces delayed toward the Rhine River, trading space for time.

- *Tripwire*—where lean conventional forces held a screen line to a predetermined point which triggered nuclear action.

- *Active defense*—where robust conventional forces attempted to defeat the enemy at or near the IGB by combining maneuver and local counterattack.

The development process has taken the best from each previous concept and incorporated it into the next. For example, the ability to esca-




Figure 1. Evolution of Forward Defense

late to nuclear weapons was carried forward from the tripwire defense and put into the "kit bag" of the commanders executing the active defense. This was done even though there were attempts being made to improve our conventional forces and ultimately lessen the need for nuclear weapons.

Throughout this evolution, there have been several imperatives. First, NATO must maintain a strong defense of the Central Region where the majority of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces were arrayed. Second, German participation in NATO depends on the need to defend as much of Germany as possible. Thus, within flexible response, there is an operational principle of "forward defense."⁶ This is made more difficult by the limited battlefield depth available in Germany. Third, NATO's conventional forces have always been limited by the resources the alliance is prepared to spend. When resources were scarce and large conventional forces could not be afforded, more reliance was placed on nuclear weapons.

The FOFA evolution brought something new. In the 1980s, several key occurrences made FOFA possible. The alliance reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen its conventional forces. Improved technologies allowed the extension of the battlefield by allowing accurate nonnuclear fires beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT). These conventional force enhancements allowed the defensive pattern for the IGB to become somewhat more mobile. These actions demonstrated a new alliance resolve and ultimately put at risk the Soviets' greatest pride—their mechanized armies. The benefits of forward defense and flexible response, supported by FOFA, include:

- Strong conventional forces that pose high deterrent value.
- Improved technology to give the battlefield depth. It did this by allowing accurate, non-nuclear deep fires to hinder the enemy's ability to conduct continuous operations.
- A higher nuclear threshold because of NATO's improved ability to deter the Soviets and to fight their superior numbers, if required.

FOFA Today

FOFA is a defensive concept that first surfaced in 1984. It has developed into Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Test Publication 3-03.1, *Joint Interdiction of Follow-On Forces (Follow-On Forces Attack, (FOFA))*, June 1988, and the concept complements the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. FOFA and AirLand Battle are not synonymous, however, because NATO policy has not allowed for friendly ground force attacks beyond NATO boundaries. AirLand Battle has no such restriction. This is an important distinction because FOFA, using current technologies, allows NATO to defend itself by targeting enemy for-

[We] are faced with an increase in territory to defend and fewer forces with which to defend it. A successful deterrent to aggression and, if necessary, defending the territory . . . will ultimately hinge on mobility. This will not be just mobility created by fast-moving vehicles but by generating and maintaining an overall mobility advantage that will permit our forces to mass and maneuver decisively.

mations deep in their own territory with conventional fires rather than ground forces (the latter being politically unacceptable to NATO).

FOFA focuses the interdiction effort on uncommitted enemy forces which, if allowed to enter close operations at the FLOT, could influence the outcome of the battle by gaining a local numerical superiority, breaking through friendly positions and penetrating deep toward critical objectives. It employs a suite of weapons against specific forces to achieve specified results over a specific time period. It attacks the enemy's center of gravity—the ability of enemy armies to maintain offensive momentum on the battlefield. The FOFA's goals are often described by four "Ds." These are delay, disrupt, divert and destroy. The closer to the FLOT, the more emphasis FOFA places on destroying enemy



Figure 2. The Linear Battlefield

forces (fig. 2). FOFA pits a US strength (technology) against a Soviet weakness (large land forces that are inflexibly employed by a complicated maneuver plan).

JPI Expands the FOFA Concept

The current operational concept of FOFA was designed to break the mass and tempo of a numerically superior and technologically inferior enemy before engagement in a close-in ground battle. While this concept is still germane under those conditions, force parity and technological advances on both sides in Europe called for the FOFA concept to be refined into what we call JPI. Until now, air assets have been the predominant method of conducting FOFA. Technological developments are now making long-range interdiction possible by both ground- and sea-launched systems.

The JPI concept expands the planning, coordination and execution of interdiction of not only an enemy's uncommitted forces but also his mobility-producing potential. Under the joint force commander's direction, all of the services' assets and capabilities can be brought to bear. The combat multiplier effect made possible by effectively integrating these new weapon systems comes at a very fortuitous time because force reductions are drawing down the numbers of systems and combat soldiers available to per-

form the area security and contingency response missions.

US and NATO forces in Europe are faced with an increase in territory to defend and fewer forces with which to defend it. A successful deterrent to aggression and, if necessary, defending the territory in a force parity situation will ultimately hinge on mobility. This will not be just mobility created by fast-moving vehicles but by generating and maintaining an overall mobility advantage that will permit our forces to mass and maneuver decisively while inhibiting the enemy's maneuver capability. This mobility differential is produced by accomplishing two tasks simultaneously—preserving and enhancing friendly mobility and selectively attacking enemy mobility.

Friendly mobility is protected by going after the potential source of attack (enemy air) and providing an umbrella of coordinated air defense artillery and defensive counterair missions. Offensive counterair and deep fire operations also enhance our mobility by blinding enemy sensors and stripping away his long-range fire capability (including mobile tactical missiles).

The second half of the equation is attacking enemy mobility to deny him the ability to mass, move, communicate and sustain. We cannot attack all enemy movement, so senior commanders must set priorities and be selective. To do this, the commander must see enemy movement deep, identify priority targets and attack selected moving targets in near real time. This is the heart of JPI, and it centers on the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).

The United States and NATO have been developing scenarios to employ a suite of new sensors and weapons to execute JPI to a depth of 150 kilometers beyond the FLOT. This suite will be in place and operational within this decade. Although these modern conventional systems are expensive, when employed together, they can approach the combat potential of tactical nuclear weapons.

Integrating these technologically advanced (high-tech) interdiction-supporting systems is



FOFA and AirLand Battle are not synonymous . . . because NATO policy has not allowed for friendly ground force attacks beyond NATO boundaries. AirLand Battle has no such restriction. This is an important distinction because FOFA, using current technologies, allows NATO to defend itself by targeting enemy formations deep in their own territory with conventional fires rather than ground forces.

critical to ensure the success of our substantially reduced force strength. The entire family of systems outlined in figure 3 is required for the JPI concept to become a reality and achieve the deterrent value and mobility enhancement these systems are capable of producing.

JSTARS is the centerpiece of this suite of systems. It functions as the "eyes" and enables commanders to see deep or over extended




Figure 3. Integration of JPI Supporting Systems

ranges laterally to expose enemy massing or maneuvering. JSTARS provides this data in near real time. This near-real-time capability helps commanders impose a visibility over the battlefield that can also be used to target the enemy and prejudice his actions. Thus, a *fatal visibility* is established that cannot be ignored by the enemy.

The new Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is the first step toward a truly joint interdiction capability. It can engage deep, as well as cross-corps, targets to encumber forward and lateral enemy movements. ATACMS provides deep near-real-time engagement capability.

JPI-related systems complement each other by providing joint suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD) protection for friendly fixed-wing or helicopter penetration of enemy air space. An effective standoff weapon that adds considerably to the JSEAD aspect is Tacit Rainbow, which can be ground- or air-launched. These systems will help win the *sensor duel*.

The post-CFE battlefield will be characterized by fewer (but more mobile) forces and more high-tech weapons. Logistic support will be difficult because of the risk of high-tech attack on logistic nodes and transportation networks, and the increased demands of supporting sophisticated weapons and anticipated high-usage rates. . . . Units on this battlefield will have to be as self-sufficient as possible.

The diverse capabilities of these systems will all be tied together by a *joint tactical fusion* system for consolidated near-real-time target detection, weapon targeting and attack control. These capabilities will help support the battlefield cycle of *concentrate/attack/disperse*.

Thus far, the discussion has described FOFA as it is today and JPI as it will be tomorrow—to include their objectives and some of the key members of the suite of systems. The next step is to determine the characteristics of the post-CFE battlefield to see if it would actually be necessary to field a JPI capability.

Characteristics of the Post-CFE Battlefield

No masses of men waiting in reserve. No roads jammed with trucks moving to the front. In fact we see no front. Only a battle area . . . we see small mobile units deployed at intervals measured in miles instead of yards. General Willard G. Wyman, 1950

This quote has proved to be prophetic of tomorrow's battlefield. The post-CFE battlefield has a definite link to historical battlefields. A brief look at two of these should be illuminating.

The Napoleonic era battlefields are most important from the viewpoint of the demibrigades. Battles were affairs of jarring local attacks to pin the enemy and break up his organization. With sufficient forces available, they were arrayed in a checkerboard pattern. Demibrigades were of moderate size, highly mobile, compact, powerfully armed, self-sustaining and bravely led.

They were the building blocks of the military and gave the Napoleonic army its flexibility. The most relevant aspect of this era is that a scouting duel was fought by skirmishers who advanced ahead of the demibrigades, protecting them and disrupting the enemy.⁷

The Pentomic battlefield also helps unlock the secrets of the post-CFE battlefield. During this time, the United States was concerned with a battlefield dominated by tactical nuclear weapon firepower. Since massed formations were priority targets, large-unit operations were not feasible. Pentomic organizations were designed to deal with the three imperatives of this battlefield—dispersion, fluidity and mobility. Mobility was particularly important with words like “fast,” “quick,” “speed” and “now” dominating orders.⁸

The post-CFE battlefield will resemble a hybrid of these two battlefields because post-CFE units and their commanders will face similar problems and will be required to accomplish similar missions.

Thus, the post-CFE battlefield will be characterized by fewer (but more mobile) forces and more high-tech weapons. Logistic support will be difficult because of the risk of high-tech attack on logistic nodes and transportation networks, and the increased demands of supporting sophisticated weapons and anticipated high-usage rates. Like the demibrigades, units on this battlefield will have to be as self-sufficient as possible. These forces will not support an operational concept based on attrition because they will be too expensive and too hard to replace. As mentioned before, high-tech weapons will approach the combat potential of tactical nuclear weapons.⁹ As in the Pentomic era, units on this battlefield will have to come to grips with the destructive capabilities of massive firepower. An operational maneuver cycle used in the Pentomic era will become important again—concentrate/attack/disperse.

There will be fewer units on the battlefield, but because the size of the area to be defended remains constant (actually increases), the defenders will have to spread out. This force-to-space ratio will result in undefended gaps. The enemy




We cannot attack all enemy movement, so senior commanders must set priorities and be selective. To do this, the commander must see enemy movement deep, identify priority targets and attack selected moving targets in near real time. This is the heart of JPI, and it centers on JSTARS.

will attempt to take advantage of these gaps to break the coherence of NATO's area defense in an effort to defeat its current operational concept. Defensive forces will have to move toward a defense based on mobility and maneuver to cover these gaps. Forces will have to be concentrated to attack enemy formations and then disperse before the firepower of high-tech weapons can be concentrated against them and cause unacceptable casualties.

The cycle of concentrate/attack/disperse depends on two key capabilities. First, our forces must be able to see the enemy while denying him that same capability. Thus, we must dominate the sensor duel and win the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle. Second, we must

find the enemy, track him and prejudge his actions. This will allow us to beat him to the punch, pin him down, attack him first with our high-tech weapons and then maneuver our forces to destroy him. In other words, we must establish a fatal visibility over the battlefield. This visibility gives us the mobility differential needed to concentrate forces. Fail in these two areas, and the cycle cannot be accomplished.

The Soviets' perceptions seem to be similar to ours on the lethality of this battlefield and the high-tech weapons that will be used there. They are attempting to develop (or acquire) these systems while, at the same time, slow down our ability to field them. The Soviets give high-tech weapons a significant combat multiplier and



A Tomahawk cruise missile being launched from an A-6 Intruder. Technological developments are now making long-range interdiction possible by both ground- and sea-launched systems.

FOFA was developed to deal with large follow-on echelons of enemy armored forces. The technology that was produced to fill the FOFA requirements is extremely well-suited to JPI in the post-CFE environment. It "sees through" deception, locates the enemy deep (or laterally) and provides a JPI capability.

credit a force armed with these weapons with having an increased combat potential. Therefore, these forces have great deterrent value.¹⁰

As modern conventional weapons approach the combat potential of tactical nuclear weapons, adversaries will have to compensate for the high-tech firepower of their opponents. Refinements will have to be made in operational concepts (fig. 4).

Post-CFE Operational Concept

Stonewall Jackson once said, "Never fight against heavy odds if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your whole force on only a part,

Soviet perception of high-tech weapon capabilities: Want and need them.

Fewer (more mobile) forces; higher-tech weapons; logistic support difficult.

Concentrate/attack/disperse cycle necessary for survival.

Victory based on flexibility, mobility, intelligence and C³.

Modern conventional weapons approach the combat potential of tactical nukes.

Figure 4 The Post-CFE Battlefield

and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it." The refined operational concept will be based on maneuver and mobility. This is required because of the force-to-space ratio and the inability of defensive forces to be everywhere at once.

The new concept will require a change in mental attitude. The first change deals with the point of reference. Linear is out; nonlinear is in. Linear implies three separate operations (deep, close and rear), all of which are referenced to the front line. A nonlinear battlefield implies a detect zone and a battle zone, focused on the enemy rather than a line on the ground. The new concept will call for strong covering forces supported by large reserves. Friendly maneuvers will primarily be counterattacks by reserve forces to destroy the enemy. This ground attack will take place after the enemy has been subjected to a devastating attack from precision interdiction weapons. JPI, with its high-tech capabilities, will help provide the mobility differential required of this concept (fig. 5).

Precision interdiction is also important in this new environment because of the way its practitioners view the battle. It is one of the few concepts concerned with accurately locating the en-

emy forces far from friendly positions. So JPI provides the right mental framework for the mobility aspects of the post-CFE environment.

Objectives:

- Locate him, blind him and pin him down.
- Create Mobility Differential.




Figure 5. A NonLinear Battlefield

Mobility is key to this concept. It can be generated by a variety of force types—heavy, light or hybrid. The point is that the JPI suite of sensors and weapons is needed by any force structure because it provides visibility over the battlefield. This visibility allows friendly forces to find, track and target the enemy force of interest. Next, the suite provides the ability to direct intelligence information to commanders who need it. Therefore, the suite aids command, control and communications (C³). When all of these are taken together, a synergism develops that allows friendly forces to inhibit the enemy's ability to maneuver by employing accurate long-range nonnuclear fires.

This suite of systems also keeps the enemy from doing the same thing to our forces by winning the sensor duel. Taken together, these benefits provide the mobility differential needed

Refined concept based on maneuver and mobility.

Post-CFE forces too small and expensive for an attrition-based concept.

High-tech suite of systems adds a deterrent value to small, mobile forces.

High-tech systems create favorable mobility differential, prevent enemy massing and establish a "fatal visibility."

Figure 6. The Post-CFE Concept

for the mobile defense (fig. 6).

But there are dangers with a mobile defense, and these dangers stem from three key requirements. To accomplish a successful mobile defense, the defender must have mobility equal to or greater than the enemy's. The defender must also have a battlefield with sufficient depth to break the momentum of the enemy attack. (In NATO areas of concern, this depth is provided by technology because offensive ground attacks beyond NATO borders are not allowed.) Lastly, the defender must have the required technology to accomplish the battlefield cycle of concentrate/attack/disperse.

If the defender cannot win the sensor duel, he cannot time his attack; therefore, he does not know where to move his forces and loses his mobility advantage. The limited battlefield depth in Europe is extended by technology that allows the defending commander to see the enemy and prejudice his actions. Lastly, the ability to command and control a mobile defense is difficult, particularly if the enemy is trying to interfere with the process by using all known C³ countermeasures.

JPI and its suite of capabilities are particularly well-suited to fulfill the requirements of a mobile post-CFE battlefield. They add deterrent value to small forces, create mobility differentials by winning the sensor duel, prevent enemy massing by establishing a fatal visibility and facilitate the cycle of concentrate/attack/disperse. In its beginning stages, FOFA was developed to deal with large follow-on echelons of enemy armored forces. The technology that was produced to fill the FOFA requirements is extremely well-suited to JPI in the post-CFE environment. It "sees through" deception, locates the enemy deep (or laterally) and provides a JPI capability.

Sun Tzu advised long ago, "What is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, not from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation." As modern conventional weapons approach the combat potential previously

The new concept will require a change in mental attitude. . . . Linear implies three separate operations (deep, close and rear). . . . A nonlinear battlefield implies a detect zone and a battle zone, focused on the enemy rather than a line on the ground. The new concept will call for strong covering forces supported by large reserves. Friendly maneuvers will primarily be counterattacks by reserve forces to destroy the enemy.

achieved only by tactical nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive doctrine, operational art and small-unit tactics will require refinement. A cycle of concentrate/attack/disperse will be necessary to limit casualty rates and ensure friendly units' survivability. Victory will be based on flexibility, exactness and timeliness of intelligence (fatal visibility), mobility and the commander's ability to command.

Fewer but more mobile forces will occupy the post-CFE battlefield. They will be compact, powerfully armed with high-tech weapons, professionally manned and bravely led. They will

have to deal with the logistic problems associated with usage rates, high-tech attack of logistics nodes and the more sophisticated weapon systems. Key concepts of this battlefield include the sensor duel, fatal visibility, mobility enhancement and a suite of high-tech systems.

The security requirements will be different, but NATO's objective will remain the same—deter conflict—but, if necessary, have the capability to attack the enemy's center of gravity to break his mass and tempo, and create the mobility differential essential for victory.

JPI is not a replacement for FOFA (delay, disrupt, divert and destroy enemy follow-on forces). Instead, JPI expands FOFA to include selectively attacking an enemy's mobility-producing potential. The key to understanding the difference is that FOFA "meters the flow" of a numerically superior force's arrival at the linear close battle to a rate the ground commander can manage while JPI creates a favorable mobility differential on a mobile, nonlinear battlefield. Both have applications today as well as tomorrow and in the foreseeable future. The JPI capability is particularly well-suited to the requirements of the post-CFE environment and must be preserved. *MR*

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1. Wayne P. Hughes, *Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 112.
2. CPT Ralph Peters, "The Age of Fatal Visibility," *Military Review* (August 1988):50.
3. A. J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 68. We have changed the cycle from concentrate/strike/disperse to concentrate/attack/disperse. This was done because the word strike in Europe connotes using nuclear weapons.
4. Interview with GEN John W. Foss, "The Future of the Army," *Army Times*, 5 March 1980, 13.
5. *Soviet Military Power 1989* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989):13.
6. Laurence Martin, *Before the Day After* (Middlesex, England: Newnes Books, 1985), 40.
7. Vincent Esposito, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1965), X.
8. Bacevich, 68.
9. We do not mean to imply that high-tech weapons will ever replace nuclear weapons. We realize that nuclear weapons are the "big boy" on the block. We foresee no replacement for them or their political impact, deterrent value and cost effectiveness.
10. *Soviet Military Power*, 59.

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Infantry

Defense Against Armored and Mechanized Attacks

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Mark Edmond Clark

The modern battlefield presents soldiers and their commanders with increasingly complex demands. One of the most daunting combat situations is the infantry unit that must defend against armored and mechanized forces. The author examines four World War II battles that exemplify the initiative and resourcefulness that can produce success. He emphasizes several intangibles that are also critical.

THE AIRLAND Battle concept, as expressed in the 1982 version of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, was a comprehensive and balanced view of modern war.¹ Among its characteristics, it ascribed equal importance to firepower and maneuver; included the elements of strong leadership, morale and psychological shock in its definition of combat power; and offered a broad view of offense and defense.²

Defense, in particular, was described as a mixture of static and dynamic elements—in reality, a combination of offensive and defensive action. The manual did not prescribe any single form or technique for a defensive operation. Each defensive battle would be designed for the specific situation facing a unit.³

Since its introduction, that version of the doctrine and its most recent version, FM 100-5 (1986), have been evaluated almost continually in unit training exercises at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California.⁴ There, Army troops, who are called the opposing force (OPFOR) and dress as Soviets, use the tactics and vehicles of Soviet motorized rifle regiments to battle battalion- and, recently, brigade-size Army units.

For the most part, modernized Army units (armed with weapons such as the M1 tank, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and other anti-tank weapons) have found it very difficult to defend successfully against attacks of larger OPFOR formations.⁵ These results should not be seen as a reflection on the quality of the Army's doctrine. Indeed, the maneuvers are intended to serve as a learning experience, and many errors are made. Time and again, for example, units have failed to coordinate their defensive actions.⁶ Nevertheless, it is not easy for troops to remain enthusiastic about engaging in a defensive action on a real battlefield after continually being declared killed by a referee during a training exercise that is designed to prepare them for it.⁷

Ordering infantrymen, even mechanized infantry, to defend against an attack by a superior armored and mechanized force may seem improper to these troops. However, they would probably be surprised to learn that infantry units have conducted successful defenses under similar circumstances in actual combat. The history of the US Army provides several examples of this point.

This article examines four cases in which US Army infantry units conducted effective

A Historical Review



Through effectively using [Hill 317's] terrain features, the attacking Germans' combat power was reduced and that of the US troops was enhanced. . . . The US troops looked downward upon the attacking enemy and hit their successive waves with small-arms fire. The clear line of sight also allowed two of the 230th Field Artillery Battalion's forward observers, who were on the hill with the infantrymen, to lay down accurate fire on those waves.

defensive actions against superior numbers of armored and mechanized forces. Each case occurred during World War II in the European theater of operations where many of the conditions of modern war were present. Defensive methods used in these actions are examined for their variety. Key tactics are highlighted, especially when they appear to relate to concepts similar to those found in current US Army doctrine.

The purpose is to demonstrate that infantry units can overcome the odds, on occasion, and fight outnumbered and win. Hopefully, it provides good examples of the type of good training, imaginative thinking, aggressive action and team spirit that may lead to success in the future.

Mortain

The first case is the action of the 2d Battalion and Company K, 3d Battalion, 120th Regiment, US 30th Infantry Division, Mortain, France, during the German army's "Mortain counter-attack." Once the US Army began its breakout from Normandy with Operation *Cobra* in July

1944, its spearheads commenced a high-speed chase after German forces that were desperately retreating southward. The German forces offered some resistance; however, their initial actions did not represent their full potential to threaten the advance.⁷ It was not until August that they put a strong effort into halting US forces with Operation *Lutich*, as the Germans called the counter-attack at Mortain. Briefly, the plan was to drive armored and mechanized divisions through US forces in the area of Mortain where those forces were bottlenecked and then attempt to restore the battle line at Normandy.⁸

The 30th Division had been in heavy action since the start of Operation *Cobra* when, on 7 August, it was hit by the 2d SS Panzer Division and remnants of the 17th SS Panzergerade Division.⁹ The 30th's defenses were not heavily fortified for they were prepared earlier by the US 1st Infantry Division as forward positions from which an attack could be launched.¹⁰ Thus, as the German force advanced in two columns, north and south of Mortain, it easily

overran the 30th's positions.

Under the circumstances, little could be done immediately to stop the German advance. However, a fragment of the 30th, which included the 2d Battalion and Company K, 3d Battalion, dug in and sought to hold the line on Hill 317, a rocky bluff just east of Mortain.

Hill 317 was an excellent position to defend. Through effectively using its terrain features, the attacking Germans' combat power was reduced and that of the US troops was enhanced. The 2d SS Panzer could not negotiate the terrain of the hill with its panzers or give up the close support of its divisional *panzergrenadiere* (mechanized infantry) for an assault. The attached troops of the 17th SS *Panzergrenadier* Division were used instead, but this disrupted the German attack plan. The US troops looked downward upon the attacking enemy and hit their successive waves with small-arms fire. The clear line of sight also allowed two of the 230th Field Artillery Battalion's forward observers, who were on the hill with the infantrymen, to lay down accurate fire on those waves.¹²

In a planned defense, heavy covering forces may be tasked with fighting defensive actions forward of the forward edge of the battle area, or lighter security forces may be used to give the main battle area (MBA) advanced warning of the enemy's approach. The security force's position may be established as a strongpoint. Although it was not planned, Hill 317 developed into a strongpoint due to the stiff resistance. The troops continued to occupy it even after it was completely surrounded. The position's effectiveness as a strongpoint was enhanced by the additional fire support the forward observers provided for the whole division.

From Hill 317, the two forward observers could survey the entire German counterattack coming out of the Selune River valley, from Domfront 25 kilometers eastward, to Mont-Saint-Michel Bay, beyond Avranches, 32 kilometers westward.¹³ This allowed them to direct a steady stream of artillery fire on all of the 2d SS Panzer's armored and mechanized columns. The heavy salvos eventually brought the Germans'

The unit had suffered 300 casualties . . . [out] of approximately 700 men. However, US troops' efforts were vital to the 30th Division. The strongpoint . . . allowed the division commander to fight one MBA battle at a time.

The resolve of the US troops, who held the line and held firm to their belief that support would be at their call and that relief would arrive, was vital in the hill's defense. The intangible elements of leadership, morale and training enhanced the unit's combat power.

movement to a halt.¹⁴

Defending Hill 317 was costly. When its defenders were finally relieved on 12 August, the unit had suffered 300 casualties, killed and wounded, of a force of approximately 700 men.¹⁵ However, the US troops' efforts were vital to the 30th Division. The strongpoint limited the Germans' access to the MBA by delaying follow-on forces and reducing these forces already engaged. This allowed the division commander to fight one MBA battle at a time and to restore the defensive line.

Establishing a hasty defense on Hill 317 was probably the last option available to the unit commander. Prepared defenses did not exist, and the US force did not have sufficient numbers present to engage the Germans. Due to the hill's excellent defensive terrain and the availability of artillery, a strongpoint was created.

However, the resolve of the US troops, who held the line and held firm to their belief that support would be at their call and that relief would arrive, was vital in the hill's defense. The intangible elements of leadership, morale and training enhanced the unit's combat power as much as any other elements.

Flamierge

The second case is the action of the 3d Battalion, 513th Regiment, US 17th Airborne Division, Flamierge, Belgium, during the Battle of

the Bulge. The Battle of the Bulge was a massive German counteroffensive on the Western Front in December 1944. Its aim was to cut the Allied forces' lines, which stretched along the German border, in half and isolate British and Canadian

It was not desirable for Anderson to order his men forward after taking heavy losses. However, a commander must conduct his defense based on an overall concept of defense specified by higher levels of command. Here, the defense plan required offensively oriented movements.

forces to the north from US forces to the south. This would be achieved by driving armored and mechanized spearheads through the weakly defended Ardennes Forest, located between the borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. The forces would then drive north to the Meuse River and beyond toward Antwerp, Belgium.

The 17th Airborne Division was among three airborne divisions used to rapidly reinforce units already engaged against the advancing Germans. When the 513th Regiment, 17th Airborne, arrived on the scene on 24 December, it, along with other units of the 17th, was ordered to take positions northwest of Bastogne which was the anchor of the US defense.¹⁶ The area assigned to the 513th was defended by troops of the 3d Panzergrenadier Division.¹⁷

The 3d Battalion, 513th, managed to secure positions immediately before the town of Flamierge and took severe casualties in the process. It was reduced to an effective strength of 525 men.¹⁸ But, despite the losses, the 3d Battalion's commander, Major Morris Anderson, remained aggressive. After receiving permission, he ordered the 3d Battalion to move forward, once more, to secure the town itself.¹⁹

It was not desirable for Anderson to order his men forward after taking heavy losses. However, a commander must conduct his defense based on an overall concept of defense specified by higher

levels of command. Here, the defense plan required offensively oriented movements.

The 3d Battalion moved forward without concealment and under heavy fire from panzers, artillery, machineguns and mortars. Communication with the rear was lost, and its only fire support initially came from its own mortars. However, the commander of the 513th, Colonel James Coutts, acting on intuition, ordered a heavy bombardment from divisional artillery once the battalion was within 150 yards of the town.²⁰ The Germans withdrew under the pounding, and the 3d Battalion took the town and established a perimeter defense.

An armored assault to retake the town was expected, and the 3d Battalion was resupplied with bazooka rounds and other antitank ordnance. Additionally, it received support from a tank destroyer company. However, the tank destroyers withdrew from their positions with the battalion shortly after arriving and left the infantry alone to hold the position against enemy armor.

The prospects of success for an infantry unit attempting to halt an armored assault during World War II without tanks, tank destroyers, close artillery or air support were perhaps the worst possible. However, the men of the 513th were no ordinary troops. The 513th had served as a troop unit at the Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and many of its men had been among the top graduates.²¹ They were expert at using stealth, cover, concealment and deception. They were able to use these skills to hide their movement and surprise, close in on and destroy the enemy.

When Anderson prepared his unit to defend the town, he thoroughly analyzed the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and troops available. He concluded that the battalion's best hope of holding off the Germans was effectively using the terrain and weather. Although the ground before the 3d Battalion was an open field, a dense fog covered the area. Poor visibility would serve to conceal his static positions and the movement of teams of paratroopers armed with bazookas.

On 25 December at 0600, the Germans began their assault on Flamierge. Fifteen to 20 panzers



A US machine gun crew during the Battle of the Bulge, Belgium, December, 1944.

The 513th had served as a troop unit at the Airborne School . . . and many of its men had been among the top graduates. They were expert at using stealth, cover, concealment and deception. . . . Although the ground before the 3d Battalion was an open field, a dense fog covered the area. Poor visibility would serve to conceal [its] static positions and the movement of teams of paratroopers armed with bazookas.

moved directly before the town from the north, while five or six more panzers, supported by *panzer-grenadiere* and six self-propelled guns, maneuvered from the lead panzers' right flank.²² German artillery fire hit the town and temporarily cut communications between the 3d Battalion and all other units again.

Once the Germans reached the paratroopers' perimeter, they met stiff resistance. The *panzer-grenadiere* were hit hard with mortar, machine-gun and rifle fire. Communications were restored, and forward observers, despite the fog, directed some supporting artillery fires against the panzers by following the sound of their engines. The panzers, for the most part, were kept out of the town by close-range bazooka fire.²³

Attacking panzers with bazookas was a deadly task. Once bazooka positions were located, the panzers would fire point-blank into them.²⁴ Nevertheless, the paratroopers continued to take that risk. The fighting did not cease until dark when the panzers, despite penetrating deep into the perimeter, were forced to withdraw.

Casualties for the 3d Battalion were heavy. Too weak to hold off another assault, the unit was ordered to withdraw.

In this case, effectively using weather conditions enhanced the defender's combat power and reduced the attacker's. The fog provided concealment for the paratroopers who hunted down the panzers. The Germans could not take advantage of these elements in a similar manner because the panzers' engines signaled the movements.

But, also, the intangible elements of leadership, morale and training again played a great role in successfully defending a position. The willingness of the paratroopers to engage the panzers face to face and their resolve to defeat the enemy made up for unavailable troops and weapons.

Eisenborn Ridge

The third case is the action of the 2d Battalion, 26th Regiment, US 1st Infantry Division, Eisenborn ridge, during the Battle of the Bulge. The 2d Battalion was not holding a position on

Elsenborn ridge but, rather, on a position at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium, in the northern sector of Elsenborn ridge's horseshoe-shaped defensive line. On 21 December 1944 at 0130, the battalion was attacked by armored and mechanized troops of the 12th SS Panzer Division from the direction of Büllingen to the southeast.²⁵

Although the battalion's position was exposed, it was supposed to be the strongest in the area in terms of available support. By 0300, the

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Germans began a heavy barrage with artillery, mortars and rockets, striking hard against the US troops. The barrage temporarily cut communications between the 2d Battalion's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Derrill M. Daniel, and the troops at the position, including Companies E and F.²⁶ The support those units expected was not provided, and they soon found themselves naked before the German armored and mechanized force.

When communications were restored, Daniel learned of the companies' situation, and he managed to contact the 1st Division's commander, Major General Clift Andrus. Andrus had tied in 1st Division's artillery to the US 2d and 99th Infantry Divisions', which were in the area, and he used all available fires to aid the 2d Battalion.²⁷

Defense efforts of this nature generally create opportunities for decisive action by reducing the enemy's closure rate and creating periods of friendly superiority, permitting the defenders to gain the initiative. The effect of the artillery fire was so devastating that the *panzergrenadiere*n

were separated from the panzers they were supposed to cover. The panzers were seemingly unconcerned with this occurrence. They continued to move forward alone and overran the 2d Battalion's positions.

Once the panzers broke through the line and their positions became untenable, the 2d Battalion troops could have withdrawn. The Company E and F troops were 90-percent replacements and had 100 men per company.²⁸ Withdrawing under such pressure could be expected of them. However, despite their relative inexperience, the troops remained under cover in their foxholes until the panzers drove through.

It was reasoned that, although they lacked the proper ordnance and numbers to defeat the armor, the troops acted to fight against the *panzergrenadiere*n who were desperately trying to rejoin the panzers. If a defensive force can delay, disrupt, or divert enemy follow-on forces and prevent them from supporting those forces already committed, then it is possible to defeat the enemy piecemeal. This was the result of the 2d Battalion's action.

When the *panzergrenadiere*n finally reached the 2d Battalion's positions, they were engaged and forced to retire. The panzers, who were still traveling along the same route, ran into a reserve force of US tanks, tank destroyers, artillery and infantry armed with bazookas. The goal of the reserve force was not merely to restore the line but, rather, to strike a decisive blow. They awaited the panzers' arrival into what amounted to a kill sack. The reserve force picked the panzers off one by one.²⁹ By 1140, the German force was crushed.

The defense of Dom Butgenbach developed as the German attack progressed. Due to the unity of effort between the artillery units and the 2d Battalion, the German attack plan was disrupted. The supporting *panzergrenadiere*n were separated from the panzers and destroyed. Without the *panzergrenadiere*n, the panzers' combat effectiveness was reduced dramatically. This allowed the reserve force, to the rear of the 2d Battalion, to act decisively.

A destroyed Tiger II continues to burn as US soldiers move past, Belgium, December 1944.



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Bastogne

The fourth case is the action of the 501st Regiment, US 101st Airborne Division, Bastogne, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge. The 501st Regiment was the first unit of the 101st to arrive to reinforce US forces in the Bastogne area 19 December 1944. Before its troops were settled, the unit's commander, Colonel Julian J. Ewell, received orders to contain the 130th *Panzer Lehr* Division that was moving cautiously toward the city and threatening to cut off a number of US units holding positions to the east.³⁰ Ewell requested flexibility in fulfilling his mission, and it was granted.³¹

The area the 501st was told to move into was practically undefended. *Panzer Lehr's* commander, Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, sent column after column of armored and mechanized forces into Bastogne. However, he was concerned with US radio traffic indicating that US forces were moving into Bastogne and possi-

bly planning to drive into his area. Although the reports referred to the relatively small 501st, Bayerlein reasoned that it was a greater force such as an armored division. Thus, he preferred to move cautiously until he could make a clear assessment of his situation.³²

The 1st Battalion, 501st, traveled only 2 miles east of Bastogne, near Neffe, before it ran into advanced elements of the *Panzer Lehr*. Ewell surveyed the situation and recognized the Germans were deployed in strength all along the route and that their position could not be taken head-on by infantry alone. Capitalizing on the flexibility he was granted, Ewell tried to turn the panzers out of position.³³

Tactics had to compensate for the US force's lesser numbers and weaker firepower. Properly positioning forces in relation to the enemy achieved results that otherwise could have been achieved only at a heavy cost in men and materiel. When mobility is used to confuse an enemy



Despite the lack of defensive measures, the success of certain elements proved to be the key to success. They were the intangible elements—courage, morale, leadership and training. Faced with seemingly overwhelming odds, the US troops held their positions and fought fiercely.

commander, it is translated into maneuver.

Ewell kept the 1st Battalion where it was and requested support from divisional artillery whose special 105mm guns' loud crack resembled that of US tanks.³⁴ He sent his 2d Battalion off the road to seize the town of Bizory to the north and continue onward to Hill 510 that dominated both Mageret and the position of the 1st Battalion at Neffe. When the 3d Battalion camp up, he ordered it to turn south and take the small town of Mont and the bridge over the Wiltz River.

Much as Ewell had hoped, his unit's aggressive movements and positioning confused Bayerlein and caused him to miscalculate US force dispositions and intentions. The additional factor of the loud crack of the airborne artillery's special 105mm guns also aided in this effort, for it caused Bayerlein to believe he was being opposed by armor. Leaving substantial forces to hold Hill 510 and the Mageret–Neffe road, Bayerlein decided to move south and not make a direct assault on Bastogne at that time.³⁵

Ewell managed to shoot down the Germans' intelligence. He prevented the *Panzer Lehr* Division from massing and driving an assault force (which could have had a 3–1 or even a 6–1 ad-

vantage over Ewell's force) through the area and onward to Bastogne. Ewell's maneuver forced the enemy forces to react and restricted their freedom of action. Despite some heavy fighting, particularly on Hill 510, the 501st managed to conduct an effective defense at a low cost.

IN EACH of the cases recounted, commanders considered every means available to fulfill their missions. Their defensive actions took shape as a result of specific situations facing their units. Success in such actions cannot be assured by using a single form or technique.

The 30th Division troops did not have an established defense plan. The small force successfully defended Hill 317 through the excellent use of its terrain features and artillery support. Once the position was established, it served as a strongpoint in the forward edge of the battle area from which artillery attacks, designed to delay, disrupt and divert enemy forces, could be directed. This created opportunities for decisive action by the remainder of the 30th.

The 17th Airborne Division paratroopers had to conform to a concept of defense established at a higher echelon, calling for offensively oriented movements. In conjunction with a heavy artillery attack, the paratroopers maneuvered aggressively and took the town. To hold it, the battalion commander considered the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and troops available, and developed a successful plan. He made maximum use of the open field and fog, and made optimal use of his unit's firepower.

Initially, the situation of the 1st Infantry Division's untried troops appeared hopeless. However, supporting artillery attacked the approaching enemy and disrupted his attack plan by separating his armor from their supporting mechanized infantry. This allowed the US troops to maximally use their capabilities. They positioned themselves to avoid the enemy armor and engaged the supporting mechanized troops trying to close the formation. This created the opportunity for decisive action by a US reserve force positioned to the rear of the infantry unit. That force engaged the enemy armor traveling with-

out its mechanized cover and destroyed it.

Finally, the regiment of paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division halted an armored and mechanized force that outnumbered them by more than 3-1. The unit, through maneuver, achieved results that could otherwise have been achieved only at heavy cost. Mobility was successfully applied to paralyze the enemy commander.

Despite the variety of defensive measures employed, there were certain elements present in each case that were key to success. They were the intangible elements—courage, morale, leadership and training. Faced with seemingly overwhelming odds, the US troops held their positions and fought fiercely. What exactly motivated the troops to fight as they did cannot be fully explained here. However, it was apparent that the troops refused to accept defeat.

It should be noted that, despite many similarities between the nature of warfare during World War II and its current nature, today's Army troops face many negative conditions, besides

the proliferation of battlefield nuclear weapons, that were unknown to their predecessors. For example, a new generation of nonnuclear weapons exists that can kill troops by the acre. The Army's most capable potential opponent, the Soviet army, possesses forces that could muster ominous force ratios, placing US forces at serious disadvantage, especially in Europe. Those Soviet forces are highly skilled and well-prepared for an engagement with the United States.

However, facilities such as the NTC, in addition to providing tactical training, give today's troops the necessary edge to counter such conditions. They give US units and commanders the opportunity to learn many tough lessons in the most realistic training environment yet developed. Through realistic training and simulation, today's forces can also learn the techniques used by innovative infantry units in previous battles to successfully defend against armored and mechanized forces. Hopefully, they will achieve as much success in actual combat as did their predecessors in World War II. *MR*

NOTES

1. William Lind, "Military Reform in the Army and Marine Corps," reprinted as chapter 11 in *American Defense Annual: 1987-1988*, ed. John Kruszel (Lexington: Lexington University Press, 1987), 237; LTC (P) Nuba Wass de Czege and LTC L. D. Holder, "The New FM 100-5," *Military Review* (July 1982):57; and Deborah Shapely, "The Army's New Fighting Doctrine," *New York Times Magazine*, 28 November 1982, 48.
2. Wass de Czege, 64-65.
3. *Ibid.*, 65.
4. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986). This latest version of the Army's doctrine reflects most of the concepts of the 1982 version.
5. *Washington Post*, 22 February 1988, A1.
6. *Ibid.*, A5.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 408; David Mason, *Breakout: Drive to the Seine* (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1968), 103; and John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy* (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 245-47.
9. Weigley, 195.
10. *Ibid.*, 195; and Robert Stern, *SS Armor* (Carrollton: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1978), 67-68.
11. Weigley, 195.
12. Mason, 103.
13. Weigley, 195.
14. Keegan, 247. The two forward observers did more than direct artillery fire. They helped the 230th Field Artillery Battalion and other field artillery units accurately place smoke shell cases filled with medical supplies on the hill. In Mason, 104, it should be noted that artillery alone did not halt the armored columns. Many panzers in the area were destroyed by air attacks and tank-to-tank combat with the US 2d Armored Division that supported the 30th.
15. Mason, 105; and Weigley, 200.
16. John S. D. Eisenhower, *The Elder Woods* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1969), 417.

17. *Ibid.*, 414.
18. *Ibid.*, 418.
19. *Ibid.*, 417.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, 417 and 419.
22. *Ibid.*, 420.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.* The defense used in this case was quite similar to that which was considered crucial to an infantry unit's defense against armor by the Germans during World War II. A portion of a translation of an SS training instruction illustrates this fact: "Success of a deep enemy thrust is not guaranteed because tanks have broken through our positions, so long as the defending troops use their weapons to cut off the tanks of the armored spearhead from follow-up infantry. If this can be achieved then even the heaviest armored attack will fail since a tank unit by itself cannot hold ground for any length of time and is obliged to turn back to refuel and to rearm. Infantry must allow the tanks to 'sweep' over them." See James Lucas, *War On the Eastern Front: 1941-1945* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1978), 156-57.
30. The 130th Panzer Lehr Division greatly resembled modern armored formations because all four of its panzerregiment battalions and its engineer battalion rode in half tracks, and all of its artillery was self-propelled. See Weigley, 30.
31. Eisenhower, 310.
32. *Ibid.*, 313.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Peter Eistob, *Bastogne: The Road Block* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 77.
35. *Ibid.*

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Multinational Command: LESSONS FROM WATERLOO

Lieutenant Colonel Mark K. Wells, US Air Force

The recent war in Southwest Asia again reminded us of the difficulties of coalition warfare. The North Atlantic Alliance has worked for more than 40 years to enhance the fighting capabilities of the NATO coalition forces. The author takes us back to the Waterloo battlefield to draw lessons from the Duke of Wellington's successful campaign against Napoleon. He finds that many aspects of Wellington's strategy and battlefield management are still useful today.

THE BATTLEFIELD of Waterloo lies only 30 miles from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). It is a popular tourist stop on the way to Brussels, Belgium, and still attracts scores of visitors more than 175 years after the famous engagement there.¹ A cluster of small shops, museums and restaurants surrounds the base of the imposing Lion Mound monument. Anyone stationed at NATO's military headquarters near Mons will have had ample occasion to visit this shallow valley near Mont-Saint-Jean farm and contemplate the terrific carnage that took place there on 18 June 1815.

Any military man's interest in the battle is occasioned by several factors. First, of course, is the

natural interest of potential combatants for military history. The events of the Hundred Days' Campaign, and of the battle itself, constitute real-life drama that remains almost larger than life. In an area encompassing little more than three and one-half square miles, more than 150,000 men fought nearly face-to-face for more than 8 hours. Almost 45,000 of them were killed and wounded. An empire was destroyed in an afternoon.

Such cataclysmic events are not easily forgotten. Hundreds of Waterloo participants recorded their impressions of battle in letters, private memoirs and books. These documents, along with scores of secondary accounts, paint an amazingly accurate portrait of combat in the

early 19th century. They are rich in vivid descriptions and often painstaking in attention to detail. Similarly, they cannot fail to evoke the strongest emotion in anyone interested in the profession of arms.

But any professional interest should transcend a mere "drums and trumpets" approach to this engagement. Examining the Battle of Waterloo can reveal much about the challenges of command faced by nations in a military coalition. For staff officers working in Allied Command, Europe, such challenges are naturally part of their appointed tasks. This article will review some of the circumstances of the Waterloo Campaign and relate them to the inherent problems of a modern-day political and military alliance. Certain similarities seem particularly apparent in the areas of mission, command, strategy and tactics. It should be noted, however, that direct comparison is not possible. Indeed, none is necessary. Occasionally, it is sufficient merely to point to the rough analogies, highlight the differences and postulate about the future.

Mission and Command

When the allies heard the news of Napoleon's return from Elba, there was great consternation at the "Congress of Vienna." While superficially called to guarantee the peace in Europe, the conference was beset by hidden agendas, mistrust and secret attempts to extend power and influence, even if these conflicting claims threatened future war.² A reactionary policy guided the congress' actions as each nation attempted to turn back the clock to prerevolutionary Europe. One of the few things the various diplomats could agree on was disposing of the French emperor. Even the method for this proved contentious, so the ultimate decision declared war on Napoleon personally rather than on France. Selecting a suitable commander in chief was another early problem confronting the allies in Vienna. Prussia, Russia, Austria and Great Britain were firm in their resolve to defeat Napoleon once and for all, and recognized the need for continental cooperation to do so. But the reluctant allies were un-

able to agree on an overall commander. It is true that Czar Alexander I mentioned such a position in a letter to the Duke of Wellington who was then serving in Paris as the British ambassador. Wellington declined, however, in part,

Previous alliances against Napoleon had often been fatally flawed by deep, internal divisions. In 1805, 1807 and 1809, decisive French victories at Austerlitz, Friedland and Wagram had each led to a breakdown in allied cooperation and the dissolution of three successive alliances. There had been disruptive factors at virtually every level of command.

because the authority and responsibilities of the post were never clearly defined. Moreover, Wellington preferred to be with an active army in the field.³

Wellington's reluctance is understandable in the context of the times. Despite overall agreement to stop Napoleon, the members of the Seventh Coalition had substantially different political ambitions and objectives. Previous alliances against Napoleon had often been fatally flawed by deep, internal divisions. In 1805, 1807 and 1809, decisive French victories at Austerlitz, Friedland and Wagram had each led to a breakdown in allied cooperation and the dissolution of three successive alliances.⁴ There had been disruptive factors at virtually every level of command. Certainly, with these thoughts in mind, Wellington had chosen to make himself available for field duty. He was duly selected to lead the combined Anglo-Dutch army in Belgium.

Wellington's decision was fortuitous for the allies. The upcoming campaign would test the patience and forbearance of the ablest commander, and the duke would prove to have the qualities of leadership necessary to organize and motivate a hastily assembled multinational army.⁵ Beyond that, his tactical genius and

stubborn refusal to yield ground were precisely the skills required to defeat the French emperor.

Despite refusing to assume the overall military command of the alliance, Wellington's responsibilities were vast enough. His forces, stationed so close to France, were the natural target for Napoleon's operations. Moreover, Wellington's Anglo-Dutch army covered the approaches to

Wellington's dispositions were dictated as much by political as by purely military considerations. He could not afford to offend the good will of his Dutch-Belgian hosts by ravaging the countryside for fodder. The location of his headquarters in Brussels was similarly calculated to stiffen the resolve of Britain's newest allies. . . . Also, the duke's protection of his lines of communication [allowed] for the sensitivities of the British government.

Brussels, a political prize of considerable value. Several factors required Wellington to disperse his forces over a wider area than might have ordinarily been prudent. First, it was necessary to provide sufficient billeting and forage areas for his 106,000 men and 14,500 horses. Second, since the lines of communication for Wellington's British contingents led back to the English Channel, it was important to sufficiently cover the roads and cantonment areas stretching through western and northwestern Belgium. Finally, since Napoleon's plans were unknown, Wellington was forced to extend his forces to maintain some kind of contact with the Prussians to the east.⁶

Thus, Wellington's dispositions were dictated as much by political as by purely military considerations. He could not afford to offend the good will of his Dutch-Belgian hosts by ravaging the countryside for fodder. The location of his headquarters in Brussels was similarly calculated to stiffen the resolve of Britain's newest allies. Many of the troops Wellington would lead had

recently fought for Napoleon. Also, the duke's protection of his lines of communication was as much to allow for the sensitivities of the British government as anything else. Last, anxious to ensure the timely cooperation of the Prussians by reassuring them of his own intentions, he spread his own forces to reach them.⁷

Wellington was busy dealing with other considerations as well. His relationship with the King of the Netherlands was particularly sensitive, especially since the king insisted on placing two young princes in positions of considerable responsibility. Neither had sufficient military experience to justify the appointments.⁸ Wellington was also concerned with finding suitable staff officers and filling the sizable gaps in his infantry units. As ever, artillery and ammunition were a problem. Only superhuman efforts could overcome these deficiencies.

Despite these difficulties, Wellington made certain he took the time to coordinate his activities with his counterpart in the Prussian forces. Field Marshal Gebhard Blücher, though old and clearly eccentric, was steadfast and determined to defeat Napoleon. Blücher's chief of staff, General August Gneisenau, was no admirer of the British but, fortunately, was just as committed to their mutual goal of defeating Napoleon.⁹

In a meeting conducted in early May 1815, Wellington and Blücher informally agreed on a broad outline of conduct. Both would stand on the defensive in Belgium until sufficiently strong to advance into France. These promises of cooperation laid the ultimate foundation for victory. The very real personal connection between these two men, who were so dissimilar in background and character, was sufficient to overcome much mutual distrust, language difficulty and ideological incompatibility.¹⁰

It is significant that this meeting also produced agreement on a liaison officer. Count Friedrich von Müffling, who would figure prominently in overcoming the fog and friction inherent in multinational command, was appointed to serve between the two staffs. His key role in coordinating the subsequent allied success is difficult to overestimate.



Wellington made certain he took the time to coordinate his activities with his counterpart in the Prussian forces. . . . Wellington and Blücher informally agreed on a broad outline of conduct. Both would stand on the defensive in Belgium until sufficiently strong to advance into France. These promises of cooperation laid the ultimate foundation for victory. The very real personal connection between these two men, who were so dissimilar in background and character, was sufficient to overcome much mutual distrust, language difficulty and ideological incompatibility.

Role and Mission of NATO Today

It is fair to ask how all of this applies to the North Atlantic Alliance. Unlike the hastily arranged Congress of Vienna, the nations that signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, did so with the freedom and self-determination of all of their peoples in mind. But, like the coalition that opposed Napoleon, the signatories to the NATO treaty considered it important to select a commander over all of their military forces. They were more successful than their 19th-century predecessors and agreed that a senior US officer should serve as Supreme Allied Commander.

There are other examples that demonstrate that the lessons of history had been learned.

From the beginning, NATO would avoid some of the difficulties that plagued the anti-Napoleon coalitions. The modern alliance's mission of deterrence and defense is clearly stated, as is its function as a nonaggressive cooperative arrangement. NATO has never been offensively oriented nor does it threaten the peace and stability of Europe. In fact, quite the opposite is true.

While political leaders of the Seventh Coalition did not trust each others' long-range intentions, no problems of similar magnitude exist today. It is true that the sovereign democracies of NATO can, and sometimes do, disagree on minor aspects of policy, but the alliance's overall direction has been firm for more than 40 years.

A day-by-day look at NATO might give a superficial impression of unresolved areas of concern, but over the years, a remarkable continuity of policy can be found. Moreover, there are tried and true mechanisms for resolving national differences:

Unlike Wellington, who contended with the spectre of ideological divisions and unreliable allies, NATO's leadership is fortunate to deal with

At the operational level, NATO enjoys a clearly defined chain of command employing four major subordinate commanders from three nations. Beneath them are senior leaders representing virtually all of NATO's nations. At SHAPE itself, there are national military representatives to ensure the closest coordination of planning and administration.

nations and military staffs united in purpose and skilled in execution. Moreover, the North Atlantic Alliance's central political character is underscored by the appointment of a secretary-general as its overall leader and a political committee to make major policy decisions.

The importance of coordinating policy, both military and political, is as critical now as it was in 1815. The closely integrated SHAPE staff is a clear reflection of this. NATO has a military committee to deal with issues that require national consensus. The alliance is, and has always been, extremely sensitive to the environmental concerns of its host nations. At the operational level, NATO enjoys a clearly defined chain of command, employing four major subordinate commanders from three nations. Beneath them are senior leaders representing virtually all of NATO's nations. At SHAPE itself, there are national military representatives to ensure the closest coordination of planning and administration. Thus, unlike Wellington and the staff of the Anglo-Dutch army who were forced to rely on personal promises and the fidelity of a largely un-

tested and unknown officer like von Mülling, the SHAPE staff and leaders can count on a well-organized team of experienced professionals.

Strategy and Tactics, Circa 1815

Wellington and Blücher faced a considerable threat in early summer 1815. Even then their opponent was widely acknowledged as one of the greatest generals of all time. Blücher knew this all too well, having seen firsthand the 1806 Prussian debacle at Jena. Wellington, of course, had enjoyed considerable success against the French on the Spanish peninsula, but this had not been against the emperor personally.¹¹

These considerations aside, Wellington was forced to rely on a military strategy that placed his army in a position easily within striking distance of the French. Recognizing the general unsuitability of his troops for vigorous offensive action, he decided to remain on the defensive, at least for as long as it took for the rest of the allied armies to form up and advance. Ultimately, France was to be invaded by forces exceeding 1 million.


Napoleon's response to the military situation facing him on his return to Paris has been discussed extensively over the years. Legitimate questions remain on his selection of suitable subordinates for the subsequent campaign, as do sound criticisms of his overall goal. Yet, one thing is certain, Napoleon's decision to seize the initiative and go on the offensive was totally in keeping with his temperament and, more important, with the temperament of his newly recalled veteran army.¹²

From a strategic point of view, the campaign deserves special attention. Aware almost from the beginning of the divergent allied lines of communication, Napoleon chose to employ a previously successful operational concept. He planned to march his army between his two opponents. Once there, the objective was to defeat whichever army seemed most vulnerable at the time. It would, therefore, be necessary to hold off the other temporarily. Only after the first battle was successfully completed would Napoleon turn back on the remaining enemy army to en-

sure its defeat. Students of Napoleonic military planning refer to this concept as "the strategy of central position."¹³ Clearly, its necessary prerequisites were swiftness, surprise, cohesion, and tight command and control. A high premium was also placed on the French army's ability to fight and win successive engagements.

From a tactical point of view, the Waterloo Campaign deservedly receives credit as a milestone in the musket-and-ball era of combat. The French had been successful for years using heavy infantry columns screened by thick clouds of skirmishers. These formations were further supported by heavy cannonades and masses of well-mounted cavalry.¹⁴ This innovative combined arms formula was finally defeated by Wellington's reverse slope tactics and steadfast infantry in long lines. Although it was a gross simplification to suggest, as Wellington did later, that the French "came on and were driven off in the same old style," the underlying notion is difficult to refute.¹⁵

Even so, the multinational character of the battle had its impact in the tactical arena. Wellington was acutely aware of the different tactical principles employed by the elements of the allied armies. Only two days before, he had commented on Blücher's willingness to openly display Prussian formations before the French army at the Battle of Ligny.¹⁶ Wellington's forces contained large contingents of Brunswickers, Nassauers, Dutchmen, Belgians and Hanoverians. Only the latter could be trusted to completely understand the reverse slope and linear tactics perfected by the "Iron Duke" in Spain. Moreover, Wellington lamented his lack of veteran British infantry, some of which had not returned from the Americas.



Secretary-General
Manfred Wörner and Paul Nitze at
a recent conference in Munich.

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An even more serious problem was occasioned by the overall lack of standard equipment in Wellington's army. Its multinational character and the speed at which it had been put together prevented any attempt at weapons standardization. This fact, particularly the various kinds of ammunition, would be pivotal for some of the key units in the duke's position.¹⁷ Similarly, there were also significant variations in uniforms. This would lead to serious identification problems and more than one case of misdirected fire.

All of these factors affected Wellington's tactical dispositions and how he conducted the battle. His decision to intersperse his allied infantry formations between veteran British units was as much to provide example as to fortify resolve.¹⁸ He placed his cavalry reserve in the rear

As was his custom, [Napoleon] gave operational-level orders and usually did not interfere in the actual tactical management of units smaller than corps. He . . . had certainly demonstrated the finesse and tactical acumen necessary again and again throughout his career. But, at Waterloo, he did not, even to the point that he missed much of the battle while away from the field.

to further fortify the position and prevent mass straggling. Finally, he resolved to conduct much of the battle personally and declined to act in the normal role of commander in chief. Instead, he became something of a super divisional commander.

Historians have suggested, with some justification, that this was always Wellington's preferred command technique.¹⁹ Yet, at Waterloo, there may have been a further imperative. He selected the positions for units personally and moved them from place to place often by direct verbal command. This very likely was a partial response to his recognition of the language barrier. He clearly wanted no misunderstandings. So, he not only set the broad objectives but also painstakingly dealt with details. As it turned out, this was precisely the course of action that was required at Waterloo. Indeed, it may have been the only course of action that could have prevailed on that day. A strong case can therefore be made that this style of command became necessary because of the Army's multinational character, as well as its lack of a tried and true staff.

The rewards and potential dangers of Wellington's tactical approach are vividly illustrated by several critical events of the battle. Throughout the engagement, Wellington took a keen interest in the pivotal French attack on the château de Hougoumont. Although only one note remains, he is known to have sent several messages to the commander of its garrison with orders pertaining to its defense. Wellington always seemed to be on the spot to offer necessary


support and reinforcements where required.²⁰ At the penultimate stage of the battle and in a different location, Wellington was similarly disposed to take the correct action at the correct time. His famous command to General Peregrine Maitland's brigade, "Now, Maitland, now's your time," signaled the final defeat of Napoleon's Imperial Guard attack. In short, Wellington was a master of the time-space problem that confronts any commander during an engagement. He almost always managed to be at the right place at the critical moment.²¹ When by chance he was not, disaster could result.

Consider, for example, what happened to Major General Bylandt's infantry brigade. Overlooked somehow by the watchful duke, this unit's position was far in advance of the protective ridge used by the balance of the army. Frightfully pounded by the French grand battery at the opening of Napoleon's great infantry attack, it fled without making any serious contact with the enemy.²² This reverse was only made good by British infantry and cavalry on the ridge.

In any event, Wellington's hands-on tactical role is even more striking if compared to Napoleon's actions. As was his custom, the French emperor gave operational-level orders and usually did not interfere in the actual tactical management of units smaller than corps. He could have exerted more control, of course, and had certainly demonstrated the finesse and tactical acumen necessary again and again throughout his career. But, at Waterloo, he did not, even to the point that he missed much of the battle while away from the field. Perhaps had he been more closely involved on Sunday, 18 June 1815, the day might have turned out differently.²³

NATO Strategy and Tactics: Now and the Future

Clearly, there have been major changes in the size, scale and technology of warfare since Napoleonic times. The physical dimensions of the battlefield have changed radically. Temporal and spatial relationships are far more complex. Yet, the principles of war so well-defined by Carl von Clausewitz are just as applicable now as then.



Wellington observes his coalition army moving into position at Waterloo.

[Wellington's] decision to intersperse his allied infantry formations between veteran British units was as much to provide example as to fortify resolve. He placed his cavalry reserve in the rear to further fortify the position and prevent mass straggling. Finally, he . . . declined to act in the normal role of commander in chief. Instead, he became something of a super divisional commander.

In this regard, NATO's military strategy is not altogether dissimilar from Wellington's. Even during a time of favorable political change in Eastern Europe and a lessening of tensions, deterrence and defense, as currently written, require the forces of Allied Command, Europe, to be prepared to defend as far forward as possible. For most of the Cold War, alliance forces faced great masses of offensively oriented Warsaw Pact forces. Since it was necessary to defend the territorial integrity of NATO's membership, any option that projected giving up large segments of ground was unacceptable. More viable defensive concepts based on depth and maneuver were eschewed. For decades, the military and political authorities worked hard to ensure the allied forces' optimum effectiveness. But the unification of Germany and subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have changed the political and military situation. So, too, these events have mandated some fundamental changes in the operational way NATO's strategy is carried out.

If the successful negotiations in Vienna are eventually ratified, for example, and large arms

reductions take place, a whole series of standard warfighting suppositions will have to be reconsidered. As US and Soviet forces are reduced to levels currently being considered, or perhaps go even lower, the basic notions about how modern war in Europe would be fought must change.²⁴

It is not just speculation, for example, to suggest that 20th-century concepts of continuous fronts may be rendered passé. Napoleonic armies maneuvered and fought quite successfully with little regard to "front lines." Acquiring territory as a primary measure of success, so familiar to generals of World War I and World War II, was not nearly so important to the Grand Army or its opponents. So it may be in the future. General security guidelines will replace the rigid defense plans that required every man to know his preordained foxhole. Napoleonic concepts like the strategy of central position, the indirect approach (*manoeuvre sur les derrieres*) and strategic penetration may bear renewed investigation. In other words, moving and concentrating armies in free space may rejuvenate more than simple anti-quarian interest in Napoleon's campaigns.

Clearly connected to previous examples in Napoleonic warfare, it follows that several operational elements of NATO's post-Cold War strategy become key:

- The strategy will demand strict attention to the time and space constraints of rapid mobilization and concentration. This factor is certainly reminiscent of Napoleon's situation in 1815. Failure to make swift and accurate decisions before the actual outbreak of hostilities could have disastrous results.

- Any future strategy will rely even more on highly mobile forces. With larger amounts of territory to cover before contact with the enemy, this fact seems indisputable.

- NATO's forces must be able to quickly locate and operate successfully against the enemy's center of gravity. As in Napoleon's time, this may be harder to accomplish. Enemy intentions may be more difficult to discern because of the relative distances between attacker and defender. Moreover, it will be no less necessary to blunt their concentrations at the point of attack. Operating like their swift-moving Napoleonic precursors, NATO's corps—supported by hard-hitting air power sources—should retain the capability to disable or disrupt the enemy before he is able to mass his forces. Focused efforts will pay off.

Thus, NATO's battlefield tactics must be adjusted not only to fit objectives but also to take into account both the changes and timeless elements of modern war. Like Wellington's army, the forces of Allied Command, Europe, come from many nations. The inherent disadvantages

of this situation—language, cohesion and standardization—have not gone away. Fortunately, more than 40 years of experience in working together have helped ameliorate most of the potential pitfalls in the NATO group. Yet, there are still major problems. Weapons standardization and equipment interoperability remain no less problems for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, than they were for Wellington. In one critical area alone, NATO has five different kinds of tanks using three different kinds of ammunition. There are also four different kinds of attack helicopters, six different missiles and five different rifles shooting three incompatible types of ammunition.²⁶

Fortunately, there are bright lights on the horizon. The recent London Declaration established definitive guidelines for NATO's future strategy. The alliance has spoken confidently of a strategy for peace, crisis and conflict. Events during the Gulf War dramatically underscored this new direction in NATO policy while simultaneously reinforcing the alliance's emphasis on mobility, flexibility, training and precision firepower.

Tactically, NATO will be able to take advantage of its firepower and its current high degree of mobility in the unlikely event of hostilities. Allied forces enjoy the ability to integrate and orchestrate theater air, land and sea assets to win superiority on and above the battlefield. Deep strikes will disrupt any enemy's attack echelons.

Allied intelligence and warning capabilities seriously reduce the potential for aggressive forces to "steal a march" on the alliance in the way Napoleon did on his approach to Brussels. Moreover, sophisticated command and control systems allow NATO's military commanders to control events from the proper level while attack elements deny any enemy the full use of the electronic spectrum. Unlike Wellington, who was forced to fight his campaign from the most elementary level, modern battlefield management requires senior commanders to be extremely well-versed in the operational level of war. The size and scale of warfare have made this necessary.

NATO also obviously enjoys an advantage that Wellington never could have. The Western

If the successful negotiations in Vienna are eventually ratified . . . and large arms reductions take place, a whole series of standard warfighting suppositions will have to be reconsidered. As US and Soviet forces are reduced to levels currently being considered, or perhaps go even lower, the basic notions about how modern war in Europe would be fought must change.

A NATO E-3A AWACS.
Sophisticated command,
control and intelligence
systems afford NATO com-
manders great flexibility.



Allied forces enjoy the ability to integrate and orchestrate theater air, land and sea assets to [strike deep and] disrupt any enemy's attack echelons. Allied intelligence and warning capabilities seriously reduce the potential for aggressive forces to "steal a march" on the alliance in the way Napoleon did on his approach to Brussels.

Alliance's nuclear deterrent capability has clearly helped dissuade potential aggression. Conventional parity alone has never been sufficient over the course of history to stop war. It was not enough to stop Napoleon's gamble in 1815. Despite the polemical rhetoric associated with nuclear weapons, the fact that they exist remains unalterable. Their credible threat of punishment to any potential aggressor has helped preserve the peace in Europe since the end of World War II. NATO's possession of these weapons, even if used only as a last resort, helps guarantee peace.

Challenges of Alliances

Wellington's great challenge the summer of 1815 was to organize and coordinate the activities of a multinational army. Under no illusions about the difficulties he faced, he later called the Anglo-Dutch army he led at Waterloo "infamous." Yet he managed to lead the army to victory, helped, in no small measure, by the Prussians' timely arrival. Wellington's careful attention to liaison between the two major allied armies, as well as both sides' loyalty to their pledges, guaranteed Napoleon's defeat.

In a very real sense, the challenges facing NATO today are no less compelling than those faced by Wellington and Blücher 175 years ago. While not in imminent danger of attack today,

the Western democracies must, nevertheless, sustain their national and collective defense capabilities based on the potential aggressors' strength, not his intentions. One of the lessons of the 1815 campaign is that intentions are hard to measure. Capabilities are not so difficult to gauge. Also, a dangerous world still exists. Uncertainty and instability are no less threatening now than in the early 19th century.

NATO must therefore display the same kind of military determination and solidarity so well manifested by Wellington's Anglo-Dutch forces and Blücher's Prussian army in Belgium. The alliance's willingness to sacrifice elements of national authority for the collective good has been amply demonstrated over the last 42 years. Nations of the West have certainly come a long way since the days of the Congress of Vienna, but much remains to be done as Europe moves to a new era of economic and political cooperation.

Like Wellington, who, despite the difficulties of his alliance, managed to find the correct formula to defeat Napoleon on the battlefield, NATO is emphasizing the "right mix" training. Allied armies must train wisely, taking resource reductions into account. They are making better use of technology by designing exercises to train senior commanders in the skills they would actually employ in wartime. NATO must ensure

continued efforts to standardize and modernize its equipment. All of this is designed to enhance the alliance's security and stability. It also helps lower the level of confrontation in Europe.

In June 1815, the threat of Napoleon's return was sufficient to overcome allied mistrust, ideological differences and conflicting national goals. Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia cooperated and took action in a successful campaign of collective security. Wellington and Blücher won a battle that shaped the direction of Europe for a generation. There is much to learn from their success.

Visiting the battlefield of Waterloo and thinking ahead to the challenges facing the NATO Alliance cannot fail to invoke several ideas. Traditionally, alliances remain strong and united only as long as the threat they face is a powerful one. In 1815, most of the countries of Western Europe were sufficiently afraid of Napoleon's return to set aside their differences, at least temporarily, and cooperate to defeat the French. But, when the threat of a new Napoleonic Empire expired on the slopes near Mont-Saint-Jean, the allies eventually returned to their own agendas.

This summarizes the new challenge now facing NATO. As events in Eastern Europe and the

It may be in the future [that] general security guidelines will replace the rigid defense plans that required every man to know his preordained foxhole. . . . Moving and concentrating armies in free space may rejuvenate more than simple antiquarian interest in Napoleon's campaigns.

Soviet Union accelerate, Western support for democracy, unity and collective action should actually grow firmer. As allied governments and populations perceive the threat from the east diminishing, responsible officials must reemphasize the strength, utility, and political and military usefulness of the North Atlantic Alliance. These authorities must manage the transition to the future of a new Europe carefully, moving away from containment while reducing confrontation. For their part, military men should carefully consider the implications of geopolitical changes on the battlefield. In this vision for the future, NATO should become more, not less, important. This is the enduring message of the now silent Waterloo battlefield. **MR**

NOTES

1. Belgian television reported that more than 200,000 onlookers were present for the reenactment staged on the Waterloo battlefield, 17 June 1990.
2. Felix Markham, *Napoleon* (New York: New American Library, 1963), 224-25.
3. Jac Weller, *Wellington at Waterloo* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967), 12.
4. The best overall treatment of these operations can be found in David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1966).
5. Richard Aldington, *The Duke* (New York: The Viking Press, 1943), 225.
6. David G. Chandler, *Waterloo* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1980), 62-65.
7. Sir John Fortescue, *The Campaign of Waterloo* (Elstree, Hertfordshire: Lionel Leventhal Ltd., 1987), 57-58.
8. Weller, 31.
9. Chandler, *Waterloo*, 29; and *Waterloo Battle of Three Armies*, ed. Lord Chalfont, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 58-60.
10. Weller, 36-37.
11. A fact not lost on some participants. See Aldington, 170.
12. Chandler, *Campaigns*, 1,016-23.
13. *Ibid.*, 171-75.
14. Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*

- (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 140-64.
15. *Ibid.*, 183-84.
16. Fortescue, 83.
17. The failure to resupply special rifle ammunition to the defenders of La Haye Sainte was a significant factor in its capture. See David Howarth, *Waterloo: Day of Battle*, (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 154-55; and Antony Brett-James, *The Hundred Days* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 140-44.
18. *Waterloo Battle of Three Armies*, 74-78.
19. John Naylor, *Waterloo* (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1960), 17-18.
20. Weller, 167-68.
21. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), 131-33.
22. There is some contention on this issue, but I have relied on the eyewitness accounts collected by Major General H. T. Siborne in *Waterloo Letters*, ed. Major General H. T. Siborne, (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1881), 63.
23. Harold T. Parker, *Three Napoleonic Battles* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1944), 207.
24. GEN John R. Galvin, "NATO and the Future," International Herald Tribune Conference, Rome, Italy, 3 May 1991.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Sir Brian Kenny, "Interoperability on the Battlefield," *Nato's Sixteen Nations*, vol. 34, no. 8, (January 1990):10-13.

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MRINSIGHTS

The US Army Officer's Learning Contract

By Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Blankenhagen, US Army,
and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Rozman, US Army

The debate has long raged as to whether service in the Armed Forces is a "profession" or simply a "job." Our soldiers' superb performance in the Gulf War adds tremendous weight to the "profession of arms" camp. The professionalism and devotion to duty of those who served in Operation *Desert Storm* are not often found in time-clock employees. A critical element in the military's success in the recent war has been correctly identified as the officer corps' exceptional leadership and competence throughout the ranks. Without doubt, the officer corps of all of the services were able and ready when the call to arms sounded.

There are several reasons for this very positive situation. High among them is the individual officer's personal commitment. This personal commitment, along with a comprehensive officer education and training system, provided the nation with officers who were more than equal to the task. It will become even more critical for the officer corps to retain its competency and commitment moving into a period of considerable uncertainty.

With the coming years' reduced resources and smaller force, especially in the US Army, officers must approach their duties with renewed vigor. With the demands of the future battlefield growing more complex, leader competence and unit readiness will grow in importance. The responsibility to meet these challenges rests both with the officer corps as a whole and with each officer individually. A personal commitment to continuous learning and professional development must be all officers' hallmark. Simply meeting the officer education system requirements and punching the necessary career advancement "tickets" will not suffice. For officers to truly serve their profession, much higher standards of competence and commitment must become the norm.

The Learning Contract. An Army officer accepts an implied service-long learning contract simultaneously with commission acceptance whether Reserve Component (RC) or Active Component (AC). This degree of commitment must be universally accepted if the officer corps is to collectively

meet the challenges that lie ahead. Yet, it appears that continuous learning as an ethical requirement has never been explicitly stated as a requirement for the officer corps nor has the Army developed a learning support structure.

Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer, superintendent of the US Military Academy (USMA), West Point, New York, developed a new USMA mission statement describing a "lifetime of service to the Nation."¹ This lifetime of service implies the individual officer is always doctrinally current and ready to fight, both intellectually and physically.

It must be stated emphatically, up front, that this concept does not advocate more classroom training. Colonel Charles J. Ardant du Picq stated, "If you make an officer a schoolboy all his life he will send his profession to the devil, if he can."² Rather, the Army must demand and each officer must accept an ethical standard of continuous individual professional learning throughout a service career. Therefore, a learning contract should be let between the individual officer (who must internalize a focused learning ethic) and the Army (that must provide the learning support system).

Change. The changing pace in today's military environment and the impact this change has on battlefield operations force the officer to accept a service-long learning obligation if he or she is to win on future battlefields. This is necessary because current classroom learning cannot keep pace. On completing school, a student officer may return to the unit and discover something just learned soon will be or already has been changed. This is not due to a fault in the school system but, rather, to the rapidity of change.

The Army's shift from active defense doctrine to AirLand Battle doctrine is an example of such change. AirLand Battle's doctrine implementation was ongoing in the field with the schools and manuals playing catch-up. The recent influx of new weapon systems and organizational structure modifications are other examples.

This change has been difficult to manage and has caused significant turmoil. A poorly ingrained

service-long learning ethic in the officer corps and the lack of a learning system that supports and encourages such an ethic contribute to this turmoil.

If this premise is valid, the officer corps as a profession should focus on three key questions:

- Do current officer professional development strategies identify and accept the service-long learning requirement?
- Do development strategies embed the ethical conviction in our officers of the necessity for service-long learning?
- Does the Army, as a total system, support the requirement for service-long learning?

Where We Stand. Current written strategies for officer career development generally address only institutional learning with little mention of the continual learning that must occur in-between. The nonresident learning programs (the only formal Army activity with characteristics compatible with service-long learning) primarily focus on supporting the RC and are mainly substitutes for resident institutional learning. This absence of a service-long strategy implies the lack of an Army perception of the need for service-long learning.

In fact, aside from individual efforts, the only encouragement to the officer to continue professional learning at unit level beyond what is learned in day-to-day experience is whatever "professional development" program the commander has established. These programs range from nothing at all to extended field trips to visit battle sites, professional subjects presentations, assigned reading lists of important military or professional writings, or encouragement to enroll in correspondence courses. From command to command, the emphasis and specifics may vary. Typically, the day-to-day operations "monster" is overwhelming, and learning beyond the day-to-day horizon rarely occurs.

The only way such an obstacle to greater learning can be overcome is through each officer's internalized learning ethic. If the officer considers aggressive personal learning a high-priority ethical responsibility, the officer will independently strive to learn regardless of environment. However, to support this learning, the Army needs to guide an officer's service-long learning so it is commensurate to duty position and learning skills. Precommissioning courses and officer basic courses primarily prepare the student to be a platoon leader or equivalent. This is the simplest training development task for officer learning because the duty assignment is generally well defined.

Motivation for lifelong learning must start in the precommissioning courses and be continually reinforced. Examples of learning vehicles are the mili-

tary history program, role models, the Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) and the ad hoc professional development efforts of units (already noted). Further, self-directed learning skills should be explicitly taught. Few curricula, military or civilian, explicitly train learning skills. Unfortunately, officer leaders are not trained how to nurture and sustain a learning ethic in their subordinate officers.

The Army is currently implementing a continuing education system—the Military Qualification Standards System (MQS)—for tasks at the precommissioning through captain level. The MQS manuals, both common core and branch-specific, provide source documents outlining critical tasks and mastery criteria. Also, they can indicate which tasks are taught in the training base and which tasks require unit training. The missing element is training the commanders to use the MQS manuals in the unit environment, specifically for active, directed learning there.

It must be noted that, even now, the field complains about the learning "burden" MQS has dumped on their officers, as well as the "burden" of doing the Combined Arms and Services Staff School correspondence phases. One division commander became quite adamant about MQS, stating it could not be done. Lack of unit commander support will doom any program to failure. Unit commanders at all echelons must reinforce service-long learning motivation if any initiative the Army attempts is to succeed.

The Army cannot assume all current commanders know how to conduct this training and mentor their subordinates. If the Army accepts the service-long learning concept, there must be explicit training for the commanders. Nothing will frustrate young officers more than to expect such training from their commanders and not receive it. It will be perceived as a major system deficiency. Failure to support and encourage service-long learning during an officer's first assignment erodes the officer's motivational commitment to pursue continued learning.

Perhaps LADP was already doomed to failure at its inception because there is no carry-over from the service school to the field assignment. The May-June 1990 *Officers' Call* states there is no requirement for the unit commander to do anything with his or her lieutenants' self-development plan. We assume most gaining commanders probably do not even know about the program, let alone have the skills to encourage their subordinates. It is very frustrating to see the Army depending on a program that appears disjointed and not fully integrated into the Total Army cycle.

At field grade level, the opportunity for lifelong learning has greater potential as officers are able to do more self-directed learning about their new duties. If their learning skills have been developed correctly, officers at this stage in their service will know how to conduct self-directed learning and what resources are available to support their efforts. A key tool they would have internalized to assist them in this task would be the ability to develop criteria for information evaluation.

Possible Ways to Support the Contract.

If you accept that service-long learning is critical to the Army officer corps' success, then the importance of the distribution, as well as the development, of learning materials becomes critical. Those in the field have complained, to some degree, about the burden of masses of published material that are "required" reading, implying the material is irrelevant. This is underscored by the fact that, although the field receives manuals, few schools teach directly from them. Perhaps it might be better to provide the field with available lesson plans highlighting the specific areas of desired learning.

If this more direct and dynamic approach were adopted, the service schools would need to develop a materials index system. From Army units and activities, it is difficult to access all of the current material because there is no single-source index. The situation is similar to the scout who sees an enemy formation but is unable to report back to his commander. The information is there, but it is meaningless until the right person has it.

There are several other initiatives that could be pursued to support directed learning in the field and reinforce continuous individual learning by officers. Schools could provide materials as outlined above. A library outreach program could be developed. Officers could receive professional journals free. Service schools could provide on-line data bases for computer access.

Another possibility would be to provide each officer with a personal professional library. The library could start during precommissioning, with additions throughout an officer's career. The library could become a lifelong learning system by itself, providing the opportunity to develop and sustain a "common professional language" for the officer corps.

To create a service-long learning system requires resources. Yet, service schools are primarily resourced for resident training only. We may need to restructure the service school resourcing system so nonresident students would have equal status. The total school target population needs to be addressed

explicitly and resourced accordingly.

The resourcing cost could be eased if the training development process was fully implemented, and resident and nonresident materials were simultaneously developed. This would require standardizing formats for all target audiences instead of using the current multiple formats.

There are certainly other possibilities that could address and support a service-long learning requirement. However, the Army must concur with the underlying requirement to support a continuous individual learning system. The service-long learning contract must become explicit.

Although the Army emphasizes a wide range of professional development imperatives for officers, it does not recognize, internalize or aggressively support the officer's service-long commitment to individual learning. Establishing and sustaining a personalized learning ethic in each officer, one augmenting all other professional development initiatives, is critical to the officer corps' ability to make itself collectively and individually able to effectively address change. Formal programs can only achieve a veneer of effectiveness for such learning. Successfully achieving such a result can only be accomplished by internalizing in the officer corps a service-long individual learning professional ethic. This ethic, to flourish, must be reinforced with supporting mechanisms such as personal libraries and easy access to current professional learning materials.

Success at obtaining a service-long learning mechanism in the officer corps will go a long way toward sustaining the corps as a resilient, stable and reliable agent for leading the Army through the challenges of perpetual change. *MR*

NOTES

1. "Darts & Laurels," *Armed Forces Journal International*, (October 1987):140.

2. Charles J. Ardant Du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* (reprinted by US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, with permission of Stackpole Books, Inc., Harrisburg, PA, 1985), 219.

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M R W W I I A L M A N A C

The 50th Anniversary of the Jeep

By John Reichley

"The jeep, the [CH-47] Dakota and the landing craft were the three tools that won the war," said General Dwight D. Eisenhower. His boss, General George C. Marshall, said the jeep was "America's greatest contribution to modern warfare."

High praise indeed and well deserved. But, for such a well-known vehicle for so long around the world, tracing the lineage of the name "jeep" proves quite elusive. Different companies, notably Ford, Willys-Overland and Bantam, vied to design and produce the vehicle for the US Army in 1940 and 1941.

Although all companies produced prototypes, Willys-Overland won the first Army contract on 23 July 1941, 50 years ago this month. The contract was for 16,000 jeeps at a cost of \$739 each.

Back to its name. One of the mysteries of the ubiquitous vehicle has been the origin of its name. A definitive book, *The Jeep*, by J-G. Jeudy and M. Tararine, offers several possibilities for the origin, but it does not state, with finality, just where the name originated.

In 1936, the Popeye comic strip introduced a new character called Eugene the Jeep. He was an animal from Africa about the size of a dog, ate only orchids and could make himself invisible. Eugene the Jeep quickly became popular with readers who soon called anything astonishing a Jeep. Within a few years, the new vehicle was certainly astonishing to the public.

Another popular thought was that jeep was coined from part of the vehicle's Army nomenclature of "GP," for general purpose. That makes sense, but Jeudy and Tararine discount it as doubtful. They didn't explain why.

No less than H. L. Mencken, superb wordsmith and author of *The American Language*, was puzzled by jeep. Even he offered no clue and asked, "Jeep—can anybody give me the exact etymology and the history of the word?" If Mencken didn't know, you won't find the definitive answer in this article.

Some other early names that were proposed for

the 4 X 4 vehicle were Bug, Midget, Peep, Blitz Buggy and Quad. Can't you just hear a World War II battalion commander telling his driver to "bring around the Blitz Buggy"? I can't either.

Jeep was first mentioned in the press by the *Daily News*, a Washington, DC, paper, in February 1941. From wherever derived, the name stuck. Actually, the name jeep has always been a registered trademark and the exclusive property of American Motors.

Having arrived on the military scene shortly be-

fore Pearl Harbor, the venerable jeep went on to serve many armies on virtually every battlefield. The Soviets asked for motorcycles with sidecars but changed their minds and asked for jeeps instead. The four-wheel-drive vehicle performed so well in swamps, on the poor Russian roads and in all types of miserable Russian weather that the Soviets asked for all they could get. Before the war ended, that was more than 20,000 jeeps.

The jeeps went everywhere else around the world as well. The gearshift diagram was produced in four languages—English, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

Although it has always been called a "quarter-ton" vehicle (for its load-carrying capacity), its actual weight was about 2,500 pounds, or a ton and a





quarter. During World War II, Willys-Overland and Ford, which also later received a government contract, jointly produced some 660,000 jeeps; a record in military vehicle production.

The worldwide workhorse could carry five people, haul a trailer with 800 pounds cross country or haul one with 1,200 pounds on good roads. Many had a .50-caliber machinegun mount between the front seats that made them rather lethal, as well as highly mobile. Or take out the machinegun mount, and you could rig three litters atop one.

Bill Mauldin used a jeep in many of his memorable cartoons for *Stars and Stripes*, and America's most beloved war correspondent, Pulitzer Prize winner Ernie Pyle, was killed while riding in one during the Okinawa Campaign in April 1945.

The Smithsonian Institution has a World War II jeep in its impressive vehicle collection, as do many other military museums. A captain assigned to the US Army Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, drives an original World War

II model around the Leavenworth area.

But, as with the equally venerable steel pot of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, the jeep of World War II, Korea and Vietnam has passed into the history books as far as the Army is concerned. You didn't see any of our *Desert Storm* commanders churning through the sands of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iraq in a jeep, did you? They were in the larger, more protected high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, or HMMWV, called a "hum-vee" by the troops.

There is one good thing about the HMMWV that writers 50 years from now won't have to wonder about. They'll know where the name came from! **MR**

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MR SUMMARIES

Leadership at the Top— Insights For Aspiring Leaders by Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Retired)

Marine Corps Gazette, November 1990

"People in charge of very large or very complex organizations require a mindset of 'big leadership,'" says retired Major General Perry M. Smith. "A top leader must be a visionary (in other words, must be a committed, long-range planner), must think like an investment banker (looking at all the options carefully), must be a risk taker . . . must focus on much more than just the bottom line, and must be able to motivate people throughout many organizational layers." Smith adds that a top leader must delegate aggressively and empower subordinate leaders while avoiding "being a micromanager, a perfectionist, or a workaholic."

On ethics, Smith says, "Top leaders find that maintaining and strengthening high ethical standards is tough since there is much that is not black and white in high level jobs." He makes it clear that he believes high ethical standards must be maintained. He says, "Standards can slide downhill fast if people think the big boss is looking the other way, giving tacit approval to unethical behavior."

Smith outlines some skills for top leaders "that are not normally needed at lower levels of command." They include dictation, speed-reading and asking creative questions. He says dictation is "a marvelous way to get a lot of work done fast." On the skill of speed-reading, he says, "Top leaders who find they are captives of their overly full 'in boxes' can get out of their offices and spend more time with their troops if they become speed readers." One reason for creative questions is that "leaders need lots of feedback, and one way to get it is through skillful questioning."

Three creative questions suggested by Smith are: "What two or three events in your life had the greatest impact on you and your leadership style? Who is your leadership role model, and why did you pick that person? What is the best book you have ever read on leadership, and why did you find it so helpful?"

Smith also lays down some rules for long-range

planning. "The leader must give regular and direct access to the long-range planners." He says, "Whenever a decision is about to be made . . . the leader should ask, . . . 'What are the long-range implications?' " He further states that "long-range planning must include divestiture planning to ensure that obsolete ideas, organizations, and systems are quickly and clearly removed from the organization."

Dealing with Congress and the media is an ability that top leaders need, according to Smith. He says many organizations have media training programs and suggests top leaders participate in them. "As far as Congress is concerned, a day or two spent on Capitol Hill sitting in on hearings, visiting with Congressmen and top staffers, and gaining insights from legislative liaison people from your Service or agency is well worthwhile."

Smith next provides some insight on "four areas where leaders in the business world are doing extremely well." He says the military lags behind in these areas and "could learn some useful lessons." The "first is the use of electronic brainstorming. . . using computer work stations." He says, "Many ideas can be generated quickly . . . [and] since there is no attribution, those in the group with the wildest ideas do not feel constrained from typing them into the work station."

"Second, many large corporations excel in the general area of divestiture. . . They close down factories, discontinue product lines, and disestablish organizations in order to maintain efficiency and competitiveness. . . The military would have been better prepared for the tough cuts that will result from the dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union if divestiture had been an institutionalized process within the Department of Defense."

Using electronic (E) mail is the third area, according to Smith, "where top business leaders are making great strides . . ." He says, "E mail is often a considerably better way to communicate with other high officials than 'telephone tag' where busy officials spend much too much of their time, and the time of their outer office people, trying to make contact by phone."

"The fourth area of business leadership excellence is in the regular use of executive development seminars for top executives." The military "pro-

vides very little up-to-date and mind-stretching education for its senior colonels and for generals and admirals."

Of leadership challenges for the 1990s, Smith says, "Top leaders in the 1990s will find it necessary to decentralize and 'demass' organizations in order

to manage change, enhance creativity, and reduce excess layers and excess bureaucracy. Only the leaders who work hard at remaining vibrant and intellectually active will be able to provide the enlightened leadership that this Nation needs and deserves in the 1990s and beyond."—DGR

LETTERS

Increase International Officers' Contribution:

The January 1991 *Military Review* published Brigadier General (P) John E. Miller's vision for bringing the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) into concert with the changing nature of war and the changing nature of the world. I applaud these efforts and think that international officer (IO) participation at the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) could contribute greatly toward this goal. As an IO in the 1991 class, I can only be sure of my own impressions. But, in talking with other IOs and US students, I feel many of my observations could apply, as well, to other schools in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command system.

Every year, about 90 officers from more than 60 countries attend CGSOC. This unique group of students represents different histories, traditions, cultures and religions, with different doctrinal experiences and concepts of building and training the force. Their knowledge can contribute much in developing the US doctrine and tactics, especially as CGSOC shifts its focus from the Soviet threat to a more global perspective. As IOs are only 10 percent of the students, they easily disappear among the 1,100 US students, and there is not enough effort to gain their best contribution. Everyone loses. There are ways, though, to gain more from the IOs for the benefit of all.

First, there should be discussions in which some of the IOs are a part of the program (not only during the question part). IOs should be integrated not later than the beginning of the second quarter (the end of tactics/joint and combined operations). Their input should be a guideline for the faculty and not only a "by the way solution." For example, hours are spent learning about the problems of fighting with a multinational force, but no attempt is made to give IOs the opportunity to present the problem from a non-American point of view. This

was especially true during the Gulf War, even though almost all of the members of the Gulf War coalition were represented in CGSOC.

Second, IOs need to have the opportunity to present different ways of thinking to the class. For example, at the end of the tactics phase, it would be very interesting to conduct a panel in which some of the IOs present the ways estimates of the situation are done in their countries, comparing them and emphasizing the advantages and disadvantages in each case. Some professional topics need to be discussed from a worldwide perspective such as principles of war in the different armies, the best location of the commander in a given scenario and the interests of those IOs' countries participating in NATO. It might even be better if the student presenting a subject dealing with another country consulted with the IO from that country (if available). Besides IO classroom presentations, there is also a need for more specific interaction. It would be very beneficial if IO and US colleagues from the same branches of their different armies were to meet separately, at least twice a year.

Third, selected IOs should be allowed to present, from their cultural, political and military perspectives, the various wars already a part of the curriculum in which their countries were involved. It seems to me a great loss that students learn about the Falklands War from an American instructor instead of listening to presentations by the British and the Argentine IOs who attend the class almost every year. There are many more examples.

Fourth, wars and conflicts are not only a part of the past; presentations on current conflicts from around the world need to be made. Officers from those countries facing current conflicts are students at USACGSC. A lot could be gained from presentations given by the IOs from the affected countries. Some may even have personal experiences in such conflicts. As an example, the problem in the Kashmir area could be presented by the officers

from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Fifth, the presence of IOs during the electives that address their countries' interests is essential. Although some countries have only one representative, I am sure the NATO elective in the second term with the French IO in attendance would be much more beneficial than the same elective in the third term without the French officer! Nor is the "US Interest in the Pacific" elective as effective when the Japanese, Indian and Australian IOs are not present. The same is true of the Middle East elective that is not as informative when the Egyptian IO is not present. Also, the IOs' presence would be beneficial if any new courses are created about the religions of the world and the role of culture and history in the different countries' political and military systems.

Sixth, some electives should start during the first term to increase the interaction between the IOs and the US officers. It would also increase the interaction to change the members of the sections at least twice a year. Officers expected to be flexible enough to fight, with little notice, as part of a multinational force, will be able to handle the adjustment of changing staff sections twice a year. They will find more advantages than disadvantages in doing so, despite the subsidiary discomfort.

Seventh, the "Know Your World" (KYW) program, in which IOs present, in an open forum, a picture of their country, is an excellent program for the families and members of the community. Some KYW presentations by the IOs should even be a mandatory part of the curriculum. Many US officers will serve in Korea, Germany and the Philippines. Students could gain a lot from the IOs' presentations on the cultural, political and military aspects of these countries. From personal experience, I know how important it is for an officer to have a good knowledge of the country to which he is assigned.

Especially today, with the Soviet Union facing waning political power, the United States as the world's only real superpower can expect stronger ties with more and more countries. It is very important that US students learn as much as possible about the world from the native perspective. The IOs could be a unique source of information, if given the opportunity.

What is the most important lesson to be gained from the IOs? It is essential to think from an international or particular country's viewpoint when estimating a situation or making a problem assessment. I think that, by adopting my suggestions, we would see the school and particularly the US students thinking about other regions/countries of

the world in the natives' terms. We will then be able to begin talking about Saddam Hussein's personal interest in the gulf and not the interests of Iraq.

No doubt, more IO intervention will demand more of their time and effort, but I think the IOs would be glad to do it. A further reduction in obligations is unnecessary. There is no cost associated with these suggestions. With good planning, these suggestions could be implemented and would support Miller's vision for the future of USACGSC. The sooner the better for the benefit of all of us!

LTC Avi Harari, *Israel Defense Force, USACGSC*

The recommendations listed in this letter were presented to the deputy commandant, USACGSC. They are being reviewed and considered for implementation by the USACGSC's staff and faculty.—Editor.

ALBF's Victory Criteria

The AirLand Battle-Future (ALBF) articles in the February 1991 *Military Review* initiate a dialogue that should result in a doctrine designed to terminate a conflict on terms desired by the United States.

There are many bothersome and worrying aspects of the new doctrine that I am sure will be sorted out as the US Army studies the new doctrine and responds to articles such as A. J. Bacevich's "New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism" in the Summaries section of the same issue. In the process of sorting out the doctrine, the Army should consider a battle's purpose. In other words, "what are the conditions that will cause 'victory' to be achieved?" In defining victory or establishing victory criteria, one will have to look beyond the battlefield to the national political and military objectives.

Fred C. Ikle, in his book, *Every War Must End*, determines that the key element of terminating a conflict on favorable terms is to cause the opponent's leadership, or some element of it, to change the opponent's objectives; that is, to eliminate the conflict's cause. If we accept this, then our doctrine should focus on the ways to make this happen. Our doctrine should be designed to attack the enemy's strategy, as Sun Tzu argues, rather than to conduct mobile operations that are force-oriented.

The nonlinear battlefield described in the February issue reminds one of the Napoleonic wars in Europe in which armies were continually marching to position themselves on the battlefield, fix the enemy (ideally, on unfavorable terrain) and, then,

fight a short and violent linear battle. Although technology has advanced considerably, resulting in greatly different time-distance factors and increased amounts of information, tomorrow's battlefield sounds very similar to the Napoleonic wars. This, coupled with the conflict termination issue raised above, is the critical failing of the proposed ALBF doctrine.

I strongly suggest doctrine writers carefully examine the post-Cold War/Gulf War world as they revise ALBF. The shape of Europe and the situation in the Third World suggest any conflict in the future that is not low intensity will go through several phases:

- The defense phase in which primarily indigenous forces are defending against a potential aggressor and the United States is conducting a military show of force to dissuade or deter the aggressor from beginning offensive military operations.

- The defense and lodgment phase in which a joint US or host nation force is defending while the United States builds its forces and targets with the appropriate element of power, the group that can change the opponent's objectives.

- The offensive phase in which attacks are conducted, not necessarily against the opposing force but against the opponent's strategy and its political center of gravity as it has been translated onto the battlefield.

This very rudimentary but complex set of thoughts suggests that, before casting ALBF into "concrete," there is a need to rethink it in light of the emerging political reality that will be the 21st century and the concepts suggested by the developed definition of "victory."

COL Bruce B. G. Clarke, USA, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

According to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, the official name for the AirLand Battle-Future concept, as used in our February 1991 issue, is now AirLand Operations. The latest version of the concept is presented in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army (Final Draft), 13 June 1991, which is currently being distributed.—Editor.

Standards of Review

In the August 1990 *Military Review*, you published Daniel J. Hughes' review of Bruce I. Gudmundsson's book, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918*. In Hughes' review, he makes a number of very serious accusations against the book and its author. For instance, Hughes says, "Gud-

mundsson's study is filled with basic errors of every sort." Later on he says, "This book has numerous cases of shoddy scholarship, individual errors of fact and shortcomings in research. . . . Effective historical scholarship has its own standards, and this book fails to live up to any of them." There are numerous other derogatory comments.

However, if one takes Hughes' specific accusations and compares them with what Gudmundsson actually said, Hughes' accusations break down. Of Hughes' seven specific accusations against Gudmundsson, only one, a minor point, represents an actual error on Gudmundsson's part. In three cases, Hughes accuses Gudmundsson of failing to handle sources correctly when, in fact, Gudmundsson handles them correctly and professionally. In another three cases, Hughes takes a comment of Gudmundsson's out of context, mentions some additional material that contradicts Hughes' (mistaken) impression of what Gudmundsson was saying and concludes that Gudmundsson has made a major historical blunder.

The first substantive accusation Hughes makes is that "Gudmundsson sets the tone of his study by assuming that in 1914 the Germans (and others) sought victory 'at the operational level' rather than by winning battles. This makes good reading for those who wish to justify the current emphasis on this concept, but it is utterly without foundation in the theory and practice of the Prusso-German army." Hughes is wrong when he says operational art is "utterly without foundation in the theory and practice of the Prusso-German army." The German official history of the world war, *Der Weltkrieg*, frequently uses the terms "operations" (*operationen*) and "operational" (*operativ*) in the same sense we would use them today: movements and actions of significance to the campaign's outcome. It is true the Germans did not talk about operational considerations in terms of "levels of war" (such as tactical, operational and strategic) which is an Anglicism that probably grew out of the "spectrum of conflict" notion.

It is not a scholarship requirement to explain the past solely within the concepts and terms in use at the time of the historical event. Reformation histories, for instance, would read much differently if historians could only use the concepts and rhetoric of the Reformation itself. In his introduction, page xv, Gudmundsson defined his terms: "One of the central ideas of this book is the distinction between *operational art* and *tactics*. For the most part, I have used both words in a way consistent with current US Army doctrine as promulgated in the 1982 edition of [US Army Field

Manual FM 100-5, *Operations*."

What apparently sets Hughes off on this issue are the opening lines in Gudmundsson's book: "In keeping with the predictions of the experts, World War I began as a war of grand maneuvers in which each side sought victory at the operational level. In such a war, the art of tactics, concerned with winning battles, was far less important than operational art, concerned with winning campaigns." That point is seen explicitly on page 13 of Gudmundsson's work when he says, "In the decades before the outbreak of war the German General Staff had, in concentrating its collective attention on operational problems, relegated tactics to the status of a subsidiary art." Considering the book's topic, this is a reasonable point for Gudmundsson to make and part of the picture he draws of tactics' development in the German army.

Hughes, however, states that German military literature emphasized battles over strategy or operations and claims this invalidates Gudmundsson's point concerning the lack of emphasis on tactics in German military thought. This is not the case. It is perfectly clear what Gudmundsson meant by tactics in this instance—advancing forward against enemy fire. The concern with the battle (*die Schlacht*), in the German military literature, involved more than just tactics. In his "Instructions to the Higher Troop Commanders" (1869), the elder Count Helmuth von Moltke considered the battle's outcome to be, in part, a result of both the initial deployment and the campaign maneuvers. At the same time, the battle's outcome affected the campaign's continuation.

Hughes takes the concept of "the battle" in German military thought and simply equates it with tactics. Hughes then asserts, "German theory, which did not recognize levels of war as current Western armies know them, consistently emphasized battles over operations." (emphasis added) (This is a very questionable assertion concerning "German theory.") By noting the relative neglect of tactics, per se, by the German General Staff, Gudmundsson has, according to Hughes, done a great disservice: "An uninformed reader thus runs the danger of being entirely misled not only about German concepts but about the controversy over them." This seems unlikely, unless these uninformed readers repeat Hughes' somewhat convoluted chain of reasoning on this issue. Writers should not be taken to task for things they did not say or arguments they did not make, unless the point in question is relevant to the work's thesis, which is not the case here.

Hughes goes on: "Gudmundsson's lack of knowledge of the Prussian army becomes ever more

obvious, as his book progresses. He argues that Prussian guards officers, whose main function allegedly was to decorate social events, shunned serious study of military affairs to the point of professional incompetence." Hughes goes on to cite the relative success of guards infantry officers in gaining admission to the War Academy, a success that is well established. Hughes is apparently referring to Gudmundsson's account of the attack of four of the eight Prussian guards regiments at the First Battle of Ypres where the guardsmen formed thick skirmish lines and advanced into British rifle, artillery and some machinegun fire, with predictably heavy casualties.

In addition to some comments on the social role and reputation of the guards officers, Gudmundsson commented that "in the long peace that preceded the outbreak of war, officers of the Imperial Guard and other prestigious units displayed an unfortunate distaste for the serious study of the military profession." The proof of this assertion would seem to be the tactics the guards officers used in the battle Gudmundsson was discussing at the time. (Perhaps all of the tactically advanced guards officers had won admission into the War Academy and were no longer serving with the guards.)

Hughes correctly takes Gudmundsson to task for stating only War Academy graduates could command beyond the regimental level. Attending the War Academy helped in attaining higher commands, but it was not a prerequisite.

Hughes is wrong when he says, "Readers should also pay no attention to Gudmundsson's explanation of the differences between *Befehl* (any order, written or oral, from any level to a subordinate level) and *Auftrag* (a task contained in an order). Although Gudmundsson makes a major point of an alleged difference (along the lines of William Lind and the extreme advocates of 'maneuver warfare'), he cites no evidence and ignores a vast amount of contemporary and historical literature that might have informed his discussion."

Gudmundsson does cite evidence for his views on this issue. I refer Hughes to page 149 of *Storm-troop Tactics* where Gudmundsson cites (twice) the *Ausbildungsvorschrift fuer die Fussstruppen im Kriege*, 2. Entwurf ("Instructional Manual for the Foot Troops in War, 2d Draft" [1918]), concerning when commanders should command through orders (*Befehle*) and when through missions or tasks (*Auftraege*). Far from being an emanation from "William Lind and the extreme advocates of 'maneuver warfare,'" the distinction between an order and a mission was well-rooted in the German military literature of the period. Considering that Hughes

accuses Gudmundsson of not reading his sources ("He tends to quote sources he apparently has not seen and to make the most daring generalizations without reference to any source or thought process."), one can hardly excuse Hughes for missing Gudmundsson's comments on this point.

Another Hughes quarrel with Gudmundsson's book begins: "Gudmundsson's efforts to link the tactical changes of 1917 to 1918 with later blitzkrieg warfare and the operations of large, armored formations is especially inaccurate." Again, Hughes demolishes an argument that Gudmundsson does not make. Gudmundsson's only comments remotely relating to this issue consist of a single paragraph on page 178. Gudmundsson repeats the, by now, commonplace observation that the German problem with their attacks in 1918 was not in their ability to make a tactical breakthrough but in their inability to exploit the breakthrough, due to their lack of motorized transport. Gudmundsson quite correctly points out that the coming of the fully motorized panzer division would solve this problem.

Elsewhere, Hughes takes Gudmundsson to task for using two secondary sources for his brief discussion of the 1888 edition of the German infantry regulations, although there is no indication that looking at the original would have added anything of value to the points Gudmundsson wished to make. Further, the two secondary sources are "mainly concerned with other subjects." Does Hughes really wish to say that historians should only draw information from sources in areas conforming to the original author's main concern?

Finally, Hughes says, "His [Gudmundsson's] treatment of the 1906 edition of the German infantry regulation gives the reader the wrong impression of that document. His views on how the regulation was applied in the units have little, if any, basis in the extensive literature on that topic." It is not clear precisely what Hughes means by this. However, Gudmundsson does show, more extensively and comprehensively than any single source in any language, what happened when the regulations of 1906 were applied in 1914.

None of Hughes' not very telling criticisms of *Stormtroop Tactics* really apply to the book's theme: the development of German infantry tactics in World War I. For 70 years now, there has been a great deal of interest in German "infiltration tactics" (which Gudmundsson more properly and historically calls "Stormtroop tactics," from the German *Stosstrupptaktik*) based upon a very thin research base. As a result, a lot of misconceptions and outright nonsense has been prevalent.

Gudmundsson's comprehensive research in a

wide variety of official sources, primary and secondary accounts, and a number of regimental histories put the subject on a solid footing. Gudmundsson uses his sources to get beyond the surface to the compelling story of the development of World War I German infantry tactics, including the institutional and cultural factors that affected this development. This book is a quantum advance over anything that has gone before, and anyone with more than a passing interest in tactics, let alone World War I German infantry tactics, ought to read it.

There is remarkably little agreement between what Hughes says *Stormtroop Tactics* says and what the book actually says, even when the highly selective nature of Hughes' review is considered. As Hughes points out, "Effective historical scholarship has its own standards." Presumably, one of them is that there should be some agreement between what a source says and what the historian says it says (or means). If Hughes is going to set himself up as a guardian of historical standards, perhaps he should consider adhering to that standard, even when reviewing a book he does not like.

Bradley J. Meyer, *School of Advanced Warfighting,*
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"I Stand by My Review"

Although I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Bradley J. Meyer's letter in defense of his fellow faculty member, I regret that this unsavory and unpleasant business is necessary. I have already had my say on Bruce I. Gudmundsson's book and do not desire to continue the discussion. I stand by my review and could cite another list of the book's problems but will direct my comments only to those larger issues raised by Meyer.

Meyer considers my criticism of Gudmundsson's argument that the German army sought victory at the "operational level" unfounded. He correctly states that German literature uses the term "*operativ*." He then assumes that the German term must be the equivalent of the modern "operational level of war," even though he admits that the Germans did not use the term. Such an assumption is unfounded. The German use of *operativ* is much more limited and not seen as a level between tactics and strategy. Meyer then quotes Gudmundsson's statement that the book uses *operativ* in the same sense as does the 1982 edition of US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. That is my point. Forcefully pouring the German army of 1914 and its theory into the terminological and structural mold of the vastly different US Army of today is not good

historical writing.

As an aside, I also disagree with Meyer's suggestion that the modern concept of levels of war originated in the "spectrum of conflict" notion. The development of high-, mid- or low-intensity conflict ideas had nothing whatsoever to do with the early ideas of "levels of war." It was the Russian/Soviet interpretation and modification of German concepts that produced rigid levels of war. These levels were reinforced and brought to the US Army by some of our civilian and military defense intellectuals and reformers. This subject has been carefully explained with regard to the Russian army and less so for US military thought. Many of us would welcome any effort Meyer might make in investigating this further.

Meyer's analogy of the Reformation is an interesting one. Of course, historians can and do create intellectual categories not used by earlier authors; however, the historian is not at liberty to give old words and concepts new meanings to conform to current thinking. *Justitia dei* had a very specific meaning for Martin Luther, just as *operativ* did for Count Helmuth von Moltke and many other writers. We must deal with the terms and concepts as their authors meant them. Meyer's line of reasoning would, in effect, extend the evils of deconstructionism to military history, hardly an enviable innovation.

Meyer then questions my criticisms of the book's assertion that the Germans emphasized tactics over strategy or operations. He refers to a vague statement by Moltke that the battle had to be part of the "campaign maneuvers." (I doubt Moltke ever used the term. It had an almost pejorative meaning in the German literature.) Moltke and many other German writers frequently argued that a tactical victory should cause strategic considerations to recede into the background. Meyer and Gudmundsson have this point exactly backward. The Germans were always willing to change their plans to achieve or accommodate a great tactical victory. As I explained in the review, this is related to what Jehudah Wallach has termed the "dogma of the battle of annihilation," which was the basis of all German planning and, in the view of most historians, important in the failures of the very offensives of 1918 that are at the core of the book.

Meyer writes that he does not know what I meant when I wrote that the book's treatment of the 1906 infantry regulations has little, if any, basis in the literature on that subject. What I mean is that Gudmundsson did not read any of the numerous studies and commentaries, even a book or two, on that regulation and its place in the evolution of

Prussian tactics. Since the book makes a major point of attacking the regulation, the author should have read into the contemporary and subsequent literature to deepen his understanding.

Meyer then raises the question of the "professionalism" of the guards infantry officers. He ignores my statistical evidence showing how the guards officers prepared vigorously and competed for positions at the War Academy and on the General Staff. They succeeded far beyond their proportion of the total officer corps. Instead, Meyer simply asserts that, since their assault in the battle Gudmundsson cites was unsuccessful, they must have been tactically incompetent and disinterested. It would be interesting to study just how many of Prussia's (and later Germany's) best thinkers and commanders came from the Prussian guards infantry regiments. By the way, there was no such thing as the "Imperial Guard," which Meyer and Gudmundsson are so fond of criticizing. They were the Royal Prussian Guards, and they were the hard core of the Prussian army.

Meyer's suggestion that perhaps all of their best officers went to the War Academy and that no good ones remained does not reflect the reality of the Prussian army. Most of its high commanders were both guards officers and General Staff officers. Meyer does not understand that one could be both as were, for example, Erich von Manstein, Paul von Hindenburg, Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven and others. The problem is that neither Meyer nor Gudmundsson differentiates between the guards infantry and the guards cavalry—a serious oversight considering the book is about the infantry.

Next, we come to the question of *Befehl* and *Auftrag*. On the basis of a draft regulation, Gudmundsson and Meyer develop an elaborate theory that an order triggers a battle drill while reference to an *Auftrag* (task) does not. An order, written or oral, contains an *Auftrag*, which is the task assigned by the higher commander. An order is more detailed and specific than a directive, usually used at high levels of command only. But that is not the issue here.

In several paragraphs, Meyer questions my criticism of Gudmundsson's use of the various editions of the basic infantry regulations. My point was simple and remains unrefuted. Gudmundsson cites and criticizes the 1888 regulations. He does not cite any of the very extensive German commentary on them. The 1888 regulations broke with the very formal parade ground tactics of the regulations of 1847 and were a major step forward. I know of no scholar who questions that.

He cites the 1906 regulations as being very back-

ward. This is equally unfounded. They were not the modern regulations of the postwar period, but again, most observers regarded them as a further step forward. It is true, however, that not all Prussian units had fully adopted them by 1914. I did not and do not dispute that. My argument is simply that the book misunderstands their place in the evolution of European infantry tactics because it has no broad context in which it might place them. This, like so many problems in this book, goes back to the lack of thorough research.

Let me conclude on the more positive note, evident even in my sharply critical review. Gudmundsson's book is correct in many areas. He is skillful in describing combat at lower levels. He is adept at using many of the sources he cited. The

book is superior in many areas to Timothy T. Luffe's *Leavenworth Paper No. 4, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. Nevertheless, the book lacks a long-term perspective on the evolution of the Prussian army's theory and its infantry tactics.

The author did not use important sources available in the German archives. He has not cited much of the literature readily available. His citations are not professional and indicate a lack of knowledge of the structure of the Prussian army and of basic scholarly procedures. I can have no confidence in even the better parts of a book with so many evident flaws.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE COMMANDERS by Bob Woodward. 398 pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York. 1991. \$24.95.

The Commanders is an interesting book. It gives us a peek inside the decision-making process at the highest political and military levels of the United States. Using the Panama invasion of 1990 (Operation *Just Cause*) and the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 (Operation *Desert Shield/Desert Storm*) as the principal focusing events, Bob Woodward gives us an insider's view of the process of formulating the decision to commit military force to attain strategic objectives.

The style is journalistic, gossipy and undocumented. The prose is hurried (the book was produced within weeks of the Gulf War's termination), sometimes poorly edited and occasionally incomprehensible (the author sometimes puts the words of others in quotes and sometimes mixes them into his own narrative). Factual matter the author considers peripheral to the events he is describing (for example, VII Corps' composition and the doctrinal themes of US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*) is not checked but instead taken at face value according to the statement of the (undocumented) source. But, all in all, the work is fascinating.

Why is that? It is not because the book reveals the military is involved in the political process or major players disagree over the best course of action. That, after all, is the natural order of things. Who would want unanimity in discussing major strategic issues? When the stakes are high, present-

ing all sides of an argument is crucial. Sound advice should precede decisive action, and that advice should be given freely and straightforwardly.

For the most part, that is what we see the people Woodward describes doing. Sometimes they hedge their bets. Sometimes they sense the air in their rarefied environment before exposing their own views. The process is political in the true sense of the word—grappling with the issues, give and take, lining up supporters and circumscribing opponents. In the end, the positions are fleshed out and a decision is reached, and we would hope, coming via a democratic process, it is the best one.

What makes this a fascinating read is twofold. First is the informality of the system. The circle of decision makers at the top is small, their interaction intimate. Sometimes they seem woefully uninformed ("Where is Mecca?" Woodward has White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu asking). Always the center of power within the group is shifting (Sununu to James A. Baker to Dick Cheney to Brent Scowcroft to General Colin L. Powell, back and forth and round again). The president emerges as firm and decisive but willing to enter into the debate throughout the process. All of them seem immensely human, affected by emotion, politics and personal philosophies, committed to the best interests of the nation they lead but cognizant of the institutions in which they serve and, thereby, influenced in their advocacies.

Second is the politics of the book itself. These are

sophisticated, worldly men about whom Woodward is writing. The author himself has been around the political block a few times. He is a longtime reporter on the Washington scene, a central figure in the Watergate episode, the coauthor of a major work on the Supreme Court—*The Brethren*—and author of another on the Central Intelligence Agency—*Veil*. Yet, it is not clear who is using whom in his work. It is his peek inside the decision-making process, after all, not ours. He is describing events, reading the body language, adding the nuance and explaining the outcomes. He is telling us what he sees through the keyhole. But he is not seeing it himself. Others are telling him what they saw through their own keyholes. It is their peek first and his only through them. They get to put their own spin on it—at best, colored by personal perspectives that may or may not be what others saw and, at worst, intentionally distorted to that Woodward and, ultimately, we see only what they want us to see.

As a result, the images become somewhat stilted. The dialogues are simplistic. On Cheney's selection as secretary of defense after John Tower was denied that position by the Senate: "Bush called [Cheney]. 'Let's do it,' Bush said. 'Okay, Mr. President.'"

On US Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak's views on the Operation Desert Storm plan: "He believed in air power as much as the departed General [Michael J.] Dugan, and felt the other services had gone way overboard in their deployments. The Marines were too willing to build another Iwo Jima Memorial for their dead comrades. The Navy didn't need six aircraft carriers for the operation, and the Army certainly didn't need the VII Corps. Ground forces would be needed so someone could walk into Saddam's office with a bayonet and make him sign the surrender papers, but not much more. But McPeak was keeping his mouth shut." (Good thing. If Woodward has it right, the president would hardly have been impressed with this level of analysis!)

On Soviet-US military relations: "[Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral William J.] Crowe [Jr.] and [the Soviet General Staff Chief Marshal Sergey] Akhromeyev had hit it off personally. Both believed it was too easy for politicians to let a misunderstanding throw the superpowers over the brink to nuclear war They set up a secret, private communications channel, with the understanding that each was to contact the other if he saw any hostile, dangerous or confusing action by the other side that might lead to war." (If this is true, we seem to have a major breach of political control over the military, an article of faith in this country, at least.)

Also missing is what the rest of the world was doing while the inner circle was making the momentous decisions. If you follow Woodward's line, one or two key people draw up the plans, conduct the debate, make the decision and execute the mission. General Maxwell R. Thurman goes to Panama and has the plans redone. National Security Adviser Scowcroft tells the president they are at a "Y" in the road; either we continue to deter and defend in the gulf or we develop an offensive option. Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl E. Vuono convinces General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to accept the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) in theater. In truth, a great number of people, ideas and events contribute to developing and selecting options. Plans evolve, decisions are sometimes forced by events and courses of action are often delimited by practical and political constraints.

For example, the JSTARS decision—considered a success—has a number of claimants. The strategic lash-up in the gulf includes a myriad of deliberate actions along the northern tier (read Turkey and Syria) that get little or no mention in the book. The development of an offensive option against Iraq has a genesis traceable to many concepts and individuals present even in the early days of the crisis. The plans in US Southern Command do not blossom anew post-Thurman. They evolve from what was already available, updated as much by changing realities in Panama and the United States as by the inclinations of any single commander in chief.

So, who is using Woodward to tell his own story—seeking in the postwar's early days the credit for the glory and the exoneration for the blame? And who is Woodward using to get his version out first, before the onrush of articles, monographs, papers and lectures? Taken too seriously, there is a danger in a book like this. It makes assertions of fact without any evidence to prove (or refute) them. It is not history, it is journalism—and poor journalism at that.

But what is history? Sir Michael Howard in his book, *The Lessons of History*, tells us there is no such thing as "history." "History is what historians write, and historians are part of the process they are writing about." Woodward is a journalist, but as a first author on the strategic decision making to the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, he has put out a historical claim. As such, good history or not, it is worth a read. As I said at the outset, *The Commanders* is an interesting book.

COL James R. McDonough, USA, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC

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EUROPE AFTER AN AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL: Economic and Military Issues. Edited by Jane M. O. Sharp. 501 pages. Oxford University Press, New York. 1990. \$76.00.

US military forces are leaving Europe. This is a certainty. The only questions remaining are to what extent and to what end? The purpose of this book is to examine how such a withdrawal will affect Europe's defensive capability and the United States' global power status. The impressively effective results belong on the reading list of all strategic planners and policy developers.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent body financed by the Swedish Parliament. In this study, SIPRI posits that NATO has a military, political, social and economic impact on Europe. How these factors are affected by a changing US commitment is examined by an array of international contributors, expert in the field of military economics or planning.

The changing US commitment is described in two options. Option A is withdrawing and demobilizing European-based forces. Option B returns withdrawing forces to US bases with a "return to Europe" mission. Impacts of each option are then explored for each European country in NATO. What are the economic, political and social costs and benefits? What is the impact on US contingency planning for a European defense? Will equipment standardization and interoperability be a casualty?

Of particular concern is the impact on US power projection of abandoning the European bases. Is the presence of US forces needed to ensure deterrence? Is forward basing necessary to adequately respond to military contingencies outside of Europe (VII Corps and Operation *Desert Storm*)?

This work raises many more questions and causes considerable reflection. And, befitting the range of possible scenarios, no single result is favored over another. That is its strength. Each author presents extensive evidence, supported by richly detailed documentation of sources, in developing a valid description of the withdrawal implications. Fortunately, numerous charts are provided for those who will argue the authors' interpretations.

This latest publication of SIPRI is timely, relevant and needed. For many questions, the underlying assumptions have become facts (reunification and Conventional Forces in Europe). Articles such as the 9 February 1991 *Janes' Defence Weekly* article: "Gulf War: European Unity Fails Its First Test" will cause other assumptions to be questioned. Surely these power-projection issues will be raised in the

aftermath of Operation *Desert Storm*. I recommend this valuable research tool for all involved in the strategic planning of US power projection.

MAJ David A. Rubenstein, USA, Medical Services Corps, Falls Church, Virginia

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CONTROL OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST by Aaron Karp. 32 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1990. \$7.95.

While Scud missiles recently rained on Tel Aviv, Israel, from Iraq, the world wondered: How did the Iraqis gain such a ballistic missile buildup? From where did the technology come? What type of missile capabilities do other Middle East nations own? What can be done to halt proliferation in the future? In a short 32 pages, Aaron Karp answers these questions and suggests a possible solution.

Karp, a US arms control specialist and leader of the arms trade project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, explains the past road map of nuclear missile proliferation in the Middle East and suggests the future critical route that will occur if that proliferation is not stopped. In the wake of Operation *Desert Storm*, Karp's thesis deserves attention.

To stem the flowing tide of communism into developing Third World countries after World War II, the United States ostensibly sold selected emerging nations missile technology for high-altitude atmospheric research. The Soviet Union quickly countered with sales to other emerging nations. After the 1973 Middle East War where ballistic missiles were an integral part of Egypt's and Israel's arsenals, the United States realized its missile sales could be used for nuclear purposes and began to curb missile technology sales to all Middle East nations except Israel.

However, by then, missile arms sales were a major export of the Soviet Union (40 to 50 percent), and it was not so willing to curb its profits. The Middle East nations, now cut off from US sales, sought missile technology from European nations or the black market. The results were the 1987 to 1988 Scud B attacks between Iran and Iraq. Ironically, says Karp, this buildup came when the two Western superpowers were "putting the finishing touches on the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]."

Karp outlines US and Soviet policies for exporting this technology to such a volatile and hypergolic area of the world. The United States helped

create the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1985. To limit nuclear proliferation, the United States was willing to sacrifice its economic market for military security. Yet, Europeans were not willing to do so, and China and the Soviet Union refused to join. Although the Soviets would not sell SS-12 or SS-23 (battlefield support missile weapon systems) technology for fear of placing Moscow in range of Middle East intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Frog-7 and Scud missile technology continued to flow to the Middle East.

As this buildup occurred, and not being able to buy Pershing missiles from the United States, the Israelis continued to work toward nuclear and ICBM capabilities. "The Israeli ballistic missile arsenal is becoming perhaps the most important single issue shaping future U.S. policy on missile proliferation," says Karp, and "the United States' unwillingness to act to restrain Israeli ballistic missiles undermines the legitimacy of its efforts" to control other Middle East nations' missile forces, "especially in the eyes of the Arab world."

Karp suggests a post-INF agreement for short-range missile forces. This agreement, says Karp, would be a face-saving measure for the Soviets to halt their sales but concedes it will not stop the "growing regional indigenous missile capabilities."

Though suggested in 1990, Karp's thesis remains credible. This work is a *Cliff Notes*, of sorts, for anyone interested in the Middle East arms race and deserves attention in this standoff over ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East.

CPT Phil Osborne, USAF, Department of History,
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DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN ON LEADERSHIP. Edited by Stuart W. Smith. 262 pages. Naval War College Press, Newport, RI. 1990.

Today, Shelby Foote is probably the best-known living Civil War historian, at least since the extraordinary Public Broadcasting System documentary of the Civil War last fall. In the middle years of the century, the field, at least insofar as the history of the late Confederacy, was dominated in the popular mind by Douglas Southall Freeman. Freeman was the longtime editor of the *Richmond News Leader*, biographer of Robert E. Lee, and author of *Lee's Lieutenants* and a seven-volume biography of George Washington that won him a second Pulitzer Prize. Freeman was "no journalistic historian." He had a 1908 Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University, considered by many to have been, at that time, the cradle of "professional" historical scholarship in the United States.

This volume, edited by Lieutenant Commander Stuart W. Smith of the *Naval War College Review* provides an excellent addition to the massive Freeman corpus and a welcome addition to the available works on military leadership. It also reminds the historian of the vacancy on the shelf where there should stand a biography of that extraordinary Southern scholar.

The son of a veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, Freeman personally knew many veterans and generals of that army. He was dedicated to preserving and recording its history. Indeed, the most moving lecture recorded is one written for his father when the elder Freeman served as commander in chief of the United Confederate Veterans.

Freeman obviously belonged to the "great man" school of historical interpretation. He belonged, also, to an age when leadership was considered a part of the discipline of ethics more than a field of behavioral science. These views may not be consistent with contemporary academic fads, but events of the past year or two have shown that they are not entirely without merit to who would understand his or her world and the motivation of men. One need only examine the changes in Central Europe or contrast the command of Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* with that of the Vietnam War to see clearly that the person does matter and that ethical values, character and integrity are not entirely passé.

These essays were speeches mainly delivered at the various institutes of higher professional military education, notably the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; and the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, during the time Freeman was writing his great biographies. They address attributes of leadership and character, using Abraham Lincoln, Lee and Washington as exemplars. While there is clearly some repetition in the conclusions drawn, each speech is unique, for Freeman felt obliged to change his perspective point each year rather than bore those who had heard him address the topics before. Aside from the historical lessons taught and the ethical principles defended, these speeches tell us a great deal about that extraordinary man of character who was the speaker himself.

Freeman's text is complemented by the editor's thorough explanatory footnotes; splendid introductory essays by the editor and Admiral James B. Stockdale; a chronology of the Army of Northern Virginia; and an appendix containing Lincoln's second inaugural address, Lee's farewell to the Army of Northern Virginia and Washington's resignation

of his commission.

This is a book that should be read by all who follow the profession of arms.

COL Richard M. Swain,
Third US Army Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AMERICA ON THE ICE: Antarctic Policy Issues by Frank G. Klotz, 345 pages. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC. 1990. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.)

Do current operations on the ice adequately support future US economic and security interests in the Antarctic region? This is the primary policy issue that Colonel Frank G. Klotz, US Air Force, attempts to address. This issue is not esoteric. Starting in 1991, the Antarctic Treaty—the international agreement that has effectively suspended the many national claims to Antarctic sovereignty and assured more than 30 years of peaceful scientific cooperation on the last continent—will be open to review upon demand by any of the current 22 consultative nations.

Going beyond whether the Antarctic Treaty system will remain intact under the pressures of potential resource exploitation, Klotz examines both the likely treaty challenges and alternative US responses to a collapse or modification of the present arrangement. He concludes that current US Antarctic operations are sufficient to support basic scientific research, but they are inadequate to determine whether there really are exploitable resources under the ice and to ensure the United States could prevent a scramble by other nations to carve up the continent.

US interests are extensive, but in accordance with the US-sponsored treaty signed in 1959, military participation in Antarctic operations is confined to logistics and support. Nevertheless, security and diplomatic issues have always been the prime incentive supporting the \$131 million polar program run by the National Science Foundation (NSF). Seven nations (a number of which are in conflict with each other) have made formal territorial claims in the Antarctic, and 13 others are positioned to do so. Ironically, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union—which together make up the largest on-ice operations—has formally claimed any part of the continent, although both have reserved that right in response to the other national claims held in abeyance by the treaty.

Klotz argues that current NSF efforts to reduce operating costs by hiring civilian contractors to replace US Navy and Air Force logistics support may

hurt future US diplomatic efforts to thwart treaty disruption. Instead, he proposes a joint military command to upgrade present military support for scientific logistics with newer equipment and facilities. In his view, current operations, under direction of the Navy, constitute a less-than-priority effort.

America on the Ice is the best one-volume source on US Antarctic policy, the details of the treaty system and an assessment of future issues. Unlike other books on the topic, Klotz describes the treaty system for what it is—an effective US-led effort to formalize peaceful scientific cooperation in a forbidding and uneconomic region. He does not attempt to portray it as a model for arms control, demilitarization or resource protection in any other area except the unique, frozen, stateless and largely uninhabited extreme south. As the author and others fear, the discovery of exploitable resources may lead to the collapse of this successful, though limited, system, creating future security issues.

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Stanford, California

THE NSC STAFF: Counseling the Council by Christopher C. Shoemaker. 131 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1991. \$29.95.

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed into law the National Security Act creating, among other institutions, the National Security Council (NSC). Intended to acknowledge the mounting complexity of the postwar world through streamlining and formalizing the ad hoc wartime strategy and policy-making agencies, the NSC never lived up to its potential or kept up with rapidly changing national security needs.

The reason, postulates Christopher C. Shoemaker in *The NSC Staff*, is that the NSC has throughout its existence been the president's creature, tailored to his personal concept of roles and structure, reflecting in its employment the president's leadership style. As a result, neither the position of the assistant to the president for national security affairs nor the size and configuration of the supporting NSC staff have been adequately defined. This defect contributed to a system that, though unwieldy and inefficient at times, was mostly workable in earlier, simpler days. Now, says Shoemaker, as the nation stands poised on the threshold of the 21st century, the system no longer serves its minimum security requirements.

Shoemaker, a military officer and former NSC staff member in President Jimmy Carter's adminis-

tration, maintains the structural weaknesses and the absence of well-defined guidelines led to the Iran-Contra affair and other avoidable security policy setbacks. To repair these defects, he would strengthen the national security adviser position by formally recognizing the position's two coequal functions as head of the president's crisis management center and as principal adviser on all national security matters. He would also define the principal functions of the NSC staff, embodying them in a presidential "national security directive" at each new administration's outset.

This slim volume is not a detailed study of the NSC nor of the NSC staff. Rather, in broad outline, it is a top-level summary of that body's structural and institutional flaws. Primarily, it is a vehicle for the author's ideas of structural, managerial and administrative reform. Within this limited scope, Shoemaker argues his case ably, if not exhaustively.

The reader looking for insight into the NSC's inner workings or for the ways such highly visible special assistants as McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski or John Poindexter dealt with the NSC's limitations and imperfections will not find it here. As the author acknowledges late in his treatment, it is a discussion of "systems, structures, and organizations," not of people. Therefore, it is more a specialist's book than one of interest to the general military reader.

LTC Patrick H. Gorman, USA, Retired,
Winter Springs, Florida

PERESTROIKA AND SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY by Michael McCWire. 481 pages. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 1991. \$39.95 clothbound. \$18.95 paperback.

In these days of patriotic parades and American flags displayed almost everywhere, it is difficult to read a book with such anti-American and pro-Soviet flavoring. If you are interested in blaming the US government for the Cold War and in absolving the Soviets from any responsibility whatsoever, then *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* is essential reading.

Michael McCWire heroically attempts to convince the reader that the Reagan administration's confrontational policies in the first half of the 1980s actually hindered the development of democratic policies in Soviet bloc countries and a peaceful international environment. This, then, distorted Soviet foreign policy behavior and led to the escalation of the Cold War. As a result, the Soviet Union was not able to focus on economic reforms. Initially, McCWire's argument may seem convinc-

ing, but his rationale fails for several reasons.

McCWire walks many miles through history before leading up to his thesis. Identifying Mikhail Gorbachev as a pioneer on the frontier of economic *perestroika*, he paints former President Ronald Reagan and his administration as hawks, fooling the American public into thinking that the Soviets could and would initiate a world war.

The threat of nuclear war is a central theme throughout this book. Although the Soviet Union had conventional superiority, it was inferior from a nuclear standpoint. McCWire accuses the Reagan administration of using this imbalance to escalate the arms race while portraying Gorbachev as a victim of aggressive capitalist policies. The Soviets believed the United States would use nuclear weapons if NATO faced conventional defeat in Europe and, therefore, could not compromise or significantly reduce their military strength on the European continent. The "assessments of the threat facing the Soviet Union were central to decisions on how to allocate scarce resources between the military and civilian sectors of the economy." McCWire concludes the United States was to blame for the subordination of economic needs to military priorities in the Soviet Union.

McCWire repeatedly uses one of his own books, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*, as a reference, citing his opinion as though it were fact. Support of his thesis is unbalanced, as the majority of references are from Soviet sources such as articles from *Pravda*, *Kommunist* and *Red Star* (*Krasnaya zvezda*), reports written by Leonid Brezhnev, and current television and radio addresses given by Gorbachev. Occasionally, a *Washington Post* or *The New York Times* article is used but only as seasoning in this big pot of borscht.

Published at a time when soldiers are returning to yellow ribbons and colors of red, white and blue, this book fights the undertow of an ocean of patriotism. The American public and military professionals are not prepared to affix responsibility for the Cold War on President George Bush's mentor. McCWire's book has little professional value to the average military reader. Your time would be better spent on other professional endeavors.

CPT Sonja S. Moyer, USA,
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THE HIDDEN WAR: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan by Artyom Borovik. 288 pages. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York. 1990. \$19.95.

This young Russian journalist has performed a great service with his insightful book on the So-

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viets' eight-year war in Afghanistan. Artyom Borovik's *The Hidden War* is an eyewitness account of that war, seen through a young man's eyes, which shares young soldiers' fears and dreams in a land of uncertainty, confusion and death.

Borovik is a 31-year-old reporter for the popular Moscow magazine, *Ogonyok*. He covered the war during three tours in Afghanistan, beginning in 1980 with the start of the Soviet invasion, again in 1985 to 1986 and, finally, at the end of the war with the Soviet forces' withdrawal in early 1989. The Soviets' Afghan invasion began as a lethal mixture of political blunder and military miscalculation and resulted in an inconclusive, eight-year war and humiliating Soviet withdrawal. The incalculable cost of national treasure, with combined casualties of hundreds of thousands, plus generations of hatred to come, all produced in 1989 nothing more than the political status quo of 1980—no gain at great loss.

The Hidden War is not weighted with political rhetoric, nor does Borovik try to judge or justify Soviet motives or the Soviet invasion. Thomas T. Hammond's *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and Their Consequences* (1984) is better than any other book at providing the greater scope of Soviet involvement. But providing the "big picture" is not Borovik's intention; he focuses on the individual Soviet soldier, the soldier's war and the soldier's thoughts.

Borovik goes on patrols, ambushes and other combat operations with the Soviet soldiers. He participates in actual combat as a combatant, not merely an observer. Through his lucid, engaging style, he brings the emotion of war into the reader's heart. He travels freely among Soviet units, interviews soldiers and experiences their daily lives. He collects marvelous "sea stories" from privates to generals: You will meet Ensign Makarenko who was killed three times in one day; a tearful deserter in San Francisco, California, Sergeant Perseleni; an exhausted airborne battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ushakov, who commands the beleaguered rear guard during the final withdrawal; and the feared and hated Colonel Antonenko, a brutal murderer and thief who has a clear conscience. Borovik also relates the feeling and emotion on the Soviet home front where returning Soviet soldiers were often unwelcome and treated with scorn for fighting in the Soviet "Vietnam."

The Hidden War is a surprisingly candid and fresh view of an unpopular and unwinnable war. Borovik reports he had great difficulty getting the book published in the Soviet Union. The military censors attempted to deny the truth, apparently fearful

of losing power. Fortunately, *glasnost* won, and we now have a first-rate, human look at the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

LTC W. D. Bushnell, USMC, US Army Armor School,
Fort Knox, Kentucky

EISENHOWER: Soldier and President by Stephen E. Ambrose. 635 pages. Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York. 1990. \$29.95.

To commemorate the centennial of the birth of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Stephen E. Ambrose condensed his monumental two-volume biography of the 34th president into a single work. The result is a highly readable biography capturing both the spirit and character of one of the most remarkable men this country ever produced. The author's avowed intent is to convey some sense of what a truly extraordinary man Eisenhower was and to examine his impact on present-day America. He succeeds admirably, demonstrating once again why he is Eisenhower's foremost biographer.

Drawing upon extensive primary sources, many of which have been only recently declassified, Ambrose makes a major contribution to the Eisenhower revisionism dominating the field for the last decade: Viewing Eisenhower as a much more active chief executive than contemporary historians judge him, the author presents an extremely balanced assessment of his subject.

Ambrose states any analysis of Eisenhower inevitably reveals more about the person conducting the assessment than it does about Eisenhower. A more fruitful approach is to examine his years in the White House—in Eisenhower's own terms—how well he achieved his goals. Using this perspective, the reader sees both the successes and the failures of the Eisenhower era.

On the debit side, Eisenhower failed to unify the Republican Party, failed to reduce the tensions of the Cold War and failed to use his office to take a strong moral stand against Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and against segregation. Indeed, Ambrose states Eisenhower's refusal to lead on civil rights was almost criminal.

On the other hand, Eisenhower presided over eight years of relative peace and prosperity. Moreover, his insistence on a balanced budget kept the military establishment in check and contributed to nearly full employment and near zero inflation. Perhaps his personal management of crises was Eisenhower's greatest contribution. Only Eisenhower could have averted war during a decade witnessing Korea, Dien Bien Phu, Quemoy and Matsu, Hungary and Suez, the Berlin crisis of 1959, and the U2 incident.

In summarizing Eisenhower, Ambrose portrays his subject as a 19th-century Victorian with both the strengths and weaknesses of that remarkable age. He remained a 19th-century man for the duration of his life. Yet, Eisenhower was also a true visionary. He foresaw the collapse of the communist system, predicted the economic and social unification of Europe, and warned America of the undue influence of the military-industrial complex.

In a recent symposium, Ambrose stated it is the academic community, not the American public, that is reassessing its assessment of Eisenhower. The revisionists are finally discovering what a generation of Americans have known for 40 years—Eisenhower was both a great and a good man who gave his country victory in Europe during World War II as a soldier and eight years of unheralded peace and prosperity as a president. After reading *Eisenhower*, it is small wonder why we still like "Ike."

LTC Cole C. Kingsood, USA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION by James M. McPherson. 173 pages. Oxford University Press, Inc., New York. 1991. \$17.95.

Since James M. McPherson has already published two superb books on the Civil War, he is well known to students of that conflict. Compared to his *Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction* and *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Era of the Civil War* that together totaled 1,600 pages, this brief book appears lightweight. But, in reading pleasure and profoundly important insights, it equals its predecessors.

In seven delightful essays, the book develops three major themes. First, taking dead aim at the

"presentist" scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s, which belittled the war's impact, McPherson argues the war rivaled the French Revolution in its revolutionary aspects—it dramatically altered the sectional balance in the North's favor both economically and politically; the South's economy did not fully recover for a century; and the South's domination of the national government since the late 1780s suddenly ended. With the confiscation of "property" equivalent to 3 trillion in today's dollars, emancipation devastated the old planter class that had ruled the South for more than a century.

Another revolutionary transformation, so important it forms a second theme, is the relationship between power and liberty. Using the concepts of philosopher Isaiah Berlin, McPherson distinguishes between negative liberty (freedom from restraint) and positive liberty (freedom to do something). Before 1861, the former theory prevailed; most Americans perceived power and liberty at opposite ends of a spectrum and believed when governmental power increased, liberty automatically suffered. But, during the Civil War, the Union used power to expand liberty's sphere and to create, in President Abraham Lincoln's phrase, "a new birth of freedom." Indicative of this new constitutional development were the postwar amendments that enhanced national power at the states' expense.

The author's third theme focuses on Lincoln's extraordinary abilities as a revolutionary leader. He not only maintained a clear vision of the war's central purpose but also developed an appropriate strategy and effectively communicated with and inspired much of the Northern population. Thus, the president was crucial to the Union's success and its attendant revolutionary implications.

Although all of McPherson's essays have been published elsewhere, having them between two

Oral History of Normandy Invasion

The 50th anniversary of the Normandy invasion is 6 June 1994. To preserve the record of the soldier, sailor or airman, Stephen E. Ambrose, director of the Eisenhower Center, is calling on all veterans of the invasion, in whatever capacity, to contribute their own taped oral history to the D-Day collection. The Eisenhower Center will also publish a book, *Voices of D-Day*, based on the contributed oral histories. If you are interested, write to Stephen E. Ambrose, The Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148.

Military Review Electronic Mail

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covers and available at such a modest price makes this a genuine book-buying bargain.

**Peter Maslowski, Department of History,
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska**

BENJAMIN O. DAVIS, JR.: *American* by Benjamin O. Davis Jr. 442 pages. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, DC. 1991. \$19.95.

Lieutenant General Benjamin O. Davis Jr. makes a definitive statement of how he wishes to be remembered in his one-word subtitle—"American." A lifelong enemy of labels and stereotypes, Davis refuses to qualify his contribution to American history solely in terms of his race. All Americans can draw inspiration from his story.

During World War II, as commander of the 99th Pursuit Squadron—the famous Tuskegee Airmen—and later the 332d Fighter Group, Davis successfully confronted both the *Luftwaffe* in the sky and discrimination on the ground. In the postwar period, he held key positions in every Cold War flashpoint—Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Germany and the Philippines. As an officer on the Air Staff he created the Thunderbirds (the US Air Force's precision flying team). He commanded the 13th Air Force, Clark Air Base, the Philippines, at the height of the Vietnam War and ended his career as deputy commander in chief, US Strike Command (the forerunner of US Central Command).

Davis does not gloss over the discrimination he confronted. Though you will bristle at every doubt of ability, wince at every affront and feel the pain of every social snub, Davis never allowed the burden of segregation and racism to deter him from his goals and does not allow them to burden his story.

His description of "the silence"—the total absence of human contact and interaction—which he endured for four years at the US Military Academy, West Point, New York, is frank and honest but devoid of bitterness and self-pity. Instead of succumbing to anger and resentment, Davis drew strength from his family and his inner sense of pride and self-worth. He refused to allow outside forces to influence his behavior or actions. In the end, those who attempted to impede or humiliate him were forced to accept him on his own merits as a soldier and a man. These skills and qualities that Davis and his military contemporaries conveyed, no doubt, hastened the integration of the US Armed Forces and served as a catalyst for all Americans to be judged by the same standards.

Davis is generous in recognizing the contributions of his wife to his public and private life. Agatha Davis, an exceptionally talented and coura-

geous woman, conquered discrimination and adversity with the same pride and determination as her husband. Independent, educated and multi-talented, she was a true Renaissance woman who impressed world leaders and common soldiers with her grace, intelligence and genuine warmth but who never allowed her duties to interfere with her enrichment or the enrichment of those around her.

Davis' autobiography is a frank account of the maturation of the US military and American society. In recounting the not so "good old days," Davis does not hedge; he tells it like it was. Through it all, Davis' unwavering faith in the United States shines like a beacon.

MAJ Charles W. Hooper, USA, USACGSC

SUN TZU'S ART OF WAR: The Modern Chinese Interpretation by Tao Hanzhang. Translated by Yuan Shibing. 128 pages. Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New York. 1990. \$10.95.

Written more than 2,400 years ago, Sun Tzu's work is said to be the earliest, most complete book on Chinese war strategies. Valued by both ancient and 20th-century generals, including Mao Tse-tung, these essays have been translated into English, Japanese, German, French and Russian. In 1960, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery said a compulsory course in Sun's concepts should be taught in all military academies throughout the world.

Sun's basic thesis is: Try to overcome the enemy by wisdom, not by force. His five fundamental war factors are politics, weather, terrain, the commander and doctrine (discipline). A comparative analysis (Force 1 versus Force 2) of these factors requires considering certain "elements": the relative wisdom of the sovereigns and commanders; natural and terrain advantages; which army has the more rigorously enforced discipline; which army is stronger; which army has the better-trained officers and men; and which army administers rewards/punishment in a more enlightened way.

The key offensive strategy Sun offers is "know your enemy and know yourself." He seems to be saying, "Attack his weaknesses with your strengths. Be aware of your weaknesses, so you can create suitable defenses." He also notes that the skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it from his subordinates. "Subdue the enemy without fighting."

His field operating principles are: Take preemptive measures and seek quick decisions in campaigns. "Defeat your enemy by a surprise move"; move troops with overwhelming momentum and

prompt action. "War is a matter of deception"; therefore, know the enemy and his commander. Attach importance to creating a brain trust, knowing how to train officers as thinkers.

The battle is often won because of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge must be obtained from those who know the enemy (spica). Foreknowledge can lead to an attack on the enemy's strategy, disrupting his diplomacy, thereby subduing his troops without fighting.

General Tao Hanzhang's presentation of Sun's maxims have interpretations/illustrations from the

perspective of a Red Army officer whose career spanned from 1933 to 1985. Born in 1917, he is a senior adviser at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies.

Tao's book is easy to read and can be worthwhile for a serious, mature student. While many of Sun's principles are simple truths, they merit the reinforcement given in this presentation. Are simple verities less valuable because they are simple?

COL R. Frank Harwood, USAF, Retired,
University, Mississippi

**DEADLINE
EXTENSION**



Military Review

1991

WRITING CONTEST

The deadline for entries in the 1991 *Military Review* Writing Contest is extended to 30 September, 1991. This is to allow more time for soldiers returning from or moving as a result of Operation *Desert Storm* to participate.

Entries on the topic, "The Army in American Society," will be considered for the \$500 cash award for the winning manuscript. The winning manuscript will also be published in *Military Review*. \$200 and \$100 prizes will be awarded to the second and third place entries. All entries will be considered for publication in *Military Review*.

The topic area can cover a broad range of issues having impact on American society. Included are such subjects as: values, ethics and morality, women in combat, public support for the military, the Volunteer Army, Selective Service, citizen soldiers and the Total Force, AIDS, the military-media relationship, equal opportunity, the Army's role in drug interdiction and substance abuse.

Manuscripts must be original and not previously offered elsewhere for publication. They should be between 2000 and 3000 words and typed double-spaced. Please clearly indicate that your manuscript is for the writing contest. Send entries to: *Military Review*, US Army Command and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910.

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
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INDEPENDENCE DAY

4 JULY 1991

Not since the end of World War II has the nation experienced such a public outpouring of emotion supporting the US military.

"I ask every community in this country to make the coming Fourth of July a day of special celebration for our returning troops," President George Bush said in his address to a joint session of Congress.

Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have been overwhelmed by the growing wave of victory celebrations across the nation. "Welcome Home" parades and parties conducted in New York and Washington, DC, rival those held at the end of the world wars. Other communities are joining the salute as military units from their towns or nearby bases or posts return from the gulf.

"The brave men and women of **Desert Storm** accomplished more than they realize," said Bush. "They set out to confront an enemy abroad and, in the process, they transformed a nation at home."

The victory in the Persian Gulf, combined with the nation's total support for the president and the military during Operations **Desert Shield** and **Desert Storm**, has once again awakened the patriotism of Americans everywhere. On this Independence Day, all Americans can be proud of our nation and especially of those who served the nation and the world in Operation **Desert Storm**.