MILITARY DECEPTION AND OPERATIONAL ART

14 May 1992

Presented to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department, COL George Ingersoll, CDR Conway Zeigler and CDR Jim Keys, faculty advisors.

This paper reflects my personal views and does not represent the views of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
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ABSTRACT

"MILITARY DECEPTION AND OPERATIONAL ART"

This paper examines the continuing relevance of deception as a force multiplier and means of structuring the battlefield. It examines several of the requirements for successful deception, such as managing the preconceptions of your enemy, plausibility, managing your opponent's intelligence gathering resources, verification of the effect of the deception scheme and the importance of intelligence. By application of theoretical constructs for successful deception to several case studies including but not limited to the Fortitude deception operation in relation to Overlord in World War II and deception in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, analysis of the relevance of deception is conducted. Organizational and training requirements for deception in the current environment are also examined. Conclusions reinforce the importance of intelligence and denying intelligence to your adversary through deception in the current environment.
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MILITARY DECEPTION AND OPERATIONAL ART

INTRODUCTION

In the fourth century BC Sun Tzu observed that "All warfare is based on deception."¹ By this he meant that the object in war is the psychological dislocation of the enemy -- a view later espoused by such noted military theorists as Basil H. Liddell-Hart during this century. Deception is "... the creation of false appearances to mystify and delude the enemy, the indirect approach, ready adaptability to the enemy situation, flexibility and coordinated maneuver to separate combat elements, and speedy concentration against points of weakness."² The primary target of deception is the mind of the enemy, in both the leadership and the opposing forces.

Much, however, has changed since the time of Sun Tzu, or even Liddell-Hart for that matter. Some would contend that deception has diminished in utility in this age of advanced technology, rapidity of battlefield engagement and maneuver. However, analysis of two major opportunities for the employment of deception in recent memory, World War II and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, suggests a continuing relevance for operational deception. Several factors have to be taken into account for the deception to be successful, however, namely:

1. The great importance of reinforcing the preconceptions of your opponent.
2. The requirement for plausibility in the deception scheme.
3. The enhanced utility of deception for an opponent with an equal or inferior force relationship in the current environment in that preponderance of force may well account for alleged deception successes when an imbalanced force relationship exists.
4. The absolute importance of managing your opponent's intelligence gathering resources to ensure transmission nodes remain open for enemy reception.

5. The relative importance of verification assets to assess the adversary's reaction to deceptive measures.

6. The necessity for superior intelligence in orchestrating a viable deception plan.

Deception is one of the few ways that an operational commander can shape the battlefield prior to actually joining forces, as well as in the midst of battle. Successful deception, however, normally rests with the side that retains the operational initiative — thus enabling its proactive employment. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the force-multiplication advantages of deception to the operational commander.

**METHODOLOGY**

If, as Sun Tzu asserted, all warfare is based on deception, then the institutionalization of deception bears consideration. Following sections will provide a consideration of the utility of deception in contemporary warfare. First, theoretical constructs for successful deception will be examined. Second, deceptive measures and their situational context will be presented as a basis for analysis. Subsequently, an analysis of the contemporary utility of deception will be critically provided. Last, the importance of organization as it relates to deception will be explored. This study establishes the continuing relevance of deception in current operational planning and engagement of forces.

**THEORETICAL DECEPTIVE CONSTRUCTS**

Deception, without questions, can be instrumental in the success of military
operations. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to establish guidelines for successful deception, it is necessary to establish some of the objectives of operational deception to adequately analyze its utility. "There are three goals in any deception. The immediate aim is to condition the target's beliefs; the intermediate aim is to influence the target's action; and the ultimate aim is for the deceiver to benefit from the target's actions."³

Dr. Donald C. Daniel of the Naval War College maintains that there are two basic types of deception -- ambiguity deception and misdirection deception.⁴ The first type is intended to cause the enemy to believe that you have more valid options than is actually the case while the second type is intended to lead the enemy to believe that your selected course of action is other than that which you have actually chosen. Ambiguity deception has the advantage of causing the adversary to suboptimize his force dispositions, while misdirection deception has the advantage, if successful, of decreasing risk and achieving surprise. Both are intended to serve as force multipliers and to shape the face of the battlefield.

While numerous maxims and precepts for conducting deceptive operations exist, several will be examined below to establish a benchmark for evaluation of the utility of deception in WW II and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. First and foremost among these is the importance of reinforcing an opponent's preexisting belief system. As Professor Michael Handel also of the Naval War College so aptly points out, no deception can be successful unless the adversary believes it, and it is not only more likely he will believe it but also easier to convince an adversary of something he already strongly suspects.⁵ One might maintain that the most successful deception is self-deception. Cover plans are normally more apt to be believed if they are based not only on
what the enemy believes, but what he hopes for. In conditioning an opponent over time several balances must be observed. To appear plausible, deceptive information should be both persistent and reinforced by use of multiple transmission paths even though management of multiple paths and security of the operation may increase in difficulty in the process. Above all, a deception plan must be based on what you want the enemy to do and not on what you want him to think.

Several other considerations highlight the importance of intelligence. For any attempt to deceive to be successful the adversary must have the ability to become aware of the deceptive measures. However, the sophistication of the adversary's intelligence apparatus may enable him to uncover the deception. The ability to manage an adversary's intelligence gathering capability -- an advantage which usually resides with the side which enjoys the operational initiative -- is, therefore, an important consideration for the security as well as the viability of the deceptive effort. Also, own intelligence is essential if feedback on the enemy's reaction to the deception effort is considered a necessary element of the operation. The central issue here is degree of risk, as well as centrality of deception to the success of the operation. If force relationships are such that risk is minimal and the deception is not considered essential to the operation but, rather, essentially a force multiplier, then the degree to which the enemy "bites" may be relatively insignificant. On the other hand, if risk is considered unacceptable unless the deception is effective, then evaluation of its success prior to launching the operation becomes more important. While intelligence feedback is always important, under certain circumstances it may be the critical element in assessment of acceptable risk.
Having established several precepts for evaluating the utility of deception, let us now turn to evaluation of its employment. While the centerpiece of this consideration will be the Fortitude deception operation associated with the Overlord landings at Normandy, several other deceptive efforts in World War II deserve attention. Colonel David M. Glantz, in a massive 644 page examination of Soviet military deception in the Second World War, provides several useful conclusions.\(^8\)

Glantz, by comparing operational maps of opposing force dispositions in German and recently available Soviet documents, has assessed the utility of Soviet deceptive efforts as rather impressive. More importantly, he differentiates between the stages of deceptive effort. He points out that, until the Soviet counter offensive of December 1941, virtually no deceptive measures were employed. He also indicates that Soviet deception was primarily confined to the tactical and or operational level until the Germans were forced on the defensive after the defeat of Gen. Paulus' 6th Army at Stalingrad in January 1943. Further, he demonstrates that strategic (theater/front) deception was possible for the Soviets to achieve prior to and continually after the battle of Kursk in summer of 1943.\(^9\) This analysis reinforces the utility of deception to the side enjoying the operational initiative. The greater the initiative, the more significant the level of deception achievable. Further, Glanz stipulates the primary tenets of Soviet deception, or Maskirovka, in their then and now:

The basic methods and means for achieving operational surprise in contemporary conditions basically remain as before: preserving the secrecy of the concept of the operation as long as possible, night movement and its concealment, the organization of diversions and all types of disinformation, rapid concentration of forces and development of maneuver, and the use of new technical means of struggle and combat and operational means.\(^10\)
While technology has largely obviated Soviet deceptive techniques employed in World War II, the validity of his overall consideration of the utility of deception remains.

In another useful consideration Professor Russel H. S. Stolfi analyzed German deceptive techniques prior to execution of Operation Barbarossa. He makes a compelling case that events not intended as part of a deceptive effort and a belief system engendered in Stalin and his advisors in previous dealings with Hitler combined to produce a powerful deception. "Joseph Stalin, the redoubtable First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and his advisors (1) refused to accept the hypothesis that the Germans would attack in 1941, and (2) believed that any German build-up would be part of a familiar pattern of demands and provocation the Soviets would recognize and could parry at least until 1942."11

The normal pattern of Soviet-German relations which had developed since the Molotov-von Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact of 26 August 1939, combined with Germany's war with Britain and preparations for Operation Sea Lion, proved to be almost airtight subterfuges for German preparations for an eastern campaign.12 The stepping up of the bomber offensive against the British in February of 1941; operations Harpoon and Shark, deceptions intended to convince the British of a Sea Lion type attack which would be launched around 1 August 1941; the fall of the pro-German government in Yugoslavia with the coup which toppled the Regent, Prince Paul, compelling Hitler to intervene militarily; as well as the requirement to support the deteriorating Italian situation in Greece and Albania with forces enabled Hitler ultimately to array 30 German Divisions in Army Group North, 51 Divisions in Army Group Center and 43 German and 14 Rumanian Divisions in Army Group South against the Soviet Union under circumstances of almost total surprise.

Several factors emerge as contributory to the magnitude of the deception:
Stalin's deep-seated preconception of German intentions; circumstances which made German force dispositions appear plausible; and a reluctance on the part of the Soviets to intensify strategic intelligence gathering to required levels for fear of creating an impression in the German hierarchy that Soviet offensive moves were contemplated. Ironically, the poor quality of German strategic intelligence emanated in part from similar concerns.

While deceptive efforts in World War II abound, perhaps the most successful since the Trojan Horse are those associated with Plan Bodyguard. Plan Bodyguard encompassed the umbrella of deceptive plans associated with Operations Overlord and Dragoon (Anvil) and were directed as indicated in Figure 1.
Bodyguard's major component operations were: Fortitude North, threatening an invasion of Norway; Fortitude South, directed across the Dover narrows against the Pas de Calais; Zeppelin, in the Balkans; Vendetta and Ferdinand, in the western Mediterranean; and Ironside, on the French Biscayan coast. These were complemented by several other operations: principally, Graffham and Royal Flush, diplomatic initiatives directed at the Scandinavian governments; and Copperhead, which featured the much-publicized visit to Gibraltar and Algiers of Montgomery's "double." Finally there were several ancillary, tactical deceptions in support of the actual D-Day landings (Quicksilver I-IV, (5) Titanic I-IV, Bigdrum, Taxable and Glimmer).

Stage center, of course, was reserved for Fortitude South which portrayed the five-division Normandy landings as only a feint to mask a later descent on the Pas de Calais by the massive forces of the notional First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) "concentrated" in southeast England. This was, in Charles Cruickshank's words,

the largest, most elaborate, most carefully-planned, most vital, and most successful of all the Allied deception operations. It made full use of the years of experience gained in every branch of the deceptive art - visual deception and misdirection, the deployment of dummy landing craft, aircraft, and paratroops, fake lighting schemes, radio deception, sonic devices, and ultimately a whole fictitious army group.

At the outset, the Allied effort was at ambiguity deception. With the purpose of tying down as many German divisions as possible, false troop concentrations and locations as well as the ability to transport them to the Continent were the focus of early deceptive efforts. As the deception matured into Fortitude, the effort became a misdirection deception aimed at convincing the Germans that the D-Day Cross-Channel invasion would occur at Pas de Calais on the French coast northeast of Normandy.

To impart the deception the allies had two tremendous and one major advantages. The first has come to be known as the "Ultra Secret." As the result of an astute Polish mechanic working in a German cipher factory in 1938, a mockup of the electrically operated Enigma cipher machine was constructed
in France and a fully operational machine was subsequently smuggled out of Poland by British agents. By February 1940, enough machines existed in Britain to begin operator training. By early 1944 the Allies were substantially able to read the Germans' mail at will. With respect to deception, this gave them not only the ability to determine if the Germans had received the elements of deception employed, but also how they had been interpreted and the degree to which they had been convinced. In terms of risk, this gave the Allies a huge advantage — particularly when conducting a five division operation against a potentially much superior enemy force arrayed in well-fortified defensive positions.

While Ultra provided mainly a comfort zone for Overlord, the British Double Cross (so named after the British XX Committee established to control turned German spies) network provided a decisive advantage. A total of fourteen double agents — some turned after capture by the British but most offering their services after recruitment by the German Abwher, or security and intelligence service — were selected for participation in the Fortitude deception plan. Of these two agents, Garbo and Brutus, put over practically the whole of the deception plan. The last advantage was the almost complete control of airspace over Britain enjoyed by the Allies between April of 1943, when the Fortitude plan was executed, until the 6 June 1944 Normandy invasion. This advantage severely limited German aerial reconnaissance and furthered their reliance on their turned SDV network, foremost in evaluated reliability of which were the Double Cross agents associated with Fortitude.

The primary objective of the deception plan was to convince the Germans that the Allied return to the Continent would come at Pas de Calais rather than Normandy. Visual means, fake radio transmissions, lighting schemes, etc., were used to penetrate the deception. Owing to the lack of German aerial
reconnaissance capability, however, the British double agents — Garbo in particular, became critically important. Having approached the British in 1940 to offer to work for them as an agent and been refused, the Spaniard Juan Pujol set out to affiliate himself with the Abhwer. Once successful and posted to London he again offered his services to the British and was this time much more attractive to them. By February 1944 Garbo had created no fewer than twenty-four fictitious sub-agents each clothed with a character and a story of his own. Aside from establishing his own credibility, Garbo's network added credence to information passed that could not have been gathered by a single agent. It also served essentially as a multiple conduit which reinforced its own accuracy.

So important was Garbo assessed to be to the German intelligence effort that the decision was reluctantly taken and approved by Eisenhower to have him transmit at about 3:00 AM on 6 June 1944 — or approximately three and a half hours before the first Allied wave hit Normandy at 0630 — that the invasion was underway. So incompetent was the German Abhwer, or at least the Madrid station at which the radio transmission was directed, that Garbo's message was not acknowledged until the net was activated at eight o'clock in the morning — or two hours after the first troops landed on Normandy.

While a three and a half hour warning would not have provided the Germans sufficient time to react, it did firmly establish Garbo's credibility subsequent to attaining an Allied foothold in France.

In his report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Eisenhower remarked: "Lack of infantry was the most important cause of the enemy's defeat in Normandy, and his failure to remedy this weakness was due primarily to the success of the Allied threats leveled against the Pas-de-Calais. This threat, which had
already proved of so much value in misleading the enemy as to the true objective of our invasion preparations, was maintained after 6th June, and it served most effectively to pin down the German Fifteenth Army east of the Seine while we built up our strength in the lodgement area to the west. I cannot over-emphasize the decisive value of this most successful threat, which paid enormous dividends, both at the time of the assault and during the operations of the two succeeding months. The German Fifteenth Army, which, if committed to battle in June or July, might possibly have defeated us by sheer weight of numbers, remained inoperative throughout the critical period of the campaign, and only when the break-through had been achieved were its infantry divisions brought west across the Seine -- too late to have any effect upon the course of victory."26 Garbo's post D-Day credibility having been preserved, his transmission on the evening of 8 June 1944 (and reinforced thereafter) indicating that the vast majority of Allied troops remained in Britain indicating that Normandy was probably a diversion for a larger operation aimed at Pas de Calais should receive major credit for the "decisive" situation outlined by Eisenhower above.27

While German intelligence was unable to determine the place of the Overlord beachhead, it was just as surely deceived as to its time or strength. Their faulty appreciation read July rather than 6 June 1944, the Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy, and credited the Allies with 42 quite mythical divisions.28 From the time the first German spy (Caroli/control 3726) was apprehended in the early hours of 6 September 1940 -- less than one day after he arrived near Oxford -- until Fortitude was executed in 1944, the entire German spy network in Britain had been turned to British advantage.29 The Fortitude array of agents, mainly the wireless operator Brutus, sustained this advantage. As Table II on the following page indicates, the purported First United States Army Group (FUSAG), supposedly under General Patton, deceptively was composed
as indicated below:

First United States Army Group (FUSAG) order of battle,
showing real and false (in bold) formations,
June-August 1944.

1st June 1944

FUSAG

First Canadian Army

- 11th Can. Corps
- 7th US Arm. Div.

16th June 1944

FUSAG

Third US Army

- 2nd Brit. Corps
- 33rd Brit. Div.
- 17th US Inf. Div.

16th August 1944

FUSAG

Fourth British Army

- 11th Brit. Corps.
- 17th US Inf. Div.

Note: The Ninth US Army was also associated with FUSAG in August 1944.
Even the strategic bombing campaign was structured to support the Fortitude deception. Quicksilver IV and V were, respectively, the bombing of the Pas de Calais beaches and German communications in the area. The overall effort, including purposefully refraining from striking militarily significant targets in the Normandy area, was intended to indicate that a seaborne landing was imminent. Activity in the Dover area, including the setting-up of new radio circuits, was increased to support the deception. Thus the entire Fortitude effort was structured to play on German preconceptions and thus structure the battlefield in terms of time, space, style and magnitude of effort.

Turning briefly to the Pacific, deception in 1942 and most of 1943 was at the operational level and associated with a specific campaign against the Japanese. However, in May of 1945 Admiral Nimitz' staff sketched a deception plan for Operations Olympic (the invasion of Kyushu). The plan called for, at various stages, the employment of U.S. forces against the China coast at Chusan-Shanghai and the Japanese island of Shikoku. Though not nearly as complicated or structured as Fortitude, Pastel, interestingly enough, employed psychological operations in the period up to early September 1945 indicating the intent to move against Japanese holdings in China. Fortunately, the war ended before Operation Olympic was executed.

DECEPTION IN OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

While detailed information on deception in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) is much less substantial than that on World War II, certain aspects of deceptive effort can be gleaned from briefing material and other sources now available. In his briefing of 27 February, 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf indicated that the decision to increase the force
levels in Saudi Arabia for contemplated offensive operations was not taken until November of 1990. That should indicate that deception planning efforts, while undoubtedly contemplated in an offensive mode at an earlier date, must realistically have centered on the defensive mission of Operation Desert Shield. Efforts during this period, when Iraq still had airborne reconnaissance assets, undoubtedly included conveying false unit locations and strengths, in this case strengths above those actually in theater, and over-the-horizon impressions of amphibious and strike warfare capabilities.

As we now know, the original USCENTCOM plan for Desert Storm called for a frontal attack on fortified Iraqi positions in Kuwait. This plan was later disapproved by the National Command Authorities/CJCS, and what is now known as the "hail Mary pass" — or western movement and envelopment of Iraqi positions by VII U.S. Army Corps and 18th Airborne Corps — was substituted in its place. Deceptive measures actually implemented for Desert Storm would have been for the most part inconsistent with the original plan as they reinforced the Iraqi perception of a direct frontal assault north along the Wadi al Batin dried river basin east of the Iraqi border into Kuwait. Figure I on the following page may be helpful in orientation to initial force dispositions.
Once the final plan for Desert Storm had been set the object of the deceptive effort was clear -- to fix the Iraqis in place in southern Kuwait, tie down an estimated seven to nine divisions on the Persian Gulf coast south of Kuwait City by the threat of amphibious assault, and achieve surprise through rapid movements to the west and envelopment of Iraqi forces in dug-in positions facing Saudi Arabia from behind. Such a plan, when combined with air operations, would serve to sever the Iraqi supply lines from the north and force them into an engagement of maneuver working directly against
their predelection for defensive use of armor and artillery and offensive use of infantry. The ensuing maneuver warfare would greatly favor U.S. Air-Land Battle doctrine in both the operational and tactical dimensions. Figure 2 below may be of use in visualizing force relationships and plan objectives.

The deceptive scheme had several key factors working in its favor. The
first and most important factor was Suddam Hussein's preconception, based on our Vietnam experience, that the U.S. could not maintain public support for the war if casualties were high. This led to a hope that the U.S. would conduct a frontal assault against Iraqi prepared defenses. The second was an over-concern with the possibility of a Marine amphibious assault. Such highly publicized amphibious rehearsals as the Sea Soldier series and Imminent Thunder by embarked elements of II MEF served to exacerbate Suddam's fears, as did the deceptive clearance of amphibious assault lanes, emplacement of markers and detonation of mine clearing devices several hours prior to commencement of the land offensive in the early hours of 24 February 1991. An unintended consequence of the amphibious deception, however, was the removal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait from as far south as the southeastern Saudi-Kuwaiti border to more defensible positions closer to Kuwait City (Figure 2). A third factor was the Iraqi perception that the U.S. would not violate Iraqi territory. This probably was a result of the perceived fragility of the United Nations sponsored coalition regarding Arab and Muslim sensitivities. Finally, the Iraqis considered armor movement to the west of their positions in Kuwait infeasible as their own experience in training areas through which the "hail Mary" would have to pass resulted in complete lack of operational integration and attendant navigational problems. Of interest, whether consciously or unconsciously, Cable News Network (CNN) and other news media services covered training exercises, amphibious rehearsals and other events in a manner that precisely reinforced the deceptive scheme.

When the air offensive began almost immediately after the 15 January 1992 deadline set by President Bush, Saddam Hussein's intelligence gathering apparatus was quickly reduced to ineffectiveness. With the exception of limited information potentially available from Bedu in in the area, the
nodes open to Iraq to perpetrate the deception were extremely limited. This served to facilitate false unit locations through electronic and other emissions. It also served to mask VIIth Corps' movement to west of the Wadi al Batin, which commenced on 13-14 February — less than one week prior to the originally scheduled commencement of offensive operations on 20 February — following the movement of logistic bases which started west just after commencement of the air war on 17 January, leaving deception behind.40

Overt deceptive efforts reinforcing the Wadi al Batin attack route were conducted throughout the period. On 13 February, VII Corps artillery opened fire on the Wadi area and the 18th Airborne conducted a helicopter reconnaissance of the area. On 20 February the 1st Armored Cavalry launched a major Brigade-sized force reconnaissance into the Wadi. As a result of these two deceptive actions the Iraqis strengthened their defenses and doubled their artillery in the area. By the time the ground offensive began on the revised G-day of 24 February the deception was firmly in place. So successful was the operation and so necessary was it to stop Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait that VII Corps launched the "hail Mary" eighteen hours early (at 1200 on the 24th) and MARCENT forces, deploying through three holes in the opposing sand berm other than the twelve they had breached in the deceptive period, reached Kuwait City in the first day of the operation.

The deceptive measures associated with Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm may have had little impact on the completeness of the victory. The United States may never again have — strategically, operationally, or tactically — as compliant an adversary as Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Armed Forces. Additionally, such a deception and operation would probably have been significantly more difficult or impossible under geographic conditions less favorable (such as a triple canopy jungle). None-the-less, the U.S. casualty figures of less than 150 killed in action and only slightly over 450 wounded in action
attest to the success of the operational concept. That concept, without question, structured the battlefield in a way that reduced risk, optimized U.S. operational doctrine and technological capabilities, preserved own options and eliminated enemy options — largely as a result of the deceptive measures taken.

**CONTEMPORARY UTILITY OF DECEPTION**

Herein, the contemporary utility of deception will be assessed primarily with respect to the six key aspects stipulated in the introduction. First among these is the great importance of reinforcing the preconceptions of your opponent. With respect to both Germany and Iraq, and especially Hitler and Saddam Hussein, this tenet of deception is firmly established in fact. Yet both Hitler and Saddam were less than capable military leaders. The completeness of the deception, however, seems less a result of military incompetence than the completeness of the deception (especially in Fortitude), the realities of the situation when logically evaluated, and cultural and military biases inherent in any nation or military organization. While the U.S. Naval War College curriculum stresses evaluation of all opponents' potential courses of action, resources may deny the flexibility to counter each satisfactorily. The U.S. may well have been able to prevail against Iraq by pure quality of forces. The opposite is demonstrably true for Germany against the Allies in WW II.

The second aspect of deception to be considered is the requirement for plausibility in the deception scheme. It would appear that plausibility is important, but not nearly as important as the preconceptions of the opposition. For example, the "hail Mary" was a plausible U.S. course of action in Desert Storm, but Iraqis discounted it because of preconceptions. This should
not invalidate the concept. however, as more sophisticated opponents may be
less prone to eliminate from consideration that which is possible but which
they themselves would not consider doing.

The next premise to be examined is that the utility of deception is
enhanced for an opponent with an equal or inferior force relationship. It
seems plausible that, given Iraqi preconceptions, predelections for defensive
employment of armor and artillery, and almost total lack of reconnaissance
assets after the start of the air war, that deception may have had little to
do with their force dispositions or operational concepts. Success may have
been more due to U.S. operational and technological superiority than to the
deceptive effort. None-the-less, the deception appears to have reduced both
risk and casualties. This is unquestionably the case with the Overlord deceptions
in World War II. Potential force relationships were definitely against the
Allies, particularly at the outset, on their return to continental Europe
in France. The utility of deception to a weaker opponent may be critical to
redress force imbalances, where it may be less significant to a dominant
military power, either in actual physical assets or technologically, but, in
the cases examined, the value of deception without regard to relative military
strength seems firmly established.

Next, the absolute importance of managing your opponent's intelligence
gathering resources to ensure that transmission nodes remain open for enemy
reception will be explored. Such nodes were certainly maintained open during
the Second World War, albeit through fortuitous circumstances such as Ultra
and Double Cross network. Lack of Luftwaffe access for visual confirmation
only served to reinforce those nodes that were kept open. In Desert Storm,
virtually all Iraqi intelligence nodes were shut down soon after the
commencement of hostilities. Without the preconceptions that already existed
in the Iraqi leadership the attendant ambiguity may have led to unexpected operational consequences. The lesson here is that greater care in maintaining selective enemy open intelligence channels should be taken to facilitate future deception operations.

Fifth, the relative importance of verification assets to assess the adversary's reaction to deceptive matters will be evaluated. It is extremely doubtful that either the Overlord or Desert Storm operations would have been jeopardized if verification of the enemy's level of acceptance of the deception could not be established. In Desert Storm, for that matter, there is little confidence that an adequate feedback mechanism existed. One might maintain that Double Cross type systems are inimicable to U.S. strategic culture, would be difficult to establish given the lack of requisite language skills in the American intelligence community, and would be virtually impossible to establish in the relatively short time available with respect to the types of conflicts the U.S. is likely to become engaged in in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, risk management would definitely make verification assets desirable.

Finally, the necessity for superior intelligence in orchestrating a viable deception plan will be contemplated. Unequivocally, deception in Fortitude and Desert Storm bears out this premise. As in the paragraph above, aspects of U.S. strategic culture may prevent adequate intelligence to penetrate a deception — especially in areas of knowing one's enemy and his likely preconceptions. Also, in this day and age superior intelligence implies superior technology. Where we may come up short on the first count, barring conflict with the Former Soviet Union (space systems). Desert Storm surely implies technicological superiority well into the next century.
"In any theatre of war, deception must operate in the main through the Intelligence channels which have already been established by the enemy." This finding in the Fortitude debrief implies that the ability to manage potential adversaries' intelligence may be important or critical to deception operations. With Low Intensity Conflict the expected military scenario in the immediate future, the ability to influence intelligence organizations in peacetime may be necessary in that time or environment may be prohibitive in crisis situations. Conditioning potential adversaries by establishing bogus operational, political or strategic patterns in peacetime may well be advisable. However, U.S. strategic culture may also deny the deceptive intent required to accomplish it in an open society in peacetime.

Far more importantly, training and establishment of operational responsibilities for deception may pay large dividends. As was true in World War II, virtually all those who have participated in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm indicate that they have had no formal training in deception. Yet the success of the Desert Storm deceptive efforts demonstrates a propensity for these types of operations intuitively in the U.S. military leadership. With relatively little cost or expenditure of manpower deception would easily be inculcated as an integral part of Service operational doctrine. First, deception training would of necessity have to be a top down priority. Otherwise, the deceptive effort would not necessarily be reflective of the Commander's operational intent. Second, the training effort should at least take place down to the Battalion level to ensure that operational deceptive efforts in the field would be self-reinforcing. Third, a joint coordination mechanism or committee should be established for the same reason.

Another major consideration is organization. Unlike deception operations
in the Middle East in World War II where deception planners reported directly to the Commander in Chief and were independent of the operational staff, they in Operation Fortitude served as deception advisors to the Service commanders and also as Commanders of Specialist Troops. To truly reflect the Commander's intent, the former arrangement appears more correct. While specialist troops may be required under separate command, the focus of deception training and implementation should be the regular forces -- particularly for contingency operations of short duration.

CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps Professor Michael Handel said it best ... "Deception is the cheapest and most effective force multiplier." While this can not be definitively confirmed, neither can it be denied — at least from the studies of deception considered in this analysis. While deception in land warfare has been the primary focus here it also has application to war at sea and strategically with respect to air warfare.

Much has been written in recent years to the effect that surprise is the great force multiplier, and that a little deception goes a long way. That is only half the story. Roger Hasketh's manuscript brings out the fundamental truth which is: Good intelligence -- the truth, timely told -- is the real force multiplier.

Without good intelligence, properly used, a successful operation would be nearly impossible. A good deceptive effort can deny or structure the advantage of intelligence to an opponent, and therefore the continuing relevance of deception is firmly established even in this age of advanced technology. There are, of course, risks associated with deception including splitting forces unnecessarily, dedicating resources that could be otherwise used or risking the security of your force. These risks, however, are normally outweighed by the attendant advantages -- particularly if the Commander enjoys superior intelligence.
NOTES


2. ibid, p. 9.


7. ibid, p. 40.


9. ibid. entire work.

10. ibid, p. 16.

12. ibid, p. 196.

13. ibid, pp. 197-198.


19. ibid, p. 15.

21. ibid, p. xii.

22. ibid, p. 24.

23. ibid, p. 24.


25. ibid, p. 135.


31. ibid, p. 184.

32. ibid, p. 184.


35. ibid, p. 5.

36. In that published material on deceptive measures for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm are scarce this soon after the event, an attempt to piece events together has been made from available materials and interviews with U.S. Naval War College personnel involved in or associated with the operations. Foremost among these are Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Breitenbach, U.S. Army, then assigned to the 7th U.S. Army Corps. and to Professor Michael I. Handel, who both deserve my debt of gratitude. Any errors in analysis remain my own.


38. ibid. pp. 96-100.

39. Thanks are again offered to LTC Daniel Breitenbach, U.S. Army, for this insight.

40. ibid.

41. Hasketh, op. cit., p. 2.


43. Handel, op. cit., personal presentation note to CDR Marv Butcher from the author.


6. Hasketh, Roger Fleetwood, *Fortitude: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe, April 1943 to May 1945*, Copy No. 20, published as official debrief of the Fortitude operation in unbound manuscript form (260 pages), provided by Professor Steven T. Ross.


