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The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

This supplement includes papers we commissioned from participants in our conference on the worldwide threats to national security and the implications of those threats for U.S. forces. The papers served as a basis for discussion at the conference. We have included abstracts of the papers in our report on the conference (National Security: Perspective on the Worldwide Threats and Implications for U.S. Forces, GAO/NSIAD-92-104, Apr. 1992).

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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ATBM</td>
<td>Anti-tactical ballistic missile</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal Party</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Force</td>
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<td>JMNA</td>
<td>Joint Military Net Assessment</td>
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<td>LAN</td>
<td>Local Area Network</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>REFORGER</td>
<td>Return of Forces to Germany</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>Sensitive Compartmented Information</td>
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<td>SOCRATES</td>
<td>Special Operations Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOFPARS</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
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On October 30, 1991, GAO sponsored a conference designed to provide insight into potential military threats to U.S. national security interests and necessary modifications to current and planned U.S. forces to meet those threats. Conference participants, including defense analysts and retired military officers, discussed and analyzed the possibility of U.S. and allied involvement in various regional contingencies in Europe and the Soviet Union, the Near East and South Asia, and East Asia. Topics ranged from the possibility of nuclear war to a general discussion of low-intensity conflict.

We commissioned the papers in this supplement prior to the conference to serve as the starting point for discussion. They represent a wide range of perspectives and do not necessarily represent GAO's views and opinions.
When a chaotic situation began to develop in the Soviet Union and the threat of national disintegration became real, the dramatic picture of Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons falling into irresponsible hands was raised repeatedly. Even before the August events, Soviet commentators had stressed that the republics’ leaders might seize nuclear weapons deployed on their territories for their own dangerous purposes. Often, hints of this threat came from supporters of a continued strong central government for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).

The shifting of the balance of power between the republics and the center will have powerful implications for the deployment and character of the Soviet nuclear forces. Two basic scenarios have appeared: The scenario that leapt to the fore after the coup attempt involves the retention of nuclear weapons on the territory of republics that are declaring their independence. An earlier scenario, consistent with previous political declarations emerging from the republics, involves the gradual denuclearization of the non-Russian republics. This paper examines each of these scenarios in turn and offers a judgment on them.

Examining these scenarios will have to proceed from the basic fact that most Soviet nuclear weapons are deployed on the territory of the Russian republic. Thus, once the central government admitted the republics to the nuclear decision-making process, the Russian president and his government would acquire a stronger say in that process than the other republics. Even without the coup and the revolution, therefore, the process of implementing the Union Treaty would have generated powerful incentives for the leaders of other republics where nuclear weapons are located to retain those systems.

In other words, for some period of time after Union Treaty signature, the Soviet Union would have been embarked on a process of sorting out relationships between the center and Russia and Russia and the other republics. During this process, republic presidents would have needed leverage in their negotiations with the center and with Russia over basic defense, security, and economic arrangements.

The revolutionary events in Moscow have accelerated this sorting-out process, which is currently unfolding as a rush for independence from the Union. This acceleration does not affect the basic requirement that the republics negotiate; it simply removes the center as a negotiating partner. Even if the union completely dissolves, a continued system of economic
interaction will be required. (Soviets and others call this a "common economic space.")

Continued cooperation on defense and security arrangements also makes sense, despite the near-term political imperatives that are a barrier to it. The virtual eclipse of the central government has sharply increased the importance of the Russian republic as an opponent to be reckoned with in the negotiations. While the agenda of what is possible is being devised, all of the republic leaders will keep hold of the greatest amount of negotiating leverage that they can muster. Nuclear weapons, like other defense assets, are a key aspect of that leverage.

In examining various scenarios, therefore, this analysis proceeds from the assumption that bargaining for necessities in the short- or medium-term will not necessarily have a particularly long-term result. When the central government, Mikhail Gorbachev and his allies, decided to set course toward a Union Treaty that took power from the center and gave it to the republics, the U.S.S.R. was already embarked on a profound transition to a state in which republic leaders would have a much more important role in defense and security decisions.

Independence for these republics might or might not result in a radical change, particularly a complete severing of ties among the republics. This scenario deserves close examination, however, because of the radical effect it could have in splitting the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

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The Independence Scenario

Over the weekend of August 23 to 26, as coup reaction set in, the 91 process fell apart in the Soviet Union. The nine republics that had carefully negotiated the Union Treaty over a 6-month period beginning in March 1991 walked away from their negotiating partner, the Soviet central government, and began declaring their intentions to become independent states. The three non-Russian republics where strategic nuclear weapons are deployed, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, were prominent in this process. Indeed, Ukraine quickly declared not only its intent to become independent, but its intent to retain control over the military assets (including, presumably, nuclear weapons) located on its territory.

These declarations, a radical departure from the somewhat orderly process by which power would have devolved from the center to the republics under the Union Treaty, set off alarm bells in Moscow as well as abroad. The specter of 15 republics, each likely to have some kind of tactical
Appendix I
Future Options for the Soviet Nuclear
Arsenal: Two Scenarios

and/or strategic nuclear assets deployed on its territory, brought to the
fore fears that had long percolated in the background as the Soviet
republics groped toward a new relationship with the center.

The decision on what nuclear arsenals would fall to each republic would
clearly not be the product of coherent planning in a traditional military
sense. The Russian republic, as mentioned above, would dominate
overwhelmingly, with most of the intercontinental ballistic missile sites
(12 of 16 silo basing sites, 10 of 12 mobile missile sites), all of the
submarine bases, and many of the medium- and long-range bomber bases
(11 of 26).

It would also have the vast majority of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia,
therefore, would have the most "balanced" arsenal. Kazakhstan would
possess two SS-18 bases; Byelorussia, two mobile missile bases (for
SS-25s); and Ukraine, an SS-24 base and an SS-19 base. In addition,
Byelorussia and Ukraine would each have medium- and long-range bomber
bases. All three of these republics would possess some tactical nuclear
weapons, as would at least some of the remaining republics.¹

It must be noted that the "usability"² of the strategic weapons would be
sharply limited by a number of factors, first of all by the safety and security
devices that are associated not only with the weapons themselves, but with
their particular deployment or storage sites. These security means and
measures—for example, permissive action links, electronic locking devices,
physical protection devices at sites—would take some time to overcome
and then reestablish, assuming that the republics' governments could
attract the expertise to do so. A second step would then require that the
weapons be made usable in an operational sense. Command and control
would have to be redirected to republic leaderships, and new targeting data
would have to be injected into missile guidance systems. These tasks, too,
would pose very difficult technical problems and would require the
formation of a cadre of strategic rocket forces personnel at the republic
level. Finally, ongoing maintenance of the systems would be an absolute
necessity, for the high technology components of the most modern Soviet
strategic weapons would quickly fall into disrepair without proper and


²"Usability" in this context refers to the operational readiness of these weapons and their availability to
the leaders who are supposed to be in control of them.
timely maintenance. Such maintenance would require technical expertise of which the republics presumably have little at present.

Of course, republic leaders are not likely to demand—nor are their forces likely to attain—the same level of usability that their Soviet predecessors required. Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were presumably targeted precisely and were integrated into a large-scale operational plan involving all Soviet strategic assets. Strategic nuclear forces falling into the republics' hands would not require the same targeting precision; indeed, in the short run, proof would not be necessary that they were capable of launching at all. Their very existence in the republics' hands would be sufficient to permit republic leaders to claim an independent nuclear capability. If, however, in 2 or 3 years, evidence did not emerge that the republics were acquiring some real operational experience and success, their "in situ" arsenals would likely begin to take on the character of that time-honored Slavic concept, the "pokazukha"—literally, "for show," "window-dressing." The Potemkin village is a fine example of a pokazukha.

Tactical nuclear weapons might be more easily made usable in a military sense once the safety and security devices associated with them are overcome. This ease would flow essentially from the greater simplicity of their protection devices and delivery vehicles and from the possibility that expertise regarding them is more widely distributed in the armed forces and KGB security forces.

The matter of the expertise available in the republics is, indeed, a great unknown. The strategic nuclear forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces, Long-Range Aviation, and the Navy nuclear cadre—have traditionally been made up mainly of Slavic nationalities, with Russians predominating. It is possible that some of these Slavs, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, could be recruited into "republic" strategic forces. They would then have to train an essentially new generation of national strategic forces to operate the systems.

For technical expertise, it is possible that experts released from nuclear weapons-related work in the Soviet defense industries would be attracted to work in the republics for monetary rewards, in essence becoming nuclear "mercenaries." Such individuals might also be recruited on the basis of national loyalties.

Thus, if the republic leaderships decided to seek usable military capability out of the nuclear forces that they acquired, in situ, on their territories,
they would be setting out on a long, technically challenging and expensive process that would bear fruit only after the passage of some years—perhaps 3, perhaps 5, perhaps more.

In the meantime, the weapons in their possession would be heading steadily toward obsolescence, and so the investment made in the republics’ nuclear forces would have to be renewed with new weapon programs. A republic like Ukraine might possess most of the research, development, and manufacturing assets to carry out new weapon programs, but only at considerable cost. For the other non-Russian republics, the costs would be much higher. Given the economic transformation with which they would all have to grapple, these costs would pose an enormous burden.

Moreover, if the republics were resolved to each retain an out-and-out independent nuclear capability, they could not be satisfied with the unbalanced forces with which the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. would leave them. Instead, they would, over time, have to diversify and modernize in order to achieve a more balanced and flexible nuclear force posture.

This effect would be especially true for Kazakhstan, with its 100 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are intercontinental weapons not designed for variable range against targets closer to home.

Because of the difficulty and expense of deploying usable, balanced strategic nuclear forces, the scenario of absolutely independent nuclear arsenals to serve the newly independent nations emerging from the U.S.S.R. seems unlikely in the long term. Competing demands on their resources will simply be too high.

The Denuclearization Scenario

Existing sovereignty statements have declared denuclearization to be a goal for Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, and republic leaders will be hard-pressed to repudiate them outright, for these statements are the product of profound antinuclear feeling. Some republic independence activists, however, those who are loudest in their calls for bargaining leverage against the center, have suggested that denuclearization be quietly shelve. It should, they say, become a long-term goal akin to Gorbachev’s 1986 proposal to seek the total destruction of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Because shelving denuclearization would essentially mean independent nuclear arsenals in the republics, most republic politicians would probably
prefer to avoid it. The most compelling reasons against maintaining independent arsenals, as outlined above, are techno-economic, but domestic antinuclear feeling and pressure against proliferation from international actors (including the United States) are probably also important.

The sovereignty statements of Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, it must be stressed, each emerged from political imperatives generated by strong antinuclear movements. The "nuclear-free" goals extended not only to weapons deployments, but also to production, storage, testing, and even to peaceful uses in nuclear power plants.

The genesis of these movements lay, in the case of Byelorussia and Ukraine, in the Chernobyl power plant accident of April 1986. In Kazakhstan, the antinuclear movement grew out of a realization of the major ecological and health damage that had resulted from years of nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk range. This movement, grass roots in its origin, became so powerful that it succeeded in closing down testing activity in Kazakhstan and forcing the Soviet government to turn to alternate sites in the Arctic, at Novaya Zemlya.

Republic politicians in 1990 and early 1991 often spoke of simply divesting their territories of nuclear weapons by moving them into Russia. Even in the context of this straightforward denuclearization, however, they spoke of maintaining some control of, first, the process of denuclearization, and, second, nuclear decision-making once the process was completed. They described the process as unfolding through East-West or bilateral arms control negotiations—the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), for example.

Republic politicians regarded the denuclearization process as both orderly and extending over some period of time—they had the 9-year example of the START-I negotiations before them. Moreover, they expected to participate in the process as members of the decision-making group in Moscow and of the negotiating delegation in the field.

In the weeks following the coup and the demise of the Soviet central government as we had known it, the urge toward straightforward denuclearization essentially disappeared. Republic leaders ceased talking about moving nuclear weapons into Russia—indeed, Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan outright repudiated the idea—and began calling for the destruction of the weapons at their deployment sites. This process, they
emphasized, would take some time. Republic political figures were clearly unwilling to allow Boris Yel'tsin and the Russian government to acquire more nuclear assets at their expense.

For a medium term extending 5 to 10 years, therefore, the republics' retention of their nuclear facilities seems to be emerging as a realistic option. Republic leaders have two requirements: (1) to bargain with first the central government and now with Russia over future defense, security, and economic arrangements and (2) to establish the republic's position as a force to be reckoned with in the international arena.

Several types of nuclear bargaining seem to be on the minds of republic politicians. Regardless of whether they desire denuclearization, they wish to become involved in several aspects of nuclear policy. Most important are their emerging demands to reform fundamental aspects of the National Command Authority (NCA), which grants republic leaders the right to participate in nuclear release decisions, perhaps through consultations, perhaps through a veto right, perhaps through some undefined type of dual-key arrangement. Soviet commentators have been speaking approvingly of the arrangements that have been worked out in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over the years. One key difference between the NATO nuclear command system and the system that republic leaders seem to be espousing was that the President of the United States always has the ultimate responsibility and authority for nuclear decision-making.

Republic leaders, by contrast, seem to be thinking in terms of a true collective, or consensual, decision-making system. Such a system actually had strong antecedents in the Soviet Union, where the Communist Party leadership, at least the top decisionmakers on the Defense Council, were said to have formed a collective NCA quite different from the single "commander-in-chief" concept of the U.S. system. Thus, it seems possible that republic leaders on the State Council, the new federal executive, are resolved essentially to replace the Communist Party leadership on the Defense Council, the body that had traditionally been responsible for NCA functions.

Because of all the international pressure that is being put on the republics to maintain central control of the strategic nuclear arsenal, the State Council will probably continue to exist, if for no other reason than to serve as this collective NCA. At the same time, new decision-making and cooperation systems are being worked out on an inter-republic basis.
Despite the revolutionary nature of this change, however, some key policy goals are being retained. For example, the denuclearization goal was apparently confirmed in the negotiations leading up to the Russian-Ukrainian agreement signed on August 29.

Moreover, the agreement not only pledged continued "adherence to the commitments by the U.S.S.R. in international relations, including agreements on arms reduction and arms control" but also "express[ed] readiness to solve in the transitional period all problems stemming from the previously adopted international commitments on the basis of talks with both states [which were] subjects of the former Union and members of the international community." The center is not mentioned as an interlocutor in these discussions. The republic governments take the initiative and, presumably, the responsibility for implementing agreements to which the U.S.S.R. had previously committed itself.

Denuclearization in a republic-to-republic context is likely to occur in a fashion similar to what would be predicted for denuclearization when the center plays a role. In a republic-to-republic context, republic leadership involvement in nuclear policy would be more pronounced and changes in the NCA more profound. Even in a center-to-republic case, however, the republics would be unlikely to accept a merely consultative role in NCA decisions. At a minimum, they will probably require a veto right over any decision to use nuclear weapons. This right would be backed up by some mechanism to enable action—in effect, a version of the "football," or black code suitcase, in the hands of each republic president. The ramifications of such a change in nuclear decision-making are enormous, potentially affecting the quality and overall reliability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

Although discussions of nuclear command and control, weapon deployment, and storage facilities make the best newspaper copy, facilities related to the development and production of nuclear weapons are at least as important in the ongoing negotiations among the republics. While no republic possesses all the facilities necessary for a nuclear weapon production complex, each has sites that are vital to all-union efforts, not only in weapon development, but also in the high technology fields in which the Soviet Union has managed to be successful. The steppes of Kazakhstan, for example, have long been used for nuclear weapon testing, missile testing, and space launch. Kazakhstan also dominates Soviet uranium production. Ukraine, on the other hand, is home to production...
plants for major missile programs, including the SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile. Although Russia is the best integrated of the republics, replacing these capabilities would be an expensive and time-consuming effort on its part. Thus, no matter what the fate of the weapons on their territories, the republics have valuable bargaining chips to bring to bear on negotiations in which Russia will seemingly play a predominant role.

Highly industrialized republics such as Ukraine and Byelorussia will be in the strongest positions, but Kazakhstan will also have a strong voice. This analysis assumes that, although these republics might seek to destroy nuclear weapons on their territories, they will retain weapon production complex facilities as a crucial part of their long-term leverage in inter-republic relations. They might enter the plants into a defense conversion program (some facilities have already become involved in conversion), but they will not close the plants. A conversion program would probably satisfy a political requirement to remove all nuclear facilities, including manufacturing, from republic territories.

A final question to address is the potential for the short-term withdrawal or destruction of weapons. If the manufacturing and research and development assets are the most critical bargaining assets, will it not be possible to remove the weapons themselves during a short-term period measured in months? Here, a limiting factor is technical. Although weapon removals might begin quickly, with a flurry of well-publicized activity, they might not end quickly, at least unless the parties are willing to sacrifice key aspects of nuclear safety and security. Russia, for example, is unlikely to have the requisite storage space for all of the tactical and strategic nuclear warheads deployed in the other republics. Constructing that storage space will be a time-consuming and expensive proposition if it is to meet the high standards of safety and security that would be desired and that the Soviets have maintained over time.

Likewise, the destruction of weapons is a time-consuming process that can stretch out over years, depending on the capacity of the facilities and equipment available for the job and on the availability of trained personnel. The destruction of Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) weapons, which took place under the strictly negotiated procedures of the INF Treaty, was completed only in May 1991, after almost 4 years.

Warhead destruction is a very demanding task that has never before been tried on a large scale, not least of which is because the nuclear materials
removed from the warheads must be safely stored or disposed of in a manner that precludes them from falling into the wrong hands.

Before the conclusion of the START accord, Soviet spokespersons were complaining about the expense of adhering to the strict destruction procedures of modern arms control agreements such as the Conventional Force Europe, the Intermediate Nuclear Force, and START. Following President Bush's September 27 speech calling for the destruction of short-range nuclear warheads, a Soviet commentator complained that the United States had not offered to pay for warhead dismantlement and that Bush's initiative would cost the Soviet Union money in the short run, the United States might indeed consider augmenting the President's proposal for technical cooperation on warhead dismantlement with resources to speed the process. It might, for example, offer to use U.S. facilities to destroy Soviet warheads. Destruction procedures might also be loosened in the interest of speed.

But without a radical change in views about destruction procedures, the denuclearization process seems likely to unfold as outlined above—over a medium term, or "transitional period." This period would last for several years—not the 9 years it took to complete the last START negotiations, perhaps, but a sufficient amount of time to permit an orderly and well-planned process. A shortening of the 7-year START reduction period to 5 years might be more appropriate. The transition would probably also proceed concurrently with discussions among the republics and the United States on the implementation of START and perhaps the negotiation of new reduction agreements and confidence-building measures.

Threats to the United States

There is no question that the nuclear threat to the United States as it has traditionally been characterized has been seriously dampened by events in the former U.S.S.R.. The idea that the Soviet leadership would be capable of launching a massive, premeditated first strike against the territory of the United States and its allies has receded quickly into the background.

Indeed, the emergence of a new collective NCA made up of the leaders of the republics pushes the country further away from a hair-trigger launch posture than, one might argue, was the case in the past. Unless large-scale launches are a bolt from the blue, the decision to launch would have to

Future Options for the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal: Two Scenarios

Appendix I

spring from severe nuclear crises or war on the Soviet periphery. In particular, the heretofore most likely case, war in Europe, now seems very unlikely, given the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet withdrawal from Europe.

Thus, the threat that a coherent decision-making body—acting on the basis of judgments and calculations of advantage to be gained by nuclear use in the midst of crisis or war—would decide to launch a nuclear attack on the United States has virtually disappeared. This threat will remain particularly distant if that decision-making body is a collective NCA made up of republic leaders unlikely to reach decisions quickly. As long as they are the legitimate command authority attached to the nuclear forces, the threat to the United States and its allies is likely to remain small.

The threat could reemerge if that collective group came to aspire to enmity against the United States or if one of its members—for example, Russia—seized a dominant role and returned to a threatening posture. This future, however, is probably the least likely, if only because the events of August and September 1991 have shaken the balance of power in Eurasia.

Threats to the United States and its allies in Europe are most likely to arise from nuclear assets gained by independent, disconnected authorities in the former U.S.S.R.—perhaps republic governments, perhaps even military personnel. It is they who could affect security relationships in Eurasia, particularly if they were not to be influenced by the calculations of risk that are the basis of classical nuclear deterrence theory. Let us examine a few examples of the threats that might emerge from such disconnectedness.

An Independent Nuclear Outcome

If the security of all parties cannot be assured, either with or without the participation of the United States, the outcome of independent nuclear potential in the republics must be considered. This outcome would be the worst case, for the tug of war that will continue over economic and broad security questions would take place against the backdrop of very uneven nuclear potential among Russia and the republics. Not only would clear recognition of mutual security requirements be lacking, but the extortion of such recognition from republic opponents on the basis of independent nuclear potential could occur. For example, Kazakhstan, with 1,000 SS-18 warheads, would be in a better position to threaten an opponent at intercontinental range than it would be to threaten its opponent to the north. Presumably, all parties would recognize such disbalances, thus
increasing pressure to seize tactical, more "usable" assets rather than unilaterally destroy them.

Remedying an imbalance could result, over a 10- to 20-year period, in some unpleasant futures. One example might be arms racing among the former republics of the U.S.S.R., at least those deploying strategic nuclear weapons, as the non-Russian republics attempt to provide themselves with true "all-azimuth" capabilities similar to those touted by the French. Ukraine is in the best position to achieve such capabilities; perhaps, once it established control and retargeted the weapons now on its territory, it would already have such an arsenal. One might speculate that Kazakhstan would offer Ukraine access to its test ranges and uranium resources in exchange for modernization of the Kazakh force toward an all-azimuth arsenal.

Such modernized, independent arsenals might result in any number of threats to U.S. allies on the Eurasian periphery, although the direct threat to the United States would probably remain at a low level, triggered only by accident or inadvertency. The threat to U.S. allies, however, could draw in the United States itself, if future U.S. policy extending its deterrent to allies in Europe and elsewhere remains consistent against the new independent arsenals.

Although highly speculative, a Ukrainian scenario is worth considering. If the Ukraine develops an independent arsenal, the United States may not be willing to interfere with Ukrainian disputes with Russia, but under certain circumstances it may wish to interfere if the Ukraine begins to look Westward. Any Ukrainian effort at nuclear intimidation against Poland, for example, would perhaps spur Germany to reconsider the formation of its own nuclear arsenal. To prevent that outcome, the United States may find it worthwhile to unequivocally extend its deterrent to Poland and the rest of Central Europe.

Another option might be the formation of security alliances based on religious and ethnic ties across the southern borders of the former U.S.S.R. The "Muslim security alliance" (which has gained the status of a nightmare scenario on the possibility of independent nuclear strategic and tactical capabilities in the Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R.) has emerged and been linked to possible third world proliferators such as Pakistan and Iran. In this case, the United States might have to consider the extent to which it is willing to shore up an independent Israeli nuclear capability with an extended U.S. deterrent.
Given the bad outcome that independent nuclear arsenals would represent, the denuclearization goal is clearly the one that the United States should strive for in the policy arena. It will probably require more than exhorting the parties to work together; indeed, the United States should use the considerable assets at its disposal to work toward achieving denuclearization. The assets are also those at the disposal of Russia, the other republics, and Soviet central authorities, should they continue to play a role. This vague balancing of assets is a result of the long and, in the end, productive bilateral relationship that the United States and the Soviet Union have hammered out in the arms control arena. Reduction negotiations, parallel unilateral initiatives, and confidence-building measures all involve tools that can be put to work.

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev have already proposed that we proceed in these three directions; now we must merely make clear the link to the dual goals of denuclearization and the preservation of the security of all parties—the United States and the republics of the former U.S.S.R.

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As a next step, let us examine how the denuclearization scenario outlined here might unfold in the context of an interaction involving the United States. This approach is only one of several that might be taken. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) countries might also be involved, as might the United Nations.

Thus, the analysis here speculates only on what might be achieved in a polycentric process in which the United States interacts with Russia, the dominant actor, as well as with Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, each of which also has strong cards in its suit.

Three basic assumptions must be stressed in this analysis. The first is that the Soviet central government will at best have vestigial authority; more likely, it will be nonexistent. Thus, either scenario will unfold in an essentially republic-to-republic context, with Russia dominating the negotiations and the Soviet government playing a moderating role or none.

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5"Polycentric" is defined as "having more than one center, as of development or control" (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1988, p. 912). As such, it seemed appropriate to the process being described here: not a multilateral process in the traditional sense, wherein multiple actors on one side of a negotiation share a community of interests (at least in theory). Instead, it is essentially a bilateral process in which one of the two sides must contend with multiple power centers, each with competing, even warring, interests. Use of the term "polycentric" in this context should not be confused with the common meaning of "polycentrism," i.e., "the existence of many centers of communist ideological thought, esp: the existence of a number of autonomous national communist movements" (ibid.).
at all. The second assumption is that the United States, based on its long-standing bilateral relationship with the former Soviet Union, especially in the area of arms control, has at its disposal not only a well developed mode of communication, but also a number of tools and levers that can be used to influence the republic-to-republic interactions. The 20-year intimacy of the U.S.-Soviet arms control relationship, in other words, has given the United States a relevant milieu in which to interact and a currency with which to bargain. In this case, the United States is in a much better position to influence events than it was, for example, in the case of Yugoslavia.

The third assumption, however, highlights a limit on this influence. The United States, we must assume, will not commit military forces to peacekeeping or other types of deployments on former Soviet territory. The on-the-ground activities of U.S. personnel will be limited to monitoring and confidence-building activities built on or developed from those previously agreed to in arms control negotiations. For that reason, reciprocity involving Russian and republic personnel on U.S. territory will probably be a necessary aspect of the interactions that emerge.

The basic goal of this polycentric negotiating process would be to enable denuclearization through a medium-term (5- to 10-year) transition process. In order to make it work, however, the non-Russian republics would have to be convinced that the denuclearization outcome would not be an overall decrement to their security. As argued above, a major factor in the development of this conviction will be the degree to which republic leaders believe that their leverage remains strong in economic relations with Russia. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, this leverage accrues from assets in the weapon production complex as well as from the weapons themselves.

Other assurance of the republics’ security will flow from factors in which the United States and possibly other members of the international community have a role. This discussion, as noted above, will be limited to the potential role of the United States. It is further limited to the role of the United States in the defense and security sphere.

The United States would likely also be engaged in economic and technical cooperation and assistance, which would provide it with additional tools and levers. These other aspects of cooperation are not further discussed in this paper.
An agenda for the negotiating process would have to balance phases of
denuclearization against a number of steps to address the legitimate
security concerns of Russia and the other republics. In the nuclear sphere
itself, a candidate list of such steps might include deep reductions in
strategic offensive forces; cooperative deployment of strategic defensive
systems; and development of an extensive, integrated array of
confidence-building measures.

A strategy that the United States might pursue in such a negotiation could
unfold as follows: The United States would propose a deep reduction in
strategic nuclear weapons, to a level of 1,000 warheads each for the United
States and Russia. The 10-year reduction period, in which all strategic
nuclear warheads and launchers in the non-Russian republics would be
destroyed, would be accompanied by intensive cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union to develop and deploy ground-based
limited defensive systems on the basis of the most modern Western and
Soviet technologies. Deployed in the republics, the ground-based assets of
these limited defensive systems would be under the strict control of the
republics. Their “eyes,” however, the early warning system, could be a
global space-based asset deployed by the United States and jointly manned
by the parties to the agreement. Henry Cooper, Director of the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization, has already suggested such an option.

Joint staffing of a ballistic missile early warning system, which was
proposed by President Gorbachev in his October 5, 1991, arms control
initiative, highlights a further series of steps that the United States might
negotiate with its Russian and republic partners. These steps would involve
a highly integrated series of confidence-building and monitoring
procedures that would extend well beyond what has been attempted so far
under INF, CSCE, and other negotiated arms control treaties. They might
include, for example, extending the concept of perimeter portal continuous
monitoring to a permanent presence for U.S. personnel at sites storing
nuclear warheads, both those scheduled for destruction and those being
retained for possible redeployment in a crisis. The sides might also

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6 Although eventual deep reductions of this kind have been widely discussed in the START follow-on
context, the particular association of deep reductions with republic demuclearization was suggested to
me by Roger Molander, Marc Dean Millot, and Peter Wilson in the scenario of their exercise, “The Day

7 Henry Cooper, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, has already suggested such an
cooperate intensively in the destruction of warheads, an idea that President Bush suggested in his initiative of September 27, 1991.

Such confidence-building measures would be complex because they have never been tried before, but they would also be complex because of the republics' involvement in them. The question of republic expertise in these areas was discussed above; in addition, the United States would be involved in a multi-actor effort, which could become as complicated and rancorous as the Middle East peace process. The negotiations would probably be helped, however, by the progress that is likely to be achieved in the confidence-building measures that will accompany unilateral reduction and destruction initiatives, such as the proposals by Bush and Gorbachev to destroy tactical nuclear weapons. Less demanding than negotiated measures, the confidence-building measures associated with parallel unilateral initiatives could quickly push forward the realm of precedent.

Although one may not agree with the particular strategy outlined here, the point of any strategy must be to assure all parties that their legitimate security concerns will be addressed, especially those involving the threats that the nuclear weapons of their neighbors might project.

Russia and the other republics can address this threat at the same time that they address the threat traditionally posed by strategic nuclear weapons in the hands of the other superpower. Indeed, the other superpower—the United States—will have to participate in the process.
The most salient feature of post-Cold War force planning is the absence of a defining threat. This is a new and unsettling development, for throughout most of this century Europe has provided the yardstick by which U.S. military capabilities were measured. The most enduring U.S. foreign policy objective has been to prevent any nation or combination of nations from establishing hostile hegemony over the European continent. For over a generation, the specific threat to that objective has been the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Warsaw Pact allies.

The task of defending against the threat provided by their considerable military capabilities has provided the rationale for the armament, size, and shape of the American military. But with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, that threat is at an end. Now a reassessment is necessary to determine the degree, if any, to which Europe still shapes and defines the American military conventional force structure.

For most of this century, Europe has been the primary strategic interest of the United States. As noted above, the nation's most enduring foreign policy objective has been to prevent any nation or combination of nations from establishing a hostile hegemony over the European continent. To that end, the United States sent its military forces into combat there in World Wars I and II to prevent Germany from seizing such control, and for over 40 years has forward-deployed a substantial part of its military in Western Europe to keep the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies at bay.

That focus held even when the United States was beset elsewhere in the world. Although the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into World War II, the United States pursued a "Europe-First" strategy for the conduct of that war, reassessing its forces against Germany and using an economy of force against Japan. Likewise, in the Korean War the United States sent more troops to Europe to reinforce the newly-formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defenses than it did to fight the shooting war in Korea. This policy reflected the belief that the main attack would come in Europe and that Korea was only a diversion.

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Even though the U.S. drew down its forward-deployed forces in Germany to fight the war in Vietnam, its strategic forces remained in Europe throughout the war. Pentagon "Whiz Kids" Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith's How Much is Enough, their 1971 analysis of Vietnam-era Pentagon thinking, is a case in point. Only about 50 pages of their 300-page book was devoted to the war in Vietnam. The majority of the book dealt with NATO strategy, unclear strategy, and the major defense programs of the day such as the B-70 bomber, the Skybolt missile, and the TFX fighter.  

This Eurocentric orientation was true within the services as well. In 1967, 2 years after the battle of the Ia Drang between U.S. and North Vietnamese Army regulars and at a time when the majority of the Army was deployed in Southeast Asia, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College taught no courses on the real war there. The curriculum still focused on a theoretical war with the Soviet Union on the plains of Central Europe.  

Even though in the first half of this century the United States had fought two wars in Asia, Europe remained the American military's reason for being.

The Soviet Threat That Defined U.S. Military Strategy

"The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack," emphasized James Madison in The Federalist in January 1788. "They will in fact be ever determined by these rules and by no others." Since the beginning of the Cold War over 40 years ago, the "means and the danger of attack" by the Soviet Union have defined the strategy and force structure of the U.S. military.

Over time the threat became magnified even beyond its considerable actual significance. As Professor John H. Kautsky pointed out over a quarter century ago:  

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3 The author returned from Vietnam in 1967 to attend the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was detailed to help write the college's first lecture on Vietnam and on the war being waged there.

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century ago in his landmark article "Myth, Self-Fulfilling Prophesy, and
Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict," the Soviet threat took
on a life of its own. It became the basis for the very size, organization, and
force structure of the American armed forces, and determined the makeup
of its arms and equipment as well. It was the criterion against which
conventional weapons systems—tanks, artillery, missiles, aircraft, and
warships—were measured and as such provided the rationale for the
nation's military research and development effort. U.S. military doctrine,
be it the Navy's maritime strategy, the Marine Corps' amphibious warfare
discipline, the Air Force's aerospace discipline, or the Army's AirLand battle
discipline, was designed to defeat the Soviet military on the land, sea, and
air.

The Soviet threat not only shaped military doctrine, it drove military
training as well. The threat influenced major training exercises such as the
annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) maneuvers where active
and reserve forces from the continental United States deployed to Western
Europe to reinforce NATO defenses. Unit and individual training was also
determined by this threat. Naval aviation's Top Gun and the Air Force's
Red Flag training programs, and the Army's exercises at the National
Training Center and the Combat Training Centers were conducted against
opposing forces using Soviet doctrine and tactics and armed with either
actual or replicas of Soviet equipment.

Whether the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact ever intended a
cross-border invasion of Western Europe is immaterial. "The point is,"
Professor Kautsky explained, "that myths, no matter how untrue, do have
very real consequences; that prophesies based on initially false
perceptions, can produce conditions which really exist (and thus fulfill the
prophesy); that men react to symbols by real behavior, be it activity or
quiescence....If men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences." 6

Among those consequences was the fact that for over 40 years NATO and
the Soviet threat sold on Capitol Hill. They provided a quick and simple
means to justify the defense budget to the Congress and to the American

6Ibid.
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people. It was not as cynical as it might seem, for this sort of strategic shorthand served a useful function.

The need for military forces to defend the American homeland and to protect worldwide U.S. interests was real. Rather than wade through the complex and arcane arguments necessary to justify that need in detail, it was easier for all concerned to reduce it to a kind of the-Russians-are-coming rationale. The beauty of that approach was not only its simplicity but the fact that once military forces and armaments necessary to provide for the Soviet threat were obtained, threats from lesser adversaries were provided for as well.

"Ten years ago, on assignment to the Army General Staff’s War Plans Directorate,” I noted in a June 1989 article,7 "I sat in on a briefing by a navy planner on the strategic rationale for the U.S. Navy. Slide after slide portrayed the Soviet naval threat to U.S. interests around the world, and there followed slide after slide depicting how the U.S. Navy was countering the threat. When he finished, the planner, an admiral, asked my boss, an army major general, what he thought of the presentation. 'Very interesting,' the general said. 'But what you’ve just said is that if the Soviet navy sank tomorrow, we could do away with the U.S. Navy.' The admiral laughed. 'You just don’t understand,' he said. 'If the Soviet navy sank tomorrow, I’d get me a new set of slides.'" Even 2 years ago when I wrote that article, it was beginning to become apparent that the defining military threat had faded and that it was indeed time for a new set of slides. "Although the Soviet navy is still afloat,” I noted, “most of the other post-Second World War rationales upon which our military force structure was built either have sunk or are listing badly in the water, swamped by…a new dynamism in international politics.”8

Altered Soviet Threat

The new dynamism saw the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent reunification of Germany, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. But even in the face of that apparent decline of Soviet military influence, there was still a belief that domestically Soviet military strength was still all-powerful. As Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said in the 1991 Joint Military Net

8Ibid, pp. 34-37, 40.
Assessment, "President Gorbachev appears ready to rely on the security services and the military and their use of force to maintain order inside the Soviet Union. There is now a widespread consensus among Soviet observers that the central government is increasingly influenced by the military and the security services, as well as the Communist Party bureaucracy." That "widespread consensus" did not last out the year. It collapsed 5 months later in August 1991 when that very Communist Party cabal staged their abortive Kremlin coup.

Now the survival of the central government is in doubt, the Communist Party bureaucracy has been eliminated, and the security services and the military have been severely purged. As Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the former chief of the Soviet armed forces, wrote when he committed suicide in the wake of the failed Kremlin coup, everything he had devoted his life to was now collapsing. Akhromeyev's earlier warnings of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its armed forces had come to pass. At the time Akhromeyev's suicide was revealed, new Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov announced on Soviet television that "80 percent of the country's top officers would leave their posts, to be replaced by younger people." "Scarcely conceivable just a week ago," noted the August 26, 1991, Washington Post, "today's developments underscored the stunning speed of the revolution that is now sweeping away 74 years of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union. By depriving the party and the security services of much of their repressive power, the post-coup leadership has opened the floodgates of change...."

That deluge has not spared the once exalted Soviet military. In fact, given the disintegration of the Soviet Union now underway, to even talk of the "Soviet military" may soon be a misnomer, as Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics declare their independence and move to create their own defense establishments from the remnants of what once was the Red Army.

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Assessment of Current Soviet Military Capabilities

While their military capabilities, and their nuclear capabilities in particular,\textsuperscript{11} remain formidable, the political and ideological underpinning that gave those capabilities meaning have now collapsed. This breakdown has far-reaching consequences, for without political direction the military is like a ship without a rudder. “Since war is primarily a politically directed act for political ends,” emphasizes the U.S. Army’s basic strategic manual in words equally applicable to the Soviet Union, “the conduct of a war, in terms of strategies and constraints, is defined primarily by its political objectives.”\textsuperscript{12}

The loss of the ideological purpose that provided the Red Army’s reason for being strongly affects the Soviet military capabilities. Combat power, by definition, is the combination of physical means and moral authority. While the facts and figures on the physical means can be catalogued with some accuracy, the loss of moral authority cannot be gauged. As Napoleon warned, “In war the moral is to the material as three to one.”

Albeit that caveat, the physical size of the Soviet armed forces is enormous. On October 1, 1991, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Grachev announced that the size of the Soviet military would be cut in half over the next 3 years from close to 4 million to 2 million or 2.5 million as the military switched to a largely volunteer force. Even at those reduced levels, it would be larger than the 2.1 million member U.S. military, which is scheduled for a 25-percent reduction by 1995.

Confusing the issue, however, is Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov’s announcement on September 30, 1991, that the Soviet military would be cut to 3 million in the next years. The Washington Post’s Fred Hiatt reported from Moscow on this contradictory statement:

The discrepancy reflected continuing uncertainty throughout the military hierarchy about the future of the Soviet armed forces as republics of this former superpower spin off toward independence. With many republics forming their own armed forces, not only the size but also the control and even the existence of the Soviet military...are being called into question.

Despite disagreement on the numbers, the military hierarchy appears agreed on the need to...move from a large conscript army to a smaller more professional, better-equipped

\textsuperscript{11}For a discussion of Soviet nuclear military power, see Rose Gottemoeller’s “Future Options for the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal: Two Scenarios” in this supplement, app. I.

Defense aide Grachev said the move away from a conscript army would begin gradually in January [but] as most republics pass laws barring their young men from serving anywhere but on their own republic's territory...it is unclear whether the union forces will be able to carry out such a gradual reform.13

The 1992 edition of the International Institute of Strategic Studies authoritative Military Balance lists the current Soviet military at some 3,400,000 active forces (with perhaps 2,000,000 conscripts) and 5,239,000 reservists. Ground forces include some 1,400,000 soldiers organized into 32 tank divisions, 100 motorized rifle divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. These divisions are normally rated as to their degree of readiness, but this year insufficient data is available to make such classifications.

The numbers of divisions will vary as units are demobilized. Thus armament may be a more meaningful measure of Soviet capabilities. Weapons systems include some 54,400 main battle tanks, including over 9,000 of the modern T-72s and 5,400 T-80s, as well as 1,000 PT-76 light reconnaissance tanks. Armored vehicles also include some 28,000 BMP infantry fighting vehicles and over 50,000 armored personnel carriers. Armed helicopters include 340 Mi-8s, 290 Mi-17s, and 1,420 Mi-24s.

Soviet artillery has over 64,200 tubes and launchers in its inventory. They include about 33,000 towed artillery pieces, ranging from 100mm to 203mm guns and howitzers; 9,000 self-propelled artillery weapons; 1,200 combined gun/mortars; 8,000 multiple rocket launchers, including the 300mm Smerch; 13,000 mortars; 1,350,723 surface-to-surface missile launchers, as well as 8,000 antitank guns, 12,000 air defense guns, and 4,960 mobile SAM (surface-to-air missile) antiaircraft systems.

The Soviet Air Force comprises some 420,000 personnel and over 4,905 combat aircraft. In addition to its 587 bombers which are part of their Strategic Aviation nuclear forces, conventional ground attack fighters include 2,240 MiG 27s, Su-17s, Su-24s, and Su-25s. Their 2,130 fighters include MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-29s, and Su-27s. In addition to reconnaissance and electronic-countermeasure aircraft, the Soviet Air Force includes some 620 military transport aircraft augmented by 1,700 medium- and long-range aircraft of the civilian Aeroflot fleet.

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The Soviet Navy comprises 450,000 personnel, 317 submarines (including 60 strategic nuclear submarines), and 218 surface combatants. These combatants include 5 aircraft carriers, 38 cruisers, 29 destroyers, and 146 frigates. In addition, the Soviet Navy has 382 patrol and coastal combatants; about 292 mine warfare ships; 78 amphibious ships; and 732 underway support, maintenance, logistics, and special purpose ships. Its Merchant Marine includes 2,800 ocean-going vessels, of which 125 are roll-on/roll-off and 3 are roll-on/float-off cargo ships.1

Soviet Military’s Excess Capabilities

These capabilities, created for a time when the Soviet Union had worldwide ambitions, far exceed today’s requirements. As the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the newly independent Baltic states, and from Vietnam, Africa and Cuba continues, the Soviet military will focus primarily on events within the Soviet Union.

Already the Red Army finds itself involved in regional conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Looming ahead, especially as the Soviet state crumbles, are long-simmering irredentist claims along the Sino-Soviet frontier, along the border between Iran and Azerbaijan, among the Iranian-speaking Muslims of Tadjikistan, along the East European frontier with Poland, and between the Soviet republic of Moldavia and Romania.

Except for strategic nuclear forces discussed elsewhere, conventional Soviet military threats to vital U.S. interests appear minimal. The Soviets are withdrawing from East Germany, from Poland, from Czechoslovakia, and from Hungary. It is also dissolving its Baltic Military District. Thus it is hard to envision a scenario where a direct military confrontation might take place.

And, as the Soviet Union withdraws from the Third World, removing its forces from Africa and Cuba and shutting down its naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, it is difficult to imagine an indirect confrontation either. Low-intensity conflict was almost totally a reciprocal of the Soviet high-intensity threat. As the zero-sum conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. comes to an end, so does the threat of Nikita Khrushchev’s “wars of national liberation.”

The issue at hand is what the Soviet Union, will do with its excess military capability. Current plans call for cutting it by one-third to one-half, but as the Soviet military hierarchy warns (in what they call a “dangerous” trend) it may instead be parceled out among the various independent Soviet republics. One concern is that excess Soviet military hardware might be put on the auction block in the international arms bazaar, a development that could complicate U.S. peace-keeping efforts worldwide.

Although the “dangers” of attack may have attenuated, the means of attack still exist. As long as they remain intact, prudence dictates that the United States continue to include Soviet military capabilities in its strategic equation. It is unlikely, especially after the abortive August 1991 coup, that the political process in the Soviet Union will reverse itself and that the hard-line ideologues will come back into power. Nevertheless, given the unprecedented changes of the past year, it is an eventuality that cannot be completely ruled out.

But even if the hard-liners did come back into power in the Soviet Union, they would find it difficult to bring their conventional military forces into a direct confrontation with the Western democracies. The reason is that, to use the words made famous by Winston Churchill, “from Stettin [now Szczecin] in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic a new curtain has descended across the continent, replacing the iron curtain that once separated eastern and western Europe.”

What only months earlier had been the Warsaw Pact has now become the modern version of the cordon sanitaire. Literally a “sanitary cordon,” a cordon sanitaire is a barrier restricting free movement of people or goods, so as to keep a disease or infection from spreading. The most famous such cordon was established by the Paris Peace Conferences in 1919 to isolate Western Europe from the spread of bolshevism. The very same countries that formed that original barrier—Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria—are once more independent and once more (along with Yugoslavia, an original cordon partner) serve as a buffer between West Europe and the Soviet Union.

In one of the great ironies of history, Soviet attempts to form the Warsaw Pact as its version of the cordon sanitaire in order to insulate itself from the spread of democracy had exactly the opposite effect. East Europe proved to be a conduit for democratic change rather than a barrier.
Challenges to communist rule began in Hungary in 1956 and flared again in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

In Poland riots broke out in 1956, again in 1970, and yet again in 1980-81. That latest unrest, sparked by the Solidarity labor movement, was so intense that it threatened the very existence of the communist state. Under pressure from Moscow, martial law was imposed to restore order. After martial law was lifted in December 1982, the movement toward democracy intensified. It culminated in the election of Tadeusz Mazowieck as Prime Minister on August 19, 1989, as the first non-Communist to head an eastern bloc nation. Some mark that as the beginning of the end for Communism. As the University of Washington's Professor Christopher M. Jones noted at the time:

In facing the imminent formation of the Mazowiecki government, Gorbachev faced an epochal choice. He could renounce his program of reconciliation with the societies of East Europe and the states of West Europe or authorize a futile repetition of the 1981 suppression of Solidarity by General Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law, again backed up by the threat of a Warsaw Pact intervention. But such military action threatened all of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies. It also risked the launching of another 'Afghan' war fought by Soviet soldiers to keep an unpopular 'ethnic' communist government in power.

In ruling out the use of Soviet power in Poland, Gorbachev immediately raised the question of whether he would rule out the use of Soviet military power to defend other communist regimes against internal threats in East Europe.\(^\text{15}\)

The question has since been emphatically answered. Gorbachev did not resort to military force when 3 months after Mazowiecki's election in Poland, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and one after another the communist governments across East Europe were forced from power.

The very face of East Europe was changed at midnight on October 2, 1990, when one of the bulwarks of the Warsaw Pact, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), was reunified with the Federal Republic of Germany and its military (including 2,800 main battle tanks and 192 combat aircraft) integrated into that of the West Germany armed forces. Completing the modern-day cordon sanitaire were the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia whose restored independence from 50 years of Soviet captivity was recognized by the United States on September 2, 1991.

\(^{15}\)Christopher M. Jones, "Gorbachev Seeks a Trade-off," *The World and I* (Feb. 1990), p. 46.
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Current East European Military Capabilities

Although the Warsaw Pact officially dissolved earlier this year, the armaments that alliance spawned are not so easily disposed of. Although significant reductions are now underway, four of the five surviving former Warsaw Pact nations—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania—have over 2,000 main battle tanks and the fifth, Hungary, has almost 1,500. Although not a former Warsaw Pact member, Yugoslavia's military also has 1,850. Combined, these nations of Eastern Europe have some 14,406 main battle tanks, almost as many as the U.S. Army's 15,585.

Eastern Europe (like the Soviet Union) finds itself with military capabilities far in excess of its current national security needs. The 107,000-man Bulgarian Armed Forces include 2,149 main battle tanks, 2,233 artillery pieces, 3 submarines, 2 frigates, 266 combat aircraft, and 56 armed helicopters. Czechoslovakia, with 154,00 men under arms, has 3,200 main battle tanks, 3,446 artillery pieces, 297 combat aircraft, and 56 armed helicopters.

Hungary has 86,500 men under arms, with 1,482 main battle tanks, 1,087 artillery tubes and launchers, 111 combat aircraft, and 39 armed helicopters. With 305,000 men under arms, Poland's arsenal includes 2,850 main battle tanks, 2,300 artillery pieces, 3 submarines, 1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 506 combat aircraft, and 31 armed helicopters. The 200,800-man Romanian military has 2,875 main battle tanks, 3,836 artillery tubes and launchers, 1 submarine, 1 destroyer, 4 frigates, 465 combat aircraft, and 104 armed helicopters.

The Altered East European Threat

As with the Soviet Union, the primary threat posed by East Europe is its own internal instability. Yugoslavia has once more reverted to the turmoil that caused the term “Balkans” to be synonymous with anarchy, with Serbia locked in a bitter struggle to prevent Croatian and Slovenian independence. Riots flare in Romania, the Czechs and the Slovaks are talking about going their separate ways, and border and ethnic

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controversies dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire are beginning to resurface. As Magarditsch Hatschikjan, a leading authority on Eastern Europe, recently observed,

The reservoir of conflict in Eastern Europe is immense...territorial disputes are conceivable...between

- Romania and the Soviet Union (over Bessarabia and North Bukovina),
- Hungary and Romania (over Transylvania),
- Poland and the Soviet Union (over Poland's eastern borders),
- Poland and Czechoslovakia (over the region of Teshen),
- Hungary and Czechoslovakia (over southern Slovakian territory),
- Albania and Yugoslavia (over Kosovo),
- Albania and Greece (over North Epirus),
- Yugoslavia and Greece (over Aegean Macedonia),
- Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (over Macedonia), and
- Bulgaria and Romania (over Dobruja).

To make matters worse,

the number of—potential or actual—conflicts concerning national minorities is even greater, involving, for example

- Hungarians in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia;
- Poles in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia;
- Germans, White Russians, and Ukrainians in Poland;
- Bulgarians in Romania and Yugoslavia;
- Turks in Bulgaria;
- Romanians in the Soviet Union;
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- Greeks in Albania;
- Albanians in Yugoslavia;
- Gypsies in Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania; and
- Serbs living outside their 'own' republic in various parts of Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.17

What makes these conflicts so potentially dangerous is that the military capabilities these countries possess almost guarantee that if armed conflict breaks out, it will be bloody. Yugoslavia has already set the terrible example, as the Serbian-dominated federal army uses air strikes and artillery against breakaway Croatia.

While vital U.S. interests are not directly threatened by this violence, such instability does affect Western Europe. As discussed below, both the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have been discussing formation of peace-keeping forces and even the possibility of armed intervention by Western European Union (WEU) military forces.

The Effect on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have affected Western Europe and its primary defense alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Signed into being on April 4, 1949, for the next 40 years NATO was the primary bulwark against Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe and the justification for committing a major portion of the U.S. military to the European defenses.

But now time is about to make an honest man of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson who negotiated the original treaty. Will the United States "be expected to send substantial numbers of troops [to Europe] as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of [Western Europe's] capacity to resist?" asked Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa during the 1949 Senate hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty. "The answer to that

question," replied Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "is a clear and absolute 'No.'"\textsuperscript{18}

But whether he intended it or not, permanent it turned out to be. Meeting with a group of Soviet officers on September 16, 1991, General John R. Galvin, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) noted that when he took over that post 4 years ago there were more than 320,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe. General Galvin went on to say that the force was now down to about 260,000, and he believed that it could be reduced to 150,000. But he also emphasized that the United States must maintain a military presence in Europe to promote stability. "We cannot retreat into a Fortress America," he said.\textsuperscript{19}

Earlier, on May 28, 1991, in what was described as the broadest strategic and conceptual changes in NATO's 42-year history, the NATO Defense Ministers approved a major restructuring of the alliance. As the Director of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Hans Binnendijk, noted, this revamped concept included:

- A mobile immediate reaction force numbering 5,000 capable of responding to crisis in 72 hours.
- A Rapid Reaction Corps 50,000 to 70,000 strong designed to respond in less than 1 week. The Corps would be commanded by the British and include two British divisions, two multinational divisions, and U.S. ground, air, and air transport units.
- A base force of seven multinational corps designed to defend Western Europe. Included would be three German corps (one in the eastern part of Germany), one Dutch corps, one Belgian corps, one mixed German and Danish corps, and one U.S. corps. A U.S. division would serve in a German corps and vice versa.
- An augmentation force, made up primarily of U.S. units, designed to reinforce NATO's base force.

Under this concept, NATO troops might be reduced to 350,000, of which nearly half could be Americans. By the mid-1990s (after Soviet troops leave Germany), the United States would have in Europe a corps headquarters, two army divisions, and corps support elements. This would

\textsuperscript{18}Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 285.

yield a new U.S. force level of about half of the current 320,000 troops or less. The position of SACEUR would continue to be held by an American, at least for now.20

In September 1991, that new concept was put to the test during NATO's 22nd annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercise. Dubbed "REFORGER lite" by the troops, as the Army Times notes, it involved about 28,000 troops and 400 tracked vehicles (but no main battle tanks) from the United States, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain, a far cry from the 97,000 troops and 7,000 tracked vehicles that took part in the exercise in 1988.

This year's exercise included "an unprecedented reliance on computer simulations to replicate battle operations for commanders and their staff members without large-scale troops maneuvers."
21 And it also marked the debut of NATO's new rapid reaction force by a prototype multinational air assault division. Commanded by a British major general with a German deputy commander, the ad hoc 7,000-man force consisted of the British 24th Airmobile Brigade; the German 27th Luftlande Brigade; a Belgian Para-Commando Regiment; and a Dutch, German, and British armed aviation element.22

West European Union and the Future of NATO

There had been some talk of allowing this new NATO Rapid Reaction Force to become the core of a WEU force. Those discussions intensified during the ongoing civil war in Yugoslavia, as the EC sought to provide for a peace-keeping force there.

"The community...has been trying to mediate a solution to the crisis since last June," reported the New York Times on September 19, 1991. "The idea of a peace force organized by the nine-nation West European Union was initially raised...by the Netherlands [and]...quickly endorsed by Germany, France and Italy." This proposal was vetoed, however, by Great Britain, which said it had learned two important lessons from its experience in sending forces to end factional violence in Northern Ireland

22 years ago: "It is much easier to put troops in than to get them out; and the scale of the effort at the start bears no resemblance to the scale of the effort later on." 23

As Georgetown's Hans Binnendijk remarked, even before the Yugoslavian crisis, the United States viewed the creation of a WEU security force with alarm.

The United States is concerned that movement toward a European defense identity will bring about U.S. political and military isolation within NATO and that eventually a new European defense organization will compete with NATO. If developments go the wrong way, they could force U.S. troops out of NATO and perhaps even destroy the alliance. 24

That destruction may already be underway. "NATO's future contingencies might well look much more like the coalition's assistance to the Kurds than anything we have planned for in the past," said General John R. Galvin in a September 1991 interview with Melissa Healy of the Los Angeles Times.

It is time, he said, to "drop the old Cold War thinking" and return to a "more generalized approach" to ensuring the security of Europe. Rather than a massive, very predictable threat, there is the possibility of great instabilities coming about that have military aspects to them. We're seeing that in Yugoslavia, for instance."

But as Healy observed,

if nettling instability, rather than massive confrontation, is to become the rationale for America's military presence in Europe, some...are saying that U.S. troops should come home. Both houses of Congress adopted resolutions this year urging the Bush Administration to reduce U.S. troops in Europe to fewer than 100,000 from the 1990 level of 300,000.

And Europeans agree with such reductions. While

most West Europeans believe that a continued U.S. presence in Europe is needed to guarantee their security in the near term...the polls also make clear that Europeans will not tolerate a U.S. troop presence forever. The EC found that majorities of Europeans would


prefer to see the European Community form a common defense organization to protect their interests in the future....

With the dizzying acceleration of change in the Soviet Union, experts say those views are likely to take deeper hold throughout Europe, and sooner rather than later. As they do, the continued U.S. presence, say some, will look more and more like a Cold War anachronism—or worse, an occupation force....

But the future of NATO is a fast-moving train. In advance of a major NATO summit meeting in Rome in November 1991, NATO Secretary General Manfried Woerner announced on October 3, 1991, what amounts to be a major transformation of the alliance's identity. According to senior alliance officials, "NATO is prepared to assume a new role as the dominant pan-European security institution by launching unprecedented political and military cooperation with the Soviet Union and East European countries."

That same day Secretary of State James A. Baker III and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called for creation of a new group to link NATO closer to the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They said the United States and Germany will propose at the Rome summit next month establishment of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council which would meet regularly, aiding the new democracies in Eastern Europe with defense conversion and other issues.

"Although the prospect of a concerted military threat to Western Europe from the east has faded dramatically," stated the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, "continuing political and economic instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union presents new concerns." Among the scenarios envisioned in that assessment is "escalation of a crisis in Europe."

In April 1991, General Colin L. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elaborated on that scenario. Noting that one of the enduring realities
of the international strategic environment was "the reality of Soviet military power," he emphasized that

while the Soviet military threat is finally being reduced, it will hardly disappear. The Soviet Union will remain the one country in the world with the means to destroy the United States in 30 minutes in a single devastating attack. And the Soviet Union will still have millions of well-armed men in uniform, and will remain, by far, the strongest military force on the Eurasian land mass.

"The second enduring reality," he went on to say, "is America's continued vital interests across the Atlantic Ocean. All of the positive changes we have seen in Europe are a testament to the success of collective defense. Preserving a free and stable Europe will remain an enduring interest of the United States."

To protect those interests (and interests in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Africa, and Southwest Asia) General Powell proposed an Atlantic Force including

a forward presence in Europe [presumably under the aegis of NATO] of a heavy Army Corps with at least two divisions; a full-time Navy and Marine presence in the Mediterranean; and Air Force fighter wings possessing the full spectrum of tactical capability....The bulk of the Reserve Components of the Services have [also] been allocated to Atlantic Forces.

Laying out an "Atlantic Scenario," General Powell pointed out that

the Atlantic is a diverse region. Consequently, U.S. air, land, space, and maritime forces must be postured to respond to any outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Africa. We are shifting our emphasis from reliance on forward-deployed forces to forward presence supported by power projection from a primarily CONUS-based reserve...Our continuing interests in the region underscore the need to preserve and enhance a core of mobile, flexible, highly trained and ready armored and mechanized divisions that can deploy and arrive ready to fight....

Air support would be provided by [U.S. Air Force] tactical fighter wings from across the nation and naval air deployed on aircraft carriers from our East coast ports such as Norfolk, Virginia. Marine Expeditionary Brigades from Norfolk, Virginia and Camp LeJeune, North Carolina would also play a key role. Sustainment would come from air bases such as Dover Air Force Base, Delaware and sea ports along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. 28

Appendix II
The Absence of a Defining Soviet Threat: the Effect on Conventional Force Structure

Conclusion

To what degree, if any, does Europe still shape and define the American military conventional force structure? That was the question with which this reassessment began. Judged in traditional fashion as purely a matter of threat-response, the answer would be that Europe is no longer a defining threat. The likelihood of any nation or combination of nations imposing hostile hegemony over the European continent has ebbed to its lowest level in this century. While the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe still maintain a formidable military capability, both are so preoccupied with their own internal problems that the near-term chances of their reversing course and once again threatening U.S. interests in Europe are practically nil.

But there is more to American involvement in Europe than the threat-response scenario. While Europe may no longer define the size and shape of America's armed forces, America remains a Eurocentric nation, linked to the European continent by strong cultural, political, and economic ties. "Every time before in this century that we've left it to the Europeans, they've screwed it up, and they realize that," a senior Defense Department official told the Los Angeles Times' Melissa Healy. "And every time we've gone off in an isolationist mode, we've helped screw it up."

Withdrawal from NATO, says General Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, "would cost the United States its 'seat at the table' in the shaping of future security in Europe. And in the final analysis, Bush Administration officials say that holding that seat has become the real mission of U.S. troops in Europe."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Atlantic Force is designed to assure our allies of continued U.S. support. But it does much more than that. Because the post-Cold War threat is so difficult to define, the overarching force structure requirement is to build sufficient flexibility into the force so that it can respond to contingencies across the geographic and conflict spectrums. As I have argued elsewhere, mid-intensity conflict is the most likely threat facing the United States today.

Just as the Soviet threat jifeed creation of a combat force sufficiently large to cover other threats to America's interests, so the Atlantic Force can provide the mid-intensity heavy ground combat force needed to protect U.S. interests there and elsewhere in the world.


Recent events have all but removed, at least for the foreseeable future, the principal raison d' être for maintaining a large U.S. military garrison in Europe; and while the Cold War's demise has unchained some old sources of violence on the Continent, the loci of and issues associated with those conflicts do not directly engage core U.S. security interests. Other than the distant and highly unlikely prospect of a militarily resurgent and territorially unsatisfied Germany, Europe is no longer, and will no longer be, threatened by a major power seeking hegemony on the Continent. America's role as the primary guarantor of Western Europe's security is fading as NATO's military component shrinks and becomes increasingly European in content.

For four decades, from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, the defense of Western Europe against a massive Soviet invasion (involving up to 60 to 100 Warsaw Pact divisions and 2,800 to 4,000 tactical aircraft), launched with perhaps little warning and from forward garrisons in Eastern Europe (containing 31 divisions and 525,000 troops), was the primary preoccupation of U.S. forces planners. The size and locus of the Soviet threat in Europe not only shaped the scope and character of U.S. conventional forces, but also dictated a heavy investment in non-strategic nuclear forces as a means of offsetting the Warsaw Pact's numerical conventional superiority over NATO in Central Europe. The nature of the threat also mandated a robust defense-industrial base and heavy investment in advanced technology.

For the U.S. Army, coping with the prospect of a short-warning Soviet blitzkrieg across the old inter-German border required a large force structure on the order of 25 to 30 active and reserve divisions, and the forward deployment in Germany of 4 to 5 active divisions along with a prepositioned stock of equipment for several other divisions retained in the United States as reinforcements. By the Cold War's end, 5 of the Army's 18 active divisions were stationed in Europe, with 5 more committed to reinforcing Europe within 10 days. A large-scale conflict against a Soviet army composed almost entirely of armored and mechanized infantry divisions also compelled large Army investment in similar heavy forces, even though such forces proved to be of marginal utility in such different non-European operational environments as Korea and Indochina.

Europe's defense requirements also dominated U.S. Air Force planning and force structure. Though there was an independent need to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent against an intercontinental Soviet first strike on the United States, it was generally believed that such a strike would most
likely come as the culminating act of an escalating war in Europe. In any event, after the mid-1960s, the strategic nuclear accounts of the Air Force declined to an average of about 12 to 15 percent of its total expenditures. NATO requirements were most evident in the rest of the Air Force’s budget, especially in tactical aviation and strategic airlift. A heavy investment in costly strategic airlift aircraft was driven primarily, but by no means solely, by the perceived need to be able rapidly to reinforce U.S. forward deployments in Europe with forces brought in from the United States. With respect to tactical air power, the Air Force’s Eurocentric focus was evident in large-scale investment in costly state-of-the-art, multi-role aircraft capable of not only defending NATO airspace but also carrying the air war, including strikes on westward-moving Soviet ground reinforcements deep Eastern Europe. It was no less apparent in the deployment, by 1989, of 9 of the Air Force’s 30 tactical fighter wings in Europe, and the allocation to Europe’s reinforcement of most of its 16 tactical fighter wings based in the United States.

Though less affected by Europe’s defense requirements than the Army and Air Force, the Navy and Marine Corps allocated a significant share of their force structure to Europe’s defense during the Cold War. The Marine Corps remains formally committed to an early defense of Norway from Soviet attack, and in the 1980s placed in that country the equipment and supplies of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. As for the Navy, several of its carrier battle groups and most of its 80-odd attack submarines were justified on behalf of its burden of protecting sea-borne U.S. reinforcements from Soviet submarine and naval air attacks. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe was also allocated several of the Navy’s 35 strategic ballistic missile submarines.

The transformation of Europe’s security environment that began in the late 1980s is still underway. But at this juncture it is nonetheless safe to conclude that the United States and its NATO allies have won the Cold War in Europe and that most of the highly favorable political and military developments of the past several years are irreversible, or at least irreversible within any meaningful force planning frame of time.

For the first time in this century, Europe enjoys the combination of a territorially satisfied Germany and a Soviet empire and union in dissolution (and increasingly dependent on Western good will for economic survival). This state of affairs virtually eliminates any prospect of a deliberate East-West conflict in Europe. Indeed, the displacement of communist political authority everywhere in Eastern Europe (except Albania and
Serbia) and in much of the Soviet Union by, in many cases, avowedly
democratic forces committed to dismantling national command economies
makes it difficult to speak in traditional “East-West” security terms,
although the fate of Russia, which has little experience with democracy and
a history of periods of limited political reform followed by harsh reaction,
is far from clear.

None of this means that prospects for serious violence in Europe have
vanished. On the contrary, communism’s disintegration from the Elbe to
the Neva has liberated long-suppressed ancient ethnic and national
antagonisms in Eastern Europe (especially the Balkans) and in the Soviet
Union itself. Civil war has already erupted in Yugoslavia, and other
potential flashpoints abound, including the Polish-Czech dispute over
claims to Silesia, Serbian-Albanian tensions over the province of Kosovo,
Bulgarian claims on Macedonia, the Romanian-Hungarian dispute over the
rights of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, sentiment of Romanians living
in the Soviet republic of Moldavia (which has announced its intention to
secede and has changed its name to Moldova) for union with Bucharest,
and mounting Russian, Ukrainian, Turkic, Georgian, and other
nationalisms within the U.S.S.R.

Nor does the Cold War’s demise preclude the possibility of an eventual and
successful conservative reaction in the Soviet Union, which would be far
more in line with the course of Russian history than any transition to a
liberal political and economic order. The pathetic failure of the attempted
coup in August 1991 dealt a severe blow to those favoring a return to the
old order, but it would be most imprudent to assume that it was reaction’s
last and only gasp. Much will depend on the speed with which economic
reforms, abetted by Western advice, agriculture commodities transfers,
and credits, can deliver sufficient relief to deprived urban populations.
Failure to deliver enough in time could strengthen sentiment for a return to
the old order even at the expense of newly acquired political and individual
liberties.

What is clear is that the Soviet military threat that sired the Cold War,
NATO’s formation, America’s permanent intervention in Europe’s military
affairs, and four decades of acute military tension on the Continent is
rapidly receding, probably never to be reconstituted again, or at the very
least without years of visible preparation. More fundamental is the absence
of any conceivable rational causcus belli between the Soviet Union and
NATO, barring the return to power in Moscow of a leadership determined to
recover by force its “lost” empire in Eastern Europe (to which in any event
neither the United States nor NATO has extended, or is likely to extend, any security guarantees). The Cold War in Europe was ultimately about a divided Germany's fate, and the clinching act of the Cold War's end was the Soviet Union's acceptance of a reunited Germany in NATO.

The scope of the Soviet military recession in Europe is dramatic and irremediable. The Soviets have pledged to remove all of their troops from Eastern Europe by 1994. The 150,000-man Soviet garrisons in Hungary and Czechoslovakia apparently have already been evacuated, and the removal of its relatively small deployments in Poland is being negotiated. In July of this year, Soviet force withdrawals from eastern Germany commenced, with the complete removal of the old Group of Soviet Forces Germany pledged by 1994. Soviet acceptance of independence of the Baltic Republics presumably will be followed by the withdrawal of Soviet forces there. True, there has been some stalling in Moscow about the pace of Soviet force withdrawals from Germany, but the explanation for the lack of sufficient housing back home for returning troops has much validity. In any event, Moscow certainly would not wish to risk forfeiting the at least $30 billion the German government has agreed to provide the Soviet Union in outright grants, loans, and credits—more than $8 billion of which has been allocated to help finance the Soviet withdrawal from eastern Germany.

Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe will create a vast buffer zone separating Soviet military power from the heart of Europe—a zone that would have to be recrossed in the event of a war with the West, and the countries in it are hardly likely to welcome Soviet forces back again. Thus, what once served the Soviet Union as a military glacis from an invasion from the West will now serve NATO as a warning zone and logistical obstacle to an invasion from the East.

To the collapse of the Soviet military position in Eastern Europe must be added the significant unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces undertaken by President Gorbachev since 1988, as well as those mandated by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in those parts of the U.S.S.R. west of the Urals. Though the Soviet military will remain the largest in Europe, Soviet military power is not only retreating eastward; it is also shrinking altogether. Moreover, the events of last August in Moscow underscored a continuing and deepening demoralization within the Soviet military leadership. This is not the cocky and self-confident Soviet military of the 1970s or even 1980s. It is a military demoralized by its own high command's complicity in the coup, by the lack of housing for officers and
men returning from Eastern Europe, by the collapse of its strategic position in Eastern Europe, by the collapse of many of its military client states overseas, by mass draft avoidance, by arms control treaties that eliminate longstanding numerical advantages in key categories of weapons, and by the embarrassingly comatose performance of its former Soviet-advised and equipped Iraqi client in the War for Kuwait.

Indeed, the post-coup formal redistribution of significant political power from Moscow to the various remaining republics, and rising sentiment in some of those republics for replacement of centrally controlled "imperial" military forces on their territory by indigenous, republican-controlled military establishments, raises the question of what Soviet, as opposed to, say, Russian, Ukrainian, Kazakhstani, or Georgian military power is going to look like a decade hence. If the devolution of power to the republics were to continue to the level of that, say, enjoyed by the American states under the Articles of Confederation, would there in fact be a compelling requirement in peacetime for a suprarepublican military establishment at all (save for maintenance of strategic deterrence and air and naval defense)?

In sum, the traditional basis for U.S. force planning for deterrence and defense in Europe has been altered beyond recognition, and in a direction that permits greatly decreased investment in Europe's defense. Moreover, while the prospect of significant violence in Europe remains very real, it is likely to take place in areas and over issues that do not directly engage discrete U.S. security interests in Europe, and therefore would not elicit U.S. military responses. Of course, no war anywhere in Europe over any issue is to be welcomed, but a distinction must be made between conflicts that would endanger fundamental U.S. interests on the Continent and those that would not. For example, the current civil war in Yugoslavia, which is rooted in an attempt by the federal army to recreate a Greater Serbia at the expense of non-Serbian populations in the country, jeopardizes no important U.S. political, economic, or military interest. The same could be said of possible conflicts stemming from age-old border disputes among East European countries. To be sure, the United States and the rest of NATO have a strong general interest in preventing the successful alteration of an established, internationally-recognized border in Europe by force, however minor or remote, because of the horrendous precedent it would set. It is nonetheless difficult to conceive of circumstances that would prompt U.S. military intervention in Eastern Europe on behalf of parties to border disputes. In any event, European states themselves have a far larger and more immediate stake than we do in the peaceful resolution of purely
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intra-European quarrels that do not threaten the balance of power on the Continent, and indeed the European Community has taken the lead in attempting a non-violent resolution of the Yugoslavian crisis.

Another source of tension not likely to directly engage U.S. forces beyond the possible provision of humanitarian assistance is the mounting flow of refugees from East to West, although again it is the European Community that will bear the primary responsibility for dealing with the problem. Since 1989 over 1.2 million people have left Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for the West, and in the recent case of hordes of Albanian refugees seeking a haven in Italy, Italian authorities had to resort to force to send them back to Albania. Continued political and economic deterioration in the Balkans to say nothing of inter-state conflict in Eastern Europe would, of course, dramatically inflate the refugee “threat.”

Of much greater concern is the possibility of genuine civil war in the Soviet Union, which would be the first civil conflict in a nuclear-armed state—in this case, a mammoth country armed with thousands of intercontinental nuclear weapons and over 12,000 tactical systems. Again, it is hard to imagine a situation that would provoke U.S. intervention on one side or the other in such a conflict, other than perhaps to assist responsible authorities in preventing unauthorized transfers and launches of nuclear weapons. (Post-World War I American, British, and French intervention to prevent a Bolshevik victory in Russia’s last civil war was an unmitigated disaster.)

However, it is certainly possible to think of circumstances in which nuclear weapons, especially tactical weapons assigned to field forces, could fall into the wrong hands and be fired accidentally or deliberately. The prospect of accidental launch has always plagued the nuclear era. But consider the possibility in an increasingly tumultuous Soviet Union of a breakaway republic acquiring nuclear weapons, of a conflict within the Soviet leadership that goes well beyond last August’s failed coup, or of a full-fledged civil war, like the 1917-21 conflict, involving large-scale military operations and rampant terrorism. Tactical nuclear weapons are widely distributed throughout the Soviet Union in nuclear storage sites, and although warheads are kept separate from their delivery vehicles, command and control of such weapons is inherently more difficult to ensure than it is for strategic weapons. With respect to the latter, approximately 80 percent are located in the Russian Republic, but Ukraine and Kazakhstan have approximately 1,000 SS-18s, SS-19s, and SS-24s deployed on their territory, and Byelorussia fields about 100 mobile SS-24s.
Whether or not these weapons will eventually be consolidated in the Russian republic remains unclear. A Ukraine, Byelorussia, or Kazakhstan bent on full independence, or at least a guarantee against the threat of resurgent Russian nationalism, might use the nuclear weapons now deployed on their territory as the ultimate security blanket. Considerations of national prestige also might come into play. At virtually no cost to themselves, these potentially breakaway republics could join the “nuclear club” overnight. Fortunately, for the moment at least, there seems to be little sentiment for moving in this direction. Many republics have expressed a wish to be “nuclear free zones”; the Chernobyl disaster has generated enduring anti-nuclear sentiment in Ukraine; and in late August the President of Kazakhstan vowed to close the Soviets’ main nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk.

Another frightening prospect that could arise in a chaotic Soviet Union would be the transfer or sale of nuclear weapons by disaffected Soviet troops to foreign countries or international terrorist groups. Saddam Hussein and Moamar Khadafi would probably give their eye teeth to get a nuclear weapon from any source at any price.

In either case, an accidental or an unauthorized deliberate launch by a desperate or renegade group inside the Soviet Union would by definition be undeterrable. The prospect of civil war in the Soviet Union, whose investment in modernizing its nuclear forces has proceeded apace as if the Cold War were still raging, alters the traditional Soviet nuclear threat to NATO as well as the calculus of deterrence. NATO’s nuclear force posture has assumed Soviet rationality on matters involving national survival, and a large-scale, even massive first strike in the event of a Soviet decision to resort to nuclear war against Europe and certainly the United States.

Neither of these assumptions hold in circumstances involving accidental or renegade launches by entities inside the Soviet Union, or for that matter by crazy Third World regimes having ballistic missiles and known to be seeking nuclear weapons capability. For the first time U.S. and NATO force planners confront multiple limited nuclear threats that are undeterrable by the traditional counter-threat of retaliation in kind. Moreover, the threats may well come from more than one direction. The proliferation of ballistic missile and mass destruction weapons technologies among hostile regimes in the Middle East and along the Mediterranean’s southern littoral poses a new threat to NATO and U.S. forces deployed in Europe. (During the War for Kuwait, Saddam Hussein could as easily have launched Scuds against
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Turkish cities and U.S. military facilities in Turkey as he did against targets
in Saudi Arabia and Israel.)

The growth of actual and nascent nuclear threats to Europe from both the
East and the South argues strongly for strengthening the Missile
Technology Control Regime (increasing its membership and creating
enforcement mechanisms) and for renewing efforts to halt or retard
nuclear weapons proliferation. It may no less strongly argue for the
erection in the European theater of ballistic missile defenses capable of
breaking up limited accidental or deliberate attacks. At a minimum,
ground-based defense of the kind the U.S. Army provided coalition forces
and Israel and Saudi Arabia should be explored, along with post-Patriot
systems now being developed by the Army. It remains unclear whether
effective future ballistic missile defense against limited attack will require
spaced-based sensors and even interceptors. What is clear is that Europe
and U.S. forces stationed there, however much they may be reduced, are
closer than the United States to the dangers of mistaken or unauthorized
launches within the Soviet Union, and closer still to such countries as
Libya, Iraq, and Iran.

The foregoing judgments on the present and foreseeable European security
environments suggest that for the first time since the late 1940s a
substantial U.S. military disengagement from Europe is strategically
permissible. This conclusion assumes that the massive threat to Europe’s
security until recently embodied in numerically superior,
forward-deployed, and operationally offensively oriented Soviet forces will
not be reconstituted in the foreseeable future, if ever, and cannot be
reconstituted absent years of highly visible preparation.

The real question is not the theoretical reversibility of the receding Soviet
threat; no one can say what Soviet (or Russian) military power and
ambitions will look like 10, 20, or 50 years hence. The real issue is how
long it would take a Soviet Union increasingly preoccupied with its own
acute economic, political, and social crises to reconstitute the threat posed
to Europe during the Cold War. The punitive 1919 Treaty of Versailles did
not prevent a revival of German military power in the later 1930s. But from
1919 until the advent of Hitler in 1933, British, French, Soviet, and
American force planners could have taken, as did the British and
Americans, an extended holiday from having to worry about the German
threat. And Hitler, unlike today’s Soviet leadership, was not constrained in
regenerating his state’s military power by an idiotic national economic
order or by centrifugal ethnic and domestic political forces that threatened his country’s very national and territorial integrity.

Both the United States and its NATO allies are already rapidly abandoning Cold War levels of national defense expenditure and have taken or announced major cuts in force structure. Germany has pledged to the Soviet Union to maintain a uniformed military establishment of no more than 370,000 people (24 percent fewer than the old West German Bundeswehr and 44 percent fewer than the combined armed forces of the previous two Germanys), and that it will limit its military presence in the old German Democratic Republic to small, German-only defensive forces. Great Britain also has announced equally deep force cuts, including a withdrawal of at least 1 of its 3 armored divisions and 7 of its 19 tactical fighter squadrons deployed in Germany. Proportionate and probably deeper cuts are likely for Dutch and Belgian forces.

Attending these cuts are sweeping changes in NATO’s force posture. Germany’s reunification with NATO and the impending departure of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe obviate the traditional requirement for thick, nationally layered forward defenses in the heart of Europe, and the new prospect of ethnic and nationalistic violence in the Balkans and Eastern Europe spilling over Western borders in Europe calls for mobile, rapid-reaction forces. Accordingly, NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels last May announced a major reorganization containing four principal components.

The first component will be the creation of a multi-national, rapid-reaction corps of 50,000 to 70,000 troops. The corps will be headquartered in Britain and under British command, but based in Germany. It will consist of contingents from Belgium, Holland Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and the United States (whose ground force contribution has yet to be determined) and include both heavy and light forces. The United States will provide logistical support and lift capability for this corps, which would be expected to respond to a crisis in 5 to 7 days.

The second component will be a brigade-size mobile force capable of responding to a crisis in 72 hours; it could form the leading edge of intervention by the rapid-reaction corps.

The third and fourth components are more traditional: a reinforcing contingent, composed probably exclusively of American active and reserve units based in the United States, and a reorganized conventional deterrent.
This latter force will consist of seven multinational corps, six deployed in
Western Europe and one (with no non-German combat units) in the
eastern part of Germany. Three of the corps would be commanded by
Germany, one each by Britain, Holland, and the United States, and the last
by a combined German-Danish staff. An American officer would continue
to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

NATO's conventional force posture reorganization reflects a recognition of
the declining albeit familiar Soviet threat and the need for greater flexibility
against smaller though more uncertain new ones.

Both the absolute and the relative size of the U.S. contribution to Europe
defense will also decline significantly because of reductions in overall U.S.
force structure and in specific U.S. deployments in Europe. Recent and
planned cuts in overall force structure continue to be driven as much by
domestic fiscal pressures as they are by the declining Soviet threat in
Europe (and elsewhere). Indeed, significant, fiscally driven reductions
would have been inevitable irrespective of favorable changes in Europe's
security environment, although the Soviet military power's recession on
the Continent makes reductions strategically less risky than in the past—as
long as those reductions are orderly and leave enough U.S. military power
behind in Europe to reassure both friends and enemies alike of an abiding
American commitment to a peaceful Europe. (Withdrawing an entire U.S.
Army corps from Germany for operations in the Persian Gulf would have
been unthinkable during the Cold War.)

Annual real U.S. defense expenditure has been declining since 1985,
3 years before President Gorbachev announced the first cuts in the Soviet
Army and the first unilateral Soviet force withdrawals from Eastern
Europe. On top of the decline that has already taken place, the Bush
administration projects continuing decreases, with a real reduction of
18 percent between fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1996, and a total
reduction of 32 percent below the projected rate of inflation between fiscal
year 1985 and fiscal year 1996. The effects of this downward spiral on
overall force structure will be quite significant. According to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, total active-duty military manpower during the
period fiscal years 1990-95 will drop by 20 percent (29 percent for the
Army, 19 percent for the Air Force, and 13 percent each for the Navy and
Marine Corps). In terms of major force units, the Army, the service most
closely tied to Europe's defense, will move from 29 (18 active) to 18
(12 active) divisions; Navy aircraft carriers from 16 to 13; carrier air wings
from 15 to 13; total battle force ships from 545 to 451; Air Force tactical
Appendix III
The New Security Environment in Europe and the Soviet Union

fighter wings from 36 (24 active) to 26 (15 active); and strategic bombers from 268 to 181 (assuming continued production of the B-2).

A big issue is whether the Pentagon can hold the line on these scheduled reductions. Sentiment is already mounting in the Congress for larger, faster cuts in force structure, and a number of events and attitudes hostile to even planned levels of defense expenditure are converging: the retreat of Soviet military power and the Soviet Union's increasingly accommodating foreign policy (motivated in part by Cold War exhaustion and mounting dependence on the West for economic salvation); the failed coup in Moscow; the surprising ease with which the U.S. military smashed the largest and most powerful standing army in the Middle East (and a Soviet-model one at that); growing public sentiment for a refocusing of national resources and energy on such domestic crises as the deficit, drug abuse, declining educational performance, health care, and the nation's crumbling infrastructure; and a conviction in Congress that somewhere in the Pentagon's wallet lies a "peace dividend" waiting to be liberated.

To be sure, Congress made few significant changes in the Bush administration's proposed fiscal year 1992 military budget, but the bottom of congressional support for "modest" cuts on the order of 25 percent may fall out in fiscal year 1993 or fiscal year 1994, portending reductions in force structure by the end of the decade of as much as 50 percent.

As for U.S. deployments in Europe, which currently total 325,000 troops, including four Army divisions in Germany, Pentagon plans, drawn up in conjunction with NATO reorganization objectives, call for cutting the force roughly in half. The heart of the U.S. military presence in Europe, the 180,000 troops of the U.S. Army's Fifth and Seventh Corps, will be reduced to a single, two-division corps of 75,000 to 90,000 troops. Air Force tactical fighter wings based in Europe are to be cut from nine to four. Again, however, public and congressional pressures may compel further withdrawals, perhaps to the level of a token one-division presence on the order of the U.S. deployment in Korea. The combination of a vanishing Soviet threat and an increasingly protectionist European Economic Community will fuel sentiment for at least a military disengagement from Europe.

The ultimate future of the U.S. military presence there thus remains in doubt. In the long pull of American history that presence has been exceptional. The first foreign policy principle of the Founding Fathers was avoidance of entanglement in European alliances, a rule first violated only
in the second decade of this century and again in 1941 and 1949. But the main reason for America’s three reluctant military interventions in Europe in this century was consistent and compelling: prevention of the Continent’s domination by a single hostile power that would have directly threatened essential U.S. security interests. In all three cases we and our allies prevailed: against imperial Germany in 1917-18, against Nazi Germany in 1941-45, and against encroaching Soviet military power until the late 1980s.

For the first time in this century, however, there is no successor aspiring hegemony. No European state today has either the will or the ability to take over where the Germans, and later, the Soviets left off. It has been said that NATO was established to keep the Americans in Europe, the Germans down, and the Russians out. Today, the Russians are leaving, and though the Germans are up, Germany’s democratization, territorial satisfaction, and integration in a web of transnational military and economic structures severely discipline any nascent desire for formal empire in Europe.

Which raises the question of exactly what function a post-Cold War U.S. military presence in Europe will perform.
Appendix IV

The Middle East: Political Trends and Their Implications for U.S. Force Structure by Louis J. Cantori

Introduction

This paper is an effort to identify the underlying assumptions and operative principles of the approach to the region discussed in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). After presenting some background contextual perspectives and identifying some assumptions of U.S. international security policy, the paper focuses upon two broad issues. The first is the identification of the factors of stability and instability in the Middle East regional system. The second is an argument about the utility of a regional approach to U.S. security interests in the Middle East.

Background and Summary Overview

The end of the Cold War in 1989 prepared the way for a U.S. dominant unipolar international system in the 1990s. The political dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reenforcing that outcome. At the same time, U.S. foreign policy is in the process of readjustment from one attuned to the global activities and ambitions of the Soviet Union to one where new definitions of security and political interests must be identified. Until such time as Japan, Germany, and the European Community adopt more activist policies, the monopolar world will apparently be in a pronounced interlude of renewed importance of regional international politics, for example, Eastern Europe, the economic union of Euro-Asia, etc. Thus, the current monopolarity of the international system represents a transitional phase from bipolarity to possible multipolarity.

Not surprisingly, a transitional unipolarity in the international system is having an impact upon the Middle East regional system that suggests a similar transitory state there as well. The Middle East regional system has possibly been unique in its relation to the international system for the historical intensity of superpower involvement and for the nondependent nature of this involvement. The high level of local conflicts of the region, as in Lebanon and the Gulf, and geopolitical and energy resource factors have always incurred such intense superpower involvement. This involvement, however, has been one of nondependence. For example, while the Middle Eastern states have often been in stable or shifting client relationships with the superpowers, seldom has the patron been determining the clients' foreign policy (e.g., Syria and the Soviet Union, and Israel and the United States).

Such an intrusive system of outside great powers and inside regional actors may be characteristic of most regional systems worldwide, but the Middle
East is unusual in the more equal influence relationships of the intruding and regional actors involved. The unipolar character of this intrusive system may be seen as stabilizing as long as U.S. policy chooses to remain active in the region because the region’s states are conditioned to participate in the system that, within limits, such actors will strive to adjust their foreign policies to accommodate, in this case, U.S. policy. The important caveat, however, is that such a system will continue as long as U.S. policy is perceived as pursuing an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem or other mutually identifiable problems.

In other words, the American effort to parlay the military success of the allied coalition into a diplomatic one is issue contingent. If the U.S. policy fails, the American paramountcy will decline, and the system is likely to return to the more parochial interests of the region’s states even while remaining regionally engaged in security and economic assistance to especially Israel and Egypt. If the U.S. policy succeeds, it also will decline with a residue of possible goodwill and appreciation and greater influence.

There are broad changes at work within the regional system itself. The most general one is that its defining culture has been undergoing a transformation from Arabism to Islamism even while Arabism remains important among the Arab states themselves. This universalizing phenomenon has reduced the alienation of two of its peripheral states, those of Turkey and Iran. In the case of Turkey, increasing domestic religious sentiment has opened the country up to Islamic cultural influences and has caused Turkish policy to regard Turkey itself as a broker between the Middle East and the West. This sentiment is reinforced by a Turkish realization that its opportunity for European Community membership is probably falling. This sentiment also acted as a constraint on Turkish policy in the recent Gulf War. The case of Iran is even more profound. Whether in Lebanon in the front ranks against Israel or in the Gulf in which Islamic solidarity is used to ameliorate Arab Gulf state fears, even while its Shiism acts in the opposite direction, Iran has now significantly joined the Middle East core grouping of states. In the core itself, Islam in the international Islamic Conference Group (consisting of all Islamic states in the world) facilitated Egypt’s reentry into the Arab state system and Saudi subventions to Islamic organizations in other countries.

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abound. Most importantly, the Israeli occupation of the holy places of Jerusalem animates Islamic sentiment in all Middle Eastern states and groups on the Palestinian question.

The Gulf War and the special Arab coalition together continue to have a diplomatic bounce even though the bounce may be declining in energy and old alignments are reemerging and new ones may be establishing themselves. Saudi reservations about Egyptian and Syrian ambitions have denied these states an important security force role in the Gulf. A reemerging alignment is Lebanon which has been stabilized by its restoration as a Syrian sphere of influence, and the result is the resolution of the conflict in Lebanon with the exception of the Israeli occupation of the southern part of the country. A new alignment is Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have joined Syria in reestablishing diplomatic ties with Iran. Iran is an important Gulf War benefactor and is being catered to in order to constrain its potential for Gulf hegemony. A major paradox is that even while the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Intifada are in leadership disarray, the Palestinian problem has been energized by an American diplomatic initiative that represents an effort to expand upon the singularity of a military victory in regaining Kuwait in the Gulf War. Iraq, however, retains a significant conventional fighting force, and Saddam Hussein remains in power. A potential U.S. domestic political question is exactly what did the war achieve. Therefore, the "linkage" question of the Palestinians is being addressed to stabilize the region for security reasons, enlarge the claims of success in the Gulf War for domestic U.S. political reasons, and assuage America's wartime Arab allies. Consequently, the new alignments, especially that of Syria and Egypt, and intra-Arab cooperation in general are sustained by the problematic peace initiative.

In light of these factors, Iraq failed to revise regional, international relationships and to impose its will upon the Gulf and the Palestinian question. The American-led allied victory has significantly returned Middle Eastern relationships, with two exceptions, to those of the pre-Gulf War period. The exceptions are that Israel and Iran are the winners in the Gulf War. Israel's continuing territorial ambitions remain a destabilizing factor, however, and Iran's Gulf policy remains enigmatic. Equally potentially destabilizing would be the ascendance of more radical regimes in key Arabian countries and their possible acquisition of missile guidance.


3For example, see the cover story, "Was It Worth It?" Time (Aug. 5, 1991).
Appendix IV
The Middle East: Political Trends and Their Implications for U.S. Force Structure

systems and “smart” weapons technology, which will inevitably appear in the international arms market.

It is premature to speak of a new regional, international order in the Middle East. The emergence of bilateral U.S.-Gulf state security pacts and a possibly increased bold approach to the resolution of the Palestinian questions hold the potential for stability if they succeed and significant instability if they fail.

Some Assumptions of U.S. International Security Policy

The international security concerns of the United States in the Middle East are based on certain worldwide generalizations and premises. The first of these is that the 1989 end of the Cold War has left the United States as the dominant power in the world. Senator Lugar’s characterization of this is that, “We are the last empire.” The quotation suggests that monopolarity in the international system equates with omnipotence, and this is far from being the case.

Operation Desert Storm had two unusual qualities that have a bearing on this first generalization. The first is that nearly the entire cost of the war was shared by others, principally Saudi Arabia. The weakened U.S. economy could not support the burden alone. The second is that the war was sanctioned and legitimated by the United Nations (U.N.), which in turn served two U.S. interests. The first interest was that it legitimized the U.S. response so as to facilitate international coalition building, military involvement, and funding. The second interest was to use the previously mentioned accomplishments to legitimate the undertaking to the American public. The United States may be singularly prominent in the international system, but there is no automatic public opinion constituency for the central military strategy concept that the United States has a “unique leadership responsibility for preserving global peace and security” (JMNA, 2-3). JMNA acknowledges that a shrinking defense budget is a result of the budget deficit but also an internal shift in sentiment from defense needs to domestic needs (2-5). The U.N. connection in the Gulf at least partially relieved this implied sentiment.

A second generalization is that unipolarity does not mean the absence of the Soviet Union either internationally or regionally. The discussions of the Russian factor globally has quickly become dated in JMNA. Without commenting upon rapidly changing strategic factors, it is clear that the

Middle East is likely to remain a region of significant interest to the Soviet Union in terms of the relationship of events there to its own Muslim population, its own central Asian energy needs, and international oil pricing policy as its economy internationalizes.

Soviet behavior in the Gulf war was possibly instructive in this regard. On the one hand, the Soviet Union mostly supported U.S. and U.N. policy, and on the other hand, it attempted to ameliorate the conflict by representing the interests of its old client Iraq in a compromising manner. This policy probably reflected the ascendancy of soft-liners around Gorbachev and the actions of the hardliners who lost in the recent coup attempt in the Soviet Union. It can be expected that the cooperative pattern of Soviet behavior may increase in the short run and, thus, favor a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question and the stabilization of the Gulf. In the long run, however, Soviet weapon sales to Iran suggest that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue its own interests and advantages in the Middle East.

A third generalization is related to international monopolarity, that is, regional conflicts are likely to be characteristic of the international system in the post-Cold War era. The Gulf War was illustrative of this more emergent regional conflict, but from the vantage point of U.S. policy concern with "access" to oil and its "free flow" helped make this region more relevant to U.S. national interests (JMNA, 1-4). Other regional conflicts might gain a lesser American policy response.

A fourth generalization deals with a discernible pattern of democratization (JMNA, 1-2) throughout the world. As far as the Middle East is concerned, the democratic phenomenon is less overwhelming, and while for certain cultural and structural reasons it may become more widespread, it is likely to remain limited. In addition, U.S. policy must be prepared to accept that democratization can result in opposition to U.S. policy. Those Middle Eastern countries that possessed the clearest evidence of liberalization and democratization and the acceptance of market economy reforms were the

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The Middle East: Political Trends and Their Implications for U.S. Force Structure

most vocal in opposition to U.S. policy in the Gulf (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Jordan). Even in Egypt, the strongest U.S. ally and the most developed of the Arab democracies, nearly all opposition parties were against U.S. policy. Thus, in the Middle East, democratization may be less pronounced as a phenomenon and yet it can also be a politically significant voice of opposition to U.S. policy.

Stability in the Middle East

JMNA identifies the Gulf and its oil as the central U.S. international security concerns in the Middle East (1-4, 2-2). It also says that the United States seeks stability in the region as a whole (2-2). The logic of this is that conflicts in the region as a whole need to be ameliorated in order not to negatively affect the pursuit of U.S. objectives in the Gulf. The following sections discuss the conflicts of the Middle East on the eve of the Gulf War and the allied coalition in order to assess long-term and short-term factors of regional stability.

Pre-Gulf War Period

The pre-August 1990 period was one of both diplomatic hope and accomplishment toward resolving the three major conflicts of the region and significant disappointment regarding all three on the eve of the war. The Palestinian question was the most complex of the three; the others involved Lebanon and the first Gulf war. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon had achieved to a degree its major objective of weakening, but not eliminating, the PLO. As the pace of settlement of the Occupied Territories increased in the late 1980s, Palestinians took control of their fate by launching the Intifada uprising of December 1987. This uprising coincided with Egypt’s efforts to gain reentry into the Arab state system. These two events resulted in the November 1988 declaration by the PLO externals of their acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions signified the PLO’s recognition of Israel and its willingness to negotiate with Israel for peace. Israel’s response was one of reluctance to abandon its policy of the annexation of the Occupied Territories. In spite of diligent American efforts to pursue a peace process, by the spring of 1990 the effort had failed. Faced with the disappointment of this outcome, the effectiveness of Israeli repression in which over 800 Palestinians had been killed, the coming to power in the same month of a hardline Israeli

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government, and the United States breaking talks with the PLO on June 20, 1990, as a result of an abortive Palestinian beach front raid in Israel, the Palestinian internals and externals were depressed by the summer of 1990.9

Saddam Hussein's rhetoric of justice for the Palestinians and the reality of his missile attacks upon Israel, therefore, received understandable but ill-considered support from both internals and externals.

The Lebanese conflict began with the civil war of 1975, which was ended by Syrian intervention in 1976, only to begin again with the Israeli invasion in June 1982. The pathology of the militia wars and western hostage taking then ensued. Attempts to stop the war failed until surviving members of the 1972 parliament met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989 and agreed to constitutional reforms that reduced the Christian role in government and reformed the system.° Even with Syrian, U.N., and U.S. support, these reforms had to await the downfall of General Michael Awn, a Manonite military commander holed up in Beirut since March 1989. His military defeat by Syrian forces did not occur, however, until October 1990, well into the Gulf crisis.

Similar to these cases, but more dramatic, the situation in the Gulf had changed from the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 with an Iraqi military victory to the crisis of July 1990. Without attempting to do more than note the event that resulted in more than 1,000,000 dead on both sides, it is important to mention that the 1980-88 war devastated the Iraqi economy and brought Iraq's longstanding grievances with Kuwaiti to a focus. These grievances were Kuwait's extraction of Iraqi oil, Kuwait's insistence on the immediate repayment of wartime loans used to defend Kuwait against Iran, and Iraq's historical territorial claims on Kuwait.

In summation, by August 1990 the Palestinian question was deflated, and the moderate internal leadership discouraged while HAMAS, the Muslim militants of Gaza, gained popularity. Lebanon had arrived at a conflict-resolving formula in the Taif agreement, but hundreds were still dying in the effort by General Awn to hold out and Iraq was on a course set

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10Norton.
for war. In short, the region had tensions that were ready to be released by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The Iraqi Invasion and the Allied Coalition

Frantic efforts at averting a war were energetically pursued before August 2 by both the Saudis and the Egyptians who became incensed because it was clear that Iraq was determined to achieve its objectives by using either the threat of force or force itself. These efforts at an Arab solution to the crisis thus came to nothing. Contributing to this situation was a shared Saudi and Egyptian sense of betrayal by Iraq of its assurances that it would not go to war. In addition, the efforts at an Arab solution were also possibly aggravated by the near bellicosity of Kuwait. The conflict had, thus, become an irreconcilable one inviting the intrusion of the United States as the Western state most vitally concerned about the invasion in terms of the threat posed to Saudi Arabia and the security of 65 percent of the world's oil reserves in the Gulf. It was the directness of the threat to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) states that motivated Saudi Arabia. Egypt, on the other hand, was probably motivated by a sense of betrayal by Iraq in the preinvasion diplomacy and by the opportunity to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. American diplomacy, thus, had ground to work in its effort to construct a successful Arab and international coalition.

The Domestic Impact of the Gulf War in the Middle East

The Gulf War exacerbated an emerging problem of domestic instability in certain key Middle Eastern states. The underlying reasons for the downturn had to do with economic problems that were aggravated by International Monetary Fund-insisted reforms in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan. These reforms were intended to cause movement toward a market economy. Political disturbances had occurred prior to the war, but Saddam Hussein's pan-Arab, anti-imperialist rhetoric found a resonance among desperate populations. As a defensive reaction to the basic unrest, a

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11This intransigence of Kuwait was the Iraqi point of view conveyed to the author in Baghdad by the deputy foreign minister on July 25, 1990. Joseph Kostiner, an Israeli specialist on the Gulf, has made a similar point regarding Kuwait's unjustified sense of security. Quoted in Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (New York: Times Books, 1990), p. 215.

“democratic bargain” was struck by the regimes to increase political participation. This bargain generally succeeded in that it has resulted in all of the leaderships retaining power. The policy consequence, however, was that, especially in Jordan but also in Morocco and more generally in Tunisia, each state supported Iraq (Jordan), withdrew its military commitment to the allied alliance (Morocco), or opposed the Allied Counter-invasion (Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen). The Islamic revival underway in the region as a whole and in each of these countries was also in vehement opposition to the U.S. involvement, while at the same time it did not support Saddam Hussein because of his pronounced secularism.

The Importance of a Regional Approach to U.S. Security Policy

U.S. international military security objectives in the Middle East are Gulf-centric. The oil of the Gulf and the security of friendly states are the focal points of U.S. policy. This paper does not address the complexities of the relationship of these objectives to Iraq and Iran and the Saudi Arabian leadership of the GCC states. Instead, the paper discusses the implications of politics in the Middle East region as a whole for U.S. Gulf policy objectives.

Middle East-Gulf Linkages

There has been a tendency in U.S. policy to argue that the Gulf is autonomous of the Middle East while in fact it is not. Perhaps the most important overlooked factor has to do with the regional foreign policy ambitions of Gulf and non-Gulf Arab states and the emergence of a regional multipolar Egyptian hegemonic system. In the case of the Gulf states, the continuing afterglow of the Gulf war should not obscure the fact that Saudi and other Gulf leaderships support the Palestinian movement as an Arab cause and the regaining of Jerusalem as an Islamic clause. Toward this end, money flows outward in large amounts from Saudi Arabia to Islamic groups throughout the Arab world and the Islamic world in general. More
important than this is the Egyptian assumption of its natural hegemonic leadership role in the Arab world, including states in the Gulf area. In the latter case, its credible military role in Desert Storm had the promise of a regional collective security role, which has been denied in favor of the Americans. The broader point is that there is a dynamic in the Middle East revolving around the emergence of a multipolar regional international system in which Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are current actors, but in which Iran and eventually Iraq will be significant players.

A second connecting issue is that the Gulf states, for example, are dependent upon accepted principles of political legitimacy that they share with the region as a whole. Two interconnected issues tie in with political legitimacy. The first of these is the unresolved Palestinian question. Before August 1990, the Gulf states were careful to attend to this problem largely by rhetoric and by large-scale financial support of the PLO. The second interconnecting issue is that thousands of Palestinians were welcomed for their advanced skills as employees in the Gulf private and public sectors. With the PLO's embracing of Saddam Hussein, these lines were severed with an as yet unknown potential for instability. Thousands of Palestinians were expelled from the Gulf along with highly skilled Jordanian workers. In the short run, the opposition in the Gulf states is accepting these actions, but these actions are potentially weakening of legitimacy in the long run.

In addition to the political aspects of the legitimacy issue, there is the third and related issue of economic transfers to the non-petroleum producing countries in the form of remittances by Jordanians and Palestinians. The sudden ending of these transfers is having a devastating effect upon the economies of Jordan and the Occupied Territories.

The regional perspective affects the Gulf in a fourth way, and that is the U.S. capability of power projections and the need to obtain the assent of the Middle Eastern states to gain air and sea passageways in case of a major buildup (JMNA, 2-4). Egypt is probably the single most important Middle Eastern country in this regard. Its large size and geopolitical locations in both northeast geographical Africa and the eastern

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15Salah Basouny, the former Egyptian ambassador to the Soviet Union, has stated the Egyptian case even more forcibly by saying that if Iraq had not been built up by the Gulf states and foreign powers and if Egypt's leadership role on the Palestinian issue had not been undermined by Western support for Israel, then Egypt might have led an Arab force to deter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In any case, Egypt seeks regional peace by being the leader of its balance of power. "The Dilemma of Egyptian Foreign Policy" and "Special Dossier: The Gulf Crisis," Middle East Papers, National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Nov. 1990, pp. 6, 8.
The Mediterranean make it a strategic air passageway, and its control of the Suez Canal ensures its importance in terms of sea passageway.

A fifth issue is related to military forward presence and prepositioning (JMNA, 2-4, 4-3, 4). In reference to the former, the politics of the Middle East has always tended to preclude this option. The memory of colonialism and the strength of nationalism have always precluded all except the most nominal forward presence, for example, the pre-Gulf War sea plane tender headquarters of the U.S. Navy in Bahrain. During the post-Gulf War period, there was talk of such a forward presence, but this talk has receded. Even overt prepositioning has proved impossible in the Middle East such as the much discussed Ras Bannas military base in southern Egypt in the 1980s. Until now, the only overt prepositioning possible until now has been in Israel, but the use of such material in a regional conflict would have a political liability resembling that which revolved around the possible Israeli participation in Desert Storm. Covert prepositioning in Turkey, and to a more limited degree in Egypt, possesses more political feasibility. The recently concluded bilateral agreements with Kuwait and similar agreements with other Gulf States are noteworthy for their public character and carry potential destabilizing baggage.

Egypt again is instructive in the intertwining of “forward presence” and “peaceful engagement” in terms of periodic deployments and joint maneuvers (JMNA, 4-4, 2-6). In general, periodic deployments in Egypt have occurred technically outside of Egyptian authority with battalion-sized units being assigned as U.N. truce supervisory units in Sinai. Even the joint maneuvers of Operation Bright Star have been carried out with internal Egyptian press near secrecy in respect of Egyptian domestic political sensibilities. Gulf leadership may not have the freedom of the press that Egypt has, but on the other hand, the leaders themselves may feel more politically vulnerable.

Security Assistance

One is tempted to characterize the JMNA treatment of security assistance as the “magic wand” of U.S. international security policy. It is supposed to substitute for the decline in the U.S. defense budget as a way of increasing regional military capability and gaining goodwill (JMNA, 2-6). Clearly implied is that security assistance will increase military capabilities on a U.S. near cost free basis. Security assistance from this point of view is nowhere in more dramatic evidence than in the Middle East where since the
There are two dimensions to such security assistance: The first is the tension between the advocacy of the alleged benefits of security assistance to U.S. policy and of advocacy of arms control. Contributing to this contradiction is an apparent level of analysis problem in that arms control is presented in JMNA as an East-West issue (11-21). Security assistance as an ongoing U.S. policy in the Middle East is self-evident. There is, however, little attention paid to the question of regional arms control.

The second dimension is the absence of evidence to support its alleged benefit of increasing military capability. For political reasons, security assistance in the Middle East has had its major impact in Israel and Egypt. The resulting enormous military capability of Israel has had only the secondary benefit to U.S. policy of making it militarily invulnerable and, therefore, not requiring U.S. military defensive force commitments. The potential benefit of Israel's military capability is nullified by Israel's political liabilities, as recently seen in its mandated nonperformance in Desert Storm. Egypt possesses both the population size and the power capacities to benefit from such assistance, and it is nearly alone among Arab non-Gulf states in being politically eligible for such assistance. Security assistance to the Gulf states has political importance in terms of presumed goodwill toward the United States and marginal military importance because of small populations and low power capabilities. Again, the relative military unimportance of the GCC forces in Desert Storm illustrates this. Egypt, thus, is the single state that truly has benefitted, and it is likely to continue to benefit from security assistance. But the full benefit of this to U.S. policy has been denied thus far by its apparent exclusion from the regional security regime in the Gulf.

Attention to regional collective security appears to be a missing link between JMNA discussion of U.S. national security interests in the Middle East and the Gulf and security assistance as a means of increasing military capability. This failure is a further illustration of JMNA not adjusting to the new regional reality (JMNA, 2-5). Specifically, in reference to the Middle East, at an Arab summit meeting in Syria in March 1991, a "Damascus Declaration" was issued. While the details of the declaration remain unpublished, it generally called for Syria and Egypt to assume security

responsibilities in the Gulf. However, this indigenous Arab approach has quietly been dropped in favor of a prominent U.S. role in Gulf security probably because of long-standing Saudi Arabian fear of especially Egyptian hegemony. An American commitment that might in practice be slipped back "over the horizon" might be better than an Egyptian one with its attendant power political ascendancy and attendant threatening republican non-monarchical principles.

Conclusions

The following might be noted about U.S. international security policy in the Middle East:

1. JMNA recognizes the importance of regional conflicts in the post-Cold War world, and yet in the case of the Middle East it shows an inability to adjust U.S. international security policy to this new reality.

   - Most notably, for example, security assistance finds Egypt with a sizeable and credible military capability that was wartime-tested in the Gulf, and it is now excluded in regional collective security terms from the Gulf sub-region.
   - The Soviet Union's change to a cooperative mode in the Middle East is not recognized, nor is its likely pronounced continued historical policy interest addressed.
   - The failure to think through the policy problems of new regionalism is strongly implied in a number of the conclusions.

2. The overall emphasis upon stability in U.S. policy serves not only to reinforce political status quo in presently nondemocratic regimes in the region but also tends to be at odds with the nascent democratic trend. Such a democratic expression so far has brought forth both Islamic and anti-American sentiment. Democratization is also stabilizing to the U.S. interests, for example, Egypt and Jordan.

3. The unclassified version of the JMNA practically makes no mention of regional chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; intermediate missiles; or a new "smart" weapons generation. Chemical and biological weapons will likely continue to be sought or manufactured as the "poor man's" alternative to the Israeli nuclear arsenal. The present lag in intermediate missile guidance systems may already be in the process of being improved by China or other producing states.
4. In general, U.S. policy in the region must be cognizant of the interdependencies between the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East as a whole. There is the reality of the emerging Middle Eastern balance of power, for example. However, although U.S. policy pursues a settlement of the Palestinian question, attention needs to be directed to other existing conflicts (e.g., Western Sahara) or to potential ones (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Yemen). Economic redistribution processes and mechanisms also need attention. For example, the extreme Gulf reaction against Jordanian and Palestinian workers is resulting in the closing of the remittance pipeline to Jordan and the Occupied Territories as an informal mechanism of economic redistribution. In the absence of a formal institution for redistribution or the reactivation of the existing Kuwait and Gulf development funds, the stopping of remittances has significant destabilizing potential.

5. Both the history and the ongoing experience of great power involvements in the Middle East suggest the elusiveness of the pursuit of influence, whether by security assistance or in some other fashion. The cases of Syria, Israel, and perhaps Saudi Arabia as “tails” wagging at times the superpower “dog” illustrate this.

6. A military forward presence and prepositioning are likely to be difficult to sustain politically.

7. Security assistance in the Middle East is of military benefit to Israel and Egypt but perhaps only of political and psychological benefit to other countries. The latter, however, is an important consideration, and in any case, such assistance in the Middle East is expected to increase (JMNA, 11-21).

8. Related to the issue of security assistance is the fact by omission and logic that a regional arms control regime is unlikely to be initiated.
The transformation of relations between East and West beginning in the mid-1980s, in combination with the recent multinational conflict with Iraq, has refocused the world's attention to the complex security problems that persist throughout the Third World. Many of the military antagonisms occurring in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia have been only indirectly affected by the amelioration of relations between Western and previously communist nations. Increased accommodation among the great powers may open the way to cooperative efforts to redress regional conflicts in the future, but the cessation of East-West military rivalry in the Third World is only a partial condition needed to bring about regional stability.

While accentuated and often exacerbated by great power involvement in the past, most Third World antagonisms are not artificial derivations of the East-West geopolitical competition. In the Middle East and South Asia, in particular, ongoing military tensions reflect fundamental disputes with long and bloody histories, many of which have eluded diplomatic resolution for decades and even centuries. Whether based on cultural, religious, or irredentist differences, the use of state and substate violence to adjudicate these conflicts remains very much part of the political landscape.

The major industrial powers may profess to no longer believe in warfare as a means of resolving disputes among themselves, but they have yet to renounce it as an element of policy in Third World regions where their economic and military interests may be at risk. The industrial nations continue their efforts to devise military strategies appropriate to the emerging security environment. Given the pace of international change, the assumptions guiding the formulation of these policies will have to be flexible and must be increasingly sensitive to regional and local differences in areas of potential tension.

The question is no longer whether developing countries will acquire the means to develop and deploy advanced weapons that may pose new regional and international threats, but when and what kind. Israel, India, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan have demonstrated steady progress toward independent weapon production capabilities, despite immense technical and political impediments, and it is clear that numerous others, including Syria and Saudi Arabia, may either follow suit or participate indirectly by providing support to emerging producers elsewhere.

These programs illustrate the dedicated efforts by developing countries to acquire the means to pursue local and regional ambitions immune from the
dictates of outside powers. With China, Israel, and even North Korea already serving as significant sources of technical assistance to other countries, this trend appears to have become a matter of intra-Third World diplomacy, potentially circumscribing further the ability of the industrial powers to impose meaningful trade controls or exert decisive political influence for arms control.

The following assesses the emerging military capabilities of nations in the Middle East and South Asia, presents two scenarios of potential conflict among regional antagonists, and analyzes the implications of these current developments for future U.S. policy.

Emerging Military Capabilities: the Middle East

The recent U.S.-led coalition war against Iraq altered the balance of power in the region by vastly reducing the offensive military capabilities of a major regional aggressor. With unprecedented scope and detail, United Nations (U.N.) Resolution 687 provides a blueprint for the virtual disarmament of Iraq. Despite its continued efforts to thwart the resolution’s implementation, Iraq cannot for now pose a major military threat, regionally or internationally.

The military destruction of Iraq, however, has not changed the security concerns of most of the countries in the Middle East in any fundamental sense. The continued survival of Saddam Hussein’s regime aside, long-standing sources of regional instability— including, inter alia, the Arab-Israeli dispute, Syria’s continued efforts to dominate Lebanon, and the persistence of radical fundamentalist regimes in Iran and elsewhere— leave little room for optimism about imminent peace.

The traditional interests of the United States in the region also have not been changed by the war. The two predominant objectives of the United States in the Middle East— protecting access to oil at a reasonable price and ensuring the security of Israel— will continue to dominate any political or military calculus informing force planning or decisions to intervene. While shoring up the self-defense capabilities of friendly Arab states (and Turkey) and promoting conflict resolution are also vital American goals, they derive from the former, more fundamental objectives.

There is consensus among industrial countries that the continued diffusion of advanced military capabilities among Middle Eastern antagonists is the primary potential threat to U.S. interests in the region, a trend that may raise the risks of or discourage U.S. intervention in any future conflict. The
emergence of bellicose states possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs, along with the means to deliver such weapons with increasing range and effectiveness, is the most notable regional security trend of the last two decades.

Although only Israel possesses an operational nuclear force for now, the experience in Iraq has demonstrated that even technologically unsophisticated countries can develop at least embryonic capabilities in this area and do so largely without international detection. The specter of unstable countries in possession of long-range, operational ballistic missile forces is prompting accelerated efforts by the United States and other industrialized countries to develop anti-missile defenses and, possibly, strategic defense systems.

The recent war with Iraq may have exacerbated the proliferation challenge by helping to augment the demand for sophisticated weaponry among key potential combatants. The clear lesson being drawn in the West is that high technology played a crucial role in ensuring a speedy and decisive victory for the coalition, a lesson that has certainly not been lost on smaller states. Similarly, the ability of Iraq to sustain its war effort against vastly superior opponents by launching its Scud-type ballistic missiles seems to have reinforced some states' aspirations to acquire or enhance their own missile arsenals. Most importantly, an interest in acquiring advanced unconventional weapon capabilities—including most notably biological warheads—is evident in several potential combatant states in the region, including Syria, Iran, Egypt, and Libya.

For now, the principal factor slowing regional arms acquisitions is not political, but economic. Faced with growing resource scarcities and the staggering costs of the war, countries are finding it difficult to fulfill the full scope of their military ambitions.

Current trends in arms acquisitions by Middle Eastern countries nevertheless underscore the rather remote character of Secretary of State James A. Baker's recent pledge to alter "the pattern of destructive military competition and proliferation in this region and reduce the arms flow into an area that is already over militarized." The agreement among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council following their July 1991

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A meeting in Paris to develop guidelines for arms shipments has yet to yield concrete results. And although U.S. efforts to reopen the Arab-Israeli peace process look fairly promising at this juncture, it is premature to imagine the kind of early progress that would yield any significant basis for arms restraint agreements in the near term.

A fundamental and long-standing tension among industrial countries about the desirability of arms sales to promote security in the Middle East has not, and is not likely to be, resolved in the foreseeable future. However much the big suppliers may say they are seeking to restrain the spread of certain types of military capabilities or even to reduce the overall volume of arms sales, the United States and its allies remain committed to helping friendly states to provide for their self-defense. As U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz summarized this dilemma, “We don’t want to construct a [restraint] regime in which our friends are the principal victims and their ability to defend themselves is limited but the threat against them is not.”

To many, including congressional critics, this means business as usual, a perception that no major supplier will allow its current political interest in arms restraint to impede ongoing arms relationships with allies and friends. The concern is that maintaining control of the military technologies sold to Middle East clients today may become an increasingly difficult challenge in the future.

Current Programs

The United States is proceeding with ambitious efforts to augment the defense capabilities of states that supported it during the war against Iraq: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller countries who are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to augmented arms sales, improving the ability of the GCC states to make better use of the military equipment they already possess is a high priority.

The United States began negotiating security pacts with friendly Gulf states shortly after the war, trying to enhance long-standing agreements with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and to establish new treaties with Kuwait and Qatar. On September 19, 1991, Kuwait signed the first such pact, a 10-year security agreement that allows the United States to preposition military equipment on Kuwaiti territory and provides for periodic cooperative exercises and joint training of local forces.

Despite growing U.S. military cooperation with the Arab world, Israel continues to be the most vital U.S. security partner in the region, and the United States is committed to helping maintain Israel's technological superiority over potential Arab antagonists. U.S.-Israeli military relations underwent significant strains during the coalition war against Iraq, partly as a result of Israeli perceptions that it was not being adequately consulted or kept informed by the United States during the military operations. Israel's agreement to forego retaliation against Iraq following the Scud missile attacks, and the reminder of its extreme vulnerability to attacks on its population and territory, have imposed difficult political pressures on the Israeli government. The experience has heightened demand for rapid military modernization in several areas, including defensive capabilities such as anti-tactical ballistic missiles.

The United States will increase the level of U.S. military aid in the coming year (Israel has asked for a total of $2.5 billion for fiscal year 1992, which includes $700 million in surplus U.S. defense equipment—up from $1.8 billion of previous years); will continue to fund at least 70 percent of the development cost of Israel's $5 billion Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile project; and plans to transfer 75 upgraded F-15 advanced fighters, 18 Apache helicopters, and such advanced ordnance as Hellfire missiles. Israel is currently choosing between McDonnell Douglas F/A-18s and General Dynamics F-16s for a future transfer of 60 fighters. Additionally, Israel is buying new weapons from other suppliers, such as Dolphin-class submarines from Germany.

Israel's existing military forces are clearly superior to any in the region. They include Jericho II missiles, which are thought to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads and have a potential range of over 1,400 kilometers (approximately 870 miles). Recent developments in Israel's space program suggest it may soon have an operational space launch vehicle that could be converted into a missile of intercontinental capability. U.S. efforts to stem the spread of missile and nuclear technology to the region have not proven persuasive to the Israelis, who clearly value the advantage these weapons accord it over its Arab neighbors. Although they may augment Israel's deterrent capabilities, the presence of nuclear-armed missiles in the region poses clear dilemmas for U.S. policy and regional stability.

The Bush administration has tried to foster closer military ties with moderate Arab states without provoking Israel, not always successfully. Proposals put forward both before and after the Iraqi cease-fire would...
provide over $15 billion in advanced arms to Saudi Arabia, including top-of-the-line M1A2 main battle tanks, airborne warning and control system aircraft, Apache helicopters, Maverick and Sparrow missiles, and advanced Patriot air defense systems. Egypt will receive 46 F-16C/D Falcon fighter aircraft, as well as 24 Apache helicopters and advanced missiles such as Hellfire, Stinger, and I-Hawk. The United States also will help Egypt produce the M-1A1 tank. 3

The other oil-producing Gulf states—Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar—also plan to purchase substantial amounts of new armaments from the United States, as well as from other industrial suppliers. The GCC states have no significant weapon production capabilities, although the United Arab Emirates has been active in recent attempts to revive the currently moribund Arab arms consortium, the Arab Organization for Industrialization.

The relative stability of the region in the future will depend in part on the success of U.S. efforts to bolster these countries’ abilities to deter future military aggression. For now, none of the Arab states are capable of deterring either Iran or a rearmed Iraq without external assistance. New regional security arrangements, which include an enhanced U.S. military presence and stepped-up arms transfers, have therefore been deemed necessary until self-defense capabilities can be improved.

Individually or collectively, some of these states could pose a threat to U.S. interests if they were to turn their forces against Israel, provide financing or weapons to front-line belligerents, or if internal instabilities resulted in the defection of currently friendly governments from the pro-Western camp. Bahrain, for example, has a predominantly Shiite population but is ruled by a Sunni minority. Efforts by Iran to topple the Sunni monarchy in 1981 proved unsuccessful, but, as is the case in many of the non-democratic states in the region, the prospects for these kinds of political upheavals cannot be ruled out. The major dilemma for U.S. and other industrial countries’ security assistance policies is that today’s well-armed friends may be tomorrow’s aggressive adversaries, a lesson learned at too high a cost in Iran in 1980.

Of more pressing concern in the near term are the growing capabilities of states that traditionally have not been friendly to the United States. Syria,
Libya, and Iran are all purchasing upgraded Scud-type ballistic missiles from North Korea and China, for example. Unconfirmed press reports suggest that Libya is planning to buy a new North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missile system capable of carrying a chemical warhead to a range of over 600 miles. Although all are still far from developing missiles that could target the United States, they may be able to threaten significant targets in parts of Western Europe.

Countries hostile to the West continue to augment their arsenals with equipment purchased from the Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact countries. Despite the discrediting of Soviet weapons in the Iraqi war, the Soviet Union is still an important, if waning, supplier. Syria currently has a $2 billion arms contract with the Soviet Union, which includes 48 MiG-29 fighters, 300 advanced tanks, and a new air defense system. As part of an agreement forged during the war against Iraq, the Syrian deal is being underwritten by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Syria also is buying about 100 tanks from Czechoslovakia.

Iran is also negotiating arms deals with former communist nations, including the purchase of Czechoslovakian tanks and Soviet MiG-29 fighters. In addition to its cooperation with North Korea to develop Scud-C ballistic missiles and the purchase of Chinese M-type ballistic missiles, Iran also plans to buy an air defense system based on Soviet SA-5s, which conceivably could be converted into surface-to-surface missiles.

Scenario I: Arab-Israeli Conflict

Widely defined, the Arab-Israeli conflict encompasses states from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. Five states in the Middle East are possible belligerents in the event of war against Israel: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. All of them possess various kinds of weapons capable of targeting Israel, including ballistic missiles. (See table V.1.)

Israel's military planning takes into account the collective capabilities of all of its potential adversaries. But with Iraq temporarily disabled, Syria may pose the most important threat to Israel's security, for several reasons.

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4Sinai, pp. 40-44.
5Sinai, p. 44.
Aside from its expanding military capabilities, Syria in the past demonstrated the greatest hostility towards Israel. Although its recent actions seem conciliatory, Syria is the key regional power that could renew armed aggression against Israel in this century. Given its involvement in the Lebanese war fighting Israeli-backed Christian forces, Syria has a proximate cause for the potential escalation of tensions. Moreover, following Jordan’s decision in the summer of 1988 to renounce all territorial claims to the occupied West Bank, Syria is also the only existing state with whom Israel has an outstanding territorial dispute.

Israel’s military establishment is recognized as the most sophisticated in the region in virtually every area, including equipment, quality of manpower, and overall level of scientific and technological advancement. Israel’s military planners have placed great emphasis on developing a highly advanced and complex operational infrastructure for modern warfare. Israel’s command, control, intelligence, and logistical capabilities far surpass those of any Arab state. Most importantly, Israel has its nuclear weapons arsenal, believed to consist of 100 to 200 weapons. The combination of nuclear weapons with advanced delivery systems, including accurate ballistic missiles, guarantees Israel an absolute retaliatory capability against any act of aggression.

The current Syrian arsenal reflects this nation’s almost total reliance on the Soviet Union for military equipment in previous years. Syria has a missile arsenal consisting of Soviet-supplied FROG-7 unguided missiles, which have a range of 40 miles; Scud-Bs, with a range of 180 miles; and the more accurate SS-21, which has a range of 70 miles. Syria’s total Soviet-supplied missile inventory is estimated at about 200 systems. Although constrained by limited financial resources, Syria is clearly intent on achieving greater independence from the Soviet Union, including through the purchase of ballistic missiles from China and North Korea.

Syria has no defense industrial capabilities and thus cannot now produce or modify missiles endogenously. Nor does Syria have nuclear weapons or a program to acquire such weapons. It is believed, however, that Syria has substantially increased its capabilities to produce chemical agents, including the nerve agent Sarin, since the 1982 Lebanon war. Chemical weapon production facilities near Damascus and possibly in Homs are thought to have been built with the help of companies in Western Europe. Syria may also be receiving chemical weapons-related equipment from Eastern Europe. While chemical weapons are no match for Israel’s
strategic nuclear deterrent, they open up new conflict scenarios in which Syria could conceivably make some tactical gains.

In the past, Syria has proven unable to prevail against Israel in combat. Its air defenses proved no match for the Israeli Air Force in the 1982 Lebanon war, for example, and it suffered a major defeat in the 1973 war. If combined with chemical warheads, however, Syria’s current missile inventory could provide it with the means to launch a preemptive attack against a number of important civilian and military targets. Chemically-armed Scuds could terrorize Israeli population centers, while the more accurate SS-21s could conceivably disable Israeli airfields or staging grounds. According to some analysts, a first strike of this sort could provide Syria with the time to mount a successful ground assault on Israel’s northern border to reclaim the occupied Golan Heights. The concern is that this added capability, combined with Syria’s large-scale investment in defenses and artillery deployments in the area between Damascus and the Golan Heights, could provide Syria with what one analyst described as “the requisite confidence that it can initiate cost-extracting warfare against Israel without intolerable risks to itself.”

While such operations may be possible in theory, and have imposed additional burdens on Israel’s defense planning, other factors may mitigate any decisive military advantages that otherwise might be gained by Syria’s possession of ballistic missiles. Israel’s highly advanced intelligence capabilities, for instance, provide it with strategic warning. Preparation for a Syrian ground offensive would have to precede a missile attack if such an operation were to be exploited effectively, and this would permit Israel to mobilize and disperse its aircraft prior to the attack.

Moreover, a Syrian attack assumes that Syria would be willing to risk the consequences of Israeli retaliation, which could range from major conventional strikes against Syria’s economic and industrial infrastructure and its army to the selective use of nuclear weapons. This is one significant

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1According to Aharon Levran, "...the principal threat to Israel resides in Syria, which possesses accurate SS-21 missiles and is at an advanced stage of developing chemical warheads for its intermediate-range SCUD missiles. The Syrian arsenal also includes as many as 200 advanced attack aircraft. Moreover, Syria’s declared readiness to inflict painful retaliation upon Israel for ‘provocative’ military actions against it would seem to be an allusion to SSMS." Aharon Levran, "The Military Balance in the Middle East," The Middle East Military Balance: 1987-1988, ed. Aharon Levran (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 212.

military effect of Israel's missile forces: They guarantee the possibility of prompt nuclear retaliation, regardless of what Syria may do with air defenses. As such, they deter the likelihood of this scenario. It is difficult to envision the stakes that would make Syria consider incurring the risks of such retaliation. This scenario also assumes that Syria would be willing to sanction heavy Arab casualties in the effort to achieve a fairly limited objective.

Still, some analysts argue that Syria's ability to launch a missile strike gives it the capability to impose unacceptably high levels of casualties and complicate a prompt Israeli response, thus undermining Israel's confidence in its deterrent. This could lead Israel to prepare for preemptive action to destroy Syrian missile launchers upon strategic warning of a possible attack, based on the calculation that it would be too late to disarm Syrian missiles after the initiation of hostilities. Facing such a threat, Syria could be expected to develop preemptive tactics as well, putting pressures on both sides to put missiles on hair-trigger alert and launch them quickly in a crisis, possibly even before intelligence of an impending attack could be verified.

Whether or not Syrian aggression can be expected to occur in the foreseeable future, the use of ballistic missiles by Iraq, along with their spread throughout the Middle East, has obviously heightened Israel's perceptions of vulnerability. The small size of Israel's territory means that strategic targets are within reach of even short-range systems. The concentration of Israel's population and industrial centers increases their susceptibility to surprise attack, while Israel's reliance on national mobilization to mount military operations could be disrupted even by attacks on population centers. The possibility of terror attacks against Israeli citizens, moreover, has profound psychological effects in a country that has such severe sensitivity to casualties. Given the short distances between Israel and several potential adversaries, warning times of missile attacks would be extremely short.

Israel has long relied on its ability to defend against air strikes, an area in which it has invested heavily. Since the Iraqi Scud attacks, additional defensive measures are being taken to protect against such future contingencies, including the development of the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile system, a program to improve Israel's capabilities to detect and destroy missile launchers, efforts to harden key military installations, and a national program of civil defense. Unless and until effective defenses
are developed, however, ballistic missiles provide potential aggressors with at least a putative capability to launch a successful surprise attack.

Still, the significance of ballistic missiles in this theater would appear, for the moment, to be more psychological and political than military. With continued Israeli military superiority, including its nuclear deterrent, the risks to Syrian or other Arab forces are not measurably reduced by the Arab possession of missile forces; Israel already has the capability to launch devastating retaliation against all the states in the region.

The ability to launch terror campaigns against Israeli population centers and possibly to disable its air force on the ground, however, may appear to some opponents of Israel to be a means of providing a semblance of parity with Israel. This is an important political objective for states such as Syria and Iraq, as they have long believed that Israeli superiority has accorded it undue political influence internationally. Similarly, the ability to respond to an Israeli nuclear strike by launching chemically-armed missiles may give some measure of enhanced confidence to aggressors about their retaliatory capabilities, further underscoring the perceived political benefits of missile and chemical forces.

Whether the United States could be expected to become involved in a conflict of this sort would depend on many factors and is impossible to predict. The recently heightened military presence of the United States in the region, however, could both serve as a deterrent to such a contingency and, conversely, add to pressures on the United States to come to Israel’s assistance if hostilities proved protracted.

Emerging Military Capabilities: South Asia

The history of antagonism between India and Pakistan, underscored by three wars in less than 40 years, stems from deeply rooted disparities in ethnic and religious affiliations; political ideologies; military objectives; and the size of their respective territories, populations, and armed forces. These disparities have left the two states in an enduring state of imbalance, which defines the nature of their antagonism.

India sees itself as a regional great power, on a par with China, and is determined to extend its political and military reach beyond the confines of the Asian subcontinent. India’s relationship with Pakistan is only one factor in its political and military calculations and, at least in public declarations, is not the most important factor by far. Nevertheless, in the effort to match
the Chinese in military capabilities, India has acquired the military potential to defeat Pakistan at any level of military confrontation.

For Pakistan, India’s aspirations to preeminence in the region are seen as a direct challenge to its sovereignty and security. The geography of Pakistan, including a concentration of population centers and major military installations near the Indian border and a lack of territorial depth, accords it intractable disadvantages. Military planning in Pakistan is almost wholly directed at achieving some kind of relative military parity with its eastern neighbor. But whereas Pakistan sees all military developments in India as a potential threat, India dismisses the legitimacy of Pakistan’s concerns, emphasizing that its broader military aspirations cannot be judged from this parochial perspective.

Although officially nonaligned, India was traditionally tied to the Soviet Union through a treaty of friendship and cooperation and, until recently, received most of its advanced weapon systems from the Soviets. India began a major program of military expansion in 1980, including efforts to produce weapons endogenously using Western technology and to enhance its nuclear weapons capabilities, which were first demonstrated in a “peaceful” explosion in 1974. India is currently reducing the pace of its acquisition of conventional weapon systems, largely because the Soviet Union now demands hard currency for arms purchases. Still, the Indian Navy has added several Soviet ships over the past year, including two submarines, and the first Indian-built Shishumar submarine has been launched. The Air Force has 80 British Jaguar fighter aircraft and is adding a squadron of Soviet MiG-29s. With more than 1.2 million troops, India’s military is more than twice that of Pakistan. (See table II in app. I.)

Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and until recently, Pakistan gained access to U.S. assistance and arms supplies second only to Israel and Egypt. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability was significantly advanced during the 1980s, in part because the United States suspended many of its more stringent strictures against Pakistan’s nuclear program as long as Pakistan assisted in the U.S.-sponsored support of the Afghan resistance. All U.S. aid to Pakistan was suspended in October 1990. No longer able to certify to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess weapons-grade nuclear material, the administration was subject to

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legislation requiring that no aid be provided to Pakistan until it could demonstrate that the nuclear weapons program had been dismantled. From the perspective of the Pakistani government, which sees its nuclear efforts as a deterrent against India's overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority, U.S. policy is discriminatory and antagonistic.\textsuperscript{10}

In addition to their nuclear efforts, both India and Pakistan have recently demonstrated their ability to build ballistic missiles. India tested the Prithvi, which has a range of 150 miles and a payload of 1,000 kilograms (approximately 2,200 pounds), several times between early 1988 and late 1989 and successfully tested the Agni to a range of 650 miles in May 1989. The latter is designed to have a potential range of over 1,500 miles with a payload of 1,000 kilograms, enough to carry a nuclear warhead. Pakistan claims to have successfully test fired two endogenously produced ballistic missiles in February 1989, the Hatf I and Hatf II, with ranges of 50 and 185 miles, respectively, and a payload capacity of 500 kilograms. Another missile system, with a range of 372 miles, is reportedly under development. Additionally, it has been reported that Pakistan will soon purchase 375 Chinese M-11 ballistic missiles and several launchers.

However ambitious their current plans, financial constraints are likely to be an important influence on both India's and Pakistan's weapon acquisition programs. Resource constraints might slow the pace of missile and other production programs, force both countries to seek revenues from outside sources to offset their increasingly prohibitive cost, or both. India announced in early 1989, for example, that it was beginning a more aggressive arms export program, while Pakistan seems determined to become a major arms producer for the Arab world, which is already a critical source of funding.

It is unlikely that any of their domestically developed missiles have yet been deployed by India or Pakistan. According to well-informed Indian sources, the decision to go forward with mass production of the Agni is still

pending, although the Prithvi is reportedly slated for deployment sometime this year. For now, the two countries' abilities to project military power outside their territories are restricted to their combat aircraft. The Indian Air Force flies a wide array of Soviet aircraft, in addition to British Jaguar and French Mirage 2000 aircraft. The Soviet MiG-29, which has a maximum combat radius of 750 miles, is India's longest range and most advanced fighter. While it can cover all of Pakistan, it falls far short of the range needed to reach strategic targets in China.

The Pakistani Air Force flies the U.S.-supplied F-16, the French Mirage III and Mirage V, and a number of obsolescent aircraft provided by China. Pakistan's longest range aircraft, the Mirage V, has a maximum combat radius of 800 miles—insufficient to reach major targets in India.

Scenario II: Indo-Pakistani

In the future, the successful development of operational ballistic missile forces could provide these states with a number of new military options that might heighten the risks of a potential conflict. Both the Prithvi and the Agni Indian missile systems could be assured of circumventing Pakistani air defenses in a surprise attack and could reach virtually all important industrial and population centers in Pakistan, which are centered along India's eastern border. The range of the Agni would make it possible for India to reach targets beyond the subcontinent as well—in China, the Arabian peninsula, and the southern Soviet Union. In the Indo-Pakistani theater, Agni missiles armed with high explosive or chemical warheads could disrupt airfields and destroy other military installations throughout Pakistan, assuming they achieve sufficient accuracy. The range of the Agni, moreover, makes it possible for India to base it in the south, beyond the range of current Pakistani aircraft or missiles.

The deployment of the 50- and 186-mile Hatf missiles would not extend Pakistan's reach deep into India; indeed, the 186-mile Hatf II is barely sufficient to reach the outskirts of New Delhi. A 372-mile system, however,

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Appendix V
Worldwide Threats and Implications for the
U.S. Force Structure: the Middle East and
South Asia

If developed successfully, could reach the Indian capital and other population centers. Given current low states of accuracy, Pakistan’s missile force could enhance its ability to deliver munitions on Indian soil but only with limited military effect unless armed with unconventional warheads.

Indeed, the inaccuracy of the missile models being developed by both sides suggests that they would be useful only as delivery vehicles for nonconventional weapons. The Indian government maintains that the Agni will be sufficiently accurate to be effective as a conventional system, but this is in doubt. Neither state seems to have an interest in acquiring chemical weapons for their own forces for now, although both have production capabilities for chemical agents.

But, armed with nuclear warheads, Hatf ballistic missiles could give Pakistan the capability to retaliate against industrial centers in northern India, and thus to deter against Indian aggression. With its entire territory within range of Indian missiles and aircraft, however, Pakistan could not be assured that its nuclear forces would survive an Indian first strike. And if Indian missile deployments intensify Pakistani fears of an Indian preemptive attack on its own missile installations, Pakistan could be induced to adapt preemptive strategies as well. Given the existing military balance in the region and India’s clear superiority over Pakistan, the potential for serious escalation of a military conflict depends largely on whether this leads to the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

If India and Pakistan hasten the pace of nuclear deployments in the context of ongoing tensions, the consequences for regional and international stability obviously could be very serious. The immediate effects on stability of accelerated nuclear deployments in the region would depend on several factors, including whether forces were deployed survivably and with sufficient assurances that they would not be used preemptively. There is disagreement among analysts over whether nuclear forces are inherently destabilizing in this context, but it is clear that neither India nor Pakistan currently has sufficient experience in doctrine or command and control to ensure stable deterrence. The rekindling of the conflict with India over Kashmir since 1989, in combination with the chronic political instability to which Pakistan is subject, has heightened special concerns about the security and stability of the command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear forces.

The developments on the Indian subcontinent inevitably pose extra-regional implications. Rapprochement between China and the Soviet
Union helped to encourage India to seek greater independence in its defense capabilities in anticipation of the likely weakening of its ties with Moscow. The Chinese sale of the CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988, which was seen by the Indian government as China's way of strengthening Saudi-Chinese ties and indirectly threatening India because of the close relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, may also have reinforced Indian resolve to develop better counters to China's military capabilities. And China's ongoing relationship with Pakistan may suggest that China would be willing to intervene in a war between Pakistan and India, a development that India might hope to forestall by developing a missile force capable of attacking targets within Chinese territory. India also has a long-standing goal to play a more prominent role in projecting influence in the Indian Ocean. India has long objected to the presence of American nuclear forces in the area. Indian officials on occasion have complained that India is "encircled" by the three nuclear powers operating in the region: the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.\footnote{As one analyst noted, "Intermediate-range nuclear missiles, which would nominally extend India's reach from Beijing to the Persian Gulf, could serve as a political counter to these pressures and unambiguously establish India's credentials as a regional superpower." See Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 40}

For all of the adverse effects on Indo-Pakistani tensions or regional stability, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent could have even more important international consequences. The deployment of nuclear-armed missiles with the range of the Agni, for example, puts a number of important Chinese industrial and military centers within India's reach. If based in the far-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, the Agni would be able to target Beijing, given sufficient accuracy. An enhanced Indian threat to China impinges on relationships throughout the region. It could involve the Soviet Union, since India could theoretically alter the regional balance of power. China, in turn, could be prompted to take actions against what it perceived to be provocation by India which in turn could pose risk to Pakistan as well.

The challenges to U.S. interests posed by potential Indo-Pakistani conflicts derive almost entirely from the effect that the use or threatened use of a nuclear weapon by one of the powers would have on overall regional stability. Aside from China, the consequences for Japan, in particular, could be severe, and conceivably could prompt Japan to consider developing nuclear forces of its own. Although one cannot discount the...
possibility of threats to U.S. naval forces posed by Indian or even Pakistani missiles in the future, direct U.S. involvement in a conflict in this region seems at this juncture to be remote.

Implications for Future U.S. Policy

Many of the classic missions of power projection that have long been part of U.S. force planning may become more difficult and costly in the future given continued advanced weapon proliferation in key areas. The growing sophistication of missile arsenals armed with unconventional warheads in countries that may be willing to risk attacking U.S. and allied forces would be a factor affecting both ground and naval operations. The apparent legitimation of chemical weapons as an alternative or counter to nuclear weapons is especially troubling. However limited in operational capability, emerging chemical forces may impose a far more difficult political calculus on U.S. decisions to intervene. As was seen in the debate about the potential for high levels of American casualties resulting from an Iraqi chemical attack on U.S. personnel in Operation Desert Storm, political support for intervention may be tested as such capabilities become more evident in the Third World. This would be even more pronounced in the case of a nuclear-armed adversary.

At a minimum, the United States and its allies may have to incur heavy costs to protect overseas military assets—including passive measures such as hardening command centers, sheltering aircraft, building additional runways and launch pads, and adding to intelligence-gathering capabilities, as well as active defenses like anti-tactical ballistic missiles and other means to protect American installations and personnel. The compensatory efforts being taken by Israel and the moderate Arab states to counter the risks of missile attacks from regional opponents, including measures for both active and passive defenses, reflect the seriousness with which this particular threat is already taken in the region. Such perceptions obviously help to deepen Israeli-Arab hostility and inter-Arab hostility and thus complicate efforts to reach regional accommodations.

As the industrial countries progress towards significant reductions in nuclear arsenals, accurate nonnuclear weapons with strategic range may begin to replace nuclear forces. The implications of nonnuclear counterforce capability accorded by precision-guided specialized warheads have been a subject of discussion in U.S. strategy for several years. Unencumbered by the taboos associated with nuclear or chemical weapons, the proliferation of such systems may be difficult to prevent. As one analyst argued, "While such technologies will not come to possess the
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psychological or status value of nuclear arms, the lower stigma attached to
their acquisition is likely to lead to their widespread proliferation."14
Although still a distant prospect for most developing countries, the
acquisition of such systems could be highly destabilizing in regional
contexts if they give states the ability to launch preemptive strikes and
encourage aggressive military operations that would otherwise be seen as
too risky with nuclear or chemical warheads.

A key question concerns how the United States will balance the imperatives
for cooperation with friendly nations against the enduring requirement to
protect the technological edge on which American security traditionally has
relied. Aside from advanced conventional weapons, exports of defensive
systems, while deemed necessary to protect key allies, also could lead to
further missile proliferation if they prompt adversaries to develop
countermeasures or if the technology is adapted to offensive use.

The export of U.S. military goods to the Third World throughout the
post-war period has been guided by the common assumption that industrial
states inevitably would retain sufficient technological superiority to stay
ahead of, and to counter potential threats posed by, the growing military
capabilities of developing countries. Even as military capabilities
proliferated in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the idea that the
international system would remain technologically stratified served as the
underpinning of an implicit concept of stability. Indeed, the provision of
conventional armaments traditionally has been a principal means of
dissuading states from pursuing nuclear ambitions and, as such, was itself
an instrument to ensure a continued military hierarchy between nuclear
and nonnuclear weapon states.

The ability to exert influence over the spread of military capabilities,
however, may be eroded in the future by domestic imperatives within the
industrial countries themselves. The high cost of technological innovations
critical to security may require producers to engage in technology-sharing
arrangements with other countries simply to afford their development and
production, adding to the structural forces for international dissemination.
In addition to political objectives, industrial countries already have been
driven to export military technologies to the Third World by their own
dependency on foreign revenues.

14Carl H. Bildt, "The Prospects and Implications of Non-Nuclear Means for Strategic Conflict,"
The effects of technology dissemination for U.S. and international security will depend on the technology and country in question. For the United States to continue to exert influence in the Third World, retain a competitive share of the global technology market, and protect its own security interests, policies will have to be devised that can capture the benefits of military trade while retaining some control over highly sensitive technologies with military applications. This will require a new framework for international trade policy that can better calibrate the competing goals sought from military and dual-use exports against the requirement to control technologies whose international diffusion is deemed inimical to U.S. security interests.

Without a different regime of controls, the premise that the West inevitably will retain power based on enduring technological stratification may be tested more severely in coming years. If current trends continue, the pace of technological diffusion may eventually vitiate the reliance of industrial countries on technological superiority to influence international events. By reducing the time between generations of weapons and between the development of weapons and countermeasures, the rapid transformation of “state-of-the-art” technology to obsolescence may make the quest for technological advantage ever more elusive. The significance of this qualitative edge, moreover, may be progressively undercut if equipment widely available internationally begins to approximate the capabilities of recent innovations or can at least interfere with their performance. There may be a point of technical exhaustion, in other words, in which the quest for an increment of technological superiority hits diminishing military returns.

The notion that the West can continue to subsidize its own military preparedness by helping smaller states to prepare for war may hasten the point at which technological superiority ceases to be a decisive determinant of national influence. The sale of weapons and weapons technology cannot be equated with the sale of other commodities, with the developed world simply unburdening its excess products for profit. As developing countries’ military capabilities continue to improve, the redistribution of military capability may begin to alter the contours of any remaining international hierarchy.
## Major Force Characteristics

### Table V.1: Middle East and Persian Gulf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Manpower (active duty)</th>
<th>Air forces</th>
<th>Ballistic missile forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>550 MBT</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>189 CAC</td>
<td>50 CSS-2 L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>2,020 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 AH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>489 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4,288 MBT</td>
<td>141,000</td>
<td>553 CAC</td>
<td>Jericho 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,780 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>75 AH</td>
<td>Jericho 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,400 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jericho 2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shavit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3,190 MBT</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>475 CAC</td>
<td>FROG-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,515 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>91 AH</td>
<td>Sakr 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,560 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCUD 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 FROG-7 L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 SCUD B L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2,300 MBT</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>513 CAC</td>
<td>M-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,585 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>66 AH</td>
<td>Ittisalt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,740 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40 FROG-7 L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80 SCUD B L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>500 MBT</td>
<td>504,000</td>
<td>185 CAC</td>
<td>Iran-130</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>820 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 AH</td>
<td>Nazeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>865 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oghab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shanin 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 SCUD B L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,131 MBT</td>
<td>85,250</td>
<td>104 CAC</td>
<td>M-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,432 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 AH</td>
<td>18 FROG-7 L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>326 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 SCUD B L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 SS-21 L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4,000 MBT</td>
<td>404,000</td>
<td>558 CAC</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,300 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>117 AH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,436 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>245 MBT</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>35 CAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>775 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 AH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72 art</td>
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## Table V.2: South Asia/China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Naval forces</th>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Manpower (active duty)</th>
<th>Air forces</th>
<th>Ballistic missile forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1 SSBN</td>
<td>7,500 MBT</td>
<td>3,030,000</td>
<td>150 MB</td>
<td>8 ICBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 SSN</td>
<td>4,800 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,900 CAC</td>
<td>60 IRBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88 SS</td>
<td>18,300 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 PSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 SSGN</td>
<td>3,150 MBT</td>
<td>1,262,000</td>
<td>874 CAC</td>
<td>Prithvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 SS</td>
<td>1,300 ACV</td>
<td></td>
<td>85 AH</td>
<td>Agni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 PSC</td>
<td>4,120 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6 SS</td>
<td>1,850 MBT</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>475 CAC</td>
<td>Hatf I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 PSC</td>
<td>800 APC</td>
<td>10 AH</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hatf II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,445 art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Legend

- ACV: armored combat vehicle (category includes light tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and reconnaissance vehicles)
- AH: armed helicopter
- APC: armored personnel carrier
- art: artillery; category includes both towed and self-propelled artillery, and multiple rocket launchers
- CAC: combat aircraft
- ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile
- IRBM: intermediate range ballistic missile
- L: launcher
- MB: medium bomber
- MBT: main battle tank
- PSC: principal surface combatant
- SS: submarine
- SSBN: nuclear-fueled ballistic missile submarine
- SSGN: nuclear-fueled submarine with dedicated non-ballistic missile launchers
- SSN: nuclear-fueled submarine

Note: The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Adrianne Goins in preparing this paper.
The United States and Security Issues in East Asia
by A. James Gregor

U.S. security policy for East Asia has become a victim of the whirlwind of changes that have swept over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On the one hand, U.S. defense policy has become hostage to the conviction among many Americans that a "peace dividend" must surely be forthcoming. Substantial funds would soon become available and could be applied to domestic problems such as education, homelessness, and general social welfare. On the other hand, U.S. force structure for four decades has been the product of threat assessments based on security circumstances that no longer pertain.

These convictions together appear to imply both substantial changes in force structure and a major reduction in defense allocations. It will be argued here that whatever the truth of such notions, they apply only in part to East Asia. While events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union influence the security circumstances on the rim of the West Pacific, it is not self-evident that the defense of national interests in the region will allow other than a modest reduction in U.S. forward deployed forces. That would mean that any savings in defense expenditures in East Asia would be little more than marginal.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has sought to maintain peace and stability in East Asia—the policy of “containment” implied as much. Economic development and international commerce, as well as local political maturation required as necessary conditions the peace and stability the United States sought to ensure throughout the region.

It is generally acknowledged that the peace and stability purchased by so much investment has contributed to the welfare of Americans. For more than a decade, the United States has exchanged more goods and services with Asia than with any other country. That traffic has enhanced the quality of life enjoyed by Americans, and any change in the flow of technology, capital, and commodities between the United States and East Asia would have serious consequences. Whatever the moral imperatives that dictate U.S. security policy in East Asia, it is evident that there are enough selfish interests sustaining it to provide continuity. Little that has happened in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union has changed that. Within that context, there are subregional considerations that individually and severally reinforce prevailing policy.

Japan

In April 1991, The London Times editorialized that "the Cold War has not ended in the Pacific; the Soviet-occupied islands, bristling with military hardware, are closer to Japan than Dover is to Calais." That judgment reflected sentiments expressed in the Japanese Defense Ministry White Paper, released in September 1989. Since that time, Tokyo has continued to articulate its misgivings about the security of the Japanese home islands.

Whatever the political circumstances in the European portions of the Soviet Union, Soviet military deployments in Northeast Asia remain very formidable. Sixty percent of the combat divisions and the combat aircraft, as well as 90 percent of the Soviet bomber inventory in East Asia, are deployed in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, within immediate strike range of the Japanese home islands. The proximity of such a large force of conventional and nonconventional weaponry remains a major source of concern to the Japanese.

For about 40 years, forward deployed U.S. forces have provided the Japanese with the security that insulates their densely populated and fragile islands from external attack. Today, threats could emanate from several sources. There were reports, for example, of a potential conflict within the Soviet armed forces in East Asia during the abortive coup attempt in the European homeland. It was reported that members of the East Asian Soviet submarine force supported Yeltsin during those anxious days, while members of the Soviet surface fleet were anti-Yeltsin. It is conceivable that had the coup attempt been more protracted, violence might have broken out between elements of the Soviet armed forces based on the periphery of the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and Japan might well have found itself inadvertently involved.


5 See the discussion in Tadashi Tajiri, "Japan and Maritime Disarmament," Global Affairs (Summer/Fall 1990), pp. 94-113.

In such instances, the presence of U.S. naval and air rapid response forces provides Tokyo with some measure of confidence that any such threats would be localized and damage-limited. The U.S.-Japan mutual security arrangement provides the home islands with the required assurances. The two tactical fighter wings, equipped with air superiority aircraft, and the Midway carrier battle group afford the Japanese a measure of security that could not otherwise be attained without substantially rearming Japan.

While the Japanese have substantial military assets, they are configured not to execute independent missions, but joint operation with U.S. forces. The Japanese have an impressive destroyer force, for example, but it could be employed effectively only with conjoint U.S. air support. Thus, while the Japanese have the world's third largest military budget, it has a force with limited rapid response capabilities and is incapable of power projection beyond the confines of insular Japan.7

It is generally understood that the Japanese have the potential for putting together forces that would have the power projection and rapid response properties of the most modern military.8 Japan has the financial resources, the research and development skills, as well as the industrial base, that would make any such effort successful. At present, its security arrangements with the United States forestall that eventuality, and the United States has every reason to try to preclude such an enterprise. Recently, U.S. Marine General Harry C. Stackpole warned that if the Japanese feel threatened by an external enemy, they might well be disposed to enhance "what is already a very, very potent military." That could create the perception throughout Asia of a "rearmed resurgent Japan"—a perception that would create anxiety throughout the region. General Stackpole argued that the assurances provided Japan by a credible U.S. military presence serve as "a cap on the bottle."9

In effect, a U.S. military presence in Japan serves not only as a deterrent to military adventure by any force within the region, but also militates against any change in Tokyo's national security policies. Any modification in policy

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8See the discussion in George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), ch. 13

that might lead to significant change in Japan's military posture could create unnecessary tensions in Asia, impair stability, and stimulate an increase in arms expenditures among the other nations of the region.\textsuperscript{10}

Japan's present security policies are predicated on a credible U.S. military presence. The costs incurred are, in part, offset by Japanese contributions. Any effort to draw down U.S. forward deployment to reduce expenditures may be destabilizing and, in the long term, prove to be very expensive.

Tokyo has agreed, in principle, to provide larger financial offsets to maintain the U.S. military presence in the home islands. It is difficult to fully measure Japan's contribution to the bilateral security arrangement, because it is almost impossible to compute the research and development contributions Japan makes to U.S. weapon systems production and improvement. Japan contributes major high technology components for U.S. weapon systems and platforms.\textsuperscript{11}

Japan has legitimate preoccupation with the safety of its own citizens. Since the publication of its most recent White Paper on defense, Tokyo has made it clear that not only is the uncertainty in the Soviet Union a source of concern, but the "instability" emanating from the Asian mainland itself is also threatening. One of the certain sources of that instability is the Korean peninsula, where one of the few remaining Stalinist regimes continues to resist change.

The Korean Peninsula

For almost four decades, peace on the Korean peninsula has been the function of a precarious armistice agreement.\textsuperscript{12} For years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has committed itself to the "revolutionary reunification" of the peninsula. At the present time, Pyongyang continues

\textsuperscript{10}See the discussion in Edward A. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), ch. 8.


\textsuperscript{12}For a background discussion, see A. James Gregor, Land of the Morning Calm: Korea and American Security, Ethics and Public Policy Center (Washington, D.C.: 1990).
to devote an estimated 23 percent of North Korea's gross national product to the construction and maintenance of its military establishment.\textsuperscript{13}

North Korea maintains about 930,000 men under arms in 30 main force infantry and 26 reserve divisions forward deployed along the narrow demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. North Korea deploys more than twice the armor, twice the combat aircraft, almost 4 times the surface-to-air missiles, 10 times the antiaircraft artillery, 4 times the surface-to-surface missiles (including the extended range Scud), and 70 times the multiple rocket launchers, than that available to the Republic of Korea in the south. Special maneuver forces, airborne and amphibious troops, as well as massed artillery are deployed in forward positions that threaten attack with minimal warning.

In May 1984, and again in October 1986, Kim Il-Sung appealed to the Soviet Union for intensified bilateral military cooperation. Following the 1986 meeting, President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to provide Pyongyang about 30 air superiority MiG-29 fighters, an indeterminate number of Sukhoi SU-25 interceptors, and SAM-5 air defense missiles. These weapon systems were to be supplemented by an advanced early warning radar system that could be employed for target acquisition and fire control. By 1988, both MiG-23s and MiG-29s had been delivered.

This transfer of equipment from the U.S.S.R has been accompanied by increased military exchanges. In 1989, at least three visits were made by high-ranking Soviet military commanders: the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet ground forces, in January; the Deputy Defense Commander, in August; and the First Deputy Director of the Soviet Army Political Bureau, in October. In August 1990, reciprocal visits were made by elements of the Soviet and North Korean navies to Wonsan and Vladivostok.\textsuperscript{14}

Since 1986, the Soviet and North Korean navies have engaged in joint exercises. As late as October 1989, the South Korean Defense Ministry estimated that more than 50 Soviet and North Korean aircraft and 400 Soviet and North Korean naval combatants participated in joint exercises. In January 1991, General Konstantin Kochetov, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense, visited Pyongyang and reportedly insisted that the


The United States and Security Issues in East Asia

A regular bilateral exchange of military delegations is "consistent with the interests of both countries."

These events have created a complex security environment on the Korean peninsula, already clogged with armaments. On the one hand, the Soviet Union has supplied the North Korean military its most advanced weapon systems. On the other hand, Moscow has communicated its evident unwillingness to support any military adventure on the part of the leadership in Pyongyang.\(^5\)

Throughout all this, Pyongyang has maintained its independence. Whatever the disposition of the authorities in Moscow, evidence indicates that decisions in Pyongyang are made and pursued on the basis of judgments made exclusively by Kim Il-Sung and his entourage. The independence of the authorities in North Korea and the military asymmetries on the Korean peninsula (no little increased by arms transfers from the Soviet Union to North Korea) create a troubled security environment on the Korean peninsula.

By the beginning of the 1990s, relations between Pyongyang and its traditional allies had become increasingly ill-defined. The political leadership in Moscow seemed prepared to distance itself from any overt military initiatives from Pyongyang. Beijing remained more accommodating, but it is unlikely that it would offer support for any adventure. Pyongyang remains uncompromising. Despite its economic disabilities, North Korea continues to invest an inordinate sum in the maintenance and modernization of its armed forces. Evidence shows that it is seriously pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.\(^6\) Pyongyang has also developed the domestic capacity to annually construct about 50 range-enhanced Scud missiles. Most of South Korea is now within range of North Korean ballistic delivery systems.

The past behavior of the political leadership in Pyongyang provides little evidence of responsibility. Through the mid-1980s the North organized and


dispatched assassination teams to murder the political leadership in the South. This suggests that the octogenarian Kim Il-Sung remains anxious to “reunify” the peninsula before the South becomes capable of effectively resisting his political or military initiatives. Analysts have argued that two factors, political stability and the U.S. military presence, currently deter Pyongyang from adventure. Of the two, the analysts said that the “American commitment to South Korea” is the more important. They further stated that “if the United States were to withdraw its troops from South Korea, an entirely new and unstable situation could be created on the peninsula.”

It seems evident that an American presence on the Korean peninsula recommends itself for the immediate and foreseeable future. By the mid-1990s, analysts estimate that South Korea will have put sufficient military capabilities in place to render North aggression very unlikely. What appears equally evident is that while prudence recommends a U.S. presence on the peninsula, the number of infantry committed has become increasingly unimportant. U.S. deterrence seems only to require credible evidence of commitment. Seoul has made clear its readiness to assume more responsibility for won-based expenses so that a continued U.S. deterrent might remain on the peninsula at minimal cost to the United States.

The U.S. military presence complicates any risk assessment made by analysts in North Korea. Even if North Korean forces could overwhelm both U.S. and South Korean forces in the beginning of an invasion, the United States’ ability to activate offshore forces would be extremely hazardous for North Korea. Deterrence remains the ultimate rationale for an American military presence on the Korean peninsula. If that deterrence is to retain its credibility, several collateral conditions must be met.

U.S. forces must have the capacity to undertake and sustain a response that would originate either afloat or from bases in the region. Therefore, U.S. forces must have secure staging and support facilities in the Japanese home islands. Further combined operations and high-intensity conflict would consume enormous quantities of material. Thus, adequate sealift and secure sealines of communication would be necessary. Sea control requires

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facilities in proximity to the major sealines. The security of East Asia involves an interpenetration of subregional concerns. The security of Korea requires the integrity of the sea control that extends through the East China and the South China Seas.

One aspect of the changes that have taken place in East Asia over the past decade is relevant in this context, but is largely neglected by the English-language press. During the late 1970s and throughout much of the 1980s, Americans chose to consider the People's Republic of China (PRC) "transformed," a "friendly, if nonallied power." They argued that the leadership in Beijing would no longer constitute a threat to their insular and littoral neighbors. They were caught up in a program of "opening to the industrialized democracies" that required a surrending of communist orthodoxy and revolutionary hostility.\footnote{8}

Since the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, the conviction that Communist China had "changed" is no longer argued. Largely indifferent to foreign opinion, the leadership in Beijing proceeded to use its mainline divisions to kill its own citizens in Beijing. The decision to use violence was clearly predicated on considerations of communist survival and a defense of an orthodoxy that most Americans assumed had been abandoned.

What has not been generally acknowledged is that the leadership in Beijing has not only sought a return to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, but has also put together a security doctrine that is ominous in its implications and threatening to U.S. interests.

Since the Tiananmen incident, Beijing has argued that the "disturbances" that threatened communist rule in the mainland of China in June 1989 were the product of an alliance between "counterrevolutionary dregs" in China and "international hostile forces," among whom the United States was identified as the principal offender. That conviction merely reflects the ideological foundation on which Beijing's foreign policy has always rested. Beijing has consistently maintained that an "international class war" characterized our time.\footnote{9} If the theme was muted during the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was never abandoned.

\footnote{8See the discussion in Maria Hsia Chang, "The Meaning of Tiananmen," Global Affairs. 4,4 (Fall 1989).}

\footnote{9"Deng's Talks on Quelling Rebellion in Beijing," Beijing Review (July 10-16, 1989). p. 4.}
In the mid-1980s that theme found an expression that must be of concern to security analysts in the United States and the noncommunist nations of East Asia. At a meeting of the State Central Military Commission in 1985, Deng Xiaoping declared that a "world war" involving the major military powers had become increasingly unlikely.\textsuperscript{20} What had become increasingly likely, Chinese analysts argued, were "small wars (jubu-zhan-zheng)."\textsuperscript{21} The Chinese further argued that developments in military technology had made these wars, fought for limited objectives in brief, high-intensity exchanges, an increasingly high probability. They cited the U.S. investment of Grenada and Panama as examples.

Chinese analysts maintained that the enhanced target acquisition capabilities and the stealth properties of modern weapon systems, together with the increasing destructiveness of conventional plastic and air-fuel ordnance, have made "brief" and "limited" wars a high order probability for the 1990s. Moreover, they argued that many of these "small-scale" conflicts would turn on territorial and border disputes.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, China's border dispute with India has been protracted and, in the early 1960s, precipitated conflict. Beijing has engaged both noncommunist and socialist Vietnam in conflict over territorial and border disputes in both the mid- and late 1970s. In March 1990, the PRC President Yang Shangkun maintained that "if the United States can attack Panama, so we can attack Taiwan, and furthermore, we have better reason for doing so."\textsuperscript{23} In May 1990, the PRC President repeated the threat. In September 1990, Communist Party General Secretary Zhang Zemin insisted that while Beijing seeks to resolve its difficulties with Taiwan through "negotiation," one could not rule out the use of force.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{21}See the discussion in Arthur S. Ding, "War in the Year 2000: Beijing's Perspective," a communication for the 19th Annual Sino-U.S. Conference on Mainland China (June 12-14, 1990) (Taipei, mimeographed).


\textsuperscript{23}As quoted, A Study of a Possible Communist Attack on Taiwan (Taipei: Government Information Office, June 1991), pp. 42-43.

\textsuperscript{24}A Study of a Possible Communist Attack on Taiwan (Taipei: Government Information Office, June 1991), pp. 53-54.
This becomes increasingly ominous when it is recognized that the PRC has territorial disputes with almost every nation in Southeast Asia. The PRC has had long-standing claims on the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) islands in the South China Sea and territories claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia. It considers associated continental shelf claims that conflict with those of Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia.25

As the PRC’s energy needs become increasingly acute, and the fish harvests of the water columns over the contested continental shelf become more attractive, because of China’s escalating food needs, the South China Sea looms increasingly large in Beijing’s policy assessments.26 Similar considerations cast a shadow over Beijing’s relations with Japan and South Korea. The same kind of territorial and continental shelf disputes arise over the PRC claim to the Senkaku Islands, as well as some Korean-controlled islands in the East China Sea. It is clear that Beijing has considered these disputes among those that might provide the occasion for “small wars.”

Beijing has advanced beyond mere doctrinal speculation. Increasing evidence shows that the PRC is planning a specialized modernization of its armed forces. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts have proposed the organization of state-of-the-art special forces, capable of both rapid response to local crisis as well as the discharge of specific mission responsibilities. Those forces would have combined weapons capabilities and high mobility.

The first such forces appeared at the end of the 1980s. Rapid deployment forces have been organized around a core of attack helicopters and are prepared to assume combat initiatives with only a 10-hour lead time. Trained in both sea and airborne operations, these units are configured for land, air, and amphibious assault. In October 1988, a joint military exercise along these lines was conducted in the Guangzhou Military Region. A year later, similar exercises were undertaken in the South China Sea.27


27 See the discussion in James B. Linder, “China and ‘Small Wars’ in East Asia,” Global Affairs (in press).
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It has been suggested that the new Chinese military doctrine reflects the influence of the “AirLand Battle” concept found in the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-5 of 1982. Like the AirLand Battle, Chinese military strategists conceive small wars to be a function of a quick destruction of enemy forces utilizing the most advanced military technology available. In such wars, all military forces are to be used without constraint as early as possible.

The Chinese have attempted a “modernized” force of ground maneuver brigades with a mixture of tanks, mechanized infantry, airborne infantry and airmobile troops, supported by attack helicopters, and afforded target acquisition and targeting by highly mobile ground and air reconnaissance. Local air control would be supplied by air superiority aircraft.

The Chinese have purchased some of the most advanced weapon systems in the Soviet inventory. For the first time in years, the Chinese military budget has increased in real terms. The budget has been supplemented by PLA profits garnered from massive foreign arms sales. At present, the PRC is one of the world’s major arms suppliers.28

Military authorities on the Chinese mainland have used the export earnings from arms sales to purchase state-of-the-art weapon systems from the Soviet Union. According to credible reports, Beijing has purchased Sukhoi Su-24s and Sukhoi Su-27s and is negotiating the purchase of the air-superiority MiG-29.29 A small number of the Su-27s reportedly have already appeared on Chinese airfields. The PLA is also credited with having Soviet Hi-24 Hind assault helicopters in military service, supplemented by U.S.-purchased Chinook and (civilian) Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters. Retrofitted with suitable military equipment, the Blackhawk serves various assault functions. The PLA is supplemented by rotary winged aircraft purchased from Germany and France, and has a fairly substantial inventory.

At the same time, there have been persistent reports of the upgrading of Communist Chinese naval combatants. It is certain that the PLA Navy has developed some blue-water capabilities; and in the recent past, Chinese combatants have engaged Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea. In

29See the discussion in Harlan W. Jencks, Some Political and Military Implications of Soviet Warplane Sales to the PRC, Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies (Kaohsiung: Apr. 1991).
effect, the PRC is developing the sea-lift and power projection capabilities that, together with the modernization of its air and ground forces capabilities, will make Communist China a regional threat in the 1990s.

This has been duly recognized by the nations of Southeast Asia, most all of whom have had territorial disputes with the PRC. Since the first announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in the late 1960s, and the gradual drawdown of U.S. forward deployed forces in the West Pacific in the 1980s, many of the nations of Southeast Asia have sought to enhance their defense capabilities through various strategies, including a buildup of forces.30

Southeast Asia

The nations of Southeast Asia have long entertained reservations about the government on the Chinese mainland. Most of them have depended on the United States for deterrent support—a military presence that would give the authorities in Beijing pause.

Since its founding, the PRC has insisted that all the islands, sandbars, cays, lagoons, and banks of the South China Sea constitute "inalienable territories of the Chinese motherland." With the advent of continental shelf claims, China's maritime territorial claims have generated an equally insistent claim to all water column, soil, and subsoil resources on the subsea shelf. Consequently, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, some of the nations of Southeast Asia remained more concerned about a Chinese regional threat than any threat emanating from the Soviet Union. With the perceived reduction of the Soviet military threat, the danger of Chinese initiatives looms larger.

While the nations of the region have called for a regional conference on disputed territorial and continental shelf claims, in an effort to resolve the potential conflict without violence, all recognize that the PRC has used military force in the Paracels and has used it against Vietnam in the Spratlys. There is every reason to believe that Beijing will aggressively press its claims in the South China Sea, a region not only rich in resources, but also through which the major sealines of communication thread themselves. Chinese control over the South China Sea would not only provide an energy- and food-poor China the resources it finds increasingly essential, but it would also allow Beijing to control much of the flow of

30For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Chin Kin Wah (ed.), Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987).
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economic and military traffic to the insular and peninsular nations of East and Northeast Asia, which would threaten their economic viability and their security.31

As the economic and political situation on the mainland of China becomes increasingly precarious—as regionalism threatens the political integrity of the regime, and factions begin to surface in the PLA and among the general population—a military adventure in the South China Sea could only appear increasingly attractive to the leadership in Beijing. A military enterprise to return lost territories to the “motherland” might marshall civilian and military dissidents once again around the standards of the Communist Party. It would not be the first time that a troubled nation sought political rededication to national purpose by mobilizing everyone in the service of irredentist enterprise.

The possibility of such an enterprise increases as China’s domestic problems mount. As the major powers withdraw from Southeast Asia, the probability of Beijing making recourse to such an undertaking increases. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from onshore facilities in Vietnam and the possible abandonment of Philippine bases by the United States increases the possibility of military initiatives by Communist China in the South China Sea.

China’s future is very uncertain. It seems intuitively clear that the dissident “democracy movement” will surface and resurface in China with increasing insistence as the economy lapses into negative growth. The Chinese military, in turn, gives evidence of mounting factionalism. All of that could generate a sense of desperation among the leaders of Communist China, and marshalling everyone to national purpose through militant irredentism might very well urge itself upon the leadership.

At present, the continued U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia is uncertain. The Philippine government may make a continued U.S. military presence in the archipelago impossible. Should the United States be compelled to withdraw from both Clark Air Field and Subic Bay,

maintaining the same capabilities for power projection and rapid response throughout the region would be very difficult and extremely expensive.\textsuperscript{32}

Throughout the decades following World War II, the availability of bases in the Philippines has served the U.S. military well in its regional conflicts and has provided credible deterrence in support of the U.S. prevailing policies of peace and stability. In Southeast Asia, most of the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations have been on record as urging the continuance of a U.S. military presence forward based in Southeast Asia. A U.S. military presence, in all probability, will remain in Southeast Asia. Singapore has offered space for U.S. forces in the narrow confines of the city-state.\textsuperscript{33} The security arrangement with Thailand holds the prospect of allowing a U.S. deployment in peninsular Southeast Asia.

However, any relocation of major U.S. facilities from the Philippine archipelago will involve a considerable outlay of funds. The expenditure would be fully justified as an investment in the protection of national interest and a contribution to the continued defense and stability of East Asia.

Conclusions

It is generally agreed that the possibility of a global conflict is more remote today than at any time since the termination of World War II. The Soviet Union, its military inventory notwithstanding, no longer seems capable of mounting the will and determination to threaten U.S. interests with its armed forces. Rather, threats to U.S. interests seem far more likely to arise from regional conflicts and instabilities than from the traditional vision of a general war.\textsuperscript{34} Given that reality, the domestic pressure for reduced defense spending, if acted on, may seriously jeopardize the peace and stability of East Asia and compromise U.S. interests in the West Pacific.

In East Asia, a forward U.S. military presence contributes to the confidence of the noncommunist nations in the region. Selective ground force reduction, of course, could be undertaken without necessarily increasing the potential for local conflict. Increased contributions from the Republic


\textsuperscript{34}\textsuperscript{34}See Dick Cheney, "Forward," \textit{1991 Joint Military Net Assessment}, p. ii.
of Korea and Japan could reduce the costs involved in maintaining a forward-deployed U.S. military presence. The reduction of ground forces would limit only those response options least likely to be required in present and future risk environments.

Planning and programming for the “Future Years Defense Program” will require maintaining a force mix, as well as forward-based supply and staging areas, adequate to the possible threats to peace and security in East Asia. Given the prevailing realities in the region, neither general conflict nor certain peace seems assured. Local conflict appears more likely—if not a high-order probability. A U.S. military presence in the region will reduce the probabilities of armed conflict. The present anticipated force reductions, programmed through fiscal year 1999, will decrease the forward-deployed U.S. presence in East Asia. Those force reductions will decrease capabilities, limit response options, and create something of a perception of U.S. withdrawal.

If programmed reductions in U.S. forward-deployed forces are not to contribute to the increase risk of regional conflict, they must be undertaken with caution, and only after bilateral and multilateral discussion. Risk assessment should be undertaken during the transition from the present threat environment to that which will emerge during the remainder of the century. Planning for the defense of U.S. interests in East Asia must be flexible. At present, the modest reduction of ground forces in Okinawa and peninsular Korea will minimally impair the deterrent capabilities of U.S. forward-deployed assets. Major emphasis continues to be on air warfare and naval combatant supply and maintenance capabilities: prepositioned-preferred munitions, bulk petroleum storage, and replacement parts.

Under present circumstances, even given the evaporation of the Soviet Union as an immediate security threat, peace and stability in East Asia require a continued and robust U.S. military presence. Such a presence would (1) dissipate any tendency on the part of Japan to attempt its own comprehensive defense force, (2) reduce the potential for conflict on the Korean peninsula, and (3) contain any present or future threats emanating from Communist China.

Given the prevailing realities in East Asia together with the prudence every American has the right to expect from the U.S. government, a responsible U.S. security policy in the region would not result in much of a savings dividend. In effect, there will be no significant “peace dividend” in East
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Asia without jeopardizing U.S. national interests and the peace and security of the entire rim of the West Pacific.
Professor James Gregor and I have agreed that his paper would focus on China and the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). I will focus on the Korean peninsula, the most likely and, if North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, arguably the most important threat to U.S. interests in East Asia and the Pacific.

I assume that the U.S. leadership over the next decade will have internalized the lessons of history that would preclude decisions to commit U.S. conventional ground forces to large-scale military combat on "the Asian landmass" (the Korean peninsula is not on the Asian landmass) or to commit large U.S. conventional military ground formations to defeat or support revolutions or insurgencies anywhere in the region. The threat of "wars of national liberation" is finished, relative to U.S. interests in this region.

Our assigned task is to analyze military threats to U.S. security interests in East Asia and the Pacific. We will stick to this task but should clearly state the proposition that economic challenges to U.S. security interests in this region are probably greater than potential military threats. Yet there is a general synergy between economic and military factors that requires a strong U.S. allied military presence in the region.

The Region

Running from the eastern reaches of the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union) to Japan, south to New Zealand, northeast through Indo-China and the People's Republic of China (PRC), this vast region's heterogeneity is evident in the extremes of size, prosperity, language, ethnic origin, climate, topography, and political orientation in its constituent countries. Consequently, this area cannot be analyzed solely as an entity but must also be considered in terms of separate countries or subregional groupings.

The peace, stability, and nonhostile orientation of East Asia are crucial to the national security and economic well-being of the United States. The maintenance of these conditions can only be ensured by a strong U.S. military, political, and economic presence in the region. This presence includes a substantial commitment of U.S. military and economic resources to our partners (variously defined) in return for their cooperation in providing military base privileges, freedom of movement, and access to resources and markets.
The challenge and need for U.S. leadership at a time of structural transition in East Asia have never been greater. Fostering regional and global peace, stability, and prosperity is part of America’s historic role. The United States, as a Pacific power not territorially located in East Asia, is uniquely qualified to fulfill this role. It is a challenge to be taken seriously.

U.S. Interests

There is no better statement of U.S. interests in the region than the one offered by Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 19, 1990:

Despite the changes that we foresee, our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past: protecting the United States from attack; supporting our global deterrence policy; maintaining the balance of power to prevent the development of regional hegemony; strengthening the western orientation of the Asian nations; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; deterring nuclear proliferation; and ensuring freedom of navigation.

Our purpose here is not to dwell on each of these eight interests. However, some fundamentals are worthy of review. The first is that the vitality of the American economy and the well-being of our people depend more on U.S. interactions with the nations of the region, which already account for more than 37 percent of all U.S. trade. The United States and Japan together produce 40 percent of the world’s gross national product. The United States, the world’s sole superpower, must be a major player in the region in every dimension of our foreign policy. Even if there were no clear threats to U.S. security interests in Asia and the Pacific, a U.S. forward military presence would be required as a backdrop for diplomacy.

Military Threats

As Yogi Berra supposedly once said, “Predicting is a tricky business, especially when it’s about the future.” I certainly do not want to deal here with latent fears among many East Asians about a potential resurgence of Japanese militarism, although a significant U.S. presence would reassure many nations of the region in this respect. In addition, I will not address the concerns often expressed by some prominent figures from ASEAN nations about potential Chinese military adventurism in the region after the year 2015. Let us stick to the single present military contingency on the Korean peninsula.

A North Korean attack to the South is the contingency that Secretary of Defense Cheney said last year “is the one that keeps me awake at night.” Why? True, there are signs that North Korea may be moving, albeit very
haltingly, toward reunification. But, Kim Il Sung is totally unpredictable, as demonstrated by the Rangoon bombing in 1983. In addition, it is a fact that North Korea possesses (now that Iraq's military has been badly damaged) the fourth largest military establishment in the world. Clearly North Korea has the military capability to attack south and inflict heavy casualties. Let us review South Korea. (See fig VII.1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force/weapon category</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total armed forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>980,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Division</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Division</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorized Infantry Division</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Infantry Division</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total divisions</strong></td>
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<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Brigade</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Brigade</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total brigades</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tank</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>3,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Appendix VII
East Asia and the Pacific: the North Korean Military Threat and U.S. Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force/weapon category</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total equipment</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,630</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,664</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Naval forces**
- Submarines: 24 (North) 0 (South)
- Destroyers: 0 (North) 10 (South)
- Frigates: 2 (North) 18 (South)
- Missile Craft: 30 (North) 11 (South)
- Patrol Combatant: 106 (North) 94 (South)
- Torpedo Craft: 173 (North) 0 (South)
- Amphibious Craft: 126 (North) 52 (South)
- Fire Support Craft: 66 (North) 0 (South)
- Other: 117 (North) 115 (South)
| **Total ships**            | **664**     | **300**     |

**Air forces**
- Bombers: 83 (North) 0 (South)
- Attackers: 30 (North) 23 (South)
- Fighters: 707 (North) 457 (South)
- Support Aircraft: 780 (North) 690 (South)
| **Total aircraft**         | **1,600**   | **1,170**   |

Note: NA indicates that the information is not available.

The probability of North Korea using these armed forces to attack South Korea at some time over the next 2 years is about 20 percent, based on the subjective analysis of supposedly objective factors. But if you are the Secretary of Defense or the U.S. Commanding General in South Korea, the probability that it will occur tonight is about 50 percent. What is the situation on the Korean peninsula that leads to this conclusion, especially in light of a renewed focus on Korean reunification?

No matter what political formulation one uses to portray the eventual goal of unifying the Korean peninsula, great obstacles remain. North and South Korea simply do not trust each other, and they envision very different outcomes of unification. The North’s leader, Kim Il Sung, wants a unified communist system under the total control of his son Kim Jong Il. The South’s leaders want to absorb the North under the democratic structure of government, which has been developing since President Chun Doo Hwan was persuaded to resign in 1987.
There can be no idea in the mind of Kim Il Sung or his son to establish a democracy in the North based on popular elections. In the meantime, the North has proposed a nonaggression agreement between the North and the South, a phase 1 withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, and a drastic reduction of the armed forces on both sides.

The South's proposal clearly involves a transition to democracy that is anathema to Kim Il Sung's totalitarian state. The North's proposal would continue the communist state for an indefinite future, which remains the greatest single threat to South Korea's security and international security in Northeast Asia. The proposals are basically incompatible as currently written.

But times are changing. North Korea's maneuver in pushing its "Koryo confederal system" is becoming increasingly constrained. The fundamental problem is that the North Korean economy is a shambles. Following a series of defaults on large foreign loans, Pyongyang can no longer borrow money abroad and is equally hard pressed to acquire foreign credits. Even the Japanese, who considered reparation payments and loans a few months ago, appear to have been dissuaded from such ventures. Former North Korean supporters, such as the Soviet Union and the PRC have their own severe economic problems and could not bail out North Korea's economy even if they wanted to. And they do not. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese have any interest in North Korean military aggression against Seoul. Both countries have joined all other major countries that have interests in peace and stability in Northeast Asia (including the United States and South Korea) concerning North Korea's march toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is in the interests of all nations of Northeast Asia that the North Korean government either open up and change or go down via a coup d'etat at the top (after Kim II Sung's death) or a revolution from below. The winds of democratic change are turning into a tropical gale worldwide. The question is how long Kim Il Sung and his successors can resist this force. He is not immune. Today there is ample evidence that even the basic needs of the North Korean people are not being met. There is also evidence that the people in the villages feel the pinch.

Soon, Kim Il Sung must ask himself a fundamental question. Should he sign the International Atomic Energy Agency accords permitting inspection of nuclear facilities and open up his society to get the foreign capital, technology, and management expertise that he needs to repair the North Korean economy? If so, he has a slim chance (albeit a low probability) of preserving his government in power. If not, his government surely will
collapse in a most violent way—whether the model of collapse is East Europe in 1989-90 or the more recent situation in the old U.S.S.R. As Winston Churchill once said, “Dictators ride to and fro upon tigers which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry.”

Of itself, this situation poses a threat to South Korea. A cornered Kim Il Sung might, in desperation, decide to lash out in an attack against South Korea. He would lose a war to the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (perhaps with a limited number of coalition partners), but he could destroy Seoul and inflict a heavy toll in casualties to ROK forward-deployed forces and the U.S. Second Division and supporting units. Thus, the administrations of President Roh Tae Woo and President George Bush must continue to provide a strong military deterrence and, if necessary, defense against a sudden military attack from the North. This will not be easy over the next 2 years as pressures against defense spending in the new era increase.

Meanwhile, South Korea will continue to pursue the policy of “Nordpolitik,” moving cooperatively in many ways with the Soviet Union, establishing trade relations with China, and working diplomatically with Japan. This policy has already had some successes.

While North Korea has chosen to isolate itself ideologically through its policy of “Juche” (self-reliance), South Korea’s Northern policy has led increasingly to the diplomatic isolation of the North on many fronts. But simultaneously, the South has initiated a number of confidence-building measures. For example, the Seoul government has approved a direct barter deal between the two Koreas—South Korean rice for North Korean coal and cement—the first such deal since the division of the peninsula 46 years ago. In the sports arena, a united Korean ping-pong team recently won the world title. A mutual U.S.-ROK agreement has instituted a number of changes to reduce the U.S. presence and profile in South Korea.

- A Korean general has been placed in command of all ground forces in South Korea.
- Korean officers have replaced U.S. officers in the U.N. Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom.
- All U.S. forces are being withdrawn from the demilitarized zone.
- U.S. forces are vacating the Yongsan base (and golf course); the overall U.S. troop strength of 43,000 in the South is being reduced by at least 7,000 over the next 2 years.
The size of the U.S.-ROK combined annual military exercise Team Spirit has been reduced by about 10 percent in each of the past 3 years. There is considerable speculation that the United States will soon withdraw any nuclear weapons that might be based in the South. None of these measures reduce the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea, and there will continue to be a substantial U.S. presence as long as South Korea wishes it. But these steps should be signals to the North that the American military profile in the South is changing.

Is the ROK Northern policy working in relation to North Korea? Although the behavior of Kim Il Sung’s government has been erratic and periodically violent, there are recent, hopeful signs. North Korea abruptly turned 180 degrees in accepting dual, simultaneous entry into the United Nations, then abruptly accepted a fourth round of prime ministerial talks in Pyongyang after having broken them off, ostensibly in reaction to the latest Team Spirit military exercises. Typically, it postponed them again. North Korea’s foreign minister also recently stated that the North probably would accept International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its nuclear facilities, then reversed that position. Those reversals are frustrating, but they probably are tactical. The secular trend should be watched carefully.

Meanwhile, the economic miracle that has made South Korea one of Asia’s “Four Tigers” is being matched by a democratic miracle. After former President Chun Doo Hwan stepped down, Roh Tae Woo was popularly elected President by a slim plurality in 1987 (with just one-third of the popular vote) in an election judged free and fair by impartial observers from around the world. Four months later, popular elections were held for the National Assembly, again judged free and fair. To acquire the political cohesion necessary to win clear majorities, President Roh’s party forged a coalition ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), joining forces with opponents Kim Yong Sam and Kim Jong Pil. This was followed by local elections in March 1991 in which local officials were popularly elected for the first time. The DLP won roughly 50 percent of the votes, again in elections judged free and fair. Meanwhile, President Roh has built a reputation as a conciliator in a country accustomed to noisy clashes among opposing personalities. The bottom line is that real progress in democracy, in tandem with the changing nature of North-South relations, is evident in South Korea.

Thus, a stark contrast exists in the governing systems and foreign policies of the two Koreas. But there is real hope for progress toward an expansion of dialogue, an easing of tensions, greater transparency between the two
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systems, and reunification. A key question is how long the process will
take—some old hands who study the Korean peninsula say that this will
take a generation (20-25 years). Others, including the author of this article,
point to accelerating factors and suggest that reunification could occur
peacefully within the next 5 years. On the other hand, war could come
tomorrow.

But how will North Korea meet the challenges that we know (through
interviews) its leadership sees? Will a concerned Kim Il Sung in
desperation attack the South despite the absolute and repeated guarantees
by the U.S. government to the security of South Korea? There can be no
doubt about the capability of the U.S. ROK Combined Forces Command,
especially after demonstration of American and coalition force resolve and
high technology military capability against Iraq. Kim Il Sung would have to
be highly irrational to take such a risk, but he borders on the irrational, and
there is about a 20-percent probability that he will take the risk. Will North
Korea’s leaders dig deeper into isolation, risking the kinds of popular
reaction they saw in East Germany and in the Soviet Union? They well
might, but this is a low probability given their increasingly desperate
economic straits, which are creating huge dependencies on foreign capital,
technology, and management expertise. Will North Korea’s leaders bow to
the inevitable and open up the kinds of information flows and exchanges of
government, business, and other delegations required to salvage their
economy and hope to stay in power through a transition toward
reunification? Yes, this is a high probability—not necessarily because they
wish it, but because they have no other viable option. Thus, the infection of
democracy will set in—and North Koreans are not immune. On the other
hand, those who have major interests in reunification now understand that
the costs of constructing a North Korea free enterprise system will be in
the many billions of dollars.

U.S. Interests in
Korean

All eight of the U.S. interests in the East Asian and Pacific region stated by
Paul Wolfowitz relate in one way or another to the situation on the Korean
peninsula. In addition, the United States has recently reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea under the Mutual
Security Treaty of 1854. The United States is also responsible for
protecting the large number of American citizens and U.S. business
interests in South Korea. South Korea is the seventh largest trading partner
of the United States, and despite recurring U.S. disenchantment with ROK
trading and investment practices and ROK resentment of U.S. technology
transfer policies, this two-way trade is very important.
A War Scenario in Korea

Previous U.S. and ROK war plans for Korea must be reviewed because of lessons learned from the Gulf War. Relevant reviews are in fact being undertaken by U.S., ROK, and North Korean planners.

Lessons Most Relevant to the Korean Peninsula

The Gulf War Was Unique

The first major “lesson” from the Gulf War severely constrains our ability to draw lessons for the Korean peninsula. All wars are different, but this war, the enemy, the terrain, and a host of other features were even more distinctive than most. Saddam Hussein’s aggression was so brutal, so calculated, and so clearly designed for personal and national aggrandizement that it greatly simplified the task of assembling an international consensus against him. An attack by Kim Il Sung would be perceived similarly, but international reactions would be different. Most of the United Nations—including, crucially, the Soviet Union and China—firmly backed a vigorous response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and did not interfere with U.S.-led military operations. Would China repudiate North Korea, its only Asian communist ally?

U.S. public opinion was buoyed by the knowledge that, although the war was largely a U.S. effort, other nations would join the United States in placing their soldiers in harm’s way or commit scarce resources to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The importance of Soviet and Arab cooperation in particular cannot be overestimated. Would Japan or the former Soviet Union do something similar?

Second, although the war was fought thousands of miles from the United States, it was waged largely from an allied country with a superb logistical base.

Third, as the coalition began massing ships, tanks, and planes in Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein did little to respond. The Iraqis took no steps to impede the coalition’s preparation for war. That one nation would begin a conflict and then sit back and wait—trusting that its potential opponents would not have the political will to respond—is nearly unprecedented. This is not a likely scenario in Korea.

The fourth unique factor in this war is that U.S. forces will not always operate in a theater that magnifies their advantages. Iraq is a nation with few physical obstacles to invasion from either land or sea and with terrain...
that allows almost constant surveillance of every square foot of territory. The flat, featureless desert made even dug-in Iraqi tanks excellent targets for U.S. precision weapons. In this war, coalition forces were given 166 days to overcome most design imperfections in weapons.

The distinctive features of the Gulf War suggest that it was very different from potential operations in Korea. It is possible that Seoul and Washington would be able to assemble a coalition against North Korea, but not nearly as robust as the one that confronted Iraq, a combination of regional and international nations. Korea lacks one key commodity that made Kuwait, otherwise a meaningless and distasteful monarchy, of great interest to the world community—oil. It is unlikely that Britain, France, or some other countries that participated militarily in the Gulf War would do so in Korea to the same degree merely for the sake of “principle.” The United States, with the assistance of the official United Nations command in Korea, could undoubtedly cajole some military contributions from other allies (as it did in the last Korean War), but it is likely that they would be far smaller. Japan would face a particularly vexing dilemma. If Pyongyang attacked the South, it would create a major threat to peace on Tokyo’s doorstep, yet Japan’s constitution appears to forbid foreign military adventures. Perhaps the most likely form of Japanese participation would be defensive, performing antisubmarine warfare screens, combat air patrols, mine-clearing operations, and other very important, but not overtly offensive, missions. Japan surely could be counted on for financial support of the Combined Forces Command combat operations.

In terms of distinctive features of the Gulf War, such as the availability of logistical bases and the lack of Iraqi interference with coalition deployments, the Korean theater is bound to be very different. Any Korean ports or airfields that were not overrun by an initial North Korean attack would likely be heavily bombed or attacked by unconventional warfare units. U.S. ships and aircraft bringing reinforcements would be subject to attack by North Korean submarines, patrol ships, and aircraft. We can assume that North Korea’s Air Force will be heavily involved in the conflict from the first hour, not notably absent as was Iraq’s.

A fourth distinctive feature of the Gulf War—terrain—offers distinctive challenges in Korea that were not found on the Arabian peninsula. The Korean peninsula offers some of the most difficult military terrain in the world—dozens of spiny mountain ranges, deep gorges, sweltering summers, and freezing winters. The rapid, undetected movement on the ground of division-sized armored forces in wide sweeps over hundreds of
miles would be prohibited by the Korean terrain. By all accounts, North Korea’s military has taken the best advantage possible of the rocky terrain, with much of its equipment and many of its command, control, and supply centers dug into mountains. Iraq’s army had a handful of weeks to dig in and prepare for the coalition’s air offensive and did a poor job; North Korea’s forces have been digging in for 40 years. Smart weapons would be of little use if targets could never be identified or penetrated.

Several other aspects of North Korea’s military power suggest that Pyongyang’s forces will be a far tougher nut to crack than those of Saddam Hussein. In all the intangibles that spelled the quick defeat of the Iraqi army—morale, training, leadership, unit cohesion, dedication to the cause—North Korean forces are likely to have a big advantage. North Korea deploys massive special forces units designed to infiltrate the South before and during a war and wreak havoc with South Korean and U.S. rear areas. North Korea’s military doctrine is more faithfully modeled on traditional, offensively oriented Soviet strategies than was Iraq’s. Its navy boasts some 20 attack submarines and dozens of missile-armed attack boats, each potentially capable of sinking a major U.S. or allied warship unless destroyed at the outset of the war.

Some of the lessons from the Gulf War would have applicability in a Korean war. Some weapons and concepts—such as precision munitions and the importance of leadership and training—were clearly validated and can be expected to have significant effects in a second Korean war. Nonetheless, the qualifications outlined above obviously circumscribe our ability to draw expansive lessons from the Gulf War. Pyongyang has tactical missiles, for example, just as Iraq did, and the military and political experience of responding to Iraqi Scuds can hold lessons for the Korean theater because the North Koreans have surface-to-surface missiles. The one unambiguously justified conclusion is not a comforting one—a conflict in Korea is likely to be far tougher and last far longer than 100 hours. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (p. 9-2) estimates that a major Korean conflict would last approximately 120 days. In all probability, this estimate is accurate.

Timing Was Crucial

Saddam Hussein’s failure to press the attack south provided nearly 6 months for President Bush to organize the coalition, get pledges of financial assistance from other nations, and take his case for war before the American people and the U.S. Congress. Time was available for the longest-lasting congressional debate over a single foreign policy issue in history—after which Congress gave the president permission to wage war.
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U.S. dependence also has an important logistical aspect. Both in deploying to the Gulf and in conducting operations there, U.S. military forces depended on coalition logistical support to a degree that is not widely appreciated. The movements of the U.S. Seventh Corps would have been beyond the capability of U.S. transportation assets, at the time already fully occupied with movements from the continental United States. Had North Korea attacked the South during the Gulf War, the U.S. logistical capability to reinforce in Korea would have been almost nonexistent.

The issue of logistical dependence is a pressing one and not isolated to inter-theater operations. Within the theater, the Saudis alone provided 800 transport trucks for general use and 5,000 tankers and trucks for distribution of 20.4 million barrels of Saudi fuel, as well as water, additional spare parts communication facilities, and other crucial logistical elements. Would all this be available in South Korea? No.

The lesson is clear: the United States depended on allies before, during, and after the Gulf war, and there is little prospect of being less dependent in any major future war. The relevance to the Korean peninsula is obvious. If the United States is to successfully prosecute a war in Korea, it will require the cooperation of many friends and allies. In the most basic sense such assistance will be required for political legitimacy. If the American public comes to doubt that an effort on behalf of South Korea is an international one, or if it perceives the burden as being unfairly borne by Washington, then public support for the war will be in jeopardy. U.S. forces will continue to be logistically dependent. Japan and other Pacific Rim alternatives will have to provide major base support. Soviet and Chinese cooperation will be required to keep North Korea from obtaining a resupply of weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other critical items required by modern armed forces.

There Is a Revolution in Warfare

Although it was a discrete example, the Gulf War documented the emergence of a challenging new era in conventional warfare. The effect of high technology—in weapons, command and control systems, intelligence, and other areas—has revolutionized the nature of war. New tactics resemble guerrilla warfare writ large: small, agile, stealthy units stage hit-and-run raids with tanks, armored cars, artillery, and helicopters integrated with tactical air support rather than with infantry squads. Ground, air, and even naval forces are becoming increasingly interdependent as static military front lines become a thing of the past and ground units depend on their air and naval counterparts for intelligence, communications, and fire support. In the future, armies attempting to fight..."
traditional, strictly linear wars will be overwhelmed and defeated. One must assume that North Korean generals have learned this lesson from the Gulf War.

The most convincing confirmation of the revolution in warfare was seen in the application of air power. The effects of the 6-week coalition air assault on Iraqi forces was devastating—thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces were destroyed; perhaps tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers were killed. In future contingencies, the enemies may not so completely abandon the skies to U.S. and allied aircraft. Apart from the Soviet Union, however, it is difficult to imagine having to counter a more extensive air defense than Iraq possessed. It therefore seems obvious that concentrated air power using modern precision weapons would be a key U.S. advantage in a Korean war.

But some weapons may not be as dominant in Korea as they were in the Gulf because of the mountainous terrain and the North Korean practice of digging deeply into the earth. Nonetheless, if the North is to conduct offensive operations, its forces must come out into the open and will often be canalized into predictable advance routes by the terrain. There they will be vulnerable to the same kinds of precision strikes that annihilated Iraqi tank columns in the Gulf War.

Space systems supported coalition military operations in a wide variety of ways, from detection to battle management. The Gulf War also demonstrated the rising value of helicopters in modern warfare. Helicopters provide both mobility and lethality, flying over terrain obstacles such as mountains and rivers and establishing new operational bases wherever circumstances dictate. Their ability to strike targets from great distances with precision weapons is a major asset to ground forces. Their mobility and flexibility would be an especially useful asset among Korea’s mountains. Helicopters could move effortlessly over terrain that would cripple ground forces and could use mountains as cover to execute "pop-up" attacks on advancing North Korean forces.

This analysis carries other important implications for the Korean peninsula. The most obvious one, and the conclusion is being drawn most commonly for Korea, is that deterrence probably has benefitted from the display of U.S. and allied combat power in the Gulf War. The United States and some of its allies have mastered the new era of warfare; North Korea (and some would include South Korea) has not, and this prospect should help deterrence. Space-based systems would provide intelligence
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People, Not Technology, Wins

Perhaps the most misleading lesson being drawn from the Gulf War is that it was won by technological superiority alone. Without doubt, various technologies such as "smart weapons" and intricate C3 systems made a decisive contribution to coalition operations. However, they were only part of the reason for the coalition victory. High technology weapons and systems can win wars, but only when deployed and operated in the proper context of allied military effort, trained people, and sound strategy. What other factors demonstrated their importance in the Gulf War? At the top of the list is people. Desert Storm was in the end a war won by people, not machines or technology.

The results of the 1980s reinvigoration of the U.S. military became clear in the Gulf War. U.S. personnel quality was consistently high in all campaigns, both at the level of combat leader and foot soldier, pilot, marine, or sailor. Coalition forces displayed great operational flexibility, including unit initiative and battlefield innovation. Morale was high throughout all the U.S. services.

The ROK military is aware of the importance of manpower, as is discussed in its 1990 White Paper on the importance of well-motivated, well-led, competent personnel. Seoul has in the past had some problems in this regard, and until recently, there were widespread reports of brutal training techniques and generally poor living conditions for the basic recruit. The new White Paper laid out costly plans to improve personnel retention and the stability of leadership posts, the moral and ideological commitment of the individual soldiers, the educational and military training level of the force as a whole, and other measures. Will the ROK government budget in this respect?

An interesting question is how well North Korean forces would fare in this regard. Most visitors to North Korea report a population that is highly indoctrinated and that accepts, at least to a degree, the soundness of their way of life. As with the issue of coalition building, much depends on the cause of war. If Pyongyang strikes first and the North Korean military perceives that political leaders are engaged in a fruitless aggression against ethnic brothers, as its Iraqi counterpart did in 1990, then morale, unit
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cohesion, and the will to fight of many North Korean units could be expected to wane.

Another element of the Gulf War victory was military strategy. The coalition air campaign was anticipated by everyone outside Baghdad, given the coalition’s huge technological advantage and the devastating effects of modern air power. Once the conflict moved to a ground phase, the fact that the coalition would strike around the Iraqi right flank was a foregone conclusion to everyone except Saddam. In the pace and expertness of the movement, however, the coalition administered an operational shock from which Iraq’s troops and leaders never recovered. All elements of military power had a role in the overall strategy, which was to isolate the enemy, deprive the enemy forces of supplies through a naval blockade, disrupt its command, smash its military forces from the air, and finally move forward and retake the land of Kuwait.

It was on the ground, however, where the coalition made the most pure use of discrete military strategy. The idea of making a major feint, or actual secondary attack by Marine forces, from the sea along one flank and striking deeply around the enemy’s other flank is probably as old as warfare, but in the modern age, the principles of deception and maneuver have been reaffirmed. This strategy allowed coalition forces to rely more on finesse than on brute force, augmenting maneuver and firepower and mass. Through the artful application of strategy, then, coalition leaders maximized their own advantages and minimized what remained of Iraqi ones; they did the unexpected and disrupted the expected pattern of events.

In Korea there would be less opportunities for wide, sweeping ground strategies. The peninsula is narrow and mountainous and does not offer terrain suitable for flanking movements. There is one avenue for maneuver, the same one used by Douglas MacArthur in 1951—the sea. U.S. and allied amphibious forces could conduct raids or large-scale landings deep in the North Korean rear, just as they did at Inchon during the Korean War.

The Iraqi army’s inability to react on the battlefield suggests that in other wars against similarly centralized militaries with a relatively primitive and vulnerable communications network, the United States and its allies should do the unexpected and attempt to throw the enemy force off balance. Once that balance is lost, such centralized militaries will have a very difficult time getting it back again. As the Combined Forces Command Commander, General RisCassi, noted in a recent report, "A fundamental assumption of
North Korean planners is that their forces will be able to dictate the terms of battle. The maintenance of the initiative relies on controlling the pace of military operations." Once such initiative is lost, North Korean forces may have little ability to improvise. Deep amphibious penetrations can help achieve this goal, though the history of Inchon may incline North Korea to expect such maneuvers in the future. An important U.S. shortcoming in this regard is in the area of mine clearing operations. The U.S. inability to clear Iraqi naval minefields was a major factor in making amphibious operations in the Gulf impossible, and North Korea could obstruct seaborne landings the same way. Improvements in this area are particularly important in relation to the Korean theater, where the luxury of flanking attacks over land does not exist. But light airmobile or air deliverable forces could be used to seize choke points and impede follow-on forces.

**U.S. Lacks Power Projection**

Another key challenge is power projection capability. Simply put, the United States does not have enough of it. We did not have enough during the Cold War, but the shortfall was somewhat camouflaged by the presence of 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe. In the post-Cold War era, however, when the United States is relying on a strategy of contingency response, its inability to transport military force around the globe will become immediately evident, as it did in the Gulf War. With only about 35,000 troops in Korea—or fewer, depending on the outcome of the second and third phases of the Defense Department's builddown plan—the United States will have to bring the rest of its combat forces into the theater by ship and plane, and its capacity for power projection will play a key role in the success or failure of operations on the peninsula.

This shortfall did not cause a disaster in the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein inexplicably allowed the coalition to build up forces in Saudi Arabia for 5 months, constrained only by the number of available ships and planes. If, however, Iraq had struck Saudi Arabia in August and challenged the United States to perform a more rapid buildup, the U.S. response might not have been adequate to halt the Iraqi advance. The first full heavy division, the Twenty-fourth Mechanized Infantry, was not in place until over a month and a half after the deployment decision was taken on August 7. The complete, sustainable U.S. land force embodying an offensive capability took almost 7 months to get into position because of capability transport limitations.

The U.S. inability to transport robust forces around the globe is of particular concern. North Korea's army possess over 3,000 tanks as well as thousands of infantry fighting vehicles and artillery pieces. Rapid
deployment units must have a strong antitank capability to stand up to such heavy forces. Existing U.S. assets for strategic mobility are inadequate to deploy anything with speed but very light units. Tactical air units will provide critical firepower to U.S. expeditionary forces because they can fly to the scene of action very quickly with limited sustainment. In Korea, for example, ground forces could be supported rapidly by additional tactical air units flown into the southern end of the peninsula or into Japan. But to transport ground forces and the massive amounts of equipment, personnel, and supplies that will be necessary, U.S. contingency responses will require more strategic mobility.

Air Defense Is Crucial

The Iraqi use of Scud missiles brought home to the U.S. military the potential of tactical ballistic missiles. The Scud was one of Iraq's very few technical successes of the war. Given that fact and that this war demonstrated the enormous difficulty in creating a traditional air force truly competitive with U.S. air and antiair forces, tactical missiles may become increasingly appealing as a long-range strike weapon of choice. U.S. arms control efforts, in the Middle East and in relation to North Korea, will focus partly on restraining the spread of such weapons. However, North Korea already possesses both the Scud B and an indigenous, improved version, so the threat in this context is more than theoretical.

There is reason to be less concerned about Scud deployments in North Korea than the U.N. coalition was in the Gulf War. As long as Scuds are not tipped with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads—and that is an important qualification—even improved Scuds pose a marginal military threat. As shown in the Gulf War, they are terribly inaccurate, and endogenously produced versions are often manifestly unreliable, sometimes breaking up in flight and even exploding on the launch pad as happened in North Korea in 1990. Even primitive anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems like the Patriot can have great success against Scuds, particularly in defending specific military targets rather than cities.

Politically, the Gulf War is said to have demonstrated the unnerving potential of even tactical-range ballistic missiles to escalate a conflict horizontally, to bring in more nations and spread the violence. That risk was mostly unique to the Middle East, however, where the potential involvement of Israel threatened to split the Arab members from the anti-Iraq coalition. North Korea could achieve little by firing Scuds (the best of a 310-mile range) at Japan, China, or the Soviet Union besides creating additional explicit enemies.
Recall that U.S. Pacific forces should be tailored for deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response, with a capability for reconstitution. Chairman Powell recently presented to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, the base force for the Pacific theater (an economy of force theater):

**Forward presence**
- Korea
  - 1 Div(-), 1-2 TFW

**Japan**
- 1-2 TFW
- 1 CVBG; 1 ARG
- Marine Expeditionary Force

**Crisis response**
- Hawaii/Alaska
  - 1 Div (+), TFW
  - CONUS—5 CVBG

This base force would be backed by contingency forces based in the Continental United States (CONUS).

Whether or not this base force will serve as an adequate deterrent is problematical. In a new world order where extended nuclear deterrence has lost credibility, do we have the capability to make extended conventional deterrence work? Will this base force be enough to cause the leadership of North and South Korea to understand that in the event of an attack south, Americans would be killed in sufficient numbers to cause immediate implementation of Combined Force Command war plans employing all forward-deployed forces, supported within days by earmarked crisis response forces and within months by CONUS-based contingency forces? Only if current and future resources for rapid power projection exist.

It is conceivable that a North Korean attack could be a limited one, with the objective of taking Seoul rapidly, then stopping to call for negotiations. Under this scenario, although most of the 2nd Division (-) would probably
be lost, time might thus be provided for U.S. reinforcements to arrive to block penetrations further south and prepare for the counterattack. But if the North Koreans learned anything from the Gulf War, they would understand the new American resolve and would not duplicate Saddam’s folly of permitting a “free ride,” U.S. military buildup.

The North Korean rate of advance south theoretically would be greater than it was in the first Korean War (greater than 10 miles a day to the Han River)—other things being equal. But, unlike the first war, the full weight of the U.S. and ROK land-based tactical fighter wings and one carrier battle group would be brought to bear. North Korean air defenses would be detected early by signal intelligence, satellite, and air reconnaissance and destroyed early. Combined Force Command air superiority would come quickly and could be sustained.

North Korea would receive no support from the former Soviet republics. PRC military support would be problematic. U.S. and ROK coalition support would also be problematic. The U.S. acquisition of the U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning North Korean aggression almost certainly would be blocked by PRC vetoes. It is hard to imagine a large-scale coalition, direct military support of the ROK/U.S. defense and counterattack. Such coalition support would be a matter of principle—in the absence of a common interest such as the free flow of energy at reasonable prices. The absence of U.N. Security Counsel resolutions condemning a North Korean attack and supporting military sanctions and the lack of widespread coalition military support would have the corollary effect of undermining any American consensus in support of a Combined Force Command response beyond restoring the status quo ante at the 38th Parallel.

All these considerations make it doubtful that the new U.S. strategy of deploying three divisions in 30 days (two by sea) could be accomplished. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Force Command would have to buy time via land and sea-based air strikes. The tempo would have to be greater than the 2,500 sorties per day generated during the Gulf War, and strategic bombing by B52s would have to be augmented.

An Inchon-like flanking movement executed before an adequate ground buildup would not be out of the question, even though the North Koreans would plan to defend against it. Assuming air superiority, and with augmented counter-mine assets (perhaps from Japan), and a minimum of six carrier battle groups and Marine units planned for Pacific forces, North
Korean naval, air, and ground defenses might be overcome to permit a successful amphibious assault.

The Combined Force Command would defend south of Seoul (perhaps near the old Pusan perimeter) until adequate reinforcements arrived. But the Combined Force Command defense would involve the air and land battle doctrine of counterattacks, not the linear defenses of old. A major offense might not be launched for up to 60 days until adequate ground forces from Hawaii, Alaska, and CONUS were in place. This is unsatisfactory. How can the strategic mobility problem be solved?

## Modifications to Current and Planned Forces

The biggest single problem we will face in executing the new military strategy is in power projection. One solution is obvious but expensive—purchase more ships and aircraft designed for rapid strategic lift. Another part of the solution is offered by increased maritime prepositioning. Because only Army or Marine troops and a little equipment need be taken by air, while heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery, and logistical base structures are prepositioned, this tactic can slash lift requirements. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), for example, uses four to five prepositioned ships to carry its equipment, while the troops can be deployed in just 250 transport flights rather than the 3,000 it would take to transport the unit and its equipment. In the Gulf War, using prepositioning, two full MEBs were in place, complete with tanks, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, by August 27—less than 3 weeks after president Bush announced his decision to deploy forces. However, this capability depends on many factors, such as "sea state."

There are alternatives to maritime prepositioning ships. For example, Brown and Root, Inc., has developed a concept for stationary, offshore bases that can be put in place (and moved as needed). This “landing ship quay/causeway” concept offers a revolutionary alternative that should be explored seriously.

In addition, resources should be devoted to expanding the U.S. stock of prepositioned equipment in Korea. Planned cuts in the size of the U.S. military could help in this regard; as units are deactivated, their equipment could be used for prepositioning. This strategy can provide only part of the answer in Korea, however. For one thing, the peninsula is becoming increasingly crowded; the U.S military is in the process of giving up major tracts of land in Seoul, and plans to expand U.S. basing facilities elsewhere may not be popular. More important, prepositioned stocks are vulnerable.
to sabotage or direct attack, a very real concern given the prevalence of North Korean special forces units and possibly chemical-tipped Scud missiles. In considering the Korean contingency, U.S. military planners might wish to emphasize seaborne prepositioning or the placement of stocks in Japan (where there might be land problems as well), the Aleutian Islands, or elsewhere, remembering that ships will still be required to move these forces. Increasingly, Seoul will undoubtedly be asked to bear many of the costs of such preparations for combat.

A second problem to be solved in relation to Korea has to do with the size of the U.S. ground force stationed in South Korea in relation to a rapidly declining defense budget and South Korean politics. That is, the United States does not need 43,000 troops stationed in South Korea to underpin deterrence. This is acknowledged in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) current plans for reductions, but the plans do not go far enough. A 2nd Division Forward, with one reinforced infantry brigade backed up by one tactical fighter wing stationed on the ground, would be sufficient to serve as a tripwire. Thus, U.S. forces stationed on the ground might be reduced to 10,000. Depending on the disposition of the rest of the 2nd Division, this could represent substantial savings. An additional benefit could accrue from the signal to North Korea in relation to a comprehensive approach to arms reductions. If this reduction were considered by the ROK government as weakening defense capability, they could take up the slack by adding two ROK brigades to their active forces. There could also be U.S. domestic political benefits in taking the wind out of the sails of those who call for a total withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula.

But significant ground based reductions should be undertaken only in tandem with acquisition of greater power projection assets to support land-based trip-wire forces—and only if there is a corresponding drawdown of North Korea’s offensive strike capabilities.
The past 10 years have seen far-reaching changes in the world and in what is generally known as low-intensity conflict (LIC). Aspects of these changes have been both evolutionary and revolutionary and predictably will continue into the next century. This paper looks at this changing world primarily from a military aspect with focuses on both present and future LIC implications. Particular emphasis is placed on a definition of low-intensity conflict, challenges and ongoing change, changing LIC threats, the U.S. approach to LIC, and corrective action. It is intended to help decisionmakers gain significant insights about LIC as the United States moves into the 21st century.

In addition to recommendations on developing a new interagency definition of LIC, this paper concludes with the following recommendations:

- Institutionalize a lead agency for LIC.
- Establish a blue ribbon panel to review the policy on paramilitary forces.
- Use recent lessons learned to counter LIC threats.
- Reform security assistance legislation.
- Provide economic assistance to the Soviets and Eastern Europe.

A Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict

Low-intensity conflict is described in different ways by various agencies and academic institutions. The most commonly accepted and used definition in the U.S. government is given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

This definition is inadequate for several reasons, including the following. First, it should be recognized that LIC is a misnomer, since the degree of intensity of a conflict depends totally on one's perspective. A conflict may appear to be of low intensity to the United States but not to nations experiencing the conflict, such as El Salvador, the Philippines, and Lebanon; to them it can be, and often is, a matter of national survival.

Second, LIC is not limited to acts of terrorism, counterdrug activities, insurgency, the Contras, and freedom fighters. U.S. employment of
conventional forces in Grenada, Libya, and Panama also qualified as LIC. The omission of a definition creates confusion for those who make policy, resource, and budget decisions. Additionally, political, economic, social, and informational instruments are frequently predominant or replace armed forces entirely. The definition of LIC should emphasize these factors.

Third, LIC masks a paradox in that it hides the potential for disproportional lethality at the lower end of the conflict spectrum where the numbers engaged are relatively few.

Technology has made all battlefields far more lethal than ever experienced in previous warfare. All indications are that they will become even more lethal in the future. Improved weapon systems and munitions that can be used at increased ranges and vastly improved probabilities of hit/kill are products of technology applications. Future foes will seek to gain the same or better capabilities and to find technologies to counter U.S. advantages in these areas. We must continue to improve our own capabilities while continually monitoring the development and the disposition of improved capabilities of others.

As seen in the Persian Gulf War, precision-guided stand-off weapons and stealth technology reduced the number of forces actually engaged and increased the kill ratio to new heights. "The exploitation of these new technologies will change warfare as significantly as did the advent of tanks, airplanes and aircraft carriers," said Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in a July interim report to Congress on Operation Desert Storm. It is only a matter of time before these and other capabilities and other technically sophisticated weapons and equipment will be employed in the low-intensity environment without necessarily leading to escalation to higher levels of conflict. With technology advancements, the term LIC will become even more a misnomer in the future.

Finally, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined it, LIC has generally come to be perceived as belonging to DOD. LIC is broader in scope and approach. In most LIC categories the Department of State is the lead agency in what often becomes and should be a very complicated interagency action. This is not to say that DOD does not have a major role in LIC; it does. But indications from past U.S. involvements in LIC suggest that successful conflict resolution requires the intense interagency coordination, planning, and cooperation that in the past occurred in the U.S government only.

during intense crises such as war. LIC is both more and less than conflict in the military sense of the word. It is also more than “confrontation between states or groups above the normal peacetime competition and below conventional war.” Such a description tends to lull decisionmakers into not being concerned about the seemingly petty day-to-day developments and becoming focused on conflicts only when they rise to levels that require U.S. military involvement, such as in Grenada and Panama. Such a description negates the importance of the interactions of the social, political, informational, and economic aspects of LIC. Early appropriate action could deter the escalation of violence.

Leaders and policymakers need to reflect upon the dramatic changes we have experienced in the last decade. Equally important, they need to focus on the implications of these changes and their potential for conflicts and disharmony at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

The changes that have occurred in the world because of the restructuring of the Soviet Union and the associated “peace dividends” indicate that the threats at the highest levels of conflict are dwindling. But LIC has not gone away. In fact, it may be growing in both scope and size. In the past, the United States has been involved mostly because of threats to the United States posed by the Soviets, the Soviet surrogates, and communism. The real issue today is that the root causes of LIC are social, political, and economic. The world population continues to grow. In less-developed areas of the world, people are exploited and denied education, medicine, and opportunities to better their lives. Therefore, unrest leading to low intensity conflicts will likely increase. For example, the current drug problem is an outgrowth of demand in the United States combined with social, economic, and political chaos in the source countries. Nearly total lawlessness has consumed countries like Colombia and Peru because of their governments’ inability to resolve the basic root causes of LIC. Timely action by the United States to identify the causes of LIC early on would allow the preventive application of U.S. government nonmilitary and military resources in conjunction with host countries and neighbors to provide a regional view. Thus, the U.S. government would engage the emerging forces of the new world order as much as possible in their embryonic status. In so doing, the government would be a proactive international participant in the formulation of a new, multipolar world before the cement of the new relations, forces, and dynamics has set.
A World With One Military Superpower

From a military/political point of view, the United States is the only nation with the capacity and demonstrated will to be a military superpower in the 1990s and maybe beyond. How the United States and the world will react to this unipolar condition remains to be seen. Clearly, both the United States and its potential foes should consider this unipolarity as they develop future military options. Decisionmakers, particularly those in the intelligence community, face the following challenges: to enhance current means of collecting critical information and direct those efforts toward unstable regions and potential foes in effective and innovative ways, to analyze all source data and produce timely intelligence to support the needs of decision-making at all levels, and to ensure the dissemination of timely and supportive intelligence. Meeting these challenges will require increased reliance on remote overseas collection activities and human source intelligence to support the other intelligence disciplines.

A Changing Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

With the ongoing changes in the Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact nations, the threat of Soviet adventurism has diminished. Several of the new players, including the central government of the Soviet Union, the new states emerging from the restructuring of the Soviet empire, and the former Warsaw Pact nations, will probably want to become at least economic partners of the West. During this period of change, instability, disorganization, and a potential for disorder will be of greater magnitude than that reflected in the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August and the ongoing civil war in Yugoslavia. What this will mean in the future is unclear. But decisionmakers should understand that this period of instability will neither be understood nor accepted by many of those most affected. Decisionmakers should also understand that the actions of these new players will not fall into the predictable patterns that we have seen from 1945 through 1989 and have grown accustomed to and even comfortable with.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, as we have known it, is accompanied by another major setback for the Soviet military. In the Persian Gulf, the world saw Soviet equipment, training, and doctrine, as employed by the Iraqis, totally destroyed, dominated, and discredited by the superior technologies, equipment, doctrine, training, leadership, and forces of the United States. As a result, the world may conclude that the Soviet Union is not only economically bankrupt but may also be substantially militarily weaker than was previously believed. This conclusion will influence how

the actors of the world view the evolving Soviet Union and how they see themselves. Military planners should observe how the restructured militaries of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe respond to these changes and what actions they take in the future. The role of the militaries, given the regional instability in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, could have a major effect on world stability throughout this decade. We cannot forget that a restructured Soviet Union will still have a large arsenal of nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and the second largest conventional military capability in the world. We must also be aware of and vigilant for the reverse engineering that will predictably occur based on the Soviet analysis of its observations of the Persian Gulf War.

The changes taking place in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe quickly point to the other aspects of LIC. Without economic and humanitarian assistance, the change from a totalitarian style of government hostile to the West to a democratic society may not take place. As Congressman Les Aspin stated, "We don't want the first winter of freedom after 70 years of communism to be a disaster for the Soviet people."

**Weapon Systems**  
Many insurgent, terrorist, or drug-trafficking organizations can acquire weapons and supporting equipment today that similar organizations of the past would not have found possible to acquire. Light, highly effective weapons, from small arms to missiles, are readily available to those able to pay. Improved or new munitions also provide additional enhancements to this military arsenal. Size and weight reductions make them easier to transport and infiltrate into any area of operations. Improved explosives and demolitions provide a "bigger bang" for less weight and size. Plastic weapons, munitions, and sensory non-detectable explosives can more easily pass inspection points and infiltrate target areas. The list of technologies increasing the ease of deception goes on. Most organizations with the capital to buy these weapons can find them in the ever-expanding world arms market. Much of the equipment is from the West and may include countermeasures to our systems that have not been developed by us. Identification of "friend or foe" becomes a more pressing problem. Extrapolation of these trends into the fields of chemical and biological weapons portends the difficulties we will face in the coming years.

Additionally, technological advancements in the fields of communications, information processing, and secure means to transfer information are no
Appendix VIII
Low Intensity Conflict in a Changed and Changing World

longer solely the province of the Defense Department. They are used every day throughout the world by business organizations and, one can assume, by increasing numbers of groups of various descriptions hostile to U.S. interests. Again, with the application of capital, our adversaries can acquire state-of-the-art and off-the-shelf commercial products that enhance their operations, provide security to their operations, and provide for command and control of activities from afar. Most of this equipment lacks readily available countermeasures, which further protects and enhances their operations. With available capital, short decision processes, and little bureaucratic restraint, illicit organizations can stay well ahead of most governmental organizations.

Arms Transfers

Several nations are major suppliers of arms. In recent years Argentina, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, South Africa, and Vietnam have joined the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. These new suppliers have depressed economies and need hard currencies. Their arms industries are expanding into the arms markets left by the West and the Soviet Union and can seriously threaten regional stability. More than a dozen nations are developing long-range missiles. Some are developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons. In the hands of less-sophisticated and unstable states, these systems can become a more immediate but not greater threat to the United States than the Soviet threat. We must be aware of and develop the means to detect and monitor such operations. We must also remain aware that the largest arms producers on the market are in the West. Transfer of technologies by these nations should be monitored, restricted, and controlled. We will face two realities: (1) Europe, the United States, and other nations will increase their arm sales to the Third World and will provide assistance to nations and regions that will support or conduct hostile actions against the United States in future conflicts, and (2) future adversaries, whether irregular forces or terrorists, will be well equipped with highly sophisticated weapons.

Information Media

Another change is the enhanced ability to communicate to anyone around the world. This was clearly demonstrated during the recent attempted coup in the Soviet Union. In the past, the flow of information could be controlled or at least inhibited by governments; this is no longer true. Information flows no longer rely only on the radio and printed material but also on the television, the telephone, and the fax machine. Radical organizations can not only influence target audiences in the area of operation but can also
influence audiences within the United States through various means of communication. Today's information and communication environment is such that both our allies and our adversaries can read and hear about and observe events as they occur.

The world of today and tomorrow offers many unique and unprecedented challenges. The Persian Gulf War, the war on drugs, and terrorism have exposed new threats and changed our perception of the last 45 years. The Soviet threat of the past was politically motivated and military or paramilitary in nature. The adversaries of tomorrow include those who are economically motivated and willing to use force at the lower ends of the conflict spectrum. The end of the Cold War may mean greater instability in the world than we have experienced since the end of the Korean War. This instability will be caused by the perceived change in the nature of the threat, that is, from the political/military Soviet threat to an emerging threat that includes the very basis of LIC—economics, religion, and ancient hatreds between ethnic groupings of people. A recent study concluded that in 27 of 47 selected low intensity conflicts since World War II, the U.S. objective was concentrated on communism. The 60 cases included in the study indicate that economics, politics, religion, and stability were the basis for the conflict. Add to these factors the power of global information reach, which can change the aspirations of the peoples who until now were relatively isolated. In the 1960s, LIC was focused, in part, on the rising expectations of the populace; in the 1990s that has changed as the expectations of people have risen and their social and economic way of life has worsened with little or no hope of improvement. LIC is now becoming focused on the true causes of conflict—social, economic, political, and the additional amplification of conflict caused by AIDS, starvation, medical needs, disasters, and illicit drug trafficking—the all without the assistance of the Soviets.

In fact, the very basic aspects of instability, those being social and political turmoil, economic failure, and requirements for food, fuels, medicines, and other forms of humanitarian assistance in the Soviet Union, make LIC situations of major concern to the United States.

Changing LIC Threats

Changing Context of LIC Threats

Since World War II, U.S. involvement in LIC has primarily been to contain the Soviets and Soviet surrogates in their efforts to gain control and influence other nations. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the ongoing restructuring of the Soviet Union, and the strengthening of the European Economic Community have forced the United States to rethink the central U.S. strategy of the previous four decades—a Europe-oriented strategy of Soviet and Warsaw Pact containment.

The evolving restructuring of the Soviet military and the control of its vast conventional and nuclear arsenal must be closely observed. We must not let ourselves lose our advantage. In spite of ongoing arms control negotiations, the recent Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and previous arms control treaties, the Soviets have maintained sufficient weapon systems to remain a major threat in the European region, in Asia, and, in some aspects, worldwide. Treaty compliance, inspection, and verification of these weapon systems may not be as effective as planned. These problems clearly remain unresolved.

In spite of the potential Soviet threat, recent events in the Persian Gulf quickly and profoundly showed that threats to U.S. interests are now less global and intense, and real dangers on a regional, low intensity conflict scale still exist and appear to be growing. Regional instability, religious fervor, terrorism, and economic, social, and political deprivation will continue to generate conflict in a world devoid of an aggressive Soviet state. Shrinking economies in the Third World, nationalism, population explosions, depleted agricultural areas, environmental deterioration, and the demands for ethnic recognition and individual freedom will drive conflict without any requirement for Marxist dogma or outside intervention. Unfulfilled expectations of peoples long held under the control of communism could escalate to greater unrest, civil war, or anarchy in regions heretofore thought to be immune to such disorder. Identifying the LIC threats, developing domestic and international support, and applying an appropriate degree of power to regional issues before they become irreconcilable provide the impetus of the Bush post-Cold War national security policy. The successful execution of such a policy requires focused, integrated, and sophisticated interagency teamwork. This basis for success has neither been fully developed nor consistently applied by the U.S. government.
Appendix VIII
Low Intensity Conflict in a Changed and Changing World

Soviet Surrogate States

With the projected reduced levels of economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union, its former surrogate states—primarily Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Vietnam, and Iraq—are going to have to change or make new accommodations in order to maintain their influence. Where they will gain the necessary assistance in the future and what changes they will make in order to survive in a world in which the United States is the premier military power remain to be seen. Regardless of where that assistance comes from, much of it will probably be arms and will present a potential LIC threat to the U.S. interests. These threats can be manifested in the form of terrorism, narcotrafficking, use or the threat of use of nuclear or chemical weapons, subversion, and other forms of conflict. The United States will need to develop and improve current capabilities to detect and monitor weapons and terrorist movements through increasingly sophisticated surveillance systems. The shift from the massive but relatively homogeneous Soviet threat to potential multiple regional or subregional threats will require flexible, innovative thinking and planning.

Islamic Fundamentalist Movements

We continue to experience a threat that is not politically or economically motivated but is based in the radical Islamic fundamentalist movement, which is largely anti-United States and committed to expansion in the Middle East and Africa.5 Uniquely, it is an even greater LIC threat to the new Soviet Union. The Palestine issue has the potential to foment disorder in the Middle East as it has for the last 40 years.

Terrorist Groups

Terrorism continues to be a major threat and may grow as a means to counter U.S. capabilities. Over 230 anti-American incidents occurred in 1990.6 As the United States assesses its successes in the Persian Gulf War, its adversaries will do the same. The decade of the 1980s has shown the administration’s willingness to use, and the nation’s support of, military force when necessary. Grenada, Libya, Panama, and the Persian Gulf all have striking lessons for our adversaries. With the proven U.S. capabilities to reach out and attack with resolve and relative impunity, those who oppose us will be seeking new ways to strike at us while limiting our ability to strike back. Terrorist tactics will appeal to groups or organizations that operate outside the internationally recognized conflict boundaries. The

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Middle East and Latin America will continue to be the most likely operational areas for terrorist organizations and other radical groups, followed by Spain, the United Kingdom, Africa, and the restructured Eastern Europe.

The U.S. Approach to LIC

The current LIC organization is dispersed throughout many of the departments and U.S. government agencies, none of which is in charge. It is accordingly difficult to reconcile vastly differing views about LIC, differentiate responsibilities, and assign priorities.

Congress attempted to solve the problem in 1986 through a proviso to the Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 99-661) that established a unified command for special operations. It also established an office at the Assistant Secretary of Defense level for special operations and low intensity conflict and recommended that a board for low intensity conflict be established within the National Security Council (NSC). Finally, as a "sense of Congress," it recommended that the President designate a Deputy for Low Intensity Conflict to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. While this legislation meant to bring organization and order to the U.S. treatment of LIC, it has had only partial success in that DOD allocated additional resources to the special operations arena. Just as the legislation had a unifying effect on special operations forces, it muddied the waters in the LIC area by seemingly relating special operations and low intensity conflict in DOD. Additionally, the legislation recommended that a LIC board be formed at NSC to focus all government efforts. Unfortunately, no direction was given to the Department of State or the other departments and agencies involved in low intensity conflict.

The LIC board has had limited success for at least two reasons. First, the participants hold varying views and have different priorities. Second, and more important, it has no clout or authority to create the changes necessary to focus and drive interagency efforts in the low intensity environment. What has not happened, in spite of achievements to date in

7Cohen-Nunn Act.
the special operations arena, is the focusing of government activities on the all-encompassing aspects of LIC.

LIC Complexities

An example of the complexities of the U.S. government’s approach in the LIC environment is the number of government agencies sponsoring paramilitary forces and employing them throughout the world. The Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other agencies currently train other nations’ forces in conducting ground, air, and sea operations that are clearly military. Sometimes this sponsorship is due to the sensitivity of employing U.S. military forces in other countries. Sometimes it is simply a political expedient or an agency’s resistance to participate in a given activity, such as DOD’s past position as to its role in this nation’s war on drugs. DOD has unique capabilities and the structure to train paramilitary forces not duplicated elsewhere in the U.S. government and should be used to support this nation’s war on drugs. DOD can be of valued service by providing material, training, and planning support to the U.S. lead agency. The use of DOD’s intelligence and communications capabilities precludes duplication of resources in these areas and provides excellent support to the drug law enforcement agencies in the United States and overseas. The DOD operational and logistical planning capabilities were proved in the desert, and what the United States has to do is to be smart in the use of the military, not avoid the use.

A second example is the difficulty in sharing information and intelligence, often caused by a lack of understanding, inadequate training, and the parochial views that are part of the U.S. bureaucracy. Keeping information away from DOD may support a law enforcement agency in a trial case, but the overall mission may be affected. The means used to collect information, the location of information, and an understanding of the requirements for sharing information greatly influence the efficiency and effectiveness of our actions.

A third theme is that effective assistance programs are insufficient to support this nation’s efforts in the LIC environment. There appears to be no commonly understood long-term interagency concept for what we should do in LIC; nor is there an effective congressional and administration approach to assistance provided to other nations. Efforts to reform economic and military security assistance programs remain at a standstill. Without effective long-term reform, U.S. government assistance will be less
than effective and remain a barrier to the realization of our national interests in these areas.

Lastly, an underlying and thoroughly unhelpful theme permeates the government effort. It is fixated on those activities requiring military approaches rather than on the broader interagency aspects that could make the military approaches more effective. NSC and Department of State coordinating capabilities should be used more fully. The application of government resources, a synergy of NSC, State, DOD, and other departments and agencies, would in the long term save dollars and precious lives. The U.S. policy could harvest the good will of countless citizens of the globe who would experience the protective attributes of a global giant that fulfills the promise of its revolutionary credo to the rights of mankind. U.S. national security interests permit neither pseudo-isolationism nor escalation as viable policy options. In the new world order, the U.S. government should identify destabilizing indicators quickly. It should select and execute appropriate policies and resources. And it should bridge the gap between nonmilitary and military assistance and participation with more skillful expertise than ever before. The future bodes signs of change, and the U.S. government’s approach needs to be modified to meet the opportunities that the decade of the 1990s will provide.

DOD's Role

The Defense Department plays a key role in developing effective, low-profile military capabilities to counter and minimize a spectrum of low intensity threats in regional affairs, in protecting U.S. interests, and in promoting long-term regional stability. DOD has responsibility for developing policies that address indigenous military and paramilitary capabilities and the causes of LIC, as well as the form of military assistance that the United States provides. Most important, however, DOD’s major role in pursuing U.S. security interests in the post-Cold War world cannot be simply recommending parameters of a U.S. government application of defense resources. DOD’s role should be defined, developed, and resourced to deter costly LIC eruptions such as we experienced in the Persian Gulf.

To do this, DOD should act now, at this crossroads in history, to review, modify, develop, and articulate policy proposals and clarifications for DOD and ultimately interagency review and endorsement. A high priority for DOD should be an in-depth examination of the employment of forces in Operation Desert Shield, their employment in the post-hostility environment, and their range of uses in the years ahead. This examination
should include evaluation of policies from both DOD and interagency perspectives. Additionally, the impact and requirements of ongoing LICs in the Third World need to be addressed in the near term to preclude their being overlooked in the force structure struggles that will predictably dominate the reshaping of the armed forces during the planned drawdown period. Besides the Iraqi conflict and current activities in the Soviet sphere of Europe, at least 15 other conflicts are ongoing in the world today.⁸

Sustaining the operational capability to meet current and future challenges and threats requires that DOD maintain readiness for participation at all levels of conflict. At the same time DOD must remain particularly responsive to emerging and expanding demands in the LIC arena. Meeting these often-competing demands is a main challenge posed in the 1990s.

The experience of the Persian Gulf crisis affords DOD the opportunity to gain valuable insights into policy issues that will dominate the reshaping of the military force structure. These insights will provide an important lens to visualize future force structure and associated requirements. Emphasis must be placed on the proper constitution of the force, its positioning, its focus, and its interoperability with other military forces and non-DOD agencies in order that it can effectively support evolving policies and strategies. Such insights may spotlight changes required at the Office, Secretary of Defense, and higher levels and may generate valuable assessments that should be embedded in evolving policy and strategy. Initial emphasis should be on quick-look assessments that will pay early dividends in the form of enhanced employment possibilities and operational capabilities.

A detailed examination is required to rapidly identify disconnects in functional integration. This would spotlight key nonintegrated points in causing conflict in functional management and identify recent shortfalls. This is vital to ensuring optimum combat effectiveness.

⁸Beyond the Cold War: A Global Assessment 1990, Special Report, AUSA.
## Corrective Actions

### LIC Terminology

The United States needs to discard the term “low intensity conflict” and select a term that encompasses the many facets of the environment and better suits the challenges it is facing. Using the term “conflict” will generally limit thinking to DOD, rather than engaging an interagency approach. The scenarios presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff already move away from use of the word LIC and focus on peacetime engagements, contingencies, and global conflicts. While this is clearly a step forward, an overall, encompassing interagency approach or strategy is still lacking.

### Lead Agency in LIC

The executive branch should take action to institutionalize the process for formulating policy and action in the areas between normal competition and conventional war. NSC should oversee this process, and the Department of State should fill the role of lead agency. A review of how the executive branch is organized to formulate policy and respond to requirements should be conducted. Changes should be made to the structure as required. Efforts should be made to avoid the ad hoc arrangements that continue to be commonplace today.

### Paramilitary Forces

The administration should set up a “blue ribbon” panel to review and assess the development and employment of the government’s paramilitary capability. Consideration should be given to the roles and missions of forces structured, trained, and equipped to create and direct paramilitary forces. Several approaches are available and should be considered to ensure that trainers and controllers of paramilitary forces are the best this nation can provide to perform this sensitive function. These approaches vary from direct use of DOD forces, when permitted, to the British practice of “seconding” personnel to other agencies or nations. In light of the U.S. government’s ever-increasing role in counterdrug operations, NSC should take the lead in reviewing the administration’s policy on paramilitary forces. Consideration should be given to developing structured cellular organizations from DOD’s capabilities that could be employed in support of other government agencies in lieu of individuals. This should facilitate interagency coordination, enhance the exchange of ideas, provide for command and control of personnel, and facilitate distribution of military

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91991 Joint Military Net Assessment, pp. 1-5.
equipment necessary to accomplish the tasks and missions. During peacetime engagements, the use of DOD's unique capabilities in communications, intelligence, training paramilitary forces, individual and collective skills required in assisting in nation building, and equipment should be a keystone to U.S. actions.

Countering the Threat
To counter the threats of instability caused by the rapidly growing changes in the world, the United States should consider the lessons learned (good and bad) from Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm. From these lessons it should continue to enhance and develop the advanced technology weapons, intelligence, and communications systems that supported our efforts so well. We must learn from our experiences and develop responses to the changing threats. And we must find innovative ways to employ current technologies against the less well-defined targets normally associated with the developing world, with the threat of terrorism, and with the threat posed by the proliferation of arms and missiles. Lastly, we must improve our capabilities to monitor the movement of weapons; the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and the standdown of arms in Europe associated with the arms control agreements and treaties negotiated with the Soviets.

Security Assistance Reform
A new approach should be taken by the administration and Congress to reform the security assistance legislation. Efforts of previous blue ribbon panels should be reviewed, and a genuine attempt by both branches should be taken to develop the reforms required. The approach should include the establishment of a bipartisan organization to recommend the changes required and to educate those involved in developing and resourcing security assistance programs.

Assistance to the Soviets and Eastern Europe
Action is required, much like that recommended by Congressman Les Aspin and former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.\(^1\) To show a full appreciation of our understanding of LIC, this nation should support the movement toward and development of democracy in the newly independent European nations and the restructured Soviet Union. This support is required to prevent starvation and reduce the potential for anarchy. And it is "cheaper than a war." To accomplish this requires direct presidential leadership and focus coupled with bipartisan support from

Congress. The administration should consider forming an ad hoc coordination committee reporting directly to the President to focus government, set priorities, promote an integrated interagency approach to include the business community (financial, banking, manufacturing, transportation, etc.) and to inculcate a sense of confidence in our allies and the new republics.

This discussion reflects only the tip of the LIC iceberg. The world is in a period of revolutionary change, and strategic thinking and planning must be flexible and responsive. The dynamic and exciting turns of the past few months in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have blurred the events in Latin America, the Middle East, and the Philippines. Movement into the 21st century will require new vision, focus, and decisionmakers capable of meeting these significant challenges to the interests of the United States.
Introduction

The basic U.S. security objective since World War II until recently was to contain the Soviet Union and its communist associates. The Soviet Union military power dominated U.S. intelligence plans, operations, and resource requirements throughout that 45-year period that terminated a year or two ago. New threats, primarily related to low intensity conflict (LIC), should now take precedence.

High intensity threats to U.S. security at home and abroad appeared to be diminishing even before the Soviet Union splintered in August 1991. Low intensity threats, which are cheap to conduct but costly to counter, occur on the conflict spectrum between normal peacetime competition and conventional combat similar to that experienced during Operation Desert Storm. Low intensity conflicts will increase for at least two reasons: they allow successful employers to achieve objectives without running the risks that mid- and high-intensity warfare entail, and they enable weak nations and subnational groups to compete effectively with world powers.

Typical LIC types include insurgencies, coups, transnational terrorism, international narcotics trafficking, and counteractions. Unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense are prominent aspects. Armed combat, mainly by small units, attracts the most attention, but nonlethal techniques (some of which are covert or clandestine) are often more important. The political-economic-technological-psychological warfare and military posturing that preceded and followed Desert Storm are representative.

James Locker, who is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), asserts that despite extensive experience, U.S. officials "still don't understand LIC", and...are still developing the tools to address its challenges." He did not single out the need for unique intelligence, but the U.S. LIC community cannot plan or operate to best advantage without it. The threefold purpose of this paper therefore, is to

- identify LIC intelligence requirements,
- identify important LIC limitations, and
- recommend improvements.

Each category is covered in synoptic style, so that key points are easily observable.
Unique LIC Intelligence Requirements

LIC intelligence requirements in some respects are the same as those for other forms of conflict. Many, however, are unique. The following 10 samples, not listed in any order of priority, were selected to indicate diversity.

1. Biographic summaries are the basis of successful operations to unseat or sidetrack key personnel who plan and implement insurgencies, coups, transnational terrorism, and drug smuggling activities that adversely affect U.S. interests. Motivations, habit patterns, friends, other important contacts, tactics, strengths, and weaknesses are particularly important. So are locations, movement, and personal security measures.

2. Successful counterinsurgents must possess accurate intelligence regarding the organization, strength, location, disposition, movement, morale, weapons, and equipment of the guerrilla bands, undergrounds, subversive groups, and paramilitary forces they oppose. Training bases, sanctuaries, and the source/type/extent of external support are among many related elements.

3. Antiterrorists/counterterrorists cannot create reliable political-economic-social-geographic-ideological-religious threat indication lists without sound intelligence concerning the sources, composition, and support of specific terrorist groups. Essential entries include patterns and trends derived from dates and locations of each terrorist incident by type, target, damage caused, responsible individuals, responsible groups, and reasons for success or failure.

4. Steps to stem or stop illicit narcotics trade and smash drug cartels, like anti- and counterterrorism, depend on international intelligence operations that share findings freely. In addition to the data covered under point one above, insights concerning crop production, processing, shipment, and sales are indispensable.

5. U.S. leaders cannot knowledgeably support or oppose any foreign coup that affects U.S. interests unless they are well informed about potential successors, especially their attitudes toward the United States and expected programs compared with those of incumbents. Otherwise, short-term benefits may become long-term liabilities with local, regional, and even global implications.

6. Teams optimized for hostage rescue and operations to retrieve documents or materiel accomplish their missions only by accident unless
they know where to look. General locations are not good enough. Reports must pinpoint spots precisely. Rescuers, moreover, cannot be properly armed and equipped unless they confirm whether the culprits vacillate or show resolve, hold hostages at single or multiple sites, are mobile or static, small or large, near or far, heavily or lightly defended, afloat or ashore, or on domestic or foreign hostile, neutral, or friendly territory where final approaches are open or covered.

7. Strategic sabotage, a favorite technique of resistance movements, depends on intelligence to verify the value of targets, together with defenses and vulnerabilities and points of entrance and egress. Skilled saboteurs must also know which targets to spare because destruction or prolonged disruption would put too many sympathizers out of work, deprive them of public utilities, or otherwise impair a previously popular cause.

8. Psychological operations wield words as nonviolent weapon systems, set stages, exploit successes, and minimize failures when properly employed. Ill-informed psychological operation, however, can boomerang. Specialists must therefore gather detailed intelligence that enables them to determine the predispositions, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities of targeted audiences and must then tailor themes and pick the best dissemination mode. (Leaflets are useless among the illiterate unless confined to pictorials; "unlucky" colors can repel rather than convert superstitious people.)

9. Individuals directed to establish evasion and escape networks in enemy territory rely on intelligence to identify trustworthy safe areas and "locals" who can furnish safehouses, sustenance, transportation, medical assistance, and useful documents, such as forged identity papers, travel permits, passports, and ration cards. Evasion and escape architects also need intimate knowledge of local restrictions and security programs.

10. Specialized conflict termination terms, such as those that accompanied the April 11, 1991, cease-fire between U.N. forces and Iraq, cannot be enforced effectively unless imperative intelligence is available. The scope, nature, status, and significance of Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare programs, for example, will remain obscure until intelligence operatives ascertain how much of what was where to begin with and what redpositions have been made during the 7-month obfuscation since Operation Desert Storm ended in February 1991.
U.S. LIC Intelligence Limitations

The U.S. intelligence network is not as prepared as it should be to fulfill LIC requirements like those just illuminated, primarily because mid- and high-intensity tasks have occupied most of its time since the decade that preceded World War II. The apparatus, people, and equipment are all improving but have sharp limitations.

U.S. Intelligence Community

Many departments and agencies of the U.S. government prepare plans for and conduct LIC operations (see fig. IX.1). Most of them collect and process specialized intelligence to suit peculiar needs. The whole, however, is less than the sum of its parts, partly because no central authority consistently connects components of the U.S. intelligence community (see fig. IX.2) and partly because coordination is loose within each component.

The National Security Council does not routinely provide interdepartmental and interagency guidance to the Central Intelligence Agency, which, according to its charter, coordinates the U.S. intelligence community. The Director of Central Intelligence consequently cannot transmit authoritative LIC-related tasks and instructions. Each intelligence organization, therefore, frequently interprets requirements, assigns priorities, and proceeds as it sees fit.

Resultant problems are compounded because the left hand does not always know what the right hand is doing at departmental and agency levels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, list security assistance surges and military support for counterdrug operations as forms of LIC, although the ASD SO/LIC lacks responsibility for either. The Department of State assigns responsibility for counterinsurgency to regional bureaus, counterterrorism to the office of a "coordinator," and drug-related conflict to the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters. The Agency for International Development, loosely linked with State, handles economic assistance. Overlapping, interlocking intelligence requirements sometimes receive too much or too little emphasis as a result.
Appendix IX
Intelligence for Low Intensity Conflicts: U.S.
Problems and Options

Figure IX.1: U.S. LIC Community

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<td>CG</td>
<td>NSA</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>USIA</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>DEA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Diagram excludes extensive congressional oversight.
Figure IX.2: U.S. Intelligence Community

Note: Diagram excludes extensive congressional oversight.


LIC Intelligence Specialists
Signals intelligence, communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement signature intelligence, and photographic intelligence supplement, but cannot substitute for, human intelligence (HUMINT) because no combination of perfectly designed instruments can collect all the information that LIC planners and operators need. Satellite sensors cannot always be over the right place at the right
time. Neither can they see through opaque objects to observe activities inside buildings or guerrilla bands in dense woods.

Currently, across the spectrum, intelligence collectors and analysts good at diagnosing political, economic, ethnic, and religious motives for LIC are in short supply. Reductions in force seriously depleted the U.S. core of covert agents during the Carter administration. That reservoir of expertise has proved hard to replace. Some colleges still restrict CIA recruiters two decades after disapproval peaked during the Vietnam War. The best and the brightest in the U.S. LIC community still focus on mid- and high segments of the conflict spectrum. Private citizens and firms once helped the U.S. intelligence community amass valuable information, but few do so now for fear that unfriendly parties will uncover their activities through the Freedom of Information Act.

Lack of continuity severely limits the usefulness of many HUMINT specialists. Revolving door assignment policies often prevent them from developing the language proficiency needed to translate important documents expeditiously and accurately or to interrogate prisoners of war. Few stay in one place long enough to acquire cross-cultural understanding and institutional memories. No amount of schooling and other second-hand information can inform outsiders adequately about local idioms, political peculiarities, pecking orders, and eccentric social practices. Prolonged service in a specified area is essential.

Such deficiencies leave the U.S. intelligence community less prepared than it should be to determine the temper of potential insurgents, locate terrorist hideouts (such as those that have long been concealed in Lebanon), rescue hostages, predict the outcome of coups, target key personalities, or conduct surgical strikes against small groups in the midst of innocent populations. Unprofessional performance can also have lethal effects on individual agents. Amateurs who try to penetrate paranoid insurgent, terrorist, or drug smuggling cells, for example, seldom live long. (Fig. IX.3 illustrates a typical cell structure, replete with go-betweens called "cutouts.") The demise of inept agents discourages replacements.
Intelligence implements for LICs in most respects are identical with those for other types of warfare and therefore pose few unique problems. Super-specialized sensors; unmanned aerial reconnaissance/surveillance platforms; portable, user-friendly systems able to fuse multisource data under primitive conditions; and undetectable or untraceable and unjammable telecommunications are among the most pressing needs.
**Recommended Improvements**

Recommended improvements, which are necessarily quite selective, occupy five categories that directly or indirectly address all LIC intelligence requirements and limitations outlined in previous sections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prioritize</strong></td>
<td>The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should direct the NSC Board for Low Intensity Conflict to activate a LIC Watch List that would identify regions where LICs seem most likely to threaten U.S. interests. Senior officials from all components of the U.S. LIC community should then focus intelligence resources on those regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralize</strong></td>
<td>Amend section 1.5, Executive Order 12333 (U.S. Intelligence Activities, Dec. 4, 1981), to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency specific responsibilities for issuing instructions to the U.S. intelligence community concerning LIC intelligence collection, processing, product dissemination, and coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diversify</strong></td>
<td>Cultivate a core of area-oriented HUMINT professionals that includes generalists and specialists throughout the LIC community. Proficiency in local dialects and familiarity with indigenous leaders and mores are basic goals. Increase emphasis on nonmilitary aspects of LIC intelligence (political, economic, social), with particular attention to types and amounts of security assistance that given countries can absorb (money, weapons, equipment, supplies, advice, education, training, construction, and services). Assign to U.S. special operations forces (SOF) intelligence collection tasks as a secondary or tertiary mission. Their capability, presently almost untapped, is considerable, since 1,000 to 2,000 normally serve in many nations around the world and they can often move about more freely than can most embassy personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Routinize</strong></td>
<td>Establish career patterns for LIC intelligence specialists, stabilize assignments overseas for 3 to 4 years, and return them to the same region after each rotation tour in the United States. Those procedures would ensure essential continuity.</td>
</tr>
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Modernize

Expedite the development of reliable, portable, secure communications systems that can transmit intelligence information to processors without compromising HUMINT agents aloft, ashore, or afloat.

Expedite the development of cost-effective LIC intelligence support systems that can fuse all types of intelligence information from all sources and transmit finished intelligence to users in near-real time. The Special Operations Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES) and the Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System (SOFFPARS), presently employed by the U.S. Special Operations Command, could be expanded, improved, and used as a model. (See point paper below.)

Point Paper

Special Operations Forces' Support Systems

SOCRATES and SOFFPARS are important elements of present and future SOF intelligence support. A Directorate of Intelligence umbrella program, SOCRATES, was developed to provide total intelligence support for SOF mission activities.

SOCRATES integrates SOF-unique data bases, connects them with national-level intelligence systems and data bases, and furnishes secure voice communications. It also facilitates access to and dissemination of maps and imagery products.

- Core automated data processing capabilities include a message handling system, a large data base machine, and a tailored version of the Joint Special Operations Command's Special Operations Intelligence System, loaded with files from Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Intelligence Threat Data System.
- The heart of SOCRATES is the Local Area Network (LAN), which provides access to all system hosts from a single workstation.
- System and secondary imagery dissemination capabilities (via the Portable Receive and Transmit System) are presently extended to and operational at all U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) component headquarters and selected subcomponents.
- Connection to theater commanders-in-chief and SOCs, as well as to other USSOCOM components, is scheduled for installation, depending on the status of equipment provided to USCENTCOM in support of Desert Shield.
Appendix IX
Intelligence for Low Intensity Conflicts: U.S.
Problems and Options

- During Desert Storm, USSOCOM expanded the SOCRATES Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) LAN to provide on-line, interactive intelligence data handling support to USCENTCOM headquarters, USCENTCOM component headquarters, and deployed SOF.
- SOCRATES provided deployed intelligence personnel with real-time intelligence, electronic mail, orders of battle, and situation assessments.
- SOCRATES provided the gateway to the SCI portion of the Defense Integrated Secure Network, giving USCENTCOM access to national data bases and Washington-area analysts.
- Toward the end of hostilities, the system had over 700 users on 23 LAN segments of the system, with reliability of the mainframe at MacDill Air Force Base at 98 percent and of the extension network to Saudi Arabia at 99 percent.
- Plans call for extending SOCRATES capabilities to theater Socs and CONUS-based SOF units via the Defense Integrated Secure Network and USSOCOM Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Telecommunications System.

SOFPARS has evolved into dual systems split between the aviation and the SOF ground/maritime components.

- The aviation system will provide automated mission planning and preview capability.
- The ground/maritime system will provide automated mission planning, preview, and rehearsal capability.

SOFPARS requirements include the ability to input and process all-source intelligence data and products.

- SOFPARS will receive inputs from SOCRATES; Constant Source, a common mapping, charting, geodesy, and imagery system; operational information; and logistics data.
- The system then fuses information, manipulates imagery, performs threat/target analyses, plans for the optimal route of infiltration, and provides a mission preview and/or rehearsal.
- These products can then be assimilated into mission plan documents.

Comment: If contractors can produce a user-friendly system that fulfills SOFPARS requirements, unit-level SOF will have the tools needed to produce and update mission planning folders.