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AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNIT MINISTRY TEAM (UMT) IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM WITH A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND TECHNICAL DOCTRINE, AND COMMAND TEAM ASSESSMENT OF UMT ACTIONS, CAPABILITIES AND EFFECTIVENESS

BY

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Operation Desert Shield/Storm provides the United States military with the data to shape the thinking of strategic planners as they design the force of the future. It is imperative that the Chaplain Corps analyze the activities of the Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) as they performed religious support in this conflict to ensure that correct chaplain doctrine moves with the Army into the future. This project utilizes observations and lessons learned through personal interviews with Desert Shield/Storm commanders who are now students at the U.S. Army War College, spouses of those commanders where applicable, and questionnaires from the chaplains who served with these commanders in the Persian Gulf. The information obtained from these sources is critically evaluated in juxtaposition with current Army Chaplain Corps doctrine and a military family support historical review in order to provide pragmatic recommendations for effective religious support in the next war.
An Overview of the Role of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm with a Critical Evaluation of Religious Support Activities and Technical Doctrine, and Command Team Assessment of UMT Actions, Capabilities and Effectiveness

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

Operation Desert Shield/Storm provides the United States Military with data which will shape the thinking of strategic planners as they design the force of the future. In this conflict, the U.S. Army fought the AirLand Battle Doctrine developed over the past decade. We fought an AirLand battle in a distant area of the world where we had to project a very large land force, a mix of both heavy and light forces. We will use the lessons learned in this conflict to design future force structures.

It is imperative that the Chaplain Corps analyze the chaplain/chaplain assistant ministry that was performed in this conflict to ensure that correct chaplain doctrine is in place as we move with the Army into the future. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has challenged us to learn our lessons well. These lessons learned will assist us in building the strategic vision for our Army.

As we adapt to the post-Cold War world, the key will be to maintain our momentum while accommodating the changes in our environment. Before we can begin to adapt functionally to change, we must establish a vision for the future Army - where are we headed? The future Army must be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight, serving our nation at home and abroad; we must be a strategic force capable of decisive victory. These are four major challenges the Army confronts as we move toward this vision.

Critical analysis of our actions in Desert Shield/Storm must not be taken lightly. The results of that analysis must contribute to the development of the doctrine which will be used in the next war. Harlan K. Ullman cautions us to not so highly regard our doctrine that we fail to examine it critically.
The most difficult task the services may have in any lessons-learned review is evaluating doctrine or service strategy. Doctrine - defined to mean the operational art of conducting battle - is holy writ because it is central to the systems the services obtain, to the preparations and training for war, and to maintaining the professional ethos and self-confidence crucial to winning the war.....the services should take a careful, agnostic look at the Gulf War, not so much to prove their doctrine's worth but to determine whether a fair test of doctrine really took place.2

Clausewitz also encourages a critical analysis of military history and doctrine if we are to arrive at some theoretical truths which will impact on our practical life.3 It is not the intent of this paper to merely report out what was heard in the interviews conducted, but to examine theories which will assist in a critical evaluation of chaplain ministry and doctrine.

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

An analysis of chaplain doctrine may not seem like a proper candidate for a Military Studies Program because, at first blush, the project seems to focus at a tactical level and not at a strategic or operational level. Placing this study in a broader context will demonstrate that this is a very strategic level for inquiry.

At the highest levels of our government the relationship between church and state continues to occupy the energy of all three branches of government. The many discussions which arise out of the First Amendment to the Constitution concerning the establishment and free exercise of religion are among the most
sensitive discussions in our public square.

The nation is concerned to ensure that the members of the armed forces are provided the opportunity to freely exercise their freedom of religion while in the service of the nation. The military chaplaincy is the strategic vehicle designed by the churches and the military to achieve that constitutional end. The chaplaincy exists to provide soldiers with the opportunity to freely exercise their freedom of religion. In the language of ends, ways and means, the end is the free exercise rights of the soldier; the way is chaplain doctrine; the means is the chaplaincy.

On November 23, 1977, Joel Katcoff and Allen Wieder initiated in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York a constitutional challenge to the Army Chaplaincy. Ruling on the case on February 1, 1984, Judge McLaughlin declared the Army Chaplaincy "a constitutionally permissible means to a constitutionally mandated end." 4

Chaplain Wayne Kuehne quotes the implications for the chaplaincy as articulated by Drazin and Currey.

Since 1981, military chaplains have emphasized that they are different from civilian clergy. They have a three-fold function. Like their civilian counterpart, they minister to denominational needs of their constituents in uniform. Yet because of the unique nature of the military, that ministry is more intense and elaborate. Although assigned to a particular unit or staff, chaplains must provide their services throughout their area, wherever needed. Most importantly they have a free exercise responsibility to provide for the religious needs of everyone. This does not mean that
chaplains must perform religious services for people not of their faith and, thereby, violate their own faith. It means they will do all in their power to make sure that service is performed by a capable person. This requires knowledge of the religious needs of every unit or staff member and follow through to ensure that their needs have been met.  

Judge McLaughlin found the chaplaincy constitutional. He based his decision on the rights of military personnel to the constitutional guarantee of free exercise.

One may thus conclude that by the end of the twentieth century, no matter what shape it may earlier have had or what practices it might have engaged in, the very raison d'etre of the Army chaplaincy was solely and simply to secure free exercise rights for military personnel within the structure. While chaplains surely also had a denominational role and were ultimately responsible to their own religious organization which empowered and authorized their status as chaplains, the constitutional basis for their existence was that they provided for the free exercise needs of the military commands to which they were assigned.

If the national strategic concern is to protect the First Amendment guarantees of the soldier, the military strategic objective is to provide the soldier the opportunity and the means to practice his religious beliefs within the bounds of military necessity.

Congress has acted to ensure that the military take seriously the soldiers' rights to free exercise. In 1984, the Congress directed the Department of Defense to conduct a thorough study of the services' policy on the military accommodation of religious practices. That policy review resulted in the
publication of Army policy in AR 600-20. The commander is tasked with ensuring that the soldiers in the command are, within the bounds of military necessity, able to freely exercise their religious freedoms.

The interviews with commanders accomplished as a part of this Military Studies Project will examine whether the commander is in fact capable of fulfilling his requirements as outlined above. Are the soldiers' constitutional guarantees being met by the commander? This study entails an analysis of chaplain doctrine, the structure of the chaplaincy, and the ability of the chaplain to perform the religious support mission of the commander in his responsibility to ensure the soldiers’ constitutional guarantees.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

This recent war, the changing face of the threat in Europe, and fiscal constraints are all converging to force the defense establishment to analyze what kind of force needs to be designed as the Army moves from a forward-deployed position to one which will be largely based in the continental United States and projected into places in which American interests are threatened. This new mission will be accomplished by a smaller Army, but likely not one less capable.

...... in this first crisis of the post-Cold War era (or of the New World Order) it was clear beyond doubt that sailing into harm's way continues to require capable, ready, and deployable forces that are highly trained and well led.
Will projecting-the-force as opposed to forward-deploying the force alter chaplain doctrine? In many ways it might. Significant changes are envisioned which will take place under this new way of operating. The Army will have twelve active divisions: two in Europe, one in Korea, one in Hawaii, and eight in the Continental United States (CONUS). The two divisions in Europe will also have a project-the-force contingency mission. Of the eight divisions in CONUS, five will be contingency forces. That means the Army will have five divisions with brigade-sized task forces on a constant state of alert. With five divisions constantly training in the logistics of projecting the force, installations will have fewer chaplains and chaplain assistants available to accomplish ministry to families while units are deployed for training.

Before doing the hard work of forging a vision of chaplain ministry in the future, one must examine what was done in this deployment and analyze current chaplain doctrine. This research will include an examination of some critical pieces of Army chaplain doctrine, but will also include an examination of chaplain ministry to the soldiers' family members. There is no doctrine for family ministry, since doctrine is usually confined to war fighting as an operational art. However, families are important to the readiness of the soldier and his preparedness to fight and survive on the battlefield.
METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to provide a critical evaluation of the ministries performed during the war in the Persian Gulf and the doctrine which designed their functions. Also being considered are the effects of these ministries on the strategic perspective of preparations, deployment, maneuvers, redeployment, family impact and reunion factors.

The UMT is always considered as a unit of two persons: one chaplain and one enlisted chaplain assistant. The command team consists of the commander and, where applicable, the commander’s spouse.

During the academic year of 1991-92, a target audience with first-hand information was available at the United States Army War College. Represented in that class were thirty-seven senior officers who had commanded units in Operations Desert Shield or Desert Storm.

Upon approval by the U.S. Army War College faculty, and in agreement with the Office of the Chief of Army Chaplains, three questionnaires were prepared for use as a research instrument to obtain the necessary data which would become the focal point of this project. These questionnaires were for the commanders, the spouses of the commanders, and the chaplains who served with these commanders in the Persian Gulf. In addition, several Major Command (MACOM) Chaplains were also interviewed, and their responses are incorporated into this project.

The interview questions were specifically designed, and
refined with the help of the Army War College faculty, to obtain the most effective information for purposes of the thesis of this project. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the commanders and commanders' spouses in order to gain first-hand information as well as the nuances of their unique situations.

All interviews were conducted during the months of October through December 1991. The commanders' and commanders' spouses' interviews were conducted personally and on location at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, by the student chaplains. Responses to the questions were both written and tape recorded by the student chaplains, and their summaries, are included at Appendix D and E, along with the original letter of request at Appendix B.

Temporary Duty (TDY) travel was requested and granted by the Army War College faculty for the four student chaplains to travel to Forts Bragg, Riley, Campbell, Stewart, McPherson and Colorado Springs for personal interviews with senior command chaplains who were a part of Operations Desert Shield and/or Desert Storm, installation chaplains who were involved in the home base support of the operations, and several unit chaplains who had been a part of ministries during the Gulf War. The record of these interviews appears in Appendices H-L.

The questionnaire for unit chaplains who had served under the command of those who were now Army War College students was mailed out under the auspices of the Office of the Chief of Army Chaplains. The cover letter from the Chief of Chaplains, and the collated responses of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm chaplains
are at Appa cices F and G, respectively.

Those who commanded units during the operations provided valuable information with regard to the guidance they gave to their chaplains as well as the effectiveness of current Army chaplain combat doctrine and practices in providing religious support activities. Personal interviews with the spouses of these commanders provided very useful information about family support group operations at home stations as well as the effectiveness of chaplain support during the predeployment, deployment, redeployment and reunion activities of their military family members.

This project is prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation at the U.S. Army War College; but, it is also written as a resource document to evaluate the effectiveness of religious ministry support to service members and their families with the goal of continuing to provide the best possible means in the future for bringing God to people, and people to God.

THE CHAPLAINCY AND THE MILITARY

The relationship between religious functionaries and the military has a very long history. The book of Deuteronomy speaks of "the priest anointed for war." The chaplaincy expresses its essential nature in the story of Saint Martin of Tours whose cloak (cappella) was carried into the battle by a priest (cappellanus). The chaplain has always been a member of one
institution (a priest of the church) serving in an institution which belongs to another (the king’s army). The tensions between these two all-encompassing institutions is not complex in a sacral society, but is most complex in a pluralistic democratic society. A chaplain leads a dual professional life as a member of an organized religious body and as an Army officer. This basic, dual professionalism accounts for much of the change and conflict in the history of the chaplaincy.9

Chaplains are members of a uniquely designed ministry. Most religious groups confer on them a different status than that conferred on clergy who minister in congregations, parishes or fellowships. In addition to military chaplaincy, the religious groups place chaplains in hospitals, hospice care institutions, prisons, on campuses and with industry.

These chaplaincies share some unique features. Chaplains are committed to the spiritual well-being of all the members of the organization. They serve members of faith groups other than the one in which they hold membership, and they are committed to a religious pluralism while maintaining affiliation with their distinctive faith groups. The slogan for this type of ministry has traditionally been "cooperation without compromise."

All chaplaincies, except for industrial chaplaincies, perform ministry in a unique institution. Sociologist Erving Goffman called this unique social structure a "Total Institution."10 A Total Institution is distinguished by the fact that it controls, to an exceptionally large extent, the total
lives of the persons involved. These institutions have such strong "encompassing tendencies" that they become a "world" or a "way-of-life" for their members. Institutions like prisons, hospitals, asylums, monasteries, and military organizations are all examples of Total Institutions.

Total Institutions have the following set of characteristics:

1. All members live under a single authority in batch-living conditions such as cells, bays, or wings;
2. activities are all tightly scheduled;
3. activities follow a single rational plan;
4. some kind of barrier exists between those inside and those outside the organization;
5. rank and status distinctions are visible and understood by all;
6. a dualism exists in how human needs are handled by a small supervisory group and a very large group bureaucratically managed;
7. information and the flow of information is very tightly managed; and
8. these institutions are incompatible with other elements of society."

The military is most clearly a Total Institution when it is in training for war and is at war. Basic training for enlisted soldiers is a model of a Total Institution and it most clearly demonstrates the rites of passage for one to become a soldier.
This rite of passage is called a "liminal process (mortification of the self)" in the sociological literature. The transitional process into the military organization is one of the most powerful in modern American society.

Chaplains always perform ministry in someone else's institution and they have dual institutional responsibilities and loyalties. They share an insider status with their constituency. Chaplains have access to the leadership of organizations in unique and peculiar ways. They have a unique access to those not religiously affiliated, serving a secular purpose as well as an organized religious function. Chaplains share with soldiers and families the life style, experiences, benefits and hardships of institutional life. Chaplains, more than other clergy, are involved in the ethical issues of the institutions because of their unique dual professional training and focus. Chaplains must deal with worshipping communities not characterized by denominational or historical allegiances. Worshippers in the military choose to meet their needs and proclivities by attendance at public worship. The chaplaincy requires training unique to the mission of the institution. Most of that training would not be characterized as religious or theological. Chaplains are judged by competence in these institutional skills and knowledge by the institution's members. Chaplains are usually called upon to articulate and train the character of the members of the institutions to ensure a humanizing force is maintained in the institution. All this must be accomplished
with a sensitivity to the cross-cultural, pluralistic and diverse complexity of the organization in which the chaplain conducts ministry.

The Army as a Total Institution makes demands on the soldiers and their families which are unique and require a sensitive understanding if a chaplain is to understand the "way-of-life" which encompasses these families and individuals. The military is a profession and not an occupation. Moskos has written extensively about the differing obligations and values of these two contrasting models for military social organization.\(^\text{13}\) The demands on the soldiers and their families are much more intense because the soldier is a professional and not an hourly wage earner.

Total Institutions, because of their all encompassing tendencies, cause other tensions such as dependency versus autonomy. Are obligations always totally toward the institution or are there other obligations of equal or higher value? How does one accumulate wealth in an institution which will always put mission before the member? Soldiers are "government issue" - expendable and consumable, who have an unlimited liability contract with the institution.

Total Institutions also abridge certain human rights. The accommodations made to these rights, and the exercise of these rights are a delicate balance for the institution. The tugs in Total Institutions are always toward homogeneity and away from heterogeneity. Uniformity is easier than pluralism to maintain
in the organization. Uniqueness and individuality are not the norm. Yet the organization is peopled with individuals. They are unique and, in a democracy, the organization must always accommodate that uniqueness.

Into these tensions the churches and the government have thrust the chaplaincy. The chaplain is to live in the tension of the two institutions, to act professionally in both institutions, and to ensure that the humans in those institutions have the freedom to exercise their constitutional liberties as citizens of our republic.

CHAPLAIN FORWARD THRUST DOCTRINE

During the Vietnam conflict, the Army was organized in such a manner that chaplains were assigned to brigades as the lowest level unit of assignment. All brigade chaplains worked together to provide religious ministry to all units assigned and attached. This doctrinal concept was designed to provide religious support to battalions on an area coverage basis within the brigade Area of Operations (AO). In garrison and on the battlefields of Vietnam this doctrinal and manning concept presented difficulties for commanders and chaplains. After the war, new concepts were developed to place chaplains at more critical places in the Army organizational structures for garrison and for the battlefield. Under the old concept the chaplain did not work directly for the battalion commander, was not part of the unit, and only showed up in the unit area to conduct services, perform counseling or
conduct classes. The battalion commander did not "own" the chaplain. Therefore, the relationship between the commander, the unit's soldiers and the chaplain was not very clearly defined. In many cases commanders and chaplains did not communicate as commander to staff officer. Only the brigade chaplain was considered part of the staff. The other chaplains were there to assist the senior chaplain. In many brigade-sized units in the Army, chaplains were attached to battalions with their primary responsibility to conduct religious ministry to soldiers and to coordinate area coverage for soldiers of different faith groups.

This is a critical distinction: assignment in contrast to attachment. Many commanders came out of Vietnam bemoaning the fact that their chaplain was "on loan" from the brigade and not his own. Attachment status made the chaplain and the chaplain's assistant seem like an alien or a foreigner to the unit commander and staff. However, those same battalion commanders lauded the effectiveness of the chaplains attached to the battalions. They reported that the soldiers responded to the chaplains who went where they went and endured what they endured. Many soldiers and commanders pronounced the chaplaincy effective because they were located at the battalion. This provided the seeds for the "forward thrust" doctrine.¹⁴

A series of conversations, which created a change in chaplain doctrine, began in 1978 between the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (Major General) Orris Kelly, and the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Donn Starry. They began the process of defining new doctrinal concepts based on FM 100-5, Operations, and the emerging Army AirLand Battle Doctrine. The idea that the chaplains needed to be assigned as far forward in
the battle area as possible resulted from weaknesses in Army doctrine for religious support which surfaced in a major Mission Area Analysis. This doctrine became known as Forward Thrust Doctrine.

AR 165-1, Religious Activities: Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, states

In accordance with the Forward Thrust doctrine, UMTs are located as far forward as possible, in battalions and brigades, to provide timely ministry to squads, fire teams, and company sized elements.13

FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine: the Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant, states the doctrine’s intent this way: "Forward Thrust doctrine, in its simplest definition means to 'bring God to the soldier and the soldier to God.'"

This doctrine created a Unit Ministry Team (UMT). The basic UMT consists of at least one chaplain and one enlisted chaplain assistant. The UMT is tasked by the commander to respond to the religious and spiritual needs of the soldiers and their families in peacetime garrison, during field training exercises and in wartime operations. The UMT provides Direct Religious Support (DRS) to units of assignment and General Religious Support (GRS) to attached elements. Army doctrine for the UMT was first articulated in the December 1984 publication of FM 16-5, The Chaplain and the Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations.

Placing the chaplain far forward, or in the battalion, is now chaplain doctrine, articulated in FM 16-1 (November 1989). It is designed to give the commander and the chaplain the
opportunity to work together to provide a comprehensive religious support program which protects the soldiers' rights to the free exercise of their religion. It also places the chaplain in the most crucial organization in the Army - the battalion. Army sociologists identify the battalion as the culture-bearing unit in contrast to the company, which is the behavior-directing unit. The battalion is the unit in which direct leadership is practiced perhaps more purely than at any other level in Army organizations. The commander and the chaplain both can have face-to-face recognition with every soldier in the unit. The battalion chaplain can make the "ministry of presence" a reality in the unit through a sustained presence in the battalion.

This continuing relationship, known as "habitual association," establishes rapport and enhances effectiveness for the Unit Ministry Team. Within this continuing relationship which the team has with the soldiers, command and staff of the unit, there is a deeper and more profound concern for the total welfare of the soldier. This is coupled with a native awareness of the spiritual, moral and morale climate of the unit. This awareness can be used to meet more than "just" the religious needs of soldiers.¹⁶

Battalion chaplains are with their soldiers in training, in garrison, and on the battlefield. Those are all times which are most challenging and trying for soldiers. Soldiers need their chaplains with them for spiritual comfort, for moral strengthening, for steeling their will and resolve in battle, and to ensure that all those things which build morale are there for them. As former Chief of Chaplains (MG) Norris Einertson said,
"Today’s Army doctrinally recognizes the need to provide soldiers in the forward-most deployed units on the battlefield with religious and spiritual support."

DIRECT AND GENERAL RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

Religious pluralism is also one of the realities of life in the United States Army which chaplain doctrine must address if the commander is to have a full comprehensive religious program meeting the needs of as many soldiers as possible. To meet this requirement the chaplaincy developed DRS and GRS doctrine. The chaplain has an operational mission to provide and perform comprehensive religious support to soldiers in combat and on installations Army-wide. The chaplain staff mission is to (1) advise the commander on religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion and the impact of indigenous religions on Mission and Operations; and (2) assist the commander in providing for the free exercise of religion for all members of the command. These missions lead to the formulation of other doctrinal concepts.

A distinction is made between those things a unit chaplain can perform and those that the unit chaplain must provide. All chaplains perform rites, sacraments, ordinances, and services peculiar to their religious faith community. All chaplains can perform religious or pastoral care. Most unit chaplains can perform a religious support function directly to most soldiers of the unit to which they are assigned. This is doctrinally what we call direct religious support. A unit chaplain can perform a
ministry which transcends his denominational tradition. Most soldiers are not concerned with the denomination of the unit chaplain since in the unit such religious distinctions are usually not all that important to the soldier. Most chaplains are so concerned about providing pastoral care to their soldiers that they minister to all and only refer their soldiers to other chaplains when there is a clearly identified denominational concern. The unit chaplain is most always "My Chaplain" to the soldier.

However, there are ministries which the soldier needs which the unit chaplain cannot perform and therefore the chaplain must provide for that ministry in other ways. The most obvious is denominational support. If the unit chaplain is Protestant, the chaplain needs to provide opportunities for worship led by a chaplain or certified lay person of that faith group for those soldiers in the unit who are from a different denomination. This is doctrinally called GRS. GRS includes, in addition to denominational support, the coordination of the religious support mission, first line casualty replacement, logistics support coordination, and chaplain technical support. GRS is provided for all the soldiers in the command's area of operation.

When the chaplain is in garrison, the religious support mission coordination is the major responsibility of the installation chaplain. Once the unit deploys, this coordination mission is the responsibility of the technical chain of supervision, which usually follows the unit chain of command.
The Gulf War provided a unique opportunity to test support doctrine. The deployment of the Chaplain Corps with units tested the adequacy of its ability to plan and conduct the GRS mission. Rarely do chaplains in echelons above battalion have the opportunity to put Army religious support doctrine into practice. Most Army training exercises are not on a large enough scale to include the number of personnel and UMTs which show up in the brigade commander’s AO during a battle which fights a corps sized unit. In building a corps exercise, the Chaplain Combat Developers estimate the brigade chaplain would coordinate the ministry of nine UMTs and a ministry to 3,198 soldiers of non-divisional units which will move in and through the brigade AO as the situation warrants.

Did the Chaplain Corps support the battalion chaplain with the technical assistance and support to meet command requirements for religious support? Was the technical chain of command the initiator or supplier of these assets? Who was most responsible to coordinate general religious support? Was the Chaplain Combat Developers’ estimate of the increased mission requirements accurate?

**BATTLEFIELD MINISTRY**

The UMT also has a responsibility to assist the commander and the soldiers in the prevention and treatment of battle stress and battle fatigue.

In compliance with the Army doctrine of Forward Thrust, the UMT will be located
primarily in the maneuver elements of the division....One of the direct religious support functions is providing preventive, immediate, and replenishing emotional and spiritual support to soldiers who are experiencing the trauma and stress of combat.19

Taking the lead from the Israeli Defense Force research on battlefield stress, the Army acknowledged the need to treat soldiers far forward in the battle area and gave that mission to the UMT. The Israeli Army research determined that the stressors on the battlefield are not simply those which are caused by the battle. The soldiers take with them onto the battlefield all of the individual stressors in other parts of their lives. The soldiers' lack of confidence, lack of competence, lack of training in individual skills and collective skills make them vulnerable to combat fatigue. In addition to military stressors, soldiers brought the stressors of other parts of their lives with them into the battle. Soldiers with family problems are very vulnerable to becoming victims of battle fatigue. Combat stress is defined as

...a combination of all the adverse conditions on the battlefield and the other stressors which result in reduced performance. A stressor is any condition such as fear, guilt, and physical fatigue that triggers an adverse reaction in an individual. Combat stress is the cause of battle fatigue.20

Treatment far forward is desired because the evacuation of the soldier sends a message to the soldier and to the unit which makes the soldier appear sicker, greatly increasing the length of time for recovery. Support given far forward assists the soldier
in regaining the confidence and will to continue as a member of the unit. Unit ministry in the battalion is very well suited to assist the soldier and the commander in the prevention and treatment of battle stress.

Once again, the relationship of the chaplain to the unit and the knowledge the chaplain has about members of the unit is critical to the accomplishment of the mission. The chaplain who has been with the soldier in training knows those soldiers who are confident and competent. The chaplain knows those other soldiers in which the stressed soldier has confidence. This creates a bonding within the unit. The chaplain should also know the strengths and weaknesses of soldiers in the unit parish. In addition, the chaplain should know the problems the soldier and the family might be experiencing. The Table of Organizational Equipment (TOE) chaplain who deploys should maintain contact with the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), or garrison chaplain, to assist the family member while the TOE deployed chaplain assists the soldier.

Based on combat experience in previous conflicts, family problems lower morale, and impair the soldier’s ability to deal with the stress of the modern battlefield. Religious support to soldier families helps assure that the soldier will be able to give full attention to the combat mission. During deployment and combat, the soldier relies on the support the family receives from the TDA/Mobilization TDA UMT.21

The Gulf War was over quickly, but every battle causes stress. What was the commander’s guidance to chaplains about the stress of preparing for, conducting, and disengaging from battle?
What did commanders ask chaplains to do? What did chaplains do? How did family life affect soldier performance?

CHAPLAIN FORCE STRUCTURE

Even a cursory examination of the Army force structure would reveal that some battalion sized units do not have chaplains assigned and authorized on the TOE. This phenomenon is the result of a process of building a force structure within a resource constrained environment.

Building the chaplain force structure is not the business of the Chief of Chaplains alone. The Chief of Chaplains does not dictate the structure of the force for the chaplaincy. Chaplain force structure is embedded in the force structure of other proponents. UMT requirements are documented in other proponent’s TOEs and in MACOM TDAs, and are based on Manpower Authorization Requirements Criteria (MARC), Military Skill Qualification Level-3 (MSQ3) studies, and DA Pamphlet staffing guides. Chaplain authorizations are established under Army of Excellence constraints, mission requirements, and program and budget guidance. Inattention to this complexity could break the Chaplain Corps and the UMT as the Army studies lessons learned and builds the structure of the force into a smaller Army. Each branch proponent, MACOM commander, and installation commander only sees a small part of the chaplain force structure and not the whole as it is impacted by individual space cuts.

With regard to the TOE, the number of chaplains in a
division is determined by the branch proponent in consultation with the combat developers at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS). In light of the constraints from the Army of Excellence, some units do not have chaplains. The decision as to which units were authorized and assigned chaplains resulted in chaplains being placed in the maneuver battalions, but not in all other battalions such as Engineers (ENG), Signal (SIG), Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and Military Intelligence (MI). Some commanders and chaplains would like to see those decisions revisited. The TDA force structure is built by the MACOMs. This paper will deal with the interface between installation chaplains (TDA), and chaplains who deployed (TOE). The Gulf War deployment is a foretaste of how we will go to war in the future. There are strategic considerations for force structure in these issues. How well did commanders without assigned chaplains conduct religious programs? If adequate means are not provided for soldiers to practice their faith, the Army will hear from churches through their denominational endorsers.

TOE/TDA INTERFACE

Currently in the TDA a distinction is made between requirements and authorizations. That distinction may need to be challenged. The distinction is based on the premise that TOE chaplains will be on the installation to accomplish part of the TDA missions, and that ministry on the installation will be shared to allow augmentation in a mobilization contingency. The
question must be asked if that distinction is still true and valid. This paper will explore ministry to families in order to determine whether soldiers' family needs demand more not fewer TDA chaplains. This paper will explore the TDA chaplain ministry needs of combat unit commanders and how ministry contributes to the ability of that command to function effectively in war. The definition and restricted use of the term "doctrine" forces the chaplaincy to restrict FM 16-1 to chaplain combat doctrine. The chaplaincy has no way to demonstrate and articulate the chaplain comprehensive religious support mission, especially the relationship between TDA and TOE chaplaincy. The chaplaincy has separated installation ministry from unit ministry both conceptually and doctrinally. Operation Desert Storm may demonstrate the mutual supportability of these facets of ministry. The distinction between the peacetime and wartime mission for the chaplain is a poor one. A chaplain in a TOE unit has the same peacetime ministry as the rest of the members of that unit: train for combat. Training includes spiritual and family preparedness. The war/peace distinction may not hold for the garrison environment either. Everything the installation chaplains do contributes to the war fighting mission of the Army. This paper will investigate how chaplains on installations performed during Desert Storm and examine whether they provided a vital role to the success of the mission. This paper will also examine whether policies and doctrines need to be built which support the entire range of the chaplain mission. We must
examine what was done or not done in order to state doctrine in terms that reflect the chaplain’s contribution to the wartime readiness of the soldier and his family.

As the Army moves from a forward presence to one which must project the force, relationships between the chaplains assigned to the TOE, TDA and reserve components will of necessity change. During Operation Desert Storm chaplains were forced to improvise much of the mobilization planning in an effort to meet the needs of partial mobilization. Mobilization planning before this operation had been for a total mobilization. Chaplains were mobilized for Southwest Asia, Europe and CONUS. This paper will analyze what worked and what didn’t.

What follows is an analysis of the responses received from the interviews with commanders and the questionnaires sent to their chaplains. A compilation of the raw data is found in Appendices D and G, respectively.

**COMMANDERS' GUIDANCE**

AR 165-1 is specific about the fact that "Commanders will provide support for religious, spiritual, moral and ethical activities of all personnel in their commands, on an equitable basis." [Paragraph 1-4.f(1)] Commanders are also directed to "assist personnel of their commands in the free exercise of their religion." [Paragraph 1-4.f(2)] Put another way, the religious program of the unit is the commander’s responsibility. The unit chaplain is the commander’s staff officer for designing and
executing the commander's religious program.

Specific guidance was rarely given to chaplains by commanders. For the most part, the commander's guidance consisted of general statements such as "be with the troops," "keep me informed," "visit the units regularly," and "keep an eye on soldier morale." This lack of specificity was often due to the fact that commanders seldom knew exactly how to utilize a chaplain.

All too often in Operations Desert Shield and Storm chaplains were left to their own devices and decisions as to what was the most effective approach to meeting the religious needs of their soldiers. Several commanders interviewed said either verbally or by the tacit lack of guidance, "I didn't really give the chaplain all that much guidance."

Unit religious programs can still be quite successful even without command guidance. When things are going well, there are words of praise for the chaplain and the program. Problems arise when the program isn't going well. If the commander hasn't taken the time to spell out specifics to the chaplain, it's anybody's game. If the program fails, it is the chaplain who will see the results on an efficiency report. If a commander isn't educated on the role of the chaplain, it is the responsibility of that chaplain to educate the commander in order to have an effective program and an open commander-chaplain relationship.

The positive comment heard most from commanders in the desert was, "The chaplain was always there." This ministry of
presence is indeed a large part of what being a chaplain is all about; but, it hardly qualifies as command guidance for the commander to say, "Just be with the soldiers."

Many problems were headed-off by commanders who were informed of potential problems in the unit. In that respect, the guidance of a commander to "keep me informed" was excellent. The process of a chaplain informing the commander, however, must be carefully done so that the chaplain does not overstep the bounds of a soldier's privileged communications in a counseling or penitent rite relationship.

Many of the desert commanders specified the location for their chaplains both in garrison and during the onset of the ground war. The greatest concern expressed by commanders was that their chaplains be in a central location in order to have immediate access to soldiers. This was done in many ways. Some preferred to have their chaplains in the medical holding and treatment area with immediate access to casualties. Others had their chaplains literally travel alongside them, not for the "angel in my pocket" reasons, but in order to have their chaplain within immediate access to the battalion tactical operations center for current situations and needs.

In a few cases the commanders were spiritual leaders in their own right. This can often be seen as an added blessing for the unit chaplain. Command support then is a "given." In one case a chaplain and commander discussed how they were going to facilitate Bible studies in the desert, and they shared the study
group leadership. This Bible study group continued after redeployment at approximately fifty per cent of its desert strength.

Commanders must exercise caution, however, in their own spiritual leadership. The commander can easily be seen as a zealot by soldiers and chaplains alike. This can result in negative attitudes toward the unit's religious program. Difficulties can arise between commanders and chaplains, too, when one comes from a revivalistic or evangelical background and the other from a more formal denominational worship focus. Care must be exercised by both the chaplain and the commander in being too openly directive in demonstrating religious preference styles. The commander's best method of participation in the unit's religious program is to work separately with the chaplain in an official relationship offering support by participation.

The chaplains received their command guidance through staff meetings and occasionally through private time with the commander. The commanders only offered general guidance, nothing personal or specific. The chaplains heard the commander wanting them to be with the soldiers, provide religious services, and care for soldiers. During the commanders' interviews, they all expressed a great need and concern to know how families were coping with the separation, and some asked their chaplains to assist in solving family problems. But in the chaplains' survey, no command requests were noted for the chaplain to assist with family issues. One chaplain stated, "TDA chaplains took care of
the families." Chaplains knew they were to assist in providing or conducting reunion classes. Most commanders were not very enthusiastic in their support for these sessions. They appreciated the importance of family support sessions, but they were mainly seen as the chaplain’s program. One commander stated, "There was no need for it."

FORWARD THRUST AS VIEWED BY COMMANDERS AND CHAPLAINS

Almost every commander wanted a chaplain assigned directly to the battalion. When that does not happen, it is often the Office of the Chief of Chaplains which gets blamed. Current doctrine does not assign chaplains to certain types of battalions (e.g., MI, SIG, ADA). This decision is not made by the Chief of Chaplains. Rather, it is made by the force design officials in the various TRADOC branch schools. If the system is to be changed, it must begin at the individual branch’s force design level. If a chaplain is to be added to the unit’s TOE it must be done by exchanging a position of equal rank. It is this fact that usually stops the ball from rolling toward having chaplains for separate battalions and certain other types of field artillery units.

The Forward Thrust doctrine works. In almost every instance, chaplains were at the forefront with their soldiers for direct ministry. Most chaplains were never very far from the soldiers, and were always within radio contact to be requested at another location. The only hindrance mentioned by many of the
commanders was the tremendous distance in the desert which would often separate elements of a single battalion. One battalion was spread over a two hundred mile radius!

An aviation battalion commander not only wanted a chaplain, but cleared a spot on his TOE to be occupied by a captain chaplain. His request went unfilled. Fortunately, two chaplains (a Protestant and a Catholic) had come to visit his battalion on an area religious coverage mission when one of that commander's helicopters crashed killing four soldiers. The chaplains just happened to be there to minister right away.

Chaplain Forward Thrust doctrine is documented in AR 165-1 and FM 16-1. Chaplains experienced many advantages of Forward Thrust doctrine. Being with the soldiers of the unit provides a bonding, a trust, and a greater sense of credibility. They felt they could better identify with the soldiers and share their experiences, thus enabling an enhanced ability to serve and to minister. The chaplain could keep his focus on the unit which provided him with unlimited opportunities to care for soldiers. When the command wanted to know the pulse of the unit, the chaplain felt confident in his assessment.

Becoming parochial and isolated can easily happen with the chaplain assigned to the battalion. Supplies and materiel support can be challenging when the chaplain has no formal access to the technical chain. Often, technical supervision is not available during war time. The chaplain must make the unit supply system support him. He must aggressively seek supervision
and continue to be a "student" to enhance his ministry.

TOE/TDA SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

The reviews were mixed with regard to interoperability between garrison (TOE) and installation (TDA) chaplains. Some said they had tremendous support, others said it was lacking. From the commanders' point of view, it was generally thought that chaplains back home did a good job in assisting with deployment, sustaining help in family support groups, and making preparations for redeployment and reunion. Only a few said that it was not done well.

Through the interviews it was heard often that this war was a training opportunity for better back-home family support in the future. The lessons learned during Operations Desert Shield and Storm will be helpful if they are not just filed in an after action review folder. Action needs to be taken on the part of installation and MACOM chaplains to ensure the interface between TOE and TDA chaplains in the areas of family support, expectations and pitfalls in deployment and redeployment, and in the whole issue of the difficulties that arise when the service member has deployed to a war zone with an unknown date of return.

The TOE chaplains worked closely with TDA chaplains while in garrison. They all shared responsibilities of serving as Officers in Charge (OICs) of post wide chaplains' programs, duty rosters, and preaching duties. They worked well together and commanders supported this policy knowing their soldiers were
benefitting from the installation programs. They all agree that every battalion, including Combat Service Support (CSS), needs a full time chaplain assigned; and, more TDA chaplains are needed, especially during deployments, to assist with family programs and services.

**FAMILY SUPPORT**

Several of the commanders vocalized problems they heard about from their spouses at home. Many commanders said their spouses felt put-upon and ill-prepared for the role they were handed. Other spouses had to give up well-paying jobs in order to assume the new role thrust upon them as a member of the command team.

Special care should be taken to note what the problems were during this war, and to deal with them at the Pre-command Course (PCC) where spouses are expected and travel is paid for them to attend. The chaplain can also be a valuable resource in this education process. In addition to addressing the commanders in the course, it is an excellent opportunity to teach a block of instruction on family issues during wartime. Future command designees and their spouses may not have had the opportunity to experience the pressures and obligations of operating the support groups at the home station.

The deployed chaplain assumed very few responsibilities for the care of families. This decision was supported by the commander due to the shortage of time, the great distance, the
lack of communications, and total focus on the soldiers. In
preparation for deployment, some chaplains either gave briefings
or attended Family Support Group (FSG) meetings and deployment
briefings. During the deployment, very little attention was
directed to family support other than some video tapes mailed
home. If a chaplain was stationed at a major port, his commander
requested assistance in telephoning family members. After the
deployment, a few chaplains conducted "stress reduction" retreats
and marriage retreats. It appears there was very little emphasis
placed on post-deployment family support other than to those who
sought assistance.

The innovations and resources of chaplains under the severe
limitations of a desert environment were astounding. Many
commanders commented on the unusual ways chaplains managed to
minister to their soldiers. From voluntary communion being
offered in a chow line, to chaplains sending videotapes of
soldiers to families back home, the ideas were as numerous as the
chaplains.

Distance was the biggest hindrance for religious coverage.
The miles traveled on a daily basis mounted up quickly. Finding
directions in the middle of the desert was no small task. The
Global Positioning System (GPS) was an excellent tool.
Topographical maps were of little use in that they were mostly
brown and showed few road routes.

Transportation was, as it seems always to be, a problem for
many chaplains. They could always catch a ride with someone, but
many chaplains had to operate without dedicated vehicle support. Even though it is a TOE item for chaplains, one commander actually said, "The Army ought to put a vehicle on the TOE for the chaplain!"

Religious services and support were readily available and provided in the desert even with the shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains. The chaplain supervisors are to be commended in coordinating the efforts. Religious services were sponsored on a weekly basis and commanders of Roman Catholic chaplains were very supportive in allowing their chaplains to provide general support even though his own chaplain was gone 75% of the time.

REUNION

Classes on redeployment and reunion were taught both in the desert and back at the home station. In most cases the chaplains had a direct role in this training. Most commanders made the training mandatory in the desert, while back home the spouses and families were so excited about seeing their soldier home again that classes seemed to be an interruption. The aftermath of reunion is still being recorded. There have been many divorces, family problems, separations, and misunderstandings between soldiers who deployed and their spouses who remained behind.

The role of the chaplain in reunion training is of key importance. Many commanders depended on their chaplains to effect this training. The future must see specific training for chaplains in the area of FSGs, and in reunions after the war is
It is highly recommended that the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School make sure that instruction on these topics is included in the curriculum.

The key figure in reunion operations is the installation chaplain. Guidance from that senior chaplain can make or break reunion activities and training. We should not wait for another war to do crash courses on predeployment stress, family support groups, or difficulties in reunion. It should be a regular part of the ongoing UMT training. We might not have the luxury of available training time in the next war.

Many chaplains said that reunion was a natural integration. As soon as soldiers returned, they went on leave. After they signed in, it was "business as usual" with the traditional fast pace. A couple of installations conducted debriefing sessions for all deployed and non-deployed chaplains to assist in rebuilding the team. All were allowed the opportunity to speak and share their experiences realizing and appreciating the quality of ministry which supported the entire mission of the Gulf War. The emphasis was not on who deployed and who did not, but the importance of the many and varied types of ministry opportunities.

**SUPPORT FOR CHAPLAINS**

Commanders are often not aware of the TOE requirements for the chaplain. An education process needs to take place from the Pre-command Course down to chaplain basic instruction. It is the
chaplain's responsibility to make sure the necessary equipment is on hand. If it is not, the chaplain should go after it.

Nearly every commander was more than willing to provide TOE items for the unit chaplain. Only in a few cases did commanders say that there was another mission of higher importance for use of a vehicle which would have gone to the chaplain. One commander said, "The chaplain can have anything he needs."

Chaplains must be fully aware of their TOE authorization. Supervisory chaplains should make it their business to ensure that subordinate UMTs have what they need for ministry.

All chaplains who responded to interviews had a vehicle and many stated it needed to be one dedicated to them. Frequently, it was "borrowed" or not of great "quality." Fifty percent had a radio in the vehicle and all had a tent. They appreciated the great support of commanders including the supply of night vision goggles which again, 50% of the chaplains utilized. Additional support included maps, GPSs and compasses. Basically, commanders supported the chaplain; but, during the war, many chaplains stated their vehicle was used for other purposes and that they had to hitch a ride.

There is a discrepancy on how we train and how we fight. "Going to the field" often isn't fun and has an ominous ring to it, especially when it's at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin. There are probably few chaplains, however, that would complain about the tough, hot desert training in California which put them in readiness for Saudi Arabia and points north.
Ministry in an actual Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) environment is yet to be experienced. Only a few have tried to vocally calm a troop when the eyes and voice both of chaplain and soldier are distorted and muffled behind the protective mask. It also doesn’t take too long in chemical protective clothing for individuals to become dehydrated and very uncomfortable. Actual training in NBC ministry must be emphasized at USACHCS. We might not be as lucky in the next war.

Chaplain training was fairly adequate except in the areas of desert survival skills, tactical driver training, management of material resources, radio communication, and care of families. The unit or the division provided for the training of military skills. Some stated they had absolutely no training in the following: desert survival, tactical driver training, management of material resources, land navigation skills, counseling skills, field worship services, care of families, host nation religions, and battle fatigue ministry. The installation must closely monitor the training provided for the UMT and insure proper training occurs.

The installation generally provided very little training in chaplain skills, especially in training lay leaders or volunteers. The supervision of volunteers and lay leaders must be emphasized. Many chaplains experienced unpleasant challenges coping with the good will and enthusiasm of soldiers willing to preach and conduct services.

Most chaplains in the war were located in the battalion aid
station to provide ministry for the wounded; otherwise, they colocated with the adjutant (S-1) or logistics officer (S-4). Most commanders wanted their chaplains to be in the center of the unit, readily accessible to soldiers. During the day, commanders wanted their chaplains out with the soldiers at least half of the time.

**MINISTRY ISSUES IN THE DESERT**

Commanders were most concerned about immediate ministry to casualties, and for that reason several directed that the chaplain operate out of the battalion or brigade medical support area.

The next concern was for the chaplain to be "present" with the soldiers. This was a concern not so much for the physical proximity of the chaplain, but for the chaplain to be able to have a hand on the pulse of morale and potential difficulties.

The chaplains were told to be with soldiers; but, during the war, the priority was for the potential casualties in the aid station. For religious services, commanders took for granted that services would be provided. A high premium was placed on the chaplain's ability to keep the commander informed on the morale of soldiers and to respond to any soldier's personal problems.

**THINGS THAT CHANGED**

Mobility for the UMT was difficult not only because of a
lack of dedicated transportation, but because of the lethal environs of the battlefield. Few chaplains are aware that tactical driving doctrine puts the chaplain behind the wheel and the chaplain assistant literally riding "shotgun." This procedure needs to be practiced often during unit field exercises. For that reason alone, the chaplain needs to have first-hand knowledge of the basic operational principles of the UMT's vehicle, first echelon maintenance, and the "defensive" driving that can only be experienced when traveling around a mine field and through the shrapnel of bullets and bombs.

Most commanders specified where they wanted the chaplain to be located during the ground war. The first priority was to the wounded and dying. That ministry could best be accomplished with the UMT in proximity to the medical facility whether mobile or stationary.

There were several chaplains who actually crossed the line of departure (LD) with lead companies as the ground war began. A chaplain in this situation must be aware of tactical operations in order to "keep up" and not be a burden to the fighting force. The chaplain assistant must remain in close proximity to the chaplain since the only UMT weapon is carried and fired by the chaplain assistant. For this reason alone, it is wise for chaplains to take a personal interest in their assistant's weapons training and firing accuracy!

Those chaplains who were able to keep their vehicle during the war were able to stay in the aid station or be ready to
respond to a most uncertain environment. Others who were hitching a ride were sometimes separated from their chaplain assistant and were very limited in their ministry. Commanders need to be educated on the importance of keeping the UMT together and for the need of flexibility in response on the battlefield.

Most commanders had no significant changes in guidance for the chaplain when the ground war began. Concern was often expressed for the chaplain's safety. The question must be asked if this is due to any obvious lack of tactical or operational knowledge demonstrated on the part of the UMTs.

Incredibly, chaplains continued their ability to conduct worship services during the fast-paced action of the ground war. Commanders commented very positively on this fact several times during the interviews.

The primary mission chaplains received from commanders was to be prepared for care of the wounded. Based on the location of the medical facility, or the wounded soldier, some means of transportation must be available to the UMT at all times.

One of two messages was conveyed during the war for the chaplain: stay out of the way, or be in the aid station to take care of potential casualties. Most commanders were in agreement on these three priorities for chaplains: take care of the wounded and dying, take care of the fighting and support soldiers, and take care of yourself.

Following direct contact with the enemy, commanders were again interested in having the chaplain somewhere close to the
center of the unit area of operations. Once again, traveling distances became a problem. For the most part, however, the chaplain was requested to be in the command area of the brigade or battalion.

The "ministry of presence" took on a new and critical role after the ground war ended. Even in the euphoria of an obvious victory there were potential psychological casualties. Commanders were concerned that chaplains keep their ears open for problems. Some soldiers were receiving "Dear John" letters from home, and the relaxed-but-tense environment after the battle provided many opportunities for depression and discouragement.

It was during this phase that commanders were interested in preparing their soldiers for reunion and whatever scenarios they would find when they got back home with their families. Many commanders commented on their chaplains' innovative methods of delivering the messages about reunion expectations. Classes were usually mandatory for all soldiers, and it was the creativity and delivery of the chaplain which made or broke the effectiveness of the instruction. Except for a few unfortunate instances, the classes got good reviews from commanders and their soldiers.

The scriptographic books about reunion were ubiquitous in the desert, but they were not the total answer for reunion training. It would be a good idea for reunion training to be included in basic and advanced courses in the future at USACHCS. 22

It is at this point that the interoperability of TOE and TDA
chaplains is put to the test. A "total chaplain team" (deployed and home-based) will have discussed signals and intentions before an armed conflict ever demands deployment. The posts where training had been ongoing were the ones that had the smoothest operations upon redeployment and reunion.

Commanders commented on the soldiers’ attitude of "I’m home now, and that’s all that matters" as being destructive to marriage and family relationships. In units such as the 82nd Airborne Division, where deployment is an "18 hour wheels-up" reality, programs are in place as a part of the chaplains’ standard operating procedure (SOP). More installation UMTs should consider the 82nd’s model and adapt it to their own scenario and installation mission.

During the redeployment phase, chaplains were serving in a garrison mode providing programs such as Bible studies, reunion briefings, stress reduction briefings, support groups, group discussions, and evening studies. Chaplains were almost back to an installation type of ministry.

Many commanders had comments about the effectiveness of chaplains conducting thanksgiving services, family days, battalion dinners and other reunion activities. Individual innovation was the key to the success of many of these events, but these innovative ideas need to be recorded and retained for the future. Some chaplains are still conducting post-reunion classes.

All chaplains know of the importance of reunion briefings
and their interest, or that of the commander, determined the quality of the sessions. Some only provided handouts, others joined their commanders in giving the briefings. A few brought in a speaker from higher headquarters, and some briefly shared information at a formation. The activities during reunion were generally of low priority. The Army doesn’t seem to be convinced of reunion importance, and this fact is demonstrated in the level of concern for families.

A look at the commander interview comments at Appendix D will show the importance of memorial services and ceremonies presented to surviving soldiers in a unit. These services and ceremonies are a primary stated function of the UMT in Reference Book 1-1 (RB 1-1), Unit Ministry Team Handbook, and other chaplain publications: "Chaplains are to minister to the living and honor the dead." 23

Some units have a standardized memorial service in order to keep from having so many differences in service style. Other chaplains are often shuffling to find formats for doing them, for these services are usually required within two to three days. It is recommended that USACHCS emphasize memorial ceremonies and publish standard formats for chaplain usage. This eliminates the unusual, and emphasizes a unity in how we honor soldiers who have lost their lives.

"Ma Bell" was on location in the form of AT&T or MCI telephone banks, and commanders utilized them. Chaplains were often the telephone point of contact for the commander, and the
commander's spouse in the USA was usually at the other end of the line as the receiver and dispenser of information. Emergencies were the first priority for communications. Any time a soldier had an emergency at home, the chaplain was often on hand to take care of effecting message traffic.

The telephone bills of soldiers skyrocketed! Phoning home wasn't cheap. Some commanders had their own military issue satellite dishes available in the unit and calls could be directed, but still at a cost.

Other commanders commented on the excellent newsletters their chaplains created for mailing to the families back home. Some commanders provided their chaplains with a video camera and video cassette recorder (VCR) for videotaping soldiers on location in order to send the videos back home to the spouses and children. It was an excellent idea, and a good use of modern technology.

Most chaplains were either absolved by their commander or absolved themselves of any type of ministry for families. Some had access to a commander's telephone credit card and phone to occasionally call the homes of soldiers upon the commander's request. A few communicated by video tapes. Research must be supported to provide ways and means for deployed chaplains to provide for family ministry. The effectiveness of a deployed chaplain could significantly be enhanced if he could minister to both soldier and family.

Chaplains appreciated the support and concern of their
commanders but felt left out with regard to specific guidance. They were often left on their own, which could be taken as a compliment. With that approach, some felt they were not a full member of the unit team. They all wanted to do well but did not quite understand what was expected of them nor what the commander thought of their ministry. Many stated that the commanders needed to be educated as to the mission of the chaplain. The PCC must inform the commanders, and the supervisory chaplain should follow up on that education.

The interviewing process provided valuable information from commanders on what went right or wrong with regard to religious ministries during the Gulf War. These comments appear as a part of questions 33 through 36 of the questionnaire at Appendix D.

COMMANDERS' TRAINING ON MINISTRY ISSUES

A block of instruction on "The Role of the Chaplain" used to be taught during the two week PCC at Fort Leavenworth. This course is still mandatory for all officers selected for brigade and battalion commands. The length of instruction at Leavenworth, however, has been reduced, and is coupled with blocks of instruction at other TRADOC school posts centering around branch-specific issues. As a result of the time cutback, the class on chaplain roles and utilization was cut from the curriculum.

During the 1980s there were chaplains designated to teach in the PCC at Fort Leavenworth. Since other branches had their most
senior officers come to Leavenworth to speak, it was decided in 1986 that the Chief of Chaplains or the Deputy Chief would travel out to Fort Leavenworth to deliver these classes. The visibility of the Chief or the Deputy was met with appreciation and enthusiasm, and the opportunity for dispensing information on the role and function of the unit chaplain was enhanced.

Several of the commanders interviewed in this study said that they either didn’t remember what the chaplain said during the PCC, or suggested that the role of the chaplain should have been covered for them in the course. It is unfortunate that chaplains no longer have this interface with command designees. The absence of chaplain instruction at the PCC is resulting in commanders giving haphazard guidance to their unit chaplains.

The installation chaplain must monitor UMT training and provide that which is missing. Some chaplains were confused in the desert and needed support which could have been provided by a thorough training program at the installation. For example, some chaplains had no training in nine specific areas of ministry previously mentioned. The unit often does not go to war as it trains.

TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

Commanders’ spouses want more comprehensive training in what to do if they are quickly called upon to start and maintain a Family Support Group (FSG). This area was not well defined when the war began and there was much concern among spouses about
their new role.

The PCC should provide a block of instruction on the utilization of the chaplain with a follow up by the brigade supervisory chaplain. Chaplains are feeling lost and confused in their ministry and great talents are not being utilized. Their ministry would be greatly enhanced if both commander and chaplain had a thorough understanding of the role of the chaplain. Commanders are requesting this type of support.

Chaplain Corps Force Designers should consider assigning Roman Catholic chaplains to units with very understanding commanders. A priest will be providing general support to several units which are not his own, a task which could require up to 60-70% of his time. Being assigned to a maneuver battalion could potentially result in overwork, discouragement and the eventual resignation of the priest.

Some chaplains and assistants did not work as a team. Intentional UMT training must be emphasized as a part of the daily garrison routine of ministry.

Reunion sessions must be a part of normal training and not an afterthought when deployment is imminent. Reunion sessions, with both spouses present and free from any time constraints, provide the maximum opportunity for training.

Night vision goggles must be added to the Common Table of Allowances (CTA) along with increased training in the use of navigational equipment such as the compass and the GPS.

Every battalion must have a chaplain assigned. Commanders
and chaplains are saying that GRS to CSS and separate battalions does not work.

MINISTRY OF PRESENCE

The above summaries illustrate some of the difficulties in a quantitative analysis of chaplain ministry. The chaplaincy does not lend itself to evaluation like other helping or social services. When the chaplaincy competes for resources with other agencies, quantifiable data is not a fair comparison. For example, social work service staffing is determined by caseload; but, should that same criteria be used to staff chaplain sections? How the Army measures chaplain ministry becomes important as the chaplaincy competes "on the margin" with other agencies for resources. An analysis of some concepts of ministry should be made as the Army evaluates the efficacy of chaplain ministry.

The difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of chaplain ministry was very evident in the interviews with the commanders. The bottom line always seemed to be some expression about the fact that the chaplain was simply there - being present for the commander and for the soldiers. This presents difficulty for any evaluator of chaplain ministry. To understand some of the difficulty we must analyze a concept called the "ministry of presence."

The chaplaincy tries to maintain a "ministry of presence" throughout the service, whether in the farthest front lines or in the quiet garrison, and adapting some
of the latest techniques of organization to carry out its mission.\textsuperscript{24}

These words by Chaplain (MG) Norris Einertson, a former Chief of Chaplains, expresses his dedication to the notion that chaplains need to be present with the soldiers and their families, and that presence is critical to effective ministry in the Army. Chaplain Einertson goes on to say,

The presence of the chaplain is not, however, limited to units engaged in combat or training for combat. The chaplaincy takes pride in complete dedication to being with soldiers in any environment - a ministry of presence. This concept is vital to an effective chaplaincy in the Army’s high-tech, mobile environment. It means being present with the soldier in the work place and at training, providing direct spiritual nurturing to soldiers by a chaplain’s presence, and by performing religious and spiritual support functions.\textsuperscript{25}

The "ministry of presence" is a concept which comes from the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. Just as the Christ became the presence of God with us in the flesh, so the chaplain becomes the presence of God in the unit. The chaplain brings God to the soldiers in many ways. The chaplain wears the insignia of religion on the uniform, provides religious rites and sacraments, conducts public worship, and ministers through pastoral counseling. But the chaplain brings more than these services to the soldier. The chaplain’s mere presence in the unit carries something more meaningful, but very difficult to articulate. Commanders stated this in many ways throughout the interviews.

This notion of service is not to be measured in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Craig Dykstra argues that such
measures are inappropriate for the Christian idea of service.

In our culture, service is tied intimately to effectiveness. That is, we do not consider a service to have been rendered to someone unless that service changes that person in a material way. We have not served the ill unless we have cured their illness....I do want to point out that, where our sole aim is effectiveness, certain diabolical dynamics are set in motion.

Effectiveness requires power and the use of power....the gathering of power into our own hands in order to become effective regularly turns into the gathering of power in order that we may be and remain in power. When this takes place we are no longer servants; we are masters.26

The entire notion that presence can be measured creates difficulty for the chaplaincy. How does one measure what commanders desire from their chaplains? Commanders want their chaplains to be where the troops are: in the motor pool, on the range, in the mess hall, in the unit area. They want the chaplain to be their eyes and ears in the unit. They expect that soldiers will talk to the chaplain and that the chaplain will be able to accurately find the pulse of the unit and report back to the commander on the morale of the unit. How does one measure that in terms of effectiveness?

For, if service is linked too closely with effectiveness, we become the ones who must decide what effectiveness means...We become the definers of health and strength and fellowship and thereby deny the ones in need of their freedom and personhood in illness, weakness and loneliness. Rather than become servants we become manipulators.27

It is vital that commanders and chaplains continue to explore the measures of ministry and the manner in which the
chaplain is utilized by the commander, because

At the heart of service lies, not effectiveness, but presence. Service as presence means being with another. Christ’s service to humankind was not effective in the sense that he brought an end to suffering and death, to illness, loneliness, weakness, social isolation, confusions, or political turmoil. Christ’s service was his incarnation—his coming to be with us to take on our sufferings as his own, to stand with us and to go through with us whatever it is we are going through. When Jesus commanded his disciples to wash one another’s feet saying, "I have given you an example that you should do what I have done to you" (John 13:15), he was commanding them to be present to others as he was present to them.

Presence is a service of vulnerability. To be present to others is to put oneself in the position of being vulnerable to what they are vulnerable to, and of being vulnerable to them. It means being willing to suffer what the other suffers, and to go with the sufferer in his or her own suffering. This is different from trying to become the sufferer. Presence does not involve taking the others place. That would be demeaning. It would suggest, "I can take your suffering better than you can, so move aside; I will replace you." Instead, presence involves exposing oneself to what the sufferer is exposed to, and being with the other in that vulnerability.

The discipline of service is a discipline through which care, concern, and aid are given by one person to another in a particular way, in a way that is shaped by presence: vulnerable, just, compassionate, and committed.²⁸

The commanders interviewed had a sense of the importance of the mere physical presence of the chaplain in the unit. The fact that the chaplain was there was important. The chaplain’s being with the soldiers in all the events of unit life made the presence of the chaplain a valued asset for commanders. They
viewed the chaplains as "combat multipliers."

THE ARMY AND MILITARY FAMILIES OF THE 1990s

Another area of inquiry focused on chaplain ministry to the family. The investigation had several foci: (1) the unit chaplain and Family Support Groups; (2) the unit chaplain, the family and the deployment; (3) the unit chaplain and the family during deployment; (4) the hand-off of family ministry to the TDA chaplain; (5) the TDA chaplain, the family and the rear detachment; (6) the TDA chaplain, the family and support ministry; (7) the TDA chaplain, the family and casualty notification; and (8) the TOE and TDA chaplain, the family and reunion.

The chaplaincy has no doctrine to guide family ministry. The Chief of Chaplain’s Policy #11 defines our policy guidance. That policy is currently being revised, and an ambitious Family Ministry Program is being implemented by the Chief of Chaplains.

In order to understand what the commanders and their spouses said during the interviews, it was important to review the extensive research on the Army family. What follows is the result of that historical review. This review became the filter through which the data from the commanders and their spouses were analyzed. This historical review was necessary to understand the many nuances in the spouse interviews. Chaplains also need to understand this historical background so that the ministry programs they design for families address the reality of family
life in the Army.

The Army of the 1990s is undergoing the greatest restructuring and refocusing of this century. Congress has ordered the downsizing of military forces. The active Army is downsizing from 720,000 to 535,000 and from 16 Divisions to 12 Divisions by 1995. It is also greatly reducing its forward presence in Europe from 300,000 to 92,000. The Army is becoming a CONUS-based, contingency-oriented force ready for rapid deployment.

The demographics of the military are also rapidly changing. In the 1940s and 1950s a low percentage of soldiers were married. The major exceptions were officers and senior enlisted personnel. Today, 60% of the soldiers in the Army are married. In the past, the majority of military spouses were homemakers and were quick to volunteer for programs on Army posts to enhance the quality of life. Commanders' spouses were automatically assumed to be a part of the "Command Team." This, too, is changing. In 1970, 30% of military spouses were employed outside the home compared 60% today. This is projected to increase to 75% by the year 2000. In interviews with commanders' spouses there is a growing reluctance, in some cases anger and even refusal, to be a part of the "Command Team."

Carolyn Howland Becraft was a research associate specializing in military and family policy issues at Decision Resources Corporation in Washington, D.C. Her husband is an Army officer. She mirrors some of the feelings uncovered in the
interviews. Upon learning that her husband was on the command list, she said, "The news of my husband's next assignment, while not unexpected, produced many conflicting emotions—especially because I knew there would be expectations for me that I would be unwilling to make." She was not willing to give up her career to fulfill an Army expectation of the "Command Team" for 18 months and then go back and pick up the pieces of her own career.

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, recently wrote in his letter, "The Army's Strategic Issues" (July 19, 1991), "We have to sustain soldier and family quality of life programs." In the past many of these "family quality of life programs" were filled with military spouse volunteers. During the 1990s there will be a smaller pool from which to draw because of the increase of working spouses and spouses "unwilling to meet Command Team expectations."

The following section of this paper is broken down into three sub-sections. The first looks at findings from research about the military family. The second looks at general findings specifically from the interviews with the commanders' spouses of USAWC Class of 1992. The third contains recommendations for the future of ministry in the Army.

BACKGROUND ON FAMILIES IN THE MILITARY

In many ways the Army took the lead in helping the defense establishment focus on families. The late 1970s were critical for this effort. Family members themselves began the process by
sponsoring meetings in Washington D.C., calling attention to the growing presence of families in the Army. These family members were the spouses of emerging senior leaders in the Army. They were the "senior ladies" who were expected by the organization to lead other Army family members. There were concerns about the Army's forcing expectations on a new cohort of younger spouses who were working and in search of their own careers. These women held three Family Symposia to raise awareness of military family problems, to train volunteers in interpersonal skills and leadership in volunteer organizations, and to make the Army aware of the growing demands on volunteer forces working with Army families.

In 1983, the Army Chief of Staff published The Army Family White Paper and articulated his philosophy:

A partnership exists between the Army and Army families. The Army’s unique missions, concepts of service and lifestyle of its members—all affect the nature of this partnership. Towards the goal of building a strong partnership, the Army remains committed to assuring adequate support to families in order to promote wellness; to develop a sense of community; and to strengthen the mutually reinforcing bonds between the Army and its families.

In 1984, the Secretary of the Army announced as the Army theme: "The Year of the Family." The Army continued to resource the annual Family Symposium and began to regularize the relationship between the Army and Army family members. This annual event became the Army Family Action Plan Planning Conference structured to raise issues to the Army staff. These
issues were rolled up in an Army Family Action Plan which tracked issues raised at the annual Conference being worked on by the Army Staff. A board of general officers, chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, monitored the actions and reported to family members the actions which were taken on the issues being worked, the responsible agent, and the progress made on each issue. The key philosophic element was partnership—a commitment to mutual responsibility.

The Army effort resulted in the issuance of Executive Order 12606, "The Family," on September 2, 1987. The Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Department of Defense Family Policy," was published on January 15, 1988. That memorandum was canceled with the publication of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1342.17, "Family Policy," dated December 30, 1988. This directive implemented family policy-making criteria for the department and directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that comprehensive family support systems were developed and resourced.

The key paragraph which delineates the DoD policy is D.3.

DoD personnel, both married and single, bear primary responsibility for the welfare of their families. Nevertheless, the total commitment demanded by military service requires that they and their families be provided a comprehensive family support system. The extent and exact nature of that system shall be based on installation-specific requirements and shall address needs for pre-mobilization indoctrination, deployment support, relocation assistance, information and referral (with follow-up), child care, youth recreation and development, private and public sector employment.
assistance (including self-employment in government quarters), special needs support, family advocacy, foster care, family life education, dependents’ education, substance abuse prevention, family health and fitness, spiritual growth and development, emergency services, counseling, support and services for off-base families (outreach), consumer affairs and financial planning assistance, volunteer training and management, separation and retirement planning, family centers, and community development.

The previous paragraph defines the basic philosophical dilemma for the Department of Defense and is not an amplification of the Army Chief of Staff’s philosophy. On the one hand, DoD asserts a philosophy that individual service members are responsible for the welfare of their own families. The policy indicates that primary responsibility resides with the family for its own well-being.

That assertion is immediately followed with a caveat observing that military service is of such a nature, requiring such a commitment, that the service member needs a comprehensive family support system to assist in meeting that personal and primary responsibility.

These two assertions are the cause of tremendous difficulty in the allocation of resources for a comprehensive family support system. There is no clarity in the proposal as to how responsibility is to be determined and divided between the individual family and the military system. In addition, the list of needs and programs proposes that the military provide a very ambitious family welfare-style agenda. Services have had difficulty in meeting this ambitious agenda as seen in the
current means used to resource family programs. Resourcing of family programs to create this comprehensive family support system are the result of congressional legislation on the one hand, and self-sufficient volunteer programs on the other. This makes the comprehensive family support system a planning and programming nightmare, while raising family member expectations that they will be taken care of with a safety net of family support programs.

A few examples will illustrate. The Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) is a congressionally-funded program which put pediatric specialists into the medical inventory to resource and support this EFMP population. Personnel policies ensure the assignment of the service member to areas where these resources are accessible. Family members expect to be provided with quality professional care for their exceptional family member. It is important to note that this program is one of many family programs funded with special congressionally-appropriated funds.

A different set of programs listed in the comprehensive family support system is resourced from Morale-Welfare-Recreation (MWR) funds which are increasingly being forced to be more self-sustaining. The move to self-sufficiency has caused costs to rise for the service member family. Support programs, which at one time were thought to be secure benefits, are now marketed as the responsibility of the family. "If you want the program, you must pay for it."

Still other programs on the list are either offered by
volunteers or demand family volunteers to lead and man them if the support program is to be offered. These are all volunteer led and provided invaluable service for the family members during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The Gulf War demonstrated a critical need which the Army must resource and build into the force structure: the need to have rear detachment military personnel to link the family to the deployed soldier and the soldier’s unit.

This hodge-podge of programs with their varied and often changing sources of resourcing continue to blur the fixing of responsibility, and they do not work toward the partnership which is envisioned in the Army philosophy. Sorting out some of the difficulties and the fixing of responsibility is important because family satisfaction is a major retention issue, and family well-being is a critical readiness issue.

Sorting out some of the issues begins with an analysis of the nature of the military organization and what "the total commitment demanded by military service requires." The military needs to continue to affirm the high cost of service and re-emphasize the "Unlimited Liability Contract" the service member has with the government. Military service has traditionally been a profession which placed demands on the individual not to marry or have a family. The old adage, "If the Army wanted you to have a family they would have issued you one," was enforced in the conscript Army by low pay, payment in kind, and a highly attractive and competitive retirement system.
The decision by Congress to create and recruit an all-volunteer force has, as a second and third order effect, created a force with a significantly higher married content. The choice to build an all-volunteer force places moral responsibility on the Congressional leadership. Senior military leaders need to assume moral responsibility for the policies they established and acknowledge that their decisions have increased the attractiveness of military service for married young people. They have recruited single parents, they have established polices which reward dual military couples, and they have assumed a responsibility for military members and family members which impact on readiness and retention.

Military sociologists have raised critical questions since the beginning of the all-volunteer experiment. Their major concern is the relationship between a profession and an occupation, a calling or a job. This discussion is important to revisit because of the total commitment demanded by military service. The military is a called profession. The planners, programmers and resourcers need to explore implications of econometric solutions to philosophical and value problems. During a period of constrained resources, family issues will soon be pushed to the margin unless they are seen as essential to mission fulfillment. If services cannot clearly delimit the responsibilities and resources to build this comprehensive family support system, they need a radical change in policies controlling the married content of the force, or a new approach.
to family member programs and benefits.

A second issue is the nature of the environment which the military creates in order to produce the soldiers it needs to perform the mission. That environment social scientists define as a "Total Institution." This sociological concept was discussed earlier in this paper. It is important to repeat here that all Total Institutions are characterized by their all-encompassing tendencies. All Total Institutions have difficulties with family care and in providing for family support. Prisons, hospitals, asylums and monasteries all find family support difficult because service to families is not part of the institution's basic and defining mission. One implication for the Army is that at the most critical time of need for the soldier and the family--going to war--the institution is least likely to have the energy and resources to commit to the family.

In addition to being a Total Institution, the military is also a "greedy" institution. As Mady Wechler Segal points out,

An institution is a set of interrelated norms and rules governing some area of social life. The study of military families involves analysis of how two societal institutions--the military and the family--intersect. Both make great demands of individuals in terms of commitments, loyalty, time, and energy; they therefore have some of the characteristics of what Coser calls "greedy" institutions. 36

Segal points out that all social institutions depend on the commitment of their members for survival, and they compete with each other for the scarce resources members can dedicate to these competing institutions. Most institutions in our society make
only limited demands on persons as individuals, so that in modern
society institutional diversity and differentiation allow people
to move between institutions with limited time and resources.

Yet the modern world....continues to spawn
organizations and groups which....make total
claims on their members and which attempt to
encompass within their circle the whole
personality. These might be called greedy
institutions, insofar as they seek exclusive
and undivided loyalty and they attempt to
reduce the claims of competing roles and
status positions on those they wish to
encompass within their boundaries....Greedy
institutions are characterized by the fact
that they exercise pressures on component
individuals to weaken their ties, or not to
form any ties, with other institutions or
persons that might make claims that conflict
with their own demands.37

Segal uses Coser’s definitions to demonstrate that both the
family and the military are greedy institutions. If we look at
the unusual pattern of demands the military makes on the service
members and their families, we can gain some additional insight
into some of the stress and distress experienced by commanders’
wives interviewed in this project. The role expectations placed
on the spouses have already been discussed earlier in this paper.
Looking here at the specific demands placed on lower enlisted
spouses, we may be able to understand more fully the pressure on
the commander’s spouse in meeting some of these needs. Segal
states,

..over the course of a military career, a
family can expect to experience all the
specific demands. Characteristics of the
life-style include risk of injury or death of
the service member, geographic mobility,
periodic separation of the service member
from the rest of the family and residence in
foreign countries. There are also normative pressures directed on family members regarding their roles in the military community.38

Certainly the fear of risk of injury and death of the service member figures heavily in the experience of the spouses. Not only do the commanders’ spouses have to manage their own anxiety and dread, but must face the questions, concerns and fears of the other members of the unit. Every spouse interviewed commented on training in casualty notification, grief training, and their fears of having to assist a spouse who had lost a mate in the conflict. Many expressed the strain caused by the reality of war and the reality of possible loss. There is still anger in many of the spouses at the stress caused by lack of training in casualty notification.

Many of the spouses of the lower enlisted were on their first Permanent Change of Station (PCS). This first dislocation has its own peculiar problems which are felt most severely by the younger spouses.

Less obvious and often less discussed in the literature on military families is the first move, which perhaps calls for the greatest adjustment....the spouse’s first residence during military service is usually away from home. This has special implications for young enlisted families because it is likely to be the first time they are away from their families of orientation and long-term friends...All are geographically separated from their usual interpersonal networks and sources of social support....The place is unfamiliar and one must learn one’s way around...They also have the fewest military institutional supports, such as family housing on post.39
Separations cause loneliness, problems with children, management of money, care of the car and apartment, loss of social role in community and family, and a litany of other problems. The spouse is now a single parent. In many cases the spouse learns a sense of independence which raises questions about dependencies in the relationship and questions about wanting the relationship to continue. New-found independence can cause as many problems as the fear and helplessness of being overwhelmed at not being able to perform needed tasks or fulfill commitments.

All these concerns and more were the daily and hourly challenges of many spouses in the FSGs. The strain and stress has had an effect. Some unit spouses related problems of depression and bouts of drinking. Others related the fun times they had with other spouses in the same units and the guilt they felt for having fun. Their own family became more greedy at the same time the military "family" also became more demanding of time and resources.

At the 1991 Army Family Action Plan Planning Conference the tension between the desire of the Army to care for families and the need to meet the military mission was again evident, as was the problem of resourcing family programs. The Chief of Staff stated his philosophy: "Soldiers are entitled to the same quality of life as is afforded the society they are pledged to defend. The well-being of the soldier and family members will be given equal consideration to readiness and leader development."
At the same conference, Under Secretary of the Army John W. Shannon pointed out that when President Bush ordered the launch of Operation Desert Shield on August 2, 1990, no one asked whether the family support group at Fort Bragg was up and running. There was no time to dwell on issues of gender or marital status; the primary focus had to be getting soldiers on the ground—the mission comes first. Seventy-two hours later the 82nd Airborne Division said, "Don't cross this line!" Shannon urged the families "not to ask the Army to do things it cannot resource, and do not give soldiers cause for expectations which cannot be fulfilled." 41

An examination of the Army budget for the next few years will demonstrate that family programs are losing ground. 42 Construction of facilities in the out-years is down considerably, including high congressional interest items like child-care facilities. Family programs are being cut back at the very moment that the Army is celebrating the contributions of family members to the success of Desert Shield/Storm. Family members contributed time and effort to support programs which would have cost the Army significant amounts of money had the Army purchased these services. The universal acclaim being paid to family members clearly demonstrates their importance to the readiness and retention of quality people in the force.

The new code word "self-sufficiency" is being offered up as the basis for a new philosophy for family support programs. Self-sufficiency is a movement away from the previous philosophy
of mutual responsibility. The services seem to be placing more and more responsibility on the individual service member and the family members. Self-sufficiency needs more definition and analysis before it becomes the philosophical centerpiece for military family policy and resourcing.

The movement to a smaller force provides the opportunity to rethink family philosophy; but, that review should be thorough and innovative. As units are consolidated at a reduced number of major CONUS installations from which forces will be projected world-wide, units will experience more frequent and sustained training deployments. This will require a cohort of soldiers with a great deal of commitment to the Army. This CONUS-based force will be a densely "married" Army with resident families. The Army must refocus family support and community policies to enable families to identify with the unit’s mission and to support and be supported by the deploying force. Communities must be restructured to enhance family functioning. Restructured communities need to be built on a philosophy which enhances the family and supports the soldier as the mission is trained for and performed.

If the services are going to move away from a comprehensive family support system built on the social welfare model they need to examine the nature of the military as a profession, the unlimited liability contract, the nature of the military as an institution, and the nature of dependency caused by our philosophy of pay and entitlements. Such a review might open up
The military services need to acknowledge and convince Congress that part of the cost of an all-volunteer military force is a force with a higher married content. The all-volunteer force is a political, not a military, choice for which the Congress must assume moral and fiscal responsibility. Congress must acknowledge that military service does make demands on its members which cause special family problems. These problems must be addressed if the military is to be a ready force capable of performing its military mission with institutional integrity. True self-sufficiency is never a possibility for military families because of the demands on the military member. An independence for family members becomes possible, developed in a system in which resources for independence are provided, and where personal responsibility for families is clearly articulated by the military services. Now is the time to begin to state that policy and frame the programs to bring it to life in our military communities.

The interviews with the spouses of these commanders proved a fascinating reflection of the history of military spouses in the Army. The spouses responded along a spectrum from accepting the role of the commander’s spouse to anger and hostility at being put-upon or taken for granted by the military. Most of them preformed heroically during the Gulf War. Even those who felt taken advantage of had stories which attested to their willingness to help take care of members of the unit. At a
spouse seminar in Lancaster, PA, sponsored by the Army War
College in January 1992, one group placed these words at the top
of a long list of things that had worked: "Spouses Did." That
received a great round of applause.

The vast burden of assistance fell on the shoulders of the
officers' and senior non-commissioned officers' spouses. One
major complaint made by these spouses was the dependency
demonstrated by enlisted spouses on the military system, almost a
demanding posture from them toward the senior spouses. The
demands made by some enlisted spouses were considered
unreasonable by these senior spouses. Many of the enlisted
spouses were young and not very socially skilled. However, this
dependency was more than a simple result of immaturity and youth.
The young spouses seemed to have been socialized to expect
assistance for almost everything, and, in some cases, had been
promised all kinds of help at the pre-deployment briefings. This
confluence of demands and promises is easy to understand when one
is aware of the several factors which historically determine role
expectations of the spouses. Allan Carlson, in *The Family in
America* examines the different roles for the officer's spouse and
the enlisted spouse. He states the following of the officer's
spouse:

Rather, in the Cold War era, the military
services sought to socialize wives and
children into a modified version of the
military model, regularizing their role as a
kind of special support system. In contrast
to the civilian world, military life
exhibited less tension between work place and
home, and women became associate members of
the services, their status fixed by husband’s rank, and their roles prescribed by an elaborate code of conduct. For officers’ wives, this basically meant adapting unwritten customs for mass guidance and education.43

The socialization of the officer’s spouse has a much longer history than the socialization of the enlisted spouse. In the early days of the Army the vast majority of spouses in the Army were the officer’s spouses. Carlson notes that at one time, “‘Military wife’ meant ‘officer’s wife.’”

The enlisted force did not become a married force until very recently. So,

The socialization of the families of enlisted men occurred in a more direct, bureaucratic manner. Simply put, the services crafted a comprehensive welfare system, involving the steady expansion of benefits which turned both the man and his family into “military dependents.”44

This basic tension in socialization processes has been exacerbated by the new roles of women in the work place and within the military society.

More broadly, the percentage of military spouses (still mostly wives) in the general labor market climbed from 30 percent in 1970 (compared to 41 percent of the civilians) to 52 percent in 1980 (compared to 51 percent of civilians) and over 60 percent by 1988. According to a study by Rand Corporation, this was the most significant change in Army family structure” during the period.45

The spouses we interviewed felt this tension and many felt that the Army was demanding more of the officer’s spouse at the same time that the rewards of the system were disappearing. The change in policy which no longer allows the rater to comment on
the spouse in the Officer Efficiency Report (OER) took away a
reward that meant a great deal to some, but was odious to others.
Spouses knew that they were still part of the evaluation of the
military member.

For officers, marriage came to be considered
vital for career advancement and divorce,
detrimental. The ability of wives to take
part in military social rituals and volunteer
work had a powerful effect on their husbands'
advancement and success.46

While rewards today are less visible, the expectations to be
on the "Command Team" is very strongly felt by the spouses. This
is especially true because the spouse is part of the PCC at Fort
Leavenworth and other forums in which expectations are placed
upon them. Not all of this socialization is negative, however,
because, as Mady Segal points out, these normative constraints
help spouses belong in the system and in the community.

While wives may experience normative
constraints as pressures, wives benefit when
they are incorporated into the military
system. With their roles institutionalized,
wives have defined social identities and are
more readily integrated into the supportive
social networks. Such integrative social
mechanisms are likely to make important
contributions to personal well-being,
especially during stressful times such as
routine family separations, relocation, and
combat deployment.47

The Command Team demands that the spouse of the service
member be involved in some form of support for other family
members in the unit. The Army has stressed that this role is not
and will not be defined, and that the spouse is free to
participate in whatever manner suits their circumstances.
However, calling the Family Support Group the "Chain of Concern" hints at a structure similar to that of the chain of command in the unit. The vast majority of spouses felt that they had to be central in the passing of information along to members of the unit. The pressures to be involved are both subtle and not so subtle. Most spouses do participate in support structures. The level and commitment to the tasks varies tremendously among spouses.

Many of the spouses had received training from the Army. Most had gone to the PCC at Fort Leavenworth. The training was well-received by most of the spouses. The major characteristic of the training was that it was informational and not skills-oriented. The information presented was helpful and most of the spouses used the packets given them by making certain that unit rosters, information letters, and welcome packets were prepared for members of the unit.

The spouses were not prepared for the disappointments of trying to get unit spouses to attend meetings and social events. All the work and planning that went into the activities usually met with limited results. The spouses began to question their ability to enlist interest among the other spouses. Self-doubt and some self-deprecation was experienced by spouses. They made some choices around their failures, or perceived failures. Some spouses lowered their expectations, some became less committed and didn’t try as hard, and others sought help by restructuring the groups for different functions and enlisted the help of the
unit to design ways to attract the soldier and the spouse.

According to the spouses, the information and training provided at the PCC needs to be re-evaluated. When asked what needed to be added, many were unable to make concrete suggestions. If spouses are doing without adequate training, maybe the Army needs to analyze the organization, missions and functions necessary to have a Command Team that works well. In some interviews, the possibility of training in operating and managing volunteer groups was suggested. For many of the spouses this suggestion was followed by interesting dialogue. Several spouses asked to pursue the management of volunteer groups at a different session. One spouse commented that no one had ever taught her how to be a member of a volunteer organization or analyzed with her how these groups functioned differently. Most of her time was spent doing volunteer work, and she had never analyzed those groups to determine how they work best.

In retrospect, the spouses felt that the PCC training lacked the touch of reality that was most crucial. The training did not hint at the reality of war and the demands of support when a soldier-spouse goes off to war. The PCC training was more akin to discussions of social support, not the hard reality of how demanding the tasks were in wartime. "Make it real and pointed," they said. As they said it, they acknowledged that making it real is difficult because of all the denial systems and mechanisms people carry with them. Everyone thinks that war happens to someone else, not to them.
Many units had family support plans in place and some organizational structure working. Those units that had a real-world mission like the Special Operation Forces (SOF) and the contingency forces had the best plans and the best working structures. These organizations should be studied to see how they train and socialize spouses. One fascinating observation concerns the demand for information. When SOF units leave and the spouses know that the mission is not to be discussed. Even the fact that the spouse is gone is not to be broadcast. One spouse said, "They leave at night and return at night." These spouses have been socialized not to ask for location and mission. They are no less anxious about their spouses, but they would not think of asking where their spouses were lest they compromise their spouses' safety. Those spouses in more conventional units were much more demanding of the system for information as to locations in the desert. Spouses wanted to know where their spouse's unit was located and what it was doing. Many had no concept of operational security.

Second-best plans were in those units which deployed often for training at places like the National Training Center. Plans were in place and practiced some, but the level of emotional concern for a training exercise is not close to the intensity and tempo of the real thing. These units did not practice in peacetime the training with which they went to war. The two most telling observations made by the spouses centered around communications and rear detachment issues.
When the unit went on training exercises the spouse could expect at least some regular contact with the deployed spouse. The lines of communication from the training area to the installation were in place and functioned well. If the spouse had an emergency, or one of the unit spouses needed assistance, the higher echelons in the unit would ensure that the message was received and answered. During training, members of the parent organization and members of the other support units attached to the battalion would make trips back and forth from the field so that there was a constant flow of information. None of these same things were possible in the Gulf War. The one overriding concern of family members was information.

When the unit deployed for training, the commander left behind one of his best officers or NCOs to take care of the rear detachment. The spouse had confidence in the abilities of the person left behind. When units deployed for Operation Desert Shield, only the non-deployables stayed behind. As one commander stated, "We left behind the sick, the lame and the ugly." His wife failed to appreciate the humor. Her response to him was, "Is that what you really think about me and the rest of the families? You leave behind a person not capable of caring for us, worse yet an alcoholic!" Such comments from spouses were common. The plans for family support were different on paper than they were in the reality of peacetime training, and still more different when the unit deployed for the real thing.

It is difficult to evaluate unit plans for family support
because they were not executed as planned. Many changes and modifications were implemented to meet the quickly changing organizational landscape of a unit moving to war. The spouses once again felt that the Army was paying lip service to the family. Several felt abandoned by the flight of all able-bodied personnel. Others felt that those left behind were a hindrance and not a help. Many spouses had to learn the new support mechanisms which were put into being as the need arose. No two installations seem to have organized in the same manner, and when spouses talked to their network across the Army they were struck by the differences. These many differences only heightened their perceptions of family support as being "thrown together."

The spouses' experiences with chaplains in the family support groups were also mixed. Many groups used the chaplain to conduct their family support sessions, so the chaplains were usually present. There seemed to be few chaplains who were central to the FSGs before the unit was alerted to deploy. The activity of the chaplains increased as the FSGs did more activities to prepare the soldier and family for deployment. Chaplains were experienced as being on the periphery of family issues. This fact seems supported by the interviews with the commanders and the feedback from chaplains. The role of the chaplain in support of the family is not clear. The TOE chaplain's focus is more often on the soldier than on the soldier's family.

This extends to the installation chaplains also. In most
cases there was no hand-off of responsibilities from the TOE chaplain to the TDA chaplain. The changes in installation personnel, and the resulting turmoil, added to the lack of continuity. Many spouses remarked on the lack of aggressiveness on the part of chaplains who remained behind. Many felt that there were too few chaplains on the installations to take care of family concerns. Those spouses who attended chapel, and knew the installation chaplain personally, experienced less frustration than those spouses who did not have an on-post pastor or those who worshipped in the unit chapel. The existing pastoral relationship transcended the unit chaplain relationship. It was an experience of loss for those with a more formal unit relationship to their chaplain to not be informed of what chaplain would cover their unit, or whether a chaplain would even visit.

The relationship of the spouses to the installation religious program needs much deeper investigation than is able to be accomplished in this study. Some observations may indicate areas which need study. A few installations chose to consolidate religious services on the installation, while others tried to keep as many programs going as possible. Both efforts met with mixed reviews. Those spouses who commented negatively on chaplains felt that, like the rest of the Army, the best chaplains went with the units while those not-so-good stayed behind. Those who received a reserve chaplain were disappointed at the staff skills of that chaplain, while many complimented the
reservist’s pastoral skills. Spouses did not have a clear distinction about Chaplain Family Life and Family Assistance Centers. Those who had relationships with the Chaplain Family Life Center and the Family Life Chaplain before the deployment used them and referred families to them. Those who did not, simply lacked the knowledge about what Chaplain Family Life programs could offer. The overall impression was that the installation chaplains were there for emergencies and crises, but not there for the various types of ministry needed in a deployment for war. The family members expressed a need for more chaplain support rather than less.

Spouses did not have much contact with the unit chaplain after the unit deployed. Those chaplains with spouses who were active in the unit Family Support Groups used their spouse as a conduit for information. Some chaplains started newsletters in the desert and sent them home. Most efforts on the part of the spouse to use the services of the deployed chaplain were for serious family problems in the unit or for emergencies. Contact was made in the best way possible and the spouses soon found the best way. Spouses know how to "network" and make the system work for everyone’s benefit.

The lack of knowledge about the religious programs provided by installations is difficult to assess from this research. In visits to the installations, the briefings received outlined special programs and efforts on the part of the installation chaplain to support families. Several of the spouses interviewed
were from posts which had the very best of family ministry programs, yet, these spouses did not seem to be aware they existed. Data is not available to explain this contradiction, however, the perception of the spouses is real and must not be dismissed. Installation chaplains should investigate why the many programs offered remained unknown to some battalion commanders' spouses.

The catalogue of problems related by the spouses ran from the tragic, to the tragi-comic, to the humorous, to the hilarious. Any listing would not do justice to the scope of the problems and concerns. All of these problems are meant to be met by, and resolved by, the Family Support Group with the assistance of rear detachment and installation personnel. This is a tall order, especially when the focus of effort is in the unit and is done by volunteer spouses. It is urgently recommended that an honest investigation be conducted into the family support structures in the Army. It is not enough to thank and praise the grand achievements of these spouses because most would not choose to do this over again. Once was too much.

The Family Support Group needs to be analyzed and structured so as not to be isolated from the rear detachment, the chaplain, and the other installation resources. It should exist as part of a network of support. The Family Support Group performs at least four functions: (1) advocates for the spouse; (2) shares information; (3) establishes social functions; (4) provides personal support and a network.
The Family Support Group is the voice of the family member to the military community. The installation chaplain must listen to what the FSG is saying. The spouses advocate for each other when the military community needs to hear the powerless spouse. This function is exercised in many ways; but, here especially the social rank of the commander’s spouse provides a ticket to a hearing. This means that the commander’s spouse must be willing to assume an adversarial role in the organization in order to get the organization to act either compassionately or justly for the soldier’s spouse. Many commander’s spouses are not comfortable with that role, nor the feedback they often get when they are forced into adversarial or mediatorial roles. Several spouses resented having to wear their spouse’s rank, but often that was the only way to get the job done. The Army needs to determine if that is a role they want spouses to have in the Army of the future. There are other approaches to accomplishing the same function which could be designed into the installation support structure. If that is a role for commanders’ spouses they need to be trained in advocacy and mediation skills. They need to be legitimated in that role, maybe as the Navy does with the Ombudsman.

The FSG also dispenses information. In many cases the telephone trees or the Chain of Concern is designed to be a one-way communication notification system. As soon as demands for information become two way communication these telephone trees become overloaded. Other methods of information sharing need to
be designed to dispense information. The spouses did not have plans in place to generate alternate information sources, and neither did most installations. The rapid proliferation of communication channels was amazing. In addition to 1-800 numbers for the total Army, installations put hot lines into quick use. Installations held major family briefings with phone hook-ups to the deployed unit where possible, and video recordings were exchanged between soldiers and families. The list of communication ideas is lengthy, though there does not exist an analysis of the information needs of the entire system.

Four communication issues from the spouse interviews will illustrate some of the concerns. The first concerns a spouse from Europe whose husband deployed with no desert uniforms, no camouflage for his equipment, and without adequate training in NBC operations. Spouses in the unit continually raised questions at the FSG meetings about these three items. The commander in the desert could not understand why spouses were concerned. The reality is that this was a major concern of the commander who worked very hard to get his equipment painted, and his soldiers equipped and trained for desert warfare. The spouses knew that these three things were important and they were reinforced in their opinions about their importance each day on Cable Network News (CNN). Spouses were concerned about the safety of their soldiers. These three elements became a metaphor for them of the security of their deployed spouse. No spouse wanted their spouse’s unit to look like a forest moving through the desert,
and no spouse wanted disaster to follow a chemical attack. If the Army indicates that something is important to the soldier’s safety, it should expect the spouse to think that important also. The commander who withheld information failed to understand that these three items were a test of the Army’s concern for the welfare of soldiers in the eyes of family members.

The ability to phone home from the desert was both a blessing and a bane to the commanders’ spouses. They individually and collectively saw the ability of the soldier to communicate with the family as a very real problem. Soldiers and families fought on the phone, ended marriages on the phone, reported bad news to each other, and used phones to increase family debt. Spouses feared out-of-channel notification concerning wounded or killed soldiers more than anything else. They also did not get to talk to their own spouse as much as did other members of the unit. Commanders were too busy to wait in lines to make telephone calls, and if a phone was not convenient the call did not get placed. Clearly, phones in the desert provided a form of communication which the Family Support Group could not control, but which impacted on their communications and support of each other.

Notification of the next of kin was a concern of many of the spouses. They attended classes on notification procedures and had classes in the Family Support Groups. Misinformation was a very real problem for many of the spouses. Many felt the system was broken, especially notification regarding those wounded in
action. Spouses had difficulty enough handling the prospect of visiting friends whose spouses may have been injured or killed, aside from fear of a notification system that might malfunction. Spouses were not clear about the chaplains role in casualty notification.

Finally, spouses have their own network of friends and former acquaintances which provides a marvelous and expansive information net. These spouses can check the accuracy of information they receive within minutes from the most reliable of insider sources. They also know small communities of people from the same branch and usually can pinpoint casualties long before the notification process even begins. These systems make it imperative that communications from the military structure be as accurate and timely as possible. If information is received that is not accurate, faith in the system is weakened. If information on casualties can be identified by the unit before that information leaves the theater, the burden of waiting for formal identification and notification intensifies.

If the system is to process information in a timely and effective manner, the Family Support Group needs the assistance of the Army and the Army needs the assistance of the Family Support Group in analyzing information needs, processes, and building a taxonomy of information systems.

A third function of the Family Support Group is the establishment of social contacts. These are means to bring unit personnel together for social functions, for training, for
information sharing, and for organizational activities. Spouses were most creative in this area. Most of them knew how to plan and arrange these kinds of events. Getting people to attend was the biggest concern. Many did very innovative things to get people out to meetings. The entire unit must be part of this process. The spouses indicated that the other spouses would attend if they and the soldier got some tangible reward out of making the effort.

The final area of building personal support and networks is the most difficult. Much frustration is caused as attempts are made to try to assist in this area. Some research shows that spouses do have friends and associates to whom they turn in moments of crisis. The spouses reported the tremendous support many of the spouses received from friends and families. Most spouses usually came to the unit for those things with which the unit alone could help them. Those with no support systems looked to the commander's spouse for friendship. They received problem solving, but not friendship. This function needs to be examined very carefully and realistically so that the Family Support Group doesn't take on expectations and measures of success which are not attainable.

According to the spouses the rear detachment elements need attention. They understand the desire of soldiers to go to war with the unit and that no commander wants to punish good soldiers by keeping them out of the battle; but, the burden of administration and support for those who remain behind is too
great a responsibility to be left to makeshift organizations. Spouses continue to test the sincerity of the Army. They are realistic and committed people, but they are not willing to disadvantage their own family well-being for a capricious system. The spouses will do what they have to do because they love their soldiers and care about the careers their soldiers have chosen. They know the sacrifices military life demands. More importantly, they live out a tension which will not hold forever.

Edna Hunter, the grand old lady of military family studies, speculated in 1982 that the Cold War family system had actually spawned the attitudes now shaking its foundations: while the military wife had been expected to place herself in service to her husband’s and the military’s needs, the system also required "an independent, self-sustaining, liberated woman" if it was to accomplish the mission. This tension could not hold forever.48

The commanders and commanders’ spouses stressed in the interviews their perception that military families make excessive demands on the system. The perception that the military would supply for all the needs of the family members causes heavy burdens on the command team. "The Army takes care of its own" is a slogan that does not lend itself to an exact definition. The stories of assistance requested and provided from needs born of genuine emergencies were told with compassion and concern by the spouses interviewed. Those requests for assistance in the form of demands which seemed unreasonable were related as irritants and affronts to both the commanders and the spouses. There was a note in the voices of many of the spouses of being put-upon.
This was commonly stated in a manner which indicated that some spouses seemed dependent on the military in ways unhealthy for the FSG, and unhealthy for the individuals making the requests.

CONCLUSION

The data collected in this project was gathered from a small sampling of officers, their spouses, their chaplains, a few select senior chaplains and other UMTs on four major installations. It is dangerous to try to generalize from so limited a population and claim scientific rigor, however, much of what was heard resonates with other research findings. What was heard conforms to intellectual concepts and theories which have previously been developed as scholars have analyzed the military chaplaincy. This research was targeted on some very specific issues which have been studied by other researchers, in order to have a standard against which the data in this paper could be evaluated.

The Gulf War deployment was not studied because it was thought that the United States Army would participate in a massive deployment like Operation Desert Shield/Storm in the near future. Changes in the world’s political landscape in the past few months suggest that this deployment might in fact be an anomaly, and that we will not participate in a major effort like this in the near future. The purpose of this paper, however, was designed to analyze this deployment in order to test current doctrine and determine what future Army missions will demand for
delivery of guaranteed rights of the free exercise of religion to soldiers and their families. One problem with most military lessons learned is that they tend to focus backward and not forward. The tendency is to plan to fight, thinking about war in the light of experiences and metaphors from the last conflict fought. The real value of lessons learned from this conflict will be to use them in determining a correct vision of the future in order to create necessary changes in doctrine, policy and plans.

The intellectual theories and concepts used to develop current doctrine seem correct in light of our interviews. The efficacy of religious services and the power of the ministry of presence was very evident in all interviews conducted. Commanders wanted the presence of a chaplain in the unit simply to be there with the soldiers. The presence of the chaplain has added value to units which cannot be measured in the usual statistical ways. A chaplain brings a presence to the soldier which symbolizes the security and comfort of religious faith.

The doctrine of Forward Thrust validates that this presence should be with those soldiers who are most in harm’s way. There is a sense on the part of commanders who did not have chaplains that they were disadvantaged by not having their own chaplain. Many commanders encouraged the interviewers to recommend that the Army re-think some decisions about where chaplains are placed in the force structure. A major caution which was received from these interviews is how the Chaplain Corps handles the assignment
of chaplains to task forces and to medical units. In the task forces deployed in Special Operations units, the absence of a chaplain was felt more than the presence of a chaplain. In the medical companies, chaplains were assigned on the basis of patient load, not to assist in ministry to the members of these medical units. Both SOF and medical units face peculiar and difficult missions needing the services of chaplains.

Who the chaplain is as a professional clergy person and the religious awe surrounding things religious cause many commanders to deal with their chaplains in a manner quite different from other staff officers. Those commanders who had experienced strong chaplains early in their careers, or who were themselves dedicated to the practice of their faith, tended to give more guidance to their chaplain. They were more willing to discuss religious ministry as they envisioned it for their command. Other commanders were less active in discussions with chaplains about religious ministry, deferring to the initiative and professionalism of the chaplain. Interviews ascertained that commanders are aware of the tension which exists for the chaplain between allegiance to two institutions. Commanders did not want to tread into the realm of the sacred where they had limited expertise. These same commanders, however, were willing to give guidance to chaplains who did not perform with the soldierly skills necessary to the conduct of the mission.

While chaplain doctrine is correct in locating the chaplain far forward in the battlefield, commanders described for the
interviewers a picture of the fluid nature of the battlefield and the complexity of changing missions. Where the chaplain needs to be located on the battlefield at any given period is dependent on many different factors upon which no inflexible rules should be imposed. Chaplain doctrine should be a selection of scenarios built on the realities defining the critical considerations a commander and chaplain need to discuss in a collaborative decision making process. The unit, the mission, the proximity to medical treatment, the danger, and command and control are all important considerations in deciding where the commander might wish to locate his chaplain during the conduct of the battle.

The shortage of Roman Catholics priests in the Army, as well as how well Roman Catholic soldiers were able to practice their religion, is the greatest test of our DRS and GRS doctrine. Reports by commanders on GRS are mixed tales of grand successes and failures. Commanders understand the difficulty of providing religious coverage for all their soldiers, and they appreciate the efforts of chaplains to coordinate a difficult and complex effort. Success was usually due to the efforts of brigade and division chaplains in attending to this task by very deliberate planning and coordination. Where there was no intentionality, there was ineffective execution of the mission. The crucial need is to place Roman Catholic chaplains in the organization’s most strategic places ensuring that they have logistical and transportation support to provide necessary ministries.

The figures stated above by the Chaplain Corps Combat
Developers on GRS proved to be conservative. Division and corp chaplains described the demands for coverage as larger than they had ever envisioned. (See Appendix L-3) A brigade chaplain position is more than justified to coordinate the efforts of many UMTs providing ministry to so many soldiers.

Neither commanders nor chaplains commented much on the problem of combat fatigue. The biggest request for a review of doctrine came from those commanders who had units with graves registration personnel assigned, or those whose soldiers had to recover bodies from the battlefield. These soldiers were under tremendous stress and needed ministry very badly. It is difficult to assess why so little was discussed or recounted about incidents of battlefield stress. Apart from talking about the effect of family problems on soldier performance there was not much other discussion of stress issues. Commanders related that their units were very busy most of the time. Boredom was experienced while waiting for equipment to arrive or waiting to redeploy after the war.

The Army is quickly developing new concepts for how it will fight in the future. The most significant strategic change will be the way we station the Army to perform the mission. We are moving from an Army characterized by the demonstration of our commitment to world security, by a show of resolve with a large forward presence, to an Army and military system which will demonstrate that resolve with an ability to project the force into those areas where the security and interests of the United
States is threatened. The withdrawal of forward deployed forces, especially from Germany, is speeding up as the need to manage the military force in a changing world and fiscally constrained environment impacts on the size and structure of the force.

Projecting the force and the creation of a smaller CONUS-based Army will generate some significant changes. These changes will be felt in all parts of the organization and by all people in the organization. Some of these changes need to be explored and analyzed for the implications which they have on ministry; and, other changes in chaplain doctrine.

The beginning of change can already be seen in an examination of how the Army will base itself in contingency forces. The majority of forces will be stationed on fewer bases with a longer period of time on-station and less PCS moves. These contingency forces will demand a high state of professionalism and a high degrees of readiness. Soldiers will deploy more for training, practicing quick response time and the logistical discipline necessary for mission accomplishment.

Chaplains in contingency force units will experience more movement and training in brigade task force configurations. The brigade task forces will deploy and operate as task forces, or be attached to other brigades designated as the first to deploy. The chaplaincy must test its doctrine to ensure that these task forces have the religious support necessary to achieve the mission. Technical chains of command must also be determined to ensure that senior chaplain structures are in place to coordinate
GRS. The brigade will become a more important unit in the contingency force than it is today. The Chaplain Corps’ Combat Developers should develop doctrine to support these task forces and analyze force structure requirements to reflect this changing concept of operations.

Chaplains in TOE units will find less time to assist the TDA chaplains in daily ministry on installations. As training intensifies and deployments increase, the unit chaplain will spend more time ensuring that soldiers and families are prepared for the turbulence of life in the contingency Army. More study also needs to be done with respect to the rear detachment and the FSG.

The chaplaincy needs to develop doctrine for family support, analyzing whether there is a need to argue for more chaplains in the Active Component because of an urgent need to minister to families. The commanders and spouses desired more chaplain involvement and not less. The family ministry hand-off from the TOE chaplain to the TDA chaplain was haphazard at best. This is not to suggest that the installation chaplains were not available to families for emergencies; but, availability is not sufficient to meet the needs of the family members.

In this operation, deployment doctrine was not tested. Like the rest of the Army, the chaplaincy planned for a full, not partial, mobilization. The questions faced in this partial mobilization need to be honed and applied to the new contingency force. How will chaplains care for families should mobilizations
come quickly? Can we rely any longer on the mobilization TDA to provide the necessary support?

A longer time on-station will enable soldiers to become more involved in the life of the community surrounding Army posts. It will also create an interesting dialectic creating more stability, as well as instability, for the soldier and his family. What does this mean for the soldier, the family and the chaplaincy? One possibility is to have part of the chaplaincy designed in an industrial model.

Longer tours on station will allow soldiers and families to purchase their own homes in the local area. That one fact alone is interesting to pursue. Who will purchase the home: senior soldiers and families, or junior soldiers and families? It is anticipated that the senior soldiers will want to invest in the community and begin a movement off of the installation. This will change the demography of post populations. The ability to purchase property and live off of the installation will provide the Army an opportunity to get out of the costly business of building and maintaining on-post housing.

The commanders and spouses continued to identify a growing mission for the chaplaincy. It is the mission to the soldier and the family members which is seen as vital to the Army's ability to fulfill the mission on the battlefield, as well as its obligation to the spiritual well-being of the soldiers and families for the free exercise of religion. This increased mission comes at the same time more soldiers might live off of
the installation, and when the need to decrease installation structure will drive many manning decisions. Commanders' spouses especially indicated the desire and need for more chaplain support during deployments. The Chaplain Corps must respond with clarity and conviction to the logic and rationale for chaplain presence and ministry to families on installations. This must be done as the Army defines doctrine and force structure for installation management and support.

The interviews and research conducted by Community and Family Support Command (CFSC) indicated that family members, the Family Support Group, and the command had higher expectations than those of the chaplains for the nature and extent of chaplain participation and ministry during the deployment. Why? The language of the interviews praised chaplain ministry which was performed in the traditional forms of ministry, but failed to praise efforts in areas where ministry moved beyond the bounds of the traditional. As an example, one installation had extensive programs and resources in family support ministries which was not known by the spouses interviewed. These excellent programs were characterized as services for clients and not for families. The spouses were offered the programs, but not encouraged to use them as part of their efforts with the FSG. In another example, the chaplains on one installation insisted that the Family Support Group bring the Chaplain Assistant of the unit to assist in the set-up, and for the security of, the chapel facility. When the spouse mentioned that the assistant had deployed with the
chaplain and the unit, the chaplain in charge set very strict rules for the use of the chapel causing the spouses to go elsewhere for their meetings.

As more families live off of the installation there will be increasing suggestions that people worship in downtown churches and synagogues, and there will be less need for chaplains on installations. Once again, the system sees chaplains in very narrow forms of ministry. Ministry to those who live off post must be articulated. What form will that ministry take and what kinds of programs will characterize that ministry? Local civilian clergy persons don't go to war, nor are they trained and equipped to help the families of deployed soldiers receive the kind of assistance provided by the military organization. Local clergypersons do not have access to the command system in order to advocate for the family, nor do they know the soldier's language or have the necessary security clearance to discuss sensitive issues with the soldiers. They are outside of the Total Institution system and have no way in. It is doubtful that any mechanism exists which could give local clergypersons the status to function adequately for the soldier. If the uniqueness of the chaplaincy could be articulated well, we would be better able to ensure that the military makes informed decisions which will ensure the free exercise of religion.

The changing face of the Army will demand that the chaplaincy reexamine the way it performs ministry. The chaplaincy will need to analyze needs for ministry and anticipate
changing demands and opportunities. The Chaplain Corps must analyze how ministry is performed in an Army whose shape and missions are being configured to meet new requirements and contingencies. Chaplains have done much to assist the Army in ensuring the right of free exercise of religion. Chaplains have the doctrine and concepts which have been validated in the crucible of war, and have trained a force of chaplains who performed exceptionally well in the Gulf. That excellence must be maintained in order to anticipate future opportunities and develop the innovations which will ensure that the national government meets its constitutionally directed ends.
RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Chief of Chaplains:

- Petition the Army to develop policy and a meaningful plan to establish rear detachment cells in each battalion staffed by personnel with family support training.
- Urge the Army leadership to study the "command team" concept and spouse training to clarify expectations.
- Develop a total Army family ministry plan for the chaplaincy which requires installations to plan and train for contingency force mobilization and deployment.
- Develop a Reserve Component Chaplain Ready Reserve Force specifically designed to provide ministry from denominations with chaplain shortages.
- The Chief or Deputy Chief of Chaplains should personally address each Pre-command Course class at Fort Leavenworth providing valuable interface with command selectees and reinforcing the role of the battalion and brigade chaplain.

To the United States Army Chaplain Center and School:

- Develop a mobilization curriculum with fully developed training support packages.
- Design a mobilization plan to quickly augment the staff and faculty to teach the mobilization curriculum.
- Design exportable training packets for UMTs in reserve units which can be used by installation chaplains at mobilization centers.
- Increase resident training and exposure to family life
training materials to support the Chief of Chaplain’s Total Army Family Ministry Plan.

- Provide exposure to training on state-of-the-art equipment for communication and land navigation.
- Develop a training module on the role of the chaplain for use in the Pre-command Course at Fort Leavenworth.

To Chaplain Combat Development:

- Readdress the chaplain force structure to ensure all battalions have chaplains assigned.
- Study the force structure requirements for task forces under the new "Project the Force" concept.
- Develop TDA chaplain doctrine.
- Integrate chaplain supplies and requirements into the National Stock System, and develop chaplain supply system doctrine.
- Develop chaplain family support doctrine to implement and resource the Chief of Chaplain’s Total Army Family Support Plan.

To Major Command (MACOM) Chaplains:

- Design and develop an information management system for mobilization and deployment after conducting an information and data flow requirements architecture analysis.
- Design mobilization plans to support new "Project the Force" concept contingency forces.
- Design plans to supervise and train commanders as to the role of the chaplain within the unit.
· Ensure that installations have fully developed programs to support soldier families in peacetime, predeployment, deployment and reunion.

To Installation Chaplains:

· Develop a Family Support Plan for the installation which includes the following:

· Designate a TDA chaplain to each TOE unit to support that unit when deployed, including a handoff of responsibility from the TOE to the TDA chaplain.

· Design a plan for chaplain involvement in Family Support Groups and with rear detachment personnel.

· Design a plan to train and assist in casualty notification.

· Develop plans to sustain, consolidate and expand chaplain ministry during periods of deployment.

· Develop a plan to coordinate with other installations and community helping agencies during deployment.

· Develop liaison plans with MACOMs, the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains to support mobilization personnel plans.

· Develop relationships with area civilian clergy to train for deployment assistance.

· Develop a marketing strategy and plan to ensure the community knows about chaplain total ministry plans and programs.
To Division Chaplains:

- Develop plans to train commanders in the role of the unit chaplain and chaplain doctrine.
- Develop family ministry plans to ensure the subordinate command chaplains and installation chaplains know the religious needs of soldiers and family members.
- Develop unit training to support the Command Master Religious Program (CMRP) in peacetime and in war.
- Develop systems for communication with echelons above and below division to include systems for communication with family members.
- Develop a pastoral leadership philosophy and a pastoral plan for major subordinate command (MSC) chaplains and families.
- Monitor expectations and attitudes of the command team, and advocate for spouses with command leaders.
- Incorporate division chaplain training for assisting families in peace and war.

To Brigade Chaplains:

- Train the way your unit will go to war.
- Develop a pastoral leadership philosophy and plan for your chaplains.
- Train your chaplains in chaplain doctrine.
- Ensure chaplains know what equipment is authorized, and how to keep it in good condition and ready to go to war.
- Develop family ministry plans in coordination with
division and installation plans.

- Analyze brigade task force contingency missions and force structures to ensure the Religious Support Plan (RSP) covers the entire task force.
- Develop communication plans with elements of the brigade task forces to ensure completeness of the technical chain during deployment.

**To Battalion Chaplains:**

- Develop a family support plan which is coordinated with brigade, division, and installation.
- Train as a UMT the way you will go to war.
- Define role and responsibility with the Family Support Group.
- Ensure all equipment is on hand, clean and ready to go to war.
- Discuss the role of the chaplain and ministry plans with the commander, and insist that the commander provide guidance and personally approve the Religious Support Plan (RSP).
- Ensure the UMT is trained on state-of-the-art equipment such as night vision goggles, land navigation systems and communication equipment is on hand, clean and ready to go to war.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

6. Ibid., p. 9.


12. Ibid., pp. 14-43.


20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. Ibid., p. 16.

22. These Scriptographic books are listed in the Bibliography.


25. Ibid., p. 266.


27. Ibid., p. 299.

28. Ibid., p. 300.


35. Moskos, pp. 41-50.


38. Segal, p. 16.
41. Ibid., 21 October 1991.
43. Carlson, p. 3.
44. Ibid., p. 4.
45. Ibid., p. 8.
46. Ibid., p. 4.
47. Segal, p. 23.
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APPENDIX A

ORIGINAL PROJECT OUTLINE

On 6 September 1991, the following outline was presented to the faculty of the War College who approved this joint effort for the MSP by the four chaplain students.

I. PROPOSED TITLE: "An Overview of the Role of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm with a Critical Evaluation of Religious Support Activities and Technical Doctrine, and Command Team Assessment of UMT Actions, Capabilities and Effectiveness"

II. PURPOSE: There are forty-three commanders (and several spouses) from "Operation Desert Shield/Storm" in the USAWC Class of 1992. The purposes of the group study project are as follows:

A. To determine how these forty-three commanders provided religious coverage for their units during the period 1 July 1990 through 1 July 1991;

B. To determine the adequacy and validity of Chaplain "Forward Thrust" Doctrine as experienced and practiced by these commanders during Operation Desert Shield/Storm;

C. To analyze chaplain force structure issues as they applied to area coverage in Operation Desert Shield/Storm as experienced by these commanders;

D. To analyze Unit Ministry Team (UMT: chaplain and chaplain assistant) ministry in the conducting of the commanders' family support mission both in garrison and in the theater of operations;

E. To recommend to the Chief of Chaplains any changes or refinements needed in doctrine, additional force structure requirements, and policy to define the UMT's role in the commander's family support mission.

III. SUBJECT DESCRIPTION: This group research project will consist of the following four parts:

A. Interviews with the forty-three commanders to examine how they provided religious coverage for the soldiers and family members of soldiers assigned to their units. Commanders will be asked to discuss the role they defined for their chaplain (if one was assigned to their unit) and the support they provided for their UMT. For those commanders who did not have assigned
UMTs, the questions will determine how religious coverage was provided and by whom. These interviews will evaluate chaplain doctrine, chaplain force structure issues, and ministry to family members by TOE and TDA UMTs.

3. Interviews with the spouses of these commanders to analyze the role of the UMT in religious support of soldiers' families as well as the support of the installation (TDA) chaplains in religious support of the soldiers' families prior to, during, and after the deployment.

C. A questionnaire sent to the chaplains of these forty-three commanders designed to discover how they viewed the commander's use of the UMT in support of ministry to the unit soldiers and the family members.

D. Interviews with selected supervisory chaplains and installation chaplains will be conducted to determine what kind of religious support was provided to deployed soldiers and to family members of those soldiers who deployed.

IV. SCOPE OF RESEARCH:

A. Interviews will be limited to those forty-three commanders and available spouses in attendance at the USAWC for the Class of 1992.

B. Questionnaires will be limited to only those chaplains who were assigned to these commanders.

C. Interviews will be conducted with division chaplains, installation chaplains, and family life chaplains from Forts Riley, Stewart, Bragg and Campbell.

D. Interviews will be conducted with the two corps chaplains and the ARCENT and CENTCOM chaplains.

E. Research findings will be reviewed from research conducted by CFSC, ARI, and WRAIR on the issue of family support.

F. After action reports and lessons learned materials will be reviewed from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains as appropriate.

V. BRIEF OUTLINE:

A. Introduction

B. The Commanders and their Unit Ministry Teams
1. Prior to 1 August 1990
2. Pre-deployment soldier and family issues

C. Deployment
   1. Prior to combat
   2. During combat
   3. Post combat (in country)
   4. Redeployment/reunion

D. The Commander's Spouse and the Unit Ministry Team
   1. Prior to 1 August 1990
   2. Pre-deployment
   3. Deployment
   4. Reunion

E. The Chaplain and his Commander
   (Same as B above)

F. The Chaplain Supervisor and Installation Chaplain Support Programs

G. Conclusions

H. Recommendations

VI. TRAVEL PLANS: Travel is anticipated as follows:
A. Trips to Forts Bragg, Riley, Campbell and Stewart to interview division and installation chaplains
B. Trip to Atlanta to interview the CENTCOM Chaplain
C. Trips to Washington, DC, to coordinate with the Chief of Chaplains
D. Trip to Colorado Springs to interview the ARCENT Chaplain
LETTER AND INFORMATION SHEET TO STUDENT COMMANDERS

21 October 1991

The four chaplains in the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992 are doing a group Military Studies Project analyzing our chaplain training, doctrine and family support plans which were employed and field-tested during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Any recommended changes in policy, doctrine, force structure and family ministries will be made to the Chief of Army Chaplains through this MSP.

Since you were in a leadership position in a unit which deployed to Southwest Asia during Desert Shield/Storm we are asking for about an hour of your time for a personal interview. If you are married, we would like to interview your spouse separately with regard to family support issues. Your insights could make significant changes for future ministry in the Chaplain Corps.

Please complete the attached sheet and return it to Chaplain Joe Miller, USAWC Box 190, by 11 November so that a convenient interview time can be arranged as soon as possible.

A copy of the final product will be available to you upon request.

Thanks for your cooperation and support.

Dave Howard
Herm Keizer
Joe Miller
Ken Seifried
INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET

CHAPLAIN MINISTRIES STUDY PROJECT

Your Name ____________________________________________

Spouse Name __________________________________________

Local Telephone Number __________________________________

Your Role/Unit in Desert Shield/Storm _________________________

Name of Your Unit Chaplain in Desert_________________________

Interview Preferences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yourself</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
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<tr>
<td>Day? (Monday-Friday)</td>
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<td>Time of Day? (AM-PM)</td>
<td>_____</td>
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<td>Location? (Qtrs or AWC)</td>
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</tbody>
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PLEASE RETURN TO CHAPLAIN JOE MILLER, BOX 190, NLT 11 NOV.
THANKS!

B-2
APPENDIX C
DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

TITLE: An Overview of the Role of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm with a Critical Evaluation of Religious Activities and Technical Doctrine, and Command Team Assessment of UMT Actions, Capabilities and Effectiveness

AUTHORITY: 10 USC 4503

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: The data collected in interviews and questionnaires will be used in research for a Military Studies Project by the four chaplain students in the United States Army War College Class of 1992.

MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information.
APPENDIX D
COMMANDER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

PREDEPLOYMENT

1. **When did you take command?**
   - Number of commanders deployed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm who are now students at the US Army War College = 37
   - Number of requests for interviews for purposes of this project = 37
   - Number of interviews granted to the four student chaplains = 36
   - Highest number of months in command = 36
   - Least number of months in command = 12
   - Average number of months in command of the 36 respondents = 25

2. **What was the basic mission of your unit?**
   - Number of units represented by USAWC students in command = 36
     - Combat units = 9
     - Combat Support units = 15
     - Combat Service Support units = 12
     - Units deployed from CONUS = 30
     - Units deployed from OCONUS = 6

3. **Was a chaplain assigned to your unit?**
   - Yes, to Combat units = 9
   - No, to Combat units = 1
   - Yes, to Combat Service Support units = 14
   - No, to Combat Service Support units = 12

4. **What was your chaplain’s faith group?** (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other)
   - TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TOE) ASSIGNED CHAPLAINS
     - Protestant = 23
     - Catholic = 0
     - Jewish = 0
     - Other = 0
   - UNITS COVERED BY NON-ASSIGNED, GENERAL RELIGIOUS SUPPORT (GRS)/AREA COVERAGE CHAPLAINS
     - Protestant = 8
     - Catholic = 6
     - Jewish = 2
     - Other = 0
5. What was the relationship of your unit chaplain to the post religious programs prior to deployment?
   • Alternate duties in DISCOM area chapel. Also involved in the Family Life Center.
   • Particularly in the [post] community, involved in the work at the post chapel
   • Helped community chaplain (2 responses)
   • Worked out of the Main Post Chapel
   • Volunteered to assist, otherwise not much involved
   • Chaplain performed area coverage for two other battalions.
   • My chaplain was a reserve component volunteer
   • Preaching at the main post chapel - general support
   • Pastor of the post Episcopal congregation
   • Pastored one of the unit-sponsored chapels (2 responses)
   • Community chaplain
   • Heavy. One of the post experts in family counseling.
   • We had a brigade chapel, but the chaplains served as duty chaplains.
   • Catholic priest, did not deploy to desert.
   • He was active at [brigade-sized post] with lots of community responsibilities and a full range of ministries.
   • She didn’t even get a chance to set up her household after arriving in early December and deploying on Christmas Day.
   • Attached to [unit] for post coverage. Preaching, duty roster, assistance in other units when they were deployed for training.
   • DISCOM services and a Bible study. Don’t know of other activities.
   • Normal installation assistance: duty roster, assisting with preaching at other chapels, etc.
   • My chaplain did a lot in the community by default. Community and regimental chaplains were not very effective.
   • We had only two chaplains on [post]. Both worked well together for wide support.
   • My chaplain was the post-wide Catholic priest, and was constantly the Catholic duty chaplain.

6. What were the most important functions your chaplain provided to your unit while in garrison during predeployment?
   • Counseling in the Battalion area with upset soldiers. Also counseled wives w/soldiers. Chaplain had a part in the work of the predeployment center briefings. Manned a chaplain booth.
   • Talking, counseling, morale, family counseling, [unit] constantly being deployed.
   • He served the entire community.
   • He preached once every five weeks and served as post-wide duty chaplain periodically.
   • Pastoral functions, crisis counseling, marriage counseling, classes on stress.
• Counseling. He was a person to assist in problem-solving, suicide prevention, and mental health wellness.
• Attended community meetings.
• Kept me informed and validated if soldier’s problem was legitimate.
• He already had programs in place that helped in the transition to war. He was known by soldiers and their families.
• There was conflict about what I wanted the chaplain to do and what I wanted my commanders to do.
• Previous experience of second chaplain proved valuable.

Family support group extremely valuable, constant at [post]. Counseling soldiers who were going to be away "again."
• New chaplain not assigned until deployment. The regular unit chaplain was taken earlier, before unit, to DS/S.
• Counseling. He was everywhere: in the motor pool, PT, field. He was the battalion photographer.
• Working with families.
• Counseling (2 responses).
• Counseling, advice, being a chaplain to the community.
• Individual/family counseling. Set up Family Support Nights to brief spouses and family members on post support.
• Identifying soldier problems before incidents (e.g., domestic) occurred.
• ADA unit: had no coverage at all for six months, though support was supposed to come from one of the line brigades.
• Establish a ministry to the unit. Be the "eyes and ears" in the battalion. Did a good prayer breakfast program.
• He briefed me on family support and networking.
• Established a brigade Family Action Council.
• SWA cultural briefings, training about Islam religion, stress management.
• The chaplain’s wife sponsored a "Waiting Wives’ Club."

7. **What was your chaplain’s relationship to family support groups during this phase?**
• Part of the briefing package at company level.
• Counseling and briefing.
• Not good. The single chaplains at [post] did better than the married ones. They had more time and were less distracted by their own family.
• Chaplain briefed, was a source of counseling.
• He spent 70% of his time in counseling, like a social worker.
• None. He resisted. Was not a good staff officer.
• I didn’t ask the chaplain to do much. I had the 1SGTs and platoon leaders’ spouses do the work.
• He attended all post family support gatherings, and helped with many others. Gave classes to all company sized units in three battalions.
• Established chapel coverage for rear area before deployment. Eight post worship programs were combined into
three after the [division] deployed.
• No chaplain assigned to separate battalion. Support from division came after request, usually at company level.
• Linked in with spouse groups and chaplain wives.
• Prior chaplain [name] was dedicated, not formal, though active.
• "I'm single, so I made him my action officer on family support. We put out a monthly newsletter. He coordinated and had a part in the meetings."
• Family support meetings in the chapel following 2 August invasion. No installation chaplains attended these meetings.
• In the [unit] we had problems because of unit mission and personalities. We had a large unit with a real-time, any-time mission.
• Action officer. He had a good program for training like the NTC which became a skeleton for when we went to war. He did a whole series on marriage and family relationships.
• Action officer for administration. He also helped with the budget.
• Occasional.
• Marginal. Did some effective one-on-one, but was not effective in group settings.
• Chaplains often coordinated predeployment briefings for dependent wives. Generally, support groups were a commander's (and wife's) function.
• He came to family support meetings. Since he was not going to deploy, he didn't need to be involved.
• He did a good job of briefing spouses. All of our chaplains deployed.
• Practiced family support program when unit was deployed to NTC. Gave briefing. Identified a chaplain at home station as point of contact for families while unit was deployed.
• No chaplain assigned. I requested one but did not follow up.

8. What special training was required for your unit prior to deployment?
• Continuance. Knew of deployment from August. Trained in NBC, PT. Trained at NTC during Aug 89/May 90. Alerted 8 Nov.
• No. No time.
• Compass training.
• Unit always ready with 18 hrs wheels-up mission capability.
• Training on stress management, rules of engagement, NBC, field scenarios.
• Not much. We had only three weeks to get ready. By the time we got there the war was over.
• "Internal Look" Index Jul 90 (good preparation), St. Croix deployment with chaplain, then "Just Cause."
• Rules of engagement, NBC, weapons, no pornography, territorial threat.
• Requested that the division chaplain visit unit, but it never materialized. I don’t have a high opinion of these chaplains, though recognize the value of chaplain support to units.
• The [division] chaplain held classes and briefed on what to expect physically, emotionally and spiritually during separation. Gave practical information on things like keys, checkbooks, etc.
• "I had the chaplain teach classes on values and commitment, and how to handle stress in combat. These classes were two hours long, and down to platoon level."
• Classes on Islam and the customs of Southwest Asia.
• None.
• Suicide prevention. Our unit had one prior suicide.
• Family support groups were already strong due to strong command.
• Heat. Arab culture.
• Death and grief classes. Did personality tests and a family enrichment program
• Moving out stuff out of the post [Germany].
• He did unit briefings and some NCOPD classes.

9. How did your chaplain help your unit prepare for deployment?
• Make sure Family Support Groups are still working. Provide information on Islam. (MP unit worked with Saudi civilians.)
• Chaplain assisted in publishing a deployment booklet which was used for NTC rotations.
• I wanted a chaplain, got a slot for one, but Chaplain Corps didn’t assign me one. I know how valuable chaplains are, and that’s why I wanted one on my TOE.
• Chaplains were present but did nothing.
• New reserve chaplain was still figuring out the Army, but was meeting soldiers and getting around.
• Counseling, talking to soldiers and their families, personal comfort.
• Classes on the Code of Conduct. Special prayer breakfasts and prayers at battalion formations. We went to special lengths to get special desert camouflage New Testaments for the battalion. The chaplain helped prepare a personalized letter to every spouse and parent of every soldier in the battalion when we deployed, thanking them for their support and commitment.
• Religious materials such as medals and New Testaments.
• Services, soldier and family counseling (3 responses).
• The chaplain kind of withdrew once he realized he was going to war. I had to talk to him about being more positive.
• Individual or family-type counseling. Failed in his mission to publish a family support handbook for spouses. My wife accomplished the mission.
• Brought in a expert on separation and reunion.
BEFORE ENGAGEMENT

10. What kinds of religious ministries were provided by your chaplain in response to the assessed needs of your unit before the ground war? (worship, confession, counsel, encouragement, other)
   • Counseling soldiers who were concerned about uncertainties, no mail, phone access, problems back home, two cases of spouse rape. Positioned with medical company located at the center of Battalion area. Had his own tent/cross-flag.
   • Chaplain had great rapport with soldiers, settled problems, helped settle rumors.
   • Chaplain provided a sensing of the soldiers and the command. He visited the hospital and informed me of what chaplain support was available there.
   • Chaplain came two months later. Provided information about services in unit area and Riyadh.
   • The chaplain was my eyes and ears. He was present with soldiers and helped determine the pulse and trends in the battalion.
   • Provided services in our battalion area plus area coverage with other chaplains/units/Catholic chaplain.
   • Bible studies weekly, stress sessions, prayer meetings, Sunday services (2 responses).
   • Services (attendance 60-80), counseling, individual problems, "Dear John" letters, etc.
   • Worship and counseling. Encouragement!
   • Regular services (2 responses).
   • Troop visitation. We had troops at thirty-seven different sites, and averaged traveling 300 miles every two days.
   • Worship and communion.
   • Gave excellent sermons; however, as the ground war approached, his sermons reflected anxiety which was not helpful.
   • The [type] units seemed more religious than the ground guys. He did a lot of services and counseling. Bible studies one night a week.
   • Ministry was difficult because of 200 mile distance.
   • Worship services, counseling, group activities.
   • Visit each company weekly even though they were separated by many miles.

11. Did your chaplain maintain contact with your home station to keep lines of concern open? (emergency messages, family situations, etc.)
   • Yes. On the road all the time traveling with JAG.
   • Chaplain had contact with local churches at home station which sent mail and care packages.
   • Chaplain didn’t have much contact with families.
   • Yes, through an AT&T phone bank. (2 responses)
• Yes. He used newsletters, videos, local television and really got around.
• As best possible via phone through commander’s wife to support group.
• Not all that much. Still getting his Army legs on. He did get involved in specific cases with call-backs.
• Yes. Called back concerning family problems and was a very reliable source of information. People are more honest with the chaplain.
• We used some lay ministers in the battalion.
• Yes. He handled many problems by phone.
• Yes. I put him in charge of making video tapes to send back to the families. This worked out well. It forced the chaplain to get out and see soldiers.
• Only through the mail.
• No (3 responses).
• The commanders did that themselves.
• He did not know the families.
• No. Phones in short supply. We needed to do more with letters.
• He passed newsletters back to [post] and was on the phone with the division chaplain every other day. Division chaplain got messages back to [post].
• When the phone banks were put in there was a problem with higher bills back home.

12. What was the most significant contribution made by your chaplain prior to the ground war?
• Every AM command and staff meeting the chaplain had a part with devotional/briefing on morale. Also evening staff updates.
• Talking to soldiers and keeping them calm. Reduced the fear of the unknown.
• Visits to all units which were quite spread out, control cells.
• Stress management classes and counseling. Chaplain was a prior service soldier and could relate well.
• He put a lot of miles on his HMMWV being with soldiers. Constant conduct of services and small Bible study groups.
• Pre-battle briefings (chaplain was wounded in Viet Nam). "We knew we were going to lose soldiers...the question was, 'Who?'"
• Being with soldiers and ALL units. He bummed rides without a vehicle at times.
• The chaplain and I discussed Bible studies before we left the states. We actually prayed together about them, and shared the conduct of them in the desert. My OCF training is full of Bible study ideas. Unchurched guys came to services the first Sunday we were in the desert.
• One on one counseling (2 responses). Five baptisms.
• Availability. Just being present. It is intangible, but just "being there."

D-7
• Instilling confidence in soldiers.
• Being with the soldiers.
• Precombat service.
• Took care of extreme cases of fear.
• Services and counseling. Lots of frightened soldiers, especially after the SCUDs came.
• Chaplain got gifts from Red Cross.
• He stayed on the road a lot. Made his presence felt, and was very visible.
• Counseling, worship services.

13. What was your chaplain’s location during this phase? Did you specify your chaplain’s location?
   • Center of battalion area. Commander selected.
     (3 responses)
   • Located in Riyadh with cell HQ, worked from there, position specified by BDE Commander.
   • With battalion HQ, commander specified (3 responses).
   • With the lead company. Chaplain chose it, commander gave option.
   • Stayed periodically with five companies where the soldiers were.
   • I positioned him between the aid station and the mess.
   • Combat trains and field trains.
   • Brigade command post.
   • Battalion main command post (3 responses).
   • Yes. Combat trains. (3 responses)
   • Located in the center of a tight battalion assembly area next to the recreation tent (which he used for services, etc). His location made him accessible to all soldiers. I placed him there.
   • Yes. Brigade rear command post.
   • Visited each battery daily.
   • With the medical company since that’s where he would be during the war. I wanted him to be forward deployed with the medics. Chaplain was anxious.
   • I had no chaplain assigned, but sent transportation for two (Protestant and Catholic) to visit our area, asking them to spend as much time as possible with the battalion. I had sensitized the command to our need for a chaplain. The supplying commander soon wanted them back...he saw their value. We need to look at building chaplain task forces. When the chaplain is there they are used...when they’re not, the unit loses.

14. What specific guidance did you provide your chaplain during this phase?
   • Be there with troops, continuance of roles learned at NTC (2 responses).
   • Visit each unit daily. Be there for soldiers. All denominations to have worship services.
• Visit companies daily. Maintain morale, and keep me informed.
• Brief me twice a day.
• Be prepared for casualties. Be personally prepared. Have letters to next of kin ready.
• He was well-trained. Just continue with normal activity, except that now it’s a life and death situation.
• Went with XO and did area coverage.
• "He knew chaplain business and ministry. He was my personal staff guy with direct access to me." He saw company commanders first, but always came to me; had pulse of command; didn’t get sucked in by troops because he was a reservist.
• He understood what he was to do. We fought as we had trained at NTC.
• "Don’t sit in one place too long. Make it happen. PFC can’t walk away from his tank to come to you, you have to go to him."
• Keep me informed on morale issues. Conduct services every week no matter what we were doing. Visit every battery at least three times per week.
• See company commanders twice a week. Ask two questions: what must I do as a chaplain in this company, and how is the company commander doing? Be with soldiers, and be alert to their problems.
• Conduct services. Visit soldiers where they work.
• When the chaplain got an assistant, the assistant became my morale officer. Chaplain and assistant got a TV and a VCR.
• Contact each company commander daily, conduct services and be available. Report to me about morale.
• Keep me informed on morale issues. (3 responses).
• Be the "eyes and ears" of the battalion.

15. How was Catholic coverage provided for your unit during this phase?
• BDE assistance from the [another unit] chaplain (RC). My chaplain also helped in Protestant coverage of the other unit. (3 responses)
• Riyadh area coverage.
• The Group Commander had a Catholic chaplain.
• DIVARTY had a priest who covered my separate battalion.
• DIVARTY priest, though not sufficient time. Location was 150-200 miles from DIVARTY.
• My chaplain was a priest. (2 responses)
• Air Force and [major unit] chaplains assisted.
• From a neighboring unit. (2 responses)
• COSCOM Chaplain (Roman Catholic).
• Catholic coverage lacking. Not enough priests (commander is also Catholic). Done by area coverage. "Soldiers don’t look at what type (Catholic/Protestant) cross a chaplain wears."
• [Unit] area coverage. PSNCO (Catholic Lay Eucharistic Minister) spoke Spanish. The previous chaplain had arranged General Religious Support (GRS) Catholic coverage.
• It was tough to get, but it came from the support battalion. The Catholic chaplain called our battalion "The Happy Soldiers."
• From the brigade chaplain who was a priest (3 responses).
• The S-1 made coordination for location.
• My chaplain coordinated coverage (4 responses).
• Used lay eucharistic ministers, and a priest from division when available.
• One priest was shared by the brigade (2 responses).
• I had to look for a priest.

16. What kind of Protestant coverage was provided during this phase?
• Two services every Sunday. Bible studies during evenings. Soldiers had time off for religious services and a schedule was always posted.
• Regular services, communion four times in five months, Christmas and Thanksgiving services.
• Weekly Bible studies, Protestant baptisms (54 out of BDE Task Force baptized).
• 2 Protestant and 2 Catholic Sunday services in [large unit]. The group got larger when the war was to start. We ended up in a huge Mercedes dealership building with an attendance of 200-250.
• Regular services (3 responses).
• Normal, just as we had trained (5 responses).
• Normal, under the circumstances of not having an assigned chaplain.
• Tried to maintain same coverage throughout deployment: weekly services, Bible studies, troop visitation.
• I also let some lay ministers conduct services. They did their own thing.
• Chaplain had sing-alongs and Bible studies in his tent.
• Brigade chaplain assisted.

17. Did your chaplain provide religious support for other units in the area?
• Yes, to [nearby unit] (5 responses).
• Area coverage for other units.
• Very much so. He was a priest.
• Yes. General Religious Support (GRS) for a Task Force with 200 augmentees guarding POWs.
• GRS in HQ area, both Air Force and Army chaplains, services, Bible studies, counseling (had a reserve Orthodox Jew; with beard, not allowed into country at first).
• My priest and rabbi gave a lot of time to other units.
• No (3 responses).
• Seldom (2 responses).
• Yes, during October to December. After that he covered my unit only except when we had artillery units reinforcing us. These units did not have chaplains.
• Assigned coverage of separate companies in garrison and during Desert Shield.

DURING ENGAGEMENT

18. What specific guidance did you provide your chaplain during this phase?
• Stay forward with commander in maneuver element, fire support element, and fuel areas, help with graves registration.
• Stay with commander (3 responses).
• Stay in aid station; but, if no movement for a half day, come forward.
• Pray for good flying weather.
• Get the word out, especially concerning SCUDs. Let soldiers know everything is okay.
• Chaplain was with the first unit to cross the LZ.
• Work with soldiers on the aspects of salvation prior to the battle.
• No further guidance. Activities were lessened for our type of unit during the ground war.
• None. He already knew what he was to be doing from our training exercises.
• None (2 responses).
• Let everybody know what is going on.
• Make sure if there were casualties the bodies were treated with dignity.
• Told battalion commanders to have chaplains in combat trains and brigade rear, colocate with battalion aid stations and brigade medical company.
• Ensure casualties have coverage.
• I wanted the chaplain forward with me in the field trains.
• Move with medical company.
• Work out of combat trains, priority to the wounded.

19. Where was your chaplain located during the ground war?
(forward, aid station, rear area, other)
• With commander, forward (5 responses).
• In DIVARTY area.
• Brigade command post.
• I got a reserve chaplain in the medical area.
• With the XO in the trains, being in the right place.
• Battalion aid station (2 responses).
• Battalion main command post.
• Forward with combat trains.
• ALOC.
• Combat trains located 1000-1500 meters behind the TOC. Colocated and traveled with the surgeon and the battalion aid station. Chaplain not initially comfortable with this, preferring to operate independently. I required it because of (1) a fluid battlefield, (2) chaplain needed to be with casualties, (3) during pauses he could easily visit batteries, under protection of logistical resupply vehicles, (4) other command and control elements from the batteries regularly came through combat trains for logistical support.
• We had several chaplain assets from a colocated COSCOM.

20. **What kind of religious ministries were provided to casualties?** (physical, psychological, the dead)
- 24-25 Feb - POW ministries made available, other unit wounded, 5 soldiers killed in 3rd BDE (graves registration help needed). For three days we hauled bodies with us. [Other unit] chaplain had memorial service. Our chaplain ministered to the graves registration personnel from our unit and for [other unit].
- Spoke to those who were afraid.
- Ministered to wounded POWs.
- Chaplain was there.
- Helped with COSCOM casualties, counseled psychological casualties who were returned to the states.
- During pre-battle, a memorial service was already planned.
- We had two casualties prior to the ground war. 6/17 Feb, the chaplain and the CSM did an excellent memorial service.
- Counseling, visitation and keeping [spirits] up.
- Taking care of injured soldiers at battalion aid station (2 responses).
- Chaplain did a good job with memorial service for a casualty.
- Chaplain helped medics cope with casualties. He also helped the graves registration people.
- Chaplain was with wounded.
- The doctors and medics liked to have the chaplain with them when casualties came in.
- When guys left the unit we lost track of them. Two wounded, no KIA.
- Had four casualties the very day the area coverage chaplains arrived. They just happened to be there at the right time. We had a memorial service the next night. "The Lord knew our need and made it happen."

21. **What equipment did you provide your chaplain for ministry during the ground war?** (vehicle, radio, tentage, other)
- Vehicle, no radio (2 responses).
- I gave him a vehicle when he needed it. He didn’t have a dedicated vehicle.
- Commercial vehicle.
- Anything he needed. He was a super chaplain.
• Chaplain moved with convoy and always in contact through S-1 vehicle.
  • Vehicle and office.
  • HMMWV with radio (3 responses).
  • Transportation provided by DIVARTY Chaplain.
  • No vehicle available (2 responses).
  • Vehicle (later on) with no radio. We travelled an area of 46,000 square miles.
  • Vehicle, radio, tent, computer. Chaplain very well supported.
  • Vehicle, tent, radio, normal field gear (2 responses).
  • Vehicle (lost part of the time to CSM), no radio, magellan, normal field gear.
  • Vehicle, no radio, tent.
  • "I made sure he had a vehicle even though the TOE does not provide him one." Tent, other normal field gear.
  • For protection, rode in a tracked vehicle with surgeon. Chaplain’s wheeled vehicle followed behind, along with radio and tent.
  • HMMWV
  • Chaplain traveled with me when he needed to fly. At base camp I provided him a vehicle.
  • CUCV and later a HMMWV. We didn’t have enough radios for him to have one, though he did know how to use a radio.
  • I gave up a truck to support the chaplain.

22. Did your chaplain utilize any unique military or personal equipment?
  • Special Desert Storm Bibles.
  • VCR. Television crew filmed our soldiers as chaplain and 1 SGT assisted.
  • Short wave radio for news and to control rumors.
  • VCR and camera.
  • He brought his own reference material.
  • Chaplain held communion in the chow line. We had a choir after the ground war, met at HQ dining area, chaplain led, sang for troops at night. Easter: had three crosses erected on high ground (at midnight) for sunrise service...soldiers followed crosses to the service, other units joined us.
  • "He needs a good speaker system for his services which could also help with music. He needs access to video equipment and good video tapes on biblical themes, values, and good entertainment. This needs to be TOE equipment for the chaplain."
  • He made up special hymn sheets at home station.
  • He built a special altar.

23. What significant religious ministries were provided by your chaplain during the ground war?
  • Held a special service prior to launch (2 responses).
  • Held services...large attendance.
  • Ecumenical Easter service.
• No changes. Unit mission less demanding during ground war phase.
• He conveyed to soldiers that we were going to take care of them no matter what...even if they died.
• Assist with an HIV positive soldier.
• Being with and available to soldiers (4 responses).
• To everyone in the ALOC.
• Ministry to the wounded.
• Chaplain provided a VCR tape which soldiers could send home. 80% participation.
• Chaplain was a "combat multiplier." Worked with anxious soldiers. It's impossible to provide a soldier what he needs without a chaplain prior to combat. Chaplain needs to "be there" with the soldiers.

AFTER ENGAGEMENT

24. What specific guidance did you provide your chaplain during this phase?
• Morale check after the effects of the ground war, report any psychological problems (2 responses).
• Always talk to me. Be with the soldiers wherever they are, and report back. Stay involved with the battalion units.
• I left him on his own.
• Watch for morale problems. Keep a positive attitude. Support command and keep us informed as to what's happening at homes of soldiers.
• My unit was 25-30% female. Be aware of male-female relationships.
• Provide programs, set up library, provide entertainment, keep a variety of activities for soldiers.
• Begin to emphasize that returning to the USA has its "down side."
• To visit all platoons and aid in deprogramming soldiers from the fight. To look for soldiers who were "at risk."
• Keep an eye on morale, get out and be seen, worship services (2 responses).
• Remain with commander in detachment area.

25. What types of rites, ordinances or ceremonies were conducted by your chaplain after the ground war? (memorials, communion, other)
• Services continue, stopped in Kuwait, GRS ministry, memorial services at mass burial site (50-60 Kuwaitis/Iraqis among the dead). Had to shoot dogs which were digging up bodies later on.
• Normal services continued.
• A special Easter sunrise service. (2 responses)
• Nothing out of the ordinary.
• Memorial ceremony (3 responses).
• Chaplain [Protestant] did some special events for the Jewish soldiers.
• We had a great Good Friday service.
• Service of Thanksgiving.

26. Did your chaplain assist any other units in religious ministries?
   • Yes. (5 responses)
   • No. (2 responses)

27. Was your chaplain involved in a liaison with home station chaplains?
   • No. Talked with chaplain’s wife who talked to commander’s wife through DISCOM chaplain and Division Chaplain.
   • Yes. The chaplain would minister to several going on emergency leaves. He took charge personally for getting soldiers to the aircraft in Dhaharan.
   • No. He did not want to contact them.
   • Very limited.
   • No. (4 responses)
   • Unknown.
   • Too far out, though we did have limited access to an MCI telephone bank.
   • Yes, through the commander’s wife.
   • Yes. Constantly via phone and newsletter.

28. What was a memorable contribution your chaplain made in religious ministries to your unit following the ground war?
   • Communion in chow lines. Easter sunrise service.
   • No matter how busy they were, they always found time for people. Used the chain of command to work soldier problems.
   • Escort of emergency leave personnel. His attitude was excellent. A very humorous guy, lighthearted.
   • Encouragement and counseling.
   • Absolutely nothing! His reputation suffered, and he became ineffective.
   • To track down soldiers in the hospital and report on their status.
   • Getting around to be with soldiers. Counseling.
   • Morale building.
   • The memorial service was very well received.
   • Chaplain helped soldiers be thankful and prayerful.
   • Chaplains did a good job of caring for casualties. Clearing stations need chaplains on location.

REDEPLOYMENT/REUNION

29. What specific guidance did you provide your chaplain during this phase?
   • Used DIVARTY chaplain to teach 3 hour reunion classes to each battalion soldier.
• To teach reunion classes at the platoon level, including classes on dealing with combat.
• Talk to married soldiers and counsel as required. Identify potential problems.
• Taught classes on reunion (7 responses).
• Distribute reunion information through company commanders and 1SGTs.
• Return to normal services and counseling.
• I sent my chaplain back early to help with redeployment issues.
• I really should have given my chaplain more guidance.
• Be patient and keep a positive attitude.
• Be sensitive to suicidal tendencies and brief every company commander on the signs of potential suicide victims.

30. **Did your chaplain provide any information about reunion or readjustment issues for soldiers about to return to their families?**

• Yes. Chaplain manned the CP, always available, classes and written material, all soldiers had time off for classes, mandatory for married soldiers, Bibles distributed.
• Chaplains ran reunion classes which were mandatory for all soldiers.
• Orchestration of reunion information.
• Continued reunion sessions. Chaplain was good at recognizing problems.
• No. Input would not have been well received because of focus on leaving the desert.
• Very detailed briefings on reunion. Chaplain and all commanders talked to every soldier.
• Yes. (7 responses)
• Chaplain did not conduct the sessions, nor did I ask him to do so.
• He taught the reunion classes, and reminded everybody to be safe when they got home (e.g., no heavy drinking and driving).
• The Division Chaplain taught reunion classes. Poor attendance.
• Yes. They were a real strong point.
• Yes. They were mandatory.
• Utilized scriptographic booklet about reunion.

31. **What kinds of reunion preparations were made by the home station chaplains in garrison?**

• Training classes (2 responses).
• Chaplains not involved. Not much input from chaplains.
• Stress classes...dealing with anger. My unit’s redeployment date kept changing.
• Reunion classes. (6 responses)
• None by the chaplains. They were informed if they needed help that it was available.
• Classes in coordination with commander’s wife.
• Reunion classes. Many soldiers wrote or called home to tell family members about these classes.
• Reunion classes. Fort [post] has a great Family Action Center.
• There were some classes taught at home station, but they didn’t go well. [Family members] were not aware of realities; they didn’t really care.
• Battalion commanders taught the classes.
• Worked with the families. Was with them at the airport.

32. In what kinds of redeployment/reunion programs did your chaplain assist, plan or conduct?
• [Several of the previous comments apply to this question.]
• I sent the chaplain back with the advance party (five days before the unit) so that he could get some family issues sorted out before the unit arrived.
• Special battalion reunion dinner.
• None other than walking around visiting soldiers.
• Conducted a special battalion "Family Day."
• Chaplain had books and films. I didn’t think the training went well. It became a joke. The macho guys didn’t like it, but it did get the message across.
• He did a lot with small groups. Used the scriptographic books along with material he developed himself.
• Reunion classes. 8-10 meetings. Training went over very well. Many positive comments from junior officers.
• Special memorial service at home station upon return.
• Classes while still in the desert. (2 responses)

33. What do you remember as the most significant religious ministries provided by your chaplain during redeployment/reunion?
• Command post area counseling, availability.
• My Jewish chaplain was always in danger. He was a very brave person.
• Weekly chapel services averaged 60-70 attendees. Chaplain was always there and available to talk.
• We stayed in Iraq for 30 days. The chaplain did an excellent job caring for civilian wounded.
• Reunion booklet, stress management led by other than chaplains. Predeployment: garrison chaplains facilitated family support groups.
• "Being with soldiers!"
• Headed off many potential family problems.
• Being welcomed home.
• Reunion dinner.
• Family Day.
• Individual counseling. (2 responses)
• Memorial service conducted for two soldiers who died shortly after our return.
• He was "there." A chaplain is vital for the unit in combat.
• He was good with small groups.
GENERAL

34. Overall, what went well in religious ministries during operations?
   • Chaplain set up quickly and publicized services, encouraged personnel to attend.
   • Christmas and pre-launch services, predeployment counseling, identification of problems, Catholic coverage from [other unit].
   • Openness of discussions about the Islamic faith. Some soldiers had said, "I'm a Muslim and I won't shoot a Muslim."
   • Chaplain [name] was always on the road, always out touching soldiers, always there for young soldiers, was "one" of the old soldiers.
   • Full coverage of services, counseling, support.
   • Lots of people sought out the chaplain.
   • The enthusiasm and coverage from a chaplain who volunteered to go to war.
   • "The battalion leadership is greatly affected by the chaplain. If you are not a chaplain (spiritual leader), you are just another staff officer."
   • Counseling.
   • The chaplain and I didn't want to lose the Bible study emphasis after we got back to [post], and started it up again after we returned. About half of the original group continued.
   • Availability. Just "being there." (2 responses)
   • The soldiers were more religious as the war drew closer.
   • Chaplain's wife part of the ministry team as commander's wife is part of the command team. Our chaplain's wife worked very hard.
   • Chaplain had a lot to do with the excellent morale of our soldiers.

35. What went wrong?
   • Stupid to have cross removed or covered. Chaplains were present there to serve OUR forces, not to influence area residents.
   • I don't remember what the chaplain said in the Pre-Command Course.
   • Catholic chaplain didn't always arrive. Poor coordination.
   • I wish the area coverage chaplain had been a member of my unit.
   • [Division] chaplains wore crosses. Moslems passed out religious literature from busses, though we couldn't do such things. I wanted a chaplain. I put in a request for a chaplain. Didn't get one.
   • Hesitancy for services because of Saudi environment.
   • All problems seemed to be elevated to my level, or my wife's.
• Families are getting their expectations too high with regard to what the Army can do for them. We’re building dependency. Soldiers and families ask for anything and always expect to get it.
• Need to plan for rear area communication before deployment.
• Classes. Chaplain elected to stay with troops rather than take an early return to [post]. Chaplains [names] seasoned. Taking away chaplain at a critical point (pre-launch) was not smart. Division Chaplain requested and Corps Chaplain made the switch.
• We had a female chaplain who pastored the area chapel.
• We need a way to get the chaplain his own vehicle.
• The Division Chaplain did not support his chaplains and had little concern for the soldiers.
• The chaplain felt threatened when a soldier started a gospel service with a huge following.
• The chaplain’s assistant was not very effective.
• Chaplain was aware of a soldier practicing with craft in the battalion, appeared to be afraid of this soldier, and didn’t know how to deal with him.
• Chaplain seemed to be afraid of combat. Sermons in late December and January were gloomy.
• The Chaplain Corps needs to look at how they assign chaplains to medical units. The chaplain in the company is for the patients, not for the soldiers.
• Aviation units didn’t have chaplain assets. Task forcing is a problem for chaplain coverage.
• Be prepared on how to deal with a self-appointed lay leader.
• I didn’t get to take my chaplain (a priest) to the desert.
• Chaplaincy needs a stronger IMA program.
• The troops deployed, but the chaplain didn’t. He had excuses why he couldn’t go, and got a deal other soldiers didn’t.
• If the installation (rear detachment) chaplain isn’t involved with the unit prior to deployment he will not make an impact afterward. There must be some kind of TOE/TDA interface in preparation for deployment.
• The chaplain had a family support plan but didn’t employ it.
• We’re used to deploying at Fort [post], but spouses were really on their own this time. Usually someone stayed behind, but only the "weak and lame" did this time.
• The rear detachment had a lot of problems. (2 responses)
• Short deployments are manageable. Over the long haul, family support structure breaks down.
• We have written an insurance policy on which we can’t deliver. My wife, and others, are burned out. She doesn’t want to talk about it in these interviews. She feels "put upon" by the Army. Lots of work and no pay.
• All [post] chaplains deployed. The replacement chaplains were late coming into Germany with not much overlap. Since we deployed a lot in Germany, we practiced family support a lot. Chaplain couldn’t get a recreation program started while waiting for redeployment. I had to counsel him. He was not prepared to do creative things. He lost interest.
• Chaplains from the states didn’t do well with us [unit from Germany].
• I had no chaplain assigned to my separate battalion. Needed a chaplain badly the closer we came to the war. The presence of a chaplain would have made a big difference to soldiers’ apprehensions.
• Forward thrust doctrine works, but the Chaplain Corps need to assign chaplains to ADA battalions. The result of having no chaplain meant no religious support for family programs, no reunion briefings, no personal contact with chaplains. No way to get a feel for chaplain viewpoint on morale of unit.
• Commanders need to be educated in the Pre-Command Course on how to utilize a chaplain.
• Every chaplain needs to have a dedicated vehicle.
• Area coverage only provides for religious services which are maybe more important to the chaplain than to the soldier. General religious support doesn’t allow for the closeness that develops between chaplain and soldier.
• The Chaplain Corps needs to educate commanders on the role and duties of chaplains.
• Family support was done mostly by my wife. She had little or no help from the installation.
• Chaplain made a negative comment to soldiers watching a X-rated movie. They resented it. The company didn’t like the chaplain (230 soldiers in that unit). Chaplain was a moralizer.
• Chaplains have to learn to market their ministry. Be salespeople. Need to offer young soldiers meaningful stuff.
• Chaplains need to go to war with units. Rear detachment mission is secondary to the war mission. We must take care of soldiers who go to war.
• Chaplains need to be assigned to aviation and SOF units, but aren’t always. That’s a doctrinal failure for the Chaplain Corps.
• Need to formalize rear detachment coverage.
• Chaplain task forces need to be established for coverage of units who don’t have chaplains assigned.
• My chaplain should not have been on active duty.
• Need to emphasize ministry in MOPP gear.
• Family support was weak. I didn’t have a good person to leave behind for the rear detachment. (2 responses) He was not helpful to my wife. She continues to let me know about that.
• There was a lot of lip service to family support on the conventional side, but when you have a specialized unit (e.g., special operations) families form bonds, especially at the company level.
• Problem with casualty notification system. It’s broken.
• Not having chaplains assigned to Air Defense battalions is a tragic mistake.

36. In retrospect, what changes in religious ministries would you make if you were doing it all over again?
• Meetings should be called "Protestant and Catholic" and in no way should we change what we’re doing. Father [name] refused to remove cross. He was located in the Dhaharan area.
• The Army doesn’t recognize the need to equip the chaplain with his own transportation assets.
• Chaplains need to be assigned to medical battalions.
• We spend a lot of time trying to get priests for Catholics. A chaplain is a chaplain.
• Deploy with enough material and money to take care of ministry needs.
• None. "I learned what a chaplain could do when I was a battalion XO. We’ve got to make sure we don’t put chaplains out of the Army. There is no way that family members in the rear areas could survive without chaplains."
• Get rid of my chaplain. He was ineffective. I should have been more demanding of him and counseled him some more.
• My female chaplain didn’t report sexual harassment against her. It annoyed me because she didn’t come to me with the problem. Several negative gender issues surrounded the presence of my female chaplain, including chaplain-to-chaplain ones. One mid-level supervisory chaplain came from a denomination which didn’t believe in female ministers, and this created difficulties. The overall supervisory chaplain didn’t intervene in this issue, either.
• The supply problem was a distraction.
• Chaplain needs more skills and training other than just Bible answers for all problems.
• There needs to be more of an emphasis on family counseling. Chaplain should try to identify potential problems before they happen.
• Considered relieving my chaplain prior to deployment, but didn’t because I could not get a replacement. I considered him better than nothing. If I had it to do over again, I probably would have relieved him. He was not a field soldier. I requested daily feedback, but didn’t receive it. Short time in the Army. Gave bad advice to soldiers through lack of understanding Army.
• My chaplain needed more supervisory skills, staff skills and energy.
• It isn’t right to expect spouses to run Family Support Group. They are not trained, have no legal standing, are volunteers, and aren’t soldiers.
• A paradigm that was broken. We took a chaplain who didn’t belong to us, and he performed well.
• If the Army is serious about care for families, then a professional should be hired for each unit. They should be well-trained and serve as a OIC for family support. Chaplains can assist, but they are assigned to care for soldiers.
APPENDIX E
COMMAND SPOUSE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND SYNOPSIS

1. Did your unit have a written family support plan in July, 1990?
   • Yes = 18
   • No = 5

2. Did your unit chaplain interact with the unit family group/s prior to July, 1990?
   • Yes = 14
   • Briefed spouses prior to every deployment
   • No = 9
   • Unit did not have a chaplain (2 responses)
   • He automatically worked with at least half of our people do to our community situation
   • Not on a scheduled basis. If invited to troop meetings, I found the chaplain always attended

3. Did you unit have instruction/information helping soldiers and family members prepare for separation?
   • Yes = 21
   • The information dealt primarily with a separation of 1 to 2 months (NTC). No information was available for a deployment of undetermined duration
   • No = 2
   • Not prior to June, 1991
   a. If yes, was your unit chaplain a part of the instruction/information?
      • Yes = 17
      • Process included a chaplain step, but it was not necessarily manned by the unit chaplain
      • No = 0

4. Did your unit have a published chain of concern (phone roster) for telephonically getting information out to spouse?
   • Yes = 23
   • No = 0
   a. If yes, how often was it used prior to unit deployment?
      • Daily = 0
      • Twice a week = 2
      • Once a week = 2
      • Twice a month = 3
      • Monthly = 12
      • As needed, Battalion had over 60 deployments in a 30-month period
      • It wasn’t used until after deployment or shortly prior to deployment
b. If yes, how often was it used after unit deployment?
- Daily = 4
- Twice a week = 5
- Once a week = 11
- Twice a month = 4
- Monthly = 0
- As needed

5. Did your unit have a written rear detachment chaplain SOP?
- Yes = 3
- Kind of an inclusive Battalion rear detachment SOP existed to cover everything from FSG to property turn in = 20
- No
- Rear detachment chaplain - no such animal (2 similar comments)
- Our Division left one chaplain back for all the families

a. If yes, did you have a copy of it?
- No = 2

6. Did your unit hold a pre-deployment family member briefing?
- Yes = 23
- No = 0

a. If yes, did your unit chaplain take part in the briefing
- Yes = 14
- Briefed family member as to what he was there to do - help and assist. Chaplain's wife very active also
- Gave explanations to families to prepare for deployment constantly
- Gave a 10-minute talk on predeployment - postdeployment expectations, hopes, fears... (excellent) - prayer
- Was present
- Present for questions
- Our chaplains were identified as people who could/would help in any way possible
- Came and spoke about separation
- Gave briefing to families; gave all a publication about helpful info for our post; did some one-on-one counseling
- Our Battalion left before any of the rest of DIVARTY so he set that up early. This was at our Battalion's request and the DIVARTY chaplain came over and helped with the briefing as to what to do, how to stay close, keep up the communication with their children. Need their willingness to help
- He spoke on problems that might arise and told us where to go for help
- He gathered some information for us and helped put together the packet of information we handed out
- Gave briefing on how he could provide help and guidance
- No = 4
• Our chaplain was taken from us by another group. Later, when we became part of another Brigade, we then had access to a unit chaplain - but that was after deployment. In the interim we used the services of the post chaplains.

b. **Did the designated rear detachment chaplain take part in the briefing?**
   • Yes = 10
   • No = 13
   • Divisional level
   • We did not have a designated rear detachment chaplain at the Battalion level

c. **Did the Installation Family Life Chaplain take part in the briefing?**
   • Yes = 4
   • No = 9

7. **Did your unit hold post deployment (while the unit was in Southwest Asia) family member briefing?**
   • Yes = 21
   • Community briefings were held weekly; I held monthly core leaders meetings with company leaders, area leaders, newsletter people, etc.
   • The Military Community Command had briefings
   • Once, the day the air war began
   • Division level had information meetings
   • Yes, but not very many women attended
   • No = 1
   • Unit did not, but community did weekly

a. **If yes, was the rear detachment chaplain a part of the briefing?**
   • Yes = 8
   • Divisional level gave out some information and prayed each time
   • No = 13

b. **If yes, how often were the briefings?**
   • Daily = 0
   • Twice a week = 0
   • Once a week = 5
   • Twice a month = 3
   • Monthly = 7
   • Meetings varied - at Battalion level, also several meetings at company level and below
   • We only had one - when a husband came back due to a death - he came in and told about the living conditions, etc. Word on their husbands individually if he had seen them, etc. The rest was information passed on at coffees and family get-togethers held while they were gone
   • Twice during deployment
• Individual batteries got together monthly. The unit newsletter was mailed monthly to the whole Battalion. It contained all sorts of information including articles from our guys which they sent to the commander’s wife.

8. Did your unit hold family reunion instruction/sessions prior to the return of spouses?
   • Yes = 19
   • Held and prepared community wide by Family Assistance and Mental Health Services
   • We left the command before the unit’s return. However, I know there were plans already underway for the reunion briefing by the Brigade chaplain
   • Information was given to all officers’ wives and 1st SGTs’ wives. I asked them to pass it on to their batteries.
   • No = 3
   • Thought pamphlets were available
   • The community did

a. Was your rear detachment chaplain a part of the instruction?
   • No = 12
   • Yes – present and gave advice
   • We did not have a rear detachment chaplain
   • Yes – he held three sessions
   • He was going to present the entire program. We had discussed these plans, and actually had to postpone the briefing at one time, because our unit didn’t come home when they were first expected
   • Provided information, written and oral, on reuniting with spouses
   • We were given information through Army Community Services (ACS). The division rear detachment chaplain offered to come if he was available. Needless to say, he was a busy man, so we held the reunion sessions without him

b. Was the Installation Family Life Chaplain a part of the instruction?
   • No = 11
   • At the division level – yes. At the Battalion level – no
   • I don’t know. I am unfamiliar with the term: Installation Family Life Chaplain
   • Yes. They were wonderful
   • I don’t know – we left before the unit returned
   • Our coffee group asked the Family Life Chaplain to talk to us – not all units did this
   • Pretty much the same information as the unit chaplain
   • I attended a command wives’ briefing every Friday. One of the chaplains was usually at those briefings. He offered some general suggestions on implementation of the program
9. Were you directly involved with the installation's Family Assistance Center?
   - Yes = 15
   - No = 8
   - The center was run by officers and enlisted. We were available only when needed, such as answering phones, stapling newsletters etc. I was contacted directly when a unit came in

   a. If yes, how often?
   - Daily = 7
   - Twice a week = 3
   - Once a week = 0
   - Twice a month = 3
   - Monthly = 2

10. Did your unit chaplain, while deployed, maintain contact with you/unit families back at the installation?
    - Yes = 6
    - Only when specifically needed, primarily professional and some family problems. But he had his hands full in Saudi. We had a chaplains' resource group at the Family Assistance Center upon which we could call or refer problems or questions
    - Communication was very limited in our division, so this was not ideal
    - As well as the mail and communications could provide. He sent back videos of each battery
    - No = 16
    - I sent various messages, newsletters, fax information, etc., as needed
    - Rear detachment chaplain took care of families in the unit

   a. If yes, please list the channel/s your chaplain used.
   - Through his wife - through my husband
   - Telephone, newsletters, videos, briefings by officers/NCOs back on emergency leave, TV spots
   - Videos
   - He did send back a newsletter and we got a tape of Easter services in the Battalion
   - Mail primarily, phone contact with me if the need was right

11. Did your unit chaplain implement part of the unit family support plan in Southwest Asia?
    - Yes = 8
    - Kept in touch with the Family Action Council
    - No = 8

12. Were you in charge of the unit family support program while the unit was in Southwest Asia?
    - Yes = 20
    - No = 3
    - The rear detachment commander was in charge of the family support groups
a. What was your role in the family support program?
- FSG leader
- Helped with organizing meetings and getting information to the spouses
- Coordination, information gatherer, advisor, friend, facilitator
- Battalion commander’s wife
- Coordinator for all companies, individual FSGs. Held weekly meetings with rear detachment commander and company commander wives
- My role was more supervisory. I had the good fortune to have a complete operating unit: president, company representatives, treasurer, etc.
- I deployed to Southwest Asia and the Battalion executive officer’s wife ran the program
- Leader, substitute Mom, coordinator
- Head of Battalion FSG. Lots of assistance from CSMs and the chaplain’s wife
- I was the tie between the group leaders and the Brigade level. Our CSM wives were the FSG leaders
- I held the meetings; activities for families or only spouses; started phone tree; I did long distance telephoning to families of single soldiers; newsletters and roster; informed and consoled. We had cookie exchanges from house-to-house to see how everyone was doing; transportation
- I fulfilled the Senior Leadership Position as an active participant as well as an advisor
- Information/Referrals
- Leader
- I was the Battalion level leader of the support group. I asked to be used as an adviser and reference point
- I was the primary source of information for the spouses. I coordinated with the company commanders’ wives to disseminate the information and was responsible for the monthly newsletter
- I was a sounding board and referral point for the company commanders’ wives
- I passed on information via telephone tree and monthly newsletter, hosted meetings, brought in speakers, had an appreciation dinner for officer wives, set up recreation activities
- Battalion Commander’s wife, ensuring there were meetings as needed. Companies had Points of Contact and monthly meetings; relaying information as received through the phone chain; caring for families
- I was completely in charge

b. Did you receive instruction/information for the commander’s spouse to head the unit family support program?
- Yes = 15
- Slightly, piecemeal, nothing that gave the lay of the land - no specific information given anywhere
- No = 7

E-6
c. If yes, who gave the instruction/information?
   • The Division
   • Some obtained through PCC (5 responses), other through ACS personnel, through the chaplain, the S-1 and my husband, other wives
   • COSCOM Commander’s wife
   • Division rear detachment
   • Higher ranking spouses, installation commander and Family Life Chaplain
   • I gathered information from previous units and experiences
   • ACS
   • Senior officer wives, meetings with helping agencies
   • Ft. Lewis sponsored monthly briefings from the command and all family support activities to FSG leaders
   • DIVARTY commander’s wife, post commander’s wife, various areas of post
   • The Brigade commander’s wife – professionals hired by ACS to run seminars

d. If yes, where did you receive the instruction/information?
   • Information sharing among Battalion commander spouses
   • At command conferences, wives’ meetings
   • Division headquarters
   • Post
   • Previous units
   • At a community meeting
   • We had tons of meetings beginning with predeployment and continuing through deployment
   • At monthly briefings
   • Seminars, booklets, meetings

13. Did you receive pre-command spouse training?
   • Yes = 21
   • No = 2

   a. If yes, where did you receive the training?
   • Leavenworth = 19
   • VILSECK
   • Seminars at Ft. Stewart
   • VILSECK and Leavenworth

   b. If yes, please evaluate the training.
   • FSG training regularly given as part of PCC training; discussed newsletters, Battalion activities, ideas which could be implemented; needed more time to discuss things that worked specifically - didn’t get down to the nitty-gritty
   • Needed more concrete ‘how-to’ info – scenarios – especially re: deployment, stress (i.e., mental illness, suicide, etc.) More guidance in legal issues - more resource information
   • Inadequate, misguided, not related to the way it really is
   • Good
• Minimal
• O.K. - in that you were encouraged to feel good about your leadership style. My best advice has come from friends
• Well-organized and theoretical. The real training was on post and on-the-job-training
• Very helpful. At our post there was no standard FSG set-up. Some Battalions were better than others. After our deployment, post set up a very efficient family information center to handle complaints, free handouts, etc. Helped to ease the problems for spouses of deployed soldiers running the FSG
• Very worthwhile, but too much to soak up in one week. I did use my information as a reference. My notebook stayed in my night stand
• Command Team Training was helpful as far as general information. Deployment was not specifically covered, however, the Command Team concept and the Volunteer Family Support Group concept did not mesh and was not the answer for our Battalion in our location. The spouses of our Battalions soldiers were comfortable with the structure that was already in place. A drastic change would have created too much disorganization and confusion. My years of experience as an army wife living in Germany paid big dividends
• The training was appropriate for normal times - not for war deployment times - although I do believe the Army speaks out of both sides of its mouth. I don’t think it addressed the Gulf War type of environment and the special support needed in war time
• At the time it didn’t seem relevant. I feel it was much too vague and theoretical. It wasn’t specific enough about actual methods or organizing Family Support Groups. Another failure was the lack of telling us true expectations of the spouse’s role at Battalion level
• In many cases the discussions seemed to pertain to larger commands, but the information was useful - especially in group dynamics
• Adequate - however, I believe the training should include more emphasis on family support training and awareness. The Army needs to recognize the genuine need for these groups and part of the unit evaluation should include assessing the adequacy of the FSGs
• They touched on a lot of areas, much written information given - which often doesn’t all get read. Need to get down more - to the nitty-gritty aspects of command. Panel of prior commanders’ wives was set up - but not enough time to ask questions - often don’t know what questions to ask of them. All seemed to say it was rosy - it was not - especially with the stress of separation of war. Need to break down in small groups with these wives and allow them to tell it like it really was - problems, etc. that come up - what worked in handling each problem etc., without names being mentioned, of course. In our Battalion we
had almost every problem that could possibly come up happen - and no one prepared me for that

- The leadership seminar at Ft. Benning is geared for company commanders' wives. I went through this before I went to Leavenworth. The course at Leavenworth is alright, but I learned more at the Ft. Benning course - about myself and my leadership style and about how the younger CPTs and LTs wives think
- Not as useful as it could have been. We all agreed we’d rather get practical information instead of the philosophical kind we received. It definitely needs to be revamped. This Fall, several commanders' wives (40-50) had a seminar, and it was attended by a Command Team Seminar representative from Leavenworth. We were honest and told her that CTS does not teach what it should
- I thought it was an informational course, and provided spouses with insight as to the possible things that could or would occur in a Battalion/Brigade. Overall, it was a good course. Also, it allowed you to find out how others felt about being the wife of a Battalion commander. Very interesting views
- My entire 'training' was on the job. The Battalion was either in the field, at NTC, or in Saudi Arabia for most of the 2-year command period. Some portions of the Family Support Program worked well; some portions did not work at all. Through most of the deployment we handled each situation as it came up. The division had 2 or 3 chaplains (I only had contact with 2). One was super; one was not. Some reserve chaplains were brought in around December. For the most part, my contact with them was very limited.

GENERAL COMMENTS

- Hope this helps - our unit chaplain worked his buns off with the unit during 'normal' times and deployment - they deserve much thanks.
The four U. S. Army Chaplains in the Army War College Class of 1992 are doing a group Military Studies Project (MSP) analyzing our chaplain training, doctrine and family support plans which were employed and tested during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Any recommended changes in policy, doctrine, force structure and family ministries will be made to the Chief of Army Chaplains through this MSP.

Since you served in Desert Shield/Storm, we very much need your input and support. Your insight can make a prophetic contribution to the future of the chaplaincy.

Your commander and spouse (if married, will be interviewed at the War College providing us a broad base for research.

We need you to take some time from your busy schedule to fill out the enclosed questionnaire. Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and return to Chaplain Seifried in the enclosed envelope by 13 December 1991.

If you have any after action reports or other material which you feel would be helpful to us in our research, please include them.

A copy of the final product will be available to you upon request.

Thank you very much for your support and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Matthew A. Zimmerman
Chaplain (Major General) USA
Chief of Chaplains

F-1
APPENDIX G

CHAPLAIN INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND SYNOPSIS

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE:

In the interview with your commander we asked what guidance you were provided and how. We want your perspective on your command guidance.

1. Did you receive any guidance in preparation to the:
   - Pre-battle? (12) yes (0) no
   - Battle? (11) yes (1) no
   - Post-battle? (11) yes (1) no

2. If yes, what was it? If no, what guidance or direction did you use to perform your ministry?
   - Where chaplain should be located
   - Was kept informed of mission and location of unit
   - Was briefed on movements and battle plans
   - Suggestions on how the UMT could more effectively provide ministry
   - Provide care for soldiers, such as religious support, counseling, assist those in great need
   - Be with soldiers or in "communicable" distance
   - Provide not just weekly religious services but "have a more frequent spiritual focus"
   - Provide a nice chapel set-up and provide recreational activities
   - Provide religious services and "we don’t need you, stay out of the way"

3. How was the commander’s guidance conveyed to you?
   - Private and in staff meetings
   - Verbally
   - Face-to-face
   - During unit briefings
   - Through the XO
   - Most mornings, one-to-one prayer and shared time
   - In person

4. What lessons did you learn?
   - Needed more guidance from the commander
   - The closer to combat, the greater the requests for religious services
   - Need to claim your own space
   - The chaplain must be with the soldiers during the time of stress and anxious situations
   - The role of the chaplain as a cultural advisor
   - The UMT must be informed on what the operation is

G-1
Must be informed to assist in rumor control and in order to plan ministry in each phase
Don’t be afraid to confront command over issues pertinent to performing ministry
To survive
Must have clear and precise communication with and from the commander

5. What recommendations would you make?
- Other branches must be educated on duties of a chaplain and how chaplains are assets
- Begin early - before deployment - to educate commanders on UMT doctrine/operations
- Chaplains need to maintain close working and ministry relationship with commanders and staff
- Command must keep the chaplain informed
- Chaplain must be actively involved in staff meetings
- Need to have access to the TOC
- Need to have personal meetings with the commander to keep him informed
- With the shortage of RC chaplains, they should be assigned to either Bde or Division level to provide coverage and not be restricted to a battalion
- Stay in close contact with soldiers and the command
- Stay alert and be flexible and "go with the flow"
- Earn credibility with command staff and they’ll support you
- Educate commanders, we are not "morale support officers" as the title was first given in the Gulf
- Married chaplains who typically confide only in their wives, must find a confidant during deployment
- The commander wants to know the "feel" of the unit through as many sources as possible.

DOCTRINE:

We are interested in three areas of Chaplain Doctrine: Forward Thrust, direct and general religious support and chaplain force structure.

1. Forward Thrust doctrine results in the assignment of a chaplain to a battalion. What do you believe are the advantages and disadvantages in being assigned to a battalion?

Advantages?
- Knowing the soldiers well and they knowing you
- Shared common experiences creates a basis for ministry
- Better understanding the factors affecting morale, morals and ethics
- More direct contact with soldiers
- A link between the command and the soldiers
Can provide assistance and guidance to the command
Better understanding of unit and better support
Unit has a sense of ownership of the UMT
Chaplain enjoys greater credibility
Ministry can be better focused
Rapport building
Close to soldiers - physically, spiritually, and emotionally
Greater knowledge of the mission
Unlimited opportunities for ministry

**Disadvantages?**

- None
- Chaplain branch support was minimal during the deployment. I often felt disconnected
- Possessiveness on part of the command, difficult to provide general coverage
- Maintaining adequate supplies while deployed
- Chaplain assistant sometimes feels "out there alone"
- Vehicle is frequently borrowed or "pulled away"
- Can become too parochial
- Not easy to cover other units
- Provides little time to be alone
- Can be overwhelming

2. **Where were you located during the:**

**Pre-battle?**
- Base camp, (Tent City), King Fahd Airport-Camp Eagle II
- Near Iraq border at a logistical base
- S/1
- DSA
- DISCOM
- Medical Company
- Headquarters Company and Medical Company
- MPs, mostly traveling
- Battalion Aid Station
- Base camp
- Combat trains

**Battle?**
- Medical company
- In back of a 2 and a half ton truck and then on an APC
- TOC
- MPs, traveling with the soldiers
- Medical company, 2ks behind the front lines
- Forward Bn area, with Medical Company
- DSA
- Battalion Aid Station
- Logistical base near Iraqi border
- Forward in TAA Campbell in Saudi Arabia, then FOB Cobra in Iraq

G-3
• Tied down to the ambulance, my CUCV was terrain-unacceptable in combat conditions

Post-battle?
• FOB Cobra; TAA Campbell
• Logistical base near the Iraq border
• S/1 ALOC
• DSA
• Rear area in Iraq
• Medical company
• Headquarters
• MPs, traveling with soldiers
• TOC
• Combat trains and walking to visit batteries
• HHC/Medical company

3. The Unit Ministry Team has two religious support functions: direct religious support and general religious support. What are some of the programs or ways that you ministered to your soldiers during the:

Pre-battle?
• Worship services, counseling, ministry of presence, classes to enable medical personnel to work out feelings in regard to working with possible traumatic injuries
• Counseling
• Visitation, Bible studies, worship, choirs, hospital visits, taking soldiers in for phone calls when possible, distributing "any soldier" mail/packages
• Provided Catholic coverage for confession and Mass, Muslim soldiers to services on Fridays, Jewish troops to services
• Discussions of this situation and relationship to the end times
• Scripture distribution, prayer meetings ministry of presence, command devotions
• Water baptism, marriage vow renewal, daily devotions, prayer breakfasts, pre-battle prayer services, gospel songs, "packages from home" for those with no family
• Designed special services
• Small group discussions
• Evening services
• Sing alongs
• Trips to a civilian American compound for food, fellowship, and worship
• Library
• Attend/supervise lay lead services

Battle?
• Same as for pre-battle (2)
• Personal visits in their sites
• With soldiers providing the sacraments

G-4
• Memorial ceremony, Bible studies, counseling, Sunday worship services, visitation, patient care
• Scripture distribution, ministry of presence
• Prayer with soldiers
• Took priest to hard to reach areas by helicopter
• Visitation, prayer, worship, counseling, presence

Post-battle?
• Services, counseling, Bible studies (nightly), ministry of presence
• Visit and worship services
• Same as in pre-battle and provided classes on "re-entry"
• Reunion briefings
• Command devotions, scripture distribution, worship services, ministry of presence
• Re-entry classes/grief work for MEDEVAC crew that died
• Conducted stress reduction briefings
• Support groups
• Group discussions
• Same as pre-battle
• Evening studies

4. Were you responsible to provide general religious support to other units? 
(10) yes (2) no
If so, what did you do and what percent of your time of your 
time was required?
• 50% religious worship services and some counseling/presence
• 10% visited frequently, included them in all UMT meetings/planning and training, re-supplied, liaison to higher command
• 20% services and limited counseling
• 20% included the parts of units in the BSA in all religious activities, some visitation and inclusion in reunion briefings
• 10 to 20% provided Protestant coverage to another unit
• 5 days a week with other units providing RC services
• 25% provide services and stayed with soldiers
• Either covered them personally or delegated responsibility to another battalion chaplain
• 15 to 20% visited their areas, provided counseling, conducted worship at isolated sites
• Very limited, attended services held in the AO

5. What recommendations would you make concerning the doctrine of direct and general religious support?
• None (7)
• Every battalion sized unit must have a chaplain with direct religious support. Chaplains will not be effective when they are given responsibility of direct support for more than one battalion sized unit. For smaller units,
general support may be the only way to go.
• Make it understood - we are to look around and care for all soldiers in our AO. "Provide or provide for."
• Be sure and make them a part of your team.
• Communicate with S-3/4 to know which units are in your AO
• Minister wherever you are

6. Concerning the force structure of the chaplaincy, what are your recommendations on the adequacy of the number of chaplains and the assigned positions?

• TDA
• Keep one chaplain per battalion
• Need to have in place a replacement system for UMT members who may become casualties
• No comment (3)
• Not enough
• Too many are assigned to TDA positions, especially in areas such as administration and personnel. Those could be filled by senior sergeants or warrant officers
• More chaplains are needed in TDA, especially two more chaplains, as Protestant and Catholic pastors
• At least two chaplains stay in case of deployment in the community
• Insure the UMT has a working knowledge of their mobilization skills and live in a state of readiness and preparedness
• Inadequate; more coverage was needed at home by chaplains who were familiar with the families
• TO&E
• DIVARTY chaplain should be Roman Catholic; his chaplains are tasked forced to brigades, thus he would have the time to provide Roman Catholic coverage for his chaplains' units and the brigade
• Inadequate; Battalions with no 56A billet realized the importance of having their own chaplain in a deployed situation. Two battalions needed and asked for more support but there was little that could be done. They are trying to change their MTOE now.
• Insure the UMT has a vehicle
• Each battalion must have a chaplain
• Separate battalions such as Signal and Engineer battalions must have their own chaplains
• None (2)
• Not enough, even with cross leveling, still a shortage and some chaplains were busy and overworked due to the shortage
• Not enough
• Every battalion needs a UMT. Since we are now part of a deployable Army
• One per battalion
FAMILY SUPPORT

The chaplain responds to family needs by counseling, planned programs and ministry of presence.

1. What was your commander's guidance for you caring for families:

In garrison?
- None (2)
- Know the needs of the unit families and respond with programs designed to meet them, i.e. counseling, classes on separation, retreats (communication/marriage, etc.)
- Prepare them for separation
- Make sure "chain of support" working prior to deployment
- Worked but three weeks in garrison with the unit prior to the deployment. No guidance but to do deployment briefings
- Invited to participate in the FSG with a major role. This included planning, counseling, teaching and any other role found appropriate.
- Great flexibility
- To provide counseling, work with post wide religious programs. Teach personal growth classes in their battalion
- Provide ministry to soldiers and family members
- Be a personal contact with the commander and the families
- To provide FSG meetings and counseling with soldiers and family members
- Let them know what aid is available while we are deployed
- Commander requested troop visitation and specific request to avoid making references to possible combat, death by combat, etc.

While deployed?
- None (3)
- Talk with soldiers and encourage their correspondence back home
- Be the connecting link between soldiers and families, especially through video and tapes
- Families were taken care of by TDA chaplains
- Provide counseling, work with Red Cross in seeing that messages are delivered in a timely manner, respond to spouse and family concerns.
- We discussed various problems at home station; no guidance was given although from our discussions I was able to gather the information needed to monitor effectively
- Don't worry about the families - focus on the soldiers
- Constant contact - insure troops know families are cared for,
- Do all you can to keep communication flow going, i.e. cards, video, etc.
- Encourage soldiers to communicate with families
In preparation for reunion?
• Teach class for each company about reunion, also identify possible/potential problems
• Training classes with handouts
• Do the classes but no time was allowed
• Re-entry classes (5)
• None (3)
• Stay close to families, problems may arise

2. What specific programs did you provide for families before, during and after the deployment?

• A program dealing with deployment hardships and expectations
• Morale and religious program and the value of staying in touch
• Reunion/re-entry workshops
• Family support groups (2)
• Small prayer groups
• None. Arrived just before the deployment
• Was given five minutes to talk to battalion spouses
• Sent information on reunion issues back to spouse in charge of rear detachment family members
• Available for counseling
• Pre-deployment, pre-reunion, and post reunion briefings and fellowship (2)
• Letters to families in preparation for redeployment
• "Dealing with stress" retreat soon after deployment
• Marriage retreat (2)
• Family Enrichment Days, quarterly deployment briefings, family support meetings
• Monthly gatherings with meals - videos taken, cards prepared, counseling encouraged
• Classes on how to survive separation
• Letter writing campaigns
• Phone calling when possible
• Programs for families during deployment was an impossibility
• Distribution of literature designed to help families during separation

3. What support did you receive from the non-deployed garrison chaplains?

• IMA and IRR chaplains did super job caring for families and troops left behind: kept us informed of births, problems, and general condition of families. "Heroes"
• Great - sent supplies, books, well wishes and whatever they could do.
• Good family support (2)
• Professional - supplies requested; checked on family members for soldiers (4)
• Personal - notes from various chaplains, sometimes even a care package (5)
• Messages were relayed concerning family matters by garrison chaplains
• Garrison chaplains handled many of the "home" issues
• Monthly information letters about ministry issues on post. Personal notes on our families and how they were doing
• Ministry to family members, 24 hours a day, a chaplain was present in the FAC
• Conducted Family Support Group meetings back home and provided counseling
• Checking on own family
• Prayers
• Best care to families given by one non-deployed chaplain

4. What recommendations would you make to chaplains in ministering to families?

• Key words - ENCOURAGEMENT and HOPE
• Developed a program called "Project Encouragement" in which chapel family set up a prayer and encouragement board with pictures of deployed spouses, giving address, etc., cards, envelopes, postage was supplied and the congregation was encouraged to support them with letters, etc.
• Be stable, be available, be sensitive, be alert for despondent spouses
• Be sensitive, supportive, and honest
• Be in constant contact with the family
• Discuss the daily events as can be seen and heard on TV, newspapers
• Pray with the families
• Provide opportunities for socials, like birthdays, anniversaries, etc., to celebrate
• None (2)
• Be aware of anxieties, chain of concern development and predeployment briefings
• Be sure all their financial needs are taken care of
• Make sure their legal needs are in order
• Work to strengthen families before deployment is even announced.
• Maintain FSG rosters. Involve spouses in the works - in short help commanders have a functioning FSG. Encourage families during deployment to do what will be best for them - i.e. returning home to families for support rather than sticking it out. Chaplains who do not deploy could maintain support groups and have classes on coping alone
• While deployed be aware of Red Cross messages
• Respond to family concerns personally
• Help form Family Support Groups
• Not much time to prepare
• Inspire hope, many spouses were told there would be many deaths
• Need to clarify our mission, not enough time to do everything such as preaching, parish work, staff functioning,
single soldiers, tactical skills, and families
• Be informed and involved, be prepared to care the second mile, warm and friendly, prepared when briefing and training
• Reunion briefings must begin with the challenges of each particular group and not some universal survey - must be very pertinent to the group

SUPPORT (Equipment and Training)

FM 16-1, The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations, lists the following equipment and support needed to perform combat ministry.

1. How often did you use these kinds of support?

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<th>NEVER</th>
<th>WEEKLY</th>
<th>DAILY</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaplain Assistant</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Maps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious literature and items</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>

2. Additional equipment and support not listed above that you used?
   • Night operation devices - a necessity during the "push"
   • Compass (2)
   • Small back packer stove/heater
   • Night vision goggles (3)
   • Solar shower
   • Heater
   • Camo - netting
   • Any soldier mail
   • Lots of "chaplain stuff" - candy, books, etc.

3. Equipment and support you needed and did NOT have? (i.e. compass, night vision goggles)

   • Night vision goggles (6)
   • Music box for worship services
   • Compass (5)
   • Dated religious literature, equipments for lay ministry
   • Maps, crucifixes, crosses, complete Bibles, religious literature, music tapes, religious films, short wave radio, camo net, field tables
   • HMMWV
   • Dedicated vehicle (4)
   • Radio (2)

G-10
4. Any specific or unique way your commander supported you with equipment?
   • Hex tent
   • Vinson
   • Heater
   • A vehicle to jump
   • Night vision goggles
   • A way to get around
   • Field telephone
   • A QUALITY vehicle
TRAINING SUPPORT

Training is necessary to support you in the performance of your mission.

1. Who provided for your training and was it adequate?

You may put an X in more than one of the boxes.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY SKILLS</th>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>2. Desert survival skills</td>
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<td>3. Tactical driver’s training</td>
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<td>4. Management of material resources</td>
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<td>6. Radio communication training</td>
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<td>7. Land navigation skills</td>
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<td>2. Field worship services</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>3. Memorial service/ceremony</td>
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<td>4. Care of families</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>6. Battle fatigue ministry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lay leaders (volunteers)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Ministry to the wounded</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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***

a. DIVISION
b. UNIT
c. INSTALLATION
d. USACHCS
e. ADEQUATE
f. NEEDED MORE
NO training provided:
• Desert survival (2)
• Tactical driver’s training (2)
• Management of material resources, land navigation skills, counseling skills (2)
• Field worship services, care of families (2)
• Host nation religions (2)
• Battle fatigue ministry (2)

2. Did you experience any unique situations or environment which demanded specialized training in your deployment? (i.e. ministry in a non-Judaeo-Christian country)

• Yes, cultural aspects of the country
• To contain our religious practices among the US soldiers
• Moslem
• Yes, non-Judaeo-Christian country, also I learned to start an IV, we received a couple of books after the battle which would have been helpful before
• How to work with soldiers involved witchcraft
• Ministry to (i.e. visitation to) EPWs
• Provided ministry to Iraqi prisoners

3. Any additional comments on any of the above areas?

• We were prepared (by grace) through types of training we had just undergone
• MSC chaplains not well trained nor effective as supervisors
• We need more radio communication and navigation skills.
• I found the entire experience to be extremely rewarding. I am grateful for the opportunity to have served
• It was unfortunate that our "Christian" soldiers who did not have a good understanding of our faith were exposed to the propaganda by the Moslem leaders, who were insulting the Christian faith; thus they converted few of our soldiers to Islam. It was a disservice done to our soldiers. I was present at such a propaganda meeting, and I objected openly
CHAPLAINS' SURVEYS

COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE:

• Commanders provided guidance through staff meetings which chaplains seem to attend on a daily basis. Very few chaplains received any personal, direct guidance. Most chaplains felt their CDR wanted them to be with soldiers, provide religious services and be aware of the mission. No chaplain mentioned that his/her commander wanted them to keep them informed of the pulse of the soldiers, yet with the CDRs’ interviews, many commanders stated the above purpose. Somehow, chaplains did not seem to pick up on this guidance, and as one chaplain stated, he learned the hard way. Chaplains were mainly left on their own without much guidance from the commanders and, while interviewing commanders, they had to hesitate trying to recall their guidance. Commanders must be educated as to how they should utilize their chaplain. As one chaplain stated, when CENTCOM stated that chaplains would be called morale officers, his commander wanted to use him as the recreational officer.

• Lessons learned from commanders: Need to be daily in touch with commander to be informed. This is a must to eliminate rumors, to understand the command and the mission and to gain and maintain the commander’s support.

• Recommendations: Educate the commander on the role of the chaplain, stay in touch with staff and commander, be with soldiers, be flexible. Chaplains also need a pastor. During the deployment, some realized the need for moral support from their supervisor. This support in the garrisons was frequently provided by the chaplain’s spouse.

• Forward Thrust doctrine ADVANTAGES:
  - Closely identify with soldiers and command
  - Excellent support from command except they also frequently "borrow" chaplain’s vehicle
  - A sense of being family

• Forward Thrust doctrine DISADVANTAGES:
  - Command becomes very possessive of chaplain
  - Chaplain’s equipment sometimes becomes "command" property
  - Some felt isolated without much support from technical channels
  - Maintaining adequate supplies when deployed
  - Sometimes a feeling of isolation
  - Need a chaplain assistant who compliments the program
LOCATION

• Many were located in the aid station or close to the HQ Company

• Ministry to soldiers - mostly the routine ways of ministry, such as religious services, Bible studies, counseling, ministry of presence, prayer meetings; nothing unique or special.
• Support to other units - most chaplains were asked to do so, from 15 to 75% of their time was spent doing so. This did not seem to cause any problems with the command.

• Recommendations on General and Direct Religious Support - Every battalion must have a chaplain; need to know what units are in your AO in order to provide support; include your area coverage units in your plan and brief the command.

MINISTRY TO FAMILIES

• Reunion sessions must be routine training
• Attend and participate in family support plan meetings
• Command placed very little responsibility on deployed chaplains to minister to families
• Chaplain must bring words of hope and encouragement
• Chaplains must attend deployment briefings
• Deployed chaplains seem to be satisfied with the support of the non-deployed chaplains, which wasn’t much other than letters and monthly newsletters
• Reunion sessions need to being with a company-level group forum to hear about the re-deployment experiences of spouses and to deal directly with some common matters in a group session. This would convey interest in families; it would permit concern to be raised immediately; it would facilitate private counseling with the chaplain; it would help provide focus to any educational program plus spouses could gain immediate support from other participants.

EQUIPMENT

• Most chaplains stated they needed a dedicated vehicle with a radio, night vision goggles and a compass. Some extra items that were needed: maps, complete Bibles, field table to be used as an altar, and religious literature.

TRAINING SUPPORT

• Many stated they needed more training in: desert survival skills, tactical driver’s training, radio communication, land navigation, care of families, ministry to POWs. There is a definite need for UMTs to continue to train while in the field and not just provide ministry.
• Denominational mix is very important on a deployment
• Each UMT must have at least one experienced member
• Must learn to work the unit’s internal supply system
• A radio is an absolute necessity in combat
• Must have a supply of the complete Bible
• Chaplains must have a working relationship with the helping agencies on post
• Religious services must be upbeat in nature while on a deployment
• Lay ministers must have prior training
• Lay leaders must also be trained and supervised
• UMT members must understand their roles during deployment and war
• Need to have a handbook on various religious beliefs available
• Supervision and communication with chaplains is a must; some inexperienced chaplains suffered for lack of competent technical leadership.

26 surveys were mailed, 12 returned completed, 2 returned with no forwarding address, a 50% return.
APPENDIX H

SYNOPSIS OF SENIOR CHAPLAIN INTERVIEWS

GENERAL COMMENTS

• There was a tremendous interface with Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs). There were five TDA UMTs operating at [post]: garrison, resource management, family life, training (2).

• The resource manager did extra work for supplying items for DS/S prior to the activation of the Desert Shield/Storm (DS/S) nonappropriated fund and appropriated fund system supplying.

• IMA (Individual Mobilization Designee) UMTs were utilized from the Reserve Components Personnel Action Center (RCPAC).

• There was a multi-cultural workshop conducted in May 1990 based on the religions in the areas of possible operations (e.g., Saudi Arabia) with emphasis on Islam. It was an excellent preparation!

• Operation "Downtrace" was conducted in December 1989 at a National Guard camp linking active duty with Reserve Component (RC) UMTs. Participants included elements from 101st Airborne, 24th Infantry, 10th Mountain Divisions, the 194th Armored Brigade, and the 197th Infantry.

• Incoming RC UMTs were assigned to specific units and were the in-place points of contact for support groups.

• Family life chaplains were key to the success of the family support groups.

• Chaplains helped family members get through the initial shock phase of deployment (e.g., responding to CNN news broadcasts, etc.) where information had to be integrated.

• Post religious programs took on a new significance and intensity not previously felt. Various in-place programs had to be shifted because some chapels were shut down and locked for the deployment. All chapels outside the division remained open.

• Operation "Helping Hand" was constantly active providing up to $75 per family for needed commissary items.
• Cross-leveling had to be done due to the shortage of chaplains and others who were non-deployable.
• 65 UMTs from [fort] joined 235 UMTs in Saudi Arabia.
• Chaplain activities were limited only by the UMT’s imagination. All sorts of activities were taking place: Bible studies, retreats (through ARAMCO, a Saudi-based American oil corporation), and the engineers even had a retreat center at Tiger Beach.

• UMTs operated better than I’ve ever seen. The joy of my job was pulling together the team efforts of great chaplains and chaplain assistants.

FORWARD THRUST DOCTRINE

• Forward Thrust is normal procedure for the [corps]. Chaplains move with their units most of the time and are used to "keeping up." The Religious Support Plan (RSP) calls for chaplains to move and set-up with their units.

• DS/S revalidated our "Forward Thrust" doctrine in combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). With it, chaplains are habitually associated with their units and unit families.

• Forward Thrust is made viable in combat when the soldier knows his/her chaplain, and the chaplain knows his/her soldiers.

• Reserve chaplains need time to bond with unit.

• Forward Thrust puts the UMT out front with soldiers who are facing a life-or-death situation. (One chaplain captured 37 Iraqi prisoners!)

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

• The [corps] Main Command Post was one hour away by road.

• The corps rear was five hours away.

• COSCOM was two hours beyond the corps rear.

• The corps administrative rear area was six hours further than COSCOM.

• There is no doctrine written to cover distance/support issues of the above types.

• Travel for pastoral care by the Corps Chaplain was a "nightmare."
• Technical difficulties arose because of area religious sensitivities. No policies were in-place prior to deployment.

• Calling chaplains "morale officers" was another example of the problems which developed. Some commanders had soldiers remove "Jewish" from their dog tags. These problems were due to a lack of understanding and communication.

• The replacement system is broken.
  - There is no chaplain replacement system in place.
  - There must be a push-forward when chaplains are lost (e.g., for Catholic coverage).
  - One plan would be to have a cache of ten UMTs to put forward immediately from AFCENT HQ.
  - Our chaplain supply system is broken. It needs to be fixed.

LESSONS LEARNED:

• The reserve component chaplains did a good job but several had not been in "ministry" for too long.

• There was only one rabbi available for four months.

• Logistical issues need to be addressed. Are we a part of the Army system or not? Cross-leveling of individual chaplain supply kits was a problem. Equipment often just sat on the docks to the south.

• Lay ministers who were prepared brought their letters and certification with them to DS/S (a commander's letter followed by official approval from the Corps Chaplain, routed through CENTCOM Chaplain).

• The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Chaplains' whole purpose in life should be to focus on the mobilization mission. Mobilization planning is only on the books. Reserve units have a lot of anger about they way they were utilized.

• Another policy mistake was to say that no chaplain would be interviewed or filmed by the media.

• Arabic New Testaments (provided by The Samaritan Press) were an issue when they were used by fundamental chaplains to press evangelism.

FORCE DESIGN ISSUES:

• The [installation] troop chaplain slot was lost.
• The requirement for a second family life UMT was taken away. (That chaplain's work log shows 17 hours per week of counseling, plus training, plus co-counseling with other chaplains, plus administration for the corps.)

SOME "STICKY DECISIONS" WHICH HAD TO BE MADE:

• Some senior commanders requested that chaplains not wear branch insignia. The decision was made to enforce that only when the chaplain's commander deemed it as detrimental to the mission.

• Chaplains were referred to as "morale officers." Too many key persons were willing to sell our heritage down the tubes.

• Some commanders refused to allow communion wine in deference to Saudi Arabian rules.

• Things would have been better if we'd had a policy ready to go. We knew where the "war would be" and should have already had lay ministries and Muslim faith instruction down pat.

• A lot of stuff done at [command] was "eyewash" for public consumption:
  - Religious policies to keep key persons happy,
  - Pornography issues (120 tons of mail per day came during Thanksgiving and Christmas with a 5-man team checking it!).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

• The Chief of Chaplains ought to have input at the Pre-command Course (PCC) and Army War College (AWC) for training future commanders on the use of the chaplain.

• We shouldn't have to sacrifice our heritage because of the religious beliefs of those residing in the locale of a war.
APPENDIX I
FORT BRAGG INFORMATION SUMMARY

GENERAL COMMENTS

• There were "phantom myths" floating around about no Bibles or communion wine being allowed. Someone was needed on location earlier to steer us through the religious minefields.

• Religious services had to be held discreetly in this Moslem area (Oman and Jordan=Moslem, also). 82nd training prepared us for this.

• Chaplain funds had to be used to provide Bibles, crosses, and religious medals.

• There was a reserve component mobilization impact. Some reserve and guard chaplains didn’t think they would have to go to the desert.

• USACHCS taught a quick course to qualify chaplains for DS/S readiness.

• Prior training was programmed with regard to comparative religions and it paid off. They were a part of our UMT RSP/scenario briefings.

• Some chaplains were caught off-guard when asked to remove cross from uniform.

REAR DETACHMENT ISSUES

• The rear detachment mission and thrust for DS/S was in three areas:
  - Caring for and counseling immature family members. Home visits were made for pastoral care.
  - Some persons actually dropped bricks on their feet in order to make an injury medical request for the return of their soldier-spouse.
  - Spouses admitted themselves to psychiatric hospitals.
  - Child care was limited.
  - Spouses threatened self-inflicted bodily harm with pills, etc. (80% were in early 20s, 20% were 30-40, 10% were over 40.)
  - UMTs worked daily with social services, provost marshal, ACS, AER, and ARC.
  - A twenty-four hour operation was maintained by UMTs for being on-call for emergency actions.
  - Family support groups worked.

I-1
- Pastoral care for the rear detachment that stayed back
  -Many felt ashamed because they were "not part of the unit’s activities."
  -Some officers and NCOs felt that their careers were ruined because of not being deployed. This led them to do "dumb things," lethargy and low morale.

- Care for soldiers that were sent back.
  -Soldiers were sent back for medical reasons (e.g., injuries), and disciplinary actions.
  -Some soldiers were treated as outcasts, ignored, or ostracized (self-inflicted problem for the most part).

- Rear area training for UMTs included the responsibilities of the divisional UMTs, physical fitness training, and refamiliarization with Army basics.

ISSUES IN THE DESERT

- All vehicles are assigned, but some never made it to DS/S. Other vehicles were "pulled" from UMTs for other missions. For transportation, UMTs "hitched" rides with S4s, S1s and the TMP.

- Radios: An airborne division has fewer radios than light divisions. Communication was through other radios available.

- There was very little need for counseling because of the 82nd’s "go-to-war" mentality. Daily contact was made with commanders. Morale was assessed with "red, amber, green" scenarios.

- Pre-battle: UMTs talked and visited in troop areas. Last minute services were held with high attendance. Soldiers wanted items like crosses, Bibles, and religious medals. Catholic and Protestant services were held daily. Bedouin tents were utilized because they held heat better.

FORWARD THRUST DOCTRINE

- FM 16-1 assumes a pre-positioned mechanized infantry, the 82nd always has units together.

- Forward Thrust is regularly practiced. A special chapter in FM 16-1 is necessary for airborne and low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations.

- There were very few psychological casualties/difficulties. When the war started there was a general sense of relief.
AFTER THE BATTLE

- People were angry because they weren’t going home immediately. Troops were told, “You were first in, you’ll be first out.” Reunification classes were mandatory and held at battalion level conducted by chaplains.

- There was a general fear that something could happen at the last minute and redeployment would be postponed.

REUNION ISSUES

- There were still the same old marital problems of infidelity. Wives had become the “head of the household,” and the “mushroom theory” hadn’t worked. There were divorces. 80% of counseling is marital. One chaplain said, "Marriage difficulty due to deployment is like shaking an apple tree....the rotten fruit will fall out first." Many promises were made by soldiers to God in the Gulf, but forgotten when redeployment was reality (e.g., plea-bargaining).

- Some soldiers were participating in "psychological adultery" by responding to "Dear Soldier" letters after receiving propositions. Truism: if a soldier is unethical in peacetime, he will be unethical in wartime.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

- Resupply kits were stopped by higher HQs. 90% of them were never seen.

- Resupply kits should have been shipped earlier. One chaplain said, "The Army system generally did a lousy job of taking care of families." Chaplain wives did a lot to assist support groups.

- There were some severe problems back at Bragg: break-ins, lack of budgeting of family money, insurance scams, rumor mills, incorrect or premature news from local newspapers, obscene phone calls, and phone bills to/from Saudi Arabia were very high.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- We have yet to see the "light fighters" chaplain kit. Our chaplains improvise with their own kits.

- Reserve chaplains’ quality of readiness questionable. "We must train them when they arrive."
"Velcro chaplains" got around the wearing-of-the-cross/tablets problem by having rank on a velcro patch for certain areas.
APPENDIX J

FORT CAMPBELL INFORMATION SUMMARY

- Thirty-four chaplains deployed from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to the Persian Gulf leaving five chaplains to provide ministry for 34,000 family members and 7,500 non-deployed soldiers. Eventually, ten reserve component chaplains supplemented the garrison chaplains during the nine month deployment.

- The Installation Chaplain had three goals for ministry during this period: (1) stability, (2) continuity, and (3) pastoral care.

- The reserve chaplains were a great resource for providing stability to family members. No chapel services or programs were canceled or consolidated. The regularly scheduled chapel events continued during these very uncertain and troublesome times. Families experiencing much turmoil found security and support in their familiar chapel community. This routine was not removed from their lives. Stable support contributed much in coping with their insecurities and the regular attendees frequently invited inactive members to return to the familiar chapel support program.

- The fears of war coupled with rumors, CNN news, and telephone calls from the desert all contributed to very emotional times of the families. The chaplains were frequently asked for reliable information. Truth was desperately sought and needed to be disseminated. In fact the Installation Rear Detachment Commander frequently called upon the chaplain to reaffirm the information he gave to large groups of spouses.

- Every unit had an identified chaplain assigned to provide support. The Religious Support Plan included the name and telephone number of each chaplain and was posted by every unit’s rear detachment commander. Chapels and chaplains’ offices remained operational with the support of the reservists. No one in need was denied the services of a chaplain.

- No new chapel programs were instituted during the deployment. The intent was to continue to provide the regularly scheduled services but do so in a traditional, pastoral, and caring atmosphere. The notion of the incarnation was the focus: as Our Lord took on the nature of a Man to be present with his people, the Fort Campbell chaplains were with their people.
• The Family Life Chaplain, a reservist, provided an extremely effective ministry. Many favorable comments were voiced reaffirming the need for a full-time family life chaplain.

• Fort Campbell excelled in chaplain support from the pre-deployment through the return of the Gulf War soldiers. Their deployment plans should be recorded for future reference. Family support plans need to be intentionally "handed off" to the nondeploying replacement chaplain.

• The high caliber of the Fort Campbell Unit Ministry Team's efforts and successes should be recorded and passed on to their successors.

• The ten reserve chaplains were a must for the support of the regular chapel programs. Much confusion could have been eliminated if they would have been able to train with the active duty chaplains providing a better understanding of the Fort Campbell community. Due to the extreme shortage of TDA chaplains, the reservists filled the void; but, ministry could have been greatly enhanced with combined training for both components.

• Closer communication is an absolute must for both the reservists and the active duty chaplains. Both need to know who will be activated and when, the nature of the mission, what chaplain or chaplains will be replaced. This information is necessary to stabilize the chapel program and add credibility to the ministry of the chaplaincy.

• A crisis ministry booklet is needed to assist chaplains who are overwhelmed with emergency requests, and names of linguists are needed to minister to foreign-born spouses.

• Most of what was learned during the Fort Campbell visit affirms what was stated at other installations. The interviews and surveys of chaplains and commanders also reinforce these insights.
APPENDIX K

FORT RILEY INFORMATION SUMMARY

• The 1st Infantry Division was alerted on 8 November 1990 for Desert Shield. The Division deployed rapidly following Christmas. Due to the unique situations of the Army Chaplain's Family Life Training Center (with two supervisors and five students, augmented by three incoming students), and the U.S. Army Confinement Activity (with two chaplains) being located at Fort Riley, plus two chaplains from the 16th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital which did not deploy, and some reserve component chaplains recalled, Fort Riley had up to 21 chaplains to cover the remaining units and all family members.

• Soon after the alert, division Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) were released from their installation duties in order to focus on the deployment. The Installation Chaplain focused on making sure deploying UMTs had the supplies and equipment necessary to deploy. They also worked up a roster for the Gym Ministry (deployment ministry).

• The Family Assistance Center (FAC) was set up in the NCO Club. It was designed to be a one-stop-problem-solving center. A chaplain was either there or on call for the FAC at all times. In addition, the usual staff duty chaplain was on call.

• Both TOE and TDA chaplains took part in pre-deployment briefings, set up and activated family support groups and chains of concern, and performed a heavy crisis counselling load prior to deployment. TOE chaplains also made an intentional hand-off to TDA chaplains as they deployed from the installation.

• The installation elected not to cancel any religious services and maintained the full schedule for the sake of continuity.

MAJOR ISSUES

• The Installation Chaplain reorganized chaplain assets to cover the "Division Rear," resupplied the division chaplains, managed personnel issues, took care of UMT families, and tried to maintain communication with the deployed units.

• Fort Riley was well equipped to take care of families with the Chaplain Family Life Center, on location with five resident students and three incoming students. Counseling hours jumped immensely. 1003 counseling hours related

K-1
directly to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. These chaplains were also involved in all of the local schools on school advisory boards. For the most part, Family Support Groups were well-organized as were the Chains of Concern. Chaplains provided classes on stress, patenting, casualty assistance and reunion.

- Casualty assistance could have been a real problem if the predicted casualties had actually materialized. The Installation Chaplain held classes, trained next-of-kin notifiers, briefed civilian clergy and family members, and worked closely with the casualty branch.

- Chaplains also conducted reunion briefings for family members.

LESSONS LEARNED

- A colonel (0-6) chaplain is necessary on the installation.
- A Family Life Chaplain is necessary for the installation.
- Family issues placed great demands on the TDA chaplains.
- Chaplains need be part of the next-of-kin notification team, but should not be the actual notifying officer.
- Chaplains need to be trained in how to deal with the media.
- Catholic coverage needs special attention during the call up.

INFORMATION FROM THE DIVISION CHAPLAIN SECTION

- 15 chaplains from Fort Riley were interviewed. The following is a summation from supervisory chaplains.
  -Chaplains perform the way they practice.
  -Every TOE unit must have a chaplain assigned.
  -Quality of ministry should be stressed over quantity.
  -Pastors need to take care of pastors. (Supervisory chaplains need to provide pastoral care for their subordinate chaplain and chaplain assistant families.)
  -There must be caring and concern for non-division units which were left out in the rapid deployment.
  -Communication
    - Things that worked: E-Mail and AT&T.
    - Things that broke: Red Cross messages.
  -During debriefing, answer the question, "When is the experience of war over?"
  -A priest should be located in the General Religious Support plan.
  -Chaplains must train the way they plan to fight.

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APPENDIX L

FORT STEWART INFORMATION SUMMARY

• When the 24th Infantry Division left Fort Stewart for Desert Shield, the Installation Chaplain was left with four chaplains and seven chaplain assistants.

• Immediately following the alert and four days after the invasion of Kuwait, all chaplain Unit Ministry Teams were released from installation duties, in order to focus on the deployment. The Installation Chaplain insured that the divisional chaplains had the supplies and equipment necessary to deploy. They purchased a great deal of commercially produced equipment off-the-shelf (e.g., tape recorders, hymn tapes, and religious literature).

• Two days after the alert the Family Assistance Center (FAC) opened with a chaplain present twenty-four hours-a-day. The chaplains were in charge for the first several days. The FAC was a one-stop problem solving center.

• The TDA chaplains gave predeployment briefings, set up and activated family support groups and chains of concern, and performed a heavy crisis counseling load.

• Additional chaplain help did not arrive until late August when the garrison unit activated three chaplains. Later, Army Reserve and National Guard call-ups increased the strength of the chaplain staff to a high of twelve; but, most of the time the strength was at eight chaplains.

• The installation elected not to cancel any of the religious services and maintained a full schedule for the sake of continuity.

• As reserve and guard units mobilized through Fort Stewart, the installation needed to assign a chaplain to the Mobilization Assistance Team. This chaplain trained the mobilized UMTs, provided religious support for units who did not have an assigned chaplain, briefed on the culture of the Middle East, and provided a full-time presence for the deploying soldiers.

MAJOR ISSUES

• The installation chaplains functioned as the "Division Rear," resupplied the division chaplains, managed personnel issues, took care of UMT families, and tried to maintain communications with the deployed unit.
The incorporation of reserve, guard, and retired chaplains into the installation religious program seemed successful in spite of the ad hoc nature of the enterprise.

Family ministry was a major concern. 45,000 family members were left in the care of the Fort Stewart UMT. Family Support Groups were not well organized, nor were the chains of concern. Chaplains provided classes on stress, parenting, casualty assistance and reunion. Counseling loads were high. Religious activities, especially prayer vigils, were added to the program.

Of special interest was the work within the local schools. 50% of the children and 35% of the teachers had a parent or spouse deployed. Chaplains were pastorally involved in nine elementary schools, one middle and one high school.

Casualty assistance could have been a real problem if the predicted casualties had actually materialized. Recalled retiree chaplains coordinated the program, trained next-of-kin notifiers, briefed civilian clergy and family members, and worked very closely with the casualty branch. They also conducted reunion briefings for family members.

LESSONS LEARNED

- A colonel (0-6) chaplain is necessary on the installation.
- The Family Life Chaplain is necessary for the installation.
- Chaplains should be placed on Mobilization Assistance Team TDA.
- Family issues placed great demands on the TDA chaplains.
- Mobilization training packets are needed on the shelf and should be locally designed.
- Chaplains need to accompany the next-of-kin notification officer.
- The installation chaplain needs more flexibility in the call-up of reserve, guard and retiree chaplains. This system needs to be reworked.
- Chaplains need to be trained in how to deal with the media.
- Catholic coverage needs special attention in the call-up.
NOTES FROM THE DIVISION CHAPLAIN

• The Division was alerted four days after the invasion of Kuwait. The first ship with the first UMT aboard left Savannah seven days later. During next two weeks nine more ships sailed, each with a UMT aboard. On 24 August the main body of soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia.

• With the addition of the 197th Brigade from Fort Benning, 16 UMTs provided religious coverage. One Jewish chaplain was with the division. The division was continually augmented. On G-day, 24 February, the division crossed the LD with 26,000 soldiers, 1,800 armored vehicles, 6,300 wheeled vehicles and 31 UMTs.

• Chaplain doctrine was generally on target. Implementation is the problem.

• The division inflicted great damage on the enemy and captured 5,000 EPWs.

• The entire division was back by 19 April. The casualties were as follows: 14 killed during the entire deployment and 26 wounded in action during Desert Storm.