MEASUREMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
DURING PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR WAR

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Maurice J. Mayfield
United States Army

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
Current information systems capture unit information that is not useful in predicting combat effectiveness. Unit Status Reports focus on efficiency measures and quantitative factors that depict how well Army support systems have supported individual units. FORSCOM 1-R is being replaced by the Training Assessment Model because 1-R did not meet requirements in reporting unit training levels adequately. Although no system exists to predict unit combat effectiveness, there is a need for that capability to determine which units will deploy and distribute resources. An evaluation methodology can be devised to account for differences in equipment, organizational culture, and AC/RC peculiarities while giving senior leaders a better information base upon which to make future decisions. FORSCOM's Bold Shift with its component Operational Readiness Exercise does not go far enough in changing training assessment and ARTEP should not be used as a test device. The paper proposes...
19. Abstract (continued)

a method to compare unit equipment and mission capability to wartime requirements within a constrained fiscal environment and improve training for all Army units.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

MEASUREMENT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
DURING PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR WAR
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
BY
Lieutenant Colonel Maurice J. Mayfield
United States Army

Colonel Phil Brehm
Project Advisor

U S Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFICIENCY VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEASUREMENT OF EFFICIENCY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Status Report</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM 1-R</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bold Shift</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A- AR 220-1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B- Bold Shift Action Plan</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C- Bold Shift Briefing to CSA</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D- Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E- Training Assessment Model</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Current information systems capture unit information that is not useful in predicting combat effectiveness. Unit Status Reports focus on efficiency measures and quantitative factors that depict how well Army support systems have supported individual units. FORSCOM 1-R is being replaced by the Training Assessment Model because 1-R did not meet requirements in reporting unit training levels adequately. Although no system exists to predict unit combat effectiveness, there is a need for that capability to determine which units will deploy and distribute resources. An evaluation methodology can be devised to account for differences in equipment, organizational culture, and AC/RC peculiarities while giving senior leaders a better information base upon which to make future decisions. FORSCOM's Bold Shift with its component Operational Readiness Exercise does not go far enough in changing training assessment and ARTEP should not be used as a test device. The paper proposes a method to compare unit equipment and mission capability to wartime requirements within a constrained fiscal environment and improve training for all Army units.
INTRODUCTION

One of the most difficult problems facing the Army during this decade is development of a peacetime force comprised of units that will be effective during conflict. The Army has three functions in maintenance of U.S. national security: prevention, control, and termination of conflict or war. For each of the functions, an effective fighting force is imperative. In the case of prevention, assumed effectiveness may deter an adversary from taking actions that could lead to conflict. When a dispute makes conflict likely, the Army must control the situation and restore conditions that are conducive to peace. If conflict begins, the Army must terminate the war under conditions favorable to the U.S.

Because of congressional perceptions that there is a reduced threat and an increased public interest in social concerns, military budgets are projected to be significantly smaller and the Army will decrease in size. During recent years, national defense requirements have been met by a force comprised largely of reserve component units. This is especially true of the Army where more than half of the force is in the National Guard or Army Reserve. The Army will continue to depend on those part-time soldiers in the future because budgets will surely decrease. This discussion will focus on how Army planners can predict unit combat effectiveness prior to employment. Differences between active and reserve units require a system that both allows for that variance and rates units according to a common standard. A framework and evaluation method for assessment of units' combat capabilities will be proposed.
EFFICIENCY VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS

In assessment, Army programmers must consider both efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency is an ability to perform missions at minimum acceptable cost. Effectiveness relates to having decisive or desired impact in a situation. Admittedly, the distinction between these two terms is fine, but effectiveness is less concerned with cost and more with impact, which is a vital difference. Historically, we have been able to determine effectiveness of units and the Army only within actual conflict.

Congress has been willing to pay for military operations required to safeguard national interests, but less willing to resource military forces in times of diminished threats. Efficiency is more closely linked with peacetime preparation when limited resources require concern about costs. "Mission accomplishment" is frequently used as a measure of success. In this peacetime environment, mission accomplishment can mean minimally meeting prescribed requirements for a particular training mission.

Of course, both considerations are important. Measures of effectiveness cannot ignore costs. Losses in personnel and materiel may preclude later missions or tasks. Leaders must be concerned with both efficiency and effectiveness during training or employment and be able to assess units' quality prior to employing them in support of national objectives.

MEASUREMENT OF EFFICIENCY
Information about unit efficiency is abundant. Almost no detail about unit performance is too small to report. Much of this information is produced to satisfy the immediate chain of command but is not available to force planners. Data reported through the chain of command concerns quality of training, personnel management, support, and use of resources. Budgetary management, another part of the training equation, is consolidated at various command levels. Appropriately, major unit commanders allocate their resources to generate the best possible corps or division. Those commanders determine developmental requirements for individual units and apportion resources to achieve maximum benefits.

There is some unit information available to senior leaders. That data is contained in the Unit Status Report (USR) that all units file and FORSCOM 1-R for reserve component units.

Unit Status Report

USR is primarily an efficiency measurement that depicts personnel, equipment, and training status of units. Active units submit USR's monthly. National Guard and Army Reserve units are required to report semiannually, but National Guard Bureau has chosen to report Guard units' status quarterly.

Personnel ratings take into account the number of soldiers assigned to each unit as compared to wartime requirements. Additionally, turnover of personnel is reported.

Separate calculations for three elements are combined to determine the overall personally rating. First, available strength is derived by comparing the number of assigned personnel with required strength. Trained strength is then developed by determining the number of soldiers
that are qualified according to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for the positions they hold as shown in the unit's MTOE. Third, senior grade available strength is determined by comparing the number of trained individuals in the grades of E-5 and higher to MOTE requirements. For each of the factors, a level rating is found by consulting tables published in AR 220-1 and the lowest is reported as the unit personnel rating.

This composite personnel rating is straightforward and simple to calculate. However, it only covers those items that are easy to measure and disregards other important factors. Unit morale, cohesion, and quality of leadership should be considered. Also, USR personnel ratings are not predictive. These assessments really show how well the Army support system has filled active units with nominally trained individuals or how well local commanders in reserve component units have recruited and whether institutional training spaces were available for their soldiers.

The second USR rating category is equipment on hand (EOH). This compares the total of specific equipment items in a unit with wartime requirements. EOH level is the percentage of equipment categorized as a pacing item or Equipment Readiness Code "A" (ERC-A) available in a unit. Pacing items are the most important equipment items, without which, a unit cannot accomplish its mission. Training and Doctrine Command specifies which equipment systems are pacing items or ERC-A in the Table of Organization and Equipment that is used to build individual MTOE's. After consulting AR 220-1, the lowest level rating for a pacing item or overall ERC-A fill is reported as the unit's composite EOH
It seems that EOH is a clear depiction of essential equipment. There are two policies that have made the rating questionable. First is the practice of substituting similar items for unavailable equipment. Items that are issued in lieu of other equipment fulfill operational requirements according to AR 220-17 and Headquarters. Department of Army publishes a list of items that are authorized as substitutes. Consideration of differing equipment capabilities when authorizing one item in lieu of another is a difficult proposition and, at times, substitute items are not completely effective. If authorized substitute items significantly degrade a unit's ability to perform wartime missions, the unit commander is required to comment in the remarks section of his USR. In practice, many higher level resource decisions are made without regard to comments contained in the remarks section of USR.

Second is a problem involved with the practice exempting Line Item Numbers (LIN) from readiness reporting. Major commands have had authority to exempt certain LIN's from reporting. These were generally modernization items of equipment, programmed to arrive in the unit or equipment new to a unit because of changes to the MTOE.

Because of both policies, the EOH rating may not depict unit readiness accurately. Recently, as a result of observations about determination of unit readiness during Desert Shield/Storm, Department of Army has stopped approving non-reportable LIN's. This will help improve the accuracy of status reporting but does nothing to offset diminished capability caused by substitution of less effective equipment. Also, like the personnel rating, EOH only reflects how well the Army support system has equipped units.
The USR also reports Equipment Readiness (ER). This rating combines the effects of EOH and the maintenance status of that equipment and compares the amount of equipment that is operationally ready to wartime requirements. Commanders use the number of days in a reporting period that pacing items and ERC-A equipment are considered mission capable to determine the unit's ER level. ER has significant value in showing the efficiency and effectiveness of maintenance, but it does not consider the effectiveness of unit and support maintenance when the unit is conducting operations.

The final portion of USR reporting concerns training data. This rating shows a unit's ability to perform its wartime missions according to the standard of Mission Essential Task List (METL). When considering his training rating, a commander should take into account all of the unit's training events and other intangible factors such as cohesion, morale, and leadership effectiveness. The commander also determines how many training days would be required to overcome unit deficiencies. The USR training rating is the most subjective element because commanders must evaluate some things that are hard to quantify and the rating is not determined by a formula as in the case of EOH, ER, and Personnel.

Also, commanders can choose to upgrade or downgrade their unit's overall rating, based on intangible factors. Some higher level staff officers do not consider upgrades credible. For this reason, many times, training information and the remarks section are completely disregarded when making higher level decisions.
USR is one of the few means currently available for assessing unit capability. Reports have a retrospective focus, especially in personnel data and equipment on hand. This rearward look, as stated in AR 220-1, can help higher headquarters to anticipate trends and identify problem areas that must be improved. In spite of positive uses for USR, a conclusion must be drawn that the report does not provide much information useful in predicting which units will be successful in combat. USR depicts the efficiency of army systems and unit actions but not a unit's capability or effectiveness.

FORSCOM 1-R

Another unit level report that is available to senior leaders is the Forces Command 1-R. This report is completed by the chief of an evaluation team assessing reserve component units during their annual training period. The 1-R captures some statistical data like the USR but has a different focus, especially in the area of training evaluation. Analyses of unit training, as shown in 1-R reports, have the purposes of identifying unit strengths and weaknesses and assisting commanders in development of future training programs, determination of additional assistance and training resources necessary, mobilization planning, and post-mobilization training planning. Evaluation comments are intended to focus on whether training is effective, if the unit is learning to perform wartime tasks, and what can be done to improve meaningful training.

While it is a very valuable training management tool, 1-R has little predictive value. One major problem with 1-R results is composition of the evaluation team. Teams are comprised of personnel that are available...
to the commander responsible for the evaluation. Although these people are actually involved in unit operations daily and likely the best qualified in the Army to evaluate performance, the team lacks continuity. It is assembled for one evaluation and is generally disbanded afterwards. Additionally, evaluation teams are used for only reserve component unit assessment.

Team makeup varies widely. Based on personal experience, teams can have as many as one officer and NCO per platoon, a similar number of evaluators at company level, and a number of staff and support personnel to monitor activities of the battalion as a whole. The other extreme (the same battalion one year later) was two evaluators, a Major and a Sergeant E-5. The number of evaluators is a function of resources available and other missions assigned to the commander responsible for the evaluation. In most cases, teams number somewhere between the extremes shown here. This disparity shows that there can be significant variation in quality of assessment in 1-R reports. Even under the assumption that individual evaluators are very highly qualified, assessments made by smaller teams cannot be as accurate as those by larger teams. Smaller teams do not have time available to fully consider all unit activities.

Training evaluations are written in narrative form. This is appropriate because there is a wide variance in training missions among units of the same type. As with other narrations, the personal writing skills of the individual completing the report make some evaluations a better depiction of events than others. Also, in some cases, the written evaluation submitted as part of 1-R is different from the oral evaluation.
given by the chief evaluator to battalion or unit leaders. Writing
skills, as mentioned before, could be one reason. Second there may be
some elements that are judged to be below the threshold in interest to
higher level commanders. Third, through observation of improvement
during an annual training period, some evaluations have been inflated.
Finally, evaluations tend to focus on core requirements rather than
METL. This results in a complaint that the narrative is often
inadequate for unit use as a guide in future training and training
management.

Finally, the 1-R was not designed as a measure of readiness or a
vehicle for comparison of units, but some leaders use 1-R for these
purposes. This leads to a conclusion that leaders see a need for some
tool to be used in assessment of unit readiness.

Because of the shortcomings listed and lessons from Desert
Shield/Storm, CINCFOR is studying new methods for assessing training
status of units and conducting reserve component training. The
initiative for improvement of training reserve units is called Bold
Shift.

**Bold Shift**

Bold Shift is to be fully implemented by FY 93. The central concept
is an effort to shape the reserve component force in preparation for an
era of contingency missions. Bold Shift will focus on benefits from high
pay-off programs, especially relating to high priority units, and will be
incentive driven.

Bold Shift has seven programs.
1. Reorganize/Realign aims at strengthening unit capabilities through force structure actions that take demographics, training, and command and control into account during current force structure reductions.

2. Operational Readiness Exercises (ORE) are focused at company level and below. They are projected to reinforce battle focus and provide assessment of mobilization readiness. One standard is to be used for active and reserve component units and evaluation teams will be comprised of active, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel.

3. Soldier training is to be improved through better management of resource allocation, programming of individuals, and quality training.

4. Unit training will be managed to ensure that units train at the right level based on each unit’s needs and to enhance leader development.

5. Leader training is planned to develop leaders with better skills, knowledge and presence through use of existing institutional training courses with some modification.

6. Training involvement of the wartime chain of command will be strengthened, both in training planning and in support of training requirements.

7. Support (full time) modifications will be recommended in an effort to improve effectiveness.

Another initiative under development by FORSCOM is the Training Assessment Model (TAM). TAM is to be used in conjunction with Bold Shift to improve training quality and assessment. It will replace I-R.
and have the benefit of focusing on METL. The developers hope that TAM will generate a more accurate picture of unit training readiness. Some of the model's elements will be usable as a cross check to ensure validity of USR's but foremost in its objectives is to support the Bold Shift training model in assessing ORE's.

Use of TAM at unit level will allow a more responsive assessment of training. TAM is to be used as part of a continuing process. Assessments are to be modified as events occur during a training year. This is a fundamental change and significant improvement over the static snapshot provided by I-R which has no update until the following annual training period. The model was also designed to support recording of formal evaluation results and can be used as a data source to spot problems and help to focus resource use.

TAM will include information that is not generally available now. Some examples are the amount of turnover in key positions such as squad leader or tank commander/gunner combinations, the amount of sustainment training crews perform in COFT, and the number of qualified crews versus assigned. A number of other indicators will be included to make TAM more usable in rating and differentiating individual units. The report will be automated which will allow leaders to develop a statistical picture of all similar units.

There are however, some issues with TAM. First it is aimed at evaluation of reserve component units. Even though FORSCOM says it will be used for active units, that use may be for validation of the model rather than assessment of all army units. For TAM to be a valid
indicator in assessment of Army training systems, it should be used to assess both active and reserve component units routinely.

Initially, and possibly longer term, because of resource constraints, TAM will be used to assess only high priority, early deploying reserve component units. This concept, although probably resource driven, is flawed. One of the stated goals in Bold Shift is to eventually apply the concept throughout the Total Army. The program should be applied across the priority spectrum to generate an evaluation of the entire force.

Although training time available, resources, and distractors can be different for active than reserve component units, the standard against which all units must be rated remains the same. That standard is the capabilities of enemy units against which the Army may be employed. The best possible unit training evaluation would be based on the most capable possible adversary and used to evaluate units regardless of component.

TAM, as in the case of 1-R, is likely to be used as a score card. In some ways that is not so bad. Any assessment will be used for rating one unit against another at times. Keeping score, however, is not one of the objectives in development of TAM nor was it in development and use of 1-R. Both vehicles were intended to assist in planning training. When an assessment tool is used as a scoring device, results are viewed differently by evaluators and evaluated units. Because more importance can be signified by the bottom line score, comments can become less objective and some of the assessment value will be lost.

USR, 1-R, and TAM fall short as predictive tools for measuring combat effectiveness. As measures of efficiency and planning tools they
each have considerable value to Army leaders. However, it appears that
the Army would need to make significant changes or devise a new system to
allow prediction of combat effectiveness.

MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

Predicting how well a particular unit will perform in combat has
been viewed by many as impossible. Notionally, standards that must be
considered are units' abilities to mobilize, deploy, perform operations,
and sustain themselves in combat. The process of determining these
standards should be focused on factors that have direct application in
each of these events. A reporting process must be instituted that allows
decision makers to determine which units mobilize when events require
military action.

Effective mobilization is a function of peacetime preparation and
includes all administrative requirements relating to personnel,
maintenance of equipment in a combat ready posture, and training
individuals and units according to Army doctrine. All army components
conduct tests periodically to determine units' mobilization status. For
active, Army Reserve, and high priority National Guard units they are
called Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE). For other
National Guard units the tests are named Mobilization Operational
Deployment Readiness Exercises (MODRE).

EDRE's are unannounced tests of plans, procedures, readiness to
deploy, and training. EDRE provides a cross check of USR data by
evaluating some of the same criteria and highlighting substantive
differences. MODRE's are not employed as effectively for other than
high priority National Guard units. A MODRE involves inspection of policies and procedures but stops short of actual deployment and assessment of training level. Two reasons why the Guard system is different and why a full EDRE cannot be performed in some Army Reserve units are that mobilization without warning can have negative effects on soldiers’ jobs and, in some cases, organic or support transportation does not exist to fully test load plans.

Deployment considerations include type and quantity of equipment and readiness of units to perform combat missions, but the focus is more on ability of the U.S. or any future coalition to move units in a timely manner. While Desert Shield/Storm was successful and large quantities of materiel were moved into the Persian Gulf with unprecedented speed, shortfalls in strategic lift were exposed as well. Congress has discussed increasing the amount of operationally ready strategic sealift but shortfalls will remain even if the current initiative is approved.

Performing and sustaining unit operations in combat is most critical to the nation and the logical end to actions of the other elements. As shown previously, in peacetime there is no system to evaluate a unit’s ability to perform combat operations effectively. In the past we have been able to determine whether a unit in any Army component was indeed combat ready only after it had actually been engaged in conflict. This is not desirable and could be dangerous in the future when decreased budgets result in a smaller Army.

Measurement of a unit’s ability to perform its missions is really dependent upon the same items reported in the current USR with some additions. First, consider equipment. Operational readiness of
equipment is reported in USR; however, equipment capability is not. An armor battalion equipped with M-60A3 tanks cannot have the same potential as one equipped with M-1A2. This notion of equipment capability was studied during 1988-89 at Department of Army resulting in "Saber," a computer model that compares units' generic METL with current equipment. For example, a maintenance unit equipped to support M113's would not be capable of supporting M2/3 Bradleys because of lacking appropriate tools, test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TTMDE). Saber generates a red, amber, or green rating for each unit, focusing on pacing items, those pieces of equipment most vital for a unit to accomplish its mission. To some extent Saber uses a rating by exception, taking the lowest rating generated by any particular piece of equipment and applying that rating to the unit as a whole as is done in the USR. Evaluation of unit capability through Saber is somewhat subjective but more scientific than any other evaluation available at the time. Saber also lacks an effective mechanism to differentiate unit capabilities within the three broad categories: green, amber, and red. Saber is only a test concept and works well enough within its limitations but is not in current use at Department of Army. There is no system in current use for assessing relative differences in units' equipment capabilities.

USR and other assessment devices measure the number of equipment systems that are combat ready while sitting in a motor pool or unit supply room. This static readiness indicator results in a different quantity of ready equipment than would be fully operational after some time in combat. Further, it is an inadequate measure of the capability to sustain operational readiness. This disconnect relates to how
equipment is maintained during peacetime and how that peacetime maintenance program is different than during actual employment.

For reasons of efficiency and effectiveness, at times peacetime maintenance is accomplished by organizations that would not provide the same service during war. For active component units, some support is provided at installation level. Reserve component units have some support provided by Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites (MATES) and other equipment storage facilities. USR does not test all supporting maintenance capabilities that would be required during war.

There are justifiable efficiency reasons for peacetime maintenance structure but, because those organizations exist, evaluation of capabilities in units that must provide the same service during wartime is not good enough. While it is true that each of the support units has established METL to guide its training, and Desert Shield/Storm proved combat support and combat service support units very capable, the current system of unit assessment does not test a unit's ability to sustain maintenance operations in combat conditions. The training centers come closest to testing sustainment actions, but, even there some artificial forces are at work. Examples are additional support emphasis by higher commanders and the fact that there is only one unit engaged. In an actual operation, some of the support available would be used to keep other units operational.

Also, it is infrequent that an army division's corps slice is employed in support of the division. One reason is availability of resources. A second factor is that no one in the Army really knows what comprises a corps slice. At echelons above division, units often have
area support missions. As a result, support during one set of conditions may differ from that provided under other conditions. Because tailoring of support is frequently necessary and corps composition may be from three to five divisions of unspecified type, the Army has not been able to define the units comprising a corps slice.

Personnel systems do not highlight all of the right date either. USR measures how well the Army's institutional training and personnel distribution systems work but does nothing to measure crew stability and other less tangible factors. A measure of crew stability is to be included in TAM, which will be a substantial improvement over the 1-R. However, as mentioned previously on page four, items such as unit cohesion, quality of leadership, and morale are difficult or impossible to quantify individually. One method of assessing these intangible factors would be to judge them at the same time other unit operational requirements are being performed. As an example, the ORE proposed by FORSCOM would make it possible to rate units holistically, taking intangible factors into account, as a way to help predict wartime effectiveness.

Unit operational capabilities are not measured well under the current system. The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is intended as a tool for commanders' use in assessment of current training level and planning of future training. Although ARTEP evaluation results are not intended to be threatening to leaders and soldiers, but to be straightforward appraisals of performance measured against a set standard, some commanders use ARTEP's as report cards. The problem is that without an officially sanctioned test to be used in conjunction with
ARTEP training, the evaluation can be viewed as a test instead of the training assessment tool it was intended to be. Use of ARTEP evaluations as tests can hamper the very positive effect of allowing leaders to learn from success and failure without those failures becoming career limiting. TAM is likely to partially fill this requirement.

It may be said that senior commanders determine which units will perform effectively based on results seen at training center rotations and other events. This gut feeling is likely to be very accurate because of leaders' experience and preparation, however, such assessments are not available to decision makers at Department of Army. Desert Shield/Storm and other recent combat experiences demonstrate that army units will frequently be deployed differently than established OPLANS and TPFDL's would suggest. During Desert Shield/Storm there were so many cases in which reserve component units were not deployed in accordance with CAPSTONE that we must question how units were selected for mobilization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

How should an effectiveness measurement system be devised? First, consider equipment. If units with dissimilar equipment have a different potential, the measurement system should take those variations into account. With regard to pacing items, a scale could be constructed that would rate items of equipment regarding potential. For the sake of this discussion, assume the M-1A2 to be the most capable tank in the world. Next, the Army would rate the potential effectiveness of other tanks in relation to M-1A2. If the effectiveness scale were built with 100 points possible, a percentage comparison could result. After taking into
account a number of characteristics like armor penetration capability of
the main gun, mobility, crew protection, fuel use, and mean time between
failure. Army planners could arrive at a score for the less capable
equipment system. The result would be a different score, or percentage
of capability, for M-1A1, M-1IP, M-1, and M-60A3 than that given to M-
1A2.

ERC-A items could have impact on the rating also. For example a
tank battalion equipped with M-1 tanks and M-113 Armored Personnel
Carriers (APC) can not be as potentially capable as a comparable
battalion with M-3 Bradleys. While it is true that tank battalions have
relatively few APC requirements, movement speed of scouts, support
elements, and other parts of the task organization would reduce mobility
of the battalion task force. Other ERC-A equipment also affects the
capabilities. Especially difficult in current assessment is application
of substitute items of equipment. An example common to many reserve
component units, is the substitution of five ton trucks for HEMMT. There
is a significant difference in capability that should be captured in the
Army's reporting system. The proposed system would apply the effects of
equipment that is actually on hand in units to provide a composite
equipment effectiveness percentage.

This concept sounds complex and perhaps too difficult to be
workable. However, the proliferation of desktop computers makes this
sort of system possible. Reporting is automated now and will become more
so with time. Equipment capability values could be an integral part of
reporting programs. That would simultaneously eliminate calculation
problems and errors at unit level.
Complexity would be more pronounced in task forces employed according to Army doctrine. Look again at the M-1/M-113 situation. Because of budgetary constraints and availability of Bradleys, it is likely that a number of National Guard brigades and divisions will have M-1 armor battalions and M-113 infantry battalions. Task forces do not report readiness and there is likely no way to achieve task force reporting because composition and units involved in cross attachment should differ according to the situation. National Guard brigades equipped with M-1/M-113 cannot have the same potential combat power as brigades with more modern BFV's. This element can be captured in a roll up report that is somewhat like the current USR's for brigades and divisions.

Using a statistical approach to rate equipment capabilities would improve the ability of higher level decision makers to differentiate among units in the force. Currently, planners are forced to view all units reporting C-1 as being somewhat equal. This method would not measure quality of maintenance and support infrastructure; that will be discussed later.

Personnel ratings also could be improved. FORSCOM's TAM introduces the concept of weapon system crew stability reporting. This addition is important. Crew stability has long been a major dilemma for commanders. Unit cohesion, leadership, and morale are not easy to measure individually. The best assessment of these items must be in relation to operational performance and, although they are less tangible than other measures, value must be attached to them. Units should continue to report the number of soldiers that are assigned to units, deployable, and
trained for their jobs. Also, units should report the number of personnel that are qualified in an MOS that is not required by their current job. Those soldiers could be used in other positions. Additionally, units should continue to report the number of soldiers that have not yet attended basic training. This issue applies only to reserve component units. Since the National Guard and Army Reserve do not have a personnel account for people that are attending school, those individuals are currently carried as unqualified unit members. By reporting this data, attention could be drawn to a situation where institutional individual training is slow or disconnected.

Assessment of training status is the least objective of current report data. The difficulty is structuring of objective valuation tools. One of the most severe limitations to the current system is that units are not tested under conditions similar to those that would be encountered during combat operations. Simulating the stress of combat would be difficult if not impossible. Within this new program, operational tests would allow for assessment of units' abilities in performance of METL similar to ORE. ORE is to be conducted by an evaluation team comprised of fifteen members: five from each component. Using personnel from all components is good because results will be more credible, but there is a danger of not using ORE to achieve maximum results.

Assessments, as suggested here, should test as fully as possible, unit capabilities through the full range of actions that would be required during a crisis. The test should begin with a short notice mobilization, like the current EDRE, and continue through accomplishment
of missions. For active units, this concept is really not a problem. Reserve component units would know that they were scheduled to attend annual training, but a short time before their scheduled departure, they would receive notification through the chain of command that the unit would be performing an operational readiness test. In this way, there would not be problems with soldiers' employers because the unit members were scheduled to be on military duty anyway. After notification, the test would proceed through mobilization, deployment to a different location than planned for annual training, and sustainment and performance of combat operations. Conditions would be as close as possible to those encountered in combat.

The size of unit tested would vary among combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Tests should be performed by combat battalions because that is the lowest level at which sustainment of systems can be integrated into the assessment. Focus at company or lower level, which is the intent of FORSCOM's ORE, will not provide an adequate test of logistical and maintenance support systems. Similarly, appropriate combat support should be integrated into combat battalion tests. For example, if a battalion can reasonably expect to receive support from one engineer platoon, that support should be included in the friendly task organization. For combat support and combat service support units with area support missions, tests would be structured to assess sustainment and operations similar to that for combat units with consideration of time, space, and realistic work load.

This test of capability would last the entire annual training period for reserve component units. It would assess all unit actions from
mobilization preparation through combat operations and sustainment. ORE is expected normally to last no longer than 48 hours. That period is not long enough to measure the effects of stress on soldiers or equipment. The ORE period is also too short for activation or any meaningful exercise of sustainment systems. The short time period envisioned for ORE is a fatal flaw in the concept.

The conduct of field operations will require an opposing force (OPFOR) of adequate size to provide battlefield width and depth. Both the OPFOR and assessment team should be a composite force of active, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel as is planned for the ORE evaluation team. Also, tests should use the lane concept, allowing the assessment team chief to control situations confronting the task force he is testing.

Resulting assessments could be quantified according to Army standards for each action. During training after the examination, those results could be used to improve training level much like is envisioned for TAM. The difference is that assessments generated would be used as a score card. Using statistical techniques, the Army could determine how many units of each type should be tested to provide an indication of overall active, National Guard, or Army Reserve unit capabilities. If the tested units are selected randomly, it could be assumed that some units would be more capable than others. An average could be calculated that would depict the general state of unit capability within an component. In the case of task forces, the rating would be applied for all armor and infantry battalions of that component.
There are several advantages to this measurement of effectiveness. First, there would be an ability to generally assess the value of organizational culture, unit cohesion, stability, quality of leadership, morale, and individual desire to accomplish missions. These are items for which there is no attempt of quantification today. Also, use of a testing device would allow ARTEP results to continue as intended, instead of being a report card. Evaluations should assist in assessment of current training level and serve as guides for planning future training. There is some danger that ARTEP's would look a lot like the test; but, training would still occur and, since the test would be based on the unit's METL, unit leaders would be concentrating on the right tasks. Finally, results of the assessment would be reported through the chain of command to give army leaders at various levels a tool for selecting contingency force units.

Cost of evaluations as a result of this program could be a significant factor. However, with all units subject to inspection resources would be conserved by testing only the number of units that represent a statistically valid sample. Because all units would be subject to assessment, the entire force would be motivated to meet the same standards. Bold Shift's ORE will be expensive too. Bold Shift plans focus on early deploying units. As resources become available and the program gains credibility with army leaders the concept would be expanded to encompass all units. The problem with this approach is that it satisfies current concerns about the capabilities in high priority reserve component units, but is not likely to improve the overall standards in reserve component training. That is because resources are
shrinking which makes the projected expansion of ORE unlikely. Of course there would be significant differences among units. Active units should be presumed to be the most capable. Reserve component units would be less capable because of resources, the most important of which is time. There should be no difference in standards. Lower scores for reserve component units and the lesser capability those scores implied would become norms for comparison of future unit tests.

Assessment results might present a short term, unrealistic indication of capability for units within a component. Units selected randomly for testing could all be above or below average. To reduce the effects of unfortunate selection, a mean capability rating could be developed over several years, perhaps three, which would minimize dispersion in the results.

When all results are compiled, with data from a number of years, Department of Army would have information upon which to base resource distribution decisions. Policies and decisions at the highest levels should be predicated on developing the best possible force within the resources provided by Congress. The cost to maintain a reserve component unit is less than for an active unit. The Total Force Policy Study Report indicates that ground forces in the reserve components cost approximately 25 percent of the recurring cost for active forces at the same level of organization. This ratio is approximately the same for combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

Another source of unit cost data. The Army Force Cost System depicts annual recurring costs for Army units. The system is a computer data base that takes into account requirements of units' base TOE. Authorized
Level of Organization, training readiness, OPTEMPO, and geographic location. The recurring cost of a National Guard infantry battalion equipped with M-113 is 17 percent of that for an active battalion equipped with Bradleys. A National Guard or Army Reserve corps engineer battalion is 14 percent of its active counterpart. When comparing forward support battalions, the reserve component unit costs 16 percent of an active unit. Cost of equipment procurement is not included and results in a difference between these figures and those quoted in The Total Force Policy Study Report cited above.

Unit cost must be considered by decision makers in the process of allocating resources. Leaders calculate a level of risk that is acceptable and structure forces that limit threats to national security but they will not be able to eliminate all dangers. A no risk strategy would be unaffordable. Structure decisions must be made with consideration of which forces will be maintained at a high level and lower levels of readiness. This determination will drive decisions relating to resource distribution and could result in a change to the current mix of active and reserve component forces if risk is accepted in readiness rather than force size.

CONCLUSIONS

Because of inadequacies in the current system of reporting unit status, some change is necessary. The truth of this observation is supported by efforts at Department of Army and FORSCOM to improve USR and reserve component training status reports. Bold Shift with its ORE and use of a multi-component assessment team with TAM are moves in the right
direction. While these initiatives are a start, they represent modifications to current systems rather than innovation based on assessment of how to achieve the desired ends. World events and the resulting changes in all services require the Army to look at methods to be used in predicting unit combat effectiveness.

Programs designed to measure unit effectiveness would be more innovative and offer significantly better data upon which to base resource and deployment decisions. They would also improve the overall readiness of army units in active and reserve components by encouraging the right training goals.
NOTES


2. Ibid., 7-8.


4. Excerpts from AR 220-1, Unit Status Reports, that apply to personnel, equipment, and training ratings are in Appendix A


6. Ibid., 9-10.

7. Ibid., 10.

8. Ibid. 11.


10. Ibid., 12-3.

11. Ibid., 13.


14. FORSCOM briefing charts that present a general picture of Bold Shift are in Appendix B. Charts briefed to CSA on 27 August 1991 for his decision are in Appendix C.

15. An excerpt from FORSCOM Operational Readiness Exercise (Pilot Program) containing policies and procedures is in Appendix D

16. FORSCOM briefing slides located in Appendixes A and B.

17. See Appendix E.


3.6. Personnel data

The Unit Status Report provides indicators of a unit's personnel status by developing a C-level that is calculated by comparing available strength, available MOS trained strength, and available senior grade strength to wartime requirements. In addition, assigned strength and personnel turnover information is provided. In preparation for fielding personnel data, commanders are discouraged from moving soldiers from one unit to another in the expectation of breaking up cohesive groups solely to cross level for unit status reporting purposes. Complete the personnel data portion of the report as follows:

- **a. Determine required strength.** Use your unit's MTOE/TDA to determine required strength. MTOE Type B column for cadre units, MTOE/TDA (required column for all other units). For MTOE organizations, additions or augmentations are included in the available strength. MTOE/TDA missions are excluded from required strength computations.

- **b. Determine assigned strength percentage.**
  1. Assigned strength percentage is based on a comparison of assigned strength required strength.
  2. Assigned strength for Active Component units will equal the accountable strength (aft personnel control number (PCN) (ACC-C27: Personnel Zero Balance Report), adjusted to the "as of" date of the status report. This number being included of the"unit strength RECAP Part II. Reports from SDFPSURAS and ARNG are used to obtain assigned strength data for Reserve Component units. Assigned strength for Reserve Component units includes Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel assigned on a separate TDA, that would deploy with the unit if it was mobilized on the "as of" date of the report. Inactive National Guard personnel will not be included in strength computations or figures in this report.

- **c. Determine available MOS strength percentage.**
  1. Available MOS trained personnel is based on a comparison of available MOS trained personnel required MOS trained personnel. Available MOS strength cannot exceed available strength.
  2. Determine the number of MTOE/TDA personnel spaces required by identification (office, Winco, and enlisted) and by military occupational specialty code (MOSC).
  3. Determine the number of personnel included in the available strength of the unit by identity and MOSC. Maximize the trained available personnel against requirements. Personnel are to be considered MOS trained for purposes of the Unit Status Report as follows:
    a. Match officers to officer spaces on a one-for-one basis. Officers may be considered MOS trained if they have completed an officer course or are assigned to a unit and the commander feels that they have the minimum skills needed to perform the wartime duties of their assigned position. They must also hold a grade within one grade higher or two grades lower than that required by MTOE/TDA.
    b. Using only the first three characters of the MOSC, consider WO and enlisted soldiers MOS trained when they can be used in their primary MOSC (PMOSC), secondary MOSC (SMOSC), additional MOSC (AMOSC), or another MOSC that can be substituted for the above. (b) is not applicable to non-traditional personnel. Commanders may grant waivers for grade restrictions when exceptional circumstances warrant, e.g., Medical Corps personnel.

- **d. Determine available senior grade percentage.**
  1. Available senior grade percentage is based on a comparison of available senior grade MOS trained personnel required MOS trained personnel. Available senior grade strength cannot exceed available strength.
  2. Commanders of COHORT battalions and non-COHORT battalions with one or more COHORT companies or battalions will consider soldiers in grade E-4 who are designated to serve in E-5 positions in a COHORT unit and are included in the 1 percent skill level one substitution minus category as E-5 when computing available senior grade strength. The number of E-4 trained may be increased to include training needed.
Toball 3-3

(1) Personnel turnover percentage provides an indicator of unit turnover by comparing the number of personnel reassigned, discharged or separated during the 3 months (6 months for reserve component units) preceding the "as of" date of the report to assigned strength on the "as of" date. Use percentage calculated in step 3 of outline.

Figure 3-5. Personnel C-level outline

1. Identify your unit's required strength (para 3-6a).
2. Identify assigned strength (para 3-6b).
3. Compute assigned strength percentage: Assigned strength percentage = Assigned strength / Required strength x 100.
4. Identify available strength (para 3-6c).
5. Compute available strength percentage: Available strength percentage = Available strength / Required strength x 100.

Use table 3-2 to determine an available strength C-level.
6. Identify available MOS trained strength (para 3-6d).
7. Compute available MOS trained percentage and C-level: Available MOS trained percentage = Available MOS trained strength / Required strength x 100.

Use table 3-3 to determine an available strength C-level.
8. Identify available senior grade strength (para 3-6e).
9. Compute available senior grade percentage and C-level: Available senior grade percentage = Available senior grade / Required senior grade x 100.

Level 3: Determine your unit's overall personnel C-level—it is the lowest C-level determined in steps 5, 7, and 8 above—H-4 being lower than C-1. (This is your overall personnel C-level unless HQDA and/or MACOM direct or approves use of a C-level of C-5 as outlined in para 2-6b).

10. Identify the number of personnel reasigned or discharged or separated from the reporting unit during the preceding 3 months (para 3-6f).
11. Identify the number of personnel reassigned or discharged or separated from the reporting unit during the preceding 3 months (para 3-6f).
12. Compute personnel turnover percentage: Personnel turnover percentage = Number of personnel reassigned / Required strength x 100.

Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 85% or greater
Level 1:
Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 75% to 84%
Level 2:
Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 55% to 74%
Level 3:
Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 50% to 54%
Level 4:

Table 3-2
Level using available strength percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Available strength: 100% or greater</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available strength: 80% to 99%</td>
<td>Level 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available strength: 70% to 79%</td>
<td>Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available strength: Below 70%</td>
<td>Level 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3
Level using available MOS or senior grade percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 85% or greater</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 75% to 84%</td>
<td>Level 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 55% to 74%</td>
<td>Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available MOS or senior grade percentage: 50% to 54%</td>
<td>Level 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-7. Equipment onhand (EOH) data

The Unit Status Report provides indicators of unit's equipment status (EOH) status by developing C-levels that are calculated by comparing the fill of selected equipment to wartime requirements. A level for all of a unit's reportable equipment as defined in table 3-4 below (to include pading items and a level for each pading item is determined. The lowest calculated EOH level is the EOH level for these levels. Complete the EOH data portion of the report as follows:

a. Determine reportable equipment and required quantities. Refer to your unit's MTOE/TDA unless updated or automated systems to determine reportable equipment and required quantities (para 3-6b). Reportable equipment is that which—

(1) For MTSE units, is designated on a
unit's MTOE as equipment readiness code
"A" (ERCA), primary weapons and equipment
(app B)

(2) For TDA units, is listed on a unit's
TDA and is designated in AR 700-135 or
AR 18-25 as DA form 2406 (Materiel
Condition Status Report), DA Form 520-1
(Army Missile Materiel Readiness Report)
or DA Form 1152 (Army Aircraft
Inventory, Status, and Flying Time
reportable unit status). (3) TDA equipment is readiness coded.

(3) Has a requirement of 1 or greater, shown in the MTOE/TDA.

(4) Has not been designated as nonreportable/except from reporting (app B).

b. Determine quantity of reportable equipment on-hand.

(1) Quantity on-hand is determined from
the unit property book.

(2) If a unit has a HQDA authorized substitute item of equipment on-hand, instead of a required item of equipment specified in authorization documents, the substitute item will be counted as equipment on-hand for unit status reporting purposes. HQDA authorized equipment substitutes are listed in SB 700-20, appendix F.

(a) HQDA authorized substitutes, as reflected in SB 700-20, appendix F, are selected based on their ability to fulfill the operational requirements of the MTOE/TDA required item of equipment and logistical supportability. Recommended changes to this list may be submitted to HQDA, DCSLOG (DALO-SMD).

(b) When authorized substitutes are approved for issue on a greater than one-for-one basis, calculate an adjusted quantity of fill for the required MTOE/TDA LIN. Then, compute the percentage of fill and determine the level for the required MTOE/TDA LIN using table 3-4. For example, a unit's MTOE/TDA required quantity for 10-kw generators is 1025. The unit has no 10-kw generators but does have thirty 5-kw generators on hand. The percentage of fill for 10-kw generators is calculated as follows: Two each 5-kw generators are a substitute for 1 each 10-kw generator. Dividing 2 into 30, we find the adjusted quantity of fill for 10-kw generators is 10/30. Multiply 10/30 by 1025, we find that the MTOE/TDA LIn on hand is 340 percent. The unit has only 60 percent of the generators required. This LIN is rated G-4 or 34 from table 3-4.

AR 229-1 • UPDATE
Table 3-4
Equipment on-hand criteria for high density lines (21 or more required)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIN flt</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>LIN flt</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>LIN flt</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>LIN flt</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least 90%</td>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>At least 80%</td>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>At least 65%</td>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>Less than 65%</td>
<td>C-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) If authorization documents are changed before new/modified equipment is available for fielding, commanders will designate selected on-hand equipment in lieu of the newly required equipment for unit status reporting purposes. If a failure to provide equipment is being considered on another basis, the procedures in (2)/(b) above, MACOMs will ensure that subordinate units properly apply the in-lieu-of policy. (See app G.)

(4) Reportable LINs having several components (for example, kits, sets, or outfits) will be reported on hand if property records show the LIN has been issued and is sufficiently complete to be used for its intended purpose. If the LIN is missing or deleted to the extent that supply action under AR 735-11 (for example, report of survey) is necessary to replace most of the set, do not count the set as on-hand. If supply actions are not required to remove the entire set and the criteria described above can be met, count the item as on-hand. Medical equipment sets (MES) will be evaluated by the readiness inventory required by AR 40-49, and comments will be included in the ESRT and IAW Form 369-H-1.

(5) Reserve Component units will include all reportable equipment at equipment concentration sites (ECS), displaced equipment training centers (DETC), regional maintenance training sites (RMTS), regional medical training centers (RMTC), training site medical (RTS-MED), training equipment sites (UTES), mobilization and training equipment sites (MATES), and weekend training sites (WETS).

(6) Do not count items borrowed from other units.

(7) Assigned equipment that is on loan in maintenance, or otherwise outside the operational control of the reporting unit, but returnable within 12 hours or in time to meet the unit's requirement to attain loaded deployability (whichever is less), will be counted as on-hand if EOH computations if a system has been established to keep the commander informed as to the fill and maintenance status of this equipment. For example, watercraft and medical equipment assigned to a unit but outside the operational control of the unit due to CONUS or overseas area that differs from that of the unit's equipment sites, the EOH level cannot be lower than the lowest pacing item C-level.

Table 3-5
Equipment on-hand criteria for low density lines (20 or less required)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MTCE/TDA required quantity</th>
<th>C-1</th>
<th>All equipment</th>
<th>C-2</th>
<th>All equipment</th>
<th>C-3</th>
<th>Equipment other than aircraft</th>
<th>C-4</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The MTCE/TDA required quantity column is used in the first C-level criteria when is equal to or less than the equipment sites, X. This table is used to determine if a given unit has a stock of items that meet the criteria.
Figure 3-6. Equipment onhand C-level outline

1. Identify your unit's reportable LIN and required quantities (para 3-7a) -- ensure reportable/exempt LINs are subtracted (para G).

2. Identify reportable equipment that is onhand -- ensure authorized substitutes and in-kind items are counted (para 3-7b).

3. Determine a C-Level for each reportable LIN to include pacing items:
   a. If the number of items required under a LIN is 21 or more, calculate a percent fill for that LIN; then use table 3-4 to obtain a C-Level for that LIN.

Percent Fill = Equipment onhand
           -----------------------------
           Equipment required x 100

b. If the number of items required under a LIN is 20 or less use table 3-5 to obtain a C-Level for that LIN except when counting substitutes/in-kind items on a greater than one-for-one basis.

4. Based on the results of steps 1-3 record the following:
   a. Total number of reportable LINs (to include pacing items) =
   b. No. LINs C-1 = No. LINs C-2 = ...
   c. No. LINs C-3 = ...
   d. No. LINs C-4 = ...

5. Calculate an equipment fill level based on all reportable LINs using data from step 4.
   a. Determine an average LIN C-Level value for all LINs. 
   No. LINs x = x = A
   b. No. LINs x = A
   c. No. LINs x = B
   d. No. LINs x = C
   e. No. LINs x = D
   f. No. LINs = E

Average LIN C-Level Value = A = B = C + D
Total LINs = E = ...

b. Determine the percent of LINs C-3 and C-4:
   a. % LINs C-3 = No. LINs C-3 / Total LINs x 100
   b. % LINs C-4 = No. LINs C-4 / Total LINs x 100

2-8. Equipment readiness (ER) and equipment mission capable (EMC) data

The Unit Status Report provides indicators of a unit's equipment readiness by developing a C-Level that is calculated by comparing the combined effect of fill and maintenance shortfalls on the status of selected equipment to wartime requirements. An ER level for all of a unit's reportable equipment is defined in a table (to include pacing items, except aircraft and selected missile systems: HAWK, LANCE, PATRIOT, and Pershing) and a level for each pacing item is determined. The unit's overall ER level is equal to the lower of these levels. To focus on how well this equipment is being maintained equipment mission capable (EMC) percentages are developed that disregard that portion of the required equipment that is short. Calculate the ER and EMC data portion of the report as follows:

a. Determine reportable equipment. Reportable equipment is that equipment which:
   (1) Does not contain items, leave blank.
   (2) Is not an aircraft assigned to a nonunit assignment (unless assigned aircraft is designated as a pacing item).

b. Determine availability days/hours:
   (1) Full mission capable data from DA Form 2406, DA Form 2166-1, or DA Form 1352 (reportable) in units which have defined time as a TDA equipment (ready to use, but not including subunit equipment), or in production current (APP C).
   (2) During peacetime, ER and EMC will be based on the full mission capable (FMC) status of a unit's reportable equipment averaged over a 1-month period for

Active Component units and 4-month period for Reserve Component units. Active Component units will compute FMC data beginning the 16th day of the prior month and ending the 15th day of the current month. Reserve Component units will compute FMC data based on the most recent quarterly (90-day) report. During combat mobilization, deployment, or employment, point in time procedure will be used (para 3-15).

(3) For MTOE units, only ERC equipment can be considered when determining an ER/EMC level for example if a unit has ERC-A and ERC-B class 2, then the ERC-A class 2 will be considered.

(4) Substitute and in-kind-of equipment will be reported. If a substitute or an in-kind-of item that is not DA Form 2406 reportable is being counted against a required MTOE ERC-A or TDA LIN, then as DA Form 2406 reportable, take nonavailable days for this equipment from DD Form 314. However, do not add this equipment to DA Form 2406 reports submitted to the Materiel Equipment Support Activity (MESA).

(5) Determine required days/hours. Required days/hours will be based on the quantity of MTOE/TDA required equipment that is both unit status and maintenance reportable, and the number of days/hours that equipment was on hand during the reporting period.

(6) Determine possible days/hours. Possible days/hours will be based on the on-hand quantity of MTOE/TDA required equipment that is both unit status and maintenance reportable, and the number of days/hours that equipment was on hand during the reporting period.

(7) Complete ER and EMC sections of sections A and B of DA Form 2175-R (figs 3-1 and 3-2).

(1) Sections A, B, C:
   (a) Blocks 43 and 44 (percent of on-hand equipment mission capable-MTOE): Use data from step 7 of outline. If no reportable items, leave blank.
   (b) Blocks 45 and 46 (percent of on-hand equipment mission capable-MTOE): Use data from step 8 of outline (refills the unit's pacing item with the worst EMC status). If no pacing items, leave blank.
   (c) Blocks 47 and 48 (percent of required equipment mission capable-MTOE): Use data from step 9 of outline (if no reportable items, leave blank).
   (d) Blocks 49 and 10 (percent of required equipment mission capable-MTOE): Use data from step 4 and 5 of outline that refills the unit's pacing item with the worst ERC status. If no pacing items, leave blank.

(2) Sections C:
   (a) Block 20 (equipment readiness level):
      Use data from step 9 of outline. If no reportable equipment, enter 1, or if HODA MACOM has directed/authorized use of a
C-5 level, enter 1. For units with pacing items, the ER level cannot be higher than the lowest ER level determined for a pacing item.

(b) Blocks 31 through 33 (reason ER level not 1). If block 30 does not contain a 1, enter the equipment readiness code from Appendix E, that which shows the main reason the ER level is not 1; otherwise, leave blank.

Table 3-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level for percentage of equipment fully mission capable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment other than aircraft FMC:</strong> 90% or greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft FMC: 75% or greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment other than aircraft FMC:</strong> 70% to 99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft FMC: 60% to 74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment other than aircraft FMC:</strong> 60% to 69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft FMC: 50% to 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment other than aircraft FMC:</strong> Below 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft FMC: Below 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level: 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
A 75 percent FMC rate for aircraft, equal to C-1, is higher than the established DA mission standard (expressed as a mission capable rate) and published in AR 700-136 for most aircraft types. Many aviation units will not have sufficient resources to achieve a C-1 level; however, most should be able to report C-2 or C-3.

Figure 3-7: Equipment readiness (ER)/equipment mission capable (EMC) C-level outline
1. Identify your unit's required maintenance reportable WTDIE (ER-A) or TDA equipment, maintenance reportable pacing items, and actual FMC data for the reporting period. Do not include equipment designated unit status nonreportable. Do not include nonAWM-authorized substitute equipment. See figure 3-6 for examples.
2. Determine an ER percentage for all reportable equipment (to include pacing items, except aircraft and the HAWK, LANCE, PATRIOT, and Pershing missile systems). ER Percent = Total available days ÷ Total required days x 100
3. Use results from step 2 and table 3-6 to determine an ER C-level: A, B, C.
4. Determine a PI-ER percentage for each pacing item (to include aircraft and missile systems designated as pacing items). PI-ER Percent = PI available days/hours ÷ PI required days/hours x 100
5. Use results from step 4 and table 3-6 to determine a PI-ER C-level for each pacing item (note separate criteria for aircraft).

Lowest PI-ER C-level = PI-ER Percent x C

Compare A and B above. C becomes the lowest of the two C-levels—C being lower than A and B. If none has reportable equipment, C = 1. C causes your equipment readiness C-level unless HAWK, LANCE, PATRIOT, and Pershing missile systems.

EMC Percent = Total available days ÷ Total possible days x 100

9. Determine an EMC percentage for all reportable equipment (to include pacing items, except aircraft and the HAWK, LANCE, PATRIOT, and Pershing missile systems). EMC Percent = Total available days ÷ Total possible days x 100

2-9. Training data
The Unit Status Report provides indicators of a unit's training status by developing a training C-level. The primary purpose of the unit training level is to show the current ability of the unit to perform its assigned wartime missions. The standard against which the unit's training status is measured is its mission essential task list (METL). The METL is derived from assigned wartime missions and is submitted to, and approved by, the next higher headquarters in the reporting unit's chain of command. METL for Reserve Component units will be approved by the unit's next higher command (peace time), in coordination with the appropriate CAPSTONE (wartime) commander. A secondary purpose of the unit training level is to show resource shortfalls that prevent attainment of a training tempo necessary to achieve or maintain training objectives.

2. The commander determines the training level based on his or her knowledge of the proficiency of the unit in accomplishing METL tasks. Evaluation of training is continuous and dynamic. Commanders must consider personal observations, reports, and the assessments of others (within and outside of the unit). The training level reflects the time needed to overcome training shortfalls to reach a condition of being fully trained in METL tasks. This estimate determines the current level of training in the unit. Do not assume that existing personnel and equipment shortages will be filled before training starts. To estimate determine the days needed to attain a fully trained (METL) status. Commanders must first determine the current level of training in the unit. The following factors should be considered in making this determination:

- The ability to operate in an nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) environment.
- Availability of flying hours, training ammunition, simulation devices, and fuel.
- The time elapsed and turnover of key personnel since major training events occurred. For example, Reserve Component unit commanders will consider their unit's trained proficiency since its last annual training period.
- The quality of training conducted, and the availability and quality of training areas.
- Considering the factors above, determine the METL tasks which the unit is currently able to perform in full as well as those tasks which the unit can perform in part. These unit abilities represent the current level of training for the unit. Those METL tasks which the unit cannot currently perform are assumed to be nonstandard and require additional training
represent the unit's training shortfall. Estimate training requirements to determine the number of days of training required to overcome the training shortfall, assuming that all available personnel can participate in training. In estimating determining training time, do not include the time needed to conduct a field training exercise or command post exercise at levels of command higher than the reporting unit. Enter the number of days required to train in blocks 51 and 52 of section A, DA Form 2715-R. Then, use this number and table 3-7 to determine a training priority. Enter this level-in block 34 of section B, DA Form 2715-R.

Table 3-7
Estimated days to be trained to standard on tasks in a unit's METL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Special instructions:
1. If a unit does not have enough people and/or equipment (counting pooled and/or borrowed items) to ever become trained to perform its assigned wartime missions satisfactorily, it should report XX in blocks 51 and 52, section A, and 4 in block 34 of section B. State in the training remarks section of the report the minimum additional personnel and equipment needed. For every such report the minimum additional personnel and equipment needed to ever become trained to perform assigned wartime missions satisfactorily, commanders should enter in their training remarks a statement to address nuclear capability or the lack thereof, within organic units.
2. If MDA or an MDA directs or approves use of a training level of C-5 as outlined in paragraph 2-66, enter XX in blocks 51 and 52 of section A and a 5 in block 34 of section B.

(b) Active Component nuclear capable units whose mission is nuclear delivery, employment, or support, and whose nuclear qualification status (as authorized by the MACOM commander in accord with AR 50-5, chap 8) is limited or removed due to training shortfalls, report a training level of 4 on block 34 of section B. Units having nuclear and conventional delivery capabilities (such as 155mm or 8-inch howitzers) whose nuclear mission capability status is limited, removed due to training shortfalls, or have not been qualified (AR 50-5, chap 8) by the MACOM/COM commander will not report training level higher than 3. Include appropriate comments in the remarks section of the report to address nuclear capability or the lack thereof, within organic units.

(c) If HQDA or an MDA directs or approves use of a training level of C-5 as outlined in paragraph 2-66, enter XX in blocks 51 and 52 of section A and a 5 in block 34 of section B.

(d) Complete blocks 35 through 37 of section B (reason training level is not 11 or 12 otherwise, leave blank).

Notes:
1. Units will enter in blocks 53 through 56 of section A the degree to which resource constraints are preventing the unit from maintaining a training tempo necessary to achieve and sustain its trained training objectives. In each of these blocks, if the resource area is having an insignificant impact on training, enter A. If the resource area is having a minor impact, enter B. If the resource area is having a major impact, enter C. If the factor prohibits training tempo necessary to maintain a satisfactory training status enter D.

1. Block 53 (assigned strength shortfall). Enter assigned strength shortfall indicator. When an overall assigned strength shortfall or lack of key MOS qualified personnel hinder training, commanders should comment in training remarks.
2. Block 54 (special duty requirements). Enter special duty requirements indicator. Assess the impact of the diversion of unit personnel to meet special duty requirements. (See glossary.)
3. Block 55 (availability of funds). Enter availability of funds indicator. Higher commanders should comment when assistance is needed from the next higher echelon.
4. Block 56 (availability of equipment: material). Enter availability of equipment and material indicator. This category is not limited equipment authorized in a unit's MTOE or TDA for example, the availability of training items such as simulators, sub-caliber devices, training extension course (TEC) tapes, and mockups should be considered.
5. Block 57 availability of qualified leaders or status of aviator training. Enter availability of qualified leaders indicator. Emphasize those leaders most needed for training in the unit's METL (for example, company commanders, platoon leaders, first sergeants, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders in infantry battalions). For units with aircraft pacing items, enter the unit aviator training level (numeric value 1, 2, 3, or 4 derived as prescribed in FC 1-110, chapter 5). Availability of nonaviator leaders in these aviation units will be addressed in training remarks. When a unit has aviators but no aircraft pacing items, include the aviator training level in training remarks.
6. Block 58 (accessibility of training areas/facilities). Enter availability of training areas and facilities indicator. Consider qualitative and quantitative availability of training areas available to the unit.
7. Block 59 (availability of fuel). Enter availability of fuel indicator. Consider need for both field and garrison training.
8. Block 60 (availability of ammunition). Enter availability of ammunition indicator. Consider both normal and training peculiar ammunition, including sub-caliber rounds for training devices.

9. Block 61 (availability of maneuver hours). Enter availability of maneuver hours. Consider the impact of competing activities which detract from training time to the extent that they reduce training readiness (such as school support activities and units without support details for other units). Units should consider the impact flying-hours have on their training and support thereof.

10. Narrative remarks. In those cases where blocks 55-61 do not contain the letter A or B (Nos. 1 or 2 for aviation units in block 57), the impact of the resource constraint will be addressed in the remarks section of the Unit Status Report (para 3-1984).

d. All reporting units will include the following in their training remarks (para 3-1986):
1. (a) ITF and CPX participation during the 12 months preceding the report (Rescinded).
(b) The date of the unit's last external evaluation to ARTEM standard (Rescinded).
(c) If a unit's training level changes from that submitted in its last report the reason for the change will be addressed. (para 3-1986)

3-10. Overall unit C-level and mission accomplishment estimate (MAE).

The overall unit C-level and mission accomplishment estimate is the commander's assessment of the overall status of his or her unit and its ability to accomplish assigned wartime missions. MAE is determined only for units with an overall level of C-4 or C-5.

In selecting an overall level, the commander should review levels attained in the
measured resource areas and C-level definitions in table 3-1, and consider shortcomings, resources, and quality factors not previously addressed.

1. The starting point for determining the overall status of a unit is the lowest unit status level attained in a measured resource area (personnel, EOH, ER, or training). However, the overall C-level code varies from the lowest measured resource area level unless one or more of the areas is rated as C-5. If no resource area is rated as C-5, or with written approval from the MACOM, the commander may subjectively upgrade or downgrade the unit's overall level if the calculated level is not truly representative of the status of the unit. For example, if the education level, quality of leadership, morale, or cohesion in a unit are unusually high or internal turbulence is unusually low, a commander may want to subjectively upgrade or downgrade the overall level. On the other hand, if the shortage of certain equipment items is having a greater impact on the unit than the calculated EOH represents, the commander may want to subjectively downgrade the unit's overall level. A calculated resource area level cannot be subjectively changed.

2. Status of prescribed load list (PLL) items, authorized stockage list (ASL) items, basic loads, common table of allowances (CTA) items, equipment regardless of readiness code (ERC-A, ERC-B, or ERC-C), and special skill requirements (SOL, LISC, or ASI) are examples of other factors that should be considered in selecting an overall C-level.

3. Once an overall C-level is selected, complete the overall level portions in section B of DA Form 2715-R.

   a. Block 20 (overall unit level). Record selected overall level.
   b. Block 21 (primary reason overall level is not 1). If block 20 does not contain a 1, enter the overall C-level code from appendix F that shows the primary factor that prevents a C-1 overall level. However, if the level in block 20 is different from the lowest calculated resource area rating (subjective upgrade or downgrade), place an „X” in block 21. If neither of these instructions apply leave block 21 blank.
   c. Blocks 38 through 40 (secondary reason overall level not 1). Enter a code from appendix F that represents the secondary factor that prevents a higher overall level. This code may be from the same resource area as the primary or secondary factor but cannot be the same code.
   d. Blocks 41 through 43 (secondary reasons overall level not 1). Enter a code from appendix F that represents the tertiary factor that prevents a higher overall level.

4. The M.A.E. is the commander estimate of the extent to which his or her unit can accomplish its wartime mission if it were to be deployed/employed on the „as of” date of the report. The estimate will be expressed in terms of the percent of wartime mission that can be accomplished except for TOE hospitals which will express the percent in operational beds. An M.A.E. will be determined by all units that attain an overall level of C-4 or C-5. A unit's M.A.E. will be recorded in the remarks section of the Unit Status Report (para 3-1B[5]).

   a. Primary purpose of the M.A.E. is to provide a more definitive estimate of the ability of a unit to perform its wartime mission than is provided by a level of C-4 or C-5. To reduce administrative requirements and the complexity of procedures, the same criteria guidelines are used for all type units. However, resource and training degradation will have a different impact on a unit's percent of mission accomplishment depending on the type of unit involved.

b. Basic loads, common table of allowances items, authorized stockage list items, and estimated training, that can be expected to be calculated or estimated for a commander may want to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

   c. Block 44 (projected overall level). If a change in the overall unit rating can be forecasted, enter rating in block 44. If a unit's overall C-level is below ALO (see sec B block 38), a projected change or overall level is required. If a unit is meeting ALO, no entry is required. If a prior forecasted entry is no longer valid, enter a numeric or pound sign (¥), leave blank.

   d. Blocks 45 through 50 (projected date of change in overall level). If block 44 contains an entry, enter the date of projected change. If block 44 is blank or contains a numeric or pound sign (¥), leave blank.

Table 3-4:

C-Level definitions

- **C-1**: DEFINITION: Unit possesses the required resources and is capable of undertaking the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

- **C-2**: DEFINITION: Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

- **C-3**: DEFINITION: Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

- **C-4**: DEFINITION: Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the major portions of the wartime mission with resources on hand.

- **C-5**: DEFINITION: Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the major portions of the wartime mission with resources offhand.

- **C-6**: DEFINITION: Unit possesses the required resources and is capable of undertaking the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed, but must use at least 90% of the TOE hospital beds.

Table 3-9:

Comparison of M.A.E. and overall C-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall C-level</th>
<th>M.A.E. range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>90% - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>85% - 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>85% - 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4</td>
<td>80% - 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>80% - 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>80% - 85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-11. Finalizing sections A and B of DA Form 2715-R.

a. Section A.

b. Section B.
(1) Block 62 (authorized level of organization). Enter the reporting unit’s actual ALO, numeric or alphabetic designation.

(2) Block 63 through 68 (date of report). Enter the “as of” date of the report or date of change, if applicable. In blocks 63 and 64, enter the last two digits of the calendar year. In blocks 65 and 66 enter the number of the month. In blocks 67–68 enter the day. For example, enter 15 October 1985 as 851015 (Yymmdd).

(3) Block 59 (parent unit identifier). Battalions, separate companies, and separate detachments organic to major combat units (divisions, separate brigades, Special Forces groups, and armored cavalry regiments), enter 5. All other units, enter 4.

(4) Blocks 70 through 75 (unit identification code). Enter UIC of unit reducing the reports to machine readable media.

(5) Block 76 through 77 (report type). Enter “FS.”

(6) Blocks 78 through 80 (report number). Enter the number which shows the order in which the report appears among all reports being submitted by the unit reducing the report to machine readable media (UIC in blocks 70 through 75).

Section III
Composite Reports Prepared by Divisions, Separate Brigades, Divisional Brigades Operating Separately, Special Forces Groups, and Armored Cavalry Regiments (Sections A and B of DA Form 2715-R)

3-12. General

Composite reports will be submitted by divisions, separate brigades, divisional brigades operating separately, Special Forces groups, and armored cavalry regiments. They provide an assessment of the status of these major units and their ability to accomplish assigned wartime missions, based on the condition of subordinate units and their ability to operate together. An averaging procedure, using the levels of all organic AA level units (except band, adjutant general (AG), and finance units), will be used to determine a composite personnel, EOH, and ER C-level. A composite training C-level, overall C-level, and MAE (C-4 and C-5 units only) will be determined using the procedures outlined in paragraphs 3-9 and 3-10, and by considering any additional factors that have not been addressed in these paragraphs that are essential to the ability of the reporting unit to operate as an effective combat force.

3-13. Determining composite C-levels

a. Units submitting composite reports will omit subordinate units reporting C-5 from measured resource area level computations (para 2-6 b(8)). However, the number of subordinate units reporting C-5 will be subjectively considered in determining the parent unit’s overall level. If the number of C-5 subordinate units is degrading the status of the parent unit below a C-3 level of operations, the parent unit will designate the appropriate resource area and its overall level as C-5 (must be approved by a MACOM). The number of subordinate units reporting C-5 will be recorded in the READY remarks section of the Unit Status Report (para 3-18b(1)(e)).

b. Roundout units will not be considered when determining composite levels until they have actually joined the parent unit after call-up or mobilization. During peace-time, units will address the status of assigned roundout units in the remarks section of the Unit Status Report (para 3-18b(7)). Commanders of divisions will consider intermediate assessment memorandums provided by assigned roundout brigades (para 2-8c) when completing roundout unit remarks.

c. Once an inactivating unit qualifies and is allowed to report C-5 it may be completely disregarded in composite reports (para 2-6b(2)).

d. Subjective Upgrade or downgrade of the computed overall level should be considered if the commander does not believe it is truly representative of the status of his unit (para 3-10a(1)). However, calculated resource area levels and a C-5 level cannot be subjectively changed.

e. Determine composite C-levels using table 3-10, the composite C-level outline (fig. 3-9), and examples in figure 3-10.

Table 3-10
Composite level criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>At least 50% of units at</th>
<th>Average of units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.54 or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 or better</td>
<td>1.55 to 2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 or better</td>
<td>2.45 to 3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cannot meet criteria to be level 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-9. Composite C-level outline

1. Identify the C-levels of assigned subordinate units (excluding band, AG, and finance units). Do not separate elements organic to a parent unit; for example, the artillery battery organic to the armored cavalry squadron will be included in the squadron. (See examples fig. 3-10.)

2. Determine the C-level value for organic units identified in step 1 for the rated areas of personnel, EOH, and ER by using the following procedure for each resource area (do not include C-5 resource area ratings in composite computations):

No. C-1 units x 1 = A
No. C-2 units x 2 = B
No. C-3 units x 3 = C
No. C-4 units x 4 = D
No. C-5 units = E

Average C-level value (each resource area) = A + B + C + D = Total No. of Units – E (units C-5 in a resource area)

Personnel Avg = EOH Avg = ER Avg =

3. Use table 3-10 to obtain a C-level for the resource areas listed in step 2. Consider both the 50 percent rule and average value. The units composite level for these resource areas will be equal to the lowest level obtained using these two criteria (C-4 being lower than C-1). Calculated composite level summary:

Personnel C-level = EOH C-level = ER C-level =

4. Based on the number of C-5 levels within each resource area, determine if any of the calculated composite levels should be changed to C-5 (para 3-13a); requires MACOM approval. Revised composite level summary (if applicable):

Personnel C-level = EOH C-level = ER C-level =

5. Subjectively determine a training level based on the training levels of organic units and factors outlined in paragraphs 3-9, 3-12, and 3-13. Training C-level =

6. Determine a computed overall level based on the lowest resource area level determined in steps 3, 4, and 5. Then, consider subjectively upgrading or downgrading the
A CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY (CSA) APPROVED PROGRAM CHARTERED TO IMPROVE AC/RC READINESS AND THEREBY ENHANCE THE TOTAL FORCE FOR THE EVOLVING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.
BOLD SHIFT
COLD WAR

KOREA

EUROPE
FORWARD DETERRENCE
10 DIVs IN 10 DAYS
COLD WAR
OBVIOUS THREAT
ELABORATE PREPLANNING
GLOBAL WAR PROBABLE

BOLD SHIFT
CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

RESTSTRUCTURING

POWER PROJECTION ERA
AMBIGUOUS THREAT
AD HOC CONTINGENCIES
GLOBAL WAR IMPROBABLE

PERVADING UNCERTAINTY
METT-T NOT PREDICTABLE
BOLD SHIFT
AC/RC MIX

STRATEGIC RESERVE

POWER PROJECTION

GLOBAL WAR HEDGE

DIVISION

CRISIS RESPONSE FORCES

EARLY REINFORCEMENT FORCES

FOLLOW-ON REINFORCEMENT FORCES

EAD

Corps

Div Slices

EAC

Corps EAC Slice

Theater Base

AC/RC MIX

70% / 30%

12% / 88%

2% / 98%

40% / 60%

Total: 862

AC: 535

REAG: 152

USAR: 175

FORWARD PRESENCE
BOLD SHIFT IMPERATIVES

- BOLD SHIFT: SHAPE RC FORCE FOR CONTINGENCY ERA.
- INCREMENTAL CHANGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT.
- COORDINATED - TOTAL ARMY EFFORT.
- SUCCESS ORIENTED.
- THREE PILLARS:

  - HIGH PAY-OFF PROGRAMS
  - SELECTED HIGH PRIORITY UNITS
  - INCENTIVE DRIVEN
TASK FORCE:
- COMPOSITION: FORSCOM/CONUSA/NGB/DIR ARNG/USARC/TAGs.
- ADVISORY CELLS: RG, AC DIVISIONS, TPUs, STARC5s, MUSARC5s, TRADOC.
- SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP (SAG): DA RO BDE TASK FORCE.

ACTION METHODOLOGY:
- EXECUTION CONCURRENT WITH ANALYSIS AND REFINEMENT.
- 7ID/AIR ASSAULT MODELS.
- PILOT PROGRAMS (SEP 91-AUG 92) RO/RU AND RDF RC CSS POOL.
- MATURE PROGRAMS (SEP 92-AUG 93) RC REINFORCING UNITS.

IN PROCESS REVIEWS:
- WEEKLY (START AUG 91) CINCFOR.
- QUARTERLY (START AUG 91) CSÀ.
BOLD SHIFT
BIG SEVEN PROGRAMS

REORGANIZE AND REALIGN

EXERCISE - ORE

SOLDIER TRAINING (MOSQ) - AC/RC SCHOOLS.

UNIT TRAINING - RESERVE TRAINING CONCEPT

LEADER TRAINING - AC/RC SCHOOLS.

TRAINING INVOLVEMENT - WARTIME CHAIN.

SUPPORT - FULL TIME.
BOLD SHIFT
ORE

- FOCUSED AT COMPANY AND BELOW (AC/RC)
- REINFORCES BATTLE FOCUS

END STATE

- MOTIVATED SOLDIERS
- UNIQUE TRAINING OPPORTUNITY
- ASSESS MOBILIZATION READINESS

COMMON EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT

BOLD SHIFT ROLE

INSTITUTIONALIZE A COMMON STANDARD
ONE ARMY ONE STANDARD
OPERATIONAL READINESS EXERCISE

- **STRONG TRAINING EMPHASIS:**
  - Training Event is the heart of the ORE.
  - Individual and small-unit collective pre-mob tasks assessed.
  - Pre-mob tasks selected and approved by chain of cmd.
  - Platoon lanes, STXs, RTS, COFT, etc.

- **Major commitment to total force policy:**
  - Applies to AC/RC.
  - One Army, one standard.
  - ORE teams manned by AC, ARNG, and USAR personnel.
  - CONUSA runs ORE.

*Success oriented, hands-on assessment that generates pride/professionalism*
BOLD SHIFT
HOW ORE WORKS

READINESS
FOCUS

ANNOUNCED
EVENT (BN & HIGHER)

READINESS
EVALUATION

SHORT:
NOTICE
CO/PLT

TRAINING
INCENTIVE

MOB FILE

NBC READINESS

SUPPLY

MAINTENANCE

PERSONNEL

ASSIST
CDR

USR

RTC MODEL

RESOURCED
AC/RC
UNITS

EVALUATED
CONUSA/CHAIN
OF COMMAND

PRE MOB TASKS
# PROPOSED ORE TEAM FOR PILOT YEAR

## ORE TEAM
- 1-LTC(02A)
- 1-SEC(GS-5)
- TRAINING TEAM
- 1-MAJ(11A/12A)
- 1-CPT(13A)
- 1-SFC(11M)
- 1-SFC(13F)

## PERSONNEL TEAM
- 1-CPT(41A)
- 1-SFC(75Z)

## LOGISTIC TEAM
- 1-CW2(915)
- 1-SFC(63B)
- 1-SFC(63H)
- 1-SFC(76Y)
- 4-NCO/CIV

17 PERSONNEL:
- 5-ARNG
- 5-USAR
- 6-AC
- 1-CIV
ORE SCHEDULING

JAN-MARCH
CONUSA SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
-PEACETIME HIGHER HQ SCHEDULED FOR ORE

**Shortrange training plans in AC normally focus on an upcoming quarter (three months) while RC shortrange training plans typically use a one year planning horizon." FM 25-100 p3-5.

SCHEDULE BNS ON YTP(RO) ANNUAL TRNG CALENDAR (AC).

1 MAY
CONUSA RECONFIRM SCHEDULE

*RC units will know AT(RTC) date and focus of IDT for upcoming year.

-RC COMPANIES NOTIFIED 120 DAYS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED ORE
-AC COMPANIES NOTIFIED 8 WEEKS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED ORE.
-PLATOONS/SECTIONS IDENTIFIED WEEK OF ORE.

**Near-term planning for AC starts approximately eight weeks prior to execution of training; for the RC, approximately four months." FM 25-100 p3-5

-COMPANY CDR PROVIDES CONUSA WITH TRAINING ASSESSMENT (T/P/U).
-CONUSA REVIEWS ASSESSMENT, SELECTS TASK(s) FOR ORE.

CONDUCT ORE

*CONUSA coordinates with both the STARC/MUSARC for assistance in providing resources. AC CAPSTONE/DTA unit may also be requested to provide resources.
OPERATIONAL READINESS EXERCISE

(LINKAGE)

FULLTIME SUPPORT

USR & TAM

FM 25-100/25-101

AMOPS/FORMDEPS

UNIT TRAINING

SOLDIER TRAINING

LEADER TRAINING
BOLD SHIFT
SOLDIER TRAINING
(MOSQ/DMSQQ)

EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION
--TAILORED TO NEED

END STATE

IMPROVED UNIT/INDIVIDUAL
READINESS

QUALITY TRAINING

BOLD SHIFT ROLE
IMPROVE THE SYSTEM

IMPROVE PROGRAMMING,
MANAGEMENT VISIBILITY
BOLD SHIFT
UNIT TRAINING

- DEVELOP CDR/STAFF PROFICIENCY

ALL TRAINING CONDUCTED
IAW INTENT OF 25-100/25-10

-BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING:
--Floors at CREW/PLT(CBT), CO/BTRY(CS/CSS)
--Train to higher level after proficiency

-END STATE

-UNITS TRAINED TO STANDARDS AT ACHIEVABLE LEVELS

BOLD SHIFT ROLE
INSTITUTIONALIZE THE RIGHT LEVEL OF PRE-MOB TRAINING

PL BLUE
PL WHITE
LDLC

56
BOLD SHIFT
LEADER TRAINING
(OES/NCOES/UNIT TRNG)

- Strengthen institutional leadership requirements (NCOES/OES)
- Improved staff readiness (OES/TCDC/RCLDAP)
- Well-trained and knowledgeable leaders
- Small unit leader courses
- Tailored RC leader training courses
- Quality training

Develop leaders with better skills, knowledge, and presence

END STATE
BOLD SHIFT
TRAINING INVOLVEMENT
WARTIME TRACE

BOLD SHIFT ROLE
FACILITATE CAPSTONE
RELATIONSHIPS AND
SUSTAINABLE DTA POLICY

- IMPROVED AC SUPPORT TO RC UNITS
- IMPROVED RC SUPPORT/TRAINING TO RC

CLOSE COORDINATION WITH
WARTIME PC

END STATE

METL AND TRAINING GUIDANCE (AW 25-106/10-1)
CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE
AND PILOT UNITS

SIGNIFICANCE:

- CRF UNIT IN EACH STATE/TERRITORY/MUSARC (LESS GUAM).

- BY EARLY FEB, BOLD SHIFT PILOT IN EACH STATE/MUSARC

- WIDESPREAD RC REPRESENTATION IN HIGHEST PRIORITY PROGRAMS.
PILOT UNITS

- NOW:
  - 7 NG BDES
  - 12 NG CS/CSS
  - 19 USAR CS/CSS
  - TOTAL: 84 (USR REPORTING UNITS: BN/SEP CO/DET).

- EXPANDING PILOT UNIT POOL.
  - IN CRF
  - CS/CSS
  - COMPANY SIZE
  - TAG - MUSARC COMMANDER SELECTS.

- NEW TOTALS:
  - UP TO 129 BNS/SEP CO/DET.
  - EXPECT COMPLETION EARLY FEB.
BOLD SHIFT SUPPORT (FULL TIME)

- Satisfy core reqmts first

END STATE

Efficient and effective full time support program

Enhanced unit mission readiness

BOLD SHIFT ROLE
- Recommend ETS priority
- Strive for effectiveness
"BOLD SHIFT" IS A MEANS TO INVOLVE AC-RC LEADERSHIP IN SOLVING MUTUAL PROBLEMS.

SOLUTIONS MUST BE REALISTIC AND MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE READINESS OF AC/RC UNITS.

WHAT WE DO MUST HAVE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE:
-- CHANGING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.
-- SMALLER BUT MORE READY TOTAL FORCE.
-- KEEP IT AFFORDABLE.
-- MAINTAIN PUBLIC AWARENESS AND SUPPORT.
BOLD SHIFT

RC ENHANCEMENT ACTION PLAN
TO CSA 27 AUG 91
**BOLD SHIFT**

**RC ENHANCEMENT**

**ACTION PLAN**

**o TASK FORCE**
- **COMPOSITION:** FORSCOM/CONUSA/NGB/DANG/USARC
- **ADVISORY CELLS:** RG, AC DIVISIONS, TPUS, STARCS, MUSARCS, TRADOC
- **SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP (SAG):** DA RO BDE TASK FORCE

**o ACTION METHODOLOGY**
- **EXECUTION CONCURRENT WITH ANALYSIS AND REFINEMENT**
- **7TH ID MODEL**
- **PILOT PROGRAMS (SEP 91 - AUG 92) RO/RU & RDF RC CSS POOL**
- **MATURE PROGRAMS (SEP 92 - AUG 93) RC REINFORCING UNITS**

**o IN PROCESS REVIEWS**
- **WEEKLY (START AUG 91) CINCFOR**
- **QUARTERLY (START AUG 91) CSA**
BOLD SHIFT
BIG SEVEN PROGRAMS
"RESULTS"

R - REORGANIZE & REALIGN - PAM FORCE

E - EXERCISE - CONTINGENCY EDRE

S - SOLDIER TRAINING (MOSQ) - USARF SCHOOLS

U - UNIT TRAINING - REGIONAL TRAINING CENTERS

L - LEADER TRAINING - TRADOC & USARF SCHOOLS

T - TRAINING INVOLVEMENT - WARTIME CHAIN

S - SUPPORT (FULL TIME)
RESULTS
RESTRUCTURE, REORGANIZE, REALIGN

O PURPOSE: PROMOTE HIGHER PERS/TNG READINESS. IMPROVE C2

O CONCEPT:
- CONSIDER DEMOGRAPHICS
  -- PERSONNEL FILL/QUALITY
  -- MITIGATE TURBULENCE
- CONSIDER C2 IMPACTS
  -- ORGANIZATIONAL & GEOGRAPHIC SPAN OF CONTROL
  -- BRANCH/CAPSTONE/DTA ALIGNMENT
  -- STATE MISSIONS
- TRAINING ACCOMMODATION - ARMORIES/CENTERS, MTA & SCHOOLS

O MILESTONES:
- APR 91 - DA IDENTIFIES SRC FOR OCAR & NGB REDUCTION
- MAY 91 - DA DIRECTS FORSCOM REVIEW OCAR/NGB CMD PLAN
- JUN 91 - OCAR IDENTIFIES UNITS FOR REDUCTION
- JUN - AUG 91 - NGB SUBMITS SUMMER CMD PLAN TO DA
  -- RELOCATION PLAN TO BE SUBMITTED
- NLT 1 SEP 91 - FORSCOM MSG TO NGB REQUESTING RELOCATION PLAN FOR REVIEW
- OCT 91 - CONGRESS ID ACTUAL FY 92 RC CUTS
- OCT 91 - DA, FORSCOM, OCAR/USARC, NGB, CONUSA COORDINATE WINTER CMD PLAN
  -- ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH DA DIRECTIVE
- 15 DEC 91 - DA, FORSCOM, OCAR/USARC, NGB, CONUSA CMD PLAN IPR
- MAR 92 - FORSCOM REVIEWS CMD PLAN READINESS IMPACTS
- APR 92 - DA DECISION ON CMD PLAN

********

- 1 NOV 92 - FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR AND DA BEGIN STUDY AUGMENTEE/TTHS CONCEPT
EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT READINESS EXERCISE (EDRE)

PURPOSE:
- INCENTIVE:
  -- RECOGNIZE/MOTIVATE MINUTEMEN
  -- BRAGGING RIGHTS
  -- URGENCY
- TPU READINESS FOCUS
- READINESS ASSESSMENT - USR VALIDATION

CONCEPT:
- TEAM CHIEF - CONUSA CMDR
- ASSESSMENT TM - CONUSA/USARC/STARC/MUSARC/TRADOC
- EVALUATE
  -- PERSONNEL - FILL, QUALITY, TURBULENCE
  -- LOGISTICS - MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY
  -- TRAINING - DMOSQ, NCOES, OBC/OAC, GUNNERY, DRILLS
  -- MOB FILES
- FREQUENCY (MATURE) - TWO/WEEK PER CONUSA

MILESTONES:
- JUL 91 - OCAR, DIR ARNG BRIEFED; SUPPORTIVE
- 10 OCT 91 - DRAFT REG DEVELOPED
- OCT 91 - FEB 92 - DRAFT REG STAFFED
  - TEAMS IDENTIFIED & TRAINED
- 1 MAR 92 - EDRES BEGIN IN EACH CONUSA (RO/RU, RDF CSS)
- MAR - SEP 92 - EDRE CONCEPT ASSESSED, MODIFIED
- FY 93 - MATURE PROGRAM
RESULTS
SOLDIER TRAINING

0 PURPOSE:
- REVIEW AND IMPROVE CURRENT MOSQ/DMOSQ SYSTEM
- DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE MOSQ/DMOSQ & SOLDIER SPECIALITY TNG

0 CONCEPT:
- FORSCOM, TRADOC, CONUSA, UNITS IMPLEMENT SYSTEMIC FIXES
- TRADOC ASSIST WITH INSTRUCTOR CERT AND POI REVISION
- CONUSA'S PROGRAM RESOURCES & ASSIST USARF SCHOOLS
- TPU IDENTIFY ACCURATE RQRMNTS & PROGRAM ATTENDANCE
- EDRE FOLLOW THROUGH

0 MILESTONES:
- 15 SEP 91 - TPU IDENTIFY RQRMNT/CONUSA PLANNING CONF
- 15 SEP 91 - CONUSA/TRADOC-USARF RECRUIT & CERT INSTRUCTORS
- 15 OCT 91 - DETAILED TNG PLANS AND CONTRACTS FINALIZED
- NLT 15 DEC 91 - COMMENCE IDT PHASES
- 3RD QTR 92 - COMMENCE AT PHASES
- NOV 91 - QTRLY REV & ANLYS-FORSCOM/CONUSA/MUSARC/TRADOC
  -- MONITOR PROGRAM PROGRESS
  -- TRACE MOSQ/DMOSQ RQRMNT PROCESS (TIED TO EDRE)
  -- IDENTIFY CAUSES FOR HIGH MOSQ/DMOSQ REQUIREMENTS
  -- IMPROVE USARF CAPABILITY (INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC)
- 4TH QTR 92 - FORSCOM HOST WORK GRP FOR SYSTEMIC FIXES
- FY 93 - MATURE PROGRAM
UNIT TRAINING
RESERVE TRAINING CONCEPT

**PURPOSE:**
- MATURE THE METHODOLOGY FOR PRE-MOB RC COLL TNG
- TRAIN RC UNITS AT ACHIEVABLE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS
- PROVIDE BATTLE FOCUS

**CONCEPT:**
- CONUSA/CAPSTONE/DTA CONDUCTED TRAINING
- CENTRALIZED PLANNING & SUPPORT
- DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
- UNIT TRAINING
  -- COMBAT: CREW QUAL & PLT MANEUVER
  -- COMBAT SPT: CREW QUAL & CO/BTRY EXERCISES
  -- CBT SVC SPT: IND QUAL & CO STX
- LEADER
  -- CO/BN/BDE CDR & STAFF
  -- SIMULATION

**MILESTONES:**
- NOV 90 - APR 91 - DESERT STORM RO BDE TNG CONDUCTED
- JUN 91 - RTC PROTOTYPE AT FT MCCOY BY 4TH ARMY
- 15 SEP 91 - CONUSA AT 92 RTC PLAN
- 1 NOV 91 - FORSCOM, CONUSA, TRADOC, ARNG, USAR PACKAGE "HOW TO" MATERIAL FROM DESERT SHIELD/STORM TRAINING EXPERIENCE
- 1 NOV 91 - TPU/CONUSA/CAPSTONE/DTA COMMENCE PREPARATION AT 92 PROGRAM
- AT 92 - RTC TRAINING IN EACH CONUSA
- 4 QTR FY 92 - RTC PROGRAM ANALYSIS & REVISIONS
- FY 93 - MATURE PROGRAM
RESULTS
LEADER TRAINING

PURPOSE: DEVELOP LEADERS WITH BETTER SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND COMMAND PRESENCE TO EXECUTE PRE AND POST MOB TRAINING STRATEGIES

CONCEPT:
- EXECUTE QUALITY LEADER TNG IN NG ACAD/USARF/TRADOC SCHOOLS
- INCORPORATE LEADER TRAINING IN RTC EXERCISES
- EXECUTE TCDC AND OTHER CDR/STAFF TNG EXERCISES
- IMPROVE EXPORTABLE RC LEADER TNG SUPPORT PACKAGES
- CONDUCT HARD SKILL, SMALL UNIT LEADER COURSES (JUNIOR LEADER BATTLE SKILLS COURSES - LIGHT LEADER MODEL)

MILESTONES:
- 15 SEP 91 - PILOT UNITS' LEADER TNG REQUIREMENTS ID'D
- 15 SEP 91 - CONUSA/TRADOC SCHEDULE RO/RU BDES FOR TCDC
- 15 OCT 91 - CONUSA/TPU PLANS FOR LDR COURSES FINALIZED
- NOV 91 - FORSCOM/TRADOC TAILOR TCDC & PREP EXERCISES
- 15 SEP 91 - CONUSA ASSISTANCE TO USARF SCHOOLS -- RECRUIT & TRAIN ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTORS
- NLT DEC 91 - COMMENCE NCOES/OES COURSES - IDT PHASES
- 2ND QTR FY 92 - FIRST RO/UP BDES ATTEND MODIFIED TCDC
- 3RD/4TH QTR FY 92 - AT PHASES OES/NCOES COMMENCE
- AT 92 - RTC CONDUCTED - EMphasis on LEADER TASKS
- FY 92 - TRADOC CONDUCTS JUNIOR LEADER BATTLE SKILLS COURSES
- FY 92/93 QUARTERLY MEETINGS (REVIEW & ANALYSIS)
- FY 93 - MATURE PROGRAM
RESULTS
TRAINING INVOLVEMENT OF WARTIME CHAIN

PURPOSE:
- IMPROVE TRAINING GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT
- INCREASE VISIBILITY OF SUBORDINATE UNIT READINESS
- IMPROVE ALIGNMENT OF AC/RC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS/EQUIPMENT PRIORITIES

CONCEPT:
- REALIGN CAPSTONE/DTA WITH CMD PLAN AND AMOPS
- DEEPER CAPSTONE/DTA INVOLVEMENT IN TPU TNG READINESS
- CAPSTONE/WARTIME TRACE INVOLVEMENT IN USR

MILESTONES:
- 15 SEP 91 - FORSCOM ID PILOT UNITS FOR XVIII CORPS TRACE
- 1 OCT 92 - FORSCOM ESTABLISHES C2/DTA FOR PILOT UNITS
- 1ST QTR FY 92 - INTENSIVE MGT/SUPPORT COMMENCES BETWEEN PILOT RO/RU/RDF & CAPSTONE DTA COMMANDS
- 3D QTR FY 92 - DA, FORSCOM, CONUSA, OCAR, AND ARNG ESTABLISH RDF WARTIME TRACE (COMMAND PLAN)
- FY 93 WARTIME CHAIN ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED FOR ALL RC UNITS
RESULTS
SUPPORT (FULL TIME)

0 PURPOSE: IMPROVE READINESS OF PRIORITY RC UNITS BY ENHANCING QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FTS

0 CONCEPT:
  - OPERATE WITHIN PROGRAMMED RESOURCES
  - STUDY UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES
    -- RIF OF AGR/MIL TECH PROGRAM
    -- RECRUIT QUALITY AC FOR FTS
    -- PROTECT AC FTS
    -- REALIGN AC FTS
    -- CONSIDER 2IC, AUGMENTEE & ADVISOR PROGRAM
    -- ENCOURAGE CONGRESS TO FUND FTS IN RO/RU/RDF AT USAF RESERVE LEVELS

0 MILESTONES:
  - AUG 91 - INITIATE PROGRAM. FORSCOM TF AND DIR, ARNG
  - SEP 91 - ARNG MANPOWER TEAM BRIEFS FORSCOM TASK FORCE
  - SEP - OCT 91 - ARNG/FORSCOM/USARC/CONUSA COLLECT INFO
    -- TARGET STATES
  - OCT - DEC 91 - ARNG/FORSCOM/USARC/CONUSA EVALUATE PER-LOG-TNG SYSTEMS
  - 2ND QTR - FORSCOM/ARNG/OCAR DEVELOP RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGES
  - 3RD QTR - FORSCCM/ARNG/OCAR DEVELOP CHANGES TO UNIT FTS MODELS
FORSCOM
OPERATIONAL READINESS EXERCISE
(Pilot Program)
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Implementing Instructions for the Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot Program


2. Reference requested detailed comments to the coordinating draft of the EDRE regulation. These comments have been reviewed and incorporated into the enclosed Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) pilot program for FY 92. This document defines the approved pilot program which will be executed during the remainder of FY 92.

3. In addition to testing and refining the ORE program, commands, states and agencies must capture accurate resourcing information so we can refine our sustainment costs.

4. Give us your feedback and lessons learned as you execute the pilot OREs. We will host IPRs in June and September to review findings and progress, but can make message changes during the pilot program if warranted.

5. Scheduling of units to undergo OREs during FY 92 must be closely coordinated among the CONUSA, Army National Guard, USARC, CORPS, STARCs and MUSARCs. Make maximum effort to program an ORE for each pilot unit in FY 92. CONUSA and pilot units should agree on the events that will be covered during the ORE. The ORE events for tank and Bradley units will include exercises in gunnery and maintenance as outlined in the ORE document dated 31 January 1992 (enclosed). CONUSA will begin OREs in March 1992.

6. All CONUSA have or will have conducted their annual scheduling conference between the months of January and March. The procedure outlined in Chapter 3 of the ORE pilot program will be used to schedule units for OREs during FY 93. CONUSA will provide FORSCOM their confirmed FY 93 schedule NLT the second week of May 1992.
FCJ3-RC
SUBJECT: Implementing instructions for the Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot Program

7. Standardization is central to the success of the ORE program. One Army, one standard. The enclosed document, dated 31 January 1992, provides the standards for the conduct of all OREs. Any deviation from established procedures, checklists, team composition, etc., must be approved by FORSCOM (TF BOLD SHIFT) prior to execution of a scheduled ORE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl

C. G. MARSH
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - HQDA, ATTN: DAMO-TRR
10 - DIRECTOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, ATTN: NGB-ARO
Commander
10 - UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND, ATTN: AFRC-PO
10 - FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY AND FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, ATTN: AFKA-DCST
10 - SECOND UNITED STATES ARMY, ATTN: AFKD-DCST
10 - FIFTH UNITED STATES ARMY AND FORT SAM HOUSTON, ATTN: AFKB-DCST
10 - SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY AND PSF SAN FRANCISCO, ATTN: AFKC-DCST
10 - I CORPS AND FORT LEWIS, ATTN: AFZH-G3
10 - III CORPS AND FORT HOOD, ATTN: AFZF-G3
10 - XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND FORT BRAGG, ATTN: AFZA-G3
Chapter 1

General

1-1 PURPOSE: The purpose of this pilot program is to establish policies and responsibilities for planning, resourcing and conducting the Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE).

1-2 INTENT:

The intent of the ORE (Pilot) program is to provide a motivational training and assessment exercise to selected companies and detachments and develop the criteria for validating the pre-mob/pre-alert operational readiness of Army units to deploy and perform assigned wartime missions. The exercise will recognize the commitment of soldiers and assess the command’s readiness in critical training tasks, personnel qualifications, maintenance of mission essential equipment, and selected mobilization, deployment, administrative and logistical areas. Additionally, the program will act as a means to institutionalize a single standard across the Total Army. The exercise will assist the chain of command in developing enhanced training, better resourcing of training programs and will serve as an important cross check to verification of the unit
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992 status report (USR) and the training plans. This program will identify resourcing shortfalls, systemic problems and Army readiness enhancement needs requiring intervention at the highest levels of AC and RC leadership.

1-3 GOALS: A major goal of the ORE pilot program is to determine pre-mob (RC)/pre-alert (AC) validation definitions, training standards and readiness criteria to be used across the Total Army and the appropriate length of time period during which a pre-mob/pre-alert validation would remain in effect. A major goal of the mature ORE program is to validate pre-mob/pre-alert operational and training readiness of selected Active and Reserve Component units and their preparedness to deploy and perform assigned wartime missions IAW Annex C, FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-1 (FORMDEPS - FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment System).

1-4 REFERENCES: See ANNEX A

1-5 SCOPE:

In FY 92, this program will apply to selected AC and RC units designated to participate in the BOLD SHIFT pilot program. The goals of the ORE pilot program are to give readiness and training focus to BOLD SHIFT pilot units, and refine the ORE for extension to the Total Army in FY 93.

a. The ORE (Pilot) will be the vehicle to confirm the accuracy and correlation of information between the criteria required for deployment pre-mob/pre-alert validation, the proposed pre-mob/pre-alert validation criteria in ANNEX D and the unit’s reported status of resources and training as contained in the most recent Unit
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

Status Report (USR). When available, the information provided by the Training Assessment Model (TAM-replaces the 1-R) will be correlated with the ORE and USR data. Specific instructions on how to accomplish cross-verification will be developed during the pilot year.

b. The ORE (Pilot) will be conducted in organizations below brigade, focusing on company sized or smaller units. The training phase of the ORE will be based on METL supporting battle tasks which the wartime chain of command has identified and approved for each unit. These tasks should be selected based on the BOLD SHIFT training framework of crew and platoon focus for combat units and section through company/battery focus for combat support and combat service support units in both the active and reserve component. The compliance and review phase will evaluate mission essential personnel readiness, equipment status and other critical readiness areas consistent with deployment validation criteria, with a primary focus on the wartime mission capability of the unit.

c. The intended process is that CONUSA, Corps, STARC s and MUSARC s establish annual ORE schedules for battalions, separate companies or smaller organizations so resources and facilities can be programmed and scheduled, while respecting "near term" notification time lines as specified in FM 25-100, Training the Force, for units actually selected. AC divisions and brigades (or equivalents) will schedule the battalion or separate company ORE on their long range planning and quarterly training calendars. RC brigades, battalions, separate companies or their
equivalent headquarters will schedule the ORE on their yearly training calendar (YTC). RC ORE’s will be scheduled primarily during IDT to minimize disruption of programmed RTC (Reserve Training Concept) training. The actual company or detachment to undergo the ORE will be notified at the beginning of the “near term” planning cycle times (120 days for RC, 8 weeks for AC) described in FM 25-100 (Chapter 3).

d. The bench mark for the conduct of the ORE is published Army standards. The approved unit METL will be the basis for all training evaluations and assessments. Where the ARTEP/MTP is published, it will be used to establish tasks, conditions and standards for the training assessment. The gaining wartime command or METL approving headquarters will develop and publish METL supporting tasks, conditions and standards when no published standard exists. Where gaining command tasks and standards are developed, gaining command tasks will be consolidated and reviewed during the pilot period (with TRADOC’s assistance) for application to like units throughout the Army for use when the program reaches maturity.

1-6 OBJECTIVES:

The objectives of ORE (Pilot) program are:

a. To enhance the Total Army by applying uniform standards against which to assess wartime mission preparedness.

b. To help bring specific training and readiness focus to small unit training plans and programs.

c. To improve unit operational readiness through objective external evaluation
d. To use appropriate personnel, logistics and resource findings to cross-check battalion/separate unit status reports to better identify resource requirements.

e. To collect information on resource requirements with the goal of improved resource allocation.

f. To eliminate duplicative evaluation and assessment programs currently applied to units, either in part or in total.

g. For combat arms companies, to develop Army wide pre-mob/pre-alert validation training standards and readiness criteria for training programs, deployment preparedness and determine the length of time pre-mob/pre-alert validation will remain in effect and changes which will affect pre-mob/pre-alert validation.

h. For CS/CSS units, to develop mobilization and deployment validation criteria.

i. To confirm the pre-mob/pre-alert preparedness and operational readiness status of AC and RC units using established training standards.

j. To create a readiness focused exercise that acts as an incentive, enhances overall readiness and reinforces the positive attitudes and the commitment of soldiers and leaders.
Chapter 2
Responsibilities

2-1 Commanding General, Forces Command:
   a. Establish, in coordination with the Army National Guard Directorate, policies
      and directives implementing the pilot ORE program.
   b. Monitor AC and RC program compliance.
   c. Oversee ORE program execution to ensure consistency in the application of
      training criteria and standards.
   d. Task FORSCOM installations and units to support the ORE (Pilot) program
      as necessary.
   e. Coordinate with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) for support as
      required.
   f. Prioritize resources to support the ORE program.
   g. In coordination with NGB, USARC, and CONUSA review and approve
      changes during the ORE (Pilot) program.
   h. Review quarterly ORE summaries to identify and correct systemic
      deficiencies and refine the ORE program.

2-2 Director, Army National Guard:
   a. Provide resource guidance to state Adjutants General (TAGs) to support the
      ORE (Pilot) program.
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

b. Establish and coordinate procedures with TAGs to monitor ARNG ORE (Pilot) program compliance.

c. Provide input to FORSCOM for necessary ORE (Pilot) program changes.

d. Review quarterly ORE summaries to identify and correct systemic deficiencies and refine the program.

e. Provide personnel to fill ARNG ORE team requirements to the CONUSA during the pilot program.

2-3 Commanders, US Army Corps:

a. Provide personnel to fill AC ORE team requirements to the CONUSA during the pilot program.

b. Monitor ORE (Pilot) program compliance.

c. Support CONUSA resource requirements for equipment, training areas and support personnel for OREs, within capability.

d. Provide input to FORSCOM for necessary ORE (Pilot) program changes.

e. Support scheduling of CORPS units to participate in the ORE (Pilot) program.

f. Review quarterly ORE summaries to identify and correct systemic deficiencies and refine the ORE program.

2-4 Commanders, Continental US Armies:

a. Have primary responsibility for conduct of the ORE program.

b. Establish and train dedicated ORE Team(s) within each CONUSA to conduct the ORE (Pilot) program. (Teams projected to be expanded in FY 93 to provide mature
d. Coordinate through appropriate CORPS/NGB/USARC peacetime chain of command for scheduling AC/ARNG/USAR units to receive the ORE.

e. Tailor the ORE program to the type unit, complexity of wartime mission, deployment priority and unit training program.

f. Provide ORE after action review and "take home" package to the assessed unit and appropriate higher headquarters at the conclusion of each evaluation.

g. Provide quarterly ORE summaries to FORSCOM, NGB, USARC, and the CORPS. Comment specifically on the validity of the pre-mob/pre-alert validation criteria and process developed for the pilot program.

h. Provide input to FORSCOM for necessary ORE (Pilot) program changes.

i. Provide Inspector General support for ORE follow-up.

j. Review quarterly ORE summaries to identify and correct systemic deficiencies and refine the ORE program.

2-5 Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC):

a. Support scheduling of USAR units by each CONUSA to participate in ORE (Pilot) program.

b. Provide resource guidance to MUSARC to support the ORE (Pilot) program.

c. Provide input to FORSCOM for necessary ORE (Pilot) program changes.

d. Provide personnel to fill USAR ORE Team requirements to the CONUSA during the pilot program.
FORSOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

e. Provide Inspector General support for ORE follow-up.

f. Review quarterly ORE summaries to identify and correct systemic deficiencies and refine the ORE program.

2-6 The State Adjutants General:

a. Support scheduling of ARNG units by each CONUSA to participate in ORE (Pilot) program.

b. Provide resources to support units selected for ORE (Pilot) participation.

c. Provide Inspector General support for ORE follow-up.

d. Review quarterly ORE summaries to identify and correct systemic deficiencies and refine the ORE program.
Forscom/Arng Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

Chapter 3

Policies and Procedures

3-1 Concept:

a. All units (i.e., battalion or separate company) scheduled to participate in the ORE program will have the month during which the exercise will be conducted identified at the CONUSA Scheduling Conference in the January - March time period for the following Training Year (TY). Battalions, CS/CSS separate companies and smaller organizations will be programmed on the ORE annual schedule so that resources and facilities can be programmed and scheduled. AC battalions will be identified on the division and brigade quarterly training calendar. RC battalions and parent headquarters of separate companies and smaller organizations will schedule ORE’s on the Yearly Training Plan (YTP).

(1) Each CONUSA will reconfirm schedules with Corps, STARC and MUSARC not later than 1 May for the following training year.

(2) RC battalions/separate companies will be informed which company elements will be exercised by their respective CONUSA 120 days prior to the ORE. Platoons and sections to be assessed (collective and individual training tasks) will not be identified until the week prior to the date of the ORE. All units will furnish the CONUSA DCST, through the appropriate chain of command, a current task assessment of critical individual and collective tasks upon being notified of an upcoming ORE.
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

(3) AC ORE companies will be notified by the division commander or his designated representative eight weeks prior to the ORE.

(4) AC units will provide the training assessment to their parent division commander. The assessment will be forwarded to the CONUSA, ATTN: DCST, for use by the ORE team.

b. The ORE (Pilot) program will consist of four phases as described below:

(1) The compliance phase will include the review of records and assessment of locally stationed equipment and should not require the presence of the entire unit.

(2) The training phase will verify the individual and unit training proficiency of the unit, including METL related critical battle tasks, selected CTT tasks, APFT test and the unit's training management system. The ORE will normally not exceed 48 hours without specific coordination with the unit, it's resourcing headquarters (AC and RC) and the ORE team.

(3) The report phase consists of two parts:

(a) The ORE Report with checklist (ANNEX D) will be prepared by the CONUSA ORE team. The report will include completed training evaluation outlines (TEO) developed from the ARTEP/MTP manual or gaining and command task, conditions and standards for each unit. Any other documents or reports used in the assessment will also be included.

(b) The purpose of the report is to provide an external, objective
assessment to assist commanders in planning training to achieve readiness, identifying systemic issues or problems and highlighting resource shortfalls.

(c) A Quarterly ORE Program Summary prepared by the CONUSA.

(4) The follow-up phase consists of two parts:

(a) The unit commander review of the ORE report.

(b) IG review of the unit’s corrective action plan and the actions by higher headquarters.

c. The CONUSA ORE Team will permit units to make on-the-spot corrections, but will note in its report the correction and the number of repetitions required to meet standards.

d. ORE teams will include qualified functional area experts to assess training, personnel and logistics readiness levels (see ANNEXES B and C). The goal for ORE team composition is equal representation of one-third AC, one-third ARNG and one-third iUSAR. A different ratio is permissible when necessary to man the teams.

e. Mission essential equipment stored away from the unit (i.e., MATES, UTES, ECSs and AMSAs) will be inspected where located. Supporting maintenance facilities will not be assessed more than once annually. These annual assessments will consist of an extensive evaluation of equipment status, all resources required to maintain the fleet and the adequacy of full-time manning support. Special attention will be paid to the organization’s, STARC’s or MUSARC’s ability to program and perform scheduled services, fill of PLL/ASL and TAMMS procedures. Assessments will be conducted
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

IAW ANNEX D Section III paragraphs A (Personnel) and E (Maintenance). The training assessment portion of the ORE will not be conducted.

3-2 Program:

a. The ORE exercise will verify the status of critical, personnel, logistics and training functions that directly impact the unit's ability to accomplish its wartime mission.

b. Compliance Phase. While the intent of the ORE is to minimize administrative focus, there are certain personnel, logistical and training management areas that require review. The unit will be given a schedule of events for all phases of the exercise prior to the ORE team arrival.

(1) Personnel: Medical records (HIV and immunizations), dental records and SGLI will be reviewed. Family support records including DEERS enrollment, dependent ID cards, legal documents (powers of attorney, wills, etc.), and family care plans will be checked. Personnel qualification records including MOS qualification (MOSQ/DMOSQ), NCO and officer qualification and personnel deployability will also be reviewed.

(2) Logistics: Unit maintenance training, operator, organizational and DS maintenance support and unit property records will be reviewed. It is imperative that a significant sample of the pacing items be inspected, along with the maintenance support system for the organization. PLL/ASL adequacy will be evaluated, along with the TMDE program (calibration and training) and status of scheduled services for
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

equipment physically located at home station (not to be duplicative of assessment at
equipment storage sites).

(3) Training: Unit’s training management system, APFT, CTT, gunnery
and marksmanship records.

(4) The unit commander may request other areas be reviewed based on
priorities and the commander’s assessment.

c. Training Phase. The focus of the training exercise will depend on the type
of unit, the unit’s wartime mission and the resources available. The emphasis will be
on those critical, METL supporting battle tasks determined by the battle focus process
(e.g., individual through platoon level collective tasks for the combat arms and
individual through company/battery level collective tasks for combat support/service
support units). The ORE team will select those tasks designated Trained (T) and
Partially Trained (P) from the assessment provided by the unit RC commander 120
days prior to the scheduled date of the ORE or prior to the six week lock-in (AC unit
commander). The ability of the chain of command to plan, conduct and assess
training will also be evaluated.

(1) The verification of the training proficiency assessment will be built
around an appropriate training exercise that is evaluated by the ORE team. ANNEX
E is a compilation of possible training exercises and suggestions for the training
portion of the ORE (not prescriptive or restrictive). During FY 92, CONUSA ORE
Teams will develop and administer training exercises tailored to the type unit being
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992 evaluated, the commander's assessment and available resources/facilities. At the conclusion of the ORE Pilot program, training exercises for like type units will be reviewed and appropriate examples incorporated into the ORE regulation.

(2) The training exercise will take place at a location that is reasonably accessible to the unit and that has the facilities/resources that support a realistic assessment. The availability of individual weapons, NBC equipment, combat and support vehicles, crew served weapons, OPFOR, TADSS and maneuver areas are essential to the conduct of the exercise. Force-on-force exercises will be conducted with MILES.

(3) For tank and Bradley units, the training exercise will include a gunnery phase. This can range from full caliber to COFT. TCGST/BCGST can be included as a portion of this phase but cannot be the sole basis used for determining crew proficiency.

(4) The units' ability to operate and maintain its pacing item(s) of equipment will be included in all ORE assessments. The focus of this requirement is on the crews' ability to perform before, during and after operations maintenance and to assess the maintenance climate established by the leadership. This requirement is not the same as that found in the compliance section of this document.

(5) The ORE team will make coordination to obtain those items essential to the conduct of the exercise which are not reasonably available at the unit.

(6) A significant sample of the unit (about thirty soldiers is a guideline)
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

will be administered selected CTT tasks and the APFT to confirm the individual task
training assessment and the physical training program.

(7) Other individual training evaluations will be tailored to pre-alert
requirements. Skills that are approved for post-alert training will not be included in
this evaluation. However, the feasibility of completing post-alert tasks within the time
available based on the unit ready to load date will be evaluated.

d. Report Phase: ORE teams will make specific observations and report
findings on the adequacy of management and resourcing (i.e., personnel, facilities,
command support and reporting visibility) in the personnel, logistics and maintenance
programs. The evaluation may include comment on command and support echelons
above the unit level being assessed, as appropriate.

(1) The ORE assessment report and annotated checklist will be used by
the ORE team to out-brief the unit commander at the conclusion of the exercise.
After Action Reviews (AAR) will be conducted IAW FM 25-101, Appendix G. The
ORE team chief will give a copy of the complete final report to the first General Officer
in the peacetime chain-of-command.

(2) A Quarterly ORE Program Summary will be prepared by each
CONUSA and provided to FORSCOM, NGB, USARC and Corps identifying the number
of OREs conducted, patterns and systemic problems. The report should contain
recommendations on improving the program.

e. Follow-up Phase:
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

(1) The unit commander will annotate on a copy of the ORE validation report indicating items the unit is able to correct and items requiring assistance from the higher headquarters to correct. The annotated report will be forwarded through the first General Officer in the peacetime chain-of-command to the IG within 30 days of completion of the ORE.

(2) A follow up visit will be scheduled and conducted within 60 days by the first IG in the peacetime chain-of-command. The IG will identify corrective action taken, resourcing shortfalls and readiness enhancements requiring intervention at higher levels of Army leadership. Results of the visit will be forwarded to the respective and the CORPS/STARC/MUSARC, and ORE team as appropriate.

3-3 Recognition:

CONUSA commanders will develop appropriate methods of recognizing units that demonstrate excellence in this program. Recognition programs may be administered by Division, State(STARC) or MUSARC in addition to the CONUSA program.
ANNEX B: Evaluation Team Guidance.

B-1 Team members must be selected for their competence in appropriate technical and functional areas. Teams will be staffed with AC and RC members without regard to the component of the unit being evaluated. DA civilians may also be team members when their special expertise is required.

B-2 Teams must be staffed with permanently assigned members. However, teams may be expanded by detailing additional functional area experts to assist depending on evaluation requirements for the units being exercised. The ORE team will include enough qualified personnel to ensure a thorough evaluation can be completed in the time allocated. The teams will be augmented as necessary to conduct STXs, MATES, UTES, or AMSA evaluations.

B-3 The number of ORE teams required by each CONUSA will vary depending on the density of units within their respective regions.

B-4 ORE team members will be stabilized for a minimum of 12 months and will have no other outside duties.
FORSCOM/ARNG Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE) Pilot 31 Jan 1992

ANNEX C: CONUSA Model ORE Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORE DIV</th>
<th>TM 1</th>
<th>TM 2</th>
<th>TM 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TM 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>TM 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>TM 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBAT ARMS</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMBAT SPT</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMBAT SVC SPT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1-LTC(02A)</td>
<td>*1-LTC(14/15/21/25A)</td>
<td>• 1-LTC(03A)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SEC(GS5)</td>
<td>1-SEC(GS5)</td>
<td>1-SEC(GS5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING TEAM</strong></td>
<td><strong>TRAINING TEAM</strong></td>
<td><strong>TRAINING TEAM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1-MAJ(11A or 12A)</td>
<td>*1-MAJ(14/15/21/25A)</td>
<td>*1-MAJ(91A or 92A)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-CPT(13A)</td>
<td>1-CPT(14/15/21/25A)</td>
<td>1-CPT(67H)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SFC(11M)</td>
<td>1-SFC(12B)</td>
<td>• 1-MSG(88Z)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SFC(13F)</td>
<td>1-SFC(95B)</td>
<td>1-SFC(76Z)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL TEAM</strong></td>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL TEAM</strong></td>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL TEAM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1-CPT(42A)</td>
<td>• 1-CPT(42A)</td>
<td>• 1-CPT(42A)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SFC(75Z)</td>
<td>1-SFC(75Z)</td>
<td>1-SFC(75Z)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOGISTICS TEAM</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOGISTICS TEAM</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOGISTICS TEAM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1-CW2(915)</td>
<td>• 1-CW2(915)</td>
<td>• 1-CW2(915)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SFC(63B)</td>
<td>1-SFC(63B)</td>
<td>1-SFC(63B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SFC(63H)</td>
<td>1-SFC(62B)</td>
<td>1-SFC(62B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-SFC(76Y)</td>
<td>1-SFC(76Y)</td>
<td>1-SFC(76Y)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-NCO/CIV</td>
<td>4-NCO/CIV</td>
<td>4-NCO/CIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL TEAM COMPOSITION = 52 PERSONNEL

* Indicates personnel required for ORE teams to execute FY 92 program.
** Number of teams determined by unit types and density in each CONUSA.
Note: MOS requirements are goals.
TRAINING ASSESSMENT MODEL

FORSCOM

TAMCOVER
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE COMMANDER'S WORKSHEET

PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

NOTE: Unit Commander is responsible for all entries (except shaded areas) in PART I.

1a. Enter the six digit Unit Identification Code, (UIC). The UIC uniquely identifies a particular Modified Table of Organization (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization.

b. COMPONENT. The Army component to which the unit belongs. Identified as follows: 1 - Active Component, 2 - Army National Guard (ARNG), 3 - United States Army Reserve (USAR).

c. COMMAND. A two position code representing the CONUSA area and MUSARC/GOCOM to which the unit is assigned. The two position state abbreviation will be used for ARNG units. The plain language translation of the code will also be shown to the right of the command blocks. Command assignment codes are found in the VFAAS Users Manual and are shown in the Reserve Components Troop Basis of the Army (U), (Annex I - U. S. Army Reserve Unit Allocation; Annex II, Army National Guard Unit Allocation.) The USAR Command Assignment Codes will are reprinted for reference in enclosure 1 to this test document.

d. STATUS. Enter a number in the status block as shown in the following matrix. If the status of the unit is unknown, or the unit does not fall into any of the listed categories, leave the status block blank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affiliated</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Affiliated (CFP Unit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CORTRAIN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CORTRAIN (CFP Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ROUNDOUT/UP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>ROUNDOUT/UP (CFP Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Contingency Force Pool (CFP) unit. (No other Directed Training Association (DTA) relationship)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. UNIT DESIGNATION. Consists of the CARSS, unit number, unit branch, and unit description. It is used for extract purposes only and is not a designated field in the data base. The Combat Army Regimental System (CARSS). This is a code assigned to combat and combat support units (IN, AR, FA, and AD MTOE units) to link the unit with an historical regiment. This code is assigned in conjunction with the unit number. For example, 1-42 IN would be "01 0042 IN." The unit description will be the shortened title of the unit. For example, "03 0102 AR BN HVY DIV."

f. UNIT ADDRESS. The complete address of the unit, to include Post Office Box (if any), street, city, state, and nine digit ZIP code.
g. TELEPHONE. Enter the commercial number including the area code in the block marked (CIV) and the DSN (formerly AUTOVON) in the block marked DSN.

h. READINESS GROUP. A two position code which identifies the Readiness Group (RG) that has prime assistance responsibility. RG codes are listed in enclosure 2 to this test document.

i. SRC. Enter the complete Standard Requirements Code (SRC) (13 digits). The SRC is identified on the most recent unit MTOE authorization document. TDA organizations leave blank.

j. MOBILIZATION STATION (MOBSTA). The name or abbreviated name of the active post, camp, or station in CONUS; or the semi-active or state-owned post, camp, or station which is designated for the unit to report to upon mobilization; and the name of the home station for all overseas units.

k. DATE LAST MOBEX. Enter mm/yy

l. LAST TRAINED WITHIN CAPSTONE TRACE. Enter mm/yy last trained within the priority CAPSTONE trace. Must include training with the next higher CAPSTONE commander.

m. CAPSTONE MISSION GUIDANCE RECEIVED/ADEQUATE. Indicate by Y or N if current CAPSTONE guidance has been received from the next higher headquarters in the priority CAPSTONE trace. Also indicate whether the guidance is considered adequate for the development of a unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) and subsequent development of a training program directed at wartime mission training proficiency. See FM 25-101 for details on the development of the METL. During external training assessment, if the answer to either question is no, the unit commander must explain in the narrative comments what action has been taken to resolve the guidance issue with the next higher wartime commander.

m. MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST PREPARED/APPROVED. Indicate by Y or N if the METL has been developed based on wartime mission guidance and if the METL has been approved by the next higher commander in the CAPSTONE primary trace in accordance with guidance outlined in Chapter Four, FORSCOM/ARNG Reg 350-2. Again, during external evaluation, in the event either response is no, the unit commander must indicate in the narrative comments the status of METL development/approval to include any action needed beyond his ability to influence.

2. STRENGTH.

a. and b. Required and authorized strength figures, based on the units MTOE, will be computer generated from VFAS.

c. ASGD. Enter the assigned unit strength from SIDPERS.
d. ATTRIT. Attrition represents the number of personnel lost from a Troop Program Unit (TPU) in the Reserve Components. It includes the following categories:

- discharges/retirements or transfers to the Active Component

- transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) including unsatisfactory participants

- disciplinary losses

- losses due to change in civilian vocation/location

- death, serious/chronic illness, disabling physical limitations, etc.

- Running totals will be kept of changes that occur during each calendar quarter. The unit commander must determine when the loss occurs based on a common sense analysis of the conditions surrounding the loss, receipt of orders, morning report entries, etc. The number to be entered in column d. will be the total at the end of the preceding quarter. This figure will not be changed until the end of the next calendar quarter. The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) will then be computer generated.

e. TURNOVER. Represents the turbulence within the organization. The number entered reflects any personnel changes resulting from:

- Changes in MTOE/TDA authorization that require internal moves (Example: MOS is changed; the soldier filling the vacancy that was previously qualified now is not qualified and requires reclassification training into the new MOS or must be moved to a vacancy in the unit for which he is qualified.)

- Promotion or any other move internal to the unit that places a soldier/leader in a position new to him or detailed to him, whether qualified or not. Specific job responsibilities may or may not change.

- Losses from the unit (This will include the number shown in the attrition block, transfers to other RC units, voluntary short tour (ADSW/ADT/TTAD) requirements with other units or activities (such as recent volunteers that supported DESERT SHIELD/STORM).

- Figures are maintained and entered similar to d. above. In both cases, annual percentage rates will be computer generated.
f. (1) PRES FOR DY AT. Blocks f. and g. apply only to the AT period. Enter in f.(1) the total number of personnel actually present for duty on the first day of AT. Include the number of personnel that may be at the AT site undergoing leader qualification/MOSQ under a "Schoolhouse to the soldier" or similar type program. These personnel will be explained in the commander's narrative. Unqualified soldiers and leaders should be in individual training programs leading to qualification during AT if the course calls for an AT phase. Unit commanders will not be penalized for reflecting that these personnel, although at the AT site, are not physically present with the unit.

(2) PRES FOR DY CC. Enter in f.(2) the number of personnel authorized activities in lieu of AT as specified in AR 140-1, AR 135-91 (USAR), and NGR 350-1 (ARNG). A roster of personnel afforded constructive credit that includes the name, grade and reason for constructive credit will be added as enclosure to the commander's narrative.

g. PRES FOR DY NOT CC. Enter the number not present for AT that have not been given constructive credit.

3. EDUCATION. In the appropriate block (3a.,b. and h.,i.) enter the number by grade authorized and assigned. In 3c through 3g and 3j through o, enter the number of personnel that require, but have not yet completed the respective training.

p. In 3p enter the total number of soldiers that are qualified in their duty MOS (DMOSQ).

q. In calculating the number of soldiers that are doubleslotted, (3q), do not consider as doubleslotted, soldiers that are in a six month overlap with an incoming soldier assigned to that position.

r. The entry in 3r is self explanatory. Split entry training soldiers or those with a reservation/date to start IADT are included. If the unit, due to its priority, has been specifically authorized overstrength in selected MOS, those soldiers will not be counted as double slotted. This presumes that the unit commander has first assigned soldiers to all unit vacancies.

s. The Commander's MOSQ Training Requirement (TR) is a number that identifies the percentage of soldiers within the organization that are not qualified that fall within the commander's ability to influence, hence, the training requirement. The percentage will be computer generated. It is figured as follows:

\[
TR = \frac{1 - \text{NUMBER OF SOLDIERS DMOSQ}}{\text{NO OF SOLDIERS ASGD} - (\text{IADT/AWAITING IADT} + \text{DOUBLESLOTTED})}
\]
4. **ANNUAL TRAINING.** Enter in 4.a. and 4.b. the dates of Annual Training (AT) and the AT site. In addition, if the unit is training as part of the Overseas Deployment Training program, enter (ODT) at end of site block. This requirement does not apply to units that are on Year Round Training (YRT). Enter the training level according to the table below. The level indicated should be a true reflection of the training level and not necessarily the level organized. A maneuver battalion, although training in a multi-echelon environment, and under battalion control, may be conducting "lanes training" at the platoon or company level. In this example a code A or B would be the appropriate entry. During the AT period, if the unit undergoes an ARTEP/AMTP External Evaluation (AEE), the results will be recorded as changes to unit performance on the METL and must be specifically detailed in the Evaluator's narrative comments. In order to receive credit for an AEE, the evaluation must include an assessment of all METL tasks. ARTEP/AMTP levels are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>TRAINING/ARTEP/AMTP LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>BELOW CO/BTRY/TRP LEVEL (SQD, CREW, TEAM, PLT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>SEP CO/BTRY/TRP OR ORG TNG SEPARATELY FROM BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>ORGANIC CO/BTRY/TRP TNG WITH PARENT BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>BN/SQDN (ENTER ONLY ON HHC/HHD/HHB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>NOT APPLICABLE (YRT/FRAGMENTED AT/ETC.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **Weapons Qualification.** In the column identified type weapons system, enter the model(s) on hand within the unit, e.g. M60A3. If the unit has more than one of a type weapons system, (such as MG or MORTAR) use block (10) and/or (11) to reflect the system. In addition, if the unit has crew served requirements not listed, the blocks (10) and (11) will be used to list the appropriate system. (e.g. Engineer systems such as the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV), MICLIC, etc.)

a. - c. Self explanatory.

d. Enter the number of crews that have trained key personnel on weapons simulation systems, e.g. COFT to sustain skills since last crew qualification.

e. Enter number of crews qualified in accordance with the frequency outlined in DA Pam 350-38.

f. Enter a number that reflects the number of crews that have experienced a change in key crew members (commander/gunner; chief of section/gunner/number1; etc.) within the last 12 months. This means a loss of a key member from the crew, or the new assignment of a key member to the crew. Cross training personnel or internal crew moves as a result of promotion will not be included.

---

102
g. Enter the appropriate number (1) or (2) or both if shortages in either ammunition or unavailability of ranges are a material detractor to crew qualification.

h. The percentage, computer generated, will reflect the ratio of crews qualified to crews assigned.

i. Enter either Y (YES) or N (NO) in the block provided if battle rosters have been used and some cross training of other unit personnel as crew members has been accomplished.

j. - k. Enter the number of services required/completed on pacing items within the unit. During AT evaluation, a daily Operational Readiness (OR) rate will be maintained on each pacing item and entered as a separate paragraph in the evaluator's narrative comments.

6. Enter number of individuals that qualified within the last 12 months. This number will be changed at the discretion of the unit commander. Qualification includes day record firing, night record firing and firing to standard while wearing MOPP4 (See DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training.)

PART II - INDIVIDUAL TRAINING SUMMARY

NOTE: Unit commander is responsible for all entries (except shaded areas) in PART II.

7. Enter Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) figures based on the past twelve months.

8. Enter mm/yy and the assessing headquarters (CONUSA, MUSARC, TAG, etc.) of the last individual training assessment using the FORSCOM Form IDT(R). The FORSCOM Form IDT(R) is self explanatory and provides a standardized format for use by the chain of command, State Authorities, MUSARC, and/or CONUSA during IDT evaluation of units. A separate form will be used for each evaluation, a copy of which will be provided to the respective State Authority/MUSARC for input into the pilot automation system. During the test year, the form will only apply to pilot units. Enter T, P, or U as appropriate in blocks b. c. and c. from the form. The overall results, a., will be computer generated.

9. (External/formal evaluation only). Upon external evaluation the evaluator will determine if the unit commander has an educational plan for unit soldiers that are not qualified in their duty MOS. The plan need not be formal or structured but should clearly provide a "road map" using RF Schools, TRADOC schools, academies, correspondence, SOJT (only as a last resort) or combinations of the foregoing for each unqualified soldier. The evaluator will enter either a Y or N as appropriate in block 9 and comment as appropriate in the evaluator's narrative.
10. INDIVIDUAL (SOLDIER/LEADER) TRAINING.

(External/formal evaluation only) An assessment by the evaluator of the items on the progressive Common Task Test (CTT) will be based on a GO/NOGO random sampling of at least 10 percent of the unit's assigned enlisted strength. Note that the CTT items have purposely been delimited for RC units so as to have general applicability across all types. Use the following as a guide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SL</th>
<th>NR TASKS TO STANDARD FOR ASSESSING &quot;TRAINED&quot;</th>
<th>NR TASKS TO STANDARD FOR ASSESSING &quot;NEEDS PRACTICE&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL1</td>
<td>MIN 85% TASKS TRAINED TO STANDARD (AT LEAST 6)</td>
<td>65%-85% TASKS TRAINED TO STANDARD (AT LEAST 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL2</td>
<td>MUST BE PROF ON SL2 TASKS AND TRAINED ON 85% OF ALL (AT LEAST 8)</td>
<td>MUST BE PROF ON SL2 TASKS AND TRAINED ON 65% (AT LEAST 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL3</td>
<td>SAME AS SL2 (AT LEAST 9)</td>
<td>SAME AS SL2 (AT LEAST 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL4</td>
<td>SAME AS SL2 (AT LEAST 10)</td>
<td>SAME AS SL2 (AT LEAST 7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soldiers should train on tasks listed as a minimum on an annual basis. The overall assessment, 11.a. will be computer generated. Those tasks listed are the select tasks taken from the FY 92 CTT list. A new list will be published biennially with an effective date of 1 October. Guidance in FR 135-7 will be adjusted accordingly. Commanders are encouraged to incorporate CTT events and appropriate evaluation thereof into unit collective training.

PART III - OTHER

NOTE: Unit commander will make an initial assessment in all items. Thereafter items 11 through 13 will only be changed as a result of external evaluation.

11. (To be evaluated during external/formal evaluation). Enter a T, P, U, N, or 0 in blocks 11.b. through f. The same general rule for assessment of tasks as outlined in the table on page 5 should apply for each of the sub-areas listed. Subtasks for the purposes of assessment are identified (1) through (n).

b. Unit Character. When assessing the subtasks of physical conditioning in the unit, the command climate, status of discipline and appearance consider the following:
- Demonstrated ability of soldiers within the unit to accomplish the physical tasks associated with the unit's wartime mission. (EX: FA gun crews able to move, stack, prepare large ammunition rounds and cannisters. Dismounted soldiers ability to participate in sustained operations or forced movement over extended battlefield distances.)

- Performance of unit members on the last APRT.

- Soldiers that do not appear to meet the height/weight standards and unit emphasis on the weight control program.

- Command climate is a more subjective and difficult area to measure. Consider pending disciplinary actions; frequency of unaccounted for absences from training; harmony observed within teams, sections, crews; responsiveness to unit leadership; interest in the training being conducted, leader concern for the welfare of soldiers as demonstrated by setting the example, teaching, mentoring and guiding soldiers through difficult training events and overall teambuilding activities.

- Discipline and appearance go hand-in-hand. Observance of courtesy and customs of the service to include wearing of the complete uniform whether in garrison or field should be evaluated. (EX: It would be wholly inappropriate to require that soldiers operate in MOPP4 where selected unit leaders do not.)

d. Maintenance consciousness and attentiveness is critical to sustained unit operations. The existence of Mobilization and Equipment Training Sites, and Equipment Concentration Sites, with the attendant full time maintenance personnel makes the challenge to establish and enforce good maintenance practices in the field even more important. Good maintenance practices are evident when individual soldiers are responsible and take routine interest in maintaining individual, crew served, mobile and special purpose equipment. Following are areas to consider:

- Preventive maintenance periods scheduled and enforced. Leaders are involved.

- Overall condition of organic equipment. Operators perform Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS).

- Repair parts are identified, requisitioned and installed.

105
- Command emphasis on responsibility for operator/organizational maintenance and for care and cleaning of individual weapons and equipment.

d. Safety considerations should include:

- Assessment of risk for all operations. This will be indicated by accident prevention measures being incorporated into operations orders, SOPs, LOIs and other policies, procedures and regulations.

- Personnel trained to a proficiency level that permits safe completion of tasks.

and licensed

-- Drivers adequately trained

-- If night vision devices required, personnel trained in their use.

-- Weapons crews trained progressively so that system is operated safely.

- Safety precautions apply to all operations. Certain operations impose a higher risk which should be given greater priority and attention. Some high risk operations include:

(convoys)

storage and handling

fire operations

transportation of hazardous/toxic material

-- Motor vehicle operations

-- Explosives/ammunition

-- Aviation operations

-- POL handling and storage

-- Weapons handling and live

-- handling/storage and

-- Water operations

-- Insertion and extraction techniques such as airborne operations, fast rope, rappelling, and heliocasting
e. Training time observations should include:

- Training is conducted so as to maximize the time available at the AT site without taking unnecessary breaks. Training should continue until the goals and objectives set by the commander are met. This routinely means training through the mid-weekend and providing individual or unit breaks, if any, later in the AT period.

- Time effectively managed through knowledge and use of a unit SOP

- Evidence of thorough preparation and organization for training, to include a clear understanding of the sequence of events and objectives to be accomplished.

- A clear understanding of the tactical vice administrative nature of the training. This will include any assumptions that must be made in compliance with land management directives or installation regulations which preclude certain activities that would normally be unrestricted in a tactical situation.

- The use of preplanned "hip pocket" training to fill any unanticipated voids in the scenario.

- Leaders supervising/mentoring soldiers at all levels from the first echelon supervisor to the commander to ensure training execution is on track, adequate guidance is provided, and on-the-spot corrections are promptly made.

- Note that all training is directed at the units wartime mission. Training distractors are held to an absolute minimum.

12. **Staff METL.** The evaluator will determine if a Staff METL has been prepared, is ARTEP/AMTP based, and approved by the next higher headquarters in the wartime chain of command. The Staff METL for the HHC/HHD/HHB will be completed on form METL(R) separate from organic unit METL(s) and will be attached to the commander's worksheet. If the METL is other than ARTEP/AMTP based, the basis for the METL will be addressed in the Commander's narrative. The unit commander will make an initial assessment and answer the questions pertaining to Staff METL with Yes or No. The evaluator, during formal assessment, will validate the answers to Staff METL questions and include appropriate comments in the evaluator's narrative. In addition to a review of the METL, the evaluator should look for evidence of thorough planning, unit organization for training, direction provided by the leadership, dissemination of orders and information, supervisory efforts by those responsible for coordinating or special staff activities. (EX: The Battalion trains not kept abreast of unit moves in timely fashion whereupon support to elements of the battalion such as provision of rations, supplies, ammunition, POL products lags)
13. (To be assessed during external/formal evaluation) The evaluator along with the unit commander will assess the goals and objectives established for this AT period, review the training level during the last and current year's AT, and will answer the question with Y or N to indicate whether the goals set for the unit were achieved. If the unit is considered trained to standard at the goal set by FORSCOM, a Y will be entered in block 13.

14. The unit commander will, using the table on page 12 as a guide, estimate the number of days required to bring his unit to a fully trained status at current level of training. The number of days will be entered in block 14.

15. Enter the number of additional training days required to bring the unit from its current training level to a fully trained condition "at the level organized" (if the current training level is not the level organized). The following should be used as a guide for the commander to use in making this assessment: Consider the need for platoon level weapons qualification if not completed. Normally a period of 10 to 14 days should be figured. The commander must also consider his ability to conduct some of this training in a multi-echelon environment with different organizational levels training concurrently. (Note: The sum total of the entries in blocks 14 and 15 should be the same as the number of days entered on the Unit Status Report (USR).)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver</td>
<td>Corps of Eng *</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Signal Corps *</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Chemical Corps</td>
<td>Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT Avn</td>
<td>Military Police *</td>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Maneuver</td>
<td>Intel</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) Also service organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING DAYS TO FULLY TRAINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANEUVER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-MNVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT SPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT SVC SPT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/08
PART IV - UNIT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL)

The unit commander will enter the identification of the appropriate training reference publication in the lead in block on the METL/Battle Task form. Each METL task will be identified on form METL(R), Part IV and the number of METL tasks for the unit will be entered in block 16. Battle tasks will be listed in the blocks provided on Part IVA, using additional pages used if necessary. Each page will be subtotalled in block 23 and the subtotal number of supporting squad/crew/team tasks in block 24. The commander will make an initial assessment on each battle task and each METL task, and will record individual results using the standard T, P, U. Thereafter, changes will be made as a result of training accomplished or during external evaluation. The unit commander will also identify if the specific task is to be trained during the period of AT, and/or reserved until the post-mobilization period. In many cases, the determination will be to train during AT and also retrain/sustain upon mobilization. The commander should use the remarks block as specified. Soldier supporting tasks and leader tasks must be trained to standard prior to achieving proficiency on battle or METL tasks. When making assessments refer to page 3-13 of FM 25-101 for generic definitions of "Trained, Needs Practice, and Untrained." Specific definition related to the task being measured is normally found on page 5-2 of the unit AMTP. Ample time must be provided for necessary repetition until each task is trained to standard. The prime emphasis is train to standard and not to time. For ease of reference in determining days to achieve proficiency on METL tasks, use the following matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>NR DAYS AT CURR TRAINING LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Trained: Unit can perform task to standard: Requires sustainment: Free of major deficiencies.</td>
<td>0 - 14 DAYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Needs Practice: Failure to meet standard in 1 or more non-critical subtasks</td>
<td>15 - 42 DAYS Cdrs' call based on nr failures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Untrained: Failure to meet standard in 1 or more critical subtasks /or/ in majority of non-critical subtasks</td>
<td>More than 42 DAYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Not Applicable - Does not apply to this unit *</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Not Observed - Applies to ext eval/AT/ORE, etc. only.**</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* If noted during formal evaluation, each N must be justified in the evaluator’s narrative.

** Applies only during formal evaluation. Evaluator must state the specifics of why the particular tasks was not observed in the evaluator’s narrative.

Soldier tasks must be trained to standard that support each METL task. Normally soldier supporting tasks, (including some MOS specific and some Common Tasks) are outlined in the matrix for the Platoon AMTP. A sample outline of the individual task to collective task matrix is outlined in chapter 2 of FM 25-101.

Leader tasks that support each collective task are outlined in the appropriate Training And Evaluation Outline (TE&O) in the AMTP. As with soldier tasks, leader tasks must be trained to competence before training on the collective METL task that is supported.

PART V - AUTHENTICATION AND REVIEW

This part is used upon conclusion of formal evaluation during Annual Training (AT) only. The unit commander, evaluator, site chief evaluator (when assigned) and each intervening level of command will sign in the appropriate block. Space has been provided for a short overall comment. Circle the appropriate block to note that comments are attached. If an ORE has been conducted within the last 12 months, a copy of the ORE will be attached to the TAM as an enclosure. Any special mission requirements unique to the specific type unit such as certification of Special Operations Forces units will be addressed in narrative format and attached as an enclosure to the Assessment Model. Certification or lack thereof will not figure in the graded measurements.

NOTES FOR THE EVALUATOR

When an external evaluation [whether AEE, normal AT evaluation, Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) or Reserve Training Concept (RTC), "Lanes Training"] is being conducted, the evaluator will:

- Make entries in paragraph 11, Other Readiness Indicators, (always mandatory), and Part IV on those tasks assessed.

- At the conclusion of the evaluation, provide written comments, based on the After Action Reviews (AAR), on each METL task attempted that is not trained to standard. Comments will reflect weaknesses and recommended correction to collective, and supporting leader/soldier tasks observed to include recommended priority/sequencing for inclusion in the commander’s Yearly Training Plan (YTP).