IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PHILIPPINES --
LOGISTIC RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE COMMANDER

by

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partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of
Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and
are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
Department of the Navy.

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19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The U.S. is scheduled to withdraw from the Philippines by 31 December 1992. Although military planners have long considered the loss of the Philippines as a plausible contingency, most planning assumed sufficient time would be available for orderly withdrawal and subsequent build up of alternate locations. This paper looks at the immediate problems facing the warfighting commander on 1 January 1993 and, where possible, provides recommendations to reduce his risk in supporting contingencies in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf regions.
The U.S. is scheduled to withdraw from the Philippines by 31 December 1992. Although military planners have long considered the loss of the Philippines as a plausible contingency, most planning assumed sufficient time would be available for orderly, gradual withdrawal and subsequent build-up of alternate locations. Based on the known deadlines, there is simply not enough time to implement the planned, long term solutions. This paper looks at the immediate problems facing the warfighting commander on 1 January 1993 and, where possible, provides recommendations to reduce his risk in supporting contingencies in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf regions.
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IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PHILIPPINES -- LOGISTIC RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE COMMANDER

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem. Under the Ramos-Rusk Agreement, the Philippines government served notice requiring the United States withdrawal from Philippine bases by 31 December 1992.¹ Although military planners and strategists have long considered the loss of Philippines bases as a plausible contingency, most planning assumed sufficient time would be available for orderly, gradual withdrawal and subsequent build-up of alternate locations. These solutions do not provide the operational commander the immediate relief required in this circumstance. Although the withdrawal from the Philippines is heavily couched in politics, and the military must support this decision, the warfighting commander alone faces maintaining viable capability to fight the next war. Paramount in maintaining warfighting capability is the ability to sustain realistic logistic support. Rapid withdrawal timeframes, now less than a year, present the operational commander with numerous logistic problems until the previously planned long term solutions can be selected, funded and implemented. This paper will examine the problems facing the warfighting commander due to the loss of the Philippine facilities, discuss consequences and make recommendations where they exist to alleviate operational impact.

¹
The Scope. This paper will limit its view to the potential logistics shortfalls that will hamper the operational commander from effectively carrying out assigned missions. For perspective, this paper will discuss these shortfalls within a prescribed scenario. This driving scenario is necessary in that it is not reasonable to assume the commander will be afforded time to "muddle" through until long term logistic solutions can be implemented. This paper will assume that the commander is actively supporting or must be positioned to support our toughest logistic mission -- a regional conflict somewhere within the Persian Gulf. This support will most likely take the form of maintaining one or more Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) in the region, an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and several smaller Surface Action Groups (SAG). The projected level of support will be representative of the support provided for our latest operational example -- Desert Shield / Desert Storm.
CHAPTER II

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE

It can be argued with a non-existent Soviet threat that U.S. presence in either the Western Pacific or the Persian Gulf is not as significant as it once was. Acceptance of this assumption reduces or removes the criticality for the operational commander to overcome logistic shortcomings derived from the Philippines base closure and implies a reduced operational tempo (optempo) in the region is acceptable. This is a faulty assumption. Presence and, more importantly, our ability to exert influence over events in both regions is essential to our national welfare, therefore a realistic response capability is essential.

The National Security Strategy of the United States ties our economic strength directly to the markets and resources in these two vital regions. Our strategy dictates that we exert our influence and interest in these areas by a definitive forward presence that signals our commitment to remain a legitimate power in these regions.\footnote{1} Indeed, our National Military Strategy further recognizes and supports the need for forward basing and presence as essential to the accomplishment of our nation military objectives.\footnote{2} Forward presence is the basic instrument used to achieve global access and influence as well as promote regional stability and cooperation. Most importantly, when called to military action, we must be capable
of projecting overwhelming force in support of mission objectives.

**Presence in the Western Pacific.** Within the Pacific Rim are the countries that are integral parts of the economic engine that drives the world's economy. This region accounts for 37% percent of our total world trade. Vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) run throughout the region. Four straits are critical to the Indian Ocean / Western Pacific trade routes - the Malacca Strait, Sundra Strait, Lombok Strait and the Ombai-Wetar Strait. Should passage in these straits become unsafe, ocean going transport would have to be rerouted around Australia, thereby doubling the sea travel distance. As a maritime nation these straits can become the choke points to our economic life. One noted author makes the following case for United States presence in this region:

The case for United States forward military presence in Southeast Asia, astride sea lines of communications, oil routes, and near the Indian Ocean works from these assumptions or assertions:

- Southeast asia and the Western Pacific constitute a politically volatile, geographically congested island and archipelago zone through which the oil lifelines of four U.S. Asian/Pacific allies or friends pass. These oil lanes constitute the strategic jugular veins of these countries.

-Noncommunist Northeast Asia's dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and Southeast Asia's chronic food and population problems, means the acquisition of energy resources, foreign trade, and development -- all involving accelerated exploration of the sea's potential, institution of exclusive economic zones, and control of the sea -- have become the new strategic foci of Asian/Pacific countries.
For the Pacific Command to fulfil its responsibilities, and to be able to react to contingencies, U.S. forward basing in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia is required.

U.S. forward military deployment and projection capability ensures that American presence for routine and crisis situations will be available if required. Since crises are unanticipated, it makes sense to retain forward assets that have proven their value in the past as a hedge against unforeseen circumstances.

By keeping an active military presence in the Western Pacific, with capability of insertion into the Indian Ocean, the U.S. discourages adventurism [sic] against its allies' SLOCs and oil routes. American presence also serves to reassure or remind littoral states of American resolve to exercise influence in the area.5

**Presence in the Gulf Region.** The Gulf region continues to be an area of tremendous instability. The Iran-Iraq War, our war with Iraq and the current difficulty in bringing regional states to the negotiating table to establish lasting peace only serves to highlight the profundity of that instability. With Western Europe dependent on this region for 30% of their oil imports, Japan 60% and the U.S. approximately 15%, the Gulf States hold a controlling grip on world economy. That grip can only become tighter in the future as they hold 63% of the world's known oil reserves.6 From a maritime perspective over half the world's seaborne oil is moving across the Indian Ocean at any one time.7 Stability and influence in the region is vital to our national survival. Our National Security Strategy outlines several ambitious objectives for this region:

American strategic concerns still include promoting stability and the security of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, countering terrorism and encouraging a peace process that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security.  

An argument has been presented validating the need for a continued U.S. forward presence and a consistent optempo though the traditional threat -- the Soviets -- has dissolved. The operational commander still faces a dynamic environment, ripe with possible contingencies and unique threats. The Philippine bases (or the capability provided by these bases) have been key in the ability to project creditable power into these regions. To gain a perspective on the range and depth of support required to support our prescribed scenario, an understanding of the current capabilities afforded by these bases and the role they played in the last Gulf conflict must be understood.
CHAPTER III

OVERVIEW OF CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES

**Current Capabilities.** The current capabilities provided by the Philippine bases were made possible by a singularly important provision of the Military Base Agreement of March 1947. This provision allows unhampered U.S. control of the military bases on Philippine soil. This agreement afforded the military an unusual degree of latitude and flexibility in operating the bases and this latitude is not duplicated in any other foreign basing agreement.¹ This freedom coupled with the tremendous build-up of facilities during the Vietnam War created a basing complex that is not easily walked away from or replaced. The original cost estimates to develop Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base were $1 billion - to duplicate these facilities today would cost between $3 - $5 billion.²

The recent closure of Clark Air Base eliminates one airfield from which logistics flights can be originated. Clark Air Base (CAB) was capable of receiving 3,500 short tons of supplies daily. In addition, capability existed to service and repair over 800 combat and supply aircraft at one time. Since there were restrictions on CAB being used to project combat missions for other than the defense of the Philippines, its value was primarily as a logistic staging point.³ It is reasonable to assume that the loss of CAB reduces excess capacity and the logistic airlift function is adequately handled.
by Cubi Point Naval Air Station.

The Subic Bay Naval Complex is the center piece of logistic support for naval forces operating in either Southeast Asia or the Persian Gulf. This complex consists of the following major components: Cubi Point Naval Air Station, the Naval Station, Naval Ship Repair Facility, the Naval Supply Depot (NSD) and the Naval Magazine. A review of the major capabilities is in order:

**Naval Supply Depot**

- 700,000 sq.ft. of covered storage (of which 65,000 cu. ft. is set aside for freeze, chill and dry provisions storage) and 400,000 sq.ft. of open storage area containing over 345,000 line items. Maintains and distributes a separate subsistence and ship's store items inventory in excess of $10 million. Location of preposition wartime reserve stocks for 7th Fleet. Operations automated under LOGMARS (barcoded receipt and storage) and NAVADS III (automated retrieval and storage). A capable container handling port moving over 25 containers per hour. Surface cargo throughput averages 1.5 million measurement tons annually. Through NAS Cubi point approximately 24,000 tons of air cargo is consolidated and moved annually. During peak operations, NSD has serviced 250 ships in port per month and has provided daily support of up to 3 forward deployed CVBG for extended periods. As the only aviation supply support activity in the Western Pacific, NSD Subic has supported over 650 deployed aircraft at one time. Dedicated, trained and responsive Filipino workforce of over 1,400 people.

**NSD Fuel Operations**

- 305 acre Fuel Terminal Complex composed of 68 storage tanks with a 2.3 million barrel capacity, solar reclamation facility, 844-foot deep-draft fueling pier and a Type B-1 testing laboratory. Capable during peak periods of providing throughput of 4.6 million barrels per month with an all time high throughput of 7.2 million barrels in May 1972. Normal operating expenditures are approximately 1 million barrels a month.

**Naval Magazine**

- 12,000 acre facility containing 200 permanent magazines or stands. Maintains an ammunition inventory of over $200 million
dollars. Two dedicated piers simplifies and facilitates ship load outs.

NAS CUBI POINT

-Air Station, consisting of a 9,000 ft. runway, collocated with the Naval Station. Apron parking of 313,000 sq. yds. (entire aircraft complement of a carrier can park and take up only 48% of available space) Conveniently located next to the Carrier Piers to facilitate aircraft maintenance. Averages 17,000 - 19,000 take-offs/landings a month. Significant ammunition and cargo storage facilities on-site.

Naval Ship Repair Facility

-Full service facility providing dry docking, overhaul, repair, alteration and conversion services. Can be operated 24 hours a day year round. Presently performs over 60% of 7th Fleet work. Handles 20 to 25 ships at one time. Labor costs for a skilled Filipino work force is 1/7 of that for other facilities in the region. During the Vietnam War a conscious effort was made to develop a highly capable organic facility, with significant investment in facilities and ongoing workforce training programs made.

Even with this condensed overview, it is easy to gain an understanding of the significant in-theater capability and flexibility available to the warfighting commander to handle a wide range of contingencies. One noted author concludes:

The Philippine bases also facilitate a "force multiplier" because fewer ships and planes are needed to provide an equivalent force presence than if it were restricted to CONUS or US Pacific possessions. This effect was proved throughout the Vietnam War when Subic Bay became the essential fulcrum for projecting U.S. naval and naval air power into the Tonkin Gulf and against North Vietnam. To have maintained a carrier force in the South China Sea by other means would have been extraordinarily expensive.

Surge for the Storm. More recently the capabilities provided by the infrastructure at the Philippine bases played a pivotal role in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. NSD Subic, as the forward most major resupply point, was tasked with providing
support for approximately 100 ships (5 AFSs, 4 Carrier Battle Groups, 2 Surface Action Groups and 3 Amphibious Ready Groups), embarked aircraft and 75,000 sailors and marines in the North Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. Demand volume rose approximately 63% as the NSD filled 652,000 requirements for food, spare parts, ammunition and consumables during the 7 months of Desert Shield/Storm. Additionally, over 925,000 tons of cargo flowed through the NSD Freight Terminal - an increase of 220% over normal operations. Desert Shield/Storm proved substantial surge capacity must exist to undertake significant operations, even against a third world threat.
CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS FACING THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

Operational Implications. The resources to replicate the infrastructure found in the Philippine bases are extremely doubtful, especially considering today's economic outlook and the expectation for a peace dividend to ease perceived domestic program shortfalls. Any equivalent solution would have required unusual foresight, over ten years ago, in predicting a definitive base closure. Still, as has been shown, national interests demand a creditable presence in both the Western Pacific and Gulf regions. The warfighting commander is still tasked with providing a viable, supported force to counter possible contingencies in these volatile regions. Significant surge capability from forward bases appears central to future operations. How is this now possible without the Philippine bases? To suggest that the U. S. can project persuasive and overwhelming power to remote locations in a crisis contingency from "Fortress America" is simply a misunderstanding of our current sealift and airlift capability. Loss of organic support from within the theater has a direct impact on our ability to maintain a creditable force on station. Costs for maintaining and sustaining a fleet will significantly increase as we move from traditional sources. "The decrease in military effectiveness for today's naval and air forces operating 1,500 - 2,000 miles farther from bases is in the neighborhood of 15 -
The operational commander is now faced with reducing presence or increasing the number of assets available in the region to do the same job. The loss of these facilities provide the operational commander with many new challenges.

**Immediate Problems.** For the operational commander assigned to support our prescribed scenario, three immediate problems arise in the face of an impending loss of Philippine bases: the loss of dedicated and significant ship repair facilities; the loss of a highly developed, forward based facility key to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf pipeline; and, the loss of an airfield strategically located on air routes from the United States to Diego Garcia.

**Loss of Ship Repair.** The U.S. Navy cannot afford to lose the ship repair capability found at Subic Bay. Given the movement toward a leaner force without a concurrent reduction in commitment, every ship that can remain in theater increases the operational commander's flexibility. This ship repair facility is tailored to meet U.S. commitments, familiar with ship repair of combatants and a home base to a highly specialized group of technicians. For example, a trip to Pearl Harbor, a complete, U.S. organic repair facility with significant excess capacity, from the Persian Gulf costs about 25 days non-stop at 15 knots (50 days non-stop round trip). If the ship is battle damaged or under tow this time can be significantly longer. There are U.S. Navy ship repair facilities in Guam, Yokosuka and Sasebo Japan, as well as commercial yards throughout the region, which could
make the trip somewhat shorter, but each has certain limitations that become important in a wartime scenario.

Shipyards in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area are too close to the fighting line in our prescribed scenario and are subject to actual enemy threat or political manipulation. Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan are the primary back-ups to Subic Bay. There is ample workforce to handle expansion, but real estate for necessary facilities expansion to handle the Subic loss is limited.\(^2\) The Japanese/United States Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as well as an unfavorable trade balance with Japan may be serious stumbling block to quick implementation. In the treaty, the U.S. agrees, among other things, to prior consultation before making any changes in the deployment of forces.\(^3\) An extensive build up of U.S. presence may not be in Japan's best interests, especially in light of a reduced Soviet threat. The trade imbalance and our proclivity for Japan bashing make the investment of additional U.S. dollars in Japanese ship repair industry a politically unsavory option. Guam, a U.S. Commonwealth, offers the opportunity for development of another large organic facility. Guam does lack a significant reserve of skilled labor necessary to handle the increase in work. Guam's government, under the Commonwealth Agreement, controls immigration and would resist the importation of the required skilled labor that would take jobs from their people.\(^4\) Time and resources to build a skilled labor force and expand current facilities in Guam would be excessive. Singapore
has several impressive commercial ship repair facilities. Since
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S.
and Singapore in November of 1990, both nations have worked
toward an increased U.S. military presence in Singapore.
Without doubt the Singapore government favors attracting the
U.S. ship repair business, although they are careful to say they
are not allowing the U.S. to establish a permanent naval base.
Singapore's care in delineating the type of support to be
provided to the U.S. is in deference to their Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) partners. Other members of
ASEAN do not see the need for another American base in the
region as it runs counter to the group's ideas of peace, freedom
and neutrality.\(^5\) Politically, a large visible presence can be
trouble for Singapore. Additionally, being foreign-owned and
commercial, the U.S. could not be guaranteed priority access in
time of crisis or any support if engaged in action the
government of Singapore did not agree with. Additionally, there
is the issue of worker clearance for work on our most sensitive
equipment.\(^6\) Of course, most of these concerns would apply to
any foreign-owned commercial shipyard. Additionally, these ship
yards would represent a significant cost increase for either
routine or emergent work over that of Subic Bay.

Could increased levels of support from Navy tenders and
repair ships ease the problem? They can to some degree; they
have capability to perform certain levels of intermediate repair
beyond the capabilities of the combatants themselves. However,
they have no capability to perform drydocking of vessels. Given the third world preferred method of coastal defense - the mine - drydocking capability is essential.

**Recommendation.** It is clear that continued access to the Subic Bay Ship Repair Facility is vitally important to our continued ability to project and sustain naval power in the Western Pacific and into the Indian Ocean. Although other facilities in the Philippines must be abandoned, an agreement acceptable to the Philippine Government must be found that allows continued exclusive use of these facilities. This agreement may be found in the form of a limited partnership between the two governments for fixed duration. Significant advantages can accrue for both parties under this arrangement.

The Philippine government has several problems with the current basing arrangement that would have an effect on the decision to join in partnership with the U.S.. Among these problems are issues of operational control of bases, the need to reduce United States influence within their country and adequate compensation for the facilities provided. The recommended solution would have to fit within the constraints outlined by these issues. A partnership agreement immediately resolves the issues of operational control; they become equal in status in the operation of the shipyard. The number of U.S. military and civilians that remain in the Philippines is greatly reduced, from thousands to hundreds. The lack of a large, permanent U.S. presence reduces our influence to a politically acceptable level.
for the Philippine government. Initially, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding would have to remain to facilitate management of government furnished material, work planning and to ensure a continued level of responsive management. Short-term retention of U.S. management is advantageous to the Philippine government in that it ensures our continued interest, investment and prevents possible infrastructure collapse due to U.S. withdrawal. Adequate compensation issues are addressed by the fact that the shipyard would be operated as a commercial concern. Additionally, the Philippine government can avoid the political embarrassment of lost jobs for many Filipinos due to their hardline policy on U.S. basing.

The U.S. accrues two major advantages; continued exclusive use under limited control and additional time. The exclusive use is necessary to ensure priority of work and dedication of resources, vital under our prescribed scenario. Also, this recommendation would allow the U.S. additional time to develop acceptable alternatives to the Philippine yard. The operational commander continues to retain a necessary asset within theater, is assured of responsiveness to mission needs, and in the future is afforded a more organized transition from the Philippines.

**Loss of a Highly Developed, Forward Based Facility.** Of the logistic problems facing the operational commander, the loss of the facilities that comprise the whole of Naval Supply Depot are the most difficult to offer viable near term solutions. As was discussed earlier, the NSD at Subic Bay has tremendous capacity
for the forward basing of provisions, consumables, petroleum, oil, lubricants, ammunition and ship and aviation repair parts. The operations are efficient and manned with a highly qualified labor force used to providing the emergent support required of a forward logistic base. Obviously, with the reality of shrinking budgets, major construction projects at other U.S. sites in the region are not a solution to the base closures problem. Additionally, major construction does nothing for the warfighting commander from 1 January 1993 until the projects are complete. There are a plethora of opinions in the research on how to redistribute the capabilities available at NSD, Subic Bay . . . move into Guam, Japan, Singapore, Okinawa, Korea, or back into Thailand and Vietnam. One author states the case clearly:

"Excess capacity at these other U.S. facilities in the region could accommodate some redeployed forces in peacetime, but existing facilities would need to be expanded or supplemented by new facilities to provide the wartime capability equivalent to the current basing system with the Philippine facilities available."8

The most complex storage problem facing the warfighting commander is one of forward weapons and ammunition storage. The size of the Philippine magazine, security and the operational freedom afforded the military commander is near impossible to duplicate today. The operational commander's future transportation priorities or potential courses of military action may be driven by the need to move remotely stockpiled ammunition and weapons to the fighting line.
**Recommendation.** There is no single solution that completely facilitates our governing scenario. Stockpiling of munitions on foreign soil is a potential solution, but an inherently risky option. The transportation or long term storage of U.S. war materials is a politically explosive topic for most foreign governments. Nuclear weapons bans adopted by many countries further limits storage options. Prepositioning exposes the stockpile to the threat of preemptive strikes by potential enemies or political manipulation by the host nation. The U.S. could try to negotiate with the Philippine government for continued use of the magazine, but this option presents several road blocks that would not make this a feasible option for either government. With our reduced presence, the magazine is exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. We would no longer have sufficient influence or presence to prevent political manipulation or to deter an direct threat to this significant arsenal. Additionally, there is no incentive for the Philippine government. One issue that caused the breakdown in recent negotiations for the base renewal agreement was the Philippine ban on nuclear weapons.\(^9\) Regardless of the actual presence of these weapons, the Philippine government would be exposed to an internal political dilemma with its own people and an external dilemma with its ASEAN partners. With no clear immediate solution, the warfighting commander is at greatest risk in this area.
For other commodities, consuming the excess capacity at Guam and at the bases in Japan is a good general strategy. Carrier based support would most likely move to Japan, due to the deep water port facilities, and AFS (Combat Stores Ships) final load out would move back to the AFS's homeport in Guam. Transit times to Diego Garcia from either Japan or Guam would on average increase by 5 days (10 days round trip) and with limited shipping assets resupply frequency could be degraded.

The difficulty comes in handling the difference between what will be physically possible compared to the capacity NSD, Subic Bay provided. A change in the way Guam and the Japanese facilities are resupplied is needed. It would make sense to keep the stocking levels in Guam and Japan as close to 100% as possible. This would entail an increase in frequency of resupply from the West Coast. Increased frequency places additional burdens on our limited sealift capability. Budgetary realities dictate that the solution must come from the creative use of existing assets or limited increased funding for established programs. This increased capability may come from restructuring the status of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships and the homeporting of these ships in Guam or Japan. By activating limited numbers of RRF ships and/or basing them in forward operating areas, the operational commander is afforded the flexibility to keep the forward depots resupplied and quickly meet the surge requirement necessary in our governing scenario. Depending on frequency, a portion of stock could in effect be
"warehoused" afloat in ships while transiting between the West Coast and forward bases. As a complementary strategy, the adoption of "just in time" inventory practices, refined through the exploitation of historical demand data, could ease the loss of storage space. Additionally, increased resupply frequency reduces the pipeline from the U.S. and establishes an increased optempo for forward resupply similar to what would be required for wartime operations. Even so, the execution of these changes would be most effective in easing the strain of normal peacetime operations. Wartime operations will become increasingly dependent on even greater sealift capability.

The Need for a Well Placed Stepping Stone. Rerouting of logistic air routes is not a difficult process. There are some constraining factors that must be kept in mind. Physically, the type of aircraft, its performance with maximum payload under less than ideal weather conditions and available basing facilities must be considered in establishing outer limits for flight legs. Additionally, situations should be avoided where inflight refueling must be routinely employed. Tankers are a limited commodity and should be reserved for combat support. Based on the criticality usually afforded air cargo, routes should be chosen to facilitate returning the aircraft for redeployment as quickly as possible; operational hours should be minimized from both a crew stress and equipment maintenance prospective.
Normally, in supporting our prescribed scenario, priority airworthy cargo and passengers would be lifted into the Philippines from Japan, Guam and Pearl Harbor (from the West Coast through Guam), then moved from the Philippines to Diego Garcia and from Diego Garcia to a host nation or other logistic airhead. The capacity to act as a centralization point increased the value of Philippine airfields and made it a natural stop over on the way to the Indian Ocean. Even considering its ideal location, the 3,366 nautical mile trip from the Philippines to Diego Garcia is the longest leg on the military airlift route to the Persian Gulf. Without the Philippines, movement from Guam, (the next closest, existing facility - 1423 miles to the east) nonstop and without inflight refueling, would require approximately a 60% payload reduction for a C-5A transport and no payload for a C-141B aircraft.11

Recommendation. Two alternate routes are worthy of consideration: an alternate route to Diego Garcia via Guam and Darwin, Australia or the establishment of Singapore as the western most centralization point.

The alternate route to Diego Garcia "via Guam and Darwin, Australia adds up to 2,400 nautical miles to the trip but keeps the legs short enough short enough to permit operationally useful payloads."12 The obvious advantage to this option is that negotiations with Australia over landing rights should be somewhat less complicated as compared to other Southeast Asian countries. We have traditionally enjoyed harmonious relations
with Australia and would expect less difficulty in obtaining and maintaining their support in a crisis.

The Guam to Darwin alternative does increase flight time and could increase cargo on hand awaiting shipment. For perspective, early in the Desert Shield build-up, backlogs more than doubled system wide in the first two weeks. Cargo generally outstripped capacity 20% to 30% each day. Suboptimal routes or the accumulation of several suboptimal routes can aggravate backlogs in crisis situations. All things considered, this is an attractive alternative.

Establishing Singapore as the western most centralization point allows you to gain most of the advantages provided by the Philippines. Singapore is suitably situated to facilitate consolidation of cargo from Japan and Guam by C-5A or C-141B aircraft. Does Singapore have the potential of becoming the base closure issue of tomorrow? Two reasons should preclude Singapore from becoming the Philippines of tomorrow:

Our initial relationship with the Philippines was very paternalistic and definitively colonial. We accrued distinct, one-sided, advantages from our negotiations after World War II. Singapore is an established sovereignty and a strong commercial entity in its own right. Agreements with Singapore would tend to be of mutual advantage to both countries.

U.S. presence should not rise to the high levels currently in the Philippines. Airlift basing support tends not to be as visible or as permanent (in a political sense) as other types of support - like ship repair for example. This should not raise the question of overt U.S. influence causing the government political difficulties.
It is always possible that Singapore could withdraw support in time of crisis. If managed by the U.S. correctly, our visible presence can be kept to minimum in using Singapore as an airlift stepping stone. This minimum presence allows the Singapore government considerable flexibility in handling global political issues in times of controversy or conflict. Singapore understands the importance of U.S. presence in influencing potential regional rivalries. President Bush's recent trip (January 4, 1992) to Singapore reaffirmed our close ties. During this trip it was announced that an additional 200 military logistic personnel were being relocated to Singapore indicating a desire by both governments to increase U.S. presence. The existing Naval Regional Contracting Center and the permanent stationing of military personnel establishes a solid starting point from which to develop further logistic capabilities.

The use of Singapore as an airlift stepping stone also carries with it one other distinct advantage. Singapore's location astride the Straits of Malacca allows a window of opportunity for passenger/priority cargo movement to Carrier Battle Groups. Singapore is in range of the CVBG's organic air assets as it transits the Strait on the way to the Indian Ocean.

The operation commander may desire to see both of these options developed and utilized. It prevents dependence on any one foreign government and increases operational flexibility in the region.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

The loss of the Philippine facilities has far reaching effects for the operational commander faced with likely contingencies in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf. Availability of supplies, solid strategic mobility and an established logistic infrastructure, once enjoyed by the operational commander, are now in question. There is no question of the value of the capabilities found at Philippine facilities in sustaining both creditable peacetime operations and the high optempo of war. We must be wary not to let our ability to project naval power atrophy to the point where we face the difficulties faced by Great Britain in their attempt to project a force into the Falklands Islands.

The three problems that precipitate from the closure; the loss of dedicated and significant ship repair facilities; the loss of a highly developed, forward based facility key to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf pipeline; and, the loss of an airfield strategically located on air routes from the United States to Diego Garcia, pose the greatest, immediate risk to the warfighting commander in maintaining and sustaining a creditable force to meet our governing scenario. These problems manifest themselves as reduced on station time, reduced readiness status and increased cost -- all culminating in overall decreased force flexibility. Alternatives to be considered by the commander
cannot depend on the element of time or increases in force structure to offset the loss. There is simply not enough time before the commander is put at risk. The recommendations put forth in this paper are designed to provide risk reducing options that can provide immediate relief to the aforementioned problems and their operational implications.
NOTES

Chapter I


Chapter II


5. Grinter, pp. 21-22.


Chapter III


2. Grinter, p. 15.


5. Cottrell and Hanks, pp. 9-10.


Chapter IV


2. Bowen, p. 113.


4. Cottrell and Hanks, p. 15.


6. Cottrell and Hanks, p. 15.


8. Bowen, p. 112.

10. Interview with LCDR Jack Sweeney, Former Director, Freight Terminal Department, Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay, Philippines: 20 December 1991.


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