


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


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THE DRUG WAR: CAN WE STOP COCAINE?

BY

Commander Robert L. Payne, Jr.
United States Navy



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The Drug War: Can We Stop Cocaine?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Commander Robert L. Payne, Jr.
United States Navy

Colonel(Ret) Murl D. Munger
Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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The United States has been threatened for years by organized, illegal drug cartels who provide cheap and available drugs to satisfy an expanding demand. In the past seven years, cocaine has developed into a powerful, addictive, and initially inexpensive drug that appeals to America's poor. Experts have identified it as the drug which most threatens national security. Easy and large profits from readily available cocaine have generated significant problems for lawmen, medical personnel and facilities, judicial services and incarceration sites, and rehabilitation and social programs across the nation. U.S. Presidents have consistently vowed to win the "War on Drugs". Are America's National Drug Control Strategy and the agreements made during the Cartagena Summit of 1990 leading to the elimination of drugs, more specifically of cocaine, from our society? Can U.S. drug law enforcement agencies' (DLEA's) efforts prevent cocaine from crossing U.S. borders? What impact is cocaine having on our allies overseas? "The Drug War: Can We Stop Cocaine?" addresses these questions and related issues.

INTRODUCTION

"All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs".¹ So began President Bush's prime-time television address to the nation on 5 September, 1989. Yet in 1991 drug abuse is still one of the most serious problems facing the United States. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, in his remarks on 1 May 1990 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, stated that international drug trafficking is a threat to U.S. National Security: "Accordingly, the President and I have made the narcotics issue a top foreign policy priority".² Secretary Baker also recognized the world threat created by drug abuse in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Narcotics on 20 February 1990, when he asserted that "drugs pose a serious threat to global security."³

Drugs likewise threaten U.S. security from within. Drug addicts needing cash to support their habits are frequently apprehended in robberies, burglaries, stolen goods transactions, extortion, blackmail and other major crimes. Gang-style killings and outright street wars across America have increased dramatically. Lawmen are often overwhelmed by major drug interdiction efforts; U.S. jails are overcrowded; and court systems are falling progressively behind in what appears to many as a near siege of the entire U.S. judicial system by drug-related crimes.

Problems created by drug crime and drug addiction are increasing at an alarming rate, seemingly proportionate to

increased drug usage and availability. Approximately one in ten Americans used some form of illicit drug in 1989.⁴ In 1990, cocaine abuse indicators declined, but gangland violence and drug-associated homicides remained high.⁵ Our drug problem involves more than just social recovery programs and hordes of drug addicts. Drug addiction stimulates street crime, fosters terrorism at all levels of society, and creates desperate battle zones in poor neighborhoods across America. Easy money and huge profits generate corruption, bribery, prostitution, and murder. Drug money corrupts government officials, police, bankers and even the military. Drug money is inexorably intertwined with criminal elements in the United States and overseas as well. A recent Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) report links multiple Colombian drug cartels with European criminal elements in a worldwide drug export market that includes ports of entry and exit around the globe. Drug quantities and purity fluctuate, but overall trends reveal increasing availability and potency.⁶

Even though total 1991 drug indicator figures have not yet been tallied, January-through-June data indicates cocaine purity is increasing while its price in most U.S. cities has diminished.⁷

These indicators affect every American. Our hospitals have experienced dramatic increases in drug-related emergencies; increasing numbers of babies are born with drug addiction and require complex and expensive treatment. Much of this medical care is unpaid and eventually written off, so taxpayers absorb the loss. Needles passed from junkie to junkie are a leading source of new

HIV-positive cases reported each year. Social programs for drug rehabilitation are financed directly by tax dollars at every level of government. Even so, a frequent recommendation is to allot even more tax money to social programs. Demand-side programs are struggling to meet the needs of growing numbers of drug abusers. Overflowing half-way houses and drug abusers who cannot obtain immediate professional help reflect the need for improved facilities and increased professional care.

Side effects and other ramifications from drug abuse negatively impact the work place. Employee drug abuse results in poor performance, difficult relations with co-workers and superiors, inadequate attention and concentration, memory lapses, tardiness, absenteeism and accidents on the job site. Lost productivity due to drug abuse costs the U.S. economy between \$60 and \$80 billion dollars every year.⁸ In 1990 Latin America produced 873 metric tons of cocaine. Only 327 metric tons were confiscated through interdiction and seizure.⁹ The majority of the 546 metric tons unaccounted for likely made it to American markets. Clearly, our way of life is being jeopardized by this severe domestic problem.

This paper will discuss only one aspect of this formidable world-wide problem. It will analyze the U.S. strategy for halting the production, distribution, financing, and use of cocaine. It will analyze the initiatives taken by both the United States and Andean nations to eliminate cocaine production in that region. The expanding international cocaine trade is also discussed, since it

is inexorably intertwined in America's efforts to combat drug abuse and drug trafficking. To provide a background for understanding the new drug strategy and initiatives, the paper briefly discusses the recent history of cocaine and America's attempts to control it.

THE PROBLEM

Cocaine use in the United States is no longer the semi-popular white collar "I'm OK-your OK" week-end fun drug it once was purported to be. Introduced by drug dealers as a recreational drug for fashionable young, upwardly mobile Americans looking for entertainment and excitement, cocaine and cocaine derivatives quickly proved dangerously addictive, and soon created major problems within our society.

Super-charged cocaine, commonly referred to as "rock cocaine" or simply "rock", has become "crack", the scourge of American cities. Its cheap price (around \$5.00 to \$10 for a "hit") has allowed its infiltration and outright occupation of poor neighborhoods across America. It is especially appealing to the poor, who have "nothing to lose"; cocaine provides a cheap form of entertainment and escape from an otherwise dismal and unstimulating environment. Cocaine is an easily produced and marketed drug. Smoked or inhaled, it produces a nearly instantaneous euphoria that lasts 10-15 minutes. The "crack" variety is also incredibly addictive. Cocaine's quick popularity has challenged lawmen in interdiction operations; it has as well alarmed health officials,

who have been confronted by astronomic increases in cocaine overdoses and addictions. In Los Angeles alone, where crack was introduced in 1982, a 90 percent rise in cocaine overdoses was reported by area hospital emergency rooms between 1982 and 1983.¹⁰ An estimated four and one-half million Americans now use cocaine. While some surveys indicate cocaine use among the middle class is down in the U.S., it is rising world-wide.^{11/12} Cocaine, especially crack cocaine, is considered by most experts as the leading drug problem in America. It remains readily available and exceptionally potent despite intense efforts to interdict trafficking and curtail smuggling operations.

DEFINING THE SOURCE

As the cocaine market exploded in the United States, Latin American drug cartels, flush with ready cash, established sophisticated production, transportation and marketing systems. They developed heavily fortified bases and well-equipped security forces, particularly in Colombia. Drug traffickers have a long history in Colombia. They began amassing large sums of money during the 1970's as a result of marijuana smuggling and again from 1974 to 1984 in the Quaalude market. The cities of Cali, Medellin and Bogota formed a drug-trafficking triangle. Medellin quickly emerged as the leading center for drug trafficking, possibly because of that city's past reputation as a smuggler's paradise. Today the Cali cartel equals or exceeds the power of Medellin. Cocaine

trafficking fit well into Colombia's ailing 1984 economy; many workers and farmers were jobless because of low coffee prices, and the large amounts of money then being spent by drug traffickers building private empires stimulated an otherwise faltering economy.

Colombia suited the cartels for three other reasons: First, her close ties with the U.S. offered an informal, reliable and accessible source of critical drug production chemicals, known as precursors. These include vast quantities of ether, acetone, toluene, and acetic anhydride. In 1986, for example, some 55 tons of ether were imported by South American cocaine producing countries, an increase of over 70 percent from amounts imported in 1983.¹³ Second, Columbia's geographical location near the Panama Canal, with access to both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, likely appealed to savvy drug traffickers seeking to establish major trafficking operations to North America. Finally, Colombia has developed a centralized processing and export site for South American cocaine. With possible exception of the plains region, Colombia's soil does not encourage the growth of high quality coca. However, geographical virtues have made her the leading producer and exporter of high quality cocaine and coca leaf products. Two other South American countries grow, reap and export to Columbia huge quantities of processed coca leaf: Peru and Bolivia. These three nations comprise the "Andean countries", as specified in recent anti-drug legislation.¹⁴ Over 95 percent of cocaine imported into the U.S. is either grown or produced in these three countries.

Mexico has recently emerged as a final staging area for

processed cocaine. Many secluded and/or abandoned airfields exist along her northern border. They provide drug traffickers equipped with sophisticated radio and navigation equipment with plenty of options for staging and distributing large quantity shipments of cocaine by air, many times in conjunction with water or ground transportation routes. In 1990, authorities were able to seize a record 53 tons of cocaine in Mexico, partly due to increased interdiction efforts by the Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), an international agency created in 1990 from U.S. and Mexican drug enforcement personnel.¹⁵ Because of this intensive interdiction effort, many shipment sites have been moved to southern Mexico and Guatemala. Guatemala now ranks as the most important transshipment country in Central America for Colombian cocaine destined for the United States.¹⁶

"Cocaine control is our number one priority and our main focus has been and will continue to be, the Andes" said Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters.¹⁷ But simply identifying where the drug is raised and produced has not led to effective containment or elimination. In fact, the U.S. has been aware of the Andean drug connection for many years. Not only has Colombia become the world's leading exporter of cocaine, Colombia has experienced her own drug problems, as well. Over-zealous drug lords sold their own countrymen poor quality, toxic-laden by-products called "bazuco", derived from production of high quality cocaine for U.S. markets. In 1983, the drug-ridden campus of the National University in Colombia was closed because of drug

abuse problems. The Colombian drug problem became so great that in 1984 the near collapse of the Colombian economy was caused at least in part by untaxed and unregulated drug money and warring drug factions. This forced newly elected President Belisario Bentancur Cuartas to proclaim a state of siege in 1984.

In 1985, President Reagan told President Bentancur the United States would help Colombia reduce cocaine production and shipment as much as it could, despite the fact that past U.S. government drug policy had generally considered the majority of the drug trade problem to be associated with the countries producing the drug. President Bush pledged to "continue our efforts to take the customers away from the drugs, which must complement our efforts to take the drugs away from the customers."¹⁸

Latin American countries reject as absurd the U.S. idea that cocaine production and trafficking is their problem. They believe northern markets create the drug demand and thus stimulate the illegal drug market.¹⁹

Colombia remains under a state of siege today. Elections were recently held on 9 December 1990 to elect members to the Colombian Assembly, the major governmental legislative body. On 4 July 1991, they completed a new Colombian constitution; it imposes new and more restrictive controls on international and domestic financial dealings and property forfeiture laws for convicted drug traffickers.

By the mid-1980's the United States clearly needed unity and commitment as well as a national strategy to begin a "War on Drugs".

EVOLVING STRATEGY

On September 5, 1989, the Director on National Drug Control Policy, the Honorable William J. Bennett, submitted a new U.S. drug strategy as required by section 1005 of Public Law 100-690, the new Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. This replaced the old strategy which had existed since 1984. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, a derivative of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, provided funds for programs of assistance to the three Andean nations. It also required yearly presidential updates on the National Drug Control Strategy. The national strategy thus sought to come to terms with drug problems confronting the nation. The 1989 strategy identified the supply side, the demand side, and various complex interactions requiring national attention. Secondly, it recognized the international drug trade as a threat to U.S. national security and the security of other nations. The 1989 strategy focused on the major coca producing countries, while the 1990 strategy expanded the Andean Strategy to review U.S. plans and programs for Mexico, the surrounding transit countries in the Americas, and likewise heroin production and transit areas.²⁰

The Andean Strategy, based on National Security Directive-18, provides the framework for allocating U.S. resources to the Andean

region. This strategy is considered the President's highest priority international anti-drug strategy.²¹ The 1991 National Drug Control Strategy specifies nine detailed goals and objectives, all with specific target dates for completion or attainment goals to be met. It also identifies frequent or addictive cocaine use as the nation's most serious and difficult short-term challenge.²² The 1992 strategy is similar to past strategies, but includes several new ideas and goals. In President Bush's introduction, he states "We are fighting a two-front war against drugs." The two fronts are identified as "hard-core users" and "first-time, or casual users". These fronts are necessarily separated to help explain the rise in 1991 figures of cocaine users above the age of 35. The new strategy rejects past methods of determining drug policy success and failure, and adopts levels of drug use as the paramount indicator. Finally, new goal interpretations and 10-year goals are presented for conducting and measuring the future drug war.

THE CARTAGENA SUMMIT

With a fresh strategy in hand and encouraging initial reports of reduced drug abuse at home, President Bush met in Cartagena, Colombia in February 1990 with the presidents of the three Andean nations to discuss objectives of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy. The Cartagena Summit, as it was later called, was a bold initiative by President Bush to deal with the rapidly increasing drug problem in the United States. In this meeting, past collapsed

coffee deals were soothed over and U.S. commitment to support local efforts to eliminate the drug cartels was re-established.²³ Significantly, this was the first time the U.S. publicly recognized Andean cocaine production was also a South American economic/agricultural problem and that because of past U.S. trade policies, we shared the responsibility for creating the drug dilemma.

At the Summit, President Bush reiterated previous proposals to provide the three Andean nations with \$2.2 billion dollars in military and economic aid over the next five years. In return, they signed agreements which essentially re-stated their commitment to eliminate coca leaf crops. The Declaration of Cartagena committed Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and the United States to seek a cooperative, comprehensive strategy to attack the production, transport and consumption of illegal drugs; to increase public awareness of the drug problem; and to strengthen international support for efforts aimed at curbing illicit drug traffic.²⁴ The parties also agreed, in general terms, to provide greater trade incentives, to increase efforts limiting the sale of automatic weapons and drug producing chemicals, to extradite major drug traffickers for trial in U.S. courts, to share drug-related forfeiture, and to actively seek alternative crops for the more than one million Andean farm workers employed in coca leaf cultivation and cocaine production.²⁵ Though not discussed, increased U.S. military presence in and off-shore of Colombia indicates more dedication to the monitoring, tracking, and

interdiction efforts by U.S. military and Coast Guard personnel.

While presidential critics pointed out shortcomings in the summit agreement, President Bush quickly followed up with proposed legislation to provide tariff preference for certain Andean imports, thus demonstrating his commitment and U.S. recognition of future Andean domestic and economic problems resulting from any reductions in cocaine production. The new Colombian President, Virgilio Barco Vargas, had already set a hard line for his government to follow in dealing with drug traffickers on 18 August 1989. In his proclamation, he announced an all-out war against drug traffickers, marking the beginning of a domestic struggle which has been both bloody and, in some instances, unpopular.

CARTAGENA REVISITED

An appraisal of important initiatives in the Cartagena agreements reveals significant problems in their actual application. To be sure, Congressional and political interpretations have removed the teeth from some of these initiatives.²⁶

For example, proposed increases in importation of Andean agricultural crops to the U.S. appears logical and reasonable. Such a measure should encourage Latin American farmers to consider growing legal crops as an alternative to the illegal coca plant. However, U.S. lobbyists from the cut-flower, sugar, and citrus growers are gearing up to fight cheap imports, which would drive

down U.S. agricultural prices and threaten many U.S. low-income job markets.

Cooperation in the extradition of major drug traffickers has not succeeded either. In view of recent approval of the death penalty in the U.S. for large drug dealers, Andean countries are unlikely to extradite drug criminals because their governments do not condone the death penalty. In addition, by Colombian Presidential Decree 2047 of 5 September 1990, any Colombian drug trafficker who voluntarily surrenders and pleads guilty to at least one criminal charge will receive a reduced sentence and will not be extradited from Colombia.²⁷

Limiting U.S. sale of automatic weapons, those specifically designed as instruments of terror and mass killing, also seems a reasonable policy. Cartagena Summit agreements included a commitment to contain these firearms. However, resulting U.S. legislation left a large loop hole: while the whole weapon can no longer be imported into the U.S. for later export, any quantity and type of gun part can be imported as long as it is destined for export. This oversight is unacceptable; it defeats the obvious intent of the original measure and smacks of special interest group pressure on legislation.

While not directly affecting coca production in the Andean nations, money laundering and drug exportation in the Caribbean nation of Jamaica has reached significant levels. The Jamaican government is prepared to help U.S. officials fight this problem. Yet when they requested U.S. economic assistance in the form of

modest shoe manufacturing trade agreements in exchange for lost drug money laundering revenue, their request was voted down by the Senate Finance Committee. It could be argued that protecting shoe prices in the U.S. is more important than catching and prosecuting money-laundering criminals in the drug trade.

Even though agreements and dialogue over drug issues with Caribbean and South American countries indicate renewed focus and resolve by heads of state, actual programs lose effectiveness due to political maneuvering and obvious Congressional pandering to special interests. In a further misunderstanding of the problem faced by the Andean countries, Congress has recently discussed a plan to increase the amount of money programmed to alleviate these countries' domestic problems. Our leaders seem to not understand: slow dollar delivery is the immediate problem--one that greater dollar commitment won't fix. Bureaucratic red tape continues to hamper disbursement of funds already apportioned in previous year budgets. Demands to increase appropriations this year to make up for undelivered funds from previous budgets neglect basic principles of money management. In his recent article dealing with U.S. efforts to combat drugs, Craig L. Carlson perhaps summed up these problems best: "The most formidable opponent in the war on drugs is not the drug lord, coca grower, trafficker or user. It is the bureaucratic inertia within our own government".²⁸

Uncorrupted in-country programs must be established and ready to support anti-drug efforts. The small legal economies of the Andean nations cannot tolerate huge infusions of cash, nor can

small, untrained local militia use large quantities of sophisticated military equipment, regardless of the price.

Management of untested, cash-rich cocaine eradication programs and alternative crop programs by untrained personnel in countries where bribery, corruption and money laundering is a way of life seem surely destined for failure. "These countries are economic basket cases" whose economies will collapse under the strain of major changes, commented Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

TURF WARS

Many problems in U.S. drug enforcement organization and coordination at the operational level hamper interdiction efforts while creating internal "turf battles". Since more than 15 federal and hundreds of state and local agencies have become involved in some or all aspects of the drug war, duplication of effort and crossed strategies and plans are commonplace; they are generally counter-productive, and they are inevitably wasteful. A Time article by Charles Lane, et al, points out an open conflict between the Army and DEA agents. "DEA agents openly call American Special Forces troops as arrogant young brats with no understanding of intelligence or law enforcement...the Army sees the DEA as city cops with no real training for jungle operations. Green Berets charge that the DEA raids in Bolivia are too often conducted in daylight and by helicopter, giving the traffickers enough advance

warning to flee".²⁹ This is only one example. Disagreements between the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs, DEA and U.S. Customs, U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Immigration officials and many local, state and federal officials arise almost daily. Our drug strategy in action must confuse and bewilder Latin American officials who are intent on controlling and stopping the drug cartels.

THE SILVER LINING ?

Optimistically, the Cartagena Summit of 1990 promises some success in America's War on Drugs. It rallied public support for drug initiatives, allied the Andean countries and the U.S. into a coalition with unified and stated goals, and provided the basis for more cooperation in major areas of drug reform. According to participants and observers, the summit's emphasis on the equal role the four nations shared in fighting the drug crises was a significant gain.

For the first time in history, the U.S. acknowledged its responsibility to reduce U.S. demand for drugs. Demand reduction programs represent a complex and interwoven approach to the deterrence of drug abuse and drug trafficking. Multi-faceted programs initiated and controlled at every level of government reflect a multiplicity of interests and involvement. These programs are well designed to serve specific needs and are considered vital to drug eradication. However, many experts believe such efforts are hampered by an imbalanced budget that favors supply-side

interdiction programs. Present budgets commit approximately 65 percent to supply side programs, with the remaining 35 percent allocated to demand side programs. This imbalance is necessary under the current program because of the expenses associated with conducting each side of the drug war. The cost of operating ships, aircraft and sophisticated radar systems in the interdiction of drugs quickly exceed costs for programs and education. Dr. Murray E. Jarvick, a professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the UCLA School of Medicine, believes the equation should be reversed, or at least changed to be closer to 50-50. In Science, he states "Highly publicized seizures of successively larger quantities of illegal drugs indicate both the immediate success and the long-term failure of interdiction. The prevalence of drug abuse shows that the current approach of drug control, with its interdiction of supply and little focus on causes of demand, is clearly inadequate".³⁰ But many Congressmen and DEA officials believe the money dispersion percentages are not the real issue; instead, they argue that the amount for both sides should be substantially increased. Further, they fear failure in prosecuting the War on Drugs should additional money not be forthcoming.³¹

Proposed assistance to Andean countries through foreign debt relief and reduced U.S. coffee tariffs are likely to give Andean nations at least a second footing in scrimmages with domestic economic problems. President Bush summed up the significance of the Cartagena Summit Meeting by announcing the establishment of "the first anti-drug cartel".

Our formal National Drug Strategy promises resolution of drug problems at home. It also provides anti-drug assistance programs for the Andean nations and others to demonstrate firm U.S. commitment and resolve. The U.S. has implemented a two-pronged attack aimed at drug supply and drug demand. At home, stepped up drug enforcement, more closely guarded borders, stiffer sentences including the death penalty for major drug dealers, new courts with more judges and attorneys, more and larger jails, educational and anti-drug mass-media advertisements and active, full time drug rehabilitation centers will contribute to reduce drug abuse in the United States.

INTERNATIONAL COCAINE MARKETS

The demand for drugs is increasingly a worldwide problem. The international illegal drug trade has rapidly grown in both complexity and magnitude.³² It may be that overseas demand is partly responsible for the decrease in drug availability in the United States.

In February 1990, at the encouragement of Colombian President Barco, the United Nations convened a Special Session to discuss ways to reduce both the supply of and the demand for illicit drugs. The leaders agreed that the U.N. must "protect mankind from the scourge of drug abuse".³³

Despite recognition and dedicated pledges by world leaders to combat drugs on an international scale, increasingly larger

quantities of cocaine are being smuggled into Europe and Japan, where markets generate higher prices for drugs and higher profits for dealers and traffickers. France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain have all experienced recent major increases in cocaine importation. Distribution points in Europe include The Netherlands and even the then-communist controlled and now defunct Soviet Union. INTERPOL reports link Colombian drug cartels with Italian organized crime groups including the Calabresians, Camorra, Cosa Nostra, and Mafia. Indeed, Italian sources report the Mafia has forced Colombians into a business relationship which includes the Mafia in profit sharing while providing Colombians with an already established crime network to assist in distribution and control of cocaine and drug money.³⁴ Cocaine seizures in the United Kingdom during the first six months of 1990 increased 100 percent, to 5 metric tons.³⁵

In the Far East, Japan struggles to combat a newly-focused Cali Cartel that is efficiently establishing a Japanese cocaine supply network.³⁶ The Japanese economic prosperity has been targeted by Colombian drug lords as a likely cocaine market. The Japanese have an available disposable income; they support a large working class; and there exists a trend among Japanese youth to emulate Western styles, especially in leisure and entertainment.

Cocaine is becoming popular in Japan. Two cocaine seizures in February and May of 1990 rank as the first and second largest cocaine seizures in Japan. In 1986, a kilogram of cocaine sold for \$160,000 to \$180,000. Similar quantities today sell for \$50,000 to

\$60,000, a clear indication of increasing supplies and improved supply networks.³⁷ Additionally, several DEA sources refer to a possible trafficking network which imports Colombian cocaine into Japan for eventual delivery to America. But it's a two-way street: in most instances, cocaine seized by Japanese authorities for domestic consumption has been imported from the United States.

Since the United Nations Special Session on Narcotics in 1990, many countries have requested direct American DEA assistance. DEA foreign embassy offices are now open and operating in over 50 countries, where they provide intelligence and source information to host country drug officials.

ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our present strategy supports a war of containment; it does not plan for elimination of drugs. Our National Drug Control Strategy must be re-written to reflect the likelihood of a two or three generation commitment to control drug abuse. Similarly, a more realistic definition of "winning" as a simple but sustained yearly reduction in U.S. drug abuse would improve goal identification while providing easily measured indicators of effectiveness. As in the Vietnam war, officials now report elaborate and detailed successes in the War on Drugs; but at the user and trafficker levels, life with drugs goes on. Our present policies are only lengthening the struggle. We are now witnessing a rapid expansion in international cocaine trafficking--our

strategy must be written to effectively deal with this expanding problem. It appears U.S. efforts have come too late with too little; they are responding to cartel actions rather than taking the initiative in smuggling actions, crop eradication and precursor control.

In the past, if one source of drugs was controlled or stopped, another quickly filled the void. If growing, manufacturing and trafficking of cocaine is somehow controlled, another drug will take its place. These situations are real; many experts believe the semi-successful control of U.S. marijuana markets in the 1980's accelerated the switch to cocaine. If this is true, then it is a relatively minor inductive leap to realize that our present anti-drug funding priorities are inappropriate. Education and rehabilitation are far more important than eradication or interdiction efforts. Our record of training and equipping host country drug eradication teams does not support continued infusion of grossly large amounts of money into these activities. Too often it directly or indirectly supports insurgency groups or drug cartels. The successes of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru provides a good example where an errant drug strategy has improved the lot of subversive elements. U.S.-provided military equipment and trained operators, delivered to fight the drug war, eventually end up working for the largest employer around--the Luminoso groups, who are getting rich earning drug protection money while they organize to disrupt local economies and overthrow legal governments. Our method of arming and training the Peruvian military and then

sending them on successful anti-drug campaigns, such as Operation Condor in 1985 and 1986, back-fired because it drove the repressed and sometimes brutalized Peruvian campesinos to form linkages with insurgents including the Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian urban guerrilla group, and the Sendero Luminoso.³⁸

U.S. military involved in anti-drug programs outside U.S. borders should be withdrawn. These personnel would be more effective if reassigned to border and port areas or to covert/passive border interdiction identification sites to counter drug smuggling and trafficking. Counter-narcotics activities within Latin American countries by our military alienate the local populace and give America a reputation for contributing to the misery of that nation's poor. Eradication of drug crops that represent a farmer's livelihood causes hardship and disenchantment for people not responsible for drug trafficking. We can better organize and promote anti-drug efforts without placing our troops into the growing and trafficking countries. Objectives, missions and goals can be task organized. For example, assignment of cargo inspection in U.S. ports of debarkation could be assigned to the Coast Guard, the Navy, or U.S. Customs, as desired. Elimination of joint responsibility and/or assignment would de-conflict in-house fighting over techniques, plans and methods of operation, while improving efficiency and affordability. Military involvement must remain within the confines of Posse Comitatus. In a supportive role, the military's efforts at interdiction on our borders and ports of entry can be better directed and task-oriented; a

comprehensive, expanded and dedicated interdiction effort will make the price of any imported drug sky-rocket, likely rendering them too expensive for most drug users.

The United States must develop and finance plans for each Andean country that favors drug crop elimination. By making U.S. support programs dependent on local success of drug control efforts, similar to some legislation already in effect, local police forces are encouraged to solve their own domestic drug problems. Leaders of these countries know what must be done, and they understand their problems better than most outsiders. Arguments that a reduction of direct U.S. intervention will translate to local government in-action fail to consider an important point: drug dealers/growers/ traffickers generally do not want to govern the country. Government collapse brought about as a result of omnipotent druglords and drug-related corruption is counter-productive to the drug business. A collapsed or puppet government that supports illegal drug manufacture and export will quickly lose vital world support and legitimacy; these countries cannot operate independently; they must have outside economic support, investment and development. A totalitarian government would seek to eliminate the drug trade. Further, lower standards of living brought on by a collapse of utilities and other infrastructure are not an attractive alternative to rich drug lords who have invested heavily in local real estate and legal businesses.

Though hampered by political differences and self-serving interpretations by the U.S. Congress, the Cartagena agreements together with U.S. domestic drug programs and stepped-up, aggressive interdiction efforts have provided a recent setback to the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Some experts cite these successes as reasons why overseas drug markets may be more appealing to drug traffickers. But these short-term successes replicate past victories; they are only minor setbacks to drug traffickers geared up for a protracted and long-term "war".

Related efforts at the United Nations by Secretary of State Baker and other diplomats can help disrupt international trafficking while making the drug business more difficult and less profitable. Ratification of the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances along with worldwide cooperation in areas of anti-drug warfare will only hamper, not stop, drug operations. The world must offer a shrinking marketplace for tough, smart, inventive, well-financed and aggressive drug cartels.

CONCLUSION

Can we break the Andean cocaine link? Yes, but only if we are willing to change goals and strategies, and recommit ourselves to a long struggle where other nations must lead their own charge against drug cartels. Do the United States, Colombia, and all nations have the resolve, discipline and fortitude to stick to our

present drug strategy which has become expensive and mired in bureaucratic waste and inefficiency? This is debatable, but with unwavering and dedicated national and world leaders who are committed to a planned, better defined drug strategy enjoying proper Congressional and public support, control and reduction of illicit drugs is possible.

We must re-define victory as a substantial decrease in the availability of illicit drugs, with a corresponding decrease in threat to U.S. and international security. The 1992 U.S. Drug Strategy comes closer to fulfilling this need, but still lacks specifics. Hopefully, these specifics may be developed in department or agency strategies. The United States now commits vast resources, including many dollars, to achieve that goal. America's anti-drug campaign cost over \$10.5 billion dollars in 1991; in 1992 it will exceed \$11 billion dollars.³⁹

Our strategy is mired in organizational bureaucracy where responsibilities and hence goals are overlapping and confusing. The lead agency in drug investigation is the DEA. When asked what would become of the DEA and its \$855 million dollar budget if the U.S. were somehow to "win" the War on Drugs, interviewed DEA agents and officials were perplexed; they have not considered an end to this conflict.⁴⁰ It appears America is immersed in another un-defined war--one where no winnable goals have been defined, perhaps one where goals cannot even be calculated.

In 1984, President Reagan declared America would be drug-free by the end of the 20th century. In 1989, then-Drug Policy Director

William Bennett stated the War on Drugs would be a 20 to 30 year process. Have even our highest leaders failed to recognize or understand the complexity of the War on Drugs? How can strategists plan the attack when the goals remain so elusive? In fairness, U.S. drug strategy is not written for a "war" in the literal sense of the word. Attempts to deal with drug concepts and strategies have become a game of semantics; we have become mired in struggles with definitions for "war", "victory", and "win". Even though some arguments support a military "low intensity conflict" (LIC) engagement, present Administration and congressional policies appear to be strongly supported and unlikely to change soon. They do not support expanded roles for the military that would be required to conduct a LIC engagement.

The War on Drugs is exceptionally complex and diverse; its many fronts often dissolve and reappear elsewhere. Drug use and drug trafficking defy easy or quick solutions. Smuggling operations that are ingenious and easily modified, sophisticated drug distribution techniques, swamped U.S. rehabilitation programs and a flagging judicial process and jail system all provide anti-drug leaders with frustrating, complex and elusive targets.

Illegal drugs are democracy's mortal enemy. They transcend every border and boundary we know, corrupting otherwise ethical people and even entire governments. Drug traffickers' ties to Mafia and other organized criminal groups are well documented. Subversive operations--including terrorism, blackmail, extortion, kidnapping and even murder of elected and judicial officials--are an outrage

to world order and discipline. Our National Drug Strategy, in concert with the Cartagena initiatives and newly developing worldwide support, are the most dramatic efforts ever dedicated to combat drug production. But they are not enough. While the world celebrates a new and unexpected spirit of democracy and international good-will, cocaine continues to expand; it will enslave the world's poor if not controlled. Free societies cannot exist until the flow of illicit drugs are stopped.

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