LIGHT CAVALRY: STRATEGIC FORCE FOR THE FUTURE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CRAIG B. WHELDEN
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
On August 8, 1990, the first troops from the 82d Airborne Division arrived in Saudi Arabia. It was several weeks later before the first tanks arrived from the 24th Infantry Division. This "window of vulnerability" was a result of a strategic deployment shortfall: the only Army forces which can be deployed on short notice are from the light divisions. With the end of the Cold War and reductions of forces overseas, the evolving military strategy will depend more and more on power projection from the continental United States. Given the uncertainties in the world today and the proliferation of both conventional and unconventional arms, the United States must be capable of quickly deploying by air, military forces which have mobility, firepower, and are self-sustaining. What is needed is a "medium force package," as suggested by General Meyer in 1980. It would consist of a regimental-sized cavalry force fielded with the Armored Gun System (AGS), the Future Scout Vehicle (FSV), the M198 Howitzer, and the Light Helicopter (Comanche). Such a force could be deployed in fewer sorties than a light division, but with a much greater capability.

On August 8, 1990, the first troops from the 82d Airborne Division arrived in Saudi Arabia. It was several weeks later before the first tanks arrived from the 24th Infantry Division. This "window of vulnerability" was a result of a strategic deployment shortfall: the only Army forces which can be deployed on short notice are from the light divisions. With the end of the Cold War and reductions of forces overseas, the evolving military strategy will depend more and more on power projection from the continental United States. Given the uncertainties in the world today and the proliferation of both conventional and unconventional arms, the United States must be capable of quickly deploying by air, military forces which have mobility, firepower, and are self-sustaining. What is needed is a "medium force package," as suggested by General Meyer in 1980. It would consist of a regimental-sized cavalry force fielded with the Armored Gun System (AGS), the Future Scout Vehicle (FSV), the M198 Howitzer, and the Light Helicopter (Comanche). Such a force could be deployed in fewer sorties than a light division, but with a much greater capability.
LIGHT CAVALRY: STRATEGIC FORCE FOR THE FUTURE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Craig B. Whelden
United States Army

Colonel Charles S. Rousek
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
On August 8, 1990, the first troops from the 82d Airborne Division arrived in Saudi Arabia. It was several weeks later before the first tanks arrived from the 24th Infantry Division. This "window of vulnerability" was a result of a strategic deployment shortfall: the only Army forces which can be deployed on short notice are from the light divisions. With the end of the Cold War and reductions of forces overseas, the evolving military strategy will depend more and more on power projection from the continental United States. Given the uncertainties in the world today and the proliferation of both conventional and unconventional arms, the United States must be capable of quickly deploying by air, military forces which have mobility, firepower, and are self-sustaining. What is needed is a "medium force package", as suggested by General Meyer in 1980. It would consist of a regimental-sized cavalry force fielded with the Armored Gun System (AGS), the Future Scout Vehicle (FSV), the M198 howitzer, and the Light Helicopter (Comanche). Such a force could be deployed in fewer sorties than a light division, but with a much greater capability.
INTRODUCTION

On August 2, 1990 the Iraqi army poured into Kuwait and captured the attention of the world. In the next few days, American forces were alerted; and by 8 August, soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division were on the ground in Saudi Arabia. President Bush drew "a line in the sand", and the world held its breath as forces were deployed over the next six months. During the first few weeks after the invasion, the only American troops on the ground were the brave, but lightly armed soldiers from the 82d Airborne. Without heavy armor, these paratroopers would have stood little chance against Saadam's tanks, had he rolled south.

A cover story of Army Times, in its review of the division's role in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, read "Speed Bumps: 82d Airborne's Shaky Line in the Sand". Many tenuous weeks passed before heavy forces from the 241D closed into theater. Airborne soldiers were elated to finally see the arrival of M1 tanks, Bradleys, and howitzers. LTC John Schmader, commander of 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry Regiment said it well:

"We watched with anticipation the landing of the 241D. We actually kept track of how many tanks came on a daily basis. You'd see the guys out there clapping because the tanks were coming!"

The Gulf War has been a laboratory of lessons learned for the Army. One lesson that was clear, even before the war, was the wide variance in capabilities between light and heavy forces --- in
deployability, mobility, firepower, and sustainability. Prior to Desert Storm there had been numerous ideas and concepts, but little movement towards closing the gap between these uniquely qualified types of units. With unprecedented changes in the world and an emerging new role for the United States, the national military strategy will require changes in the shape of our force structure -- across all services.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and shortcomings of our Army's force structure, and to support the development of a quick-reaction, air deployable, light armored force that can fill the capabilities gap which currently exists between light and heavy forces. Because the employment of such a force would normally evolve from the President's national military strategy, it is necessary to review some of the recent and dramatic changes in world events.....and how they are affecting the development of this strategy.

A NEW WORLD ORDER?

On April 13, 1991, a few short weeks after the defeat of Iraq, President Bush delivered a speech to the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. Here, he outlined his vision of "The New World Order" as one based on four shared principles:

"It [the new world order] springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations. Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples."
Time will tell whether or not the President's vision is prophetic. Events over the past several months have shown that achieving these ends will not be easy. President Bush clearly understood this, as evidenced by his qualification in the same address:

"We also recognized that the Cold War's end didn't deliver us into an era of perpetual peace. As old threats recede, new threats emerge. The quest for the new world order is, in part, a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay."

There is no doubt the "rules" governing international order are being rewritten. The preparation for and conduct of the Gulf War is evidence that we have clearly broken away from the Cold War paradigm. We have evolved from a bipolar world, dominated by the United States and the former Soviet Union, to a multipolar world with a growing number of major player states.

How then, has power brokering changed in the world's political arena? During the Cold War, battle lines were largely drawn between East and West. Most military, political, and economic issues were addressed in this context. It was a classic face off between the United States and its allies against the Soviets and their satellites.

The dissolution of the Soviet empire has left our nation's leadership with some major challenges: How do we define our future relationship with Eastern and Western Europe, and the new "Commonwealth" of former Soviet republics? What authority will this
new Commonwealth exercise? How will our previously negotiated treaties and agreements be recognized? Who will maintain control of the vast and now dispersed nuclear arsenals? To whom will the former Soviet armed forces show its allegiance; a central government or individual republics? What will be the long term effects of nationalistic, cultural, and ethnic epidemics sweeping across Eurasia?

These, and other questions, are difficult to answer, since the only "constant" seems to be change itself. Every day brings a new chapter in the quest for national and ethnic identity. Even as freedom seeking republics of the former USSR struggle for their own independence and recognition, nationalistic factions threaten to break brittle coalitions within the republics.

A number of world leaders have expressed concern about the uncertainty and instability in the region. In a speech to the United Nations on 28 September, 1991, President Bush spoke of how "suspended hatreds have sprung to life" from the ashes of communism.4 As early as December, 1990, the ever-prophetic, on-again-off-again Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze said:

"It's impossible to preserve the Soviet Union peacefully at the moment. I'm afraid of violence if power should be applied in this respect. Our country just cannot collapse peacefully and disintegrate peacefully. This will be connected with a civil war and application of nuclear weapons. And God only knows where these missiles fly--to Kiev, Riga, or Washington D.C."


The breakup of the Soviet Union has had a disquieting effect on much of the rest of the world as well. Without superpower competition, nations and nationalistic groups are "testing freedom's waters"...some violently. Third World countries, no longer in the Soviet or U.S. sphere, are reaching out for their own identity.

The world is changing in many ways, and the seeds of future conflict are now taking root. Proliferation of both conventional and unconventional arms is on the rise. Natural resources such as oil, industry-critical minerals, and even fresh water are becoming increasingly scarce. The environment is endangered by human growth and greed. The global communications explosion, especially in the Third World, has brought a greater awareness to what the "Have Nots" do not have!

These and other factors all influence the shaping of United States foreign policy. The world is becoming more inter-dependent, and we will likely find that national security interests may be more and more at risk. The recent Gulf War is a classic example. When this type of crisis occurs, the President has a number of flexible deterrent options from which to choose: diplomatic, political, economic, and military. Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved to be an excellent case study of the balanced use of all four of these elements of power.
The Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire have had a profound impact on our evolving national military strategy. The end of the Cold War reduced the need for a large U.S. presence in central Europe. The sudden onset of Desert Shield made clear our shortcomings in strategic lift. At the same time, a growing deficit, domestic concerns, and election year politics are having a significant impact on future defense resourcing. All these factors weigh-in when policy-makers and military leaders are developing the national military strategy.

The Army's Role in Our National Military Strategy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, has established the foundations for our evolving national defense policy. This policy rests on four pillars: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution.

With these principles in mind, General Powell created the "Chairman's Base Force" from the Congressionally-mandated personnel ceilings established for 1995 and beyond. The "Base Force" incorporates all services and is, for the most part, geographically focussed. It includes the Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces. The Army has a responsibility in all four, but is primarily involved in Pacific, Atlantic, and Contingency requirements. Because contingency forces are the first to respond in a out-of-theater crisis, they have been the subject of ongoing debates across the services and in Congress. Central to this
discussion is their deployability. This issue involves all three services and can be very controversial. The bottom line however is that the Army cannot project power without the Air Force or Navy.

Although Desert Shield made this point painfully clear, it was not a new lesson. We have known it for years. In his 1980 White Paper, General Edward C. Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the Army, called for "lighter forces to meet the most demanding challenge confronting the U.S. military in the decade of the eighties". He went on to advocate a more flexible "spectrum of force" including "medium force packages for rapid deployment missions".

In response, the 9th ID was structured as a "motorized" division and, over the next few years, took on the appearance of a military chameleon. It was given license to experiment with everything from doctrine to equipment and had the unique authority to short-circuit Army procedures by buying "off the shelf". It was the only unit in the force structure that resembled General Meyer's "medium force" to support rapid deployment contingencies.

However, as it was never able to settle on a force structure long enough to be doctrinally validated, and the concept was contrary to established/fixed mindsets of a number of senior and strategic leaders, the 9th ID was an early candidate for elimination when the Army began to "build down" the force. Its "experimental" nature made it an easy target.
In addition, in the early eighties the light infantry divisions (LIDs) came into being primarily because of the support of General Meyer's successor, General John Wickam. They were cheap, easily resourced, and could be strategically lifted anywhere in the world on short notice. These attributes kept them in the force structure throughout the eighties. However, they have significant limitations. Their very "lightness" makes them extremely vulnerable to an armored threat. The LIDs also lack mobility once in theater and are difficult to sustain. Cynics contend that instead of tailoring our forces to potential contingencies, we created a force which could only meet our existing strategic lift capabilities.

The Army of the early eighties could not predict the magnitude of change in the world for the coming decade. The "enemy" was viewed through a two-dimensional prism: the Soviet Union and Korea. Pre-positioned forces were in both theaters and were supported by substantial reinforcement plans. Southwest Asia contingencies were embryonic at best. LIDs were optimistically viewed as a multi-capable force, but were "ideally" suited only for quick-LIC scenarios such as Grenada and Panama.

The past few years have proven the absolute need for rapidly deployable forces. However, the proliferation of arms in Southwest Asia, and in the Third World, requires a much greater combat capability than is offered by light infantry divisions. Prior to his retirement, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, reaffirmed a commitment to a rapidly deployable contingency corps, but made clear
the need for forces with a full range of capabilities:

"In enhancing deployability, the objective should be to have the capacity to project the major elements of a multidivision corps, with the capability for forcible entry, substantial armored forces and sufficient sustainment, anywhere in the world in one month."11

General Gordon Sullivan, our current Chief of Staff, has recently repeated the call for a truly strategic Army:

"My vision of the Army is a strategic force trained and ready to fight and achieve decisive victory wherever and whenever America calls......The United States has worldwide interests, so the Army must be ready to fight anywhere. As a strategic force, the Army must have global reach."12

It is clear that we must carefully examine our role in the emerging national military strategy and be prepared to make necessary doctrinal, equipment, and organizational changes to meet the challenges of the nineties and beyond. General Sullivan went on to say:

"The design of our units too, will flow from the requirements of the new doctrine. I expect the doctrine development process to be an informed debate over the next year that will yield recommendations on the size and composition of our formations from company to corps."13

We must break the mold of the eighties, even with growing fiscal minefields facing us, and recognize the need to vigorously argue for proper forces. The Army must be capable of projecting overwhelming combat power, over a short period of time, in order to defeat potential threats across the spectrum of conflict.
So, What is the Future Threat?

The Soviet military machine, as we knew it, has disappeared. Isolationists, optimists, and pork-barrel politicians would have the American public believe that there is no longer a threat. Nothing could be further from the truth. The spread of nuclear weapons technology, arms proliferation, Third World unrest, emerging nationalism, ethnic and cultural rivalries, and terrorism all are potential threats to U.S. national interests.

On one hand, the Cold War was precisely the reason the world avoided global war. On the other hand, over 1,000 low intensity conflicts have occurred around the world since the end of World War II. Many of these conflicts might have grown substantially, were it not for the restraining efforts of the two competing superpowers. Skeptics might say the absence of superpower competition has unlocked Pandora's Box. They may be right.

The world is potentially more dangerous now than at any time since World War II. Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil are all on the verge of joining the "nuclear club", or have already become members. Israel is believed to have more than 300 nuclear weapons, and recent publications assert they have put their nuclear forces on alert three times; most recently as a result of Scud attacks during Desert Storm. Iraq was much closer to building a nuclear bomb than thought before the war, and recent reports are that China has been exporting nuclear weapon technology to Iran. North
Korea, itself a major arms exporter, is on the verge of developing a nuclear bomb and could be a major threat to the fastest developing region of the world, the Pacific Rim.17

Arms control efforts so far have been minimal. Ironically, seventy-five percent of the weapons sold in the international arms market in recent years have been provided by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.18 Czechoslovakia, one of the "emerging democratic states" in Eastern Europe, is keeping its T72 tank plant open, exclusively for export, because of hard currency needs.19 China is selling billions of dollars in arms to anyone who will buy.20 Brazil, Israel, South Korea, and India are all arms exporters, and could sustain the supply of protracted regional conflicts.21

Civil War has raged in Yugoslavia, and both NATO and the European Council (EC) were unable to influence the outcome in any discernible way. U.N. efforts are also failing. Civil unrest and ethnic strife is rampant in most of the emerging republics of the former Soviet Union. Nationalistic fervor is fed by the new governments' inability to provide even the most basic of needs.

In a July, 1991 interview with World Monitor, Soviet Army Colonel Viktor Aleksnis spoke of the imminence of civil war, and warned that such an outbreak could suck the U.S., Europe, and Japan into World War III. Known as the "Dark Colonel", Aleksnis headed a group called Soyuz, a powerful and influential faction in the now
Thus, peaceful coexistence in a "New World Order" as envisioned by President Bush will, no doubt, be more difficult to attain than at first thought. Even for those who are still not convinced that the world is more dangerous, there are a number of issues to address: How do we anticipate threats to our national security interests? How much should we shift the emphasis from a strategy of forward presence to one of power projection? If we continue in this direction, what types of forces are needed?

The answers are not easy. The U.S. must look at the world in a much different way. Rather than focus exclusively on a particular adversary, we must closely monitor and control the proliferation of weapons throughout the world, evaluate regional issues that affect our strategic interests, and balance the two with planning scenarios that are plausible.

In developing these scenarios, we must remember the suddenness of change in recent world history: the fall of the Shah of Iran; the decade-long support and subsequent arrest of the Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega; the democratization movement in China and the massacre in Tianamen Square; the fall of the Berlin wall and
reunification of the two Germanys; the collapse of the rest of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union; civil war in Yugoslavia; the elimination of basing rights in the Philippines; and of course, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

We must also not forget that two world wars in this century began with violent expressions of national and ethnic sovereignty.

In view of the tremendous turmoil since the end of World War II, and the incredible changes in the world in the past few years, General Powell recently remarked that the rush to demobilize the armed forces reminded him of a Clausewitzian caution: "Beware the vividness of transient events". Our nation would be wise to follow the advice in this simple but profound and powerful statement.

The Structure of the Army Contingency Corps

Currently, the Chairman's Base Force allocates five Army divisions to the Contingency Corps: one airborne, one air assault, one light, and two heavy. All but the heavy divisions are air deployable. The heavy divisions must be moved by sea but, as we found during Desert Shield, this is easier said than done. Both shipping and air transport assets are woefully short. During the buildup for the Gulf War, we were even using Soviet ships to move our equipment to the Persian Gulf. Because of these types of deployment challenges, few will dispute that funding for the C-17 and the Navy's Strategic Sealift Ship (SSS) is a critical strategic need.
Other factors influencing how military power should be used in contingencies will depend on other variables: What is the threat? Is the theater accessible by sea? If so, are the ports sufficient? Is prepositioned equipment available? Does the region's infrastructure support the use of heavy forces? Does the crisis allow sufficient time for a military buildup? Must forced entry be used?

Clearly, different scenarios will have different requirements. If the crisis area is inaccessible by sea (which is the case with more than 35 countries around the world), airlift may be the only force projection option. And, if the enemy is largely mechanized (which most of the larger armies are), the exclusive use of airborne or light infantry would be inexcusable.

An example of this type of contingency would be the assistance given to Chad by the French in recent years to help defend against invasion by Libya. Clearly, the exclusive use of light infantry would have been inappropriate and because forces could not be introduced into theater by sea, light armor was airlifted.

Another example is a region that is accessible by sea, and may have the port facilities for offloading heavy forces, but the host country's infrastructure (roads, bridges) is incapable of supporting the use of tanks and other heavy tracked vehicles. Honduras is such a place. With only one major paved road in the country (Pan American Highway), and none of its bridges with a weight classification of 26
over 30-35 tons, Honduras would not be conducive to the use of our current heavy armored formations. The situation is further compounded during the rainy season. Numerous countries in the world fit this scenario.

Finally, a contingency might have excellent port facilities and a region that is conducive to the use of heavy forces, like Saudi Arabia. The problem we could confront in this scenario might be how quickly these forces can be introduced into theater. As we saw during Desert Shield, there was a period in August and September when the soldiers from the 82d would have been considered "speed bumps" had Sadaam Hussein decided to push south to the port of Dhahran. His hesitation gave the U.S. and its coalition partners time to build up a sufficiently capable defensive force. Other potential adversaries no doubt learned from Sadaam's mistakes, and next time we may not have six months to build up forces in theater.

In all three of these examples, the solution to fill the capabilities void would be light armored forces which can be rapidly deployed by air. A number of countries in the world have such forces. The United States is not one of them.

The Light Cavalry Regiment

As we saw with Desert Shield, there is a capabilities gap in our ability to project forces. Paratroopers from the 82d Airborne can deploy anywhere in the world in a matter of days, but once on the
ground, they lack mobility, firepower, and sustainability. Armored forces must be moved by sea, but with only a heavy division's worth of Fast Sealift Ships, this process can take many weeks; provided the theater is even accessible by sea, and the infrastructure will support heavy tracked vehicles. A light armored force, which is air transportable, is a highly practical and flexible solution providing a more lethal balance and mix.

Such a force should be organized as a light cavalry regiment. Cavalry organizations have a historically proven record of offering the greatest mix of the combined arms team. As outlined in FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, the Army's keystone doctrinal manual, cavalry is ideally suited for the widest variety of missions: offense, defense, security, and reconnaissance. Desert Storm validated the tremendous utility and flexibility of cavalry organizations.

As the commander's "eyes and ears", cavalry is normally structured at both division and corps level. The heavy corps have doctrinally and traditionally had their own regiment of cavalry. Extremely robust and combat capable, these regiments have always had a tremendous reputation and few could argue for changing the current structure. In fact, in 1988 the French liaison officer to the Armor Center at Ft. Knox said: "I'm quite ready to ask for U.S. citizenship if I can keep my rank, and if you give me command of an armored cavalry regiment."
As the Army downsizes over the next few years, one of the more commonly known options has been to retain only two regiments in the active force: the 11th Armored Cavalry in Germany, and the 3d Armored Cavalry at Ft. Bliss. The 18th Airborne Corps, as the Army's primary contingency force is without an assigned regiment, and is a logical candidate for light cavalry. Rather than deactivate, a reorganized 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment could fill this critical void.

For years, the Armor Center has been a leading proponent of organizing and fielding light cavalry forces. In 1983, it proposed a light armor regiment as an armor "plug" for the light infantry divisions. This concept evolved into a light cavalry regiment. In 1985, the Army's Chief of Staff disapproved the concept, but approved two light armor battalions for LID support. These battalions were to be fielded with the Armored Gun System (AGS), a 20 ton light "tank" specifically designed for strategic air deployment. However, in 1987, funding for the AGS was terminated. This essentially killed any plans for an air deployable armor force, since the AGS was the centerpiece of such a force.30

In 1989, the Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps reiterated the urgent need for a replacement for the M-551 Sheridan. This rekindled interest in the AGS, and plans were taken off the shelf. Currently, Congress has funded the purchase of 300 vehicles, and in April, 1992, the Army will select bids from a field of 12 competing defense companies from around the world.31
TRADOC is considering a number of force structure options. The regimental-sized option (Figure 1) designed by the Armor School at Ft. Knox, is a powerful and versatile organization. It consists of 82 Armored Gun Systems, 106 Future Scout Vehicles (CBT), 80 Future Scout Vehicles (Stealth), 53 Light Helicopters (Comanche), 15 UH-60 helicopters (Blackhawk), 3 EH-60 helicopters, 16 M198 howitzers, and 18 4.2 inch, HMMWV-mounted mortars.

The regiment would consist of two cavalry squadrons (Fig 2), a reconnaissance squadron, an aviation squadron, and a support squadron. Combat support assets would include a light engineer company and a military intelligence company that is capable of gathering both tactical and strategic information and intelligence. The support squadron would be sufficiently robust to allow the regiment to deploy separately, and would be able to sustain itself until augmenting corps CSS assets could arrive in theater.

Wargaming conducted by the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) at Ft. Leavenworth indicates the entire regiment could be deployed with approximately 400 C5 or C17 sorties. (The C-17 is especially important because of its ability to use over 6,000 runways around the world not accessible by the C5). By contrast, using a combination of C5 and C141 aircraft, the 82d Airborne used about 650 sorties in its deployment to Desert Shield. In addition to this large number of sorties, the division used portions of about 28 ships to position itself in the Gulf.
The bottom line is that the regiment could deploy by air just as quickly, and with fewer sorties than a light division, while providing the theater CINC a much greater capability in firepower, mobility, and sustainability. The range of options for employment of a light cavalry regiment is greater than perhaps any organization in the force structure. Along with the 82d Airborne Division, such a force should be at the top of every contingency planner's Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL).

With most of the new combat systems (AGS, FSV, LH) still in the development stage, fielding such a force is a few years off. In the interim, the regiment should begin forming with systems that are air deployable and currently available. These might include variants of the M113, the Marine Corps' LAV, the HMMWV, and the OH-58 helicopter. In addition, there are a number of high quality, light combat vehicles around the world, which should be considered for the regiment. The lessons of Desert Shield make clear the requirement for such a force is not for some time in the future, but is now.

CONCLUSION

The Organizational and Operational Plan (now referred to as an Operational Requirement Document) developed by the Armor Center for the regiment outlines the tremendous versatility and capability heretofore not available to the contingency corps commander:

The light cavalry regiment will provide the contingency corps commander the capability to effectively see the battlefield and direct combat power decisively at the
right place and time. The regiment will provide a rapidly deployable, lethal, and survivable mobile combined arms force capable of conducting its missions throughout the depth of the battlefield.36

Organizing and fielding a light cavalry regiment for the contingency corps should be a very high priority. Simply having the capability to project such a force adds significantly to deterrence. The presence of light cavalry on the future battlefield will greatly reduce the risk to earlier-deployed (light infantry) forces, and provides a compounding effect on the options available to the corps commander.

Light cavalry is not just another combat arms organization. As a strategic asset, it offers more flexibility and capability than any other land force organization currently available to the national command authority. Given its deterrent value, force projection capability, combat power, and mission profile, it provides more combat potential than an entire light infantry division, both strategically and operationally.

The Army must not retreat from the development and fielding of the light cavalry regiment. Its importance to our national military strategy has been acknowledged since the early eighties, but never before has the need been so great. The strategic value of light cavalry mandates that it be included in the Army's force structure. If resourcing is an issue, then the debate should not center on whether or not to field such a force, but rather what must be given up to make room for it. It is that important.
LIGHT CAVALRY SQUADRON

HHT
2 FSV (C)
10 FSV (S)

LT CAVALRY TROOP
9 AGS
17 FSV (C)
3 MORTAR

ARTY BATTERY
8 M198

AGS COMPANY
14 AGS

RECAP
41 AGS
53 FSV (C)
10 FSV (S)
8 M198
9 MORTAR

(Fig 2)
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


17. Clarke, p. 38


24. Ibid. p. 42.


36. Light Cavalry Regiment Organizational and Operational Plan, Directorate of Combat Developments, United States Army Armor Center, Ft. Knox, Kentucky.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Clarke, Phillip C., "Unilateral Disarmament Could Pose an Invitation to Tomorrow's Terrorists", The Officer, November, 1991.


Grenadier (COL), Interview with the French liaison to the U.S. Army Armor School during the Light Cavalry Symposium, March, 1988.


Shaver, David E., "Justifying the Army", Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 25 September 1990


25


