SSI Special Report

Nato Documents Pertaining to European Security 1991

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NATO DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
1991

Introduction


Chapter 3  Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Rome Summit, 8 Nov 1991.


Chapter 5  Military Committee Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. Approved by the DPC, Brussels, 13 Dec 91


Glossary
INTRODUCTION

The dramatic events of 1989 commencing with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November and the continued process of rapid democratization throughout Eastern Europe in 1990, caused the NATO allies to seek a fundamental transformation of the Alliance to meet the new realities of the post Cold War environment. It was feared that if NATO was unable to adapt to the emerging realities it would become irrelevant.

The process of transformation began in earnest with the July 1990 London Declaration where the NATO Heads of State and Government set a new course for the Alliance. This Declaration placed the Alliance on a course to adapt rapidly to the changing security environment in Europe and encourage the positive developments underway in the Central and Eastern European countries.

Within NATO, a decision was taken to transform the Alliance from an organization which was primarily military oriented to one more focused on the political dimension of defense and security. The Allies have been determined to give NATO a new face and demonstrate its continued relevancy in what has become a threat barren/ambiguous environment. Indeed, since 1985, the legislative bodies of most Allied governments have been reducing their respective defense budgets, and hence their defense structures. It was necessary, therefore, to reexamine the raison d'être of the Alliance, provide new political guidance for the development of a new military strategy, and then develop a force structure which was capable of preserving and protecting the hard won peace.

A Strategy Review Group (SRG) chaired by the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Plans and Policy (ASG-DPP) with representatives from the National Delegations, International Military Staff and the Major NATO Commanders, was formed to develop a document which would provide the over arching political guidance from which a new military strategy could be developed. This new document would be a "Grand Strategy" to provide the necessary vision for the future direction of the Alliance.

While the new strategic concept was being developed by the SRG, the Military Committee (MC) was reviewing MC 14/3 (Military Committee document 14/3, popularly known as the flexible response strategy). The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was busy contributing to the work of these documents, while at the same time conducting a fundamental review of alliance force structure. All these efforts were somewhat complicated by the events of 1990 and 1991 including the War in the Gulf, disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, Civil War in Yugoslavia and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

In late Winter 1991, the French were invited to join in the development of the new strategic concept. Heretofore, the SRG
reported to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) which excludes France, but with their inclusion, the SRG then reported to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The new strategic concept was to be completed, along with the new force structure, in time for the Spring Ministerials, but since the French had been brought into this process late, they expressed numerous reservations and sought to delay both the strategic concept and the new force structure until the Fall Ministerials in November. The military authorities, however, needed to gain approval of a new alliance force structure in order to stop the free fall of member state’s defense commitments. As a result, the NAC was unable to approve the strategic concept at its Ministerial session, but the DPC on 29 May, approved the new Three-tiered Force Structure for Allied Command Europe (Chapter 1).

In previous years, NATO Summit meetings have been arranged to compel the Allies to reach consensus on difficult issues. The 1991 Rome Summit was no exception. It was conceived to achieve consensus on what is now known as "The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept." The August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union nearly derailed the approval of this document, but in the end, it was ready for signature when the Heads of State and Government met in Rome in November (Chapter 2).

At the Summit’s conclusion, the Heads of State and Government issued their Rome Declaration approving The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept and announcing that a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council would be formed to include the former Warsaw Treaty Organization states and the newly independent Baltic republics. Their first meeting to be held the following month (Chapter 3).

The military authorities, who had contributed substantially to the development of the new strategic concept, had also been reviewing the military command and control structure of the Alliance. At the DPC Ministerials in Brussels in December, Ministers approved the elimination of one of the Major NATO Commands (Allied Command Channel) and to detailed planning for the amalgamation of the five Principal Subordinate Commands into two (Chapter 4). Additionally, the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff (MC/CS) session, and subsequently the DPC, approved MC 400 which, along with the new strategic concept, replaced the MC 14/3 flexible response strategy and its companion document, MC 48/3, which detailed the implementing instructions for the Major NATO Commanders (Chapter 5).

On 20 December, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) met for the first time pledging "to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe." Thus the year came to a close with former adversaries sitting around the same table pledging to build genuine partnership (Chapter 6).
Indeed, 1991 was an historic and pivotal year for the Alliance. It began with a war looming in the Gulf. It witnessed the first wartime deployment of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) air assets to Turkey, a redeployment of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force aircraft and the Naval On-Call Force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) in support of operation DESERT STORM. Following DESERT STORM, Alliance forces formed another coalition to protect the Kurdish people during operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Next came the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the development of an Alliance "Grand Strategy," a new Military Strategy, new force structure and new command and control structure. At year's end, the Soviet Union had been dissolved and the Russian president announced his intention to seek NATO membership in the future.

No one predicted the events that would follow the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus far, the Alliance has largely benefitted from the winning of the Cold War. But, if the last two years has told us anything, it is that our knowledge, understanding and ability to influence events in this time of momentous change is extremely limited. Prudence dictates that we should proceed with caution.

In the following chapters the above mentioned documents (with the exception of MC-400 which is classified NATO CONFIDENTIAL) are provided in their entirety preceded by a brief commentary which both summarizes some of their key points and also notes some of the more interesting, controversial or unique features which set them apart from previous documents.
It had been hoped that the Spring Ministerials would witness the approval of The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the future force structure of NATO’s forces by the Defense Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group (DPC/NPG). However, this was not to be. Shortly before the Ministerials, the French tabled several substantial changes to the new strategic concept which could not be agreed in time for the ministerial session. The normal practice in NATO is to find a compromise solution to a member nation’s objections and then send back to all nation’s capitals the revised text to seek consensus. Normally this process takes about 6 weeks.

Since it was not possible to reach consensus on The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, French authorities attempted to prevent the DPC/NPG from approving the new future force structure, but the Military Committee needed to seek approval for a new force structure so they could develop a baseline or floor on the forces necessary to maintain a cohesive defensive structure for the Alliance. Shortly after the new future force structure was approved, the French Foreign Minister criticized the Alliance publicly for approving a force structure in advance of an approved strategy. In fact, the London Declaration provided the political guidance from which to develop the future force structure and both the new strategic concept and the future force structure had been developed in parallel.

The following are some highlights from the DPC/NPG Final Communique:

- Recognizes the importance of continued Soviet force withdrawal to their territory and the decision by the Warsaw Pact to formally dissolve its military structure. COMMENT: Soviet force withdrawal from Central Europe was on schedule and on 1 April, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was disbanded.

- The Ministers appealed to the Soviet Union to find a way to resolve the impasse blocking ratification of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. COMMENT: The issue dealt with the re-subordination of three Soviet Army motorized divisions to the Navy, a move which placed them beyond the scope of the treaty, and the removal of several thousand pieces of treaty limited equipment to the eastern side of the Ural mountains, which effectively placed this equipment outside of the area of application. Both issues were subsequently resolved.

- They applauded the success of the international coalition in the Gulf War and noted with satisfaction the political
solidarity and determination of the Alliance to fulfil the commitment of collective security stipulated in Article 5 of the Treaty. COMMENT: The decision to send forces to assist Turkey during the Gulf War was met by severe resistance by some alliance members. Some members of the German opposition (SPD, vice FDP, CDU/CSU) argued that the North Atlantic Treaty was essentially an East-West document and did not apply to the action in the Gulf. In the end, the air element of the ACE Mobile Force was deployed to Turkey.

- The key element of this ministerial was the approval of the future force structure for NATO consisting of Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces and Augmentation Forces. A Rapid Reaction Corps under United Kingdom command was agreed to and a multinational Reaction Force Planning Staff was to be established at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to develop and coordinate plans for reaction forces. COMMENT: There is a continuing debate between the British and the Germans, played out in the press, over the command of the Rapid Reaction Corps. It was subsequently agreed that the Germans would command the air element of this corps. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) will consist of approximately 60,000 personnel organized in multinational formations with a 5,000 man quick reaction force. Main Defense Forces will be organized into 6 multinational corps and the Augmentation Forces will be the reinforcing elements and mobilizable forces.

- The Ministers noted with satisfaction the final elimination of American and Soviet missiles under the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. COMMENT: The INF Treaty was a milestone achievement for the Alliance. It resulted from a long standing policy embodied in the 1967 Harmel Report of pursuing both deterrence and dialogue simultaneously. In 1979 the so-called Twin-Track decision was taken calling for deployment United States Pershing II and Cruise Missile while at the same time negotiating their elimination. The INF negotiations commenced in 1981 and the INF Treaty was signed in 1987.
PRESS COMMUNIQUE M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38

For immediate release
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FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. The Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial sessions in Brussels on 28th and 29th May 1991.

2. At last year's London Summit NATO's Heads of State and Government set a new course for the Alliance, aimed at adapting to the profoundly changed security environment and encouraging the continuation of the positive developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The new era has well and truly begun for Europe and for the Alliance. The process of dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including political and military contacts at all levels, has now been established and should continue to be expanded. The Allies will continue to promote co-operation on the basis of the principles set out in the Paris Charter. All these steps are helping to overcome the divisions of the past as we move towards our goal of a Europe whole and free.

3. The continuing withdrawals of the Soviet Forces to their territory and the recent decision by the member states of the Warsaw Pact formally to dissolve its military structure are important developments, which are further enhancing security and stability in Europe. We seek full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty, which would represent a major step forward. We appeal to the Soviet Union to find a way to resolve the remaining issues delaying ratification of the Treaty.

4. The new political situation and the much improved security environment in Europe have made an East-West conflict much more unlikely. Nevertheless uncertainties and risks remain. The Soviet Union is undergoing a difficult political evolution. We clearly have an interest in the success of the process of political and economic reform, not least because the Soviet Union continues to retain substantial nuclear and conventional
capabilities. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are subject to considerable political, social, economic and ethnic pressures which could lead to crises jeopardizing overall stability in Europe. Moreover, as the Gulf war underlined, risks can also arise from elsewhere. The Alliance thus needs to continue to work to protect peace and freedom, and must preserve the strategic balance and maintain credible deterrence and an effective common defence to counter any threat to the territory of the Allies.

5. We warmly welcome the success of the international coalition forces in the recent Gulf War. We note with satisfaction the effectiveness of the prompt action taken by the Alliance in deploying naval and air forces to its Southern region to deter any possible attacks on its members. This included the first operational deployment in Alliance history of elements of the ACE Mobile Force. The Alliance's actions have once again demonstrated the overriding importance of political solidarity and our determination to fulfil the commitment to collective security stipulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

6. We are adapting and transforming our collective defence arrangements as foreseen in the London Declaration. Our broad approach to Alliance security policy is reflected in its three mutually reinforcing elements of co-operation, dialogue and the maintenance of an effective collective defence capability. Arms control and disarmament policy plays an important role in pursuit of dialogue and in the co-operative approach to European security. We have noted with satisfaction that substantial progress has been made in the development of the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which is nearing completion. We look forward to the new Concept being approved later this year. The work done so far to reflect the changed security environment provides a sound basis for the continuing efforts to develop further the Alliance's defence policy and in particular to reshape our nuclear and conventional force posture through the collective defence planning process.

7. As the Alliance adapts to the new environment, the preservation of enduring principles, such as the indivisibility of our security and the need for sharing responsibilities, will remain important. These principles are reflected in the integrated military structure and collective defence arrangements which have maintained a credible deterrence and effective military capability over the past forty years. A continued presence of forces from North America in Europe is indispensable.

8. In our Defence Planning Committee meeting we continued the intensive consultations on the reviews many member countries
that all NATO Allies are adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security.

7. We noted with satisfaction the substantial progress that has been made in transforming the Alliance's defences. We approved detailed military guidance to NATO and national military authorities for implementing the new Strategic Concept through our force plans and posture. We agreed the planning requirements for the Alliance's new force structure in terms of military concepts, organisation and capabilities. In our Annual Review we examined nations' plans for the period 1992-96 and beyond, and have concluded that, in general, the overall plans currently envisaged should meet future Alliance requirements. The major changes in force posture, including substantial reductions in the overall size of our forces, called for in the new strategy are already under way. Good progress has been made in identifying the necessary national contributions to Reaction, Main Defence and Augmentation Forces - the three force categories of the new Force Structure. Plans are also being developed for the creation of multinational units within the structure. These multinational forces, together with the need to maximise the effectiveness of the smaller forces of the future. will place an even greater premium on training and exercises and on the ability to work closely together. Our collective defence planning arrangements, based on an integrated military structure as well as on co-ordination agreements, will play a key role in ensuring the most cost-effective achievement of our common tasks.

8. We considered proposals for a new NATO Command Structure with the aim of streamlining it, reducing it in size and adapting it to the new environment. As a first and major step we agreed to reduce the number of Major NATO Commanders from three to two - the Supreme Allied Commanders for Europe and the Atlantic. Furthermore, we decided that within Allied Command Europe there will be three Major Subordinate Commands responsible for the Southern, Central and Northwest regions, the command arrangements in the latter cases being based on the proposals of the study which we set in hand at our meeting in Taormina. There is also agreement that the detailed planning for the reorganisation of the Central Region should commence, including, inter alia, the amalgamation of the present five Principal Subordinate Commands into two, one for land forces and one for air forces. Work will continue to further develop the proposals for the whole structure down to Principal Subordinate Command level, and below where appropriate, including implications of costing and timing.
9. The Strategic Concept emphasises the importance of reinforcement as a means available to the Alliance for conflict prevention, crisis management and defence. We approved a new Concept of Reinforcement for NATO which provides nations and NATO's Military and Civil Authorities with additional politico-military guidance for the flexible and effective deployment of Allied forces.

10. The process of transforming our defence posture is complex and still continuing. We discussed the progress being made in the review of our common funded infrastructure programme, which is intended to ensure that the programme and its management are adapted to meet the requirements of the new Strategy and force and command structures. We reaffirmed our support for the continuing efforts to promote armaments co-operation, notably through endorsement of the first ever NATO conventional armaments plan, and noted the work under way aimed at improving the conditions of defence trade among the Allies. We are reviewing our crisis management arrangements to ensure the Alliance is capable of responding appropriately to the future risks and challenges which we may face.

11. Recognizing the continuing need for NATO's land-based fighter presence in the Southern Region and acknowledging the constraints precluding funding and thus the possibility of constructing the planned base at Crotone, we have directed the appropriate NATO authorities to explore alternative solutions which, taking into account the new security environment, will enable the Alliance to meet its standing commitment to fulfil this requirement.

12. Our new force posture will maintain the principles of strategic unity and collective defence. A valuable contribution to improving the ageing and obsolescent equipment of the forces of Greece, Portugal and Turkey will be made by the commonly funded transfer of equipment which is becoming available as a consequence of the reductions planned to meet the requirements of the CFE Treaty. Military Assistance will still be necessary for these countries.

13. In the field of arms control and disarmament, we attach the highest importance to the early ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty. The Allies have been successful in actively shaping the follow-on CFE IA negotiation and proposals have been tabled which aim to establish limitations on military manpower. We remain committed to achieving results in the CSBM and Open Skies negotiations. The Allies intend to promote in Helsinki, with the participation of all CSCE states, a co-operative process aimed at establishing a new quality of
openness and confidence and at strengthening security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence.

14. We discussed the recent developments in the Soviet Union and its republics and appeal to all parties concerned to pursue peacefully the process of transformation. We trust that in this process the republics, as they develop towards a common ground of co-operation, will fully respect the international security commitments of the Soviet Union, in particular those created by arms control agreements, notably the CFE, START and INF Treaties. We attach the greatest importance to ensuring the safe, responsible and reliable control of nuclear weapons under a single authority. On this crucial issue we pursued further our discussions started in Taormina and we will continue thorough and timely consultations within NATO in the future.

15. During our discussions we expressed our deep concern over events in Yugoslavia, and our support for the efforts of the United Nations, CSCE, the European Community and WEU to resolve the crisis. We emphasized the considerable contribution being made to these efforts by Allies, both collectively and individually. We appeal to parties involved to end the conflict.

16. Our meeting marks a further important step in the process of adapting to the changing environment. The Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe. We are moving towards a Europe of co-operation and will continue to initiate and support constructive steps on this road where possible. Building on our achievements, and recognizing the challenges and opportunities of the future, we will continue our efforts to these ends. The prospect for success is all the surer for being based on political solidarity and effective collective defence within the Alliance. Recent crises and uncertainties underline this need.
This is the first time that NATO has produced such a document. In the past, communiques from ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or Summit Declarations have served as the necessary guidance for the military to formulate military strategy and its corresponding force structure. It was felt, however, that since there was such a fundamental alteration of the military balance on the Continent, NATO had to transform itself substantially in order to survive. This document constitutes the political guidance and strategy for the Alliance. This new concept, along with MC 400, replaces MC 14/3 and its corresponding implementing instructions MC 48/3. Whereas previous Alliance strategies had always been classified documents, it was felt that the new strategic concept should be available to the public in order to demonstrate that the Alliance had adopted new thinking. The development of the Alliance Strategic Concept, its implementing directive (MC 400), and the new three-tiered force structure announced on 29 May 91, were produced in parallel with each other.

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept notes the following:

- The threat confronting NATO for the past forty years has disappeared.

- Security Challenges and Risks which remain are multi-faceted, multi-directional, and unpredictable.

- Recognizes the contribution to security provided by the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC) and the United Nations (UN). But, it emphasizes the primacy of NATO concerning the security and defense of its members. COMMENT: As this new strategic concept was being developed some EC members were advancing the development of a defense and security dimension for the EC to include their own military component. Indeed, at the October 1991 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina, Italy, Germany announced that a Franco-German Corps of about 70,000 soldiers would be established and they invited other NATO members to contribute forces. This formation was to be independent of NATO command, however, assigned formations could be dual-hatted. This announcement created quite a stir among NATO members, especially the United States.

- Recognizes for the first time that “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption
of the flow of vital resources and acts of terrorism and sabotage" (emphasis added). COMMENT: This could mean that NATO has recognized and is prepared to deal with these out of area concerns.

- An appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces will be maintained and kept up to date where necessary. COMMENT: This language is a substitute for dreaded "M" word (modernization) which translates to spending money for defense. However, this language provides political support needed by some of the Allies (the US for instance) to modernize key weapons systems.

- Alliance forces must be structured for peace, crisis, and war. At present, war is the least likely of the three. COMMENT: This lack of a clearly identifiable "enemy" will prove difficult for some Allied states to maintain a viable defense structure. Nonetheless, whereas MC 14/3 focussed primarily on "Deterrence and Defense," the new strategic concept foresees a military role in preserving the peace, complementing and reinforcing political actions during crises, and finally providing the capability to defend Alliance territory should deterrence fail.

- There will be greater reliance on reserves forces. COMMENT: This will likely translate to the establishment of reserve force readiness standards which have not existed heretofore. Note also that American reserve forces are unique among the Allies when it comes to readiness and deployability.

- New doctrines of rapid mobility will require long distance airlift and air refueling capabilities. COMMENT: This may lead to the creation of a NATO common funded Tanker/Cargo force similar to the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force.

- There will be increased reliance on multinational forces and there is a call for more efficient use of scarce defense resources. COMMENT: This is a renewed call for role specialization which has never been popular.
THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991

1. At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

PART I - THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.
3. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of the WEU, are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the rôle and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

4. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be pursued following President Bush's September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

5. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and co-operation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace.

6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a
great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

7. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RISKS

8. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.

10. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.

11. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.

12. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern
Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.

13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.

14. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.

15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.

PART II - ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS

THE PURPOSE OF THE ALLIANCE

16. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.
THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE

17. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.

19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased co-operation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of co-operative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

THE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

20. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a co-operative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

21. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

22. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

PART III - A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY

PROTECTING PEACE IN A NEW EUROPE

24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

25. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy: dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.
26. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

27. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to co-operation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

DIALOGUE

29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater co-operation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.
CO-OPERATION

30. The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

31. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and co-operation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

MANAGEMENT OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

32. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

33. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.
34. The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.

PART IV - GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE

PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY

35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

37. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.
38. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on co-operation and co-ordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.

39. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

THE ALLIANCE'S NEW FORCE POSTURE

40. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies’ military forces and in their posture.

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

41. The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.
42. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

43. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.

44. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

45. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;

b. that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place lineal defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure
a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

47. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

a. Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.

b. The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.

c. Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.

d. In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political authorities
will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

48. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable elements.

49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to co-operate closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:

a. Ground forces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance on mobilisation and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.

b. Maritime forces, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.

c. Air forces, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support - as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air
refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

50. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defences.

51. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.

52. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.

53. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as
appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

54. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

57. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear
forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.

PART V - CONCLUSION

58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

59. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and co-operation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.
CHAPTER 3

Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 8 Nov 91

This summit promised to be controversial from the outset since the French and the Germans had previously announced their proposal to form a European Corps outside of the NATO military structure which they indicated could serve as the nucleus of a European Community military structure.

President Mitterrand of France noted "The Alliance is a good one, but it is not a holy alliance." An obvious reference to the fact that NATO might someday disappear. Hence the need for the Europeans to begin thinking about providing for their own defense. Reportedly President Bush deviated from his prepared remarks and offered the following challenge: "If, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today." Not one of the Alliance member states indicated a desire to see the United States withdraw from the Continent.

Among others, the Rome Declaration approved "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept." The following are some highlights:

- It recognizes an emerging security architecture of interlocking institutions (NATO, EC, CSCE, WEU and COE) that complement each other. COMMENT: NATO now recognizes security in its broadest sense as well as the contributing role of other institutions. Heretofore, NATO has focused itself narrowly on military security.

- Security for the Alliances is now based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. COMMENT: NATO has always pursued dialogue on the political level, but now encourages military-to-military contacts at varying levels with former adversaries.

- Established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council by inviting the former Warsaw Pact and Baltic states to meet in Brussels on 20 Dec 91, and periodically thereafter to launch a new era of partnership.

- Strongly supports the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and notes that the Alliance will continue to be a source of initiatives to achieve that end.

- Calls for continued efforts at arms control and disarmament in CFE-IA and the CSBM negotiations. And, supports the establishment by the United Nations of a non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. COMMENT: Efforts at controlling the proliferation of conventional arms transfers have
largely failed in the past. As the European militaries become smaller there will be an inevitable rise in the cost of maintaining modernized forces. The only way to lower these costs is through economies of scale which can only be achieved by foreign sales.
ROME DECLARATION
ON
PEACE AND COOPERATION

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance. The far-reaching decisions we have taken here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched in London last year.

2. The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.

A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

3. The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE: OUR NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

4. Yesterday, we published our new Strategic Concept. Our security has substantially improved: we no longer face the old threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realize in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.

5. The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor; but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY AND DEFENCE ROLE

6. We reaffirm the consensus expressed by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the
European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.

7. We welcome the spirit in which those Allies who are also members of the Twelve and the WEU have kept the other members of the Alliance informed about the progress of their ongoing discussions on the development of the European identity and about other issues, such as their peace efforts in Yugoslavia. Appropriate links and consultation procedures between the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance will be developed in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.

8. We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning the developing European security identity and defence role compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance. We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed Alliance. We will help move this development forward.
9. We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.

10. The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries. Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries. This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new level.

11. Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. In particular, we propose the following activities:

- annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;

- periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;
additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;

- regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:
  - NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
  - the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.

This process will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. It will be carried out in accordance with the core functions of the Alliance.

12. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance participation of our partners in the "Third Dimension" of scientific and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our liaison activities.

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

13. We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change. We will intensify our efforts to enhance the CSCE's role, in the first instance by working with the other participating CSCE states to ensure that the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992 will be another major step towards building a new Europe. The CSCE has the outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all countries of Europe and Canada and the United States under a common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic liberty. The new CSCE institutions and structures, which we proposed at our London Summit and which were created at the Paris Summit, must be consolidated and further developed so as to provide CSCE with the means to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents and thus permit the CSCE to meet the new challenges which Europe will have to face. Our consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening the CSCE.
14. Consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation among all participating States, capable of effective action in line with its new and increased responsibilities, in particular on the questions of human rights and security including arms control and disarmament, and for effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, consistent with international law and CSCE principles. To this end, we suggest:

- that the CSCE Council, the central forum for political consultations, continue to take decisions on questions relating to the CSCE and the functions and structures of the CSCE institutions;

- that the Committee of Senior Officials serve as the coordination and management body between Council sessions and that it acquire a greater operational capacity and meet more frequently, with a view to ensuring the implementation of decisions;

- that the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities be improved: as one contribution, in addition to the functions entrusted to it by the Paris Charter, the means available to the Conflict Prevention Centre should be strengthened and made more flexible to enable it to fulfil the specific tasks assigned to it by the CSCE Council and the Committee of Senior Officials;

- that specific tasks based on a precise mandate by the CSCE Council or the Committee of Senior Officials might be entrusted to ad hoc groups;

- that the decisions taken at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting ensure complementarity among CSCE activities in the security field including, inter alia, conflict prevention, arms control and consultations on security;

- that consideration should be given within the CSCE to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard, through peaceful means, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned;

- that the Office for Free Elections be transformed into a broadly focused Office of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

- that the monitoring and promotion of progress on human dimension issues be continued in the form of periodic meetings of short duration on clearly defined issues;
that further political impetus be given to economic, scientific and environmental cooperation so as to promote the basis of prosperity for stable, democratic development.

ARMS CONTROL

15. We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decision of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central role in President Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.

16. We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount importance we attach to the CFE Treaty and call upon all CFE signatories to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements in the CFE IA and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We welcome the resumption of the Open Skies negotiations; we look forward to agreement on an Open Skies regime by the time of the Helsinki Meeting as an important new element in greater openness and confidence-building in the military field.

17. The Helsinki Meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically forward. Our goal will be to shape a new cooperative order, in which no country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:

- strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;
- conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and fostering a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies; and
- promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.
18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional arms beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security. We also deem it essential to complete a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision to explore the feasibility of verification.

BROADER CHALLENGES

19. Our Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including our responses to such risks. We will continue to address broader challenges in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

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20. The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a now undivided continent of Europe; and to make our Alliance's contribution to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.

21. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the Italian Republic.
CHAPTER 4

Final Communique - DPC Ministerial, 13 Dec 91

Alliance Defense Ministers meet in ministerial session twice annually. What sets this particular meeting apart is that it announces a new military initiative to fulfil the mandate of the Rome Declaration and notes key changes in the NATO Command Structure.

- Noting that NATO has built a unique body of experience and expertise in defense-related issues, the ministers have pledged to have their militaries intensify contacts with the Central and Eastern European, as well as the Baltic, states and provide advice on a broad range of issues. COMMENT: There are currently extensive military-to-military contacts occurring between individual NATO states and member states of the former Warsaw Pact. The issues under discussion cover a broad range to include education and training, and reforming military structures to be more compatible with and responsive to a democratic society.

- Welcomes the fact that the Western European Union (WEU) will be developed as the defense component of the European Community to contribute towards a strengthened European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and that practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defense identity and the Alliance. COMMENT: The US, in addition to other Allies, wanted to preclude the WEU from developing into an organization which would compete with rather than complement the Alliance. One should note that Defense Ministers of the DPC are those same ministers who represent their country at ministerial sessions of the WEU (realizing of course that membership in NATO and the WEU are not similar). The only difference is that during the WEU ministerials, Defense Ministers are joined by Foreign Ministers.

- Ministers agreed to reduce the number of Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) from three to two. Henceforth Allied Commanders for Europe (ACE) and the Atlantic (ACLANT) remain. Allied Command Channel is eliminated. Within ACE there will be three Major Subordinate Commands (Northwest, Central, Southern). Next they announced detailed planning to reorganize the Central Region of ACE to include the amalgamation of the present five Principal Subordinate Commands (PSC) into two, one for land forces and one for air forces. COMMENT: Currently the PSC are NORTHAG, CENTAG, AAFCE, TWOATAF and FOURATAF. Both ACE and ACLANT are commanded by Americans. ACCHAN was commanded by a British admiral.

- They noted that funding for relocation of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) from Madrid, Spain to Crotone, Italy was not available. Noting the security environment in the Southern
Region, alternative basing arrangements will be considered. COMMENT: Bottom line on this one is that the US Congress refused to fund the new construction of an air base at Crotone. NATO Infrastructure funds were to defray most of the costs but since the United States pays about 25% of the Infrastructure budget, the costs to the United States was considered too great at a time when bases are being closed throughout the United States.

- Ministers noted the contribution of "cascading" equipment to Greece, Turkey and Portugal as a result of the equipment which is becoming available through CFE Treaty limitations. COMMENT: Most of the equipment to be cascaded is of United States origin and the US Congress has not amended the statutes to allow the no-cost transfer of this equipment. Even if the US were to agree to such a transfer, it would also pay 25% of the relocation costs through the NATO Infrastructure budget.
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FINAL COMMUNIQUE


2. Over the eighteen months that have passed since the London Declaration the Alliance has undergone a far-reaching transformation. In response to the profound changes in the security environment, at their meeting last month in Rome the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and issued a Declaration on Peace and Co-operation. This transformation clearly demonstrates NATO’s ability to respond to the dramatic changes that the Alliance itself helped to bring about. At our meeting we took a number of important decisions on the implementation of the Strategic Concept, new arrangements for force and command structures, and reinforcement.

3. The Rome Declaration included proposals for advancing our partnership with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania whose newly regained independence we warmly welcome. On the basis of these proposals, and consistent with the objectives of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, which will hold its first meeting next week, we underlined our determination, as Defence Ministers, to play our full role in this endeavour. NATO has built up a unique body of experience and expertise in defence-related issues, including the planning and management of defence programmes, education and training and democratic control of military forces, which could be of great value to the governments of Central and Eastern Europe. We will therefore make this experience and expertise available to all the Central and Eastern European nations represented in the liaison process, and we considered ways in which, at various levels, this could be done. Our military will contribute to this process by intensifying their contacts and providing advice.
4. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept marks a significant change from our past strategy. It sets out a broad approach to security reflected in the mutually reinforcing elements of dialogue, co-operation and the maintenance of an effective collective defence capability. The Concept is designed to maximise the opportunities presented by the improvement in our strategic environment, while providing the necessary insurance against the multi-directional and multi-faceted risks that may arise. Preventing and, if necessary, managing crises affecting the Alliance's security have become key features of the strategy.

5. The Strategic Concept, as an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all the Allies and for the further development of our defence policy, should also facilitate the necessary complementarity between the transformed Alliance and the emerging defence component of the process of European integration. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole. In parallel, we shall enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. In this regard, the significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we shall preserve the operational coherence on which our defence depends.

6. We welcomed the agreement of the European Council in Maastricht on a common foreign and security policy of the European Union and its member states including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence; a policy that will respect the obligations of member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. We welcomed the fact that the European security and defence identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases, and that the WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. We also welcomed the fact that the WEU is prepared to develop further its close working links with the Alliance; that the WEU member states will strengthen their role, responsibilities and contributions in the Alliance; and that practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance, including giving all European members of the Alliance the possibility of fully participating in its activities, and
are undertaking of their future national defence plans, and the
consequences of these reviews for the common defence. We also
considered recommendations developed by our Military Authorities
for the future structure of NATO's forces. The new force struc-
tures will reflect the characteristics of flexibility, mobility
and multinationality identified in the London Declaration. We
noted with satisfaction that both the future national plans and
the work done on the new NATO force structures will enable us to
maintain a coherent and effective collective defence posture at
lower overall force levels.

9. We have agreed the basis of a new force structure
consisting of Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and
Augmentation Forces, including multinational forces of all types:
land, air and maritime. In particular we have agreed various
national contributions to the multinational corps of Main Defence
Forces for which detailed planning will now proceed. With regard
to Reaction Forces, we have agreed that these should consist
of immediate and rapid reaction forces, comprising contributions
from most NATO nations and including national as well as
multinational formations. As part of the rapid reaction forces,
we have agreed the creation of a Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied
Command Europe, under United Kingdom command with a multinational
headquarters. These forces, together with our future air and
maritime force structures, will provide the basis for the
flexible deployment of a range of forces depending on the
situation. In this context we have agreed the establishment of a
multinational Reaction Force Planning Staff at SHAPE for
development and co-ordination of plans for all Allied Command
Europe Reaction Forces. A number of important aspects relating
to the implementation of the new force structure now require
examination, including the composition of multinational air and
naval components and their command arrangements. We agreed that
the necessary studies should be undertaken immediately. Finally,
we have agreed that a study of NATO's command structure should be
pursued as a matter of urgency with the aim of streamlining and
adapting it to the new situation.

10. We have approved the 1991 Ministerial Guidance, which
provides political guidance for Alliance defence planning
activities, both national and collective, for the period up to
1998 and beyond. It will thus cover the period of transition
during which the new Alliance Strategic Concept is to come into
effect and its implementation will therefore need to take account
of the new strategy as finally approved. The Guidance reflects
our agreement on the need to maintain the effectiveness of our
collective defence arrangements and thus to provide the level of
resources necessary to ensure that our forces contributing to the
new force structures are adequately manned, equipped, trained and exercised. Nevertheless, we agreed that a continued improvement in the security environment should permit reductions in the defence burden for most countries. However the adaptation and transformation of the forces in this period of transition will inevitably have financial consequences and for the majority of nations defence expenditure in real terms should not be expected to reduce substantially in the near term. In this context a more effective use of defence expenditures and an equitable sharing of the common defence burden remain key objectives.

11. We also reviewed the work being undertaken in a number of key areas of Alliance defence planning as part of the process of adaptation of our forces. These include crisis management, which will assume greater importance in future to reflect the range, variety and unpredictability of the risks facing the Alliance; reinforcement planning where, in addition to the continued vital importance of the transatlantic link, inter-regional reinforcement within Europe, involving both European and North American forces, will play an increasingly significant role; the Air Command and Control system; and infrastructure, armaments co-operation, as enhanced by the Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS), and logistics support arrangements. Although much of this work can only be concluded once the new Strategic Concept and the new force structures have been finally approved, good progress is being made. We received a briefing on military lessons of the Gulf conflict. We agreed that these should be carefully studied, and applied where appropriate.

12. In our Nuclear Planning Group meeting we discussed a broad range of nuclear related issues. We were briefed on the status of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and supported United States efforts to obtain a successful conclusion to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). We noted with satisfaction that the final elimination of United States and Soviet missiles declared in the INF Treaty has now been completed. We welcomed this milestone in our efforts to achieve a stable security environment at lower levels of armaments. In this context, we reviewed the status of Alliance consultations on an arms control framework for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF).

13. Last year we initiated a fundamental review of the size and tasks of the Alliance's nuclear forces. It looks forward to reduced reliance on and substantial reductions of nuclear
weapons. It also recognizes that for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons have an essential role in a strategy designed to preserve peace; and, as part of this, that there remains a need for sub-strategic forces to be based in Europe, with widespread participation in nuclear roles and policy formulation, and kept up-to-date where necessary. The review is well advanced and will be completed in conjunction with the new Alliance Strategic Concept. While seeking the lowest level of nuclear forces commensurate with Alliance security requirements, we are also investigating the measures necessary to ensure that those forces that remain continue to be effective, flexible and survivable, with the requisite communications capability.

14. Against the background of the Gulf War, we discussed the potential risk posed by proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and the need to consider complementary approaches to dealing with the problem, including export controls and missile defences. We welcomed a briefing by the United States concerning its concept for global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes.

15. The transformation of the Alliance has begun in an environment in which unprecedented opportunities exist to promote freedom, stability, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the growth of democracy throughout Europe. We welcome the intensified dialogue and cooperation with all countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a promising contribution to increased mutual understanding and trust. Building on the spirit of the Paris Charter, the CSCE process should play an increasingly constructive role and will complement the Alliance's efforts to achieve a more secure and stable European environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other nation or impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. To this end arms control and disarmament should also continue to make an important contribution. The efforts further to develop a European security identity and defence role should lead to a strengthened European pillar within the Alliance and thus not only serve the interests of European states but also enhance Atlantic solidarity by underlining the preparedness of the European allies to take a greater share of the responsibility for collective security. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultations among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

16. At our Autumn meetings we will consider the implementation of the new Alliance Strategic Concept and in particular the resulting nuclear and conventional force and
command structures. The process of adapting to the needs of the new security environment is a challenging task. We have made a very good start. We remain determined to ensure that our common defences which have served us so well in the past will continue to do so in the future.
CHAPTER 5

Military Committee Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept

On 10 December 1991, the Defense Planning Committee approved NATO’s new "military strategy," MC-400 (title as stated above). This document, along with The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, supersedes MC 14/3 "Flexible Response Strategy" and MC 48/3 which constituted the implementing instructions for MC 14/3 to the Major NATO Commanders.

In replacing MC 14/3, it was decided to break the traditional MC 14-series of Cold War military strategy documents in recognition of the fundamental transformation of the Alliance (at enclosure is a chronology of NATO military strategy documents).

This new document provides the detailed military guidance and requirements which will allow the Major NATO Commanders (SACEUR and SACLANT), as well as the nations, to develop operational concepts and plans. It provides guidance for peacetime posture and the military contribution to cooperation and dialogue with our former adversaries as well as the military’s role in crisis management and defense. It notes that NATO’s future force posture should be multinational, interoperable, flexible and mobile. Further, it states the roles and missions of the three-tiered force structure of Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces and Augmentation Forces. Detailed guidance concerning the configuration, capability, and command and control of nuclear forces is provided. It stresses that political control over nuclear weapons will be maintained at all times. Finally, it states the requirements for support structure, command, control and communications (C3), training and exercises.

MC 400 is classified NATO CONFIDENTIAL. As such, it is not included in this compilation of documents.
CHRONOLOGY OF NATO MILITARY STRATEGY DOCUMENTS

DC 611, 30 Nov 49  "Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area"

MC 14, 28 Mar 50  "Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning"  
                  (Cosmic Top Secret regraded NATO Secret, Dec 68)

MC 14/1, 9 Dec 52  "NATO Strategic Guidance"  
                  (Cosmic Top Secret regraded NATO Secret, Mar 68)

MC 14/2, 6 Apr 57  "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area"  
                  (Cosmic Top Secret regraded NATO Confidential, Feb 89)

MC 14/3, 22 Sep 67  "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area"  (NATO Secret)

MC 400, 9 Dec 91  "MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept"  (NATO Confidential)
CHAPTER 6

North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation

This was an historic meeting of former adversaries. It was particularly noteworthy because the Soviet Ambassador was summoned to the telephone during the meeting and when he returned he informed the Council that he had instructions to request that all references to the Soviet Union be excluded from the communique. This document is important because it established the framework for annual meetings at Ministerial level, bi-monthly and as-needed meetings at Ambassadorial level, and meetings of NATO subordinate committees to include, among others, the Political, Economic, and Military committees.
PRESS COMMUNIQUE M-NACC-1(91)111(Rev) For immediate release 20th December 1991

NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL STATEMENT ON DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION 20th December 1991

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States, and the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, and the Representative of the Soviet Union(1) have gathered in Brussels to develop further the process of regular diplomatic liaison and to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council marks an historic step forward in our relationship.

2. In the new era of European relations where the confrontation and division of past decades have been replaced by dialogue, partnership and cooperation, we are determined to work towards a new, lasting order of peace in Europe. Aware of NATO’s positive influence as a source of stability, our common objective is to contribute to the enhancement of European security by promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe. As stated in the Joint Declaration of Paris, security is indivisible and the security of each of our countries is inextricably linked to that of all States participating in the CSCE. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation therefore concern us all. In coming closer together, we wish to further the great progress that has been made across Europe in establishing solid democratic institutions, respect for human rights and economic liberty. The success of efforts to create modern competitive market economies is essential to overcoming grave economic disparities and thus enhancing our common security and stability. We reaffirm the need to continue to support these efforts with all available means.
3. We are determined to make another substantial contribution to our shared goal: a Europe whole and free. Our new joint undertaking will contribute to strengthening the role of the CSCE and to the achievement of its objectives without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. We seek an architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Security is today based on a broad concept that encompasses more than ever political, economic, social and environmental aspects as well as defence. For this reason an interlocking network in which institutions such as the CSCE, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other, can best safeguard the freedom, security, and prosperity of all European and North American states. Frameworks of regional cooperation will also be an important part of this comprehensive security architecture.

We welcome the progress made in the sphere of conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament. We are determined to achieve full implementation of the CFE and START Treaties, as well as to continue to seek security at the lowest possible level of arms.

We all recognise the need, and acknowledge the responsibility to ensure full respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to refrain from any steps that could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and to take firm measures to prevent the unauthorised export of nuclear or other destabilising military technologies. Authorities in the Soviet Union have confirmed their intention to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons under a single unified authority. All members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council agree on the importance of this effort.

4. Following the proposal of the Alliance Summit in Rome, we have agreed to build on our existing liaison and to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues, and in particular to:

- hold annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;

- hold bi-monthly meetings of the North Atlantic Council with liaison partners at the Ambassadorial level, beginning in February 1992;

- hold additional meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at Ministerial level, or of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session with Ambassadors of liaison partners, as circumstances warrant;
hold meetings at regular intervals of NATO subordinate committees with representatives of liaison partners. This will include inter alia meetings with the Political and Economic Committees, as well as with the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities, and NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group.

5. The focus of our consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. We will enhance participation of liaison partners in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programmes. We will cooperate actively in disseminating as widely as possible information about NATO in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and embassies of NATO member countries.

6. The implementation of the process described above and in particular the practical arrangements for meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level and with NATO committees will be determined by Ambassadors who will prepare a workplan.

7. The annual meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will, as a rule, take place in Brussels in conjunction with the Autumn Ministerial of the North Atlantic Council. Exceptions are not excluded. Our next annual meeting will take place in Oslo in June at the invitation of the Norwegian government.

(1) Ambassador Afanassievsky made the following statement in this connection:

"We proceed from the assumption that the agreements concerning the contacts in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which is being created today are valid for the Sovereign States which are becoming legal successors of the Soviet Union."

Later in the session he made the following additional statement:

"In accordance with the latest instructions received from Moscow which result from the consultations between the sovereign states, we request that all references to the Soviet Union be excluded from the text of the Statement."
GLOSSARY

NAC North Atlantic Council. This is the highest political and military authority in the Alliance. The NAC meets at least weekly in permanent session at ambassadorial level and twice yearly at ministerial level where member states are represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. At times, summits are convened and are attended by Heads of State and Government. Decisions are taken by consensus and express the collective will of the nations. The Secretary General of NATO is the chairman of the NAC, DPC and the NPG.

DPC Defense Planning Committee. This committee deals with defense matters. Its membership includes all Alliance members less France. Meetings are held at ambassadorial level and at Ministers of Defense level twice annually.

NPG Nuclear Planning Group. This committee follows the same pattern of meetings at ambassadorial level and at the level of Ministers of Defense. The primary focus of this committee is on nuclear matters and has the same functions and authority as the NAC and the DPC. All member countries except France participate. Iceland has observer status.

MC Military Committee. This committee is the highest military authority of the Alliance which answers to the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, or where nuclear matters are concerned, the Nuclear Planning Group. Its members include the Chiefs-of-Staff of all Alliance members less France, which is represented by a military Mission to the Military Committee. Iceland provides no forces but is represented by a civilian. The Chiefs-of-Staff meet three times a year (MC/CS). The MC meets weekly in permanent session (MC/PS) where the countries are represented by a Military Representative appointed by their Chief-of-Staff. The MC is chaired by a Chairman who is elected to a 3 year term by the Chiefs-of-Staff. He is assisted by a Deputy Chairman of three-star rank who is an American (primarily for nuclear matters and arms control) and a Director of the International Military Staff (IMS) who is an officer of three-star rank elected by the MC in permanent session to serve for a period of three years.