AD-A244 008

(2)

U.S. ARMY SOUTH AFTER WITHDRAWAL FROM PANAMA (USARSO-2000)

DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 30 1991
S D
D

Murl D. Munger
Philip A. Brehm
William W. Mendel
J. Mark Ruhl

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

91-19158

August 15, 1991

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5050

91 1227 037

* * * * * *

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

* * * * * *

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717) 245-3911 or AUTOVON 242-3911.

******

The authors of the study and the Strategic Studies Institute appreciate the excellent assistance given by members of the Army War College faculty in reviewing the study drafts. The reviewers included Colonels Leonard Hardy, James Kelly, John Sloan, and Dr. Gabriel Marcella. Deserving a special mention is Dr. John T. Fishel for his several contributions to the study.

******

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; Distribution unlimited
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) ACN 91019	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Strategic Studies Institute 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCI	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) U.S. Army War College Carlisle Bks, PA 17013-5050	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
U.S. Army South After Withdrawal From Panama (USARSO-2000)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Munger, Murl D.; Brehm, Philip A.; Mendel, William W.; Ruhl, J. Mark

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Final	FROM ____ TO ____	1991 August 15	48

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Central America; South America; Panama; Latin America; U.S. Army South

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The United States is readjusting its policies to reflect new world realities and is recognizing that priorities and limitations will be required when developing its national security program. This study is designed to help planners and decisionmakers better understand what Latin America faces in the immediate post-2000 period and what the regional environment of that time portends for U.S. security interests. The study also sets forth principal period. It concludes with recommendations for roles, missions, and a force design that will efficiently protect and promote U.S. regional interests. In so doing, it prescribes a role for U.S. Army South after withdrawal from the Republic of Panama.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Marianne P. Cowling	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3001 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCI

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . . **v**

SECTION I **1**

INTRODUCTION 1

Background. 1

Scope. 3

SECTION II **6**

POST-2000 LATIN AMERICA 6

General. 6

Sociological Conditions and Trends. 7

Economic Conditions and Trends. 8

Political Conditions and Trends. 10

Summary. 13

SECTION III **15**

LATAM 2000 - INTERESTS, THREATS, AND POLICY . . . 15

General. 15

U.S. Interests. 16

Principal Threats to U.S. Interests. 19

Pillars of U.S. Regional Policy. 20

SECTION IV **22**

STRATEGY 22

Principal U.S. Objectives. 22

Strategic Concepts. 22

Required Resources. 24

Implementing Strategy. 25

Section V **26**

RECOMMENDED MISSIONS
AND FORCE DESIGN 26

General. 26

Mission 2000. 27

Command and Control. 30
The Army Component Command. 31
Army Force Design. 34
ENDNOTES 39
ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS 41

FIGURES

Figure 1. Digest of Trends. 6
Figure 2. Digest of Interests. 16
Figure 3. A Theater Command Plan. 31
Figure 4. USARSO 2000 Organizational Diagram. 36

FOREWORD

As we approach the 21st century, most of the world is experiencing profound political and economic change. The nations of South America and Central America are no exception. The growing demand for democratic government, stable economics, and enhanced respect for human rights and civil liberties echoes throughout the region. At the same time the nations are beset by many social and economic problems that inhibit progress and promote dissent among the rapidly growing population.

The United States is readjusting its policies to reflect new world realities and is recognizing that priorities and limitations will be required when developing its national security program. This study is designed to help planners and decisionmakers better understand what Latin America faces in the immediate post-2000 period and what the regional environment of that time portends for U.S. security interests. The study also sets forth principal U.S. objectives and strategic concepts suitable for the Latin America of that period. It concludes with recommendations for roles, missions, and a force design that will efficiently protect and promote U.S. regional interests. In so doing, it prescribes a role for U.S. Army South after withdrawal from the Republic of Panama.

Karl W. Robinson
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

A-1

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

Background.

In compliance with the Panama Canal Treaty, at noon on December 31, 1999, the U.S. military presence in Panama is scheduled to end. No longer will there be a U.S. Unified Command deployed in Latin America (LATAM) nor will there be a major U.S. Army headquarters permanently located there. While these events may represent the end of an era, they do not signal an end to the defense of U.S. security interests in LATAM or the termination of a U.S. Army role in the region. Forward deployments may be diminished or cease altogether, and command and control systems altered to fit the situation, but enduring U.S. security interests in the region will require a military role in the pursuit of our national objectives.

During the 1980s, the United States displayed a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward Latin America and the Caribbean. As articulated, U.S. foreign policy was sound. Based upon the Four "Ds" of Democracy, Diplomacy, Defense, and Development, our regional policy promised much for ourselves and our southern neighbors. In practice, the first three "Ds" were energetically pursued while the Development initiative went lacking.

Politically, the region was extremely important. As the United States resisted Soviet expansionism, Latin America and the Caribbean became an East-West battlefield and the principal weapons were ideological. The United States fought the spread of Marxism with the promotion of democracy. The benefits of democratic rule were advertised widely and authoritarian governments of both the extreme right and the extreme left were candidates for change. Marxist-led insurgencies and campaigns of terror against friendly governments in places like El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia

and Peru prompted U.S. support to government forces. In Nicaragua, then a Marxist-led state, the United States supported "democratic resistance forces" in their campaign against the ruling Sandinistas. In Honduras, the United States established Joint Task Force Bravo to deter the Sandinistas and show U.S. support for our Central American friends and allies. Throughout Latin America, the first three "Ds" of our foreign policy (Democracy, Diplomacy, and Defense) were in combined action. Economic weapons were also brought to bear against the likes of Cuba, Nicaragua, Noriega's Panama and various terrorist/insurgent groups operating in the region. The result was political victory for the United States—at least in the short term. In 1980, of the 19 governments in Latin America only 6 could be classed as democracies. Today, all the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba and Suriname excepted, were chosen by popular vote. Whether this success can be sustained may depend on the fourth D—Development—and now a fifth D—Drugs.

Latin American nations have been in deep recession since 1981. Trade imbalances, massive foreign debt, rampant inflation—all exacerbated by high petroleum costs—have created havoc in most Latin American nations with the exception of Venezuela. This has led to capital flight and reduced foreign investment which feed the downward spiral. As a result, the poor are getting poorer and there are more of them every year. Such conditions do not bode well for continued democratic rule unless solutions are found to alleviate poverty and despair. Drug abuse and the negative effects associated with drug trafficking will remain a major problem during the next 20 years for the United States and the nations of Latin America. This region, which produces 100 percent of the cocaine supplied to the United States plus a majority of the world's marijuana and almost 40 percent of U.S. heroin imports, will be the focus of our counterdrug programs to reduce production and interdict the traffic. All branches of the U.S. military will be involved in counterdrug activities.

Elsewhere during the past 2 years profound changes have occurred in many areas that affect U.S. national security policy. The decline and fragmentation of the Soviet Union; the

disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the turmoil in Eastern Europe; the reunification of Germany and the continued strength of NATO have all combined to ease the threat of war involving the Soviet Union and the United States and to reduce Soviet adventurism. The necessity for a large U.S. force deployment in Europe is rapidly eroding and the threat from Cuba has all but vanished. This decline in the military threat to the United States coincides with a period in which it faces serious economic problems manifested by a huge national debt, a continuing negative trade balance and a domestic recession. The result of these combined circumstances is a perceived reduction in the need for services of the U.S. military and pressure to reduce international aid and assistance programs across the board. Yet, events in Southwest Asia and the Middle East have revalidated the need for a responsive and effective force to protect U.S. interests whenever and wherever required. Furthermore, recent public opinion polls in Panama indicate considerable sentiment for a continued U.S. military presence in that country. The results of these and other dynamics are causing a close look at the what, where, how many, and why of U.S. forces and deployments in general.

Scope.

This study is primarily a forecast of the responsibilities and the requirements that the U.S. Army will face in pursuing U.S. objectives in LATAM during the immediate post-2000 time period. It is the result of a tasking from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army (ODCSOPS, HQDA) which must identify and help determine the types of forces, command and control, resourcing requirements and location of Army forces needed during that period. Five assumptions were examined during the research phase. These were:

- The United States will continue to have important national security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin.
- Political unrest, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking will continue to plague various Latin

American and Caribbean nations and the United States.

- There will continue to be a unified command oriented on Latin America after 1999.
- There will be a continuing requirement for Army support of that unified command.
- No U.S. military forces will be stationed in Panama after 1999.

Our analysis confirmed the validity of the first four assumptions, however there is some likelihood that the fifth assumption is invalid in that either renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaties or negotiation of some other agreement may result in a limited U.S. military presence in the Republic of Panama at least during the first decade of the 21st century.

However, to be of value, even the valid assumptions must be qualified in the context of the LATAM 2000 environment, and the likely priority that will be given to LATAM within our global affairs. The study team has studied current conditions, identified major trends, and forecast a LATAM 2000 environment. We sought to determine whether Latin America will be a low priority, economy of force theater of marginal significance in the overall defense picture, or if events will have so transformed the world scene that the region lying south of the United States will become relatively more important. Findings regarding roles and mission and force requirements are based upon our assessment of projected U.S. security interests foreign policy objectives, likely threats, and an informed appreciation of the importance of LATAM to the United States.

Readers not needing the whys and wherefores of regional trends and U.S. interests in LATAM can refer to the digest listings in Figures 1 and 2. The several principles of U.S. military strategy that will dictate roles and missions are discussed in Section IV and further amplification of the U.S. Army mission, related tasks, and force design appears in Section V. This final section sets forth several

recommendations designed to assist U.S. Army planners in looking to future force requirements in Latin America.

SECTION II

POST-2000 LATIN AMERICA

General.

The societal environment of a post-2000 LATAM is being shaped by a number of major global and regional trends that are identifiable today. The nature of these trends favor evolutionary rather than revolutionary change but their magnitude make some pronounced changes inevitable. The following paragraphs describe those sociological, economic, and political factors which are shaping the future of LATAM. Figure 1 provides a synopsis of projected conditions for those readers not requiring a detailed analysis.

LATAM 2000 FORECAST

- Exploding population (556 million); widespread poverty.
- Unfulfilled expectations; democracy tarnished.
- Marginal economic improvement; continued maldistribution of wealth; lingering debt burden.
- Governments challenged by Left/Right/Drug cartels, e.g. insurgencies/coups/corruption. Marxism remains a factor.
- North-South issues replace East-West consideration. USSR/Cuba less significant.
- Drug production areas expanding beyond Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.
  - Will include Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay and Guatemala.
  - Opium poppy grown in South America.
- Possible small U.S. military presence in Panama.
- Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile best U.S. trade prospects.
- Mexico more important to the United States; markets/materials/drugs/emigrants.
- Flow of illegal immigrants continues.
- Environmental issues gain importance.

Figure 1. Digest of Trends.

Sociological Conditions and Trends.

Many aspects of Latin America's future are difficult to predict, but there is one certainty: the region's population will continue to expand rapidly. The area's annual demographic growth rate of 2.2 percent will swell the regional population from approximately 457 million in 1991 to 556 million in 2000.[1] By 2010, it is projected that Latin American will have 691 million people, an increase of 52 percent (234 million) in just 19 years. Demographic strains will be especially severe in nations such as Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Ecuador, where the yearly rate of population increase exceeds 3 percent.[2] At the end of World War II, the United States and Latin American had roughly similarly-sized populations; in 2010, the Latin American population will be *twice* the size of our own.

In most Latin American countries, the added burden of millions of new citizens will place enormous stress on available national resources. A 51 percent larger Latin American population will require vastly increased rural food production in a part of the world that already cannot feed itself. Although an even larger proportion of Latin Americans will gravitate to the cities in coming decades, making the area over 70 percent urban early in the next century, the rural peasant population still will rise in absolute terms.[3] Thus, agitation for land reform will intensify in a region of highly concentrated tenure. Population pressures will be even more strongly felt in urban Latin America where the demands for jobs, housing, education, transportation, potable water, electricity, health care, and sanitation will be impossible to meet. The unmanageable urban and environmental problems of contemporary Mexico City will become common throughout the region after 2000.

The expected expansion of population threatens to exacerbate a wide range of social problems in an area that already suffers from endemic poverty (average per capita gross domestic product = U.S. $2,425 in 1991) and extreme social inequality.[4] A tiny, mostly white social elite and a small middle class together account for only about 20 percent of the area's population; an additional 10 percent is composed of a relatively well-off, unionized sector of the industrial working

class. The other 70 percent of Latin Americans, consisting largely of Mestizos (mixed European-American blood lines), live in very difficult social circumstances. This bottom 70 percent suffer from low income, poor nutrition, substandard housing, and meager public services. Many struggle simply to find work of any sort; combined figures for unemployment and underempioyment today approach 50 percent of the adult workforce in much of Latin America.

It is difficult to imagine a social context less prepared to absorb an additional 234 million people over the next two decades.

Economic Conditions and Trends.

Can the Latin American economy perform well enough in the future to meet the challenge of an ongoing population explosion amidst widespread poverty? On balance, the outlook is unpromising, but there are some reasons to be more optimistic now than in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a wave of free market economic reform is starting to sweep across Latin America. Following the lead of Chile and Mexico, many Latin American governments are beginning to privatize money-losing state enterprises, reduce nationalistic obstacles to foreign investment, liberalize trade, and trim excessive public sector spending.[5] Nations which are able to sustain these reforms against the intense political opposition they generate will emerge with more efficient, vigorous, and productive economies in the next century.

The foreign debt situation which severely limited economic growth during the 1980s is stabilizing. The Brady Plan, applied first in Mexico, exchanges concessions by the banks for economic reforms by the debtors and is beginning to reduce the share of regional export income that must be devoted to repaying interest and principal on outstanding loans. Many difficult financial problems lie ahead, particularly for large debtors such as Argentina and Brazil. There will be new rounds of negotiations and new debt relief plans for years to come. Nonetheless, by early in the next century, the worst of the debt crisis should be over for the nations that embrace

economic reform; indeed, the region's total debt is already edging downward from $496 billion in 1987 to $464 billion in 1991.[6] In addition, the major oil-exporting countries in the area (Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador), which were battered by falling petroleum income in the 1980s, can look forward to gradually rising prices in the next century as world demand for oil (now increasing at 3 percent per year) catches up with global production capacity. With more than 120 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves (58 billion barrels in Venezuela alone), Latin America is a key oil-exporting alternative to the Middle East.[7]

Although Mexico's projected oil reserves are smaller than Venezuela's, our southern neighbor stands to gain substantially from increasing economic integration into the Allied U.S.-Canada North American market if opposition from Mexican nationalists and U.S. organized labor and environmentalists can be overcome. Indeed, the Bush administration's 1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative looks beyond the North American market to the formation of a free trade zone embracing the entire Western Hemisphere.

Because of these positive factors, the Latin American economy as a whole will perform better in the 1990s and after the turn of the century than it has in the last decade. In fact, a few countries such as Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico could produce truly impressive rates of economic development. But so many traditional obstacles to rapid economic expansion remain intact in Latin America that growth rates still are likely to be very unimpressive in many of the other countries of the region. Many of these nations may be unable to expand their economies even marginally faster than their rates of population growth.

Assuming this economic prognosis is substantially correct, several Latin American countries will fail to generate enough economic growth to meet the demands of their poor and rapidly expanding populations after 2000. Consequently, the contemporary Latin American social conditions of poverty and inequality will be much the same early in the next century as they are today in a large part of the region. Even where strong

exports produce far better than average growth rates, as in Venezuela, Mexico and Chile, social inequalities will remain.

The persisting economic difficulties of post-2000 Latin America will also continue to encourage the cultivation, processing, and sale of illegal narcotics. These activities may concentrate in countries such as Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico where they are now well established, but they will also move elsewhere in the region (Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela) as circumstances demand. Currently, Peru produces 55 percent of the world's coca, Bolivia grows another 30 percent, and Colombia refines 70 percent of the cocaine reaching the United States.[8] Mexico is the largest source of brown heroin and marijuana imports. The major markets for these narcotics exports still will be the United States and Western Europe after 2000, but demand within Latin America itself can also be expected to rise.

Political Conditions and Trends.

During the 1970s, the great majority of Latin Americans lived under military rule, but between 1980 and 1991, freely-elected, democratic governments were reestablished throughout the region. Although re-democratization has been broadly supported in Latin America, some of these new democracies are quite fragile and may not survive into the next century. Political instability will continue to be characteristic of much of Latin America after 2000.

Re-democratization was greeted with euphoria in the 1980s but, by the early years of the next century, many of democracy's former advocates will have become disillusioned. The greatest disappointment will be in the failure of many nations' democratic rulers to effect dramatic improvements in the dismal social and economic conditions of the lower class majority. As population burdens mount and poverty and inequality remain or, in some cases, worsen, democratic leaders will be blamed.

Even in countries where beneficial free market economic reforms have been instituted, these policies will require a favorable international economic environment to be successful

and may take years to provide concrete benefits to the lowest social sectors. If unfulfilled demands for jobs, urban services, and land mount after 2000, populist and radical politicians can be expected to exploit these factors in electoral contests. Democratic governments could change from right to left and back again with bewildering frequency.

Other disappointments with democracy may occur as well. The selfish battle for spoils and patronage that has absorbed politicians' attentions in the democratic 1980s and early 1990s has appalled many Latin Americans and often paralyzed their governments. Moreover, scandal and corruption have accompanied the reestablishment of civilian rule in Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Such developments will continue to discredit and weaken democratic regimes in the future.

In Latin America, political support is tentative and can evaporate overnight if economic conditions deteriorate. The precipitous decline in popularity recently experienced by such leaders as Fernando Collor (Brazil), Carlos Menem (Argentina), and Alberto Fujimori (Peru) indicates what is in store for many of their colleagues in the next century.

In many Latin American countries, democratic leaders will also continue to have their ranges of action limited by the need to spend scarce resources on the still influential armed forces and to avoid policies at odds with military preferences. The military will remain the most powerful political actor in many ostensibly democratic countries of the region.

If democracy loses its luster and memories of unsuccessful military regimes and failed revolutions fade, Latin Americans may reexamine nondemocratic political alternatives from the military hardliners of Guatemala on the extreme right to Marxist revolutionaries of Peru on the extreme left. Post-2000, the frustrated far right and far left both could attract numerous new recruits to their campaigns of violence against the democratic order.

Thus, in 2010, Latin America may embrace a greater diversity of regime types than it does today. Democracies will still be in the majority despite their flaws. Indeed, where

economic circumstances have been especially favorable (as in Venezuela) and/or where an unusually strong, broadly-based political party (or parties) has managed to gain a reputation for reform and efficiency (as in Costa Rica), democracy could become well-institutionalized. Chile and Uruguay, for example, have the potential to reconstruct what were once two of Latin America's strongest democratic regimes. Elsewhere, Latin American democracies will continue to be fragile, unstable, and potentially vulnerable to antidemocratic threats from right and left.

Some of these weak democracies ultimately are likely to be replaced by authoritarian military governments, usually of a conservative stripe, or by demagogic populist dictatorships. Both types of regimes will suppress opposition and violate human rights. In the next century, the danger exists that some nations' governments may become dominated by drug lords and other criminal elements. Smaller countries will be in the greatest danger in this respect; Noriega's Panama may prove not to have been unique. Other governments that remain democratic may be severely undermined by narcotics traffickers.

Cuba's Communist regime may also survive into the next century. Unlike the deposed rulers of Eastern Europe, Fidel Castro came to power in a popular uprising in 1959. Although he has lost much of his support in ensuing years, he retains more popular backing than most of the world's Communist leaders. In addition, by purging the military and security forces of unreliable elements in 1989, the Cuban leader has reinforced his capability to repress future threats to his control. However, as the Soviet Union and former Eastern Bloc nations pursue economic reform and reduce their subsidies to the inefficient and sugar-dependent Cuban economy, standards of living will fall dramatically, creating increased unrest. The U.S.S.R. provided a hefty U.S. $5.5 billion in economic aid and subsidies during 1990 but the 1991 figures will drop to around $2.5 billion.[9] The Soviet desire and ability to continue this level of funding while struggling with its own economic deterioration are uncertain, but may essentially disappear in the near future. Because of the abject failure of Castro's mid-1980s radical

economic "Rectification Campaign" and his nation's mammoth debt burden, the Cuban Revolution is already in the throes of the worst economic crisis in its history. Soon Castro may face the choice of adopting the market-oriented economic reforms he despises or seeing his island become a backward, isolated tropical North Korea. Current U.S. demands are that the Soviet Union must drastically curtail its aid to Cuba if the U.S.S.R. expects to receive U.S. economic assistance. The Cuban dictator can only look back with nostalgia at the cold war era when the Soviet Union still valued his island's strategic position.

If current trends in Soviet foreign policy "New Thinking" continue, the U.S.S.R. will reduce or even cease its aid to Marxist revolutionary movements in the Americas. The Castro brothers still believe in socialist internationalism, but will be too economically weakened to provide much more than advice and moral support. As the lack of external support handicaps Marxist revolutionary movements in Latin America, a negotiated end to the war in El Salvador becomes more likely.

Nevertheless, revolutionary movements will still pose a threat to established governments in the region. The poverty, inequalities, and unfulfilled expectations troubling the Latin American masses are likely to continue to spawn homegrown insurgencies based on egalitarian and nationalist ideals. The insurgent groups are likely to affiliate in some way with narcotrafficking to raise funds necessary to support their activities.

In this environment, Latin American militaries are likely to remain concentrated on the problems of maintaining internal order. They will spend some of their budgets arming themselves against their neighbors, but international military conflicts in the region will be the exception in the 21st century as they have been in the 20th.

Summary.

In short, Latin America after 2000 still will be a very socio-economically troubled and politically unstable region. Economic growth may resume at more normal rates than in the

"lost decade" of the 1980s, but in many countries growth will be insufficient to meet the needs of a poor and rapidly expanding population. The unsatisfied demands of the lower class majority in Latin America will represent a serious obstacle to democratic political stability in the 21st century. In this context, more Latin Americans may seek to leave the economic and political ills of their homelands behind to emigrate to the United States. The pressures on our borders will certainly intensify.

Since it is in the best U.S. interests to have a stable, prosperous, and secure Latin America as a neighbor, the U.S. Government will search for the ways and means to assist the LATAM nations in solving their internal and regional problems.

SECTION III

LATAM 2000 - INTERESTS, THREATS, AND POLICY

General.

The regional trends described in Section II, plus recent geopolitical events throughout the world, have called into question the future strategic importance of LATAM to the United States. With the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and the near demise of Soviet adventurism, the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the discredit of Marxism as a viable economic system, LATAM has virtually ceased being a U.S.-Soviet battleground of conflicting democratic and Communist ideologies. Therefore, some strategists argue that the United States has few national security concerns in that region. (Cuba is the main exception but poses no large threat without Soviet backing.) Since our principal trading partners are Canada, Japan, and the nations of Western Europe, analysts may contend that Latin America is marginally significant to our economy and with its debt, inflation, and stability problems, poses more problems than promises. Such simplistic arguments have led to conclusions by some political analysts that Latin America may virtually "drop off the map" as far as Washington is concerned.[10] We agree with Abraham P. Lowenthal that such conclusions are both short-sighted and erroneous. The geographical proximity of Latin America will require the United States to be acutely interested in the degree to which LATAM nations are successful in dealing with problems that, if left unsolved, will spill over into the United States. To deal with these continuing baseline problems, LATAM nations will focus on key goals. These include the emergence from the current economic recession; the expansion of petroleum production; the consolidation of democratic government; the elimination of illicit drug production and trafficking; the control of population growth; the

improvement of standards of living and the increase in respect for human rights; and the attainment of environmental standards. Each of these goals have direct effects on our political, economic, and social well-being. The United States has clear-cut national interests in LATAM, many of which have national security implications.

U.S. Interests.

MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA

- Curtailment of illicit narcotics production and trafficking.
- Viable and stable democratic governments throughout LATAM.
- Economic growth and progress - Access to markets and resources.
- Regional stability - Absence of domestic or regional armed conflicts.
- Orderly management of immigration to the United States.
- Environmental management and protection.
- Free transit along strategic lines of communication.

Figure 2. Digest of Interests.

A discussion of these interests follows.

Curtailment of illicit narcotics production and trafficking. This interest will have top priority because problems resulting from widespread drug abuse will continue to plague society. The problems are not confined to the economic and social impairment of U.S. society, but also include undermining legitimate governments and economic stability, increased criminal violence, and reduced health standards throughout LATAM. The illicit drug trade threatens all other U.S. interests and objectives in the region and, more importantly, attacks the fiber of U.S. society.

Viable democratic governments. The acceptance of democratic government throughout virtually all of LATAM is a success story for U.S. foreign policy, and a strategic victory for the United States. General Fred F. Woerner, USA (Retired) aptly called democracy "a bulwark against totalitarian doctrines; it is also a marvelous system for expanding the community of values and for nurturing maximum cooperation

and economic trade among the societies of the hemisphere."[11] Unfortunately the LATAM democracies are being threatened by economic depression, drug cartels, and insurgencies. Many will need U.S. assistance and nurturing if they are to survive and mature. Democracy without true pluralism, appropriate judicial institutions, protection of human rights, and reasonable chance for economic progress is no democracy at all. Democracies throughout LATAM are "good business" for the United States and we must support their maturation process.

Economic growth and progress - access to markets and resources. It is in U.S. interests to encourage free market economic reforms, debt relief, and economic integration. These will stimulate LATAM economic growth and increased imports from the United States. U.S. businesses have lost over $75 billion in potential exports since the recession in LATAM began, and, as a result, perhaps as many as one million jobs have been forfeited within the United States.[12] Currently our imports and exports to LATAM are about one-half of those with Western Europe. Considering the projected population growth and the existing storehouse of natural resources, LATAM has great market potential.

The United States imports many raw materials from LATAM including antimony, bauxite (96 percent of our aluminum comes from LATAM bauxite), tin, and copper. Over 40 percent of our petroleum imports originates in LATAM.[13] In light of projected increases in oil prices and the political volatility of the Middle East, maintaining secure access to the hemisphere's petroleum resources is in the best interests of the United States. Two-thirds of LATAM oil exports presently are sold to the United States, and current efforts to expand the U.S.-Canada economic union to include oil-rich Mexico are to our long-term benefit.[14]

Regional stability and peaceful change. Though progress may be made in strengthening the role of democracy and free market economies in Latin America, acts of terrorism by dissident groups and campaigns of insurgency are likely to develop in certain countries. Narcoterrorism and the linkage of insurgents with drug traffickers will be a continuing threat.

Such actions are inimical to overall U.S. interests, particularly when U.S. citizens and facilities are targeted. Although deep and costly entanglements should be avoided, modest levels of economic and military assistance to friendly governments compatible with our democratic values could be used to promote an environment conducive to evolutionary political change.

Orderly management of immigration to the United States. No one is certain how many aliens illegally enter the United States each year, but during FY 1990, 1,046,420 illegal aliens were apprehended along the U.S./Mexican border alone.[15] For every apprehension conservatively three or more aliens are successful in illegally entering. Faced with poverty and little opportunity at home, Latinos are lured by jobs and access to benefits in the United States. Such alien workers may deprive U.S. workers of jobs, swell welfare lines, and create strains on local government infrastructures. Often criminal violence and illicit narcotics trafficking are a by-product of illegal entry. Such massive population movements cannot be stopped by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service or the U.S. Border Patrol. Helping solve the economic and political problems in Latin America will alleviate the problems caused by illegal immigration by eliminating the cause.

Environmental management and protection. Current LATAM environmental issues of particular concern include atmospheric pollution (global warming, acid rain, and ozone depletion); sea pollution (industrial discharge, spills, and sewage) which is damaging fisheries; and earth destruction (deforestation, erosion, and contamination). Each year, 27,000 square miles of forest are destroyed in LATAM as overpopulation forces migrations that use slash and burn techniques for subsistence farming. Industrial pollutants are contaminating or destroying vegetation and marine life to an unprecedented degree. Recognizing that this ecological damage is affecting the health and welfare of U.S. citizens, as well as undermining the long-term economic viability of the region, the U.S. Government is prompting efforts throughout LATAM to reduce environmental destruction.

Free transit along strategic lines of communication. The ability to move freely through the air and sea lanes of the Western Hemisphere, particularly the Caribbean Sea and the Panama Canal, is important to U.S. national security. The recent deployments to the Persian Gulf revalidated this requirement.

Principal Threats to U.S. Interests.

Threats to U.S. interests and LATAM regional security are listed below. They differ little from those identified since World War II, but lack the significant Soviet and Cuban threat that existed during the cold war period.

- Narcotics production, trafficking and abuse.
  - Political undermining of friendly governments.
  - Economic, social and health problems in producer/transit/user countries.
  - Linkage of drug trafficker with terrorists/insurgents.
  - Economic, social and health problems in the United States.
- Economic depression + population growth = unfulfilled expectations = instability.
- Strain on fragile democracies may prompt a return to authoritarian regimes.
- Massive illegal immigration to the United States.
- Terrorism directed against U.S. facilities and businesses.
- Loss of Panama Canal access; restriction of regional SLOCs.

These potential dangers could result in loss of access to raw materials, markets and investments. Coordinated policy guidance and a coherent regional strategy are required to prevent the development of such threats or, if present, foster their ultimate successful resolution.

Pillars of U.S. Regional Policy.

In the realm of foreign policy, only the degree of emphasis placed on the tenets of today will change. The five "Ds" now articulated will have a reordered priority.

Drugs. The magnitude of the worldwide drug problem and the continuing economic and social costs at home will force U.S. policymakers to keep counterdrug activities high on the list of foreign policy programs. By 2000, either the path to successful control of drug trafficking will be in sight or the problem will be so significant that more drastic curtailment methods will be considered. Either way, significant U.S. assets, to include use of the military, will be engaged to prosecute supply reduction operations LATAM drug cartels are likely to continue to expand and diversify throughout the 1990s and the U.S. drug problem will still exist as the new century begins.

Development. The importance of economic growth and development will be almost co-equal with the drug issue and closely related to it as long as viable economic alternatives to drug growth and production are not available. Until growth and development problems lessen, the production and export of drugs will continue. Initiatives can be expected that will be designed to stimulate foreign investment in LATAM; vitalize and expand agriculture and industry throughout the region; alleviate debt problems; enlarge markets for U.S.-made products; and guarantee U.S. access to LATAM petroleum, other raw materials, and manufactured products. If the economies are to get better, exports other than expendable raw resources need to be developed. Priority is likely to be given to Mexico, Venezuela, the Andean nations and Brazil because of their greater importance to both economic and noneconomic U.S. interests in LATAM. While not of the magnitude of Franklin Roosevelt's Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act or John Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which is based on trade, investment and debt reduction, offers promise over the long term for sound economic growth. If the North American Free Trade Agreement is accepted by

Congress and proves successful, greater economic ties with all of LATAM will follow.

Democracy. The United States will continue to promote the maturation of established democracies and speak out against human rights abuses. Because of the problems of poverty, overpopulation, and political instability mentioned earlier, weak LATAM democracies are vulnerable to overthrow from extreme left and right wing political groups or military coups. To avoid this situation, U.S. economic and political support of popularly elected governments can be expected.

Diplomacy. Successful during the 1980s, diplomacy will continue as a valuable tool to promote understanding and compromise within the Western Hemisphere. The importance of the drug issue, illegal immigration, and the growing market potential of LATAM will demand greater attention from future U.S. administrations.

Defense. World events may have downgraded the national security importance of LATAM to those who saw it principally as an arena for U.S.-Soviet political and military competition. While it may be true that the threat from direct Soviet/Cuban actions is virtually nil and threats from Marxist-oriented insurgent and terrorist groups have greatly diminished, the importance of regional lines of communications, strategic materials, and political support remains high. Also the drug issue may well have a growing military component. Because of decreased likelihood of major external involvement, Latin America will be an economy of force theater but the requirement for a quick, efficient and sustainable U.S. military response will remain. Security assistance and foreign internal defense will continue to be important tools in U.S. policy implementation. The following section suggests a strategy for supporting our LATAM policy.

SECTION IV

STRATEGY

Principal U.S. Objectives.

As the 21st century begins, the United States will have seven principal strategic objectives within LATAM whose accomplishment may require U.S. military contributions.

- Maintain regional peace and stability to include consolidation and maturation of democratic government.
- Develop viable and progressive economic systems throughout the region to include solutions to debt problems.
- Curtail illicit narcotics production and drug trafficking.
- Maintain access to regional products, raw materials and markets.
- Assure unrestricted movement along regional strategic lines of communication to include an open and neutral Panama Canal.
- Encourage the elimination of human rights abuse.
- Protect the natural environment.

Strategic Concepts.

The military strategy for supporting these national objectives will be based upon those principles now articulated in the national strategy. General Colin L. Powell, in February 19, 1991 testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, discussed the major military strategic concepts for the 1990s. Though not all elements of the global strategy may be necessary for LATAM, it is predictable that certain elements will apply. Those are

deterrence, power projection, forward presence, collective security, sea and air superiority, security assistance, and arms control.

Deterrence. We will seek to deter terrorism, insurgency, narcotics trafficking, and the export of revolution. Security assistance and nation assistance will be provided to friendly nations to help eliminate the root causes of domestic political instability. Combined with economic and political support, military assistance programs can be of significant help in preserving national and regional peace.

Power Projection. The United States must retain the ability to move quickly within Latin America and the Caribbean. Whether U.S. forces are involved in counternarcotics activities, counterterrorism, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), or other responses to unilateral or multilateral calls for military interventions to restore peace and protect stability, the ability to move them rapidly to crisis points will protect U.S. interests and support deterrence. The capability to construct and insert force packages for sustained operations in theater is a strategic necessity. They will come from contingency forces located in CONUS and the Army elements would be assigned to one or more of the three CONUS-based U.S. Corps.

Forward Presence. While forward basing will be minimal in a post-2000 Latin America, U.S. Military Groups or Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) will remain, as will mobile training teams, assisting in counterdrug and counterinsurgency activities. It may also be possible, even likely, that U.S. forces will be maintained at Howard AFB and Rodman Naval Facility in Panama plus a forward Joint Task Force (JTF) located there for counternarcotics activities.

Collective Security. The Inter-American system remains viable be utilized to promote dialogue, understanding and cooperation. The Rio Treaty, the Inter-American Defense Board, and the Conference of American Armies all contribute to these ends, as do other global organizations such as the United Nations. Such fora advance the concept of democracy and promote military-to-military relations among nations.

Sea and Air Superiority. Unrestricted movement, in peacetime as well as in time of war, along the Caribbean SLOCs, through the Panama Canal, and along both coasts of South America requires regional sea and air superiority. Such freedom assures access to important raw materials and petroleum products, and enhances power projection capabilities to other potential crisis spots throughout the world.

Security Assistance. Military assistance programs help friendly regional nations to consolidate democratic gains, achieve internal stability, and promote economic development. Security Assistance is an important strategic tool.

Arms Control. Discouraging the proliferation of conventional arms and the acquisition of nuclear arms by Latin American nations are important U.S. strategic objectives. Arms races between neighboring Latin nations detract from economic growth and promote instability. U.S. efforts should be directed towards insuring that the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Tlateloco be respected by all South American nations.

Required Resources.

If U.S. objectives in LATAM are to be achieved, then adequate resources will be required. Foremost is an ample security assistance budget. Because the process for approving and resourcing International Security Assistance and International Development and Humanitarian Assistance lies outside the domain of military officials, the military will influence this process at the margin. It is within the certain grasp of the Army, however, to structure small, specialized forces to implement certain military aspects of our LATAM strategy. A Special Forces Group and other units will be required, including mission forces with psychological operations, medical, engineer, intelligence, communications, and civil affairs capabilities. Specific requirements are addressed in Section V.

Implementing Strategy.

Implementing our strategy throughout the Americas will require a command and control structure, and assigned and supporting units that are adequate to address the threat in LATAM-2000. The following section offers a concept for the Army role in the LATAM of the near future.

Section V

RECOMMENDED MISSIONS AND FORCE DESIGN

General.

U.S. strategic objectives in the early 21st century will require an Army that is well-trained, modernized, responsive, and prepared for with its role in Latin America. The Army will be required to act in nontraditional ways as it supports U.S. regional policy because each of the foreign policy pillars (the five "Ds") has a military component. Furthermore, command and control relationships will be different from those of the past 50 years since the unified commander responsible for Latin America will be CONUS-based and may have few U.S. Army units dedicated to his command. Due to anticipated force reductions, his dedicated forces possibly may consist only of a planning staff. Whatever constitutes his assigned forces, they will also be CONUS-based (with a few possible exceptions) and may be dual-missioned to other unified commanders for their contingency planning. While such multiple taskings create difficulties for unit commanders in terms of proper equipment and training for different environments, the challenges are not new to the Army. The Army must be prepared to deploy for a wide range of contingencies in the LATAM theater.

For many years, the peacetime roles and missions for U.S. military forces in Latin America have been defined by the theater commander-in-chief. Based upon his interpretation of U.S. national military strategy, the CINC set forth his strategic objectives, to complement national policy. That a definite or precise articulation of roles and missions does not always flow from Washington should surprise no one. The CINC is best suited to evaluate the situation and advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the

most effective way to orchestrate employment of military power within the theater. When defining the mission of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the two previous commanders-in-chief have made similar declarations. General Fred F. Woerner's mission statement read "Defend the Panama Canal and the southern flank of the United States and advance U.S. national interests in the area." General Maxwell Thurman's statement was more succinct, "Secure the Southern Theater." Both Generals saw almost identical tasks/objectives flowing from the mission statement. They both sought to:

- Promote and support the democratization process in LATAM.
- Assist regional nations in defeating drug trafficking.
- Defend the Panama Canal.
- Protect U.S. lives and property.
- Combat terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.

The current Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO), General George A. Joulwan, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1991, stated that the focus of USSOUTHCOM includes assisting host nations to promote, enhance and solidify democratic institutions. He further said that in facing the nontraditional threats, we must be concerned with the social and economic problems of Latin America as well as the internal insurgencies and drug trafficking problems. These tasks are in addition to the purely military ones of defending the canal and being prepared to execute contingency operations in theater.

Mission 2000.

Taking into consideration the statements of the last three CINCs and projecting current trends 10 years hence, we can derive a plausible year 2000 mission statement for the successor to USSOUTHCOM. The mission, and associated objective tasks for LATAM and the Caribbean, are likely to be:

Mission: Defend the Southern flank of the United States; assist in promoting U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean; and secure the Southern Theater from external threats as necessary.

Theater Objectives: U.S. armed forces will be prepared to:

- Conduct military operations as necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and U.S. lives and property within the assigned area of responsibility.
- Support activities directed against the production and trafficking of illicit drugs in conjunction with host nations and other U.S. agencies as appropriate.
- Support U.S. policies to consolidate and strengthen legitimate democratic governments in Latin America. Promote democracy, development and diplomacy.
- Ensure the neutrality of the Panama Canal and guarantee free access to ships of all nations.
- Defend the Panama Canal as necessary and help maintain free and safe passage along the regional strategic lines of communication.
- Assist friendly nations in deterring/combatting terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.
- Conduct disaster relief/humanitarian operations as required.

The mission statement and objectives are compatible with the new national security strategy and reflect an evolution of previous policy with changing priorities. Being prepared to conduct conventional military contingency operations has first priority, but any such large scale endeavors are considered unlikely. Contingencies similar to Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), Just Cause (Panama) or 310/2 (Dominican Republic), while conceivable, are also unlikely to recur. Interventions/invasions requiring sustained combat operations are even less likely.

Counterdrug activities, however, are expected to continue and even increase as narcotraffickers disperse, diversify, and

increase production to meet worldwide demand. Since trends indicate greater cocaine manufacture, introduction of the opium poppy to South American cultivation, and no lessening of marijuana production, the regional militaries will be required to expand their involvement in counterdrug activities. Likewise, the U.S. military will be more involved as the Andean strategy is executed.

The projected U.S. policy to help consolidate legitimate democratic governments stems from President Carter's human rights policies and President Reagan's Four "Ds" of Latin American policy. President Bush has maintained these initiatives along with his own plan for economic development (Enterprise for the Americas Initiative). The U.S. Army, in particular, has a role in promoting democratic development because of its long-standing professional relationships with most Latin American armies. Since the advent of the Rio Treaty following World War II, the U.S. Army has utilized activities such as the Inter-American Defense Board; the Conference of the American Armies; U.S. Military Groups (MAAGs, SAOs, etc.) administering security assistance programs; in-theater combined exercises; and nation-development/civic action programs to build professional and social rapport with Latin American militaries and the host nation citizenry. Building on this foundation, the U.S. Army can influence the Latin American militaries through example and education regarding the proper civilian/military relationship in democratic societies.

Guaranteeing the neutrality of the Panama Canal is permitted by treaty, even in the post-2000 period, either through unilateral action or in conjunction with Panamanian forces.[16] Since Panama shows little propensity to reinstitute any form of military organization similar to the old Panama Defense Forces (PDF), any significant defense of the canal becomes a defacto U.S. contingency. U.S. military forces must maintain contingency plans to protect free and unrestricted movement along the regional strategic lines of communication, and be prepared to assure access to critical strategic resources in times of emergency. All U.S. military components must also be prepared for disaster relief/humanitarian missions in a

region prone to earthquakes, volcanic activity, and hurricanes, and structurally unprepared to deal with them.

Finally, the U.S. Army will continue to be involved in training and otherwise assisting friendly nations to counter threats and root causes of terrorism and insurgency. Providing mobile training teams, intelligence support, service school training, and specialized equipment to forces of threatened nations will be tasks for the U.S. Army in addition to an ambitious Army-to-Army exercise program such as the current "Fuerzas Unidas" series. Encouragement and assistance should also be provided those friendly LATAM nations seeking to establish their own Reserve Component forces. Reserve forces are generally more reflective of the society they serve and act as a positive interface between the professional army and the citizenry. Additionally, the presence of Reserve forces may be a more economic way to meet some of the defense needs of a nation thereby allowing more funds for nondefense programs. Such assistance could parallel efforts now underway by the U.S. Army Reserve in Venezuela. Other U.S. military services conduct similar programs.

Command and Control.

Whatever U.S. unified command will have responsibility for LATAM after 1999, it will not be USSOUTHCOM as we know it today, and it will not be forward deployed in theater. Whatever the command turns out to be, and wherever it is located, will be influenced by a number of factors. These include continuing defense budget constraints dictated by the domestic and international economy; the diminished Soviet threat; provisions of the Panama Canal Treaties calling for withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Panama by the end of 1999; base closure plans within CONUS; reduced Active and Reserve Component force structure; and the nature of the global threat and mission requirements. As a result, those responsible for preparing a new unified command plan should seriously consider creating one command responsible for the insular Caribbean and the land mass comprising North and South America. The LATAM portion of its mission statement and derived tasks will be similar to the "Mission 2000" stated

above. The command will be CONUS based and is likely to have component command headquarters from each of the three principal services plus a Special Operation Command. Figure 3 illustrates an organizational structure favored by the study group. For study purposes, the unified command will be referred to as Americas Command. Location of the unified headquarters conceivably will be in Florida, Georgia, or Texas. The decision where to locate will be based on political and economic factors as much as military considerations.



Notes: (1) Army FORSCOM functions; Commands CONUSAs and Corps. CGUSARNOR and CINCAMERICAS could be dual hatted.

(2) Command Nation Assistance Forces: SOF, Medical, Engineers, Intelligence, Signal, Aviation. ARSOUTH could become a subunified command.

Figure 3. A Theater Command Plan.

The Army Component Command.

The Army component of the Americas Command would be most efficiently represented by two commands: a United States Army North (USARNOR) responsible for the land mass north of Guatemala; a United States Army South (USARSO)

encompassing Central and South America, the same as the current USARSO. USARNOR could assume the Army missions of the current Forces Command (FORSCOM), including the land defense of the continental United States (CONUS). Mexico, although commonly thought of in Latin American terms, is geographically in North America. This would also recognize the special status of that country for U.S. political interests in the Western Hemisphere. By assuming the Army mission of the current FORSCOM, USARNOR would be responsible for:

- CONUS-based Active and Reserve Component unit training and readiness.
- Army force mobilization.
- Military support to civil authority.
- Support to drug law enforcement agencies.
- Land defense of CONUS.
- Troop support to exercises and operations worldwide.

United States Army South would be the lead agency for Latin American affairs within Americas Command, responsible for planning, coordinating and administration of:

- Military contingency operations.
- Counternarcotics support.
- Intelligence gathering.
- Security assistance programs.
- Overseas deployment training.
- Combined ground exercises/joint air-ground exercises.
- Counterterrorism/counterinsurgency.
- Embassy evacuation/hostage rescue operations.
- Training guidance to AC/RC units with designated LATAM missions.
- Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

U.S. forces dedicated to LATAM missions, such as those engaged in administering security assistance programs, counternarcotics operations, or any other long-term operations in Latin America would be assigned to USARSO. Units with on-call or contingency missions, primarily combat forces, would be assigned to USARNOR. Most contingency forces would have multiple taskings and be available for attachment to any of the CINCs worldwide.

While it does not fit with our stated assumptions, retaining some U.S. Army forces at Howard AFB/Fort Kobbe would do much to advance our regional capabilities. In this regard, an interesting recent development has been Panamanian calls for continued U.S. military presence there beyond 1999. Several public opinion polls taken in the March/April 1991 time frame indicate as many as "two out of every three Panamanians want to extend U.S. military presence beyond 2000."[17] Such actions also have been proposed by some U.S. senators and Panamanian legislators have suggested that the issue be submitted to a Panamanian plebiscite. It is too early to identify this as a probability, but it may become a significant issue in Panamanian politics and consequently significant in the formulation of U.S. strategy for the region. Retention of an advance base in Panama would strengthen the U.S. capability for timely projection of military power throughout the region. Additionally, Howard AFB is ideally situated as a way station for military personnel traveling to South America from the United States.

USARSO would also serve as the lead service component for providing command and control and service support for any Americas Command Joint Task Forces needed in the region. For example, USARSO could provide the core of a semi-permanent JTF Panama; perhaps such an arrangement could become possible considering the growing political trend among Panamanians for retaining a U.S. military presence in their country located at Howard AFB, Panama. This could facilitate Panama Canal defense, counternarcotics support and security assistance to LATAM nations.

Army Force Design.

Militarily the Latin American region will continue as an economy-of-force theater in the early 21st century. During this period the U.S. Army may face some of the most difficult challenges in its history. Defense of the Panama Canal and guaranteeing its neutrality will remain an important mission, and preparedness to conduct contingency missions throughout the region will continue as a high priority. However, the continuation and, indeed, increase in nontraditional missions such as counternarcotics operations, nation assistance, security assistance, civic action, and disaster relief will test the flexibility and professionalism of those serving in the new U.S. Army South command. Successful transition by the Army to those nontraditional roles will promote stability in the region and in those individual nations facing subversive actions and low intensity conflict.

The U.S. Army's role in assisting host nations in meeting their stability objective will continue in the form of small Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Joint Training Exercises (JTXs), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), individual and small unit exchanges, and training LATAM military personnel at U.S. service schools. Our assistance, while often indirect and discrete, will ensure a continued U.S. military presence in the region.

By applying military power indirectly and discretely, the U.S. Army will increase its probability for success in contributing to our regional objectives. Although less glamorous, providing nation assistance may prove more difficult than the traditional Army mission of training for conventional combat operations.

In considering regional stability to be a principal objective of U.S. policy, we must be prepared to give greater attention and support to developing national and regional internal infrastructures. By so doing, besides providing a viable peacetime mission for much of its force structure, the Army can also assist in deterring low intensity conflict by helping eliminate its underlying causes. Additionally, small projects, both in mission scale and number of participating U.S. personnel, can often yield better, more cost effective results

than larger ones. Regardless of size, all projects should be considered for long-term benefits, not just their immediate payoff. Quick fixes should be viewed with caution. We must avoid projects that raise expectations that may not be fulfilled.

The structure required to accomplish USARSO's future roles and missions would be primarily oriented on combat support and service support units. The authors see little or no requirement for dedicated combat units after 1999, except perhaps for Canal defense missions. Assuming no new major threats to U.S. national security develop during the 1990s, we believe the Army will enter the 21st century with an active force of about 500,000. Therefore, we do not believe it feasible to have AC combat units of brigade size or larger singularly dedicated to USARSO if the theater remains free from significant external threats.

Numerous State Department and military officials emphasize that the most important U.S. military role in Latin America is support for host nation counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and counternarcotics activities and increasing its role in alleviating the root causes for political unrest. While a LIC environment probably will continue in the region, the U.S. Army will have an indirect role. This is appropriate, due in part to strong nationalistic feelings in the region, but also because it is ultimately a more effective way to achieve U.S. national objectives.

With the above in mind, we propose an Army force structure oriented on nation development forces. While these forces could be used to augment contingency combat forces when needed, their primary focus would be nation assistance rather than combat operations. The command and control element of this Army force structure should be located in CONUS with some dedicated combat support and service support forces. The Army component commander, CG USARSO, will be responsible to the U.S. unified commander (CINCAMERICAS) for projects/exercises and deployment planning and coordination with host nations and supporting units. We also suggest that those units with nation assistance missions be drawn primarily from the Reserve Components. This would allow a smaller Active Component to focus more sharply on

timely response to worldwide contingency missions, while at the same time capitalizing on extensive existing RC experience in the region conducting engineer, medical, and civil affairs training. We envision a structure similar to that shown in Figure 4. CG USARSO would rely on and coordinate with CG USARNOR for force units required for contingencies or the conduct of army-to-army tactical exercises. The exercise interface between combat elements of the U.S. and Latin American Armies has proven very beneficial in the past and, considering the influential role most LATAM armies play in their national governments, they provide the U.S. soldier an opportunity to act as a positive role model—professional yet subordinate to civilian authority.



Figure 4. USARSO 2000 Organizational Diagram.

As the structure in Figure 4 implies, the future USARSO will be focused on many tasks requiring direct contact with foreign nationals of the region, both civilian and military. Consequently, the Army's effort would be enhanced if key USARSO personnel

are sensitive to the culture, history, and differences among LATAM nations, and are proficient in the Spanish language. This is feasible with the limited but dedicated AC and RC force structure depicted.

Unique Mission Forces will be required to conduct those missions requiring special training such as counternarcotics, counterterrorism, embassy evacuation, specialized MTTs, counterinsurgency, psyops, and intelligence collection/ dissemination. A Special Operations Forces element would probably be the centerpiece of the Unique Mission Forces. It would be involved in army-to-army training, intelligence gathering/ distribution, and occasional humanitarian/civic action programs.

U.S. Army contingency forces, those elements required for conventional combat roles, should be left under peacetime command and control of USARNOR which will be responsible for those Army tasks now being performed by U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM). They are best left as separate elements to be tailored and deployed as required in accordance with CINCAMERICAS' contingency plans. It is worth noting that during research interviews both in CONUS and in LATAM, the general opinion expressed was that events like Operation Just Cause are exceptional situations whose circumstances will seldom, if ever be repeated.

In summary, we suggest the indirect approach to projecting U.S. influence; with nation assistance and civic action programs being both the cost effective and efficient means with which to enhance U.S. interests. USARSO should be structured to support that effort with forces suitable to peacetime engagement (nation assistance/ development) and Unique Mission Forces. In his 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, President Bush states:

> For America, there can be no retreat from the world's problems. Within the broader community of nations, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our citizens and our interests, but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. We must work with others, but we must also be a leader.

Later he continues:

> Our response to need and turmoil must increasingly emphasize the strengthening of democracy, and a long-term investment in our own and free governments. Such measures are an investment in our own security as well as a response to the demands of simple justice. Nowhere is this more true than in our own hemisphere, where our fundamental aims are to deepen the sense of partnership and common interest.

We view nation assistance development as the Army's primary mission in Latin America and the one providing the greatest strategic payoff at least resource cost. Nation assistance has significant deterrent value while improving the reputation and increasing U.S. influence in the region. The primary focus for U.S. military activities in LATAM should be helping friendly governments to achieve stability while providing for the basic needs of their citizens. If this can be accomplished, problems such as subversion, terrorism, insurgency, massive emigrations, and drug trafficking will wither from lack of popular support. The proposed organization and force structure support the long-term U.S. security interests in the region and U.S. national objectives in general.

ENDNOTES

1. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1989 Report*. Washington: IDP, 1989. p. 457; and *Information Please Almanac, 1991*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1990. p. 140. See also The World Bank. *World Development Report 1989*. Washington: Oxford University Press, 1989.

2. Latin American Newsletters. *Latin American Weekly Report*, September 20, 1990. p. 11.

3. *Ibid.*, May 31, 1990. p. 3.

4. *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, p. 463, and *Latin American Weekly Report*, September 27, 1990, p. 8.

5. Georges A. Fauriol, "The Shadow of Latin American Affairs," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1990, pp. 120-122.

6. IDB. *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, p. 25, and *Latin American Weekly Report*, September 27, 1990, p. 8.

7. Ken Fuad, "A Foreign Fillup for Oil and Gas," *Hemisfile*, March 1990, p. 3.

8. Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1991, p. 9.

9. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Countdown in Cuba?," *Hemisfile*, March 1990, p. 7, and interview with Dr. Donald Shultz at the U.S. Army War College.

10. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Does Latin America Matter Any More," *Military Review*, March 1991, p. 60.

11. General Fred F. Woerner, in testimony before the Defense Subcommittee, Appropriations Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, on February 1, 1989.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. Interview with Gustavo De Lavina, San Diego Border Patrol Sector, U.S. Border Patrol, San Ysidro, CA, November 28, 1990.

16. *Panama, A Country Study*, DA Pam 550-46, Appendix B. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989, pp. 291-293.

17. "Legislator Gonzalez on Future of U.S. Bases," Latin American Daily Report, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, March 27, 1991, p. 21; and "Poll on U.S. Presence, Treaty Renegotiation," Latin American Daily Report, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service,* April 24, 1991, p. 27.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

COLONEL MURL D. MUNGER, U.S. Army Retired, is a National Security Affairs Analyst for the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He has held a wide variety of positions which include five years of command, service on the Army General Staff, and assignment with the Office of Policy Development, the White House. Previous Army War College assignments were as Director, Military Strategy Studies, Department of Corresponding Studies; Chairman, Latin America Studies Group, Strategic Studies Institute; and Adviser to the Commandant on National Guard Affairs. Colonel Munger has written extensively on Latin American and Caribbean issues and on international terrorism. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and holds a Bachelor's Degree in Geological Engineering from Kansas University and Masters' Degrees in Political Science and Mass Communications from Shippensburg State University. He also serves as an Associate Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College.

COLONEL PHILIP A. BREHM is the Army National Guard Adviser to the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is a 1986 graduate of the Army War College and holds a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg University. A Signal Corps Officer, he has served tours of duty in Germany (two), Panama, and the National Guard Bureau and commanded a Combat Support Battalion for a Separate Infantry Brigade. His most recent assignments were as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army South and as Senior National Guard Adviser for U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Army South, Republic of Panama.

COLONEL WILLIAM W. MENDEL, U.S. Army, is a tenured Faculty Instructor at the U.S. Army War College where he holds the Maxwell D. Taylor Chair of the Profession of Arms. He is

a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. He earned a Master's Degree in Political Science at the University of Kansas and was graduated from Harvard's Kennedy School Program for Senior Officials in National Security. His military duties have included infantry and general staff assignments in the United States, Korea, Vietnam, and Germany.

DR. J. MARK RUHL is Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University in 1975. Professor Ruhl has written extensively on Latin American politics with special attention to the Honduran and Colombian cases. He is the co-author with R.H. McDonald of *Party Politics and Elections in Latin America* (Westview, 1989) and the author of *Colombia: Armed Forces and Society* (Syracuse, 1980). Articles by Professor Ruhl have appeared in *Western Political Quarterly, Latin American Research Review, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Estudios Sociales Centro-americanos, Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record*, and several other journals and collections.

DR. JOHN T. FISHEL, on temporary assignment with the Strategic Studies Institute as a strategy analyst, contributed to this study. Previously he was on active duty with the U.S. Southern Command where he developed the strategy for Panama's recovery after Operation Just Cause and conducted assessments of civil-military operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia. Dr. Fishel received his Ph.D. from Indiana University in political and administrative development. He taught political science and Latin American studies at the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse, the American Graduate School of International Management, Campbell University, and was a Visiting Professor of Latin American Studies in the U.S. Army's Foreign Area Officer Course.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft
Commandant

******

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Colonel Karl W. Robinson

Authors
Colonel(Ret) Murl D. Munger
Colonel Philip A. Brehm
Colonel William W. Mendel
Dr. J. Mark Ruhl

Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary
Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

******