THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRY
DURING THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN J. LONDA, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

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The Role of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga Campaign

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This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union Cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign. General William S. Rosecrans' desire to develop Union cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland into an effective counter to Confederate cavalry is compared to the results achieved during the Chickamauga campaign. The Chickamauga campaign was the first major test of the consolidated Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Cumberland. The contribution of the cavalry failed to meet expectations in developing intelligence on General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and in influencing the outcome of the two day battle. This study attempts to answer the question "How could the Union Cavalry have been better utilized during the campaign?"

This study concludes that the improvements in the Union cavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched by development of senior cavalry leaders that had a clear vision of how to employ the instrument of their own making, a consolidated Cavalry Corps.
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THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRY DURING THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN by MAJ John J. Londa, USA, 142 pages.

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First, this investigation addresses Rosecrans' operation plan for the Chickamauga campaign and what role he envisioned the cavalry would play. Secondly, it describes the state of Union Cavalry in August 1863 in terms of organization, strength, training and leadership. Analysis of operations by the cavalry focuses on how the cavalry were integrated into the campaign, the success of their missions, and strength and weaknesses in their employment. Finally, this study attempts to answer the question "How could the Union cavalry have been better utilized during the campaign?"

This study concludes that the improvements in the Union cavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched by development of senior cavalry leaders that had a clear vision of how to employ the instrument of their own making. a consolidated Cavalry Corps.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Thesis Approval Page....................ii
Abstract....................................iii
Table of Contents.......................iv
List of Maps.............................v

Chapter 1- The Chickamauga Campaign....................1
Chapter 2- The State of Union Cavalry....................18
Chapter 3- The Cavalry on the Left Wing..................37
Chapter 4- The Cavalry on the Right Wing.................70
Chapter 5- Conclusions..................................108
Appendix A- Union Order of Battle........................130
Appendix B- Union Cavalry Casualties.....................137
Bibliography..........................................139
Initial Distribution List.........................142
**LIST OF MAPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map 1.</td>
<td>Tullahoma Campaign</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 2.</td>
<td>Chickamauga Campaign</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 3.</td>
<td>Movement to the Tennessee River</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 4.</td>
<td>Actions on the Tennessee River</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 5.</td>
<td>Movement to Chickamauga Creek</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 6.</td>
<td>Alexander's and Reed's Bridges</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 7.</td>
<td>Wilder's Brigade at Chickamauga</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 8.</td>
<td>The Right Wing above the Tennessee</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 9.</td>
<td>Crossing the Tennessee River</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 10.</td>
<td>Reconnaissance in Will's Valley</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 11.</td>
<td>Reconnaissance around Alpine</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 12.</td>
<td>Consolidation at Crawfish Springs</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 13.</td>
<td>Chickamauga Battlefield</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1- THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

On January 4, 1864, General William S. Rosecrans, former Commander of the Army of the Cumberland, sent Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell and Colonel John T. Wilder's reports of their operations during the Chickamauga campaign along with his comments to the U.S. Army Adjutant General. He praised the Union cavalry stating:

"I cannot forbear calling the special attention of the General-in-Chief and the War Department to the conspicuous gallantry and laborious services of this arm. Exposed in all weather, almost always moving, even in winter, without tents or wagons, operating in a country poorly supplied with forage, combating for the most part very superior numbers, from the beginning of one year ago, when its operations were mostly within infantry lines, it has become master of the field, and hesitates not to attack the enemy wherever it finds him."  

Rosecrans' praise for the cavalry focused on the cavalry's improvement and the hardships that they endured. His lavish praise for the part cavalry played in the Chickamauga campaign is noticeably missing.

Union cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland could have contributed much more to the Chickamauga campaign. An examination of the role of Union cavalry in this campaign underscores the point to which Union cavalry had progressed. By August 1863, the development of Union cavalry in terms of arming, equipping, training of soldiers and leaders, and doctrine development had not progressed in a balanced manner. As a result, during
the Chickamauga campaign, the cavalry failed to make a major contribution to the Union effort.

Rosecrans' remarks reflect the concern that he had for developing an effective counter to Confederate cavalry. The demands that Rosecrans placed upon Washington for improved weapons and new mounts for his cavalry, when met, had to pay off with results. Rosecrans concluded that the investment in cavalry by Washington would harvest significant rewards on the battlefield. During the Chickamauga campaign, he would not reap the benefits.

When Rosecrans took command of the Army of the Cumberland, he inherited an undisciplined string of units that were poorly trained. The lack in the numbers of cavalry was further aggravated by their dispersal throughout the army. He had to contend with Confederate cavalry that could raid behind his army to interdict his supply lines. Rosecrans saw that this weakness had to be rectified. The improvement in Union cavalry became one of his highest priorities. Rosecrans felt he made progress in the development of the cavalry. In his January 1864 comments to the Army Adjutant General, he stated:

"This great change, due chiefly to the joint efforts of both officers and men has been greatly promoted by giving them arms in which they had confidence, and by the adoption of the determined use of the saber."

2
"To Maj. Gen. D.S. Stanley is justly due great credit for his agency in bringing about these results, and giving firmness and vigor to the discipline of the cavalry."²

This study will examine how Rosecrans envisioned using his cavalry during the campaign, the state of Union cavalry in August 1863, how the cavalry executed its missions, and how Union cavalry could have been more effectively employed.

The Strategic Setting

By the summer of 1863, the tide appeared to be turning for the Union cause. Victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg promised to provide stepping stones to the eventual Confederate defeat. The victory at Gettysburg in the opening days in July showed that General Robert E. Lee was capable of being beaten. Finally, after two years of losses to the Army of Northern Virginia, the Army of the Potomac proved itself in battle. Vicksburg, which also fell in early July, opened the Mississippi River to the gulf and severed the Trans-Mississippi Confederate States. General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of all Confederate forces west of the Mississippi, was told by Jefferson Davis that he would have to be almost entirely self-sufficient.³

Jefferson Davis realized that the South was in its darkest hour. In the previous two years, the South had
lost nearly half of the territory it had claimed in 1861. The loss of territory reduced the lands that sustained the Confederate armies. General Braxton Bragg, Commander of the Army of Tennessee, held fertile middle Tennessee near Tullahoma. Middle Tennessee produced a record wheat crop in the summer of 1863, which Bragg did his best to harvest for his army. With Rosecrans’ army in the vicinity of Murfreesboro, Jefferson Davis expected the Union to try to slice the Confederate states east of the Mississippi in half. Davis could not let that happen and he would have to reinforce Bragg’s army.

After the Battle of Stones River, the Army of the Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro for six months refitting and building up supplies. Rosecrans saw his mission as keeping Bragg’s forces from reinforcing General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston, commander of Confederate forces in the west, failed to coordinate Bragg and Pemberton in an attempt to defeat Grant and lift the siege on Vicksburg. The inactivity of Rosecrans permitted the Army of the Cumberland to prepare for a summer offensive against Bragg’s army. Washington did not appreciate Rosecrans’ lengthy delay in resuming the advance on Bragg. General Henry Halleck, General-in-Chief of Union armies, thought that only by actively maintaining contact with Bragg could
Rosecrans kept Bragg tied up in Tennessee. On June 23d, the Army of the Cumberland began its advance on Bragg to bring him to battle near Tullahoma. General Halleck was very much relieved when he learned that Rosecrans' army was on the move.

**The Tullahoma Campaign**

Bragg's forces occupied a line north of the Duck River with Polk's Corps establishing a strong point at Shelbyville and Hardee's Corps at Wartrace. Hardee's position blocked three gaps: Hoover's, Liberty, and Bell Buckle (Map 1). Bragg had to cover a wide area but his position was well selected for defense or retreat.6

Rosecrans intended to maneuver Bragg out of his prepared positions and then bring him to battle. He planned to turn Bragg's right and threaten to cut Bragg's line of retreat. Rosecrans gave Bragg indications that his army would advance through Shelbyville. By using parts of his cavalry and Reserve Corps, Rosecrans conducted feints on the Confederate left. He pinned Bragg's forces with one corps and sent two corps around Bragg's right. Bragg's subordinates were not prepared to receive an attack. The quick seizure of Hoover's Gap by Colonel John Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry on June 24th turned the operation into an exploitation for the Army of the Cumberland.
On June 29th, Bragg abandoned his defenses in the Tullahoma area and withdrew south of the Elk River. He destroyed the bridges over the river and continued his withdrawal south of the Tennessee River, falling back on his base of supplies in Chattanooga. Rosecrans' exploitation failed to catch Bragg's army. Sixteen days of rain starting the 24 of June turned the roads into quagmires. Heavy rains and bad roads slowed the army's advance such that Bragg was able to safely effect a retreat.

The Tullahoma campaign cleared the Army of Tennessee out of middle Tennessee with only 570 killed, wounded, captured, or missing in action. Major General Stanley, Rosecrans' Chief of Cavalry, in his memoirs praised the campaign stating:

"If any student of the military art desires to make a study of a model campaign, let him take his maps and General Rosecrans' orders for the daily movements of the campaign. No better example of successful strategy was carried out during the war than this campaign."

Despite the success of the Tullahoma campaign, Rosecrans had to hold his army for six weeks to repair the rail line to the Tennessee River. General Halleck was impatient with the lack of progress to advance. Halleck continued to pressure Rosecrans to begin the campaign to defeat Bragg.
The Operational Setting

Chattanooga was strategically important because of the rail lines that joined there. Richmond and Chattanooga were linked by a 500 mile stretch of rail line that passed through the Appalachian Mountains. As long as the Cumberland Gap remained in Confederate hands, the rail line could be used to bring reinforcements and supplies from Virginia to Bragg's army.

Chattanooga represented a strong point that could not be directly assaulted. In the vicinity of Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, Walden's Ridge, and the Tennessee River all converged. They greatly constricted an army's movement giving a great advantage to the defender. The strength of the position at Chattanooga made Rosecrans consider a more indirect approach. The plan that Rosecrans developed to capture Chattanooga resembled the plan for Tullahoma. Rosecrans would use maneuver to dislodge Bragg from Chattanooga.

The obstacles between Rosecrans and Bragg were formidable. Rosecrans faced having to cross the Cumberland Plateau, the Tennessee River, Sand Mountain, and Lookout Mountain. The rugged nature of the terrain greatly restricted movement. It also had the effect of screening the movement of both armies from each other.
The army that could best develop accurate intelligence concerning their enemy would gain a great advantage.

Rosecrans wanted to capture the key city of Chattanooga and to bring Bragg's army to battle. He faced many difficulties closing his army on Bragg's. The flanks of his army would not be secure. His army would have to cross a major water obstacle, the Tennessee River. He had to continue to advance without being able to extend his railroad supply lines beyond the Tennessee. The terrain that his army would cross lacked forage and would barely support his horses. The worst problem of all was that he had little accurate intelligence about Bragg's disposition, strength, and intentions.

The Army of the Cumberland was organized into five corps: XIVth, XXth, XXIth, Reserve, and Cavalry Corps. Rosecrans started the campaign with 80,000 men. His forces, however, had to maintain a long supply line from Nashville. Rosecrans had to use two thirds of his Reserve Corps to guard his supply lines reducing his effective strength to around 65,000.

Jefferson Davis, who knew that Bragg had to hold his own against Rosecrans, ensured that Bragg was reinforced. Bragg, who in mid August had 44,000 men, was to receive reinforcements from Knoxville, Simon Bolivar Buckner brought 8,000 men, from Mississippi, Joe
Johnston sent 11,500 under John C. Breckinridge and W.T.H. Walker, and Lee sent James Longstreet with 12,000 from Virginia.\textsuperscript{11} When Bragg did meet Rosecrans at Chickamauga he would have the advantage in numbers of troops.

Rosecrans planned to advance his army on three axes to the Tennessee (Map 2). He would try to deceive Bragg as to where he would cross the Tennessee and then use the mountainous terrain to mask his movement. Rosecrans planned to conduct a demonstration with a portion of his cavalry north of Chattanooga while conducting a deliberate river crossing operation south of the city. By moving south of Chattanooga, he intended to interpose the Army of the Cumberland between Bragg's army and Atlanta, forcing Bragg to fight on ground that he would pick. The movement south of the Tennessee would also be on three widely dispersed axes while moving over Sand and Lookout Mountain.

Bragg was initially unsure about what course of action to pursue. He was concerned that Rosecrans and Ambrose Burnside, Commander of Department of the Ohio, would conduct a joint move against his army. By the time Rosecrans reached the Tennessee, Bragg decided to concentrate his army southwest of Chattanooga and go on the offensive.\textsuperscript{12} He hoped to attack at the time and place of his choosing.
The Battle of Chickamauga

When Rosecrans' army emerged from behind Lookout Mountain, XIVth, XXth, and XXIst Corps were widely scattered. Major General Alexander McCook's XXth Corps was the farthest south of the three corps with Major General Stanley's Cavalry Corps operating to his front. McCook's corps was 50 miles south of Chattanooga when his corps reached Alpine. Major General George Thomas' XIVth Corps came into McLemore's Cove at Steven's Gap. He was 15 miles from the northern most corps, Crittenden's corps. Major General Thomas L. Crittenden moved directly into Chattanooga after Bragg had evacuated it. He continued toward Ringgold before Thomas uncovered Bragg's location.

With the three corps so widely dispersed, Bragg had an excellent opportunity to fall on each corps and defeat each separately. The Army of Tennessee had concentrated at La Fayette and could defeat Rosecrans in detail. First, Bragg tried to launch an attack against Thomas. His subordinates unfortunately balked at conducting the attack. Bragg, next, turned his attention to Crittenden's corps which had moved up to Lee and Gordon's mills. Once again, Bragg's subordinates failed to press an opportunity to attack.
Rosecrans realized the perilous position of the Army of the Cumberland. He ordered a hurried concentration of his army in the vicinity of Lee and Gordon's mill. McCook's corps and Thomas's corps conducted forced marches and closed on Crittenden's corps before Bragg could strike. The cavalry on the left flank, on September 18th, guarded the crossing of the Chickamauga Creek gaining time for Rosecrans to solidify his position along the La Fayette Road. The Cavalry Corps on the right flank of the army closed in to support McCook's corps.

Bragg's plan of attack was based upon flanking Rosecrans' left. His intent was to gain the La Fayette Road, therefore cutting Rosecrans off from Chattanooga. On the morning of September 19th, as Bragg continued to send his units across Chickamauga Creek, Thomas launched an attack against what he thought was an isolated Confederate brigade. The fight on the 19th continued to escalate throughout the day as new units were thrown into the action. The fight developed into a general engagement as the two lines met. Bragg continued to push to reach Rosecrans' left. The day ended in a stalemate with each side sustaining a large number of casualties.

Bragg decided to press the issue the next day and attacked once again. He continued to try to turn
Rosecrans' left. At around 10 AM on the 20th, an order from Rosecrans' headquarters to Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, a division commander in Crittenden's corps, directed Wood to close up on Major General Reynolds' division. This created a gap in the Union line. At about the same time, Longstreet attacked with three Confederate divisions through the gap. Longstreet's attack completely ruptured the Union defense causing the Union right to flee the field for Chattanooga. The Union left under Thomas was bent back but established a hasty defense at Snodgrass Hill. The fragments of units that rallied on Snodgrass Hill continued to hold. The army's Reserve Corps under Major General Gordon Granger marched to Thomas's assistance. Thomas continued to hold the hill until late in the day before withdrawing to Chattanooga.

The Battle of Chickamauga was one of the bloodiest fights of the civil war. The losses for Rosecrans included 1,656 killed, 9,749 wounded, and 4,774 missing; a total of 16,179 casualties. Bragg suffered 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing for 20,950 in total. The collapse of the Union right caused Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden and many other senior officers to flee the field. Shortly after the Battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were relieved of command. The Union army continued to hold
Chattanooga only to find themselves under siege in the city. Rosecrans' campaign that began so gloriously after his success at Tullahoma culminated in disaster for Rosecrans and only a partial victory for Bragg.

Commander's Vision for the Cavalry

Rosecrans was a meticulous planner and tended to closely manage his subordinates. His plan for the use of the Union cavalry was characterized by those two traits. The initial orders for the campaign detailed the size of cavalry forces to be employed on each flank and specified the units to be used. He assigned specific missions for the two cavalry brigades on the left flank but gave more leeway to Major General Stanley on his right flank. The primary mission of the cavalry on the left flank was to screen the army's flank and conduct the demonstration above Chattanooga. The right flank would exploit the attainment of the enemy's flank by conducting a raid to cut Bragg's supply lines.

Rosecrans' vision of how to use his cavalry seemed to end as they arrived on the battlefield. The cavalry represented a critical intelligence asset that Rosecrans needed to utilize to see the battlefield. They also represented considerable potential combat power which Rosecrans needed.
The role of the Union cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign was based upon how the Cavalry Corps developed. How the cavalry was organized, armed, equipped, trained and led effected its employment. Chapter 2 of this study will detail the state of Union cavalry in August 1863 as Rosecrans started the campaign. In chapters 3 and 4, the missions that Rosecrans gave the cavalry on both wings and how those missions were performed will be detailed. Chapter 5 presents an assessment of the appropriateness of the cavalry's missions, the strengths and weaknesses in the cavalry's employment, and how the cavalry could have been handled better.

Union cavalry was an evolving organization trying to come to grips with how it was to be employed and what it could accomplish. This study looks at the Union cavalry in the Chickamauga campaign, its first major test after its consolidation and reorganization.
ENDNOTES

1. The War of the Rebellion A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 79.

2. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 79.

3. Catton, Bruce, Never Call Retreat, p. 207.


9. Catton, p. 239.


By August of 1863, the state of Union cavalry had improved substantially from the beginning of the war yet still had some major shortfalls. The most pressing problems facing the Union cavalry were: understrength of cavalry regiments, untrained newly mounted regiments, and the limited cavalry experience of its leaders.

Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi in June of 1862. The Army of the Mississippi was to form the basis of the Army of the Cumberland when it was organized in October 1862. Rosecrans recognized that he was woefully lacking in cavalry. He had but seven regiments of cavalry (7th Illinois, 2d Iowa, 7th Kansas, 2d and 3d Michigan, 1st and 5th Missouri) for his army. He dispatched numerous pleas to the Chief of the Ordnance Bureau, the General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, and the Secretary of War asking for more horses and arms, particularly revolving rifles or breachloading carbines for his cavalry. Rosecrans' cavalry spent the summer months of 1862 scouting between their camp near Corinth and the Confederate camp at Tupelo. Daily skirmishes between the Union cavalry and the Confederate cavalry continued to point out the lack of sufficient cavalry, with the Confederates having at least a two to one
advantage in numbers. The Federal Quartermaster’s Department and the Ordnance Bureau provided some relief. On October 30th, Union cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland was composed of eight regiments. The state of Union cavalry, however, still did not meet Rosecrans’ satisfaction.²

The Establishment of the Cavalry Corps

Rosecrans telegraphed General Henry Halleck, General-in-Chief of the armies, on October 30th, requesting that Brigadier-General David Stanley be assigned to the newly created Army of the Cumberland as Chief of Cavalry. Rosecrans wanted Stanley to be given command of the cavalry rather than serve strictly as an administrative staff officer. Stanley was considered by many as the type of cavalry officer capable of whipping the cavalry into shape. Rosecrans had his way, and on November 24, Stanley was assigned to command all of the cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland. During the initial years of the Civil War, cavalry regiments were assigned to infantry divisions. Stanley saw his first task as consolidating the cavalry. Stanley set about to form the cavalry into brigades and divisions. Initially, the cavalry was organized into three brigade under General Stanley and had a strength of about four thousand.³
Rosecrans, still not satisfied with the strength of the cavalry, continued to press Halleck, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs for mounts for his cavalry. Meigs was able to respond by sending 2,000 more horses to Indianapolis. Rosecrans continued to press Washington for more cavalry to counter what he believed was Bragg’s 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. By December 31st, Stanley reported a strength of 4425 men in his division as the Army set out for Stones River.

CAVALRY
as of 26 December 1862

Brigadier General David S. Stanley

CAVALRY DIVISION
Colonel John Kennett

FIRST BRIGADE  SECOND BRIGADE  RESERVE BRIGADE
Col Robert Minty  Col Lewis Zahm  BG D.S. Stanley

2d Indiana  1st Ohio  15 Pennsylvania
3d Kentucky  3d Ohio  1st (5th) Mid
Tennessee
4th Michigan  4th Ohio  2d Tennessee
7th Pennsylvania

ARTILLERY
1st Ohio, Battery D (Section)

UNATTACHED
4th U.S. Cavalry

Confederate cavalry under John Morgan successfully conducted a raid of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad from December 22 to 5 January 1863. While in Kentucky Morgan’s cavalry destroyed the Bacon Creek
Bridge and several miles of track. The disruption of Rosecrans' lines of communication and the frustration of not being able to pursue the Confederate raiders provided sufficient impetus to get Rosecrans to back Colonel John T. Wilder's request to mount his brigade of infantry. On January 14th, Rosecrans wired Stanton requesting authority to purchase five thousand horses and saddles to mount his infantry. The quick approval of Rosecrans' request and the vigorous scouring of the countryside for horses led to the forming of the famous Lighting Brigade of Mounted Infantry. The regimental historian of the 72d Indiana Infantry, Sergeant B.F. McGee reported that one or two companies drew "convalescent mounts- a feeble sort of animal." Other mounts issued at Murfreesboro were undrilled horses which McGee states caused problems to the newly mounted infantry.

"We were little less than a mounted mob for a little while; but we soon gave our horses a saddle, bridle and spur drill which led them to understand pretty well what we were up to."

This brigade would frequently be ordered to conduct cavalry type missions, but as mounted infantry it remained assigned to an infantry division.

Reorganizing the cavalry on April 10, Stanley formed two divisions of two brigades each. The cavalry had a total of 22 cavalry regiments and three batteries
of artillery. The strength of the cavalry regiments was such that they were regiments in name only due to a lack of mounts. The average regiment was about 50% strength.

CAVALRY CORPS
as of 30 June 1863

Brigadier General David S. Stanley

FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION
Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell

FIRST BRIGADE
Col Archibald Campbell
4th Kentucky
5th Kentucky
7th Kentucky
2d Michigan
9th Pennsylvania
1st Tennessee

SECOND BRIGADE
Col Edward M. McCook
2d Indiana
4th Indiana
5th Kentucky
2d Tennessee
1st Wisconsin

ARTILLERY
1st Ohio, Battery D (One Section)

SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION
Brigadier General John B. Turchin

FIRST BRIGADE
Col Robert Minty
3d Indiana
5th Iowa
4th Michigan
7th Pennsylvania
5th Tennessee
4th United States

SECOND BRIGADE
Col Eli Long
2d Kentucky
1st Ohio
3d Ohio
4th Ohio
10th Ohio

ARTILLERY
1st Ohio, Battery D (One Section)
Stokes' (Illinois) Battery

By May 31, the Union Cavalry numbered approximately 4,961, not including Wilder's brigade. Rosecrans still faced Confederate cavalry with an effective strength of
14,000. Rosecrans' army continued to build up supplies at Murfreesboro while being pressed by Halleck to advance on Bragg. Rosecrans continued to seek an additional 6,000 cavalry before moving to the offensive. Between April 27 and August 17, the Louisville quartermaster was to send an additional 12,383 horses bringing Rosecrans' cavalry to a present for duty strength of 10,400.8

By August, the cavalry was restructured once again into two divisions, of three brigades each. The brigades were typically composed of four regiments and commanded by a colonel. A cavalry regiment, composed of twelve companies, was commanded by a lieutenant-colonel. Captains commanded companies with an authorized strength of approximately one hundred men.9 At the highest point of Union cavalry strength, Rosecrans' cavalry had few companies at full strength. As soldiers were killed, wounded or deserted, the companies shrank in size and capability. The average company, in August 1863, had between 30 to 40 men present for duty. Stanley complained in his memoirs;

"Instead of raising a fixed number of regiments and keeping them filled up, they raised new regiments thus giving an opportunity for more commissions and leaving the first regiments as well as the new ones inefficient."10
Despite Rosecrans' request for revolving rifles for his cavalry, the primary weapon of the Union cavalryman was the single shot breechloading carbine. The decreased length and weight of the carbine coupled with its durability, firepower, and its waterproof cartridges made it the preferred weapon of the cavalry. Although a wide variety of carbines were issued, the Sharp's, caliber .52, and the Burnside's carbine, caliber .54,
were the prevalent carbines issued. Together, they made up 60% of the carbines that the cavalry had. The Smith's carbine and Merrill's carbine were also common, representing 20% of the weapons. Regiments had mostly one type of weapon but almost all had to contend with a mixture of weapons. The 2d and 4th Michigan cavalry regiments were an exception in that they were not armed with carbines. Instead, they were armed with Colt's revolving rifles, caliber .56. Approximately, 450 weapons of this type were on hand between these two regiments. They had a five chamber revolving cylinder which took some time to reload but permitted the rapid firing of 5 rounds. The longer length and heavier weight made them harder to handle than a carbine but did provide an increase in firepower.\(^{13}\)

Contrary to European tradition, the carbine was preferred to the saber by Union cavalry.\(^{14}\) Each cavalryman was, however, issued a saber and a revolver in addition to his carbine. A curved blade cavalry saber was the standard issued. Additionally, the light cavalry saber was on hand in small numbers in most regiments. The standard issue pistol was the Colt revolver, Army model, caliber .44, that was loaded with powder and ball and fired with percussion caps.\(^{15}\) While 80% of the pistols were the Colt Army model, at least 8 other types of pistol were on hand.
Turning in their old Springfield rifles, Colonel Wilder's brigade received Spencer seven shot repeating rifles on May 15, 1863. Through Wilder's initiative to finance their purchase, circumventing the Ordnance Bureau's opposition to the weapon, his brigade was the only unit to be equipped with Spencers in August of 1863. While Wilder's brigade was for the most part outfitted with Spencers, the 92d Indiana was only partially equipped. Joining the brigade in June, they had mostly Enfield rifles and a limited amount of Spencers. The repeaters were to substantially increase the Lighting Brigade's firepower and would initially demonstrate their value at Tullahoma.

Cavalry Tactics

The drill regulations of this period were the "41 Tactics" or the "Pointsett Tactics" authorized by J.R. Pointsett, Secretary of War in 1841. They were heavily based upon French tactics with some minor changes. The 1826 Scott's Tactics and Cooke's Cavalry Tactics also influenced the tactics used by cavalry. Cavalry, considered an arm of secondary importance to infantry, was judged indispensable for reconnaissance before the battle. The European view of cavalry as critical for completing the destruction of the enemy during the battle was not prevalent during the Civil War. During
the battle, Union cavalry was frequently expected to fight dismounted as infantry. Cavalry was also expected to use its mobility to pursue and destroy a beaten enemy.

During the first two years of the war, Union cavalry was frequently used as outposts, scouts, and couriers. Outposts provided security for the army and acted as a barrier to the entrance of patrols and spies or to resist sudden movement of the enemy. The extensive use of cavalry pickets and the use of cavalry to protect lines of communication were responsible for tremendous wear on Union mounts. Infantry pickets and guards were as effective as cavalry and saved the cavalry for what it did best. The importance of scouting became apparent and came to be considered as a necessary preliminary to every campaign. The consolidation of the cavalry under Stanley eliminated much of the waste of Union cavalry and allowed it to exploit its mobility.

The use of Confederate cavalry to conduct raids behind Union lines to destroy railroad lines and supply trains, added a new mission for cavalry. Soldiers stationed along the supply routes protected the Union railroads and depots. Infantry and cavalry worked together to secure the long supply lines. Due to the
limited numbers of cavalry, Union cavalry conducted few raids on Confederate supply lines.

**Training the Cavalry**

Training was a major challenge for the leaders of the Union cavalry. The general belief was that it took about two years to train a cavalryman. This belief was responsible for the failure to commit resources at the start of the war to develop the cavalry. Feeling that the war would be won quickly, General Winfield Scott resisted accepting volunteer cavalry. As it became clear that cavalry was needed, officers and men of newly made cavalry regiments had everything to learn.19

Training in horsemanship was especially lacking. This was to initially account for much of the waste of good mounts. Horses were overloaded, marches were prolonged without adequate rest, and forage was not always readily available. It was experience alone that trained the cavalry to eventually travel light and care for their mounts.20

Cavalry, being viewed as both mounted and dismounted fighters, required training in riding, horse care, mounted close order drill, dismounted drill, and the manual of arms for saber, pistol and carbine. Besides the training required of a cavalryman, training needed to be conducted in the usual duties of soldiers
such as scouting, camp life and military courtesy. Since there was no formal schooling program for training, unit commanders were responsible for all training, frequently learning one step ahead of their men. Men were drilled six hours a day when possible, while the commissioned officers were put through an extra number of hours in the mornings or afternoons. As more regiments received their mounts, units would conduct company and battalion drills in preparation for Rosecrans' Tullahoma campaign.

Leaders

The inexperience of Rosecrans and many of his senior cavalry leaders in August of 1863 is not surprising. The Civil War brought into the Union Army many officers who had limited military experience. General Rosecrans' background did not suggest that he was clearly the most obvious choice to command the Army of the Cumberland. He graduated from West Point in 1842 and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. Failing to serve in the Mexican War, the next ten years of service after his graduation was unexceptional. He left the service, but at the start of the Civil War he returned to serve as aide to General McClellan as a state colonel of engineers. In June of 1861, he was promoted to Brigadier General. Rosecrans commanded an
infantry brigade during the Battle of Rich Mountain. By May of 1862, he found himself directing the left wing of Pope's Army of the Mississippi. When Pope was summoned to the eastern theater, Rosecrans found himself in command of the Army of Mississippi. Rosecrans was clearly concerned about the state of his cavalry but did not have the experience to know how to best use them. Stanley stated in his memoirs: "As I have stated before, Rosecrans had no idea of the use of cavalry".

General Stanley, on the other hand, was a professional soldier. He graduated from West Point in 1852 and was posted to cavalry on the Indian frontier. In 1861, he was stationed at Fort Washita, Oklahoma and participated in the Missouri Campaign. On September 28, 1861, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He spent the winter of 1861 laid up with a broken leg but returned in March of 1862 to command a division at New Madrid and Island # 10. His extensive experience with cavalry on the frontier did not prepare him for massed cavalry utilization, yet he strongly held the European beliefs about the effectiveness of massed cavalry. He placed a lot of emphasis in preparing the cavalry to use the saber over the carbine. He would serve as Rosecrans' chief of cavalry until just four days before the Battle of Chickamauga began.
Robert B. Mitchell, who was to replace Stanley as chief of Cavalry for the remainder of the Chickamauga campaign, served in the Mexican war with the 2d Ohio. He returned to Ohio in 1855 where he went into politics. By 1856, he had moved to Kansas. At the outbreak of the war, he was commissioned Colonel of the 2d Kansas Infantry. He was badly wounded at the battle of Wilson Creek in August 1861. His promotion to Brigadier General on 8 April 62 was followed by command of a mixed infantry and cavalry brigade at Fort Riley. At Perryville he commanded the 9th Division of Gilbert’s Corps. Rosecrans placed him in command of the First Division of the Cavalry Corps over Stanley’s objections. Mitchell’s experience with cavalry was primarily under Stanley as a division commander. He remained the commander of the Union Cavalry for only a brief period based upon his performance at Chickamauga. Before the Battle of Chattanooga, he was called to Washington. Stanley’s opinion of Mitchell was that he was “A politician, always thinking of the votes he could make in Kansas”. Crook also held a low opinion of Mitchell’s worth as a commander.

Brigadier General George Crook, who commanded the Second Division of the Cavalry Corps, graduated from West Point in 1852. He was commissioned in the 4th Infantry and served until the outbreak of the war in the
northwest; northern California and Washington. On September 12, 1861, he was promoted to Colonel of the 36th Ohio and served in West Virginia. In August of 1862, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He took part in the Battles of South Mountain and Sharpsburg. On July 30, 1863, he was transferred to Tennessee and was given command of the Second Division. He had the reputation as a leader who shared hardships and dangers with his men and was considered an excellent officer.30

Colonel Edward M. McCook, a politician who turned soldier, was to become the First Division commander when Mitchell became the chief of cavalry. On May 8, 1861, he was commissioned as a lieutenant of cavalry in the Regular Army. He was quickly promoted to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel with the 2d Indiana Cavalry. He was to command a brigade at Perryville consisting of the 2d Indiana and three Kentucky regiments.31 McCook did not have any military experience before the start of the Civil War. He became, nevertheless, an effective divisional cavalry commander despite his limited background.

Brigade commanders in the cavalry corps had similarly mixed levels of experience. The best Union cavalry leaders were Colonel Robert H. G. Minty and Colonel Eli Long, both in Crook's Division. Colonel Wilder, while not a cavalry brigade commander, was a
superb leader. He amply demonstrated at Tullahoma his bold leadership.

**Summary**

Efforts to improve cavalry by increasing its numbers and improve its training made substantial progress toward providing the Army of the Cumberland with an adequate cavalry force. By the cavalry's consolidation, Rosecrans tried to bring his cavalry to the level expected of European cavalry. Stanley's goal for the cavalry was to have a force that could conduct a massed cavalry charge with sabers and be decisive on the battlefield. The increased range and lethality of the infantry rifle was to decrease the effectiveness of massed cavalry charges. The cavalry had the mobility and firepower it needed to allow it to conduct security operations but not the firepower to defeat massed infantry.

Despite the initiative to consolidate the Union cavalry into a cavalry corps, utilization of the cavalry was at times fragmented. Brigades were attached to infantry divisions, dependent upon the needs of the mission. Rosecrans' shortage of cavalry, coupled with marginally trained cavalry regiments and the limited experience of senior officers in employing massed
cavalry, played an important role in how Union Cavalry
was employed during the Chickamauga campaign.
ENDNOTES


4. O.R., Vol XX, Pt 1, p. 182.


6. O.R. Vol XXIII, Pt 1, p. 418.


12. Miller, p. 56.

13. McGee, B.F. History of the 72d Indiana Volunteer Infantry of the Mounted Lightning Brigade, LaFayette, Indiana: S. Vater and Company, 1882, p. 120.

15. Miller, p. 58.


17. Miller, p. 60.


19. Miller, pp. 60, 70.

20. Miller, p. 70.

21. Thiele, p. 56.


25. Stanley, p. 158.


30. Warner, p. 103.

CHAPTER 3- The Cavalry on the Left Wing

The cavalry on the left wing was composed of two brigades while the bulk of the Cavalry Corps was operating of the right flank of the army. The two brigades consisted of Minty’s brigade from the Second Cavalry Division and Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade from General Thomas’ XXst Corps. They were to operate forward of Crittenden’s XXIst Corps in the movement to the Tennessee.

Initial Missions for the Cavalry

During the movement to and the crossing of the Tennessee River, three missions were evident for the cavalry on the left wing. The three missions were to conduct security operations near Sparta, conduct reconnaissance operations forward of Crittenden’s XXIst Corps, and to conduct a demonstration from Chattanooga north along the river.

Initially, the gap between the Army of the Ohio and the Army of the Cumberland posed a problem for Rosecrans. The slower moving Army of the Ohio could permit Confederate cavalry to slip between the two Armies. The movement of the Army of the Cumberland into Southern Tennessee required that the left wing be screened. The task came to Minty’s Saber Brigade, the
First Brigade of the Second Cavalry Division. On the 1st of August, Minty's brigade was detached from the Cavalry Corps to the left wing, General Crittenden's XXIst Corps. In Rosecrans' order of the 15th of August that initiated the campaign, Minty's cavalry received detailed instructions. Minty's brigade acted under the orders of General Van Cleve, Crittenden's corps. Minty's orders were:

"to move with two brigades of Van Cleve's division".1

Rosecrans' orders to Van Cleve concerning Minty were specific; move:

"the main body of the cavalry via Sparta, clearing the rebels out from Caney".2

The second mission called for the cavalry to gather intelligence concerning the Army of Tennessee's location, strength, and disposition. Unknown to Rosecrans was whether Bragg would actively resist his crossing of the Tennessee River. Minty and Wilder's brigades were to share this mission.

Rosecrans' initial order required that Van Cleve have:

"two battalions of Minty's cavalry accompany the infantry column which will move, via Spenser, on Pikeville".3

After clearing the left flank and posting a cavalry battalion at or near Sparta to watch the flank of
Van Cleve's route, the remainder of Minty's brigade would rejoin him at Pikeville. Van Cleve, from the initial order:

"on arriving at Pickville, he [Van Cleve] will without delay push a strong cavalry reconnaissance, if possible, to the Tennessee River".  

Minty was to recon the river crossing at Blythe's Ferry and at Washington.

Wilder's mounted brigade, remaining under the control of Reynolds, Thomas' corps, was:

"to make a demonstration on Chattanooga and Harrison's Landing."

Crittenden's other two divisions were to support Wilder's reconnaissance and subsequent demonstration. General Palmer would support the move on Harrison with an infantry brigade while General Wood would support the move opposite Chattanooga.

Rosecrans decided that he would cross the Tennessee south of Chattanooga. His intent for Crittenden's corps was to conduct a demonstration to the river and if the Confederates had withdrawn south to search for crossing sites. While conducting the reconnaissance mission, the third mission for the cavalry on the left wing was to support a demonstration to confuse Bragg as to the army's movement. Bragg could not be sure whether Burnside would in fact link up with Rosecrans. A crossing north of Chattanooga would permit the two
armies to maintain contact. A crossing further to the south was also a concern for Bragg as it would bottle up his forces in Chattanooga.

The missions for the cavalry were well within the scope of what they could accomplish. They took advantage of the mobility of the cavalry to provide security for the army by providing early warning and protect the main body. Wilder's mounted infantry was given missions that were more in line with cavalry, but considering Rosecrans shortage of cavalry this was not unusual.

The Brigade

Minty's brigade consisted of the 4th Michigan, 7th Pennsylvania, 4th United States Regiments, the 3d Indiana Battalion, and the second section of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery. Colonel Robert H. Minty immigrated to Michigan from Ireland in 1853. Prior to arriving in the United States, Minty served four years in the British Army. He joined the Union army at the outbreak of the Civil War and rose quickly in rank. Within the first year of the war, he was promoted to colonel, 4th Michigan Cavalry. He took command of his brigade on November 5, 1862 and continued to command at that level until April 2, 1865. He was given command of a division late in the war but was never awarded regular
Brigadier General. He was breveted to Major-General for his battlefield successes but declined a commission in the regular army after the war. He was considered a popular and highly competent officer, yet many felt his services were not rewarded with promotion in a timely manner.8

Wilder's brigade was composed of the 17th and 72d Indiana, the 92d, 98th and 123d Illinois Infantry Regiments and the 18th Indiana battery. Colonel John T. Wilder was raised in New York but traveled west as a young man to make a living. He gained experience in foundry work and at the outbreak of the Civil War was making cannons at his foundary in Greensburg, Indiana. He tried to raise an artillery battery but instead was mustered in as infantry. He rose quickly in rank and was appointed to colonel of the 17th Indiana Infantry Regiment. In the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland in December 1862, Wilder was appointed to command the brigade.9 Wilder was a dynamic leader who molded his men into an effective fighting force. By August of 1863, Wilder's brigade had gained some initial experience with their Spencer repeaters. The firepower of the Spencers provided them a capability far superior to any other brigade size units on either side. Much of the credit for the effectiveness of this brigade is attributable to Wilder's foresight and leadership.
Organization Problems of the Left Wing

The command relationship between the cavalry and the corps commanders was unclear from the opening days of the campaign. Crittenden was clearly unsure of his relationship to Minty. Crittenden asked Garfield, Rosecrans' Chief of Staff, as late as the 24th of August to clarify the situation.

"In clause 4 of the marching orders, you state Minty will act under the orders of Van Cleve, according to special instructions of the Commanding General. I should like to know these orders, if any." 10

Garfield responded to Crittenden by clarifying that:

"Minty's command is under your [Crittenden's] direct orders." 11

The command relationship also posed problems for Crittenden in gathering intelligence. Minty reported to Van Cleve while Wilder reported to Reynolds. Crittenden had to rely upon reports from the infantry brigades supporting Wilder's brigade to find out what was happening out in front of the right wing of his corps. The brigades were several miles behind Wilder at times and were reporting solely what they thought the situation was out in front.
The Campaign Begins

The order to start the Chickamauga Campaign was issued on the 15th of August, with units to move starting the 16th. Minty's brigade, started from McMinnville as the campaign began. The total strength of Minty's brigade on the 15th was approximately 1,700 troopers. His brigade was substantially short the 5 days of forage that Rosecrans' order stated that they needed for the operation. On the 15th, Minty reported having only 1 day of forage on hand. A shortage of horses was also a problem. Minty was to leave 200 men in McMinnville due to a lack of mounts. Despite the shortage of forage, Minty started his movement at 0200 on the 17th. Forage was scheduled to be brought in by rail to McMinnville but was to remain a constant problem on the move to the Tennessee.

Wilder started from Decherd on the 16th. Wilder's brigade moved by way of University and Tracy City to Terman's (Map 3). At Terman's, Wilder would link up with Wood's infantry brigade.

A Brush with Dibrell Cavalry at Sparta

Minty was to link up with Van Cleve on the 18th at Pikeville after clearing Dibrell's cavalry brigade from
Sparta. Having attempted to clear Dibrell out of the vicinity of Sparta on the 4th and 9th of August, Minty’s brigade was familiar with the rebel brigade activities. Minty found Dibrell 2 miles from Sparta on Monday afternoon, 17 August with a strong force and according to Minty’s report “attacked and routed him”, pursuing and capturing 23 prisoners. The Union losses were reported at 16 casualties. Minty left the Third Indiana Cavalry battalion at Rock Island to watch the rebels that had been in the vicinity Sparta.14

Continuing on to the linkup at Pikeville, Minty arrived the evening of the 19th. Upon reaching Pikeville, Minty had only about 1,200 men with him. The rough terrain and the shortage of forage was taking its toll on his mounts. Van Cleve, in his report to Crittenden, stated that Minty would start the reconnaissance to the Tennessee on the next day taking about a 1,000 men.15

From the Sequatchie Valley To the Tennessee

Minty’s one day delay in arriving at Pikeville put him behind Rosecran’s schedule, however the delay was insignificant as the remainder of the XXIst Corps was moving equally as slow. Van Cleve’s brigades arrived at Pikeville in the Sequatchie Valley earlier in the day on the 19th.
Wilder’s brigade on the 18th was 3 miles in front of Wood’s division in the vicinity of Pruden’s and had received reports that possibly two regiments of Confederate cavalry were in the Sequatchie Valley blockading the Anderson road over Walden Ridge. At 1 P.M. on the 19th, Wilder’s brigade arrived at Dunlap in the Sequatchie Valley. Upon arriving in the Sequatchie Valley, Minty’s lead regiment, the 92d Illinois, made contact with Confederate pickets, surprising and capturing 14 Confederate soldiers. Wilder by now believed that the Confederates had no major units north of the Tennessee and sent this up in his reports. General Palmer’s division arrived an hour after Minty’s brigade reached Dunlap. 16

On the morning of the 20th both Minty’s and Wilder’s brigades left Sequatchie Valley and started the climb of Walden’s Ridge. The steep, rugged climb slowed movement but by 9 AM on the 21st Minty had reached Morgantown where:

"His scouts to Washington drove a force of 150 rebels from Morgantown to Tennessee River, which they crossed below Washington." 17

Minty was responsible for the crossings at Washington and Blythe’s Ferry. When Minty’s scouts reach Blythe’s Ferry, they reported finding two Mississippi regiments busy throwing up entrenchments on the far side of the river.
Wilder, on the other hand, had reached Poe's Tavern on the 20th. A small party of 11 Confederate soldiers were surprised and captured at Poe's Tavern. Wilder, on the 21st, pushed two of his regiments to Harrison with 2 guns and the remainder of the brigade on to opposite of Chattanooga. Wagner's infantry brigade by this time was on the south side of Walden's Ridge on the road that ran out of Anderson. They were to remain on the high ground overwatching Wilder's progress and reporting back to General Wood.

**Actions along the Tennessee**

From the 21st of August until the 9th of September, Minty's and Wilder's brigades remained in the Tennessee Valley where they provided useful intelligence of activities along the river from Chattanooga to Kingston (Map 4). Minty monitored the fords and ferries from Sale Creek to Kingston. Wilder's brigade was in position to closely observe the activities in and around Chattanooga and Harrison. Both brigades kept up an active presence as part of their mission to conduct a demonstration. All the while, they conducted reconnaissance along the Tennessee River searching for crossing sites.

Minty, on the 22d, sent his scouts forward to Washington and Blythe's Ferry. His scouts returned with
MAP 4
ACTIONS ON THE TENNESSEE RIVER
22 AUGUST-11 SEPTEMBER

PLATEAU OF THE CUMBERLAND

PIKEVILLE
MORGANTON'S
SMITH'S CROSSROAD
BLYTHE'S FERRY
SODDY P.O.
ANDERSON'S
POE'S
DALLAS
HARRISON
WILDER
CHATTANOOGA
BRIDGEPORT
RINGGOLD
DALTON

KINGSTON
WALDEN'S RIDGE
WASHINGTON
CLEVELAND
ATHENS

10 MILES

N
information that Forrest’s cavalry was crossing back across the Tennessee at Sale Creek. The August 22d contact of a forage party with rebel forces at Washington and observations of five artillery pieces and 900 men arriving at Blythe’s Ferry caused Minty to become very concerned about the distance between his brigade and Wilder’s. Minty was afraid that his brigade might get cutoff from the rest of the army. Without orders, early in the morning of the 23d, Minty moved the bulk of his command south toward Poe’s Tavern closing in on Wilder. He posted small forces along the Tennessee to watch the crossing at Washington, Blythe’s Ferry, and Sale Creek to comply with his mission. This decision did not meet with either Crittenden’s or Rosecrans’ approval.¹⁹

Crittenden, initially unsure who ordered Minty’s move to Poe’s Tavern, was still highly concerned with the threat to his left flank. Crittenden told Van Cleve that Minty must maintain contact with his division and to "mind the exposed condition of your left".²⁰ Van Cleve, in response, ordered Minty to move back to Smith’s crossroads near Morgantown or rejoin him at Pikeville. Minty returned to Smith’s Cross-roads on the 25th and continued to post 12 man pickets along the roads leading to the crossing sites with a 24 man picket at Blythe’s Ferry. The remainder of the brigade on the
25th commenced to conduct reconnaissance north along the river toward Kingston. The Confederate activity during this period was confined to the threat by Forrest further up the Tennesse River. Reports of 5,000 Confederate cavalry at Kingston greatly concerned both Minty and Crittenden.  

On the 22d, Wilder began to shell Chattanooga and the Confederate positions at Harrison. His artillery sank one steamboat, the Paint Rock, and disabled another, the Dunbar, as well as causing a good deal of activity in Chattanooga. From opposite Chattanooga, Wilder was able to monitor the movement of trains in and out of Chattanooga and the location of units around the city. His report on August 22d stated:

"I believe that the rebels are leaving Chattanooga. I distinctly saw two locomotives leave there drawing eight other locomotives to-day at 1 p.m. There does not appear to be as many troops in the vicinity as there was yesterday".  

On the 23d, Wilder sent two of his regiments north to Sale Creek where they met Minty. This was the first opportunity for the two brigades to exchange intelligence and Minty was able to pass on information on what he thought was going on toward Kingston. The linkup no doubt came as a relief to Minty and together with Van Cleve's orders gave Minty confidence in patrolling further north along the river. Wilder continued to maintain pressure on Chattanooga by
shelling everyday and giving the appearance of a much larger force. On the 30th, Wilder sent three of the scouts from the 17th Indiana across the river and up on Racoon Mountain to determine the strength of Bragg around Chatanooga. Scouting missions from August 30th on were expanded to the south toward Bridgeport.

Friar's Island, the best fording site on the Tennessee river north of Chattanooga, was scouted on August 25th. Fording the Tennessee at this point was possible except during periods of heavy rain. Wilder's scouts found it heavily picketed; guarded by a battery of artillery behind earthworks. The 72d Indiana conducted scouting missions to the island everyday but continued to be opposed. Wilder's brigade was checked from crossing all along the Tennessee at the crossing sites by emplacements south of the river.

Minty's report of the 7th, on his efforts to find a crossing of the Tennessee, was bleak. He reported:

"not a boat to be had on the river. The rebels have possession of them all".

Minty continued to observe activity on the far bank of the river while pushing the 4th Michigan north toward Kingston.
Crittenden's Corps Moves to the Crossing Site

Preparation for crossing the river south of Chattanooga however were moving along well. By the 28th Rosecrans had a pontoon bridge across at Caperton's Ferry. Rosecrans pushed two infantry brigades across and started to ford the cavalry in the south on the night of the 28th. At 10 PM on the August 30th, Rosecrans ordered XXIst Corps to move down the Sequatchie Valley to cross the Tennessee River. Rosecrans continued his deception with actions on the left wing while he moved the rest of the Army to the crossing sites at Bridgeport and Caperton's Ferry.

On the 1st of September, Minty made contact with the advance element of Burnside's Army entering Kingston. The linkup was made by the 4th Michigan and greatly reduced concern for the Army of the Cumberland's left flank. Rosecrans ordered Wagner to have Minty maintain contact "with Burnside until his cavalry closes down upon our left".

The Tennessee river, reported Minty, was still strongly picketed by cavalry and infantry from Smith's Crossroads to Kingston but reported, on September 2d, that previously entrenched artillery had been removed. Wilder, at the same time, had taken possession of
William's Island and could ford the river. He also reported that:

"All is quiet in front; but small garrison at Chattanooga. Large camp at Tyner's and at Ringold". 28

Bragg had started to withdraw from the Tennessee north of Chattanooga.

Minty's and Wilder's brigades were to remain in their current positions supported by Hazen's and Wagner's infantry brigades. The command relationship for Minty and Wilder would not be formally changed until September 3d when Rosecrans put them under the command of Brigadier-General Hazen. With the same date to brigadier, Brigadier-General Wagner wrote to Rosecrans to protest that he had date of rank over Hazen based upon their dates of colonelcy. On 4 September, Rosecrans returned Wagner's message making him the commander of the four brigades. Hazen protested that he had seniority based upon order of appointment. Hazen would remain in command while Rosecrans sorted out who was the senior. 29

Rosecrans' order of 3 September required Minty and Wilder to send a regiment to Crittenden and Thomas respectively. Wilder sent the 92d Illinois to Thomas but Minty complained that he could not afford to release a regiment. Minty's 3d Indiana had not been returned to him when they left Rock Island. Instead, Van Cleve had

53
kept them guarding the left flank near Pikeville. Additionally, the 4th Michigan had a battalion with Crittenden. As a result, Minty kept the remainder of his command together. The mission continued to threaten Chattanooga. Hazen had the latitude to cross the Tennessee at Bridgeport if "it should appear to him that his services were no longer needed".

On September 5th, Hazen told Minty to begin to close down on the left. Minty moved his brigade down the Tennessee Valley to McDonald's mill on Sale Creek where they remained until the 11th of September. He continued to overwatch the crossing sites and maintain contact with Burnsides' cavalry. The threat to the left flank of the army, while reduced, would require Minty's brigade to cautiously withdraw to a safe crossing site closer to Chattanooga.

Wilder picked up signs that the Confederate forces north of Chattanooga were withdrawing. He reported that the Confederate infantry pickets along the Tennessee were being replaced by cavalry. A division sized Confederate force was departing Tyner's Station headed toward Chattanooga. Later that day at 5 P.M., the infantry and artillery at Friar's Ferry was withdrawn. Forrest demonstrated at the river crossings north of Chattanooga as if to launch a raid to cover the general withdrawal south.
Bragg Evacuates Chattanooga

Wagner reported that the Confederate forces had evacuated Chattanooga on 8 September. This report, coupled with Rosecrans belief that Bragg was withdrawing, led to his belief that the operation had changed to a pursuit. The orders to conduct the pursuit required a change in command structure. Minty and Wilder were to come under Crittenden’s command again. Their mission was “to gain all information possible and capture prisoners”.33 Wilder’s brigade would revert to Thomas’s command when Crittenden’s and Thomas’s lines of march merged. Wilder would get orders from both, leading to some confusion as to which commander he was to respond. On 11 September, he requested a clarification and was told to respond to Crittenden’s orders.

On 9 September at 1300, Wilder crossed his command at Friar’s Ferry (Map 5). On the 10th Wilder headed south toward Ringgold and camped the night at Taylor’s Gap. The next day was to be a day of skirmishes with Scott’s Brigade, Forrest’s Cavalry, delaying back toward Ringgold. Wilder pressed Scott’s Brigade to within 4 miles of Dalton spending the night at Tunnel Hill before being ordered to withdraw to Ringgold.34
MAP 5
MOVEMENT TO
CHICKAMAUGA
CREEK
9-18 SEPTEMBER
Wilder Returns to Thomas

Thomas complained to Rosecrans on the 12th of September:

"As I am now it is impossible to know the strength or position of the enemy". "The information I desire, and which is all important is beyond reach for the want of cavalry". 35

Rosecrans cut Wilder back to Thomas that day.

Crittenden, however, could keep Wilder's brigade until Minty's regiment had closed on Crittenden's position.

The 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment left Minty at 2030 that day to report to Crittenden at Gordon's mill. 36

While waiting for the arrival of the 4th U.S. Cavalry, Wilder moved from Tunnel Hill to Gordon's mill. Enroute to Gordon's mill, Wilder skirmished with elements of Pegrams' Division of Forrest's Cavalry and observed an infantry brigade in the vicinity of Leet's Tanyard. 37 From Wilder's reports, Crittenden incorrectly inferred that the Confederate's were simply conducting a vigorous rearguard action. Wilder was to perform one last reconnaissance for Crittenden. At the direction of the Army Headquarters, Wilder was sent up Chickamauga Creek toward Thomas and report to Crittenden if it was clear. Wilder was to report that the only Confederates that he was to meet up with withdrew towards Peavine Church. Finally, on the September 14th,
Wilder returned to Reynolds' division after almost a month of operating on the left flank.

Thomas had written to Reynolds to lay out Wilder's new mission. Wilder was to recon in the direction of the two gaps through Pigeon Mountain, Dug and Catlett's Gap. Reynolds sent back to Thomas that Wilder's men and horses were so worn that the 14th would be spent recovering. No sooner did the Lighting Brigade return to Thomas then orders on the 16th returned Wilder's brigade minus one regiment to Department of the Cumberland control. Wilder was to report to Rosecrans' headquarters for his next mission. Rosecrans gave Wilder responsibility for securing Alexander's bridge on Chickamauga Creek.

Minty Returns to Crittenden

Minty, on 11 September, moved down to near the mouth of the Chickamauga Creek in preparation for a crossing. A dispatch from Rosecrans' headquarters gave Minty two missions. The first was to seize three steamboats up the Hiawassee. The second was to send Crittenden the cavalry regiment that had been stated in the orders from September 3rd. Minty responded by informing Rosecrans that the steamboats had been burned the other day and that he could not afford to send Crittenden a regiment. Minty included in his reply that he had not received an
order to send a regiment to Crittenden. Minty was
trying to keep his command from being too widely
dispersed. The next day, Minty crossed at Friar's Ford
and moved into Chattanooga.

On the 12th, Minty decided to send the 4th U.S.
Cavalry, as ordered, to Crittenden. Rosecrans gave
Crittenden specific directions for its employment. The
4th U.S. Cavalry was to be employed on Crittenden's
right and front to watch the crossroads leading to
Pigeon Mountain and to examine Peavine Creek. Minty's
3d Indiana Cavalry Battalion, which had spent most of
the campaign operating apart from his brigade, was also
given a new mission. Wagner, upon reaching Chattanooga,
was given responsibility for the city. The 3d Indiana
was to support him by performing picket and courier
duty. Minty reported to the Army Headquarters for new
instructions.

Minty's instructions were to guard the approaches
from Ringgold and La Fayette and secure Crittenden's
left front. At midnight on the 13th, Minty reported to
Crittenden at Gordon's mill to carry out his new
mission. The first reconnaissance by Minty on the 14th
crossed Missionary Ridge into Lookout Valley and then
returned to Gordon's mill the next day. On the 15th,
Crittenden ordered Minty to move into Peavine Valley and
establish his headquarters at Leet's Crossroads.
Crossing at Reed's Bridge, Minty established his headquarters at Pealer's mill on Peavine Creek. Minty's patrols to Grayville, Ringgold, Leet's and Rock Springs determined the following:

"Forrest is at Ringgold, Pegram at Leet's, Buckner at Rock Spring, Cleburne and Longstreet at Dalton".40

It was clear to Minty that the Confederate army was not withdrawing. He met with Crittenden and Rosecrans on the 16th and did his best to convince them that Bragg was massing on the army's left.

On the 16th, Minty observed three Confederate columns in the Peavine Creek Valley and realized that unless he withdrew toward Reed's bridge the line of communication to Crittenden would be cut. He pulled back but remained on the eastside of Reed's bridge.41 Minty's decision to defend forward of West Chickamauga Creek allowed him to provide early warning if the Confederates would try to cross at Reed's bridge. It also adversely affected his ability to hold the bridge. He forfieted the benefits of a strong natural obstacle, the creek, between the Confederate and Union Forces.

**Alexander's and Reed's Bridge**

The actions of Minty and Wilder's brigades at the two bridges bought time for the Army of the Cumberland.
to shift its forces to deal with Bragg’s intention to
strike the Union left. Minty was cheered to have Wilder
on his right due to the cooperation the two units had
shared in the past. That cooperation would be sorely
needed on the 18th.

Early on the 18th Minty’s patrols reported that the
Confederate forces were moving in mass from LaFayette
and Ringgold (Map 6). The Confederate force coming out
of Ringgold threatened to cut off elements of the 4th
Michigan, 4th U.S. and his artillery section. Minty
wrote to Wilder to request support for his left flank.
Wilder sent two regiments, 72d Indiana and 123d
Illinios, and two of guns of Lilly’s battery to Minty’s
assistance. By 1200 on the 18th, Minty had been
forced back across Reed’s bridge. The additional
support allowed Minty to continue to hold Reed’s bridge
until 1430. Minty’s men tried to tear up the planking on
the bridge to not avail. Minty continued to contest the
crossing of the creek until he received a note that
stated:

"Colonel Wilder has fallen back from Alexander’s
Bridge to Gordon’s Mills and the enemy are
crossing at all points in force." After receiving that message, Minty decided also to
withdraw to Gordon’s mill.

Wilder, who was also attacked by a rebel infantry
brigade on the afternoon of the 18th, held Alexander’s
MAP 6
ALEXANDER'S & REED'S BRIDGES
18 SEPTEMBER

TO McFARLAND'S GAP

JAY'S MILL

REED'S BRIDGE

WILDER

ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE

LEE & GORDON'S MILL

MINTY

1 MILE

N
bridge. Wilder reported that three Confederate infantry brigades attempted to crossing at Alexander's bridge. His force repulsed them. Wilder received a report of rebel infantry getting into his rear. It is not clear how rebel infantry reached a position to threaten his flank. This may have been the result of an erroneous report. At 1530, Wilder decided to withdraw to the Chattanooga Rossville Road where he would link up with Minty. Around 2000, Confederate forces made one last attack on Minty's and Wilder's brigade which was repulsed. Minty spent the night at Gordon's mill before being relieved the next morning.

September 19: The First Day

Minty was then ordered to report to Granger to screen the left flank of the Army. Granger posted Minty along the Rossville Road at Missionary Mills. Minty's brigade rested and cared for their horses on the 19th. Minty's brigade contributed to the development of the battle on the 18th but on the critical days of 19 and 20 September, was not a factor in the battle. Minty sent patrols out on the 20th to Chickamauga Station and Graysville but did not encounter any rebel units. On the afternoon of the 20th, Minty moved toward Red House bridge and came across Scott's Brigade of Forrest's Cavalry Corps. They had a skirmish that lasted for about
an hour before Scott's Brigade withdrew across West Chickamauga Creek. Minty remained guarding the Red House bridge until 22 September; long after the Union army had retreated back to Chattanooga. Minty withdrew to Rossville to rejoin the army. 45

Wilder's Lightning Brigade, on the 19th and 20th, would serve as dismounted infantry continuing to prove their worth. On the morning of the 19th, Wilder received orders to report to Army Headquarters. He was ordered to take up a position on the right flank on the army's line of battle (Map 7). At 1300, fighting to Wilder's front caused Crittenden to order Wilder to advance from his prepared position. Wilder counterattacked but soon found that he risked being flanked. He withdrew to his original defensive position and opened a heavy fire from his artillery and their repeating rifles into the attacking rebel columns. Wilder's brigade succeeded in breaking up the attack in his sector. Wilder's men were not attacked again that day. 46

September 20th

On the morning of the 20th, Rosecrans directed that McCook place Wilder's brigade on the army's right. Wilder established a strong position a quarter of a mile to the south of the Widow Glenn's house. Around 1200, a
Confederate column attacked on Wilder's left nearly capturing a Union artillery battery before Wilder was able to shift forces to counterattack. The counterattack was successful in driving the rebel forces back from the Widow Glenn's house. The defeat of the attack at Widow Glenn's contributed in slowing the overall Confederate breakthrough on the morning of the 20th.  

Wilder received word of the defeat of the army's right flank from General McCook's Chief of Staff. Wilder, however, did not quit the field after the rout of the right wing of the Army. Only after being told by Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana to march his unit to Chattanooga did Wilder leave the field. After ensuring that the hospitals at Crawfish Spring were withdrawn and some of McCook's artillery was saved, he moved his command to Rossville. At Rossville on the 21st Thomas thanked him for the fine work his brigade performed on the previous day.

Summary

The left wing cavalry contributed to the campaign in three major ways. First, they were successful in concealing Rosecrans' intent to cross the Tennessee south of Chattanooga. This eased the movement of the army by allowing the army to cross the Tennessee unopposed. Secondly, they provided warning to Rosecrans
of Bragg's attempt to mass sufficient forces on the Union left to destroy the Union Army. The early warning enabled Rosecrans to shift Thomas to the left of Crittenden strengthening the Union left. Thirdly, Wilder and Minty conducted successful guard missions on Alexander and Reed's Bridges to buy time for Rosecrans to shift his forces. Had they failed to provide the extra day for Rosecrans, Thomas would not have been in position.

Minty's brigade did not play a significant role during the battle. Rosecrans erred by putting the First Brigade under Granger and not under Thomas. Wilder's brigade contributed to the fight on both days of battle as dismounted infantry and demonstrated the worth of repeating rifles. The most significant failure, however, for the left wing stems from the failure to get out in front of the army after the Army of the Cumberland's successful crossing of the Tennessee River. The cavalry was held too long on the other side of the Tennessee river leaving the army blind as it advanced across Lookout Mountain. The left wing cavalry contributed substantially to security of the Army during the Chickamauga Campaign but did not contribute in a meaningful way to the outcome on the two days of battle.
ENDNOTES


34. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 3, pp. 574, 575.
42. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, pp. 447, 922.
43. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 923.
44. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 447.
45. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, pp. 923, 924.
47. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 448.
Major General Stanley commanded the cavalry on the right wing, composed of the remainder of the Cavalry Corps. The Cavalry Corps controlled four brigades: three brigades from the First Division and one from the Second Division. At the start of the campaign, Colonel E.M. McCook commanded the three brigades of the First Division. The First Division had two regiments detached to the Reserve Corps near Nashville. The two regiments, the 3d Tennessee Cavalry of the Second Brigade and the 7th Kentucky Cavalry of the Third Brigade, had a total strength of 811 men and would not be available for the campaign. Colonel McCook assumed command on August 3d when Brigadier General Mitchell became ill and left the command.

The Second Division had only the Second Brigade available for the right wing. The First Brigade under Minty was screening the left wing of the army. The Third Brigade, under Colonel Lowe, supported the Reserve Corps. The 5th Iowa, 10th Ohio, and 5th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment supported the First Division, Second Division, and Third Division of the Reserve Corps respectively. Brigadier General Crook, the Division Commander and Colonel Eli Long, the Second Brigade Commander, were both present for duty. The two levels of command would provide
redundant command of the Second Brigade. It did permit the command to be split when the need occurred for smaller cavalry operations.

By August 13th, the First Division began deploying along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Huntsville to Stevenson (Map 8). McCook's division was responsible for guarding the rail line against sabotage by guerillas. The three brigades departed Huntsville and moved west along the Huntsville road; the First Brigade guarded from Stevenson to Larkinville, the Second Brigade, headquartered at Larkinsville, had two regiments there and one regiment at Paint Rock River, and the Third Brigade, the closest to Huntsville at Flint River, covered the road back to Huntsville. The Second Division, as a reserve, was located at Winchester with the Army Headquarters.4

Initial Missions for the Cavalry

The initial order for the Chickamauga campaign contained little information for the Cavalry Corps. It simply stated:

"The chief of cavalry with the reserve brigade will follow the general headquarters, and will have special instructions for the remainder of the cavalry, which will be given him by the general commanding".5

The cavalry's initial positions were close to the river. From the Huntsville Road, they could protect the
MAP 8
THE RIGHT WING
ABOVE THE TENNESSEE
13 AUGUST - 3 SEPTEMBER
rail line as well as patrol down to the Tennessee River. The cavalry could conduct reconnaissance of the Tennessee River to find fording sites while Rosecrans established bridge sites. Scouting missions to the Tennessee did develop information on possible crossing sites and the amount of resistance along the river. Until the cavalry crossed the Tennessee in force, they could not, however, develop intelligence as to Bragg's disposition or intentions. Aggressive patrolling across Sand and Lookout Mountains would be needed to discover Bragg's intent.

**The Brigades**

The First Brigade, composed of the 9th Pennsylvania, 2d Michigan, and the 1st Tennessee Cavalry Regiments, was under the command of Colonel Archibald P. Campbell. Campbell came into the Union Army with no military experience and had to learn quickly. Considered scholarly by his men, he observed successful professional officers and attempted to emulate their best qualities. Though respected by both superiors and his soldiers, he was never to rise above the grade of colonel before the end of the war.\(^6\)

The 9th Pennsylvania camped near Mud Creek, guarding the railroad bridge over the creek as well as Bellefonte Ford, Gunter's Ford and the mouth of the Mud
Creek. The 2d Michigan and the 1st Tennessee camped at Bolivar guarded Caperton's Ford, Cox's Ford and Shallow Ford.\(^7\)

The Second Brigade, composed of the 2d Indiana, 4th Indiana, 2d Tennessee and 1st Wisconsin Cavalry Regiments was commanded by Colonel McCook before Mitchell became sick. Colonel Oscar La Grange had assumed command of the brigade when McCook took command of the First Division and would command the brigade prior to crossing the Tennessee River. Colonel Daniel M. Ray, 2d Tennessee, was senior to LaGrange. However, the 2d Tennessee was detached to General Phillip Sheridan while the brigade was at Huntsville.\(^8\) When the 2d Tennessee rejoined the brigade, Ray would take command of the Second Brigade. Ray's 2d Tennessee supported Brigadier General Lytle at Bridgeport. Lytle, commander of Sheridan's First Brigade, was responsible for establishing the bridge site at Bridgeport. While working for Lytle, the 2d Tennessee conducted small expeditions to Bellefonte, Bolivar, and Jasper.\(^9\) On August 23d, the 2d Tennessee was attached to Reynold's division to act as couriers for Reynolds to maintain contact with Wilder.\(^10\)

Along the Huntsville Road, the 2d Indiana and the 1st Wisconsin went into camp at Larkinville while the 4th Indiana was established at Paint Rock Bridge.
Patrols from the Second Brigade covered Larkin's Landing, Gunterville and Fort Deposit Roads as well as the rail line.\textsuperscript{11}

The Third Brigade under Colonel Lewis D. Watkins was composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Kentucky Cavalry Regiments. Watkins had experience in the militia of the District of Columbia prior to the war. He served briefly as an enlisted man prior to being commissioned into the regular army infantry. Watkins served as Chief of Cavalry for the Army of Kentucky in December 1862. He was appointed to a colonelcy in the 6th Kentucky Cavalry on February 1st, 1863 and took command of the brigade on July 8th.\textsuperscript{12}

The Third Brigade was initially to go to Flint River but Watkins complained about the unhealthy conditions there and would eventually camp at Maysville. The Third Brigade had responsibility for the Flint River and Hurricane River bridges and conducted patrols to Huntsville, Whitesburg, and Lemon's Ferry.\textsuperscript{13}

The Second Brigade of the Second Division was commanded by Colonel Eli Long. His brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, 4th Ohio and the 2nd Kentucky Cavalry regiments. Long had attended the Frankfort Military Academy in Kentucky in 1856. He was commissioned into the regular army and spent the pre-war years on frontier duty with the 1st Cavalry Regiment. He accepted a
colonelcy of the 4th Ohio Cavalry in February 1863 and took command of the Second Brigade in March. He was wounded at Murfreesboro and would be wounded again at Selma. Due to his wounds, he retired in 1867 as a major general.14

On August 19th, Crook and Long departed Winchester for Bridgeport. The mission for the brigade was to picket General Lytle's front at Bridgeport and along the river as far as Cedar Bluffs Ford.15 They arrived on the August 22d at Bridgeport and remained there until September 2d.

Guerilla Fighting

Prior to crossing the Tennessee, the Cavalry Corps had to counter Confederate guerrilla activity. McCook reported on August 21st that guerrillas ambushed a forage party on the Larkin Landing Road. He included in his report a description of the methods and results of dealing with guerrillas:

"The country has been pretty well cleared of them since I have ordered them when caught to be hung and property destroyed in vicinity where they make attack."16

Due to guerrilla activity at Winchester, Rosecrans ordered Stanley on August 23d to move a cavalry battalion from Cowan to Winchester. Limited guerrilla activity remained a problem that the cavalry had to deal
with. On the 25th of August, bushwhackers, as McCook called them, captured five soldiers from the 6th Kentucky. McCook ordered that all property in the vicinity of the attack burned. Watkins reported to McCook that guerrillas destroyed the Indian Creek, Limestone, and Piney bridges on the 26th. The three destroyed bridges along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad however did not hamper supply operations from the north. The 1st Tennessee Cavalry historian W.R. Carter recounted the pleasure of hearing the "welcome sounds of the locomotive" bringing supplies for the army during the last part of August.

Reconnaissance of the Tennessee

Scouting, picketing and guarding the fords and ferries along the Tennessee kept the cavalry busy. While the work to establish bridges continued, the cavalry searched for ford sites and conducted reconnaissance across the Tennessee to develop intelligence on Bragg's army.

On August 25th, McCook reported to Stanley that Major Leslie of the 4th Indiana had a fight with rebels at the ferry opposite Fort Deposit. The brief skirmish led to the capture of 6 prisoners. The intelligence generated from the questioning of prisoners...
and deserters confirmed to McCook that Bragg's army was very demoralized.

The identification of ford sites was important to the cavalry as they were to initially ford while the infantry crossed pontoon bridges or by flat boats. Captain James Hawley of the Department of the Cumberland Inspector's Office identified a ford on August 26th. He forded half way across at Hart's Bar, four miles above Caperton's Ferry, finding the depth no greater than 4 feet. Rosecrans directed Stanley to prepare the road to the ford and mark the site. McCook on the 30th, also, located a ford, 1 mile west of Bellefonte, requiring a 200 yard swim. Stanley, that same day, conducted a personal reconnaissance of this site.

On the 28th, the 2d Michigan was given specific orders to cross the Tennessee by Rosecrans:

"The general commanding directs you to send the Second Michigan to this place at once, to cross the river at the ford and drive bushwhackers away from the other side." The 2d Michigan forded the Tennessee scouting north along the river to Running Water Creek before returning to Bridgeport on September 1st. On September 2d, the 2d Michigan Cavalry recrossed the Tennessee ascending Raccoon Mountain at Moore's Gap (Map 9). They scouted 12 miles out before returning to Caperton's Ferry on the 3d.
Rosecrans, also, ordered Crook on the 28th to send two regiments across at Hart's Bar. Crook sent the 1st Ohio, 3d Ohio and the 2d Kentucky to conduct a raid across Raccoon Mountain to Trenton, capturing some prisoners and supplies. They returned to the north side of the Tennessee by the 31st.24

Ray's 2d Tennessee, now in support of Reynolds' division, XIV Corps, on the night of the 30th, crossed the Tennessee. They scouted toward Chattanooga, coming to within 2 miles. King's brigade of Reynolds' division and Ray's regiment made contact with Confederate pickets. They reported observing a five gun battery on Lookout Mountain and capturing 25 prisoners. By 1400 on the 1st, they returned to Shellmound.25

The reconnaissance across the Tennessee did not uncover sufficient information to determine Bragg's intentions. The pickets and guns along Lookout Mountain were convincing evidence that Bragg's forces were still in the vicinity of the Tennessee. The cavalry was not able to ascertain whether Bragg was withdrawing or consolidating in the vicinity of Chattanooga.

The Tennessee to Valley Head

With the completion of the trestle bridge on September 2d at Bridgeport, the Army of the Cumberland began to push across. Rosecrans' order for the crossing
of the Tennessee was issued early on September 3d. Stanley was to take the First Division across at Caperton’s Ferry to Rawlingsville. Crook, maintaining contact with General McCook, would take his division by way of Trenton and Valley Head to Rawlingsville (Map 10). Stanley’s orders called for him to send a force of his choosing from Rawlingsville to Rome:

"to ascertain the position and intentions of the enemy. This force should push forward with audacity, feel the enemy strongly, and make a strong diversion in that direction." 26

The First Division started crossing the Tennessee River on the 1st on the pontoon bridge at Caperton’s Ferry. The order of march was Second Brigade, Third Brigade, First Brigade. They ascended Sand Mountain and consolidated at Valley Head in Will’s Valley on September 4th. 27 Based upon information from deserters from the Fifty-first Alabama Cavalry, Stanley believed that Wheeler’s cavalry was at Lebanon. Upon arriving at Valley Head, Stanley would push McCook’s cavalry to clear Wheeler out of Lebanon.

The Second Brigade left Larkinville on the 31st of August and crossed over the Tennessee on the 2d of September. They passed over Raccoon Mountain and south to Valley Head. The 2d and 4th Indiana were given the mission to recon from Rawlingsville east on the Rome road toward Alpine. They uncovered three Confederate
MAP 10
RECONNAISSANCE
IN WILL'S VALLEY
4 - 9 SEPTEMBER
regiments camped in the vicinity of Alpine. On the morning of the 5th, the 2d Tennessee, which had been posted previously at Jasper in support of Reynolds, rejoined the Second Brigade at Valley Head. Colonel Ray assumed command of the brigade upon his arrival.

The First Brigade crossed the Tennessee on the 1st and camped at Caperton Springs. On September 3d, First Brigade marched with its two regiments (the 1st Tennessee and the 9th Pennsylvania) arriving at Valley Head at 8:30 AM on the 4th. The 2d Michigan, marching separately, rejoined the First Brigade on the 4th just in time to participate in the reconnaissance on the 5th.

The First Brigade scouted down Will's Valley on the 5th in the direction of Lebanon. They initially scouted to 1 mile south of Rawlingsville, where they encountered some Confederate cavalry, before proceeding on to Lebanon. At Lebanon, they found the town evacuated so they returned to Allen's farm, 4 miles from Valley Head, by 8:00 PM.

McCook sent the Third Brigade, after their arrival at Valley Head, to scout to Davis' Gap on the top of Lookout Mountain. Watkins' scouts crossed at Davis Gap and drove the rebel pickets within 6 miles of Alpine. The 4th Kentucky Cavalry captured 10 prisoners from the 4th Georgia. The intelligence from the 4th Kentucky
reconnaissance located a cavalry brigade, Crew's Brigade, Wharton's Division, from Wheeler's Corps near Alpine.32

Long's brigade on the morning of the 2d of September crossed over the Tennessee at Hart's Bar. On the 3d of September, they ascended Sand Mountain just opposite Caperton's Ferry and moved on to the Raccoon Mountain plateau. By nightfall, they caught up with Stanley and the cavalry command. The Second Brigade of the Second Division moved through Winn's Gap and camped at Winston's House at Valley Head by midday on the 4th. Crook's division, on the 5th, conducted a reconnaissance 16 miles east of Winston's, crossing Lookout Mountain into Broomtown Valley.33

The results of the cavalry scouting missions confirmed in Stanley's mind the direction to continue his probes. The recon south toward Lebanon indicated that no Confederate forces were there. The reconnaissance toward Alpine, however, uncovered a brigade of cavalry.

The Failed Raid

Stanley was in position to attempt to get behind Bragg's army and wreck Bragg's lines of communications. On September 5th, Stanley inquired into McCook's status on "claw-hooks, crowbars or any other means of tearing
He thought that he could do some damage to the Western and Atlantic railroad in the vicinity of Rome. McCook replied that he did not have the means to tear up track and no one trained to handle explosives. Crook requested that the army headquarters arrange for turpentine to be made available to him. Rosecrans picked up on the request and rightly concluded that turpentine was needed to burn bridges along the railway. He wrote to Stanley on the 8th:

"Why have you not supplied our command with means to burn bridges and destroy railroads."

On September 6th, 7th, and 8th, the First and Second Division rested in camp at Allen’s farm. Long’s brigade remained at Valley Head but did conduct several reconnaissance missions to various passes through Lookout Mountain. The pause allowed the cavalry’s trains and McCook’s XXth Corps to catch up. The three days spent at rest at Valley Head before continuing to scout to Alpine was time that could have been valuably spent in reconnaissance to the southeast to locate Bragg’s army. Rosecrans’ commented in his report on the campaign:

"The cavalry for some reason was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and necessities of the campaign required."

On the 7th, orders for the raid on the rail line were given to Stanley with McCook’s corps providing
infantry support. The raid was scheduled for September 8th. The raid failed to start on the 8th, prompting Rosecrans to write to Stanley expressing his disappointment with the lack of action by the cavalry.

"It is also a matter of regret to me that your command has done so little in this great movement. If you could not move toward Rome, nor toward the railroad, you might have at least cleared the top of Lookout Mountain to Chattanooga and establish a patrol and vedette line toward it which I should have ordered had I not trusted to your discretion." 38

Stanley explained his delay to Garfield stating he did not initiate the raid on the 8th because many of the cavalry's horses needed to be reshoed. By delaying the raid a day, Stanley stated that he added six hundred additional men to his force. 39 Rosecrans cancelled the raid believing that Bragg had started to withdraw south away from Chattanooga.

Reconnaissance near Alpine

After cancelling the raid, Rosecrans ordered Stanley to recon toward Alpine to confirm reports of a large infantry and cavalry force there. Late on the 8th, Crook returned to the top of Lookout Mountain. McCook's division moved out at 3:00 AM on the 9th toward Alpine. 40 Stanley expected to get his forces there by 11:00 AM on the 9th and expected to have a sharp skirmish with the Confederate forces there. Late in the
evening, Rosecrans sent a message to Stanley giving him specific guidance. Rosecrans wanted Stanley to send a brigade reinforced with infantry from General McCook along the Chattanooga Road to the southern spur of Missionary Ridge and another brigade with infantry toward Alpine and on toward Summerville.41

As Rosecrans' message did not reach Stanley until midday, Stanley's orders from the 8th were carried out. With Crook's command in the advance, Stanley's cavalry came through Henderson's Gap and made contact with Confederate cavalry pickets and drove them back through Alpine along the Rome Road and Blue Pond Road. They captured twelve prisoners and three documents that gave information about Wheeler's cavalry concentrating in La Fayette if they were driven out of Alpine.42 With possession of Alpine in hand, Stanley planned three reconnaissance missions for September 10th. First and Third Brigades of McCook's division and Long's brigade would fan out from Alpine to the southeast to find Bragg (Map 11).

First Brigade scouted in the direction of Rome stopping at Melville. They encountered no significant resistance but did capture four prisoners during the expedition. They returned to Alpine that night only to repeat this expedition the next day.43 Third Brigade moved along the Summerville Road. They moved into
Summerville on the 10th; chasing off several companies of the Third Georgia Cavalry and taking 11 privates and 1 captain prisoner before they returned to Alpine. They found out from the prisoners that Wheeler had withdrawn the night before toward LaFayette leaving only a small force of cavalry at Summerville. Elements of Second Brigade participated with First and Third Brigades on these two recons. Crook’s division, moving along the La Fayette Road for the third reconnaissance, confirmed the intelligence picked up by Colonel Watkins’ Third Brigade.

The reconnaissance missions of the 10th were repeated on the 11th. McCook scouted toward Rome with his First and Second Brigades while the Third Brigade was order to support General McCook’s corps scouting toward La Fayette.

On the 11th, the 1st Tennessee Cavalry Regiment sent six companies under Colonel Brownlow toward Dirt Town. At Dirt Town, this force encountered pickets from Wheeler’s force, capturing fifteen prisoners and destroying a small bridge over the Chattooga River. The remainder of the force moved toward Mellville and met little resistance. From Mellville, they moved to within 10 miles of Rome and wrecked a saltpeter works.

General McCook’s XXth Corps arrived in Broomtown Valley late in the afternoon of the 10th. They were
ready to probe toward La Fayette on the morning of the 11th. Colonel Harrison, 39th Indiana Mounted Infantry Regiment of General McCook's corps, pushed within six miles of La Fayette and met Confederate cavalry. Watkins' Third Brigade linked up with Colonel Harrison late in the day on the 11th to scout toward La Fayette. Watkins received word of the size of force that Harrison had encountered that day. Watkins camped where he had met Harrison until the next day then tentatively probed with a part of his force two miles from his encampment and did not find any Confederates. He withdrew back to Alpine concerned that the reported size of force at La Fayette would be too large for him to deal with.  

Rosecrans and McCook were clearly concerned that they had underestimated Bragg's determination to stand against the Union Army. Stanley's reconnaissance patrols on the 10th and 11th of September confirmed that Bragg was not withdrawing toward Rome. By late in the day on the 11th, Rosecrans ordered Stanley to close up his force toward McCook. McCook moved his division back to Alpine the next day to join up with Crook. Stanley's next operation would be to probe La Fayette in strength to determine the size of forces there.  

90
The Reconnaissance to La Fayette

General Rosecrans on the morning of the 12th called for General McCook and Stanley to close up on Thomas' position as it was clear that Bragg would make a stand in the vicinity of Pigeon Mountain. Rosecrans' order to McCook stated:

"Stanley will cover and assist the movement of McCook's Corps to seize the head of McLemore's Cove and endeavor to find what the enemy is doing. He will particularly guard the approaches to your line of march from Broomtown Valley."

Stanley's health was deteriorating fast. He wrote to Garfield that dysentery had been working on him for a week. By the 12th, Stanley was spending most of the day resting, only able to get up a few minutes at a time.  

Brigadier General Mitchell had returned to the army on the 11th and was at Chattanooga with the Army Headquarters. He was not able to get forward to the Cavalry Corps' headquarters in time for the reconnaissance. Crook, as the senior cavalry officer, would lead the Cavalry Corps on its mission on the 13th.

There were two roads leading to La Fayette from the cavalry's position. Cronk would command a recon on one and McCook on the other. McCook's division moved out from Summerville at 0600 with the Second and Third Brigades. The 4th Indiana Cavalry led the advance for the Second Brigade. McCook led with a small force and
held the remainder of his force at Troin Factory. The 4th Indiana made contact with Wheeler’s cavalry 3 miles further on toward La Fayette. The strength of the force that they encountered convinced McCook to join Crook on the route that he was taking.

First Brigade moved on the 12th to join Crook’s division for the La Fayette reconnaissance. First Brigade’s 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry led the advance of the two brigades on the La Fayette road. They closed to within three miles of La Fayette before encountering Confederate pickets. The 1st Tennesse was brought up on the 9th Pennsylvania’s right. The 2d Michigan trailed the 9th Pennsylvania in support. The fight ended abruptly with the receipt of orders from Crook to fall back. Crook felt that he had developed the situation enough to obtain the information that he needed.

The Cavalry Corps fell back to Alpine later that day. McCook reported a column of infantry and cavalry moving on the Summerville Road toward Rome. His reconnaissance, however, was not detailed enough for Stanley. Stanley commented that he considered it very unsatisfactory when he sent his end of day report to Rosecrans. Crook’s reconnaissance, however, did accomplish its purpose. The recon toward La Fayette succeeded in capturing 18 prisoners and confirmed the location of Bragg’s headquarters. The cavalry now
turned to its next mission of closing up on Thomas' position.

A Change in Command

The cavalry started its move to join Thomas on the 14th by ascending to the top of Lookout Mountain, reaching the Little River by the end of the day. Late in the day on the 14th, Rosecrans dispatched a message to General McCook with orders for Stanley to send one brigade of cavalry to hold Valley Head and establish a courier line to Cooper's Gap. McCook's corps was to move to Dougherty's Gap at the head of McLemore's Cove. Stanley ordered Crook to move to and secure Dougherty's Gap (Map 12). He reported to Garfield that Crook was having problems identifying the gap. 54 Civilians that lived on Lookout Mountain did not know the location of the gap.

McCook's division crossed over the mountain and came into Will's Valley on the 15th. Still plagued by dysentery, Stanley came across Lookout Mountain in an ambulance. Stanley arrived at Winston's House on the 14th and met Brigadier General Robert Mitchell. Mitchell had also arrived at Winston's on the 14th. When First Division came down from Lookout Mountain, Mitchell was prepared to take command of his division. Stanley's condition was so bad, however, that Stanley
told Rosecrans that he might have to turn over command to Mitchell.55

On the morning of the 15th, Crook, who had continued to scout along the top of Lookout Mountain, reached Dougherty's Gap. Upon reaching Winston's Gap, McCook's division was given the remainder of the day to rest and care for their horses before continuing its move. The wear and tear on the cavalry was taking its toll. Mitchell reported to Garfield that he had to send 300 sick men to Stevenson as well as replace Stanley in command.56 Stanley stayed an additional day at Valley Head to find out if he could get transportation to Nashville. Mitchell took charge of the cavalry with little idea of what missions he needed to accomplish. In his message notifying Rosecrans of the change in command, he requested "specific directions with regard to the cavalry movements."57

The directions that the Cavalry Corps headquarters sent to the divisions for the 16th indicated the confusion as to what to do next. The First and Second Brigade were to be prepared to move while the Third Brigade would hold Valley Head. Mitchell told the divisions:

"We will not move from here to-morrow till about noon probably, unless some other orders are received. Watkins' brigade will be left here."58
Orders for the cavalry were on the way to bring them to the battlefield.

**Consolidation at Crawfish Springs**

On the 16th, Mitchell received Rosecrans' order to move McCook's division to Crawfish Springs. Upon his arrival, McCook was to report to the Army Headquarters for directions. Crook was to remain at Doughtery's Gap and guard it while General McCook's corps was moving through Steven's Gap. Crook held the Doughtery's Gap position for three days until he was told to move up on the morning of the 19th.

McCook's division, minus Third Brigade, reascended Lookout Mountain crossing through Dougherty's Gap. The Third Brigade, caring for 400 sick men and 4 prisoners at Valley Head, would continue to hold until ordered up on the 19th. McCook's division ended the day at the head of McLemore's Cove. They continued down the cove on the 17th reaching Cedar Grove, within five miles of Stevens' Gap, by the end of the day. The next day McCook moved 6 miles to Pond Springs and halted for the night.

On the 17th, Union lookouts sighted a Confederate cavalry force moving through Blue Bird Gap in Pigeon Mountain. Rosecrans relayed the information to General McCook for the cavalry. On the morning of the
18th, Mitchell with McCook and both brigades moved to Rodger’s house to overwatch Blue Bird Gap in support of General McCook. That evening Mitchell was given orders to consolidate the Cavalry Corps and close up on XXth Corps’ right (Map 13). Orders were dispatched to Crook and Watkins at first light to move to Crawfish Springs. Early in the day on the 19th, Mitchell and the force at Rodger’s house moved to Crawfish Springs.\(^6\)

**The Cavalry at Crawfish Springs**

The move from Rodger’s house to Crawfish Springs encountered minor resistance along the way. The Second Brigade and the First Division trains were attacked by cavalry and artillery which delayed them an hour during the move. The brigades could hear the heavy firing coming from the direction in which they were marching as the first day’s fighting at Chickamauga broke out.\(^6\)

When Mitchell arrived at Crawfish Springs he received a dispatch from General McCook stating that a rebel cavalry force was reported in Chattanooga Valley. The dispatch told Mitchell: "It is absolutely necessary for you to dispatch a portion of your force there."\(^6\)

The First Brigade reached Crawfish Springs around 1500 and within the hour were directed to the crest of a hill
overlooking a road that led down to the Chickamauga Creek. McCook’s orders directed him to position:

"Colonel Campbell with two regiments of his brigade, in Dry Vailey to protect ammunition and supply trains; the 2d Indiana on the left of Colonel Wilder’s mounted infantry, and the remainder of the division front and on the left of Crawfish Springs."⁶¹

Campbell moved the 1st Tennessee and the 4th Indiana with him about 1 mile to the rear of Crawfish Springs as ordered.

McCook took command of the cavalry’s left at Crawfish Springs: 9th Pennsylvania, 1st Wisconsin, and the 2d Indiana, while Mitchell took command of right: 2d Michigan and Ray’s brigade. McCook positioned the 9th Pennsylvania on the left and the 1st Wisconsin on the right. The 2d Indiana, which had fought the previous day as rear guard in the move from Rodger’s house, was kept in reserve.⁶⁵

The Second Brigade moved into Crawfish Springs after their delay and went into line. The 2d Michigan from Campbell’s brigade arrived before Ray’s brigade and scouted down to the fords along the Chickamauga. They moved down to south of Glass’s mill. They spent the night of the 19th camped 1 mile from the fords. The next morning the 2d Michigan drove the Confederate pickets they found from Bird’s Ford.⁶⁶
The cavalry ended the evening on a line from Crawfish Springs to the northeast. During the battle on the 19th, McCook's corps shifted to the north in response to the battle leaving the cavalry poorly tied in with the rest of the army. After the first day's fight, Rosecrans called a meeting for his commanders to assess their situation. Rosecrans placed General McCook in command of the right wing of the army. The cavalry on the right wing was to now respond to orders from McCook. At the same time, Mitchell received the following order from Rosecrans for the 20th:

"With your entire force adhere close to General McCook's right, sending patrols with all the wagon trains to the rear. You will defend the hospitals at all hazards." 67

The cavalry was tasked to defend the army hospitals that were at Crawfish Springs. They would spend the 20th skirmishing with Wheeler's cavalry along the Chickamauga until 1600 when they were ordered back.

Crook, who started to move on the 19th, did not arrive at Crawfish Springs until late morning on the 20th. He met Mitchell upon his arrival and was directed to move forward to relieve the First Division along the Chickamauga. 68 Crook with Long's brigade moved forward and found the First Division. Shortly after the First Division withdrew, Crook's unit was attacked by Wheeler's dismounted cavalry. The Second Division fell
back rejoining the First Division in the vicinity of Crawfish Springs.

At 1500 on the 20th, Mitchell received orders from McCook to withdraw. Mitchell sent members of his staff to determine the state of the General McCook’s position. He found out that the right wing of the army had been driven from the field. Mitchell got the trains and ambulances in and around Crawfish Springs headed toward Chattanooga and had McCook and Crook escort the trains back through Chattanooga Valley.69

Campbell remained to the rear of Crawfish Springs until 1600 on the 20th when he received orders to make contact with Sheridan. As he prepared to move toward Sheridan’s position, he found out the fate of the right flank of the army. He was then instructed to bring up the rear of Mitchell’s column moving toward Chattanooga.70

Third Brigade Stumbles into the Fight

On the morning of September 20th, Watkins moved in response to the order of the previous day. He passed across Lookout Mountain at Steven’s Gap. After crossing, Watkins took the main road to Crawfish Springs. As they closed to within 3 miles of the Springs late in the day, they began to run into Confederate pickets. A small detachment was sent by
Watkins to determine what was going on at Crawfish Springs. Lieutenant Joseph Cowell, 4th Kentucky Cavalry, led the patrol and reported upon his return that Crawfish springs was held by the Confederates.\textsuperscript{71}

Watkins decided to get his command to the Chattanooga Road and head toward Chattanooga. In trying to get through and protect the trains with him, Watkins conducted a withdrawal to try to reach Cooper's Gap. Prior to being able to start the withdrawal, Confederate forces closed in on Watkins' position. The 5th Kentucky Cavalry was ordered to Cooper's Gap to protect the retreat. The 4th and 6th Kentucky formed a battle line to meet the Confederate forces closing on their position. The two regiments fell back slowly as the trains withdrew. The 4th Kentucky was flanked when the 6th Kentucky withdrew behind the 4th. The 4th fell back to the 6th's position where they both became flanked. They commenced to conduct a running fight to the rear only to be entangled with their own trains. A large number of men were captured as the brigade tried to extract itself from the enemy. The brigade lost 8 officers, 228 enlisted men, and 53 wagons captured before the action of the day diminished.\textsuperscript{72}

As the Confederates did not press the attack against Watkin's brigade, Watkins was able to extract the remainder of his unit. He found a small train of
wagons belonging to Thomas on the Chattanooga Road. He promptly decided to escort them to Chattanooga with his brigade. It wasn't until 2200 on September 21st that Watkins reached Chattanooga with the trains.\textsuperscript{73}

**Summary**

Indicative of a lack of planning on the part of Rosecrans, Stanley and Mitchell, the Cavalry Corps' employment on the right wing throughout the Chickamauga campaign was poorly timed. From the outset, the cavalry was slow to develop the enemy situation after crossing the Tennessee. The dispersion of the cavalry and the failure to anticipate future requirements prevented the force to mass prior to or during the battle. The cavalry on the right did not achieve its full potential to influence the campaign and battle. If Mitchell could have massed the cavalry, he could have attacked Bragg's flank at the critical moment of the battle on the 20th. Mitchell could have caused Bragg's army great difficulty. The cavalry of the right wing did not mass and were not prepared to strike the blow that Rosecrans needed.
ENDNOTES


33. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 3, p. 353,374
37. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 52.
42. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 888-889.
43. Letter of R.M. Russell to Col F Ruger, June 12, 1867.
44. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 913.
45. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 891.
46. Carter, pp. 87, 88.
47. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 3, p. 541, 571.
52. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 890.
53. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 890, Pt 3 617, 618.
61. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 904.
63. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 129.
64. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 895.
67. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 137.
71. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 915.


73. O.R, Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 915, 916.
CHAPTER 5- CONCLUSIONS

In a letter from Brigadier General David S. Stanley to Captain Marshall P. Thatcher dated 31 May 1883, Stanley gave his assessment of the use of cavalry during the Battle of Chickamauga:

"Ten days before that battle I was attacked by acute dysentery and was lying prostrate at Stevenson during the great battle. Perhaps I ought not express an opinion under the circumstances, but I think you are right in your suggestion that the cavalry was not handled as a whole as skillfully as it should have been. A few brigade commanders, as near as I can learn, acted independently and conducted the cavalry in a great battle that might, it seems to me, have changed to the discomfiture of the Confederates. I have always regretted the sickness which kept me from Chickamauga."1

Thatcher concluded in his analysis on the use of the cavalry at Chickamauga that:

"After all the cavalry had done in discovering the enemy's position, their further service was considered of secondary importance. To guard the right flank was important, but they were ready and anxious to do more, and were kept further to the right than were actually needed."2

In evaluating the performance of the cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign, Rosecrans' plan for the cavalry as a whole must be considered as well as the actions of the two wings. The two wings had very different missions at times during the campaign and achieved different levels of success. Each wing was plagued with different problems in the areas of command structure, organization, missions, and leadership. The
cavalry as a whole represented a finite asset that the army commander had available to him. How he used that asset determined what he could expect in return in terms of intelligence gathering, security, and combat power.

Operational Plan for the Cavalry

Rosecrans' plan for the Chickamauga campaign was bold and imaginative with good prospects for decisive results. Rosecrans had two objectives for the cavalry in the early part of the campaign. The first objective was to conduct the deception operation to get the army across the Tennessee and the second was to disrupt Bragg's lines of communication.

Rosecrans' first objective was for a convincing deception effort above Chattanooga. In this effort, Minty and Wilder were highly successful. Rosecrans, unfortunately, had no further plan for the cavalry on the left wing. After the successful deception operation, Rosecrans turned the two brigades over to Crittenden to use as he saw fit.

Rosecrans' second objective for the cavalry, however, supports Stanley's contention that Rosecrans never:

"understood the true uses of cavalry. Each of these commanders was given to sending cavalry on aimless raids, invariably resulting in having their cavalry used up and accomplishing nothing."
Rosecrans plan for the cavalry included a raid to destroy Bragg's line of communication. This was the reason the bulk of the cavalry was placed so far to the right of the army. From Alpine, the Cavalry Corps could strike the rail lines that Bragg needed. Unknown to Rosecrans, the raid on Bragg's lines of communications might have slowed and possibly made Longstreet's arrival at La Fayette too late to aid Bragg. Considering the assets that Stanley would have needed to conduct this raid, the Army of the Cumberland would have been left without eyes to see the battlefield. As it developed, the raid was not conducted and the army did not have the assets to see the battlefield. The cavalry on the left was not positioned to provide timely information to Rosecrans.

Rosecrans failed to see that he needed a cavalry force to screen the front of his army as they moved forward. Thomas realized that he was in a precarious position without cavalry and asked Rosecrans to send Wilder back to him. Rosecrans moved the army forward in three columns but provided security for only two of the columns, McCook's and Crittenden's. In retrospect the Army of the Cumberland was fortunate that Bragg could not compel his corps commanders to execute the attack on Thomas' isolated corps at Stevens Gap.
The Left Wing

Minty’s and Wilder’s brigades succeeded in accomplishing three tasks for Rosecrans on the movement phase of the campaign. They conducted a security mission that gave Rosecrans freedom of maneuver. Secondly, they vigorously conducted a demonstration above Chattanooga which allowed the uncontested crossing of the Tennessee River. Finally, they provided timely intelligence on Bragg’s actions. Rosecrans’ initial missions for the left wing were realistic and were performed well.

Minty provided the security that the Army of the Cumberland needed on its left flank. As Burnside’s army continued to lag behind the Army of the Cumberland, security was a critical concern. Without secure lines of communication, Rosecrans’ movement south could have been interdicted by Forrest’s cavalry raiding into the army’s rear areas.

Wilder’s portrayal of a much larger unit and his aggressive use of his artillery was successful in buying time for Rosecrans to build a pontoon and a trestle bridge across the Tennessee and move across undetected. The sinking of the two Confederate steamboats and the shelling of Chattanooga would catch and hold Bragg’s attention long enough to cross the Army of the
Cumberland. Convinced that holding Chattanooga was a
detriment rather than an advantage, Bragg had to
withdraw. Bragg's withdrawal led to the easy capture of
Chattanooga and achieved one of Rosecrans' operational
objectives.

Wilder and Minty kept Rosecrans well informed.
Wilder reported on Bragg's actions in Chattanooga from
his overwatch. Minty provided Rosecrans feedback on the
effectiveness of the deception effort. The intelligence
collection by Wilder and Minty gave Rosecrans a good
picture of Bragg's reaction to Rosecrans' movements
until Bragg withdrew behind Pigeon Mountain.

The initial success on the left wing stemmed from
clear objectives. However, from the time the Army of
the Cumberland crossed the Tennessee until Wilder and
Minty established their positions on Chickamauga Creek,
the handling of the cavalry on the left wing was weak.
The problems caused by poor command structure hampered
the coordinated use of the two brigades. Instead of
conducting an aggressive reconnaissance to locate
Bragg's army, the cavalry was slow to get across the
river. The two brigades did not work together until
they reached Chickamauga Creek.

Minty's brigade in particular was held up too long
from crossing the Tennessee. His brigade did not cross
the Tennessee until September 11th, three days after
Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga. Rosecrans' concern for the army's left flank diminished when Minty made contact with Burnside's cavalry at Kingston on September 1st. Wilder had possession of a ford at Williams Island yet did not cross until September 9th. Both brigades, once they crossed, were pushed to recon toward Ringgold while the situation to the direct front of the army was vague.

The squabble over who controlled the cavalry after they crossed the Tennessee is indicative of the problem caused by the weak command structure. Rosecrans did not have a plan for the use of the cavalry south of the Tennessee. He gave Wilder back to Thomas based upon his pleas for cavalry and left Minty with Crittenden. The need for firm, centralized command and control was very evident. In Rosecrans' defense, Thomas needed to know what was going on to his front, but that could have been solved by effective control of the cavalry brigades. The lack of a division headquarters on the left wing kept the two brigades from being employed effectively.

On the battlefield, Minty and Wilder did make some important contributions to the Union effort, most notably, the guarding of Reed's and Alexander's bridges on the 18th. The guard action at the bridges bought time for Rosecrans. The time was critical as it enabled Rosecrans to have Thomas march to the army's left flank. Without that delay Bragg would have been able to cut the
La Fayette road and strike Rosecrans' flank. The close cooperation between Minty and Wilder in the guarding of the bridges is indicative of the quality of these two leaders rather than a formal plan to have them work in conjunction.

On the 19th and 20th, Minty was left out of the action. He was posted at Missionary Mills far on the left flank. The mission to keep the line of communication via Rossville to Chattanooga open was an important mission. Minty's brigade could have been better posted along the La Fayette Road and would have contributed to keeping the road free as well as keeping the Reserve Corps commander, General Gordon Granger, better informed about the situation of the army. Granger and Minty share responsibility for the poor posting of Minty's brigade.

Wilder, on the other hand, was working directly for the Army Headquarters. He was able to select for his brigade positions that enabled his men to deliver enfilading fire on the Confederate infantry that attacked them. Wilder's men fought as dismounted infantry on the two days of the battle. The superior firepower of the Spencer repeaters and Wilder's effective leadership on those two days prevented a serious penetration of the Union line on the 19th and delayed Hindman's attack on the 20th. General
Longstreet told Wilder after the war that the firepower of the Spencers lead him to believe that he had encountered a whole army corps. The delay caused by Wilder's men gave Thomas time to solidify the defenses on Snodgrass Hill.5

Rosecrans praised Wilder's contributions in the campaign highlighting the actions above the Tennessee, the reconnaissance toward Gordon's Mills and the guard action along Chickamauga Creek. He recognized Wilder's contribution stating:

"I trust that Colonel Wilder will be promoted for his many gallant services."6

The left wing made several major contributions to the campaign. Nevertheless, the cavalry could have done much more for Rosecrans if he had provided for better command and control. The absence of a plan for utilizing the cavalry south of the Tennessee led to confusion and missed opportunities to learn the true disposition of Bragg's army several days sooner.

The Right Wing

The Cavalry Corps' operations on the right wing were several days behind the needs of the army throughout the campaign. The uninspired handling of the cavalry may have resulted from a failure to anticipate the needs of
the army. Rosecrans was right to chastise Stanley on September 8th:

"So far your command has been a mere picket guard for our advance."

By spending 3 days resting, reshoeing and resupplying from the 6th through the 8th of September, Stanley prevented Rosecrans from getting timely warning as to the location of Bragg's army. A bold advance toward Alpine would have confirmed that Bragg was at La Fayette several days early. This might have allowed Rosecrans to concentrate his army behind Missionary Ridge. They would have arrived at the battlefield in a more orderly and prepared fashion. Rosecrans, instead, came upon Bragg in an unexpected manner that nearly resulted in disaster for the Union army.

The reconnaissance toward La Fayette on September 13th only confirmed what Rosecrans already knew. Bragg had decided to stand and a general engagement would occur shortly. The lack of timely intelligence stemmed from Stanley's decision to wait 3 days at Valley Head and, more importantly, the posting of the Cavalry Corps to the far right flank of the army.

With four brigades of cavalry available to Stanley, he should have advanced on a much wider front. The restrictive terrain kept the cavalry tightly bunched until they descended Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans'
desire for a raid toward Rome, as opposed to finding out what was going on in front of his army, influenced Stanley's decision to recon toward Alpine, Summerville and Dirt Town rather than move the bulk of his force through La Fayette. Once at Alpine, the Cavalry Corps should have moved to clear the army's front.

The mission of the cavalry corps from the 14th through the 19th kept the cavalry, for the most part, out of the two days of battle. The dispersion of the cavalry by the 19th placed Crook with Long's brigade at Doughtery Gap, Watkins with his brigade at Valley Head, a large part of Campbell's brigade a mile to the rear of Crawfish Springs and only McCook with the rest of his division in the line of battle. Watkins and Crook arrived at Crawfish Springs too late to be incorporated into the battle in a coherent way.

The role of cavalry on the battlefield as a combat unit was not exploited. The security mission on the flank and protection of the supply trains wasted the cavalry as a maneuver unit. Rosecrans in his January 4th report stated the cavalry:

"was to provide for the security of these [the army's spare] trains, which had been sent to that [Chattanooga] valley on the 18th and that they should be moved into Chattanooga after our right was driven back on the 20th, that I directed special attention, and it is greatly due to the behavior of the cavalry on that day that we lost none of our wagons, and that many of our
ambulances and some of our artillery and caissons came safely into the place."  

The security missions should have been an economy of force mission that left the cavalry free to influence the battle. The cavalry could have done much more for Rosecrans but he dispersed the cavalry on a number of doubtful security missions.

The cavalry suffered problems in four areas that bear close scrutiny: command structure, organization for combat, missions, and leadership. The problems that the cavalry suffered through were in large measure caused by the initial plan for the cavalry's employment. Rosecrans had options open to him that could have improved the performance he got from the cavalry.

**Command Structure**

The command structure on the right wing on the two days of the battle was very loose. Rosecrans' intent was for Mitchell to work for General McCook on the right wing of the army. In McCook's Court of Inquiry, Rosecrans testified that McCook's command on the second day of battle:

"consisted of Sheridan's division, three brigades; Davis' division, two brigades; and the cavalry had orders to communicate with him, and close on his right. The senior officers of the cavalry were told that they must take orders from him, though attend to their own business."
The Army Headquarters continued to send orders to Mitchell which made Mitchell unresponsive to McCook's orders. Mitchell had missions that he had gotten from Army Headquarters that he took as the priority over McCook's request. During the inquiry, Major G.P. Thruston, McCook's assistant adjutant general, stated in response to the question of whether McCook sent orders to the cavalry:

"He did;"..."to close to the left, and endeavor to support our right"..."I sent this order in General McCook's name to General Mitchell (commanding the whole cavalry), by a staff officer. General Rosecrans gave General McCook permission to order the cavalry. General Mitchell replied twice that General Rosecrans had ordered him not to leave Crawfish Springs."..."General Rosecrans told General Mitchell subsequently, in my presence, that he should have obeyed General McCook's order."10

The command structure change that put Mitchell under McCook was not clear to Mitchell. The change should have been made during the move south of the Tennessee rather than after arriving at the battlefield. Orders and reports between Rosecrans and Mitchell were being relayed through McCook when the cavalry was at Alpine. Under McCook's command, the cavalry would have provided more support to McCook's Corps. McCook could give the cavalry a more aggressive mission than simply flank security. On the 19th and 20th, Mitchell ignored the order from McCook focusing instead on the guidance he received from the Army Headquarters.
Organizational Alternatives

The organization of the left wing could have improved substantially by placing a division headquarters in charge of the two brigades on the left. By giving Crook responsibility for the two brigades, the cavalry would have worked together better than they did. From an organizational standpoint, Crook could have been detailed to use both of his brigades and report to Crittenden. This structure would make Crook work as a division commander instead of simply providing redundant control of Long's brigade. This would have kept both brigades working closely together, not only during the movement to the Tennessee but also south of the river. Crittenden would have been well informed about what was happening forward of his Corps. Crook would have been concerned about keeping his command together and would have pushed Minty to keep up with Long's brigade. Wilder's brigade would have been freed up to perform other missions.

An alternate use of Wilder's brigade might have been to leave it with Thomas. Under Thomas's control, Wilder could have generated intelligence on what was happening forward of Thomas' Corps. Wilder would have been more responsive to Thomas' needs and been able to
pass information to Rosecrans through Thomas. The army would have gained immeasurably in security.

Cavalry Missions

Rosecrans’ initial missions for the cavalry were not completely appropriate. The deception mission was certainly a good mission for the cavalry. The raid was an inappropriate mission while the army was moving forward. The cavalry could have been more effective if they were screening in front of the army.

During the battle, the cavalry needed to be closely controlled with only regiment size forces performing the security missions of guarding Valley Head and Dougherty’s Gap. The remainder of the cavalry on the left flank could have been used to pitch into the Confederate flank. This would have disrupted the Confederate attack. The terrain along the Chickamauga Creek is not particularly favorable to cavalry but the added firepower of the cavalry could still be effectively exploited. Forrest, operating in the same rough terrain, made effective use of his cavalry by fighting dismounted. The cavalry represented too much of the army’s potential combat power to simply reserve them for security missions.
Effective Leadership

Rosecrans went to great lengths to develop an effective cavalry force. The leadership of the cavalry was certainly a wide ranging variable. The division and brigade commanders were experienced and well thought of by their men.

Mitchell, however, did not have the experience to be the Cavalry Corps' commander. He did not demonstrate the initiative that such a position required. He followed orders as directed but allowed the cavalry corps to be dispersed throughout the right wing of the army. Mitchell, when he realized on the 18th that a major battle was going to occur, should have ordered the cavalry to concentrate. His delay prevented the cavalry from massing combat power. He can also be blamed for the losses that Watkins took trying to get to a lost battlefield. During the rapidly changing battle, Mitchell followed his last orders but did not demonstrate any sense of understanding the flow of the battle. He knew what was going on to his immediate front but not on his flanks.

Stanley's remorse at not being physically able to lead the Cavalry Corps during the battle is understandable. He personally was responsible for much of the improvement in the Union cavalry but did not get
to lead it at the time it was to be sorely tested. It is doubtful that he would have made a significant difference. Rosecrans was obviously not happy with his progress to September 8th. Stanley would have been hard pressed to keep the right wing from getting dispersed.

Stanley's failure to push the cavalry into Broomtown Valley earned a sharp rebuke from Rosecrans. Whether Stanley did not see the urgency of the move or the cavalry was in such bad shape after crossing Sand Mountain is speculation. His failure to develop intelligence on the situation to the army's front almost resulted in the army being defeated in detail.

Rosecrans' leadership style had a profound effect upon the cavalry's performance. Rosecrans preferred to give directions rather than missions. He robbed his commanders of the latitude to make decisions on the employment of their forces. While the entire army had to deal with Rosecrans' leadership style, Rosecrans often directed which cavalry regiments would perform certain tasks. When controlling regiments, Rosecrans was managing three levels down. The effect was to reduce the effectiveness of his subordinate commanders. This is most notably demonstrated by the problems his orders caused. The blame for the dispersal of the Cavalry Corps must rest with Rosecrans as he directed the size of the forces to guard Dougherty's Gap and
Valley Head. Rosecrans could have gotten better results by giving his commanders more leeway.

**Developing Superior Units**

FM 100-5, the U.S. Army's manual on warfighting, states:

"Superior performance in combat depends on three essential components. First and foremost, it depends on superb soldiers and leaders with character and determination,"..."sound well understood doctrine",... and "weapons and supporting equipment sufficient for the task."

The study of the role that Union cavalry played in the Chickamauga campaign offers insights into the factors that are needed to develop superior units. The three components that FM 100-5 describes were not all present.

The cavalry leaders of the Army of the Cumberland were men that were dedicated to their cause. They had a wide variety of background and experience. By the time of the Chickamauga campaign they understood the capabilities of cavalry companies, battalions and regiments. They had developed effective brigade commanders that had experience in handling these smaller units. The most glaring shortfall occurred at the highest level of leadership. The Army of the Cumberland and the Cavalry Corps commanders were not prepared to lead the instrument of their own creation. Their men
were up to the tasks at hand if they could be led in the right direction.

As the U.S. Army restructures we need to remind ourselves that leader development is a critical function. The professional army officer must be knowledgeable and able to train others. We will find that we will not have the luxury of prolonged training time to meet future requirements.

Rosecrans, Stanley, and Mitchell did not have a "sound and well understood doctrine." Rosecrans' vision of what he wanted the cavalry to accomplish during the Chickamauga campaign was not well defined. Stanley and perhaps Mitchell may have been able to achieve Rosecrans objectives for the campaign if they were better understood. Stanley and Mitchell, in their own minds, were not sure of what they wanted to accomplish in support of the army as well as McCook's corps. Doctrine for the Army of the Cumberland didn't have to be a published manual. It had to be a concept of how the Cavalry Corps would fight. Without Rosecrans' intent, Mitchell could be expected to flounder when he took command four days before the battle started.

While we have a published document, FM 100-5, Operations, that states how we will fight, commanders must be capable of relaying their intent or vision. The use of mission type orders with an understanding of the
overall intent of our higher commander will allow subordinates to operate independent of detailed instructions.

Despite Rosecrans not having an understanding of what he want to accomplish with his cavalry, he did understand that he needed a strong cavalry force. His efforts to secure better mounts and weapons made the Union cavalry a much more effective force. Rosecrans’ lines of communications were never seriously threatened throughout the campaign. Wheeler’s raid after Chickamauga succeeded in destroying a huge wagon train of supplies but never damaged the all important rail lines. Wheeler’s command barely survived the raid. The Union cavalry had become an effective counter to the Confederate cavalry. Rosecrans showed the foresight and fortitude to demand support from Washington in developing an effective cavalry force.

Good equipment alone does not make superior units. The best equipped units with weak leaders or a poor understanding of its mission will often fail. We must continue to develop effective weapons systems for our army. We can not afford, however, to neglect the development of leaders. They must understand their equipment and how it is employed.

The Chickamauga campaign was in total a poor demonstration of the cavalry’s ability to influence the
campaign. They failed in one of the primary missions of
cavalry, intelligence gathering. They were not an
effective pair of eyes for the commander. They did not
develop the timely information that Rosecrans needed.
During the battle, they did not bring their firepower to
bear and represented wasted combat power. Rosecrans had
just reasons to commend the cavalry for the hardships
endured and their overall improvements, the cavalry in
the Army of the Cumberland still had room for
improvement before they truly became "master of the
field."
ENDNOTES


2. Thatcher, p. 152.


8. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 1, p. 79.


APPENDIX 1
UNION ORDER OF BATTLE
September 19 and 20, 1863

Army of the Cumberland
Major General William S. Rosecrans

General Headquarters
1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters
10th Ohio Infantry
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry

Fourteenth Army Corps
Major General George H. Thomas

General Headquarters
9th Michigan Infantry
1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L

First Division
Brigadier General Absalom Baird

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Brigade</th>
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<th>Third Brigade</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col B. Scribner</td>
<td>BG J. Starkweather</td>
<td>BG John King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th Indiana</td>
<td>24th Illinois</td>
<td>15th U.S. 1st Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ohio</td>
<td>79th Pennsylvania</td>
<td>16th U.S. 1st Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Ohio</td>
<td>1st Wisconsin</td>
<td>18th U.S. 1st Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>94th Ohio</td>
<td>21st Wisconsin</td>
<td>18th U.S. 2d Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
<td>19th U.S. 1st Bn</td>
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Artillery
Indiana Light, 4th Battery
1st Michigan Light, Battery A
5th U.S., Battery H
Second Division

Major General James Negley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Brigade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG John Beatty</td>
<td>Col Timothy Stanley</td>
<td>Col William Sirwell</td>
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<td>19th Illinois</td>
<td>37th Indiana</td>
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<td>42d Indiana</td>
<td>11th Michigan</td>
<td>21st Ohio</td>
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<td>88th Indiana</td>
<td>18th Ohio</td>
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<td>15th Kentucky</td>
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<td>78th Pennsylvania</td>
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Artillery

Illinois Light, Bridges' Battery
1st Ohio Light, Battery G.
1st Ohio Light, Battery M.

Third Division

Brigadier General John Brannan

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<td>Col John Croxton</td>
<td>Col F. Van Derveer</td>
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Artillery

1st Michigan Light, Battery D
1st Ohio Light, Battery C
4th U.S., Battery I
Fourth Division
Major General Joseph Reynolds

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<tr>
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<td>Col Edward King</td>
<td>BG John Turchin</td>
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Artillery
Indiana Light, 18th Battery
Indiana Light, 19th Battery
Indiana Light, 21st Battery

Twentieth Army Corps
Major General Alexander McD. McCook

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<tr>
<th>General Headquarters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81st Indiana Infantry</td>
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<td>2d Kentucky Cavalry, Company I</td>
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First Division
Brigadier General Jefferson Davis

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<td>Col Hans Heg</td>
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<td>75th Illinois</td>
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<td>22d Indiana</td>
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<td>Minnesota Light Arty</td>
<td>Wisconsin Lt Arty</td>
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Second Division
Brigadier General Richard Johnson

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<td>Col Joseph Dodge</td>
<td>Col P. Baldwin</td>
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Major General Phillip Sheridan

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Twenty-First Army Corps
Major General Thomas L. Crittenden

General Headquarters
15th Illinois Cavalry, Company K

133
First Division
Brigadier General Thomas Wood

First Brigade  Second Brigade  Third Brigade

Col George P. Buell  BG George Wagner  Col Charles Harker

100th Illinois  15th Indiana  3d Kentucky
58th Indiana  40th Indiana  64th Ohio
13th Michigan  57th Indiana  65th Ohio
26th Ohio  97th Ohio  125th Ohio

Artillery
Indiana Light, 8th Battery
Indiana Light, 10th Battery
Ohio Light, 6th Battery

Second Division
Major General John Palmer

First Brigade  Second Brigade  Third Brigade

BG Charles Cruft  BG William Hazen  Col William Grose

31st Indiana  9th Indiana  84th Illinois
1st Kentucky  6th Kentucky  36th Indiana
2d Kentucky  41st Ohio  23d Kentucky
90th Ohio  124th Ohio  6th Ohio
24th Ohio

Artillery
1st Ohio Light, Battery B
1st Ohio Light, Battery F
4th U.S., Battery H
4th U.S., Battery M

Unattached
110th Illinois (Battalion)
Third Division

Brigadier General Horatio Van Cleve

First Brigade  Second Brigade  Third Brigade
BG Samuel Beatty  Col George Dick  Col Sidney Barnes
79th Indiana  44th Indiana  35th Indiana
9th Kentucky  86th Indiana  8th Kentucky
17th Kentucky  13th Ohio  21st Kentucky
19th Ohio  59th Ohio  51st Ohio
99th Ohio

Artillery
Indiana Light, 7th Battery
Pennsylvania Light, 26th Battery
Wisconsin Light, 3d Battery

Reserve Corps
Major General Gordon Granger

First Division
Brigadier General James B. Steedman

First Brigade  Second Brigade
BG Walter C. Whitaker  Col John Mitchell
96th Illinois  78th Illinois
115th Illinois  98th Ohio
84th Indiana  113th Ohio
22d Michigan  121st Ohio
40th Ohio  1st Illinois Light Arty
89th Ohio  Battery M
Ohio Light Artillery, 18th Battery
Second Division

Second Brigade
Col Daniel McCook

85th Illinois
86th Illinois
125th Illinois
52d Ohio
69th Ohio
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery I

Cavalry Corps
Brigadier General Robert Mitchell

First Division
Colonel Edward McCook

First Brigade
Col A. Campbell
2d Michigan
9th Pennsylvania
1st Tennessee

Second Brigade
Col Daniel Ray
2d Indiana
4th Indiana
2d Tennessee
1st Wisconsin
1st Ohio Light Arty
Battery D (section)

Third Brigade
Col Louis Watkins
4th Kentucky
5th Kentucky
6th Kentucky

Second Division
Brigadier General George Crook

First Brigade
Col Robert Minty
3d Indiana (battalion)
4th Michigan
7th Pennsylvania
4th U.S.

Second Brigade
Col Eli Long
2d Kentucky
1st Ohio
3d Ohio
4th Ohio

Artillery
Chicago (Illinois) Board of Trade Battery

136
APPENDIX B

UNION CAVALRY CASUALTIES

September 19 AND 20, 1863

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### Second Brigade

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Total Second Brigade: 2 17 5 74 2 36 136

Total Second Division: 3 23 6 106 2 44 184

Total Cavalry Corps: 4 28 7 129 11 289 468

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Letter of R.M. Russell to Col F. Ruger, June 12, 1867.