BEYOND THE NATION-STATE—A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING
THE SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE INTEGRATED UNITED
CONTINENT OF EUROPE

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1990

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BEYOND THE NATION STATE: A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING THE SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE INTEGRATED UNITED CONTINENT OF EUROPE

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
May 1990
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


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The security needs of Europe are changing. Questions concerning NATO’s role continue to surface. It is likely a new organization, different from NATO, will emerge as the European Community evolves into a significant and united entity.

The U.S. defense involvement in the development of this new model should be extensive and forward looking. This work defines and analyzes a strategy-determining process in light of newly-evolving European security organizations; e.g., the Western European Union, the Independent European Program Group, and the European Communities. The arenas of contention: economics, nationalism, politics and the military are reviewed. A process for analyzing strategy is developed using strategic elements from Karl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri Jomini. Six variables are considered; force structure, nuclear posture, technology, security assistance, joint exercises, and information sharing.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For the past 40 years the threat facing Europe has been communism and potential aggression by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. The NATO response to this threat has evolved over the years to deterrence through flexible response and forward defense. This has included the determination to use nuclear weapons if required. Rhetoric concerning the issues of security and defense in Europe will fill a library. But subtly missing from these discussions is any consideration of what actions should be taken to meet the challenges of a new Europe. One such model of a new Europe must be considered, however, with the emergence of the European Communities (EC).

The NATO alliance model has sought to deter the Soviet Union and to control security in the Federal Republic of Germany.¹ It has sought to do this by organizing military forces and developing security and political relations. The policy has been deterrence through strength in force structure and maximizing East-West cooperation. The objective has been security policy cooperation and stabilization of Europe.²


Changing Perceptions

The United States has been the dominant provider for this deterrence in Europe. In the past, the U.S. has guaranteed the security. What we find today is that the perception of this guarantee seems to be changing, and possibly it is. It has been stated that Europe is a front-line defense for the United States instead of a front-line defense for Europe. This belief has gained in popularity as technological advancements have given nations the capability to deliver offensive missiles from their homeland to the enemy's homeland. It follows then, that any U.S. forward-based forces are, in a sense, a front line for the homeland.

Our response to the rapidly changing Soviet Union posture supports the perceptions. We are also seeing a continuing change in the public opinion in Europe spurred by unilateral agreements and talks between the U.S. and the Soviets. There are also growing perceptions that the U.S. is becoming unwilling to guarantee this deterrence.*

These perceptions grow for many reasons. One is the result of U.S. proceedings with Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This perception is that as the U.S. develops means to defend itself from its homeland, there is less willingness to defend from positions in Europe. U.S. concerns over burden

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sharing and the involvement in more theaters and third world developing countries also causes concerns by Europeans that our willingness is waning. The European consensus is that our interests are becoming more widespread.

The U.S. influence in NATO has existed due to its economic dominance, military strength, and leadership. This began with the Marshall Plan and has grown over the years. The recent perception is that this dominance has declined. The U.S. debt has been a contributor to this perception. Future financial resources will be limited. This restricts, somewhat, the ability for the U.S. to regain dominance in this area. Doubt in Europe about American resolve to fix this problem grows. This is nurtured by observing our political unwillingness to tackle the national debt head on and to correct it. The Europeans observe this to be a non-issue on the American public's agenda. These perceptions foster the belief that the U.S. is unable to provide future economic leadership and dominance.

New Generations

Shared experience and a common purpose have always been a tying link between the U.S. and Europe. This, also, is changing. The younger generation in Europe does not have


*Ibid.
World War II experience or recollection. This absence of direct experience makes growing perceptions of U.S. declining interest and involvement easier to accept.

Europe is also perceiving a declining U.S. interest in European affairs evidenced by ethnic population shifts in America. In the early years of NATO there was a strong national link in America with Europeans. Immigration, family ties, and political commonalities were prevalent and "east coast" oriented. Today the immigration and family ties seem to be Asian and Central American, south and west coast oriented. The trend is toward multipolar association throughout the United States.

**New Threats**

The threat is changing. Changes in Europe today are happening so fast it is difficult to keep up with them. Gorbachev has made statements and taken action to add substance to his words that he was going to remove the enemy threat from Europe. As he acts, the threat will change.

There are other threats to be considered. The changing threat occupies a spectrum not limited to the old arenas of communism and Soviet forces. The new threat is present in all arenas: the economic, the social, the political, and the military. The aspirations of West European nations are

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*Ibid., p 176.*
reaching higher and higher. As these aspirations grow, economic imbalances and needs are growing. The successes and speed of the European Community (EC) movement toward its goal in 1993 is a powerful force in setting new threat parameters. With this movement the social, political, and military threat arenas are changing.

Societies and states are beginning to see threats concerning environmental pollution. They want to know who is going to pay the environmental bills. These include polluted air, the shrinking water supply, and shrinking fuel reserves. As these challenges multiply, the source of solutions becomes difficult to identify. A cooperative movement of the people through political channels seems to be the emerging source.
CHAPTER II

IDENTIFYING NEW THREAT AREAS

What does all this have to do with a new emerging alliance model, security in Europe, and the actions to be taken by U.S. Defense in Europe? As the changes in Europe take place, the U.S. must have a plan and a process to carry it into the next decade. The plan must include an accurate estimate of the threat and a clear course of action to deter it.

In the past the threat has been a military force or an institution represented by a military force. Today it seems the threat source is changing as the power of economics grows. Both economics and military force are potential centers of gravity. Centers of gravity are localities and capabilities from which freedom of action and power emerge. Clausewitz teaches us that there is a hub of power and movement on which everything depends. This is the point at which all energies should be directed." This is the center of gravity. The center of gravity of the threat must be identified to enable an accurate analysis of strategy. The candidates for threat centers of gravity are economics, military power, political power, and social power or nationalism. These have shown

potential to be the centers of gravity in the recent events in Europe, both east and west. A review of each will help in determining their relative influence and power as a center of gravity.

Economic Threat

The economic areas are exerting a powerful influence on the events of today. These are influencing and governing the security needs in all nations. The most significant economic event in Europe was the creating of the Single Europe Act (SEA) of 1987. Included in its agreements are provisions that address security issues. These have come about by economic concerns. This is unique in that the EC neither has intended, nor do they want to focus on national security issues. As Andre Danzin, a high level French consultant for telecommunications information industries states, "they (EC) are in the security business whether they like it or not." Among the many provisions of this act, it provides for solidarity among its members to protect common interests. It also addresses community wide arms procurement. The act also provides for the maintenance of technology and industrial conditions for the security of Europe. These issues involve security and are driven by economics.

There are several areas within the economic arena that are exerting influence. Technology is one of them. It has been advancing technology and superpower competition that has rendered the Soviet Union's economy destitute. The U.S. pursuit of high technological defense has driven the Soviets to economic thresholds they are unable to pay for. This combative weapon (technology) hit a center of gravity in the Soviet Union.

The SDI is an excellent example. This example shows how influential technology has been in affecting a center of gravity. The race to develop capabilities that eliminate the success of an offensive nuclear missile strike is stretching the Soviets beyond their technological and economic capabilities. The multiple effects in the Soviet Union include upsetting the military balance of power, creating a sense of urgency and panic, and diverting capital expenditures away from the private sector.

The monetary system is another area of economics exerting strong influence. This becomes more significant as Europe moves toward 1 January 1993. The momentum by some states in the EC is to establish a single monetary system in Europe. This action requires some nations to forfeit a level of sovereignty they are not willing to release. Even the very discussion of losing sovereignty at the hand of an economic action is an indicator of economics being a significant center of gravity. It also causes some nations to be excluded.
because of their inability to offer a convertible currency; e.g., the Soviet Union.

Military Threat

Let's move away from economics as a center of gravity and consider military and military force structure as a center of gravity. The military, its structure and strategy, has been the center of gravity for the past 40 years. It always presents itself as a candidate for the center of gravity. Europe's history has been one of military campaigns over time interrupted by brief periods of tranquility.

In recent history, U.S. strategy in Europe has changed from total annihilation to flexible response. These strategies were developed and implemented based on military threat and posture. It is progressive to assume that a new strategy will be adopted as times change. This is inevitable with the significant changes occurring in Europe today. Momentum is already causing U.S. troop reductions and force reductions. Is this happening with development of a new strategy? The answer is unknown. This may be because the definition of the center of gravity is not obvious with the fast changes in Europe.

Force structure is a significant statement of strategy. As it changes, so also will the strategy. Several factors are driving the current force structure changes. Budgetary
limitations and the political need to service the debt are causing some of these changes. Perceptions that peace has broken out also add momentum to force structure changes. The question must be asked, "What is the strategy associated with new force posture?"

The NATO alliance is under constant criticism to change or go away as the changes in Europe occur. The response to this criticism depends on personal perspective. American politicians are not too concerned with a need to change or restructure NATO. Europeans, on the other hand, are racing toward fulfillment of the Marshall Plan objectives and the prophecy of Winston Churchill to develop a "United States of Europe" or a "Fortress" Europe.

Defense functions are subtly being replaced by superpower cooperation. This is creating a changing role for the alliance. It supports the notion that there is an important mission for the alliance, but it is in new areas. As Voigt asserts, the new functions are becoming platforms for debate and not platforms for averting the enemy. If this is the case, discussion of dissolution must be ruled out. Energies should be expended to develop the possibilities for growth in these new functional areas. What are they? How are they to be integrated into old alliance functions? These are just

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*Voigt, op. cit., p. 357.
some of the key questions for the future.

Political Threat

The political arena is another influential candidate as a center of gravity. Its potential as a center of gravity is growing in importance in this age of cooperative dialogue. Social-political issues are burning at every level in every state of East and West Europe. East-west relations have taken the foreground agenda in Europe. The issues are cross-walking through politics, economics, military, and social arenas. As the U.S. assesses the capitulation of communism, the German reunification question, and the stabilization of Europe, it must decide what role it will play and how that role affects the U.S. in NATO. Force structure planning and defense planning will change. Arms control and arms negotiations will change. The levels and areas of involvement will change. Even the ideological position of states will change. NATO must take steps to influence these new functional areas.

Social Threat

The fourth arena as a candidate for a center of gravity is the social arena. Nationalism is now able to express itself in all countries in Europe. This is especially true in
the Eastern European countries. It must be observed, analyzed, and assessed to learn how to interface with the changes. The alliance roles and functions must move with these changes. Nationalism is a strong force. It is expressed in many forms and can be an invisible influence on the direction of a nation or an alliance.
CHAPTER III

PLAYERS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

Having looked at the arenas which portend centers of gravity, careful consideration must be given to the players who can address the threat. The candidate players seeking to become the security pillar of Europe and who show the capability to adequately address the issues of the new threat are many. They include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), the European Communities (EC), and the European Political Cooperative (EPC). Though there are many other organizations which constitute large councils or assemblies, these are the most likely candidates. Figure 1 illustrates these players and the emerging model. In recent years, several of these players have become more influential and vocal in the development of the changes toward the European Community.

Western European Union (WEU)

The Western European Union (WEU) is committed to ensuring the defense of Europe and in recent years has become proactive in establishing its authority and influence. It has emerged
FIGURE 1. Players Bidding for the Security Pillar
recently (the last few years) as a significant influence in response to a European need to reach a unified position concerning U.S. initiatives. These initiatives were the SDI proposal in 1983, the Reykjavik Summit discourses of 1986, and the U.S. actions to eliminate the intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe. The initiatives were taken without consultation with European leaders. As these leaders have become insistent on establishing a unified position, the WEU has helped this action. They (WEU) are the "street criers" proclaiming that the 1993 integration will not be complete without including defense and security. Recall, this is the same idea Voigt is saying.

Additional activities in the U.S. have sent mixed signals to Europe that have contributed to the momentum of the WEU. The U.S. Congress' campaign about burden sharing, and the growing U.S. involvement in the affairs of the Pacific and in Asia, have led many in Europe to believe the U.S. is focusing more on its own interest than those of NATO.

The WEU has resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. Its focus includes the continued pursuit of European integration including security and defense areas. They use institutional mechanisms to promote and strengthen their work. They have eagerly sought the responsibility to organize and function as a defense action arm of

representation. Its out-of-area involvement in the Persian Gulf in September 1987 is an example of their success. The WEU is active in the area of arms control and East-West cooperative defense efforts.

There are some concerns that the WEU may be attempting to supplant NATO. Their words say that European defense must include U.S. involvement. A balance of conventional and nuclear defense is essential. The WEU advocates the U.S. must remain involved. The European integration in 1993 is the direction and focus of their actions. The U.S. has not, until recently, recognized the WEU as an influential player. There is still only slight interest and recognition by the U.S. As of yet, neither NATO nor the WEU have exchanged serious liaisons.

**Independent European Program Group (IEPG)**

Another significant player is the Independent European Program Group (IEPG). It organized to foster cooperation in the area of armament planning and production. It functions with an intent to maximize weapon standardization in Europe. Technology optimization, cost savings, and interoperability have been motivators for its activities. The IEPG would like to enhance the European defense systems market as part of the integration process.

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The European Community (EC) is the biggest player in the European pillar. The EC is working hard to expand relationships with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and to cooperate with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The EC's direction is Pan-European. This is one aspect that keeps it unique when comparing the possible roles it shares with NATO. NATO's focus is on the 16 NATO members and Western Europe. This is only significant as we consider the question of continued NATO complement with the developments in Europe. NATO finds itself limited only to the West European countries. As cooperation and alliances emerge with the East, NATO will not be an influential player. What we see is territorial influence dictating capabilities. In the long term, we may find this to be an untenable limit on NATO.

Now this raises the question of who will become the "power broker" in the security business? The EC renounces the military dimension and enhances the cooperative efforts with the East. Though the means of the EC is economic, it is careful to include in its charter to ensure the security of industrial complexes and exchange of technology. It seems that all ventures in this direction have security and defense applications. Recall that like it or not, the EC is in the
defense policy business. The implications are that the EC will evolve into a defense policy making organization. Though its initial desires may be to avoid this dimension, it cannot be separated from the other dimensions of organizational structure of this magnitude.

Security and technology are inseparable. If not, the EC would not have to take steps to include security and technology in their charter. Technological advances have significant security implications. Additionally, all technological advances are routinely protected by developers to ensure industrial interests.

The whole issue of borders and their opening and closing is a security issue. As the EC moves toward the free movement across borders, it will find itself in the business of cooperative security planning between states. This is already happening.

Countries of the EC having large defense industries will maintain a high level of interest in ensuring the security of their complexes. The cooperative efforts to ensure this are written into the EC charter and are becoming more a part of the EC daily concerns.

The areas that will demand the highest levels of security are in scientific research and technological development. These areas provide the greatest opportunity for economic growth and so become highly protected. Electronics,

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Hitchens, op. cit.
computers, and telecommunications are the front runners in potential profiting and synergistic developments. As such, they will become the safeguards and secrets of the states that develop them. The integration process must eliminate the natural barriers of this tendency toward hoarding "National Champions." This leads to cooperative security. The EC, WEU, IEPG are all working toward this end.

NATO

NATO is one of the current pillars of the European security. It is due to the mission of the past. Its objective has been to deter the Soviet Union and to control the security policy of West Germany. It has served to organize the military and secure political relations of Western Europe. Success has been stabilization for 40 years. As the threat changes and as the circumstances change, NATO will become more a political instrument instead of a defense security instrument. The second mission of stabilization in Europe has become the primary mission and East-West relations will command all the energies and actions.

"Hitchens, op. cit., p. 2.

The Call for Change

With every wind of change in Europe there is a plethora of scholarly writings that ask questions like, "Do we still need NATO?" "Is there a future for NATO?" "Back to the drawing board?" "Does NATO have a future?" In these writings the authors take great pains to assess the state of the institution in view of current affairs. Some say deterrence won't work or nuclear retaliation is not the answer. Some would have one believe the new direction is devolution or defense through dissuasion. Many boldly say the transatlantic relationship, in its present form, is undergoing a gradual but palpable, predictable, and potentially, disastrous deterioration. Some say NATO is okay. Others say it has to change. Still others say it is time to disengage.

In the U.S. it is particularly interesting that all the above opinions are expressed. Some leaders are insistent that NATO is necessary and must, or will, remain a significant institution. They frequently fail to define what actions or roles NATO should take for the future. Authors making recommendations for structure and function changes in NATO are doing so because of the changing threat in Europe.


Gorbachev's initiatives are the main motivator for all the rhetoric. Prior to these initiatives there were only quiet murmurings about changes in NATO. The significance of this is that the requirements for change were already in the wind due to the emerging powers from the European Community. Even without Gorbachev's initiatives there would have been a need for reviewing the role of NATO. In this respect the authors failed in their abilities to render anything other than generalizations of the need for change. The writings do not analyze the process for change and do not discuss the strategic rational for solutions.

An analysis must be conducted using the elements of strategy applied to real change capabilities. The political and military changes occurring in Europe today are happening at lightning speed. The tenets of strategy require careful analysis. The players and the arenas of the threat have been identified. Some of our leaders have summarized the current thinking on the subject.

The Call for Stability

General Colin Powell states that no major changes are likely to occur in NATO. He emphasized our need to remain clear about the Soviet challenge. NATO must speak with a

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unified voice as changes occur in Europe. General Powell was keen to articulate the need to educate the public concerning the role of NATO. This is a new requirement today. As discussed earlier, the generation of today views the world without the experience of World War II and formation of the alliance.

NATO must remain a stabilizing force in Europe. It is difficult to argue with the success of 40 years of peace. There are, however, many changes occurring that diminish the visibility of the role of NATO in today's Europe. The European countries of NATO have articulated their position by their actions. Most significantly, the WEU's representation for the collective defense of Europe is providing a framework for significant changes. The role and importance of the economic changes in Europe have set new agenda items for NATO members. There is a growing need for transatlantic consultations on the defense industry issues. Additionally, the WEU initiative and success in out-of-area operations as a representative for Europe have set the stage for new emerging changes to alliances in Europe.

A recent Rand study gives us another perspective on the


"Ibid., p. 9.
views and positions concerning NATO. Robert Levin states that the policy drivers are Soviet policy, economic events, and security policies of European NATO partners. His assessment is that the U.S. will be satisfied with the status quo and will not make radical changes in NATO. This is consistent with what General Powell concluded in his address to the Roundtable Conference.

The Call for Leadership

Sam Nunn (D., Georgia) provides a congressional perspective that gives insight into his identification of the need for change. NATO must think beyond CFE and begin serious considerations of the type of European political and security system it wants to establish in the next decade and in the next century. Nunn articulates the need for vision and leadership into the future. He is calling for quality analysis and wisdom. He sees a need for what he calls "specialization through buildup." This will be accomplished by each nation doing what it does best as it contributes to the security of the alliance. For the U.S., it is providing rapidly deployable forces and the nuclear deterrence card.

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Builddown is not new thinking. In fact, it started in 1981 with the steps toward reductions in missile capabilities on the advent of SDI.

The future requires leadership and vision. Though this seems simple, perhaps trite, the writings of today suggest there is no vision that would account for the major economic changes occurring in Europe. Though the leadership in NATO and in Europe is strong, it is not in concert. Sun Tzu reminds us there is power in an alliance, and a strength in the enemy's attack is in his success in disrupting the alliance. The current struggle is for unity. To attain it will require unique leadership. The challenge for NATO is to keep its political head while these changes are going on. As a European arms control agency, not just a North Atlantic military alliance, the need for cohesion and leadership will be even greater.

The U.S. leadership needs to stick to its basic tenets articulated in its AirLand Battle Doctrine. Although this is Army doctrine, it applies to the leadership required in the formulation of strategy and best describes the nature and need for the United States. These tenets are initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. If the U.S. is careful to insure we lead from strong positions of initiative and agility, we

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will remain influential in NATO. We must have depth in our thinking and actions. This will require change. We need to get beyond the periphery of NATO and out into the other arenas developing in Europe. This must be accomplished through continued, synchronized effort by all partners in the alliance and with those nations not in the alliance.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY - A PROCESS

The U.S. strategy in Europe will change as Europe changes. This transition will occur by a process. The process of transition to a new strategy has not been identified or discussed. The potential exists to allow the course of events to dictate the process. CFE talks are captivating the decision makers. CFE itself could be allowed to become the process if one is not identified and exercised. The threat and players have been identified and discussed. The next step is to identify a process to analyze strategic elements simultaneously considering the threat arenas and the players. The U.S. preparation and ability to accomplish the inevitable transition with ease and acumen will depend on the existence of the process.

Two perspectives are used to analyze strategy options. Each is a candidate for a strategy-determining process. The first method will use Karl von Clausewitz's elements of strategy. The second uses Antoine Henri Jomini's elements of strategy. Elements of strategy will be used to evaluate the utility and sufficiency of different security options and capabilities of a state. The evaluation will consider the threat discussed in chapter 2 and the players in chapter 3. Figure 2 illustrates the analysis methodology.
FIGURE 2. Methodology for a Strategy-Determining Process
With all the activities and changes occurring in Europe today, a clear set of assumptions must be made before analyzing the strategy process. The assumptions used in this analysis are simple and characterized by a continuing trend of the current course of action in moderation. My assumptions are that budget cuts have been initiated in defense spending and will be continued; force structure reductions have been initiated and will continue. The extent of the force structure change is not known, but the expectation is that significant reductions will continue for at least the next four years. Talks and agreements that are ongoing; CFE, START, INF, etc., will continue and result in minor agreements in the directions desired. Strategic defense initiatives will continue in the U.S., although at a slower rate.

In an attempt to identify a process or processes to implement the needed changes for the future, we must consider the possibilities from which to choose. To be certain the status quo has got to go. We are too comfortable with the status quo. It is natural to resist change when it does not seem needed or urgently necessary. U.S. leaders do not readily accept the evidence that it requires change. We have considered Europe as our own forward defense; our first line of defense. This perspective has not changed.

In an alliance, strategy's central purpose is to

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determine how military force can best be used to defend the interests of all its members. There are limited areas that can be changed, fixed, or altered. I call these defense variables. Review of the DOD defense guidance, the DOD Annual Report to Congress, and the defense posture statement provides the source for selecting these variables. At the outset of determining defense variables to analyze, an exhaustive list of possibilities was prepared. The purpose was to examine all possibilities despite limiting factors to ensure capturing all possible variables. From this list, variables were eliminated from consideration because they did not align with the assumptions or were inconceivable for the trends and actions of today. This process rendered the following defense variables; force structure changes, nuclear posture changes, combined force mixes, technology transfers, cooperative programs of training and equipment integration, financial aid, budgetary expenditures, and military exercises.

Analysis Using Clausewitz’s Elements of Strategy

The first part of this analysis will look at the defense variables in view of Clausewitz’s elements of strategy. The objective will be to explore a process for strategy formulation and analysis. Clausewitz’s five elements of

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strategy are the Moral, the Physical, the Mathematical, the Geographical, and the Statistical. Appendix A shows a matrix that was used as a thought-guide in this analysis.

Clausewitz's moral element of strategy emphasizes the importance of leadership. In an arena of uncertainty it is leadership that provides valued insight, accurate intuition, and broad impressions that render sound judgement. Without these, the moral element of strategy is void of influence and power. The demand for solid leadership increases as the uncertainty increases. In today's Europe, uncertainty is at a record high. If the U.S. is to remain a leader in NATO, must then lead from a position of strength. This will be achieved by adhering to the moral element of strategy.

Force Structure

Force structure changes are being driven by budget pressures and the perception of peace breaking out in Europe. Insight and wisdom require us to exercise caution and consider Clausewitz's elements of strategy in our decisions. The moral element of strategy reminds us that the psychology of a strategy is effective only if there exists an army that exudes a spirit. As force structure reductions occur we must maintain the traditional high level of virtue possessed by our

"von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 184."
force. This means a force must be present in the theater of operation. This should not pose a problem for the U.S. We can do this simultaneously with force structure reductions. The wisdom of this element is that, in NATO, there must be a virtuous force of some type on the ground regardless of its parent organization.

The players other than NATO are not able to provide for this element of strategy. The EC and the IEPG do not have a means to provide a force. The WEU has shown an ability to marshal some cooperative force effort but it does not appear capable of achieving the level of virtue required by this element of strategy.

NATO's strategy includes the consideration for the physical presence of forces. The strategy that ensures victory includes the winning edge in the areas of size of force, composition, armament, space and distance, time and unification, concentration, and the economy of force. As force structure reductions occur, these factors must be considered. These factors have served strategists well for 40 years in deterring war. It could be said that the factor of armament has been the overriding factor ensuring this deterrence. Nuclear deterrence has been the cornerstone. As centers of gravity change, it is likely these factors of the physical element of strategy will change.

Force structure changes impact the mathematical elements of movement and cunning. Considerations must be given to the
new requirements in these terms. How is this accomplished? Can the WEU, EC, or IEPG provide for this? The current NATO system is the only source for this. The U.S. forces play a large role and must be sensitive to this need. For example, U.S. force structure reductions may require more responsive movement of troops from the continental U.S. to Europe. This becomes difficult and reduces one's ability to exercise cunning. As force sizes decline, required movement of forces during a time of conflict becomes a more difficult endeavor.

It is easier to exercise high levels of cunningness in one's movements and capabilities as one's size of force decreases.

Changes in force structure do not change the geographies of the alliance and thus does not violate this element. Force structure changes do change the degree of influence geography brings to bear.

Force structure changes affect the statistical element of strategy. Support requirements change proportionally with force structure changes. This aspect of strategy is most often subordinated by strategists in favor of the operational considerations of strategy. Military historians routinely neglect this element, yet it weighs heavily in all military conflicts. Force structure reductions generally place additional burdens on existing force structures to do the support functions. As reductions occur, leaders must be careful to consider the support implications associated with them. This is especially significant as U.S. forces are
reduced in Europe. Greater service support burdens will be required of NATO countries.

Nuclear Posture

The nuclear posture and strategy debate continue at full speed. As we consider these debates and the elements of strategy, several factors must be included. Nuclear deterrence has enabled the alliance to take advantage of Clausewitz's mathematical tenet which includes the factors of surprise, security, and speed. It has also supported the technological factor giving advantage to the element of geography. It has just been in recent years that Liddell Hart's maxims of, "Adjust your ends to your means," and "Keep your object always in mind," has caused the alliance to adjust its policy. Realizing the inevitable end of nuclear confrontation, both East and West are fully engaged in reduction negotiations.

As the nuclear dimension is considered, one must ask who will provide the leadership and control of the nuclear weapons? This is an area where one finds significant weaknesses in other potential leaders. The EC and IEPG are not interested in the nuclear weapons business. The systems and requirements are immensely complex. They have been

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established over the years at the hands of careful planners. Confidence in the system is the product of the many years of maintaining it. This level of confidence may not be quickly obtainable under a new leadership.

Technology

Technology is a dynamic factor in today's world. It is driving many events as already discussed. As applied to Clausewitz's elements of strategy, it has an impact on the physical, the mathematical, and the geographical. It is significant in that it impacts three of the five elements of strategy and also provides the platform for the most flexibility in decision making. This is an indicator technology has become a powerful element in analyzing strategy.

Technology is changing the way the individual soldier, the team, and the unit fight wars. It is changing the battle on the ground, in the air, at sea, and in space. The physical elements of strategy that are affected are force composition, armament, and economy of force. The impact on the process of analyzing strategy is significant. Technology can allow one to make changes to the physical elements without a corresponding change to one's strategy. It gives decision makers the most flexibility and latitude to change the defense variables and continue to achieve the current strategies.
Technology also affects the mathematical dimension of strategy. It enhances a nation's ability to change its posture and its ability to move. The factors of security, surprise, and speed have been enhanced through technology to levels never before imagined.

Again, the SDI example shows this change. Advances in technology and the strategic defense program have generated a threat response to the Soviets in such a way that they are required to expend high levels of investment to counter. SDI has successfully denied the Soviet war aims. Few changes have such a wide impact on the elements of strategy. SDI itself affects changes in the physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical elements of strategy.

Many geographical barriers are being removed with changes in technology. The ability to see and move quickly over limited traversing terrain have changed the strategy formulation process.

Joint Exercises

Exercises with alliance nations affect the moral, physical, and geographical elements of strategy. Changes in strategy can be tailored to retain high levels of coordinated exercises between and among forces. We have seen in Europe this capability extended in the French-West German brigade exchange and in the Italian-West German force alliance.
agreements. This factor is easily accommodated with fewer forces and significantly meets the requirements to consider the elements of strategy.

Information Sharing

Cooperative programs such as information sharing between states is another area that satisfies the requirement for consideration. Satellite information, intelligence information, training, and technology information all provide for enhanced cooperative effort and promote strength in the alliance. These factors have an impact on the moral, mathematical, and geographical elements of strategy. The experiences gained by the commanders and their forces improve on skills which Clausewitz identifies in his moral element of strategy. Security improves too. Geographical barriers are removed allowing access into previously denied terrain.

Analysis Using Jomini's Elements of Strategy

Jomini's "elements of strategy" embrace the subject of war and strategy in a way that is particularly useful in viewing different centers of gravity. His elements allow considerations above the operational tactics of war and

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facilitate analysis at the strategic level more so than Clausewitz's elements of strategy.

This analysis illustrates a process for determining strategy. The process is current, dynamic, and effective in the face of changing world structures. In Europe, the center of gravity is shifting. Economics are becoming more influential. With these changes and the success of the EC, it would be incomplete to conduct an analysis without considering a strategy development process whose center of gravity is economics.

Jomini identifies ten elements of strategy. They are:
- select theater of war, select decisive points, select bases from which to operate, select your objective, select your fronts and lines, choose lines of operations, choose the best course of action, plan for reserves, select maneuver areas, and select depots and logistic sites.

The challenge is to translate this arena (economics) into strategy. This analysis considers the defense variables in view of Jomini's elements of strategy. Appendix B shows a matrix that was used as a thought-guide in the analysis.

**Force Structure**

Let's consider the variable of force structure changes as

they apply to Jomini's principles. Changes to force structure can be made during this period of significant change and high technology with much less impact than in the past. There are four principles of strategy that are affected. Our ability to select bases for operations in future conflicts diminishes as force structure decreases. To some degree our ability to select lines of operation diminishes as force structure is reduced. Maintaining force structure enhances our ability to choose logistics and lines of communications. Finally, force structure affects the ability to choose and exercise reserves. It seems that the significance of the above is not excessively degrading to a strong economic center of gravity. That is; force structure changes, increases or decreases, can be tolerated without violating Jomini's principles of strategy. The price paid is a decreased capability in those areas. They are not significant enough to secure victory or defeat by themselves. Maintaining an influential posture can be achieved and sustained concurrently with force structure reductions.

It seems that all the players (NATO, EC, IEPG, WEU) have a capability to accomplish the elements of strategy. In fact, as the EC matures, it will become much easier to select these theaters, bases, lines of communication, and decision points. This will be enhanced by the elimination of border restrictions. Of course, this assumes away the long and hard work of the cooperative negotiating of agreements on the
subject.

Nuclear Posture

Our nuclear posture and capability is an area in which we retain some of our greatest strength and influence. Maintaining this capability supports Jomini's first principle of selecting the theater of war. This is possibly the most significant capability because it transcends the military and economic arenas. This capability retains power and influence. It also conforms to the second principle of choosing decisive points. For Jomini, decisive points meant capital cities. Today this means capital cities and economic centers. We can retain a high degree of flexibility in decision making in this arena.

With this high degree of flexibility, the U.S. retains the ability to select the best course of action from multiple alternatives. This has been seen in the bargaining power exhibited during arms control talks. It follows that this flexibility also allows freedom in selection of objectives in strategic goal setting.

Technology

Technology and technology transfers are new arenas for Jomini's principles. Technology is powerful and applicable in
military and economic arenas. As mentioned above, it is this area that provided some of the motivation for the significant changes occurring in the Soviet Union today. We retain a strong capability to choose and influence actions in Europe as we control technology and its exchange.

Technological superiority, like air superiority, allows one to choose the theater of war; i.e., where to fight. One has freedom in selecting objectives to attack when one has the technological edge. Through technology, one can expand the ability to select courses of action to analyze. That is, one can find more alternatives to analyze. This gives an advantage when selecting the best course of action.

Technology gives us the ability to choose decisive points and to choose lines of operations. Although seldom considered, technology plays a role in the area of choosing and using diversions as a strategy of war. The capabilities and mystic reputation of Patton in WW II can be viewed as a "technology" that was successfully exploited as a diversion. The technology battle rages wildly in Europe and Japan. We remain competitive but we must not underestimate the influence of technology nor the means to exercise that influence.

International armament is a hot issue in Europe. The IEPG seeks to be the controller. The U.S. is a decisive leader in this area. It remains an influential U.S. defense variable and complies with the principles of choosing decisive points and lines of operations. In this arena we must
continue to strive to exert influence and control. It will remain a power point long into the 1990's. In order to participate we must get ourselves into the organizations seeking to control it.

Security Assistance

Security assistance and aid are defense variables which subtly influence decisiveness in strategy formulation. Choosing objectives, lines of operations, and depots and logistics centers can be accomplished with these actions. Although these actions are smaller in dollar expenditures and less visible, they remain a means to influence and shape arenas in Europe. This area is one that could be doubled or tripled and the pay-off would be exponential.

Joint Exercises

Joint military exercises with NATO allies are areas that reinforce our capability to select the theater of war, select decisive points, select bases of operations and logistics. Joint exercises reinforce working cooperation between allies. They allow plans to be prepared to meet the requirements dictated by Jomini's elements of strategy.
Information Sharing

Cooperative programs and sharing information is an area that is unlimited. Knowledge is power, and the acquisition and distribution of it is power. U.S. defense retains the world’s greatest capabilities in the arena of information gathering and acquisition. Choosing decisive points, lines of operations, maneuver areas, logistics centers and depots, and facilitating diversions are all dependent on information. As the European continent unifies, their need for knowledge will expand exponentially. The U.S. can take steps to enhance activities in this arena and retain power and influence.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The research suggests that U.S. strategy in NATO will remain "flexible response." With the emergence of new players and new arenas of contention, deterrence will be achieved by new methods. Flexible response is undergirded by non-strategic and strategic nuclear capability. The U.S. is the economic power of the world. As the European Communities emerge, the U.S. posture should be to complement the transition to European unity in 1993. The European posture should be toward increased strength and stability in the areas of economics and security.

Force Structure & Nuclear Posture

Force structure reductions are already taking place in Europe. Many politicians want to reduce forces now. The mind and mood of the people have determined to take action. The youth of Europe do not remember or fear invasion, defeat, or occupation. The call of economic unity and power is drowning out the conservative whispers of caution, deterrence, and military strength. This course of action requires wisdom and caution. Although the analysis suggests force structure reductions do not reduce the ability to accomplish strategic
objectives, deterrence is still required.

As economics continues to emerge as the power base, force structure cuts can be continued. However, there must remain a yet to be determined, force structure level to ensure our adherence to Clausewitz's elements of strategy. This level will be determined by CFE agreements. NATO insulates its member states from the CFE negotiations. This allows them freedom for continued development of their leadership roles in the emerging united Europe.

We should not alter our nuclear force structure. INF agreements should be approached from a standpoint of maintaining our flexible response capability. The analysis suggests that this variable must be maintained as a deterrent. Nuclear capabilities ensure the selection of decisive points and the theater of war. These capabilities continue to provide a greater number of courses of action to choose from. There will be multiple options and methods for maintaining the nuclear force levels. For example, non-strategic nuclear capabilities could be reorganized at corps levels to allow them to remain in Europe regardless of forces reductions. Force structure reductions will require careful considerations to accomplish this without losing the nuclear capability.

NATO should remain a viable military entity in Europe. The players, except WEU, have taken positions of not being in the security business. As has been seen, the European leaders envision NATO continuing its role. Inferences are that it
will become a political entity. In fact, it was established as a political organization. Its method of providing force levels on demand will change. If U.S. forces are reduced in Europe and the contingency mission is not changed, it implies a need to designate additional continental U.S. (CONUS) based units as rapid deployment units. This will require new planning and operating procedures. Joint planning and operating procedures must be updated also. This may require force structure changes in CONUS.

Technology

Technology and technology transfers are becoming the diplomatic bartering tool of Europe. As the analysis has shown, there is significant power in the technology base. The EC and the IEPG are wrestling with technology transfer issues regularly. Sovereignty issues generate political emotions concerning retaining or losing power. The issues of sharing technology across borders also generate heated emotions which challenge existing cooperative efforts and capabilities. This avenue of power and influence should be exploited with forward looking non-protectionistic attitudes. The EC and IEPG are learning to do this. The U.S. can lead in this cooperative effort as we establish sound policy and procedures on the sharing of technology with the EC. The integration process is going to unite, albeit with great resistance, the nations of
Europe in the technology arena. The U.S. needs to be in that arena if it wants to retain the leadership edge.

It seems that to get into that arena at least two events must take place. One, our attitude of protecting our technology must be broadened. The EC and IEPG will make extensive efforts to improve the technology transfers among the European states. In time, free flow of technology will become a reality. If the U.S. is to retain leadership, it must also adopt this attitude to some degree.

Secondly, we must interact with the EC with verve. A way to do this is to seek greater involvement in the EC. This involvement should extend beyond the current American Mission we have with the EC. Possibilities include membership, of some form, in the EC structure.

Security Assistance

This is an area that provides a means for continued interaction with the alliance nations through commitments of training, sales, and cooperative operations. This area should be continued and even expanded. We should seek ways to reinforce commitments and increase our involvement.

Military education, student exchanges, and military training are avenues that can easily be expanded. They provide the introduction to increased cooperation.

Foreign military sales and European standardization are
becoming the business of the IEPG. The U.S. should expand its participation in the IEPG. It should be the U.S.’s expectation that the IEPG will become the channel for all future military sales and standardization in Europe. The U.S. can be a positive influence in the success and efficiency of the IEPG. This would benefit the U.S.

Joint Exercises

Joint allied exercises provide a means for continuing the open exchange of information and coordination of operations. It keeps the U.S. involved with the business of military projection in Europe. The U.S. should increase the number and type of exercises it conducts with NATO. Computer driven command and staff exercises should be increased. This enhances computer technology and information sharing while simultaneously reinforcing U.S. commitment and support. These exercises can be conducted despite force structure changes. These exercises would show continued support for the alliance’s objectives.

Prepositioned equipment and supplies outside of CONUS would need to be maintained or possibly increased in quantity. This is a somewhat inexpensive method of continuing the capability of conducting these exercises. It also supports our effort to demonstrate continued commitment in NATO.

The Western European Union (WEU) is seeking to be the
security center in Europe. The U.S. should encourage this progression and induce the WEU to take the command and control of some exercises. The best way to stay involved is to get involved. The U.S. should support the growth and development of the WEU and conduct some initial oversight (assistance) in joint exercise operations and control.

Information Sharing

We should exploit our capability in this area. We should offer to share, sell, trade as it meets our goals and objectives. Our capabilities allow us to lead alliance nations in the design of information systems. This would enhance continued interfacing with the NATO nations as they improve and expand in their capabilities to collect and process information. NATO states are continually seeking opportunities to obtain and share U.S.-collected information. This cooperative effort applies to all areas of information and communications growth. Leaders lead and that we must do.

NATO’s roles are changing. The events in Europe necessitate change. Unfortunately, some of these changes are not an agenda item for NATO. To be sure, the changes in the communist block countries are, but the EC movement does not seem to motivate NATO toward change. With the coming of 1993, both economic and social-political changes will be the drivers of policy in Europe.
NATO and the military defense posture will change to meet the challenges of the next decade. The problems are much more complex and profound than they have been in the past. They have expanded from the simplistic fundamentals of economic growth and military stability to the complexities of social-political stabilization, technological and scientific cooperation, economical cooperation, and military cooperation. To change, NATO must be involved in every aspect of the developing EC. There must be an agency, liaison, or representative in every organization that holds discussions that have security implications. To do this successfully, NATO and its members are going to have to become smarter in the affairs of the EC and its developing structure.

The new demand will be for consistency. As decisions are made in new and multiple areas, they will be overlapping. They will overlap in the areas of foreign and security policy. As we discussed earlier, there are many players competing for power in these areas. Consistency in social-political actions will be the key to power and strength in Europe. NATO must view the enemy from a new perspective. The enemy is no longer the communist hordes of the East. In the short term the enemy is confusion and disconnected policy without a process for adjustment. In the long term, the enemy is socioeconomic integration in Europe.

NATO will move to a position to address all those outlying elements clamoring for a voice in Europe. They
include strategic stability, political change, and shifting roles. The shifting roles are internal and external. In the past, NATO has remained focused on defense and military posture. The shift is toward political interface and stability with an overall movement toward political deterrence through strength in economic power.
APPENDIX A

DEFENSE VARIABLE ANALYSIS USING CLAUSEWITZ'S ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY

This chart was used as a thought guide in the assessment of the influence each defense variable has on an element of strategy. Clausewitz's elements of strategy are listed in the left margin. An "X" indicates the element is affected by the defense variable. The effect is a subjective assessment.

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APPENDIX B

DEFENSE VARIABLE ANALYSIS USING
JOMINI'S ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY

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