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A SPECIAL FORCE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE JEDBURGH PROJECT  
IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION OVERLORD


A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

WYMAN W. IRWIN, MAJ, USA  
B.A., Methodist College, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 1975

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1991

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This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.

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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

A SPECIAL FORCE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEDBURGH PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION OVERLORD by Major Wyman W. Irwin, USA, 211 pages.

This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission.

The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort.

These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.

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## C H A P T E R 1

### INTRODUCTION

Any nation that uses it [partisan warfare] intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

This study will explain the history of the creation of the Jedburgh project, to include the selection and training of personnel to execute the plan. In the way of a brief introductory definition, the Jedburghs were small special operations teams which were parachuted throughout occupied France and Holland from June through November 1944. Working well behind German lines, the Jedburghs' primary mission was to coordinate activities of the various French and Dutch resistance elements to ensure that these activities supported the Allied ground operations. As such, the Jedburghs were the doctrinal forerunners of our present day Army Special Forces.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The Jedburghs, as well as OSS Detachment 101 in WWII Burma, can be considered the forerunners in terms of the Army Special Forces mission of unconventional, or partisan, warfare. Other special operations units in the Second World War, such as Merrill's Marauders and the combined American-Canadian First Special Service Force, were forerunners in terms of the SF direct action mission. For more on the history and lineage of U.S. Army Special Forces,

This paper will cover the period up to the deployment of the first Jedburgh teams on the night of 5 June 1944. This allows discussion of training, as well as refinement of the Jedburgh plan and its relation to Allied planning for the invasion of the continent which continued up to D-day. I do not intend to evaluate the operational effectiveness of the Jedburgh concept or the accomplishments or shortcomings of any of the teams. That is an area for further study.

The value of any special operation, particularly within the context of total war, is often a source of debate. Operations such as these are difficult to conduct and even harder to evaluate in terms of their success. For those wishing to pursue the study of the contributions made by the Jedburghs, I would offer the following. Many of those who dispute the contributions made by groups such as the Jedburghs should caution against overestimating the expected results of such operations. It is true that the organized resistance, aided by the Jedburghs and others, did not 'win' the war for the Allies in Europe. Nor did the signal corps, the engineers, or even the armor or the

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see Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, 1986), written by a former Jedburgh team member; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, DC, 1982); Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets* (Novato, 1983); and Shelby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975* (Novato, 1985).

infantry. But each contributed, in its own way, to that victory. That the activities of these special forces and the resistance groups helped to shorten the Allied campaigns in France is almost certain.

To fully understand the origin of the Jedburgh concept, it is first necessary to comprehend the role that unconventional, or partisan, warfare was expected to play in the war against Germany. As we shall see, this role actually changed considerably from the original concept to the final plan. I will begin, then, by explaining this strategy and its origins. The Jedburgh plan was conceived as one method of carrying out the overall Allied strategy of capitalizing on the potential for armed resistance by the peoples of France, Belgium, and Holland. It was not the only method. I will, in the course of this paper, discuss other methods only as they related to the Jedburgh plan.

First, we will look at the origin of the strategy for the use of partisan warfare in Western Europe. Three factors contributed to the development of this strategy. First was the pre-war efforts of the British in exploring the utility of 'irregular warfare.' Second was the occupation of Western Europe by the Germans and the creation of an organized resistance within those countries. Third was the emerging Allied strategy for the liberation of Western

Europe and the part to be played by partisans in that strategy. The Jedburghs, as we shall see, were simply a tool for the implementation of that strategy. The composition of the Jedburghs, the timing of their employment, and the manner in which they were commanded and controlled, were all influenced by the three factors mentioned above.

Partisan warfare was definitely nothing new at the outbreak of World War II. Indeed the American patriots had used it to gain their independence in the eighteenth century. It was used against Napoleon during the Peninsula War of 1808-1814, where the term "guerrilla" originated. Later, during the Franco-Prussian War, the German invaders in 1870 were harassed by French franc-tireurs.<sup>2</sup> The British had capitalized on it in the Middle East during the First World War. Surely, though, it was not well understood by most senior Allied officers at the outbreak of World War II.

The concept of unconventional, or partisan, warfare as planned and conducted in northwest Europe in the Second World War was historically unique in its scope and methods. New technologies allowed for methods of clandestine warfare never before imagined. As an anonymous writer of one of the Office of Strategic Services' War Diaries wrote,

<sup>2</sup>B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London, 1954), 2d Rev. Ed., paperback (New York, 1974), 370. An excellent review of the guerrilla in history is Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (Garden City, 1975).

Men, money and supplies have been passed across hostile frontiers by land and by sea in all the wars of history but never until this war has it been possible to penetrate the enemy's lines regularly, quickly, and at rendezvous far behind the frontiers. The airplane with the help of modern communication has made practical the transfer of large quantities of stores and troops to selected points difficult for the enemy to detect or guard.<sup>3</sup>

It was a concept born in the minds of political and military leaders at the highest levels and developed by a small group of dedicated, imaginative British and American army officers (both regulars and soldier-civilians). It was supported with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the Allied field commanders and executed by a few hundred highly motivated and adventurous soldiers. As we shall see, the Allied strategy of supporting and coordinating with partisan forces of the occupied countries of Europe was devised as early as February 1941. Indeed, the British had hit upon

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<sup>3</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries, Volume 6: Air Operations," War Diary Section, SO Branch, OSS-ETOUSA, 1945 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985, Microfilm), i; also published by Garland Publishing, Inc. (New York, 1988). This official diary of the OSS organization in the European Theater of Operations was declassified in 1984. The War Diaries record the work of the SO Branch leading up to its integration with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its subsequent role in the functions of Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). The activities of the Air Operations Section, SO Branch, OSS, ETOUSA, are documented in this volume. NOTE: Since these diaries will serve as the principle primary source for this research, future footnote references will simply cite 'OSS, SO WD,' followed by the applicable volume and page references.

the idea a few years prior to that. The planning and preparation for the unconventional war began almost in isolation. Over the next three years, it would become more and more an integral part of the plan for Operation OVERLORD, the return of Allied forces to France.

In Great Britain, many senior government and military officials by 1938 had begun to see the likelihood of war with Germany. Among them was Admiral Hugh Sinclair, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6). In March of that year, Sinclair formed a new branch of his organization. Section D, as it was called, was charged with studying "alternative forms of warfare."<sup>4</sup>

Under the leadership of Major Laurence D. Grand, this equivalent of a modern-day 'think-tank' prepared a number of papers and pamphlets on guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear. Grand often collaborated with another engineer officer, John Holland, in writing of the advantages of supporting partisans in the enemy's rear. Unlike Grand, Holland had some experience in irregular warfare, having served with T. E. Lawrence in World War I Arabia and in Ireland during the fighting between British troops and Irish nationalists.<sup>5</sup> Grand and Holland did not, however, have a

<sup>4</sup>Nigel West, *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-45* (New York, 1983), 60.

<sup>5</sup>M. R. D. Foot, *Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism, 1940-1945* (New York, 1977), 138. Holland would go on to command an engineer battalion.

large readership. This subject was not met with a great deal of interest or enthusiasm by many senior leaders of the armed forces.

Despite this lack of institutional backing, Grand and Holland succeeded in persuading the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Gort, to approve expansion of Section D. This expansion was specifically intended to allow work on the development of resistance capability in countries under German occupation. This included the study of how best to support these secret armies.<sup>6</sup>

Grand and Holland's studies resulted in ideas that were in many ways prophetic. They described a rough concept for the use of partisan forces in support of a conventional battle. As they explained in a report dated 1 June 1939, "if guerilla [sic] warfare is co-ordinated and also related to main operations, it should, in favourable circumstances, cause such a diversion of enemy strength as eventually to present decisive opportunities to the main forces."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>West, MI6, 61.

<sup>7</sup>Report quoted in M. R. D. Foot, *SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944* (London, 1966), 3-4. This volume is considered the official history of SOE. Foot worked in SAS headquarters during the war and is one of the very few (maybe the only) historian ever to have access to classified SOE files.

Section D did not confine itself entirely to research. It established a training center for unconventional warfare at Brickendonbury Hall. The cadre included experts in explosives, sabotage, and other facets of irregular warfare.<sup>8</sup>

The so-called 'phony war' in Western Europe ended with Germany's invasion of France and the Low Countries on 10 May 1940. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain resigned that same day, and the King asked Winston Churchill to form a new government. Churchill, now as Prime Minister, became head of the government and commander-in-chief of her armed forces as well. His domination of the services was even greater since he also assumed the leadership of the Defense Ministry, with General Hastings Lionel Ismay as his deputy.<sup>9</sup> Those in the military were comfortable in their respect for Churchill's knowledge and experience in military affairs and strategic planning. As Ismay remarked, "in his

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<sup>8</sup>West, MI6, 62. Two former Shanghai police officers, Captains Fairbairn and Sykes, were recruited to teach hand-to-hand combat. They would still be around to teach their art to Jedburgh trainees some five years later. These officers developed the commando dagger, adopted for use by both the British SOE and the American OSS, that bore their names.

<sup>9</sup>Gordon A. Craig, "The Political Leader as Strategist," pages 481-509 in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, 1986), 498.

grasp of the broad sweep of strategy [he] stood head and shoulders above his professional advisers. . . ."10

As the countries of northwest Europe fell, their governments fled in exile to Britain. First came the Dutch. Then, on Friday, 17 May, the Germans entered Brussels. Belgium, for all intents and purposes, fell on the 28th, when King Leopold surrendered his army. The Belgian government, however, refused to accept the status of a defeated nation, fled the country, and vowed to fight on with the Allies.<sup>11</sup> On the 19th of May, General Maxime Weygand had become the new French Commander-in-Chief, succeeding General Maurice Gamelin.<sup>12</sup> The Allied troops fought their tragic retreat to Dunkirk, where their evacuation was carried out from 29 May to 4 June 1940.

Churchill had begun, even at this early date, to think about an armed resistance movement within France. On Tuesday, 11 June, Churchill flew to an airfield near Orleans, France. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Mr. Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, General Ismay, and General Sir John Dill, the new CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff). The French government was leaving

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 502.

<sup>11</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *Blood, Sweat, and Tears* (New York, 1941), 284.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 278.

Paris and the military high command had relocated to Briare, near Orleans. At a chateau in Briare, the British party met with French Premier Paul Reynaud, Marshal Henri Philippe Petain, General Weygand, and others. Also among the French was the newly appointed Under-Secretary for National Defense, General Charles de Gaulle. After some time, General Joseph Georges, Commander-in-Chief of the Northwestern Front, arrived and described the situation at the front. As the situation seemed nearly hopeless, Churchill refused to commit additional British air squadrons, as the French requested. He explained that these squadrons were needed for the defense of the channel and Britain itself. He then urged his plan for guerrilla warfare to the French.<sup>13</sup>

The conference continued for another hour before a short break was taken before dinner. Churchill took this opportunity to further press his plan on General Georges. He suggested that the French continue fighting as long as possible and to make preparations for a guerrilla warfare campaign. When the conference resumed the following morning, he continued to expand this idea. Among the questions he posed were,

- If the period of co-ordinated war ends, will that not mean an almost equal dispersion of the enemy

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<sup>13</sup> Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. II: *Their Finest Hour* (Boston, 1949), 137.

forces? Would not a war of columns and [attacks] upon the enemy communications be possible? Are the enemy resources sufficient to hold down all the countries at present conquered as well as a large part of France, while they are fighting the French Army and Great Britain?

- Is it not possible thus to prolong the resistance until the United States come in?<sup>14</sup>

Churchill's ideas were not accepted by everyone present. But General de Gaulle was one who did vote in favor of a guerrilla war. Interestingly, in describing these meetings in his correspondence to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill made no reference to the guerrilla warfare scheme, although he did mention the tenacity of the young General de Gaulle. Churchill felt that the 85 year old Petain was ready to capitulate. "Reynaud on the other hand is for fighting on and he has a young General de Gaulle who believes much can be done."<sup>15</sup> As it turned out, he couldn't do much but run.

The Germans marched into Paris on 14 June. Marshal Petain took over direction of French government after Reynaud resigned two days later. Petain sued for peace the following day. Charles Joseph de Gaulle, at 49, France's youngest general officer<sup>16</sup>, fled to England. By the 18th,

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 140.

<sup>15</sup>Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 12 June 1940, in *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas (New York, 1975), 99.

<sup>16</sup>Ronald Matthews, *The Death of the Fourth Republic* (London, 1954), 84.

the Germans had reached Cherbourg and were crossing the Loire in several places. But at 6 p.m. that evening the people of France heard over their radios a BBC broadcast directed at them. It was the voice of General de Gaulle. He called for all Frenchmen presently on British soil, or those who would be there soon, to join him in keeping French resistance alive.<sup>17</sup> De Gaulle probably had only the regular forces of a Free France in Britain in mind when he made this call. But eventually it would also be answered by those who chose to resist from within France. The French government, on the other hand, signed an armistice with Germany on 21 June and another with Italy on the 24th. Almost immediately, small and unrelated pockets of resistance began to emerge.

One of de Gaulle's first acts was to establish a French Imperial Defense Council to manage and direct the Free French war effort.<sup>18</sup> On the 28th of June, the British government announced its recognition of General de Gaulle as the head of Free France. The Vichy government of Petain broke off diplomatic relations with the British on 5 July,<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Francois Kersaudy, *Churchill and De Gaulle* (New York, 1982), 78; for full text of this broadcast see *The Speeches of General de Gaulle* (London, 1944), 1-2.

<sup>18</sup>De Gaulle, *Speeches*, vii.

<sup>19</sup>Churchill, *Blood, Sweat, and Tears*, 332.

and sentenced de Gaulle to death in absentia.<sup>20</sup> The United States government, unlike that of Britain, continued to maintain relations with the Vichy government. They would do so until the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942.<sup>21</sup> As we shall see, this was to become a source of continuing conflict. Failure to agree on the recognition of a French government in exile also meant there was no recognized political leader to represent the interests of the French resistance.

Roosevelt's refusal to recognize and publicly support de Gaulle and his organization caused many problems. In the coming years, for example, the president would insist that General Dwight Eisenhower deal with de Gaulle and carry out a policy which even Eisenhower felt was unreasonable. This kept the general from devoting his full energies to military matters.<sup>22</sup> Roosevelt's personal dislike of de Gaulle was thinly cloaked in an official position that de Gaulle had not been popularly elected. He therefore, according to Roosevelt and his advisers, could not be recognized as the representative of France and the leader of her people.

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<sup>20</sup>Foot, *Resistance*, 236.

<sup>21</sup>Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, United States Army in World War II series (Washington, DC, 1959), 8.

<sup>22</sup>Matloff, *Strategic Planning, 1943-1944*, 502.

There is evidence, however, that de Gaulle had acquired a substantial following within France by the end of 1942. John Ehrman wrote that de Gaulle was recognized as "the unchallenged leader of the Resistance"<sup>23</sup> by the resistance groups in central and southern France by the autumn of that year. His acceptance continued to grow and spread to movements in the north and to the many smaller groups throughout the country during 1943. The problems in recognizing an overall leader of the resistance, however, would continue for some time. But what did these resistance groups look like during the early years of the occupation?

The resistance elements throughout France could be divided into three main categories. Two of these were components of the organized resistance. These were the clandestine organizations, or underground, and the armed guerrilla and paramilitary units. The third was not, technically speaking, part of the resistance. They were the seemingly uncommitted populace who were sympathetic toward the resistance movement and provided covert support. Their's was a passive form of resistance.<sup>24</sup>

The underground included the movement's sub rosa political leaders and others who made up the infrastructure.

<sup>23</sup> John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy, Vol V.: August 1943-September 1944* (London, 1956), 324.

<sup>24</sup> In the parlance of current U.S. Army unconventional warfare doctrine, they were the "auxiliary".

It also included those people who carried on their normal business activities and home life during the day. At night they engaged in intelligence gathering or political activities. Political activities included the publishing and distribution of resistance newspapers and pamphlets. As these organizations grew and expanded their operations, they established covert sabotage cells. Such underground elements were located almost exclusively in the major urban centers, although they did operate escape routes through the countryside. These escape routes were credited with returning hundreds of downed Allied aircrews back to England.

The paramilitary units formed the overt, military arm of the resistance. The major resistance groups throughout France were formed by military officers, government officials, and intellectuals. Initially, they confined their activities to publishing and distributing clandestine newspapers and pamphlets, speaking out against the occupying Germans and the collaborationist Vichy government. As these groups grew, they created armed units called *Corps Francs*. It was these units that would begin to carry out the war of sabotage against German war industry and lines of communication.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>The most balanced recent accounts on the political situation in France during this period, including the birth and development of the major resistance groups, are: Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*

It is hard to overemphasize the importance of the third element of the resistance, the supporting populace. This "auxiliary" is as vital to a resistance movement as lines of communication are to conventional forces. Their role is explained by Miksche:

In this age of total warfare, the whole nation is engaged in the struggle. In underground warfare, however, the population is even more intimately concerned. Each man fights in his own particular manner, some with weapons, others by passing on false information to the enemy, others by sheltering members of the resistance movement and using their dwellings to hide arms and stores, while many can help solely by withholding their knowledge from the enemy. By these means the whole nation takes part; men and women, old people, even children.<sup>26</sup>

As we have seen, then, this emerging resistance organization looked mostly to General de Gaulle as the symbol of the Free France for which they stood. The major exception to this was the communist resistance movement,

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(New York, 1972); John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French Under Nazi Occupation* (New York, 1986) and *The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944: A History of the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance* (Dekalb, IL, 1976). Earlier works include: J. de Launay, *European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945* (London, 1960-64); and Ronald Seth, *The Undaunted: The Story of the Resistance in Western Europe* (London, 1956). Interesting journalistic accounts, are: Blake Ehrlich, *Resistance: France 1940-1945* (Boston, 1965); and David Schoenbrun, *Soldiers of the Night: The Story of the French Resistance* (New York, 1980). An excellent personal account by a founder of one of the major resistance groups is Henri Frenay, *The Night Will End* (New York, 1976).

<sup>26</sup>F. O. Miksche, *Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements* (London, 1950), 81.

which became active in France after the German offensive in Russia began.

By early 1942, de Gaulle had begun to form the political infrastructure through which he hoped to direct the resistance effort. He established the French National Committee as the political organ. To coordinate directly with the resistance, through agents parachuted into France, he established the BCRA (Central Office of Information and Action) in January 1942.<sup>27</sup>

As the year 1941 came to a close, then, the seeds for a partisan war in Western Europe had been planted. The British had begun work on the concept, and were now being led by the concept's greatest champion, Winston Churchill. The French had begun to organize themselves for the ordeal. The Americans were soon to enter the picture.

In the next chapter, we will look at the events that led to the creation of the British and American organizations which would be responsible for fielding missions to the resistance groups. The strategy which eventually led to the conception of the Jedburgh project will also begin to appear.

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 109.

## C H A P T E R 2

### ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT

Set Europe Ablaze!

Winston S. Churchill (1940)

In Britain, a significant change in the organization and responsibility for special operations took place in 1940. The British, particularly Churchill, soon began to understand that it was a mistake to keep a department responsible for special operations subordinate to an intelligence organization. An intelligence agency is, after all, more concerned with the gathering and processing of intelligence than with conducting irregular warfare. They were also ill-equipped, untrained, and poorly organized for such activities.<sup>1</sup>

In his biography of Sir Stewart Menzies, Anthony Cave Brown wrote of a ministerial meeting held on 1 July 1940. Churchill's developing ideas on irregular warfare became known to all at this meeting. It was his belief that the populace within the occupied countries of Europe, through organized underground movements, would have to play

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<sup>1</sup>Miksche, *Secret Forces*, 108.

a large role in their own liberation. And in order to stimulate this unconventional war, an organization was needed whose primary mission was the nourishment of these underground movements.<sup>2</sup>

Over the following two weeks, Churchill came to the conclusion that the new organization should be set up separate from the military. One can only speculate as to his reasons for this decision. It may have been due to the military's traditional prejudice against such activities. Another possibility is that he was interested in the cover that such an arrangement would provide. Whatever the reason, on 16 July he charged Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare, with responsibility for coordinating the sabotage effort. This marked the birth of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE).<sup>3</sup> The organization began as a consolidation of various sections of the foreign office, the war office, and SIS. Appropriately, it was Section D that came from SIS. Sir Charles Hambro, a banker, was named second-in-command of the new organization.<sup>4</sup> SOE's

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<sup>2</sup>Anthony Cave Brown, *"C": The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 295.

<sup>3</sup>Foot, *SOE in France*, 8. For more on general history of SOE see Foot's *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-46* (London, 1984); also E. H. Cookridge, *Set Europe Ablaze* (New York, 1967); and David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945* (Toronto, 1980).

<sup>4</sup>Brown, *"C"*, 297.

charter was "to co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas."<sup>5</sup> To Dalton, Churchill directed, "And now set Europe ablaze."<sup>6</sup> SOE, as envisioned by the Prime Minister, was to be a secret organization whose principal concern was unconventional warfare.

There were at least two reasons for Britain's decision to immediately begin unconventional warfare against the Germans. In part, it was a desire not to become involved in another stalemated and costly land war such as World War I. Another reason was that Britain was not capable, at the time, of fighting any other kind of war.

Since the fall of France in 1940, SOE monitored the state of morale and resistance among the French population.<sup>7</sup> Immediately following that tragic defeat and for some time thereafter, morale among the French was low due to the hopelessness of the situation. Oppressive occupation policies and the accommodation of the Vichy government further soured the French mood. For a resistance movement to have any potential for success it must have some reasonable hope for success. In 1940 there was no such hope.

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<sup>5</sup>Quoted in Foot, *Resistance*, 137.

<sup>6</sup>Foot, *SOE in France*, 11.

<sup>7</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2: "Planning", vi. This volume documents the work of the Planning Section of SO Branch, OSS, ETOUSA.

The resolve of the French patriots clearly needed strengthening. SOE proposed to accomplish this through the use of agents infiltrated throughout occupied France. They would organize the resistance into an effective guerrilla fighting force and arrange for supplies to be dropped to them. Weapons, ammunition, explosives and other supplies would be hidden away for future operations. Some would be put to use immediately.<sup>8</sup> This experiment in irregular warfare was to be directed from SOE's main headquarters at 64 Baker Street in London.<sup>9</sup> In a radio broadcast to the French people on 21 October 1940, Churchill hinted at the form of warfare he had in mind. "Those French who are in the French Empire, and those who are in so-called unoccupied France," he said, "may see their way from time to time to useful action. I will not go into details. Hostile ears are listening."<sup>10</sup>

The British Chiefs of Staff issued their first directive to SOE on 25 November 1940. The subject of the paper was the requirement for subversive activities to support plans for re-entry into the continent of Europe. According to SOE historian M. R. D. Foot, the document's authors:

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Foot, *Resistance*, 139.

<sup>10</sup> Churchill, *Blood, Sweat, and Tears*, 403.

hoped that Germany would be so weakened by subversion that eventually a land striking force could be sent across to defeat her; but meanwhile it was hardly possible to indicate particular targets for sabotage. Subversive activity needed, they thought, to be prepared over wide areas, to be implemented later as occasion arose. They specified service communication targets as important; and directed, though not at high priority, the setting up of some organization that could co-operate with an eventual expeditionary force in Brittany, the Cherbourg peninsula, and southwestern France.<sup>11</sup>

So the British chiefs were not looking for sabotage operations to begin on a large scale immediately. They preferred that the resistance be prepared as a force to be employed only when called upon and in support of conventional ground operations. This would clearly require a significant SOE presence in France to organize and train these groups and to ensure that their actions were in line with British goals.

In November, then, SOE established an 'F Section' which was to be the British government's focal point for establishing and maintaining contact with the various French resistance groups. Specifically,

Its purpose was to contribute to French resistance by organizing closed circuits within France for the recruitment, training and supply of saboteurs, and directing their operations against specific targets in conformity with the plans of the allied military command as well as their day-to-day sabotage operations."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Foot, SOE in France, 149.

<sup>12</sup>OSS, "OSS Aid to the French Resistance in World War II," Report 985, "F Section Missions," (1945), 10. These reports are on file at the Marquat Library, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC.

F Section's existence, for security reasons, remained secret, even from de Gaulle, for some time. When he did discover it, it became another source of irritation for the politically sensitive general. De Gaulle was offended first by the knowledge that SOE was building an infrastructure of agents inside France without his knowledge and consent. Furthermore, his subordinates were trying to recruit agents for the same purpose, and thus found themselves in competition with the British organization.<sup>13</sup>

In the spring of 1941, SOE began to build these "circuits" of organized resistance within occupied France. They were small teams of agents parachuted or landed by sea into France. Each circuit consisted of an organizer, his lieutenant, and a wireless/telegraph (W/T) operator. Their job was to organize, train, and coordinate supply drops for local resistance groups. They were also to direct sabotage activities.<sup>14</sup> This organizing effort was remarkably

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<sup>13</sup>Foot, *Resistance*, 248. For more on F Section, see Maurice J. Buckmaster, *Specially Employed: The Story of British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance* (London, 1952). Buckmaster was head of F Section. Also see Patrick Howarth, *Undercover: The Men and Women of the Special Operations Executive* (London, 1980); Marcel Ruby, *F Section, SOE: The Buckmaster Networks* (London, 1988); and Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street Irregular* (London, 1965).

<sup>14</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 3: "Western Europe", 14. The significance of these circuits to the Jedburghs is that these organizers were the first Allied contact with the resistance. When the Jedburgh teams finally began to arrive in France beginning on D-day, the resistance groups that received them were, for the most part, organized and partially equipped by the circuits. Many of these circuits, some of which included women from SOE and OSS, were still active

successful, perhaps too successful. According to one author, some of these circuits, by early 1943, reached a strength of some 2,000 to 3,000 patriots.<sup>15</sup> As we will later see, expansion on such a large scale was dangerous, and it was to have damaging results.

There were many resistance groups in France, however, which were not under the control of an F Section organizer. Many of these were run by similar circuits fielded by SOE's de Gaullist RF Section. Buckmaster's F Section circuits were called "closed circuits" because their existence and composition remained unknown to RF Section. This arrangement provided some degree of protection in case any RF circuits were "blown", or compromised to the Germans or to the Vichy security police. SOE maintained some control over de Gaulle's circuits since RF Section had to depend on the British for air transport, funds, materiel, and communications. SOE maintained contact with RF circuits and their resistance groups through the National Committee of Liberation in London.<sup>16</sup>

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upon arrival of the Jedburghs and in some cases the Jedburghs were subordinated to them.

<sup>15</sup>Brown, "C", 504.

<sup>16</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 55. There were a number of interesting first-person accounts written in the immediate post-war years by members of both F Section and RF Section circuits. Some of the best are: Philippe de Vomecourt, *Who Lived to See the Day: France in Arms, 1940-1945* (London, 1961); George Millar, *Maquis* (London, 1945) and *Road to Resistance: An Autobiography* (Boston, 1979); and Peter Churchill, *Of Their Own Choice* (London, 1952), *Duel of Wits*

Talks between the military staffs of Britain and the United States began in Washington in January 1941. The American officers represented the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The British delegation was from the office of the British Chiefs of Staff. It was becoming increasingly clear to many that America stood a good chance of entering the war sooner or later. The aim of these conversations was to develop a combined strategy. The meetings concluded in March with the results drawn up in the ABC-1 Staff Agreement.<sup>17</sup> Following the ABC conference, in April, a plan known as RAINBOW 5 was drawn up. One element in the strategy for the defeat of Germany, according to this plan, was the support of resistance groups in occupied countries.<sup>18</sup>

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(London, 1953), and *The Spirit in the Cage* (London, 1954). A good account by an American OSS organizer is William J. Morgan, *The OSS and I* (New York, 1957). For the role of women in F Section and RF Section circuits, see: Russel Braddon, *Nancy Wake: The Story of a Very Brave Woman* (London, 1956); Jerrard Tickell, *Odette: The Story of a British Agent* (London, 1949); Margaret L. Rossiter, *Women in the Resistance* (New York, 1986); and Irene Ward, *F.A.N.Y. Invicta* (London, 1955). The tragic story of a circuit organizer suspected of treachery is told in Jean Overton Fuller's *The Starr Affair* (London, 1954). The stories of three circuit organizers are told in E. H. Cookridge's *They Came from the Sky* (New York, 1967).

<sup>17</sup>U.S. Army, *The War in Western Europe, Part 1* (June to December, 1944) (West Point, 1949), 4. "ABC" stood for "American-British Conversations." The talks were held in Washington from 29 January to 29 March 1941.

<sup>18</sup>Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, United States Army in World War II series* (Washington, 1953), 44.

Shortly after the Washington strategy conference President Roosevelt took the first step in establishing a special operations capability for the Americans. On 27 May 1941 he declared that a state of national emergency existed in the United States. One of the many emergency measures that the President invoked was the creation of a service responsible for secret intelligence and special operations.<sup>19</sup> In July, Roosevelt named William Joseph Donovan as Director, Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), an organization established with the purpose of gathering information bearing on national security. Roosevelt had recognized the obvious talents of the World War I Medal of Honor winner who had become a Wall Street millionaire and Justice Department official. In fact, he had first known Donovan as a fellow law student at Columbia.<sup>20</sup>

In 1935, Donovan began a number of secret fact-finding missions for the President. On one such trip in July 1940, Donovan traveled to England, where he met with King George VI and Prime Minister Churchill. He also talked with the War Cabinet, the British Chiefs of Staff and their commanders in chief.

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<sup>19</sup>Brown, "C", 358-59.

<sup>20</sup>Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (New York, 1982), 149.

The meeting that was to prove the most influential with Donovan, however, was with Colonel Stewart Menzies, successor to Hugh Sinclair at SIS. As head of MI6, he was simply known as 'C'. Although he was a regular cavalry officer, he was well suited for the intelligence business. Foot wrote of Menzies, "The passion for the devious was strong in him . . . ." <sup>21</sup> After briefing Donovan on the British intelligence organization, Menzies introduced him to Colonel Colin Gubbins of SOE. Gubbins brought Donovan up to date on the work being done in developing the potential of resistance movements in occupied territories. <sup>22</sup>

In his biography of William Donovan, Anthony Cave Brown observed that, "Few generals and admirals in Washington understood the nature of the secret war Donovan had been hired by FDR to fight." <sup>23</sup> The type of warfare Donovan's organization had to prepare for was seen as distasteful by many of those on the General Staff. The situation Brown described was similar to that of Donovan's counterpart across the Atlantic.

Colin McVean Gubbins, like Churchill, was an early champion of irregular warfare. The son of a diplomat, Gubbins was born in Tokyo in 1896. Service in the First

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<sup>21</sup>Foot, *Resistance*, 135.

<sup>22</sup>West, *MI6*, 204.

<sup>23</sup>Brown, *The Last Hero*, 216.

World War left him with a wound and a Military Cross. Shortly after that war, Gubbins began to develop an interest in irregular warfare. Two events of this period stimulated that interest. The first was the Bolshevik revolution. The second was the civil war which broke out in Ireland. Gubbins served there from 1920 to 1922,<sup>24</sup> during a period in which the British Army contingent engaged in a struggle with the rebellious Irish Republican Army. This conflict was characterized by guerrilla and terrorist tactics.<sup>25</sup> In the spring of 1939, Gubbins joined Holland at GS(R), an office which had grown out of Section D at the War Office. Here Gubbins kept busy turning out guerrilla warfare manuals. Later that year, he was posted to Paris on a mission of liaison with the Czech and Polish resistance movements. He was returned to England in 1940 and given the remarkable task of forming a civilian force (stay-behind parties) to conduct guerrilla operations in case of a German invasion of England. By November, Gubbins, now an acting brigadier, was attached to SOE.<sup>26</sup> As chief of the Operations Division, Gubbins was known as 'M'. His work involved establishing

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<sup>24</sup>Blake and Nicholls, ed., *The Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980* (Oxford, 1986), 367.

<sup>25</sup>Harold J. Schultz, *History of England* (New York, 1968), 311.

<sup>26</sup>Blake and Nicholls, *Dictionary*, 367.

training facilities and operating procedures. He was also responsible for relations with the joint planning staff.<sup>27</sup>

It was during his tenure as head of COI that Donovan recruited many of the brilliant and talented men who would later serve on his staff at OSS. These Donovan hand-picked from the elite in the worlds of industry and banking. They included prominent lawyers and academics. The COI became a highly efficient fraternity; but it was a civilian organization and was not considered entirely trustworthy or reliable by the military.<sup>28</sup>

One of Donovan's first acts at the head of this new organization was to establish a COI office in London. Donovan chose New York lawyer and Rhodes Scholar, William D. Whitney, to head this office. Whitney, accompanied by Robert Solborg, the chief of COI's new Special Operations branch, arrived in London in October 1941. Solborg had been charged by Donovan with studying the methods used by SOE.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Brown, *The Last Hero*, 194. The discretion of Donovan's staff was so suspect in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff that COI was not even included in the distribution of 'Magic' message traffic. These intercepts were the result of the American penetration of the code used by the Japanese Foreign Office.

<sup>29</sup> West, MI6, 207-08.

The American and British staffs had another chance to discuss grand strategy during the meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill at Argentia, Newfoundland, in August 1941. This was the meeting that produced the Atlantic Charter. The American delegation at these talks was briefed on the British concept for re-entering the continent of Europe. The British were apparently cautious in their planning, hesitant to involve large forces in a stalemate as in the last war. Rather, they preferred a strategy of peripheral attacks, such as in North Africa and the Mediterranean. They planned to subject German forces on the continent to strategic bombing, blockades, propaganda, and subversion. Once the enemy had been weakened by this indirect form of warfare, a relatively small, highly professional invasion force would land:

We do not foresee vast armies of infantry as in 1914-18. The forces we employ will be armoured divisions with the most modern equipment. To supplement their operations the local patriots must be secretly armed and equipped so that at the right moment they may rise in revolt.<sup>30</sup>

It is clear that the British were thinking in terms of a national uprising by the populace of the occupied countries. Resistance on such a large scale was not only unlikely, it is doubtful in the extreme that it would have had the desired effect.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 55.

What was General de Gaulle's opinion of this plan? There is no evidence that he was even aware of it. But he had also recognized that the resistance would have a role to play in the liberation of France. On the 24th of September, 1941, de Gaulle announced that he had formed a French National Committee which would act, essentially, as a provisional French government. A month later, he made it clear that he also considered himself commander of all resistance groups within France. De Gaulle called on all patriots to refrain from arbitrarily killing Germans; such actions only invited reprisal. Resistance groups should, he said, remain prepared to act upon receipt of orders from him.<sup>31</sup>

By the fall of 1941, de Gaulle was learning much more about the extent of the French resistance movements. One of the many who had made their way to England to join de Gaulle's organization was Jean Moulin, the former prefect of the French department of Eure-et-Loir. Moulin had come to England as an emissary to de Gaulle from the main resistance organizations of unoccupied France. In October, he submitted his report on French resistance activities. In it, the French agent wrote of the eagerness of the patriots to assist in the liberation of their country.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>De Gaulle, *Speeches*, 87.

<sup>32</sup>Foot, *SOE in France*, 496. The full text of Moulin's report, entitled "Report on the Activities, Plans and Requirements of the Groups formed in France with a view

Moulin's report also addressed the delicate subject of support to communist resistance groups in France. He said that all groups with which he was in contact were willing to cooperate with the communist groups only to the extent necessary to rid France of the Germans. The only exception was the group Liberte, which was inflexibly anti-communist.<sup>33</sup>

Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war, Roosevelt and Churchill held the third of their Anglo-American strategy conferences.<sup>34</sup> The Arcadia Conference, as the meeting came to be known, was held in Washington in late December 1941. Churchill departed England on the 12th aboard the Duke of York.<sup>35</sup> During the ten-day voyage to Washington, the Prime Minister dictated his ideas for an Allied war strategy.<sup>36</sup> His plan was on paper by the time the British party arrived at Hampton Roads, Virginia. From there, they boarded a plane and flew the short distance to Washington, arriving

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to the eventual liberation of the country," is found in Appendix E of Foot's book.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 493.

<sup>34</sup>Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," pages 677-702 in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, 1986), 683.

<sup>35</sup>Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. II, 555.

<sup>36</sup>Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III: *The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), 573.

late on the 22nd. Roosevelt met them at the airport and Churchill rode with the President to the White House.<sup>37</sup>

The Prime Minister wasted no time in presenting his proposals for an Allied grand strategy. He introduced them during a dinner party, which William Donovan attended, at the White House on his first evening in Washington. Later, he provided them in written form to the President. Churchill's plan included landings in Western and Southern Europe by the armies of Great Britain and the United States, and a simultaneous uprising by the populations of the occupied countries.<sup>38</sup> This, of course, was a restatement of the strategy presented by the British Chiefs in August. Churchill recognized that the budding resistance movements in Western Europe held little chance of success as long as the German occupation forces could focus their attention on counter-guerrilla and police operations. These forces would be incapable, however, of dealing with both "the strength of the liberating forces and the fury of the revolting peoples."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 587.

<sup>38</sup> The complete text of Churchill's three strategy documents of December 1941 are in *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, I: Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942*, ed. Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, 1984), 294-309, passages quoted above are on page 302; also see Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, 582, 588.

<sup>39</sup> Kimball, *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, I*, 302; Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, 583.

This liberation of France, Churchill felt, should be carried out in the summer of 1943. He went on to describe this liberation that would involve, he estimated, 40 Allied armored divisions backed by a million troops of other branches. "If the incursion of the armoured formations is successful," he wrote, "the uprising of the local population, for whom weapons must be brought, will supply the corpus of the liberating offensive."<sup>40</sup> Although Roosevelt and Donovan were intrigued, the more traditional American Chiefs of Staff were not.<sup>41</sup>

As a result of the Arcadia Conference, the British and Americans resurrected the Allied Supreme War Council of the First World War. For this second war they called it the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and established its headquarters in Washington. This body's first task was to evaluate the Prime Minister's Arcadia plan. The plan was presented by the British in a paper entitled, "American-British Grand Strategy." During the discussions by the CCS, the more unconventional measures were not given serious study. They remained, however, a part of the plan as the Americans accepted it.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, 584-85.

<sup>41</sup> Brown, *The Last Hero*, 204-5.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

General de Gaulle, as self-appointed commander of all French resistance forces, understood the principle of unity of command. Critical to the success of the partisan role in the liberation of France, de Gaulle realized, was that it be a unified effort. He undoubtedly also understood that whoever controlled the resistance would benefit politically in post-war France. De Gaulle did two things in January 1942 to extend his authority and influence over the French resistance movements.

One thing he did was form a Free French intelligence organization. This organization would also establish contact with resistance groups and maintain liaison through agents dropped with the assistance of SOE. It was known as the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action, or BCRA (Central Office of Information and Action).<sup>43</sup>

De Gaulle also dispatched two missions to France with the purpose of unifying the scattered groups into a nation-wide movement. One mission was sent to form a coalition among the resistance groups in the unoccupied, or southern, portion of France. The other mission's objective was to accomplish the same in the occupied north.

As the agent to carry out the southern mission, de Gaulle chose Jean Moulin, the man who had come to England to

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<sup>43</sup>Miksche, *Secret Forces*, 108.

ask for support for the resistance. Moulin parachuted back into France on New Year's Day, 1942.<sup>44</sup>

The three largest organizations in southern France at that time were Combat, Liberation, and Franc-Tireur. Combat was formed in late 1941 by the merging of two smaller groups, Liberte and Liberation nationale. Moulin spent the next 18 months working to pull these various groups together under one umbrella organization. His first major success was in the formation, in March 1943, of the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance (MUR). It was a coalition of all non-communist resistance groups in southern France.<sup>45</sup>

Three agents were sent to carry out the unification mission in northern France a year after Moulin's departure for the field. Wing Commander Forest F. E. Yeo-Thomas and Commandant Pierre Brossolette, both of SOE's RF Section, joined the head of BCRA, Colonel Passy<sup>46</sup>, on the mission to occupied France in February 1943.<sup>47</sup>

In the north, there were five major movements: Ceux de la Liberation, Ceux de la Resistance, Defense de la France, Liberation-Nord, and Organisation Civile et

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<sup>44</sup>Foot, Resistance, 240.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>This was a pseudonym; Passy's real name was Andre Dewavrin.

<sup>47</sup>Bruce Marshall, *The White Rabbit* (Boston, 1952), 17-22. This book relates the wartime experiences of Wing Commander Yeo-Thomas.

Militaire.<sup>48</sup> After the Germans' attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the communists within France also organized a resistance movement. In fact, the only organization with a nationwide presence in 1942 was the communist *Front National* and its military arm, the *Francois Tireurs et Partisans*, or FTP.<sup>49</sup>

In May of 1943, Moulin succeeded in establishing a nationwide confederation, the *Conseil National de la Resistance* (CNR).<sup>50</sup> All major resistance movements within France now had one leader and one purpose. They had agreed to follow General de Gaulle and to operate in accordance with orders issued by the Allied high command.<sup>51</sup> Six weeks later, the Germans were tipped off to a meeting of resistance leaders in Lyons. They raided the meeting on the 21st of June, capturing Moulin and the others. Moulin died shortly thereafter as a result of torture by his German captors.<sup>52</sup>

When Moulin and the other resistance leaders were arrested, much of the higher echelons of the movements were

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<sup>48</sup>Sweets, *Politics*, 231-33.

<sup>49</sup>Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, United States Army in World War II series (Washington, DC, 1951), 198.

<sup>50</sup>Foot, *Resistance*, 240.

<sup>51</sup>Marshall, *The White Rabbit*, 40.

<sup>52</sup>Foot, *Resistance*, 240.

compromised. The Germans made widespread arrests and nearly destroyed many of the resistance groups. Fortunately, enough remained, especially of the armed elements of the resistance, to allow the groups to rebuild. And a legacy left by the earlier leadership was the importance of a national organization.

Most of the resistance groups had organized paramilitary units known as Corps Francs. Upon unification of the various groups, these Corps Francs were combined under one commander, General Charles Delestrain, known in the field as General Vidal. This national paramilitary command, the Armee Secrete, was organized on a regional basis.<sup>53</sup> The French organization was taking shape. The Americans and British, as we shall see, were also building their combined organization.

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<sup>53</sup>Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 200.

## C H A P T E R 3

### BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE

A project is under consideration for the dropping behind of the enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication.

Brigadier Colin Gubbins (1942)

Robert Solborg, who had been in London observing the workings of SOE, returned with his report to Donovan in January 1942. His recommendation to Donovan was that, in the American organization, the intelligence function and the special operations function be combined in one organization. Solborg had witnessed the constant turf battles which plagued the separate British SIS and SOE organizations. He concluded that the efficiency of both had suffered as a result. Donovan accepted Solborg's recommendation. The two functions were combined in COI with the establishment of a Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch and a Special Operations (SO) Branch.<sup>1</sup>

Now it was necessary to establish forward offices, for each of these branches, in England. Donovan went to

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<sup>1</sup>West, MI6, 211.

London in early June 1942 to confer with Colonel Menzies of SIS and with the head of SOE, Sir Charles Hambro.<sup>2</sup> As it turned out, Donovan was moving to position COI in England at the same time the U.S. Army was becoming established there. The European Theater of Operations, United States Army, or ETOUSA, was formed on 8 June. Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower arrived on the 24th to assume command. That same day, Donovan and Hambro concluded an agreement on cooperation between the OSS and SOE.<sup>3</sup> This agreement was to take full effect with the concurrence of the United States JCS and the British Chiefs of Staff. This compact created SO Branch's London office with a cavalry officer, Colonel Gustav B. Guenther, as chief.<sup>4</sup>

When Donovan returned to Washington, he learned that his organization had been given a new name, and he a new title. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was established by Executive Order 9182 on 13 June 1942. President Roosevelt appointed William Donovan to be Director of OSS.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 127.

<sup>3</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xv.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., liv.

<sup>5</sup>Brown, *The Last Hero*, 149. General histories of OSS include: Robert H. Alcorn, *No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the OSS* (New York, 1962); Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage* (New York, 1964); Corey Ford and Alistair McBain, *Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of OSS* (New York, 1945); Edward Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II* (New York, 1972); and Richard Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley, 1972). The closest thing to

The organizations which actively participated in the Jedburgh program were now established. Next, we will look at the emerging concept which became the Jedburgh project. In his celebrated work *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz devoted a chapter to partisan warfare. In it, he described an arrangement that proved to be the formula for the Jedburghs. "A commander can more easily shape and direct the popular insurrection," he wrote, "by supporting the insurgents with small units of the regular army."<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the British had experimented, on a very small scale, with the use of a British officer working with Arab guerrillas in the First World War. This, of course, was T. E. Lawrence, of whom Winston Churchill was a great admirer.

The potential for unconventional warfare in the enemy's rear was significantly greater in the Second World War. As Otto Heilbrunn explained, "The rear had by then become an even more profitable theatre of war since the armies now depended almost entirely on the rear for a sustained effort . . . ."<sup>7</sup> In addition to lines of communication, other targets were abundant. Morale, combat

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an official published history of OSS is *War Report of the OSS* (New York, 1976), and its companion volume, *The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS, Volume II* (New York, 1976); both volumes are edited by Kermit Roosevelt.

<sup>6</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), 482.

<sup>7</sup>Otto Heilbrunn, *Warfare in the Enemy's Rear* (New York, 1963), 25.

effectiveness, and industrial capacity were all vulnerable to attack by guerrilla forces. There was nothing so disconcerting to a soldier as the uncomfortable knowledge that he was prone to attack at all hours of the day or night, even if far removed from the front lines. And newer technology made it possible to infiltrate personnel by long-range bomber aircraft, and to keep them resupplied by the same. Wireless telegraphy was available to allow those personnel to maintain fairly reliable and secure communications with the controlling headquarters.

The first recorded use of the term "Jedburgh" as applied to these operations dates back to early July 1942. SOE's London Group was at that time headed by Brigadier Colin Gubbins. Gubbins had apparently been working on a concept for fortifying the resistance in the occupied countries of Europe with small teams of Allied officers. On Monday, 6 July, he wrote the Chief of SOE's Security Section, suggesting that the codename "Jumpers" be applied to the project. The Chief of Security was not impressed with the name "Jumpers" and replied that the new group would be code named "Jedburghs".<sup>8</sup> It is likely that the name was chosen at random from a list of pre-approved codenames. Jedburgh was actually the name of a small Scottish border town.

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<sup>8</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, i.

Two days after Brigadier Gubbins requested a code-name for the concept, SOE's chief, Sir Charles Hambro, met with Major General Eisenhower at 20 Grosvenor Square, the general's London headquarters. General Ismay also attended the afternoon meeting, as well as the new chief of SO London, Colonel Guenther.<sup>9</sup> It is possible that Eisenhower first became aware of the concept at this meeting. But, with the head of SOE and the theater representative of SO Branch present, it is likely that at least the relationship between the two organizations was discussed.

The OSS/SOE agreement entered into by Donovan and Hambro in June was approved by the JCS on 25 August 1942. Across the Atlantic, the British Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office also gave their approval. The agreement, in its final form, indicated that British and American special operations organizations would generally operate in separate areas. These would coincide with the areas of operations of the British and American armies, respectively. With regard to the working relationship between these organizations, the agreement stipulated that SO Branch would work in close collaboration with the French desk of SOE. SOE was to provide general direction.<sup>10</sup> This arrangement may have been

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<sup>9</sup>Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years: V* (Baltimore, 1970), 76.

<sup>10</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xv-xix.

on the agenda when Donovan and Hambro met again with General Eisenhower in early September.<sup>11</sup>

General Eisenhower was probably aware of the reservations that the JCS had about the civilian OSS. It must have become clear to all concerned that, if OSS was to play an active role in a theater of operations, it would have to become accountable to the military. In fact, Donovan had advocated placing OSS under the direct control of JCS. That relationship was made official when OSS was activated by JCS Directive 155/4/D on 23 December 1942. Its mission, operating under the direction and supervision of the JCS, included responsibility for the conduct of both secret intelligence operations and special operations, or unconventional warfare. Special operations tasks were to include sabotage in enemy and enemy-occupied countries, guerrilla warfare, and providing support to indigenous resistance groups. The SO Branch was charged, under the provisions of OSS General Order 9, with the responsibility for planning and conducting these operations.<sup>12</sup>

Special Operations Branch was headed by former All-American Yale quarterback and Wall Street attorney, Lieutenant Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. On 6 January

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<sup>11</sup>Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, Vol. V, 89-90.

<sup>12</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1: "Office of the Chief", i. The activities of the Office of Chief, SO Branch, OSS, ETOUSA, are documented in this first volume.

1943, Huntington went to England to further negotiate SO London's relationship with SOE. The Americans were interested in becoming more active in the conduct of special operations, and were fearful of becoming nothing more than a support base for SOE. Huntington also wanted to establish SO's relationship to ETOUSA, now that OSS was under the direction of the JCS. From the handful of officers who accompanied Huntington to England, he designated Major George E. Brewer, Jr., to be Chief Operations Officer and Executive Officer. Pending assignment of a new permanent branch chief for SO London, Huntington also appointed Brewer acting chief of the branch, replacing Colonel Guenther.<sup>13</sup>

The first item on Colonel Huntington's agenda was to re-negotiate SO London's position in the European theater, arguing that the American organization should operate on equal terms with SOE. Huntington, and probably everyone else in OSS London, believed that, once an invasion of the continent began, British and American forces would fight under separate commands with separately assigned areas of operations. Accordingly, he envisioned SO London serving the American armies while their British counterpart, the 'London Group' of Special Operations Executive, served the British forces.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., ii, liv. Brewer's appointment was effective 11 January 1943.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., iii.

On 14 January 1943, SOE chief Charles Hambro joined Lieutenant Colonel Huntington in signing another agreement affecting their organizations. This document, entitled "SOE and SO London (Operational Arrangements)," came to be known as the "London Arrangements." Although Huntington was not successful in gaining parity with SOE, he did garner an improved position, one from which SO could expand and learn the business from the British. Among other things, the document stated that SO would attempt to field language-qualified "Operational Groups".<sup>15</sup> Generally, though, the agreement clearly suggested that SOE was to predominate and that SO would essentially support them. In the event that SO did introduce operatives into the theater, access to SOE training facilities was assured.<sup>16</sup>

Colonel Huntington was certain of one thing. If the Americans were to begin conducting special operations any time soon, they would first have to learn the trade from the British. The SOE had, by this time, acquired a base of experience. He instructed the new "SO London" branch to collaborate fully with the British and learn all they could

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<sup>15</sup>An Operational Group (OG) was a team usually consisting of 32 uniformed officers and enlisted men. OGs were parachuted into an Axis-occupied country with a special mission such as sabotage. Following completion of that mission, they were directed to link up with the nearest resistance group, where they provided training to the partisans.

<sup>16</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xxiii-xxv.

as quickly as possible, with the goal of being capable of conducting operations independently by 15 June 1943.<sup>17</sup>

As a first step toward this goal, Huntington ordered that SO London should be organized exactly as SOE, with the same operational divisions and sections. A Western European Section, for example, was established to correspond to SOE's Western European Directorate. This 'mirror-imaging' would, it was felt, facilitate cross-attachment of SO personnel to their counterpart SOE section for the purpose of collaboration.<sup>18</sup>

While in London, Colonel Huntington also met with senior officers at ETOUSA headquarters. Huntington explained the functions of OSS and expressed a need to establish the necessary command and control and support relationships with the theater headquarters. The JCS had already directed, he pointed out, that all OSS operations in a theater of war be conducted under the direct control of the theater commander.<sup>19</sup>

There was soon to be another headquarters and another staff with which to coordinate. It was the beginning of a combined command whose staff was charged with planning the Allied invasion of France. During their

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, iii; Vol. 3, Book I, i-v.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, vii.

conference at Casablanca in January 1943, Allied leaders agreed to appoint British Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan to head the planning staff. The commander was to be named at a later date.<sup>20</sup> Morgan's title was Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate). He, and his staff, would become known by the acronym COSSAC.<sup>21</sup> As chief of staff to a commander who did not yet exist, General Morgan had to exercise many command functions. Any concept for special operations to be conducted in support of OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of France, would require his approval for further planning. The plan itself, of course, would eventually require the supreme commander's approval.

As a result of Lieutenant Colonel Huntington's efforts, SO London began to expand to meet the needs of the organization and its mission. If the Americans were to conduct unconventional warfare on a scale equal to the British, they would have to develop certain capabilities required to launch and support operations such as those of the Jedburghs. One of the first requirements was a section to coordinate and conduct air operations. Groups such as

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<sup>20</sup>Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* (Garden City, 1950), 6-7. At this time the Allies assumed that the commander to be named would be British, as it was expected that Britain would provide the bulk of the forces for the invasion. The Mediterranean theater would remain under American command.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 283.

the Jedburghs would almost all be infiltrated behind enemy lines by parachute. Once these groups began working with the resistance, weapons and other supplies would need to be delivered by air. Accordingly, SO's Air Operations Section was established and the London mission requested that OSS headquarters in Washington send an officer to head it. Major Brewer made arrangements for the section chief, upon his arrival, to work with the head of SOE's air section.<sup>22</sup>

With the creation of the air section came the need for aircraft. The task of acquiring airplanes fell to an OSS officer in London named Commander Junius S. Morgan.<sup>23</sup> In a cable to Donovan on 6 February 1943, Morgan suggested that OSS attempt to obtain a dozen B-24 'Liberator' aircraft. These, he wrote, should be specially modified versions of the bomber to be used for dropping agents and supplies to resistance groups. This mission, he added, would also require specially trained and dedicated crews. Morgan explained that among the benefits to be gained from possession of this squadron would be the leverage it would give SO London in dealing with SOE. SOE was engaged in constant competition with SIS for scarce air assets. Perhaps SOE would be willing to allow greater participation in projects such as the Jedburghs if the Americans could

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<sup>22</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 6, ii.

<sup>23</sup>Son of financier J. P. Morgan, according to Smith, OSS, 16.

provide airlift. But more importantly, SO would not be in a position of having to depend on the British for special operations air support. The British offered the use of an airdrome and agreed to train the American crews on special air operations.<sup>24</sup>

An officer who was instrumental to the development of SO London, and one who had a key role in the Jedburgh project, was Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Franklin O. Canfield. The 32 year old Canfield had graduated Magna cum laude from Harvard in 1932 and received his law degree from Columbia four years later. After completion of his schooling, he had been employed for a time with the State Department. At the time of the fall of France in June 1940, Frank Canfield was practicing law in Paris. He received an Army commission upon joining OSS in June 1942 and by October had been posted to the OSS mission in London. On 1 March 1943, he became head of the French Desk under the Western European Section of SO Branch.<sup>25</sup> This SO French Desk, under the arrangement explained earlier, was the American counterpart of SOE's French Section. Two days later, Canfield also became the SO representative to SOE's Planning Section, commonly known by its codename "Musgrave".<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 6, iii.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., Vol. 11, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, i.; Vol. 4, Book I, xvii.

Canfield, on 13 February 1943, drafted a paper stating the mission and functions of his French Desk. SO's French Desk would be modelled after SOE's French Section. Canfield understood SO's role at this time as one of assisting SOE by recruiting agents and providing materiel assistance.<sup>27</sup> This understanding was shared by Paul van der Stricht, chief of SO's Western European Section. Van der Stricht, however, added that, with additional training and experience, SO should be allowed more autonomy.<sup>28</sup>

With Captain Canfield now actively involved with the British in planning, the Americans were one step closer to a share of the Jedburgh project. Planning for this project was, in early 1943, essentially at a standstill. This was probably because, as a supporting operation, it was dependent upon an overall invasion plan. The concept had been initiated only on the assumption that they would operate in support of an Allied invasion of Western Europe. As of early 1943, however, the SOE planners had received no firm information on such an invasion.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, an important development in France would have an affect on the eventual employment of the Jedburghs. The formation of a

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, xxvii.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, xxvii-xxix; Vol. 3, Book I, i-v.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, vii.

guerrilla element known as the maquis represented a broadening of the resistance.

Shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, German forces marched into unoccupied (Vichy) France. Soon thereafter, the Vichy government passed a compulsory labor service law called the *Service du Travail Obligatoire*, or STO. The STO was designed to send young Frenchmen into forced labor in Germany. Hundreds of young men, in order to escape this labor draft, took to the mountains and forests to join the resistance. The groups formed by these young men were called maquis, and its members maquisards.<sup>30</sup> These were the groups with which most of the Jedburgh teams would eventually work.

For the sake of survival, the maquis were forced to live in the more remote rural areas. They essentially lived the lives of outlaws.<sup>31</sup> These groups received clandestine support from the local populace or from captured German stocks. According to John Ehrman, the existence of the maquis groups did not, at first, change the way in which SOE planned to operate in France. SOE was more comfortable confining its relationship to the more established resistance groups which they had been supporting.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Matthews, *The Death of the Fourth Republic*, 93.

<sup>31</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12: "Basic Documents", 55.

<sup>32</sup> Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, 324.

Eventually, though, the SOE planners realized that the maquis represented the potential for a significant expansion of the resistance support for OVERLORD. The time had come for further development and testing of the Jedburgh concept for coordinating this support.

## C H A P T E R 4

### DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT

We were convinced in all our work that full weight must be given to the fact that OVERLORD marked the crisis of the European war. Every obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered, every priority granted, and every risk taken to ensure our blow was decisive.

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery,  
Memoirs (1958)

In early March 1943, SOE participated in a General Headquarters field exercise known as "SPARTAN". Here they planned to test the "Jedburgh" concept, and OSS was invited to send observers. SO Branch sent Captain John Bross to observe the exercise. Another representative of SO, Captain Canfield, participated in the exercise at the SOE Control and Dispatch Center.<sup>1</sup>

According to the exercise scenario, elements of the invading British Second Army, having already established a beachhead, were to break out and begin an advance inland. The "beachhead" was in the vicinity of Salisbury Plain, an area of barren pastureland some 90 miles southwest of London. Beginning at midnight, 3 March, the British forces

<sup>1</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, xxii.

were to advance from this beachhead towards Huntington. Enlisted soldiers of the 8th Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers played the unfamiliar role of resistance groups. To help organize, equip, instruct, and lead these forces in guerrilla warfare against the "Germans," SOE employed eleven "Jedburgh" teams. Other agents were inserted into the problem as well. The "Jedburghs" sent all W/T message traffic to a communications base established in Scotland. From here, the messages were relayed to SOE representatives at Second Army headquarters. SOE was also represented at corps and divisional headquarters.<sup>2</sup>

These "Jedburgh" teams were composed of staff officers from SOE's country desks. During the exercise, which continued until 11 March, the teams received tactical missions such as demolitions or the prevention of enemy demolitions. They also attacked enemy lines of communication and command and control facilities. Secondary tasks included attacks by guerrilla forces on small rear area administrative and logistical sites.<sup>3</sup>

Many lessons were learned which would help planners in determining the types of missions and operational procedures most appropriate for such teams. The Jedburgh teams, it was shown, should be dropped in excess of 40 miles

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, x-xi.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

behind the German lines. At this depth, the teams could conduct their operational mission and then, as friendly forces neared their area, support these forces tactically. The teams, with the help of resistance forces, were also found to be particularly valuable in attacking enemy lines of communication through small-scale guerrilla strikes.<sup>4</sup>

In retrospect, an important lesson that was apparently not learned through this exercise was that a lack of direct communications between the Jedburgh teams and the field armies inhibited their tactical employment. Planners felt that a minimum of 72 hours lead time would be required for a Jedburgh team to respond to a field army commander's request for support.<sup>5</sup> This resulted from communications arrangements that required the army commander to forward his request, through his attached SOE staff element, to SOE/SO headquarters in London. London would then, based on the disposition and capabilities of deployed teams at the time, select a team in the field and give them the mission. This would prove, in practice, to be a cumbersome and time-consuming process.

On 5 March 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington took a further step toward gaining an active role for SO Branch. In a paper to Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, European

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, vii; Vol. 4, Book I, xi.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, xi.

Theater Commander,<sup>6</sup> Huntington formally requested authority for OSS to conduct special operations in the ETO.<sup>7</sup> On 11 March the theater commander approved Colonel Huntington's request. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at ETOUSA headquarters was assigned staff responsibility for all OSS activities. The approving document stated that the G-2 would make all necessary coordination with G-3 for special operations conducted by SO Branch.<sup>8</sup>

The outlook for SO's active participation in special operations was becoming more promising. In the meantime, the Americans became increasingly involved in the planning for Jedburgh operations. SOE's Norgeby House offices were the scene of a series of meetings of British SOE and American SO officers in March 1943. The subject of these meetings was the proposed Jedburgh plan and the results of the testing of that plan during the recently completed SPARTAN exercise. These discussions concluded on 18 March with the drafting of a memorandum on cooperation between SOE and the Allied military forces in the invasion of Europe.<sup>9</sup> This document was, in effect, the charter for

<sup>6</sup>Lieutenant General Andrews had assumed command of ETOUSA after Eisenhower departed to lead Allied forces in the landings in North Africa.

<sup>7</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, x; Vol. 10: "Supply", i.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., Vol. 1, xi.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, xxii.

the combined SOE/SO headquarters, and for the special operations projects originating from that headquarters, including the Jedburghs. For that reason, the contents of the document are covered here in some detail.

The SOE/SO memorandum of March 1943 was entitled "Coordination of Activities of Resistance Groups Behind the Enemy Lines with Allied Military Operations in an Opposed Invasion of Northwest Europe." This document examined methods of providing support to the emerging resistance movements in occupied Europe. Furthermore, it established that such support should be provided in such a way as to be most beneficial to the overall Allied war effort. The paper listed the following as the main functions of SOE and SO:

- (1) To promote Resistance in occupied countries.
- (2) To arm and equip Resistance Groups.
- (3) To give direction to Resistance Groups.
- (4) To plan actions to be taken by Resistance Groups.
- (5) To coordinate the actions of Resistance Groups with Allied military plans.<sup>10</sup>

The document also pointed out that intelligence collection was not a function of SOE and SO. Any information gathered in the course of other operations, of course, should be forwarded to the appropriate Allied organizations.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> SOE/SO Memorandum, "Coordination of Activities of Resistance Groups Behind the Enemy Lines with Allied Military Operations in an Opposed Invasion of Northwest Europe," undated copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 54-64.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 54.

Training for resistance groups, according to the memorandum, would be in the areas of guerrilla warfare, explosives and demolitions, weapons, fieldcraft, communications, and security. The groups would be supplied with arms, ammunition, explosives, radios, and operational funds through parachute drop by Allied aircraft.<sup>12</sup> Most of this training would be conducted by the organizers in the various circuits.

The authors of the joint memorandum clearly felt that the resistance could assist in a number of ways to improve the chances for a successful invasion. Of primary importance was their ability to damage the German Air Force specifically, and the entire German war machine generally. This they could do through sabotage of war-related industry and rail transportation. They could also undermine German morale through guerrilla warfare. Lastly, they could force the Germans to disperse their manpower throughout the country, rather than concentrate it at the invasion site. Many German divisions which could have been deployed nearer the invasion area would instead be scattered throughout France conducting counter-guerrilla operations.<sup>13</sup>

This document, furthermore, established the command and control arrangement for the conduct of this

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 57-58.

unconventional war. A combined SOE/SO Headquarters was to function under the operational control of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). This special operations organization would comprise the London Group of SOE and the SO Branch of OSS, ETOUSA.<sup>14</sup> The Supreme Commander would exercise operational control by providing planning direction through the SHAEF G-3 and his SOE/SO liaison officer. This planning direction included country and target priorities and a breakdown of activities to be conducted prior to and after D-day. In addition, instructions would be provided to planners to indicate where and when the intensity of these operations should be adjusted to best support SHAEF's overall plan.<sup>15</sup>

It was understood that there would be changes, even at the last minute, in the priority of effort to be applied, based on the tactical situation. As Allied operations evolved or plans were adjusted, support might be required from resistance groups that were not currently under the direct control of SOE/SO. Planners must have anticipated that, once the liberation of Europe began, resistance elements would grow significantly, thus requiring additional last minute infiltration of agents from London. For this

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 58.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid. 59.

reason, the joint SOE/SO document explained that a "special reserve" of agents would be maintained.<sup>16</sup>

This reserve would consist of approximately 70 Jedburgh teams, each made up of three men--a team leader, a second-in-command, and a radio (or W/T) operator. One member of each team was to be a Frenchman, a Belgian, or a Dutchman, depending on the country in which the team was to operate. The remainder of the team would be Americans or British. The Jedburghs would provide the resistance group with officers schooled in guerrilla warfare to act as advisers and, if necessary, leaders. The teams would also provide a means of direct communications with SOE/SO headquarters, allowing receipt of instructions from London and transmission of requests for supplies from the field.<sup>17</sup> For the first time, then, the mission of the Jedburghs was clearly stated:

By the use of Jedburgh teams, it is hoped to achieve greater coordination between the Resistance Groups and the invading forces. It is expected that the main function of Jedburghs in the field will be one of liaison, although in some cases they may have to organize, train, and lead a Group in its operations against the enemy.<sup>18</sup>

The next subject discussed in the plan was communication of instructions to the field. A number of

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 60.

pre-planned actions by resistance groups, all designed to benefit the Allied landings, would be initiated in one of three ways. For those groups operating with SOE/SO organizers, the 'execute' order would be transmitted by radio message from SOE/SO headquarters to its agent in the field. In the case of resistance groups that were without an SOE/SO agent, two methods were available. For those groups which had already received instructions regarding their D-day mission, a coded message would be broadcast at a designated time over BBC radio. For other groups, instructions would be personally delivered by Jedburgh teams or other agents of SOE/SO.<sup>19</sup>

Planners expected that field army commanders, once they had established themselves on the continent, might develop requirements for support by resistance groups. These requests for support would be relayed to SOE/SO headquarters by a special force (SF) detachment<sup>20</sup> attached to that field commander's staff. SOE/SO would then transmit

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 60-61.

<sup>20</sup> When referring to these detachments, the SO Branch War Diaries use the terms "SO detachments", "Army Staffs", and "SF detachments" interchangeably. Since they were eventually designated as numbered "SF detachments", I will use this term throughout this thesis to avoid confusion. The following detachments were eventually deployed: SF Detachment No. 10 with First U.S. Army, SF Detachment No. 11 with Third U.S. Army, SF Detachment No. 12 with First U.S. Army Group (later 12th Army Group), and SF Detachment No. 13 with Ninth U.S. Army. The history of the SF detachments is recorded in Volume 5 ("Army Staffs") of the War Diaries.

the necessary instructions to the appropriate Jedburgh team in the field. An SF detachment would be attached to each U.S. army and army group headquarters. Likewise, SOE would attach a similar staff liaison element to each British army and army group headquarters. The staff elements, each headed by a field grade officer, would also act in an advisory capacity at the headquarters to which attached. In this role, they could provide advice to the army staff, particularly the G-3, on the capabilities and proper use of resistance forces.<sup>21</sup>

With regard to linkup between organizers or Jedburghs and the advancing Allied ground forces, the plan proposed the establishment and use of "hides." These hides would be areas, reasonably safe and easily identifiable, to which organizers or Jedburghs could go when contact with advancing Allied forces was imminent. SF detachments at army level would be provided a list of these hides. At the appropriate time, they were to position officers with lead elements of the army in order to locate the hides and identify the organizers or Jedburghs. The overrun organizers or Jedburghs would then be immediately debriefed by the G-2 (intelligence officer) of forward ground forces. This would allow lower-echelon headquarters to gain any information of

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<sup>21</sup>SOE/SO Memorandum, "Coordination of Activities of Resistance Groups . . . ," OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 61-62.

immediate tactical value. Additionally, these overrun teams would be able to provide information of value to the CIC (the Army's Counterintelligence Corps).<sup>22</sup>

Now that the Jedburgh concept had, for the first time, been clearly laid out, further planning could begin on the assumption that the concept would be approved. The Musgrave Section held a meeting on 24 March 1943 to discuss recruitment and training of Jedburgh personnel. As stated earlier, the planners determined that a total of 70 Jedburgh teams would be required. They further estimated that the training of the officers would take about two months. Wireless telegraph (W/T) operators would require much more extensive training. The group also agreed that the Jedburgh plan should be approved by the theater commander before the recruitment process was begun.<sup>23</sup> The combined theater commander, of course, had not yet been named; approval in the meantime would have to come from COSSAC.

Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, on the first of April, received the official orders designating him COSSAC.<sup>24</sup> Morgan's staff established headquarters at

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 62-63.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, xxii.

<sup>24</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 27.

Norfolk House, St. James's Square, in London.<sup>25</sup> In accordance with agreements on the organization of COSSAC, the British chief of staff was to be backed up by an American deputy chief of staff. The Americans appointed Brigadier General Ray W. Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, to be General Morgan's deputy.<sup>26</sup> While serving as Deputy COSSAC under Morgan, Barker continued to fill a position at ETOUSA, once again as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.<sup>27</sup> Barker, then, was in a key position to not only recommend approval of the concept, but also to back SO in their quest for greater participation in projects such as the Jedburghs.

The American special operations staff also received support from Lieutenant General Andrews. The American theater commander and an entourage of brass visited SOE's Tempsford airfield and Station 61, a packing station, on 20 March. Accompanying Andrews were 8th USAAF commander, Major

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 34. Barker, an artillery officer, had arrived in England in early 1942 to assist the British in developing a plan for a cross-channel invasion. Prior to becoming Deputy Chief of Staff of ETOUSA in February 1943, General Barker had served successively as G-5 (War Plans) and G-3 (Operations) at that headquarters.

<sup>27</sup> Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command, U.S. Army in World War II* series (Washington, 1954), 2. General Barker continued in the G-5 position at ETOUSA until October 1943; he served as Deputy COSSAC until becoming the G-1 at SHAEF in the spring of 1944.

General Eaker, General Barker, SOE's Major General Gubbins, OSS London chief Lieutenant Colonel David Bruce and SO's Major Brewer. The staff at Tempsford provided these officers a demonstration of aerial supply of resistance groups. Generals Andrews and Eaker later visited the SOE/SO Operations Room at Norgeby House.<sup>28</sup> Commander Junius Morgan, we recall, had forwarded an 'in house' request for a squadron of aircraft for OSS London earlier in 1943. This request was sanctioned by the theater commander following the visit to Tempsford.

Perhaps based upon what he saw there, General Andrews, in early April, asked OSS London to prepare a memorandum requesting a squadron of aircraft for use by SOE/SO.<sup>29</sup> In early May, the Planning Section drafted a paper entitled, "Aircraft for Special Operations in North-Western Europe". This document explained the complete dependence of the resistance on supplies delivered by air and requested a squadron of American aircraft for this purpose. The request was submitted, over Colonel Bruce's signature, to the new theater commander, Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, on 5 May.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 6, vi-vii.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., vii.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, xxiv.

SOE and SO now worked in earnest to gain approval of the Jedburgh concept so that further planning and recruiting could commence. Using the 18 March draft memorandum as a starting point, the SOE Planning Section drafted a paper which discussed the potential for the use of resistance forces in support of the field armies. They submitted this to the British Chiefs of Staff on 6 April 1943.<sup>31</sup> Then came the opening that SO had been seeking. SOE offered participation to OSS in the Jedburgh project, asking SO "what part it wished to play in the new venture."<sup>32</sup>

In considering a response to this offer, the Americans realized that if they were to participate in anything other than a role subordinate to SOE, certain adjustments needed to be made to the SOE/SO Agreements. On 9 April, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce cabled General Donovan<sup>33</sup> in Washington. Bruce expressed his desire that SOE and SO become completely integrated rather than plan independent operations. He pointed out, pragmatically, that SO London consisted of ten people, compared to SOE's 6,000. Bruce

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, vii.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, xxx.

<sup>33</sup> Donovan had been serving in a civilian capacity, accepting no government salary, until the spring of 1943. Holding the rank of colonel in the Army Reserve, he was activated with promotion to brigadier general on 2 April 1943. He would eventually, in November 1944, attain the rank of major general (Ford, Donovan of OSS, 174).

stressed that "if SO refused participation in the Jedburgh plan all hope would be ended for future collaboration in France between SOE and SO."<sup>34</sup>

On the 15th of April, the acting branch chief at SO tasked Captain Canfield with staff responsibility for the Jedburgh concept.<sup>35</sup> Canfield's SOE counterpart on the project would be Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Rowlandson, the head of SOE's Planning Section.<sup>36</sup> This fortuitous collaboration resulted in the evolution of the Jedburgh idea from concept to reality, in the form of 100 trained and ready teams, in little more than a year's time.

Assisted by Rowlandson, Canfield drew up a version of the Jedburgh concept similar to that submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff. The paper echoed some of the ideas in the original draft memorandum prepared jointly by SOE and SO planners. Canfield also added the idea that OSS-manned Jedburgh teams were meant to work in areas ahead of the American armies; SOE-manned teams would work ahead of British forces. Canfield also suggested that recruiting begin as soon as possible, and that additional staff

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<sup>34</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xxxi.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., Vol. 4: "Jedburghs", Book I, xvi.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., xvii.

officers would be needed for briefing Jedburgh teams prior to their deployment.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to Jedburgh teams, the paper called for SF detachments to work at the headquarters of U.S. army, army group, the Supreme Command, and SOE/SO headquarters.<sup>38</sup> These SF detachments, working with the army G-3 section, would ensure that all organized resistance activities were planned and conducted to support army operations.<sup>39</sup>

Further planning by the SOE and SO Planning Sections began immediately. Determinations had to be made regarding the number of Jedburgh teams to be provided by each of the Allies. Additionally, the SO planners needed an idea of what the SF detachment commitment would be. The Americans, new to this business, had to determine where to look for the personnel to meet these requirements and what their qualifications should be. Captain Canfield drafted a memorandum to the acting chief of SO Branch, Lieutenant

<sup>37</sup> SO Memorandum, Subject: "Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines with the Actions of Allied Military Forces Invading N.W. Europe," dated 23 April 1943, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 65-68.

<sup>38</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xiii.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, viii, xxiii-iv. The paper was submitted on 23 April 1943 to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, for approval. It was forwarded with the endorsement of the SOE Planning Section, which also requested that a representative of OSS be appointed to commence joint planning. Canfield, on the next day, also sent a copy of the paper to the chief of SO Branch, Major Brewer, noting that the British were in complete accord.

Colonel Charles S. Vanderblue, with his rough estimates. Canfield estimated that the U.S. commitment should include 35 Jedburgh teams, each composed of one officer, one NCO, and one radio operator. It appears as though Canfield, at this time, saw the SO commitment as being one of teams composed entirely of Americans.<sup>40</sup>

Captain Canfield was careful to keep OSS Headquarters in Washington informed of the progress of Jedburgh planning. On 5 May 1943, he sent a copy of the SO Jedburgh memorandum, along with a progress report, to Colonel Ellery Huntington, Jr., head of operations at OSS. Canfield expressed optimism in gaining the approval of the theater commander on the concept. When Captain van der Stricht departed in mid-May for a visit to Washington, Canfield sent with him additional details of the Jedburgh plan.<sup>41</sup>

The following week, there were two important personnel changes within SO London. On the 11th of May, Captain Canfield became Planning Officer for SO. His work with the Western European Section was finished.<sup>42</sup> OSS ETOUSA also acquired a new head of special operations in May. It should be remembered that Major Brewer had been

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., xxvi.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., xxv. The purpose of van der Stricht's trip was "to stimulate agent recruiting." (Vol. 1, li).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., i.

designated Acting Chief, SO London, in January 1943. He was relieved of this job when the permanent branch chief, Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Vanderblue, a signal corps officer, assumed that position on 15 May. Brewer became Executive Officer of the branch.<sup>43</sup>

In late May 1943, SOE drafted a paper which detailed their projected personnel requirements for implementation of the Jedburgh plan. Like the Americans, the British proposal called for 35 Jedburgh teams as their share of the total reserve of 70 teams. To man these 35 teams, SOE recommended that 70 men be recruited from the British Home Forces. The remaining 35 men should be provided by the Free French or another Allied government. In addition SOE proposed to train and provide 90 officers and men to perform liaison duties with staffs of British field organizations.<sup>44</sup>

All work on the Jedburgh project, up to this point, was based on a general concept of how such teams might be employed in the field. For this concept to evolve into a thorough plan, COSSAC had to give the planners at SOE/SO specific objectives to be accomplished by the Jedburghs. The planners at COSSAC were getting closer to doing just

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., Vol. 1, liv-lv.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, xiii. This paper, entitled "Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines with the Actions of Allied Military Forces Invading N.W. Europe," was submitted to the War Office on 27 May 1943.

that, and sabotage plans were already being developed by SOE and the French BCRA. General Morgan was taking an added interest in the work being done by the circuit organizers in the field. And he recognized the need for a coordinated scheme for the employment of resistance forces in support of the invasion.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 174.

## C H A P T E R 5

### FROM CONCEPT TO PLAN

If we are to get any help from the French for the invasion, Ike must have a directive which will permit him to encourage and direct resistance movements within France. In other words, we must have an effective fifth column.

Captain H. C. Butcher, USNR, Naval  
Aide to General Eisenhower (1944)

Among the agreements reached at a Washington conference of Allied leaders in May 1943 was that the invasion of France was to take place the following year.<sup>1</sup> On 25 May the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a supplementary directive to COSSAC concerning invasion planning. It specified the target date for the invasion as 1 May 1944.<sup>2</sup>

At this stage, the Jedburgh project consisted of a concept paper which described only in a very general manner how these teams, and the resistance groups they fortified, should contribute to Allied operations on the continent. It had become clear that the earlier British strategy calling for a general uprising in the occupied countries of Western

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, *The War in Western Europe*, Part 1, 212.

<sup>2</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 66.

Europe, followed by a rapid invasion, was not a sound one. The resistance was neither large enough nor strong enough. Furthermore, very little of the French, Dutch, or Belgian terrain was favorable for guerrilla warfare. Clearly, any operations undertaken by the resistance would have to be in support of a greater invasion force. The key now was to determine what that supporting role should be. How, specifically, could these widespread resistance groups, trained, supplied, and in some cases led by Jedburghs and other Allied special forces, contribute to the success of the Allied campaign?

Obviously, the partisans could perform a valuable service by providing intelligence, maintaining a continuous assessment of the enemy's force deployment, troop movements, and logistic capabilities. But, as stated earlier, this was not their primary mission. They could also interdict enemy lines of communication through ambush, and attack transportation, communications, and war production facilities by sabotage. Such actions would force the enemy to deploy ground forces and other assets to protect lines of communication and support facilities, and units to conduct active counter-guerrilla operations. Any German forces engaged in such activities would not be in a position to help resist an invading Allied force, and well-timed and coordinated sabotage and interdiction efforts by the resistance could delay reinforcements from reaching the battle. Finally,

there were tasks to be accomplished once the German armies began a withdrawal from France and the Low Countries. Constant harassment of these withdrawing forces by guerrillas could help prevent the Germans from escaping intact or from consolidating to establish a defense. The resistance could also be used to prevent German destruction of certain installations or facilities vital to a rapid Allied advance and the restoration of French industry.

During the planning for OVERLORD, the COSSAC staff made the assumption that German reserves in Western Europe would be about the same in 1944 as they were in 1943. They expected that the Allied air forces would, as they claimed, be able to delay these reserves from reaching the battlefield. It was difficult to assess how effective these air forces would be, though, particularly in the likely event of bad weather. Even harder to calculate, however, was the degree to which the French resistance could contribute to this purpose. Any planning figures at this early date were the result of pure speculation. The planners concluded that the Allied landing force could be successful so long as German mobile reserves on D-day did not exceed twelve divisions. General Morgan felt that of these, no more than three could be allowed to approach within striking range of Caen on D-day. This number increased to five on D+2 (the second day following D-day) and nine on D+8. No more than

15 German divisions could be allowed to move into the area within 60 days of the landings.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of a number of planning conferences, staff officers from COSSAC, and later from SHAEF, established a priority of targets for resistance forces. First in priority would be the delay of German armored units travelling by road to Normandy. The cutting of rail and other transportation lines was second in priority. Third came the disruption of telecommunications.<sup>4</sup>

The SOE Planning Section began discussions on the subject of sabotage by French resistance groups. Free French representatives participated in these talks which continued into the fall of 1943, resulting in a number of options for the employment of French resistance forces. By 1 September 1943, a total of eight plans were being developed, all to be carried out solely by agents of the BCRA and not by F Section.<sup>5</sup> In the days and weeks immediately following D-day, however, it was likely that implementation of some of these plans, or attacks against targets included in those plans, would involve British and American special forces, including the Jedburghs.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 155-56. Also see Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. V, 69-70, 327.

<sup>4</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, ix.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., xii-xiii.

Therefore, I will briefly discuss the focus of each of these plans.

A proposal known as Plan Vert (Green Plan) called for French railways to be cut, on order of SOE, to inhibit the movement of German forces to reinforce either the channel area or the Mediterranean coast. Methods would include sabotage of tracks and switch facilities to divert or delay trains. It could also include the killing of key German personnel at important rail centers.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, certain aspects of Plan Vert would require the collaboration of French railway officials.<sup>7</sup>

This railway interdiction plan put priority on the lines running from Germany, through Belgium, to France. This, the planners realized, was Germany's main means of moving large units.<sup>8</sup> Later, they extended the plan to include Bordeaux and northeastern France. COSSAC approved Plan Vert in early May 1943.<sup>9</sup>

Plan Tortue (Tortoise Plan) centered on the disruption of road movement and was similar in nature to

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., xiii.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., xv

<sup>8</sup>Alfred Goldberg, "Air Campaign OVERLORD: To D-Day," in *D-Day: The Normandy Invasion in Retrospect* (Lawrence, 1971), 64.

<sup>9</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, xvi. COSSAC's approval was announced at a meeting of the SOE Planning Committee on 10 May 1943.

Plan Vert. The object of this plan was to delay the movement of German reinforcements to the area of the Allied landings. Particular emphasis was to be placed on the delay of armored units. In addition to ambushes and other guerrilla activities, traffic would also be disrupted and misdirected through the manipulation of road signs. This could cause traffic to be misrouted for considerable periods of time. German road traffic, according to this plan, was to be delayed by use of anti-tank mines and weapons or by means of sabotage of vehicles.<sup>10</sup> Another key element of this plan was the destruction of bridges, particularly heavy-load bridges. Finally, in mountainous and forested areas, roads could be blocked by abatis or other obstacles formed by felled trees. Ambushes would then attack the stalled columns.

The Planning Committee made an adjustment to plans Vert and Tortue in May 1943. Since they realized that German armored divisions did not remain for long periods of time in one location, the planners decided to leave the selection of targets up to the regional resistance leaders.<sup>11</sup>

Plan Violet (Violet Plan) attacked German telecommunications targets, mainly underground and overhead

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., xvi, xix.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., xvii.

telephone cables. Junction boxes and central switchboards were critical nodes in the telecommunications systems, and therefore invited destruction.<sup>12</sup> Plan Violet would be executed with the assistance of *Poste Telegraphe et Telephone* (PTT) workers. These specialists were already active in the resistance and were attached to the Regional, Zone, and National Military Delegates of the FFI.<sup>13</sup>

A plan which attacked railway auxiliary services was Plan Grenouille (Frog Plan). The object of these attacks would be railway turntables, roundhouses, and locomotives. This plan also included the destruction of telephone networks involved with railway systems.<sup>14</sup>

Plan Noir (Black Plan) centered on German command and control elements. Specifically, it instructed resistance groups to attack those German Army headquarters which were safe from RAF bombing due to their location in the larger towns. Plan Rouge (Red Plan) targeted German supply dumps, particularly fuel storage sites. Similarly, Plan Jaune (Yellow Plan) involved the attack of German ammunition dumps. Finally, Plan Momie (Mummy Plan) called for resistance elements to make every attempt to prevent demolition

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<sup>12</sup>Miksche, *Secret Forces*, 140.

<sup>13</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, xiii. PTT was the French post office, which also operated the telephone and telegraph systems.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, xiv; Miksche, *Secret Forces*, 139.

or other destruction of key facilities by the Germans. In the months to come, only plans Vert, Tortue and Violet would be developed in any great detail.<sup>15</sup>

With all the planning activity in the spring of 1943, it must be remembered that SO London was still experiencing the pains of bureaucratic growth. The branch was handcuffed by a lack of three things: 1) clarity of the command and control relationship between the theater OSS contingent and ETOUSA, 2) a strategic and operational focus for mission planning, and 3) a source and conduit for logistical support. Although theater control of the OSS group was formalized in a JCS directive of 4 April 1943, General Devers's headquarters did not publish an implementing order until 4 June.<sup>16</sup> A theater directive issued on that date designated OSS London a military detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bruce. It also stipulated that all operational plans for OSS missions be forwarded to the theater commander for approval, along with a statement of personnel and materiel required for their execution.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, xiv.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, xii-xiii; Vol. 10, ii. The implementing document was an ETOUSA directive titled "Military Control of the Office of Strategic Services."

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

It was also at this time, in the summer of 1943, that the Planning Section of SO London became involved in an internal conflict over responsibility for the Jedburgh project. The Western European Section, which was responsible for controlling all SO operations in Western Europe, claimed control of the proposed Jedburgh project as well. But when the SO Branch chief granted Canfield, then a member of the Planning Section, authorization to recruit Jedburgh candidates in the United States, that authority apparently was not challenged by the chief of the Western European Section.<sup>18</sup>

In fact, Canfield and others in the Planning Section had done all the work on development of the Jedburgh concept, up to this time, largely on their own initiative. This authority was never formally delegated by the chief of SO Branch and never recognized by those in the Western European Section. This was the source of occasional friction between the two sections. And, although most of the recruiting and training of the American Jedburghs in the months to come was accomplished through the efforts of those in the Planning Section, operational control remained with the Western European Section.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, xxviii.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

Throughout June and July 1943, General Barker, in his role as ETOUSA G-5, reviewed the SOE/SO plans for the support of resistance forces and coordination with those forces. In developing an estimate of the situation for theater planning, his staff needed more information than that provided in the paper of 23 April. Upon the G-5's request, the SOE/SO Planning Section provided a second, more detailed paper on resistance potential.<sup>20</sup> Again, Captain Canfield was involved.

Franklin Canfield, as head of SO Branch's Planning Section, became a liaison officer to G-5, ETOUSA on 1 July 1943, the same day he was promoted to major. Since the Planning Section's mission required it to coordinate resistance group activities to support Allied campaign plans, Canfield maintained close liaison with the G-2, G-3, and G-5 sections of ETOUSA headquarters. Specifically, he was to ensure that missions assigned to resistance groups and SO personnel, including Jedburghs, were designed to support those plans being developed by COSSAC.<sup>21</sup> As time went on, additional officers joined the section to assist in planning for expanded operations in 1944. By year's end, the planning staff numbered seven.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., xxv. This second paper, dated 19 June 1943, was titled, "Support of Military Operations by Resistance Groups in France."

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., iii.

Major Canfield's contact at G-5 was Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, a regular Army officer and a graduate of the United States Military Academy. In July 1943, Haskell was serving on the G-5 staff at ETOUSA, while doubling in the same capacity as a member of the COSSAC staff.<sup>23</sup>

Having thoroughly reviewed the SOE/SO plans for the coordination of resistance efforts, Haskell wrote, on 17 July, a number of recommendations for the G-5, General Barker's, signature. He recommended approval of both the Jedburgh concept and the SF detachment concept. In addition, he felt that American and British staff officers and Jedburghs should be organized and trained together. Finally, Haskell suggested that General Barker's staff continue detailed planning of these matters with OSS, SOE, and COSSAC. Representatives of these offices should also, he wrote, determine the number of American Jedburgh teams required. Once this number was agreed upon, OSS should immediately commence recruiting and training the force.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., vi.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, xiv-xv.

<sup>24</sup> G-5, ETOUSA, Memorandum For Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, "Direction and Support of Resistance Groups in Enemy Occupied Countries Subsequent to the Initiation of Operations on the Continent," 21 July 1943, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 69-71. Also see Vol. 2, xxv; Vol. 4, Book I, xv; Vol. 5, iii.

Haskell put the SO paper of 23 April, with the prepared endorsement, before Major General Barker. As mentioned earlier, Barker was the G-5 (head of war plans section) at ETOUSA, but he also doubled as Deputy COSSAC under General Morgan.<sup>25</sup> So when he signed the memorandum on 21 July 1943, he was indicating his approval as the American theater plans officer, as well as recommending approval to General Morgan.<sup>26</sup>

At the same time that the SO paper was gaining approval from the commander of ETOUSA, the British version was being reviewed by COSSAC. From his headquarters at Norfolk House on St. James Square, on 19 July 1943, General Morgan sent his recommendation to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Morgan indicated his approval of the Jedburgh and SOE staff detachment manning proposals which had been drafted on 27 May. He further requested that the War Office ensure that all necessary personnel be transferred to SOE.<sup>27</sup> The British Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal on 21 July and forwarded the appropriate directions to the War Office.<sup>28</sup> So now the Jedburgh concept

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<sup>25</sup> Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, 2.

<sup>26</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 69.

<sup>27</sup> COSSAC, 14th Report to Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet, "Fourteenth Report by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate)," 19 July 1943, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 117. Also see Vol. 4, Book I, xiv.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

had been approved by the British high command and was awaiting the approval of the American theater commander, Lieutenant General Devers. Progress was also being made in establishing the support base for the Jedburghs.

The SOE packing station known as Station 61 was used for packaging and preparing weapons and other supplies for parachute delivery to the resistance. In June 1943, the chief of the SOE/SO Air Transportation Section, an American officer, recommended that a similar packing station be established, to be manned and operated by SO. Additionally, he urged that SO create a supply system for the procurement of materiel for the resistance.<sup>29</sup>

There were still those who felt that the chief contribution to be made by the Americans in SOE/SO activities was the provision of supplies. Within SO, assistant planning officer Major John A. Bross had been tasked with determining supply requirements. In late July, Bross recommended to the SO branch chief that a separate OSS supply branch be established. Furthermore, he urged that a supply officer be acquired to head this new branch. The special operations supply requirement was twofold. First, they would need 'operational supplies,' those supplies to be dropped to resistance elements. Second, supplies to be used by the Allied special operations teams, or 'organizational

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<sup>29</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 6, viii.

supplies,' would be required. The coordination of this effort with SOE would be a full-time job.<sup>30</sup>

Communications was another area needing attention. Leaders of resistance groups and Jedburgh teams in the field needed a reliable means of communicating supply needs and other information to London. For these groups to receive orders from London, Major Canfield obtained small, portable receivers from the OSS Communications Branch.<sup>31</sup> A standard transmitter/receiver set would later be made specially for the Jedburghs.<sup>32</sup>

The support base, then, began to take shape in the summer of 1943. Arrangements were made for supplies and for the communications needed to request those supplies and to receive operational instructions. One other requirement needed to be addressed; SOE/SO needed to take steps to set up a Jedburgh training base. On 5 July 1943, 39 year old Captain John Tyson was appointed SO Training Officer.<sup>33</sup> He was attached to SOE as American Training Officer on 15 August. His SOE counterpart was Colonel James Young.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, xxxix-xl; Vol. 10, i-iii.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, xl.

<sup>32</sup> SOE/SO, "Basic Directive on Jedburghs, Prepared Jointly by SOE/SO," December 1943, in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 40.

<sup>33</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xliv; Vol. 11, 19.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, xliv.

On 11 August 1943 the OVERLORD plan was first disclosed to SOE/SO. With disclosure of the plan came a request for an outline of a concept for resistance support. COSSAC wanted to know how SOE/SO could provide support both before and after D-day.<sup>35</sup> SOE/SO responded by the end of the month with an outline plan.<sup>36</sup>

COSSAC fully realized, though, that SOE/SO, and the COSSAC planners as well, were hindered by instructions they had received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. COSSAC had been ordered not to involve the French in any detailed planning for OVERLORD. The COSSAC staff felt that this restraint was counterproductive. In August they asked for an amendment to these orders allowing for a "special arrangement" to be made with General de Gaulle's headquarters in London.<sup>37</sup> This request was approved.

To provide a single point of contact at COSSAC headquarters for the French and other Allied Military Missions, the staff added a new section called the European Allied Contact Section. Through this office, COSSAC assured representatives of the occupied nations of Europe that an operation aimed at the liberation of their countries was not far off. The staff requested these Allied representatives

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, viii.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., viii.

<sup>37</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 120.

to provide whatever information was available on the existing situation in their countries. Interests centered particularly on any indigenous plans or movements.<sup>38</sup>

The Allied leaders, at a conference in Quebec in August 1943, reaffirmed the OVERLORD target date as 1 May 1944. The OVERLORD plan presented by members of the COSSAC staff was approved, in concept, for further planning.<sup>39</sup>

Another important step was taken in late August with Allied recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the provisional government (in exile) of France. This formal recognition by the American, British, and Canadian governments was announced on the 26th.<sup>40</sup> The Allies acknowledged General de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud as co-Presidents.<sup>41</sup>

At SO London, Major Canfield's section continued to expand in anticipation of the theater commander's approval of the Jedburgh and SF detachment proposals. Major John Bross was appointed Assistant Planning Officer, SO Branch, on 23 July 1943. This made him responsible for SO planning

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 122.

<sup>39</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 166; Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. V, 75-76.

<sup>40</sup>Churchill, *Onwards to Victory*, 223.

<sup>41</sup>Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. V, 164.

for France and the Low Countries.<sup>42</sup> On 30 July, Canfield wrote Colonel Charles Vanderblue, chief of SO London, that recruitment of personnel for the Jedburgh teams was to be the next step.<sup>43</sup>

Lieutenant General Devers, U.S. European Theater commander, approved the Jedburgh and SF detachment plan on 24 August 1943, some four months after its initial submission.<sup>44</sup> On the 29th, he sent a directive to Colonel Bruce, commander, OSS ETOUSA. Devers ordered that the plan be implemented and that recruiting begin at once. The directive also noted that the War Department had been requested to fully support OSS in this effort. OSS was to conclude its recruiting drive in time for the candidates to begin training with the British on New Years Day.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xxxv.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, xxviii-ix.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., viii. The document approved was the SO concept paper entitled "Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines with the Action of Allied Military Forces Invading North-Western Europe," drafted by Captain Canfield in April 1943. The SF detachment proposal, which General Devers forwarded to Washington with his recommendation of approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, included a draft table of organization. Each of the proposed detachments, to augment the staff of a field army or army group, would be commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Another five officers and 24 enlisted men would complete the organization. Additionally, an OSS signal detachment would be required with each SF detachment to facilitate communications with SOE/SO headquarters in London (Vol. 2, xxvii).

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., Vol. 12, 118. Also see Vol. 1, xxxvi; Vol. 4, Book I, xv-xvi.

## C H A P T E R 6

### RECRUITING THE FORCE

The Plan for SO representation at SOE HQ, for SO Staffs with U.S. armies, and for agents and JEDBURGHS in the area where U.S. armies will operate, depends exclusively on one thing: qualified personnel to carry it out.

Major Franklin Canfield, Jedburgh Project  
Planning Officer, SO Branch, OSS ETOUSA  
(August 1943)

In his 29 August 1943 memorandum to Colonel Bruce, Lieutenant General Devers directed that recruitment of U.S. Jedburgh personnel be conducted in time for those recruits to begin training with the SOE candidates. Planners in London indicated that the radio operators should arrive in England no later than 1 December 1943. The officers would need to be in theater by the end of December, since training was scheduled to begin on 1 January 1944.<sup>1</sup>

Initial attempts at "in-country" recruiting of personnel for the Jedburgh project were made by both the SO Planning Section and the Western European Section. A screen of personnel records of available American officers and men

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Commander, OSS ETOUSA, to Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, dated 20 September 1943, subject: "Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines. Training and Organization of Jedburgh teams," in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 120.

in the United Kingdom uncovered none with the requisite qualifications.<sup>2</sup>

Major Canfield then informed OSS headquarters in Washington that it seemed probable that recruitment would have to be conducted in the United States. This was true not only for Jedburgh candidates, but for SF detachment personnel as well. On 24 August, he requested Lieutenant Commander Davis Halliwell and Major George Sharp in Washington to make preliminary arrangements. This, of course, was contingent upon JCS approval of the proposed tables of organization. Canfield followed this letter up the next day with a second letter to Major Sharp who was Area Operations Officer for Western Europe. Concerned about selection standards for the Jedburgh candidates, Canfield stressed "the unusually high qualifications desired in the personnel to be selected."<sup>3</sup>

Eventually, Major Canfield decided to travel to the United States to personally supervise the selection of Jedburgh candidates. To this end, an officer in the Planning Section drew up a list of desired qualifications for Canfield's use. Among the more important of these were general intelligence, staff experience, and a knowledge of French.<sup>4</sup> Other desirable characteristics were strong

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<sup>2</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, xxix.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.; also Vol. 4, Book I, xvii.

leadership abilities, excellent physical condition, and a willingness to parachute and operate behind enemy lines. The recruiters were to look for similar qualities in the enlisted radio operators, although in their case a "fair working knowledge" of French was considered adequate. Additionally, the radiomen were expected to reach a speed of 15 words per minute in sending and receiving Morse code prior to overseas movement.<sup>5</sup>

Canfield departed London for the United States on the 4th of September 1943.<sup>6</sup> He carried a letter to the War Department G-2, from Brigadier General James C. Crockett, ETOUSA G-2, requesting the department's support of Major Canfield's recruiting team.<sup>7</sup> Canfield met with representatives of the JCS on 9 September in Washington. After receiving a briefing on the Jedburgh plan, the JCS officers agreed to the OSS recruitment proposals with one condition. If the required number of "qualified" personnel could not be found, OSS should not actively participate in Jedburgh operations.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, xxix.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, xviii-xix.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., xvii.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., xviii.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., Vol. 2, xxx.

OSS Washington had approved the allocation of 100 officers in support of the Jedburgh plan. This number included 50 actual Jedburgh officers. The remainder, which the OSS headquarters staff considered to be part of the Jedburgh plan, comprised 34 SO staff officers for the SF detachments and 16 officers for similar duty at SOE/SO headquarters.<sup>9</sup> A meeting of OSS officers in Washington on 1 October 1943 resulted in a confirmation of these numbers and the requirement for 50 enlisted W/T operators as well. The officers further agreed to an arrangement for dividing responsibility for the recruiting effort. The recruitment of Jedburgh officers would be the responsibility of the executive officer of the Operational Groups Section of OSS Washington, in coordination with OSS's Personnel Procurement Branch. The Communications Branch, also working with the Personnel Procurement Branch, was to coordinate recruitment of the W/T operators. The recruitment of these radio operators would take place at Army Signal Corps schools.<sup>10</sup>

Recruiting officers traveled to a number of stateside installations in search of potential Jedburgh officers. Most of the officer recruiting was done at Fort Bragg and nearby Camp Mackall, North Carolina, and Fort Benning, Georgia. These installations provided officers who

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 4, Book I, xviii.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., xix-xx.

were already airborne qualified. Some jump qualified officers had already been recruited for the OSS Operational Groups earlier in 1943, and were in training in the Washington, D.C., area when selected for the Jedburgh project. Recruiters also journeyed to such remote posts as Camp Hood and Camp Fannin in Texas.<sup>11</sup> Recruitment of the initial quota of 50 American Jedburgh officers was completed by late November.<sup>12</sup>

At each station, recruiters reviewed personnel records in search of officers or enlisted men with foreign language qualifications, particularly French or Dutch. Camp officials announced that a briefing would be given at a certain time and location for anyone interested in overseas duty. When all interested personnel had assembled, the recruiter explained that the assignment called for volunteers who would have to undergo parachute training and that there would be danger involved. Those who were still interested were individually interviewed by the OSS recruiter. At no time during this process was OSS or the

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<sup>11</sup>Letters to the author from former Jedburgh officers Everett T. Allen, 26 October 1988; William E. Colby, 27 March 1989; Lucien E. Conein, 10 November 1988; Ray H. Foster, 22 December 1988; Henry D. McIntosh, 24 October 1988; Robert K. Montgomery, 22 October 1988; John M. Olmsted, 13 January 1989; Major General (Retired) John K. Singlaub, 5 December 1988; Harvey Allan Todd, 9 February 1989; and George M. Verhaeghe, 2 November 1988. Also see William B. Dreux, *No Bridges Blown* (Notre Dame, IN, 1971), 1-2; and Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets*, 1-3.

<sup>12</sup>Schoenbrun, *Soldiers of the Night*, 331.

Jedburgh project mentioned. Former Jedburgh officer William Colby recalled that, "of the hundred-or-so parachute officers who volunteered for the mission, only some fifty survived the initial screening process."<sup>13</sup> Volunteers were simply told that if they were selected, orders would follow.

As stated earlier, recruiting of radio operators was conducted at schools operated by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. These included the High Speed Radio Operator School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which produced six Jedburgh candidates<sup>14</sup> and the Radio Operator and Mechanics School at Scott Field, Illinois, which produced nine.<sup>15</sup> Most of the wireless operators were selected at the Signal Corps Morse Code school at Camp Crowder, Missouri. According to one radio operator recruited from Camp Crowder, over 100 trainees attended the briefing by the OSS recruiter. When the nature of the assignment was made clear, three-fourths of the attendees decided that parachute training and operating behind enemy lines were not for them. Those remaining were individually interviewed. Fifty were

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<sup>13</sup>William E. Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York, 1978), 35-36. Mr. Colby served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 to January 1976.

<sup>14</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xxi.

<sup>15</sup>Letter to the author from Donald A. Spears, 12 January 1989.

selected and sent to Washington, D.C.<sup>16</sup> A radio operator recruited at Fort Monmouth recalled a similar experience at the briefing session he attended, although on a smaller scale. There, a group of "2 or 3 dozen" French-speaking trainees were gathered. After those with no interest in high-risk employment departed, only two remained.<sup>17</sup>

Each of those who volunteered for hazardous duty with OSS had his own reason for doing so. Those who responded to the Jedburgh recruiting drive often shared a common situation. Most of these men were anxious, almost desperate in some cases, for an opportunity to leave their present unit of assignment and make a move which would put them nearer the action. Some had bad experiences from which they wished to distance themselves. Many were simply willing to try anything to get into the war.<sup>18</sup>

Shortly after their brief interviews with the field recruiters, roughly 100 prospective Jedburgh officers and more than 60 radio operators received orders placing them on 21-day temporary duty with OSS in Washington, D.C.<sup>19</sup> Most

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<sup>16</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xxi; also letters to the author from former Jedburgh radio operators Jacob B. Berlin, 30 November 1988; Norman R. Franklin, 28 February 1989; Lucien E. Lajeunesse, 22 March 1989; Donald A. Spears, 12 January 1989; and William T. Thompson, 27 October 1988.

<sup>17</sup>Letter to the author from Norman R. Franklin, 28 February 1989.

<sup>18</sup>Letter to the author from William Thompson, 27 October 1988. This sentiment was echoed in many letters from former Jedburgh team members.

were instructed to report to the Munitions Building, one of a number of old "temporary buildings" remaining from World War I, on Constitution Avenue. Others were directed to the OSS headquarters building at 25th and E Street. Shortly afterward, Army trucks transported them to the Congressional Country Club, known to the OSS as "Area F" since they had requisitioned it for OG training.

The reason for the temporary duty to Washington was for each candidate to appear before a screening committee. This allowed both the candidate and OSS another chance to evaluate the other. This committee, which was to interview each candidate, consisted of Lieutenant Colonel R. T. Salzmann, Mr. C. S. Williams, and Major Canfield. A Mr. G. W. Howland was charged with processing security clearances on all candidates prior to their overseas movement.<sup>20</sup> For those found acceptable, orders were published for their permanent assignment to OSS.

The Congressional Country Club is located six miles northwest of Washington in what, in the pre-Beltway days, was the Maryland countryside. Here the Jedburgh candidates were billeted in comfortable rooms or tents and put through a period of intensive physical training and night exercises. There was also practice in encoding and transmitting radio

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<sup>19</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xx-xxi.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid, xx.

messages. The period spent at the country club was also one of psychological assessment, the object of which was to judge how well the candidates operated individually and as part of a group. After about a week, they were transferred to "Area B", an old CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) camp near Thurmont, Maryland.<sup>21</sup>

At Area B the candidates were trained in map reading and land navigation, communications, first aid, tradecraft, explosives and demolitions, hand-to-hand combat, foreign weapons, and pistol firing. Knife fighting was taught by the former Shanghai policeman, Major Fairbairn. First Lieutenant Lawrence Swank, an engineer officer and West Point graduate, was a demolitions instructor at Area B. He would later join the Deaburghs in England and deploy as a team member. Other training included irregular tactics and night patrolling, and an obstacle course. Free French officers conducted daily French classes.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Letters to the author from Everett Allen, 26 October 1988; Jacob Berlin, 30 November 1988; Major General (Retired) John Singlaub, 5 December 1988; and William Thompson, 27 October 1988. Area B was near President Roosevelt's weekend retreat, "Shangri La", now Camp David, Maryland. An interesting description of a visit to the Congressional Country Club in November 1943 is given by James Grafton Rogers in *Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 1942-1943*, edited by Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, MD, 1987), 174-75. Also see a description of "Shangri La" in David Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War* (New York, 1988), 202.

<sup>22</sup>Letters to the author from Everett Allen, 26 October 1988; Jacob Berlin, 30 November 1988; William Colby, 27 March 1989; Norman R. Franklin, 28 February 1989; and Major General (Retired) John Singlaub, 5 December 1988.

After some six weeks of this training, the Jedburgh candidates were put aboard a train to New York. Upon arrival at Grand Central Station, they were trucked to Fort Hamilton, in Brooklyn, to await passage to England. The officers sailed on the Cunard liner Queen Elizabeth in early December 1943. The radio operators embarked aboard the Queen Mary just before Christmas.<sup>23</sup>

Major Canfield, although he was not able to get the radio operators to England by 1 December, as the planners had wanted, did get all recruits to the United Kingdom prior to the commencement of training on 1 January 1944. The stateside recruiting effort had yielded 55 Jedburgh officers<sup>24</sup> and 62 Jedburgh radio operators, along with 31 officers and men for SO staff detachment duty. Ten Free

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Lieutenant Swank died of wounds received while deployed in France as a member of Jedburgh team EPHEDRINE in 1944.

<sup>23</sup>Letters to the author from Jacob Berlin, 30 November 1988; William Colby, 27 March 1989; Norman R. Franklin, 23 February 1989; Lucien Lajeunesse, 22 March 1989; Henry McIntosh, 24 October 1988; John Olmsted, 13 January 1989; Major General (Retired) John Singlaub, 5 December 1988; Donald Spears, 12 Jan 89; William Thompson, 27 October 1988; Allan Todd, 9 February 1989; and George Verhaeghe, 2 November 1988.

<sup>24</sup>Of the 55 officers, 50 were acquired as a direct result of the Jedburgh recruiting drive, the remaining five being previously recruited for operational groups and then transferred to the Jedburgh project. Of the 50, 16 were recruited from Camp Mackall, NC; 16 from Fort Benning, GA; five from Fort Sill, OK; three from Fort Bragg, NC; two each from Camp Hood and Camp Fannin, TX; and one each from Fort McClellan, AL; Fort Riley, KS; Camp Wolters, TX; Camp Blanding, FL; Camp Shelby, MS; and Camp Edwards, MA (War Dept. Special Orders No. 313, 9 November 1943, photocopy provided the author by George Verhaeghe).

French officers assigned to the French Military Mission were also selected as possible French Jedburgh team members.<sup>25</sup> His mission accomplished, Canfield returned to London on 28 November.<sup>26</sup>

This was not to be the end of the recruitment of American Jedburgh personnel, however. A small number of American officers serving in England in early 1944 were selected after the Jedburghs had begun their training program. In early January, Colonel Bruce obtained the theater commander's permission to seek recruits for the Jedburgh plan from U.S. divisions in England.<sup>27</sup> Those few recruited from units such as the 9th Infantry Division had gained combat experience in North Africa and Sicily.<sup>28</sup> Some officers were "walk-ins", having seen a bulletin asking for volunteers or, in one case, having encountered a friend among Jedburgh trainees on pass in London.<sup>29</sup>

British Jedburgh candidates were largely recruited from the Home Guard, where they answered notices on unit bulletin boards. One such notice reportedly read,

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<sup>25</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xx.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., xxi.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>28</sup>Letter to the author from Cecil Mynatt, 8 November 1988.

<sup>29</sup>Letters to the author from Charles Carman, 20 August 1989, and Bernard Knox, 13 October 1988.

"Volunteers who are interested in parachuting and guerrilla warfare and with a knowledge of French, step forward."<sup>30</sup> Those who answered the call were sent to a hotel for an interview,<sup>1</sup> then told to pack night gear and gym shoes. They were trucked to a country house for two days of physical and psychological testing. One British Jedburgh recruit recalled that they were subjected to "a very strange interview" with a psychiatrist.<sup>32</sup> Following two weeks of waiting, selectees were taken to the Jedburgh training facility at Milton Hall, near Peterborough.<sup>33</sup>

Procedures followed in the recruitment of French Jedburgh personnel were similar to those used by the Americans. The recruiting was carried out in North Africa and in the United Kingdom. As early as July 1943, SOE/SO sent a request for officers to the French General Staff in Algiers.<sup>34</sup> The BCRA had already begun a recruiting drive in

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<sup>30</sup> Stanley Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed* (Cheddar, Somerset, U.K., 1986), 12.

<sup>31</sup> One of the interviewers was Wing Commander Yeo-Thomas, the officer who had parachuted into occupied France in early 1943 to encourage unification of resistance organizations. Yeo-Thomas was reported to have turned away Jedburgh volunteers who, in his opinion, did not display the required degree of discipline. Of eight officers he interviewed in one day, he rejected six (Marshall, *The White Rabbit*, 84-85).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Cannicott writes that he walked away from the interview convinced that "they were crazy." Ironically, he would later become a psychiatrist himself.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

Casablanca to find replacements for the many agents lost in France in 1942.<sup>35</sup>

French Jedburgh recruits, both officer and radio operators, began arriving in Scotland as early as November 1943. Those that passed physical and psychological testing were sent to the BCRA offices at 10 Duke Street in London to be interviewed by a board of four officers. If selected, a recruit was given the opportunity to choose between intelligence work or "action", which meant special operations. The goal had been to recruit 100 French Jedburgh officer candidates, plus a small number of radio operators. When the selection process was complete, there were 100 officers and 14 NCOs.<sup>36</sup>

Roughly 75 percent of the French officers selected were from the regular army, most with platoon leader or company command experience. Many of the French combat arms officers in North Africa in late 1943 were particularly susceptible to the Jedburgh recruiting effort. As a result of the restructuring of French divisions that were being

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<sup>34</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xxxi.

<sup>35</sup>Letter to the author from Brigadier General (French Army, Retired) Paul Aussaresses, 17 September 1989.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid. Most of these were recruited from French units in North Africa. Some had made their way there through Spain from occupied France. Four were recruited from the French Foreign Legion. Five had been living in America and were recruited from the U.S. Army along with the American Jedburgh candidates (letters from General Aussaresses, 19 September 1989, and M. Michel de Bourbon de Parme, 3 January 1990).

rearmed by the U.S., many combat units were redesignated as service and support units. Combat arms officers in those units were anxious to find a means of joining the war against Germany. Even those who were fortunate enough to remain in the rearmed combat units could not be sure they would not have to sit out the rest of the war in North African garrisons.<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile, SOE/SO planners in London were continuing to develop the Jedburgh plan and the scheme for commanding and controlling combined special operations. A series of meetings were held during the first week of September 1943, covering Jedburgh training and organization, as well as operating procedures to be used at Norgeby House, the headquarters of SOE/SO.<sup>38</sup> Major Canfield, in his paper of 23 April 1943, had recommended establishment of a combined special operations headquarters for control of Jedburgh and other Allied special operations. This headquarters would be responsible for planning missions and briefing and dispatching teams. It would also be required to operate a secure communications base. These requirements, along with the operating procedures for the SOE/SO operations room, were topics of discussion throughout the final months of

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, xxxii, xxxvi-vii.

1943.<sup>39</sup> The combined SOE/SO headquarters was established by December.<sup>40</sup>

On 20 September 1943, members of the SO Planning Section prepared a memorandum which was a record of agreements reached at the 5 September meeting. This document, addressed to the Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, was staffed with the commander of SOE and with the G-2, G-3, and G-5 at ETOUSA. The subject was the organization of Jedburgh teams and a general outline of the proposed training program. Jedburgh candidates would, on 1 January 1944, begin a three month training program which consisted of a basic training phase and an operational training phase. The British and the Americans were each to furnish 35 "first-line" Jedburgh teams and 15 reserve teams, for a total of 100 teams.<sup>41</sup>

By the fall of 1943, the Allies were steadily succeeding in raising the morale of the resistance groups.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid. xxxiv-xxxviii.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., xxxix.

<sup>41</sup> Memorandum from Commander, OSS ETOUSA, to Chief of Staff, "Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines: Training and Organization of Jedburgh Teams," 20 September 1943, copy of text with concurrences by Major General R. W. Barker, Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, Brigadier General James C. Crockett, and Brigadier General Daniel Noce, in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 119-21.

At this point, General Morgan, COSSAC, sensed a very real danger that the Maquis might initiate a premature uprising, based solely upon rumor of an impending Allied invasion. The results of such an act would be isastrous.<sup>42</sup> The COSSAC planners warned the patriots that, no matter what they heard from other sources, they were to do nothing without word from London. Fortunately, these warnings were heeded.

Individual SOE and OSS agents were being dropped throughout France to assist in the organization, arming, and training of the patriots. Increasing amounts of weapons and explosives were dropped to build a stockpile for future operations with the Jedburghs and to encourage limited sabotage operations.<sup>43</sup> Up to this time, this materiel was mostly being delivered by British aircraft. On 12 October, Colonel Charles Vanderblue, chief of SO London, recommended to the theater commander that the OSS become more involved in this process. Since American Jedburgh teams would be expected to organize, train, and in some cases lead resistance forces, OSS should aid the resistance in building up stocks for such operations. SOE's Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman concurred in the recommendation.

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<sup>42</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 102.

<sup>43</sup>OSS, *SO WD*, Vol. 2, vi-vii.

Lieutenant General Devers approved the action on 19 October 1943.<sup>44</sup>

Colonel Bruce, OSS ETOUSA commander, requested on 9 October, that the theater commander authorize an increase in the OSS Detachment's Table of Allotment. This request was based upon a need for additional staff personnel to implement the plans which had recently been approved. The numbers included the 50 officers and 50 enlisted men required to man the American Jedburgh teams; the third member of each team was to be provided by the Free French. Also included among these new requirements were ten Jedburgh instructors and an administrative officer for the Jedburgh project. The remaining personnel authorizations were for SF detachments for army and army group headquarters, as well as SO staff officers for duty at SHAEF and SOE/SO headquarters. This latter requirement called for 39 officers to control Jedburgh teams and resistance groups. General Devers approved the increases on the 16th.<sup>45</sup>

Other important changes were made in the SO and SOE command structure and support base during the last months of

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<sup>44</sup>Letter from Chief, SO Branch, OSS ETOUSA, to Commanding General, ETOUSA, "Supply of Resistance Groups," 12 October 1943, with 1st Indorsement, 19 October 1943, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 128-31.

<sup>45</sup>OSS ETOUSA Letter to CG, ETOUSA, "Supplementary Table of Allotment," 9 October 1943, with approving indorsement dated 16 October 1943, in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 122-26; SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xvi.

1943, all of which would affect the Jedburghs. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Haskell, the plans officer at ETOUSA who had drafted General Barker's approving endorsement to the Jedburgh plan, was assigned to OSS on 18 October. He was appointed Chief, SO Branch, OSS ETOUSA, the following day, replacing Colonel Vanderblue. Haskell was promoted to Colonel on 25 November.<sup>46</sup>

Plans for providing logistical support to the Jedburghs were also taking shape. On 19 October, General Devers approved the request for a packing station and dedicated aircraft for SO.<sup>47</sup> Major Bross's recommendation for a separate SO Supply Branch, submitted back on 18 August, was approved in December. Bross served as the acting supply officer until Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert W. Embury, an artillery officer with previous logistic planning experience, became head of the new Supply Branch on 10 November 1943.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, lv; Vol. 11, 1.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., Vol. 1, xxxvii. For more on the reassignment of U.S. bomber squadrons to support Allied special operations, see Ben Parnell, *Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe* (Austin, 1987). This is a history of the squadrons and crews that flew the Jedburghs to France. The British special air operations unit was known as the Special Duty Squadron of the Royal Air Force. Better known as the "Moon Squadron", it operated from Gibraltar Farm in Bedfordshire, just outside London. See Gerrard Tickell, *Moon Squadron* (London and New York, 1956).

<sup>48</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xlvi; Vol. 2, xl; Vol. 10, iii.

There was a significant command change on the British side. Sir Charles Hambro resigned as executive head of SOE in September 1943. He was replaced by Major General Colin Gubbins.<sup>49</sup>

In the autumn of 1943, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee placed the combined SOE/SO organization under the operational control of COSSAC. If not yet official, this relationship seems to have been informally recognized as early as September.<sup>50</sup> The reason for putting all special operations under the direction of COSSAC, of course, was to ensure that these activities supported the overall Allied campaign plan. As General Morgan explained, "We had no desire to curb their activities--very much the contrary--but we had to be certain that by no possible mischance could the outcome of a small special operation be such as to give the enemy any clue to anything else."<sup>51</sup>

Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman had voiced some concern that this action by the British Chiefs applied only to SOE. In a letter to the Deputy G-3, COSSAC, he indicated that, because of the very close collaboration of SOE and SO Branch, OSS, SO's affiliation should be officially

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<sup>49</sup>Blake and Nicholls, *Dictionary of National Biography*, 363.

<sup>50</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, viii.

<sup>51</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 176.

recognized. General Devers concurred with this on 11 November 1943. Consequently, on that date, operational control of all SO activities in France and the Low Countries passed from ETOUSA to COSSAC.<sup>52</sup> This arrangement improved working relationships between the COSSAC staff and SOE/SO planners, and resulted in benefits such as increased intelligence sharing.<sup>53</sup>

Final approval of the Jedburgh plan resulted in a governing paper, or "Basic Directive on Jedburghs" which was published on 20 December 1943.<sup>54</sup> This document spelled out the planned organization, purpose and method of employment of the Jedburghs.

The one thing that set the mission of the Jedburghs apart from other SOE/SO projects was that they were to constitute the theater special operations reserve. The Jedburghs were intended to respond to 'last-minute' requirements transmitted from Allied ground forces through their SF detachments.<sup>55</sup> As it was felt that the number of resistance forces would increase dramatically once the

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<sup>52</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, xiv.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, x.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., xxxiii; Vol. 4, i.

<sup>55</sup>SOE/SO, "Basic Directive on Jedburghs, Prepared Jointly by SOE/SC," 20 December 1943, complete text in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 39.

invasion of France began, SOE/SO needed a communications link to the newer elements. The deployment of Jedburgh teams was seen as the most rapid and effective means of transmitting operational orders to these groups. They would also need liaison established for the coordination of arms and materiel deliveries. Liaison, then, was clearly the primary purpose of the Jedburghs. Additional tasks included training partisans in the use and maintenance of weapons and communications equipment, organizing the guerrilla groups, and providing advice and leadership when necessary.<sup>56</sup>

Each team was to consist of three military personnel--two officers and a noncommissioned officer. One officer was to be a native of the country to which the team was to be deployed. The other officer would be American or British. According to the plan, one of the officers would be the team leader, the other his second-in-command. The noncommissioned officer would serve as wireless telegraph, or W/T, operator. Teams were to be composed of personnel from nations as indicated in the following table which is taken from the directive:

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 37.

<u>Appointment</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Belgian</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Leaders and 2 I/C's	50	50	82	9	9	200
W/T Ops	35	50	15	-	-	100
Totals	85	100	97	9	9	300 <sup>57</sup>

There was apparently a surplus of personnel factored in to this allocation, as the directive called for a total of 70 teams for action in France, Belgium and Holland.<sup>58</sup> Remarkably, SOE/SO planners estimated that only one of every two teams would be successful in safely infiltrating by parachute.<sup>59</sup>

Accompanying them on their drop would be bundles or canisters filled with weapons, explosives and other equipment. Resistance leaders were to be notified of an impending drop by coded message from London over the BBC. The resistance would then form a reception party to gather the Jedburgh team on the drop zone and pick up all accompanying baggage. The team was then to remain with the partisan group until further instructions from London directed them to do otherwise. It was not intended that the

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 36; also Vol. 4, Book I, ii.

<sup>59</sup> SOE/SO, "Basic Directive," OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 40.

Jedburghs usurp the authority of any resistance leader, except in the case of an obvious lack of any leadership.<sup>60</sup>

The next question involved those areas to which Jedburgh teams would be sent. The first and most obvious requirement was the presence of a resistance group. If none existed, there remained the possibility that a team could be dropped into an area where the potential for formation of a resistance element existed.<sup>61</sup>

The specific mission given each Jedburgh team would depend upon a number of factors. Foremost among these were the size and current state of training and organization of the resistance element which the Jedburgh team would be joining. Another important factor was the geographical features of the area and the significance of the region to the Allied operational concept.

Sabotage was to be another task of the Jedburghs. The tasks outlined and the priorities established for training indicate that the planners expected the Jedburghs, and their resistance groups, to contribute to the sabotage efforts planned earlier by SOE and BCRA. Targets, in order of priority, were to include: rail and road transportation, telecommunications systems, enemy headquarters and logistics facilities, German air force assets, electrical power grids,

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 37; Vol. 4, Book I, ii.

bridges, railway roundhouses and turntables, engines and rolling stock. The only targets the Jedburghs were specifically prohibited from attacking were industrial plants, public utilities other than electrical power for military use, and shipping.<sup>62</sup>

The directive of 20 December also outlined criteria for special Jedburgh missions to be deployed as needed. These would be task organized according to the needs of the mission and might require augmentation. If absolutely necessary, such teams could be dropped "blind," or without the aid of a reception committee.<sup>63</sup>

An interesting aspect of the directive is the manner in which the subject of the wearing of uniforms was treated. Jedburgh teams, according to the directive, were normally to be dropped in uniform in order to allow some degree of protection under the provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Each individual, however, was given the latitude of changing into civilian clothes to carry out his mission, although no one would be forced to do so. "It should be made clear," the planners wrote, "that there is nothing dishonourable in such a course."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>SOE/SC, "Basic Directive," OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 38-39.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 37.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 37-38.

The SOE/SO planners envisioned that some Jedburgh teams would be in a position to perform a valuable secondary task. If German forces in the area were to begin a withdrawal, or if Allied forces were rapidly approaching, the Jedburghs and their guerrilla contingents might be given the mission of protecting vital points, such as bridges or industrial facilities. And, as the Allied ground forces approached, the Jedburghs would increasingly find themselves in a position to provide valuable tactical information on the enemy.<sup>65</sup>

Lastly, the directive dictated the training program to be followed by Jedburgh candidates. Few training programs were as intense or as diverse as that which awaited the Jedburgh candidates upon their arrival in the United Kingdom.

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

## C H A P T E R 7

### TRAINING THE FORCE

Ah! Those first OSS arrivals in London. How well I remember them, arriving like "Jeunes Filles en Fleur", straight from finishing school, all fresh and innocent, to start work in our frowsty old intelligence brothel. All too soon they were ravished and corrupted, becoming indistinguishable from seasoned pros who have been in the game for a century or more.

Malcolm Muggeridge

It should be remembered that the Americans in the United Kingdom were dependent upon the British for access to training facilities. The training establishments of SOE had been in operation since the beginning of the war and their instructors had benefited from the experiences of many successes and some failures. SOE would thus play a large part in the training of Jedburgh and SF detachment personnel. OSS had reached an agreement on this with SOE based on the recommendation of Captain John Tyson, the chief of SO's Training Section.<sup>1</sup>

Tyson had also recommended incidentally, that Jedburgh and other SO recruits receive no training in the United States prior to movement to the United Kingdom. He

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<sup>1</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 9: "Training", ii-vii.

felt the two-week paramilitary course taught by OSS near Washington would hinder the trainees when they began the six-week SOE course, making them feel that the training was redundant. OSS Washington disagreed, pointing out that the short training period in the United States helped in the process of "weeding out" undesirable personnel.<sup>2</sup>

The plan for a Jedburgh training base called for a British commander, an American deputy, a British chief instructor, and an American deputy chief instructor. Of the remaining 21 instructors, the British would provide eleven, the Americans ten. These ten would be selected from a group of 22 SO instructors which Captain Tyson had requested from Washington. The remaining staff would consist of 273 British enlisted personnel.<sup>3</sup> Included in this number were cooks, drivers, administrative staff, and batmen (enlisted orderlies).<sup>4</sup> It also included a number of females from the Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), who served in positions such as Morse code instructors, drivers, and administrative staff.<sup>5</sup>

In October 1943, Tyson, by then a Major, turned his attention to acquiring a Jedburgh training site. On the

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., vii-viii.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., xi.

<sup>4</sup> Alsop and Braden, *Sub Rosa*, 141.

<sup>5</sup> FANY was a British women's auxiliary service comparable to the American Women's Army Corps (WAC).

16th, Tyson and his SOE counterpart, Colonel James Young, inspected a property known as Milton Hall, located about 90 miles north of London. The large country estate, four miles from the town of Peterborough, included an expansive Elizabethan brownstone house which lay at the end of a half-mile long driveway.<sup>6</sup> The 17th Century house had many rooms, which made it ideal for both billeting and providing classrooms. And the extensive, well-manicured grounds would allow adequate training areas, with a reasonable degree of security.

Based on the favorable report by Tyson and Young, SOE requisitioned the estate and requested the necessary furniture, supplies, and equipment.<sup>7</sup> It would become known as the Jedburgh School, or Area D.<sup>8</sup> They planned to have the site staffed by 1 December 1943, with training to begin there on 1 January 1944.<sup>9</sup>

The three-month Jedburgh training program was divided into a six-week basic paramilitary training phase and a six-week operational training phase. The program of instruction to be followed in the training of the Jedburghs

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<sup>6</sup>Alsop and Braden, *Sub Rosa*, 141; Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed*, 22. Milton Hall was the ancestral home of the aristocratic Fitzwilliam family.

<sup>7</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 9, xi.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, xi.

was outlined in the basic Jedburgh directive of December 1943. According to the plan, all officer training would be conducted at Milton Hall.<sup>10</sup>

Training of W/T operators would begin at SOE Special Training School (STS) 54. On 1 February, the radiomen would join the officers at Milton Hall. From that date, the W/T operators were to receive general training along with the officers. They would continue to receive specialized W/T training, however, while at Milton Hall. All training was to begin on New Year's Day and was to be completed by 1 April 1944.<sup>11</sup>

Parachute training was to begin about the first of February. Students would be sent in groups of 50 to STS-51, the site of SOE's parachute training school. All trainees would make three jumps at the school; additional jumps would be made as part of the operational training phase.<sup>12</sup>

The program of instruction for Jedburgh officer basic training included the following subjects: demolitions, physical training, map reading, fieldcraft, weapons training, field orders, guerrilla tactics, aerial resupply and reception committee work, anti-tank mine warfare, street fighting, motorcycle and car driving, and intelligence

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<sup>10</sup>"Basic Directive on Jedburghs," December 1943, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 42; also Vol. 4, Book I, xxiii.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

training. Weapons training was to include instruction on American, British, French, and German small arms. German tactics would also be studied. All training was to be related to the tasks prioritized earlier in the directive.<sup>13</sup>

Provisions were also made for the officers to receive briefings on the history of the resistance movements in northwest Europe, and on the geography of France and the Low Countries. Language study was to continue while at Milton Hall. Furthermore, they were to learn what life was like in occupied France, Belgium, and Holland. Officers would be given limited training on the wireless equipment.<sup>14</sup>

The December directive also provided guidance on the formation of teams and noted that these groupings should be made early enough to allow students to operate as a team in collective training. The staff at the Jedburgh training school was to identify any teams showing an exceptional talent for sabotage. These teams were to be nominated for further training.<sup>15</sup>

The Queen Elizabeth, with 55 American Jedburgh officer candidates aboard, reached the port of Gourock, near

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<sup>13</sup>"Basic Directive," 42-43. These tasks, mentioned briefly in Chapter 6, are listed in Appendix A.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 44-45.

Glasgow, Scotland two days before Christmas, 1943.<sup>16</sup> The Americans were sent to a commando training area near the coastal town of Arisaig in northwestern Scotland.<sup>17</sup> There they were billeted in three old Scottish homes--Garramoor, Inverie, and Traigh House.<sup>18</sup> The officers remained at the Arisaig site for about two weeks, where they received basic commando training. This included such activities as long, cross-country hikes, hand-to-hand combat, and pistol firing.<sup>19</sup>

Beginning in their second week in the United Kingdom, the Jedburgh officer trainees underwent the standard OSS/SOE psychological and physical testing. Between 28 December 1943 and 5 January 1944, the officers were sent in three groups to the south of England for this evaluation by the Student Assessment Board at STS-3.<sup>20</sup> This took from three days up to a week for each rotation.

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<sup>16</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book 1, xxii; Vol. 3, Book 2, xxix; Vol. 9, xii; John M. Olmsted, untitled personal account of Jedburgh team DUDLEY, spring 1946 (ms.), 7.

<sup>17</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book 1, xxii; Vol. 3, Book 2, xxix; Vol. 9, xii.

<sup>18</sup>Olmsted, team DUDLEY report, 8.

<sup>19</sup>Colby, Honorable Men, 36; Olmsted, team DUDLEY report, 8-9.

<sup>20</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xxii; Vol. 9, 3. Also see Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York, 1948). The assessment procedures followed by OSS were based on those used by SCE.

The purpose of the assessment was to determine a candidate's character and his ability to operate in a stressful situation. There were three components--the stress interview, the construction problem, and the brook test. The "stress interview", conducted under conditions simulating an interrogation by captors, evaluated the candidate's emotional stability under severe strain. At the conclusion of the interview, the subject might be told that he had failed. The examiner would then study the candidate's physical reaction to the rejection.<sup>21</sup>

The "construction problem" assessed the officer's tolerance to frustration. The candidate was given a number of large wooden blocks, and dowels of various lengths that fit into circular holes in the blocks. The examiner instructed the student to build a cube of certain specific dimensions. Two enlisted soldiers (actually members of the assessment board) were available to assist the candidate. These "assistants" had secret orders to obstruct progress and annoy the officer in other ways, being anything but helpful.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, the "brook test" tested a candidate's initiative and resourcefulness. A group of four to seven officer candidates were taken to a shallow meadow stream

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<sup>21</sup>Ford, Donovan of OSS, 137-42.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

about eight feet in width. The examiner pointed out a pile of short boards, none of which was long enough to bridge the stream, laying near the bank. There were also three lengths of rope, a log, a pulley, and a small boulder. The candidates learned that the log replicated a "delicate range finder", and the boulder a "box of percussion caps". The stream, they were told, was a deep, raging, torrent too deep to ford and too wide to jump across. The group was given ten minutes to devise a method of transporting the "range finder" and the "percussion caps" to the far side of the stream. In making his assessment, the examiner considered the time it took to reach a solution. Extra points were awarded anyone who displayed exceptional leadership.<sup>23</sup>

The reports resulting from these evaluations were reviewed by Major Tyson and officers from the country section, F Section in the case of France.<sup>24</sup> As a result of the Student Assessment Board evaluations, 37 Jedburgh officer candidates were selected for further training.<sup>25</sup>

Due to labor and materiel shortages, work on Milton Hall had not yet been completed, and the estate was not ready for occupation by the Jedburgh trainees. Therefore, the officers were divided into three groups and sent to

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 9, 6.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, Book I, xxii.

three different SOE training schools (STS). One group went to STS-45 at Fairford, Gloucester. Another went to STS-40 at Gumley Hall in Lancashire. The third group was sent to STS-6 at Walsingham, Surrey. The American officers remained at these training sites until 1 February 1944, receiving most of the preliminary, or basic training, phase of their Jedburgh training.<sup>26</sup> The shortage of American officer trainees that resulted from the assessment board screening was made up through recruiting from U.S. forces in England. Majors Henry Coxe and Horace Fuller of SO recruited the needed officers by late February.<sup>27</sup>

On the last day of 1943, the 62 American Jedburgh radio operator recruits arrived in Scotland. They were immediately sent to STS-54, the SOE Communications School. Rather than sending the 62 radio operators to the Student Assessment Board, a team of three psychiatrists went to STS-54 to interview each candidate. On 5 February, 46 out of the original 62 radio operators moved to Milton Hall to join the officer trainees.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, xxii, 9. The first mention of the three training sites in volume 4 lists them as STS-6, STS-45, and STS-41. Later in the same volume they are listed as STS-6, STS-45, and STS-40.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., xxii.

The French officers recruited in North Africa, after their assessment and initial processing at BCRA headquarters, moved on to Milton Hall. But the search for Jedburgh candidates by the BCRA in North Africa had not yielded the required number of officers. To make up the shortage, SOE and OSS each sent an officer on a recruiting mission to the Middle East. This resulted in the acquisition of an additional 70 French officers, who arrived at Milton Hall in late March 1944.<sup>29</sup>

Prior to the commencement of training at Milton Hall, the Jedburgh trainees attended the SOE parachute training course at STS-51 in Altrincham, Manchester. The trainees were sent in groups of 50 beginning on the first of February. Even those who had completed the six-week course at Fort Benning were required to undergo this special three-day course. All trainees were required to make three parachute jumps. The first two jumps were made in daylight, first from a balloon at an altitude of 700 feet, then from an airplane at 500 feet. The third, also from an airplane, was a night jump.<sup>30</sup> This rotation of Jedburgh trainees to Altrincham continued into early March. Twenty American Jedburgh officers graduated from the course on 1 March 1944. Others had begun another class the previous day.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 9; Alsop and Braden, *Sub Rosa*, 141-43; Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed*, 23.

As each group of Jedburgh trainees completed the parachute course, the men received a three-day pass to London. Once their 72 hours were up, they reported to Milton Hall for the operational phase of their training.<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, the planners at SOE/SO headquarters continued to refine the Jedburgh plan. We have seen how SOE/SO had virtually become a combined headquarters by December 1943. This combined command became official on 24 January 1944.<sup>33</sup> By this time, SOE/SO had under its control 21 F-Section circuits, with an additional five under construction.<sup>34</sup> SO Branch sent SF detachments to the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), First Army, Third Army, and Ninth Army headquarters by the end of January.<sup>35</sup> Major Canfield and others from the planning office were in constant liaison with the G-3 staffs at these headquarters, ensuring that the SO plan supported that of the army. Three months later, on 28 April, SHAEF approved a request to form

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<sup>32</sup>HHD, OSS ETOUSA, Special Orders Number 19, dated 1 March 1944, photocopy provided the author by George Verhaeghe.

<sup>33</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, 9.

<sup>34</sup>Copy of memorandum of agreement, dated 10 January 1944, in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 33. Also see Vol. 1, 1-2, 11-12. The request to SHAEF for approval of SOE/SO integration was made on 11 January.

<sup>35</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 3, Book III, 14.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, 17.

two more SF detachments for a planned addition of two new army headquarters.<sup>36</sup> Planners now had to develop procedures for infiltrating American operational groups, British SAS parties, and the combined Jedburgh teams, into their respective areas of operation.

In January the SOE/SO planning staff held three meetings to study preparations for the reception of Jedburgh teams in France. These preparations included the identification of drop zones, establishment of safe houses, and the organization of reception committees to meet the Jedburghs and clear the drop zones of parachutes and supply canisters. These elements formed the basis of the "Mitchell Plan", which arranged for each drop zone to be manned by a reception committee of resistance members. The committee would be organized by the local delegate of the Free French or by the F Section organizer in the area. The Allies sent an officer to France with funds totalling two and a half million francs to see that preparations on the continent were begun.<sup>37</sup>

Another aspect of the Jedburgh plan that undoubtedly received attention during this period was the legal status of the teams and of the resistance groups they might lead. Internationally recognized laws of land warfare left little

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., Vol. 1, 113-15; Vol. 2, 22.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, 11-12.

doubt that "commando forces", if captured, were to be provided protection as prisoners of war. Interpretation of the law with respect to partisans was not so simple.

Field Marshal Kesselring echoed the sentiments of most German commanders when he wrote, "The Partisan war was a complete violation of international law and contradicted every principle of clean soldierly fighting."<sup>38</sup> This interpretation, obviously, was not shared by the Allies.

The provisions of the 1907 Hague convention included requirements which partisans had to meet in order to be protected. One of these requirements was that a member of the partisan force must wear a distinctive emblem or uniform, which would establish his status. SOE/SO planners felt that they should follow these guidelines, even if there was little indication that the Germans recognized such a symbol. Accordingly, when air supply containers and packages were loaded, any available space was often filled with tricolor armbands.<sup>39</sup>

General Eisenhower arrived in England on 15 January 1944. He officially assumed command of COSSAC two days later and the headquarters became known as Supreme

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<sup>38</sup>Albrecht Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring* (Novato, CA, 1989; Bonn, 1953), 227.

<sup>39</sup>Foot, *SOE in France*, 477.

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).<sup>40</sup> SOE/SC now came under the operational control of this new command. On the 24th, Eisenhower recommended to the War Department that OVERLORD be postponed, slipping D-day from May to June, to allow time for the needed buildup in men and equipment.<sup>41</sup>

The Jedburgh School at Milton Hall finally became available for use in the first week of February 1944.<sup>42</sup> Several huts had been erected on the grounds, the large sunken garden was converted to a weapons training area, and the dairy barn became a Morse code classroom. Many rooms in the old mansion made the transition to classrooms, and a large room on the first floor was fitted with a movie projector and screen. In other areas, athletic equipment was installed.<sup>43</sup> Little of the charm of the old house was lost, however. Many large portraits were left hanging on the walls and one Jedburgh trainee remembered that, "eminent, be-wigged gentlemen looked down on us in a faintly disapproving and questioning manner as we trained with our explosives."<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, 278.

<sup>41</sup>Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York, 1951), 220.

<sup>42</sup>COSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xii, 9-11.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 10-11.

<sup>44</sup>Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed*, 22.

The administrative staff at Milton Hall was a combined U.S.-British organization. The first commandant was a British officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner. Spooner's American deputy was Major Horace W. Fuller of the U.S. Marine Corps. Of the 25 instructors, 17 were British and 8 American.<sup>45</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel G. Richard Musgrave of the British Army replaced Spooner as commandant of the Jedburgh training school on 8 April 1944. The deputy commandant position also changed when Major McLallen assumed that post on 3 May, after Major Fuller deployed with 15 Jedburgh teams to North Africa on the previous day.<sup>46</sup> Command of the Jedburgh teams remained vested in the commandant during the training period, or until the teams became operational.

SOE/SO established an additional Jedburgh staff at their headquarters in Norgeby House in February 1944. This Baker Street staff was essentially a liaison link between the Jedburgh school at Milton Hall and headquarters in London. It was jointly headed by Major Henry B. Coxe, Jr., of the U.S. Army, and Major F. O'Brien of the British Army. British Lieutenant Colonel Carleton-Smith replaced Major O'Brien in early March.<sup>47</sup> This staff, which was

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<sup>45</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, 1-3. Remaining staff members are listed at Appendix B.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 3-4.

administrative in nature, took on a more operational role once the Jedburgh teams completed training. Command of the Jedburghs was vested in LTC Spooner at Milton Hall until termination of the operational training phase. The teams then became operational, and command authority transferred to Lieutenant Colonel Smith and Major Coxe. This transfer of command authority occurred on 8 April 1944.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the administrative and training personnel, the Baker Street Jedburgh staff also included five briefing officers--two Americans, two British, and one French.<sup>49</sup> It was their job to escort alerted Jedburgh teams from Milton Hall to an apartment on Baker Street. The briefing officer then briefed the team on its mission, after which the team was escorted to an airfield, outfitted for the jump, and put on an aircraft for infiltration that same night.

Major Coxe, American co-director of the London Jedburgh staff, had also played another important role in the Jedburgh project. Along with a British officer, he directed a committee which dealt with Jedburgh equipment requirements. This included the development and acquisition of a standard short-wave radio set built specifically for the Jedburghs.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

The operational training phase of the Jedburgh training program began at Milton Hall on 21 February 1944. Throughout the basic training phase, training priorities had included weapons instruction, demolitions, physical exercise, and French language instruction. Now the emphasis shifted from individual training to collective training. The vehicle for this training would be the practical field exercise.<sup>51</sup> But training in certain individual skills also continued to round out the training schedule.

The regimen at Milton Hall was varied and often was a repetition of schooling the Jedburgh trainees had received elsewhere. Subjects that were not entirely new to the men were silent killing, clandestine radio, Morse code, and the night training exercises. The reason for this, of course, was that the trainees had to be drilled on some activities to the point that they became second nature.<sup>52</sup> Repetitive training, however, did not seem to dampen morale, which remained "incredibly high". Frequent passes to London helped keep it that way.<sup>53</sup>

There were new topics on the itinerary also. Cryptography classes included use of the cipher system known

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., xxiv.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 9-10.

<sup>52</sup> Colby, *Honorable Men*, 37.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

as the one-time pad, still used today.<sup>54</sup> Students also received instruction on the use of forged papers, and how to eat, dress, and act like a Frenchman. Lectures on the French maquis and other resistance networks, and on counter-guerrilla tactics used by the Germans and the Vichy police helped prepare the trainees for the task ahead. They also received talks from agents and commandos who had returned from missions to occupied Europe.<sup>55</sup>

On Thursday, 24 February 1944, Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman, Director of SOE's London Group, spoke to the Jedburgh trainees on the "Role of the Jedburghs". In his speech, he explained that the Jedburghs would be operating in France, Belgium, and Holland, in what the Allied high command considered a strategic role. Their primary functions were those of liaison, organization, and leadership. But their most important role, as he saw it, would probably be that of technical advisors to the various Maquis and other resistance groups.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Cannicott, *Journey of a Jed*, 24. Cannicott gives a good description of the use of the one-time pad. For more on this cipher system, see Lorain, *Clandestine Operations*, 193.

<sup>55</sup>Colby, *Honorable Men*, 26.

<sup>56</sup>"Role of Jedburghs: Summary of the speech by Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman to Jedburgh students on 24th February 1944," 10 March 1944, copy of document in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 113; also Vol. 4, Book 1, 10.

Mockler-Ferryman pointed out that the Jedburgh teams were, in most cases, not to usurp the authority of local resistance leaders. In those circumstances where leadership was weak, however, members of the resistance might naturally choose to follow the Jedburgh team. Indeed, in situations where resistance leaders were killed or captured, Jedburgh teams might be inserted with the express purpose of taking command of a group.<sup>57</sup>

The brigadier then turned his attention to Jedburgh involvement in direct action missions, such as those in the various BCRA plans (Vert, Tortue, etc.). Jedburgh teams, unlike the Operational Groups, would not be sent to the field with a specific direct action target, or "coup-de-main operation". The resistance group with which they were to link up, however, might receive such a mission. The Jedburghs, then, had to be prepared to provide advice and assistance as needed.<sup>58</sup>

In March, the Jedburgh trainees took part in one of the first major field exercises of their operational training. Exercise "SPILL OUT" was a six-day exercise intended to simulate conditions in occupied France. General Pierre Koenig, de Gaulle's designated head of the FFI in London, on 24 and 25 April observed another exercise named

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., Vol. 12, 114.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

"SPUR". The "SPUR" scenario involved the ambush of a German general officer by a group of partisans led by Jedburghs.<sup>59</sup> These exercises, and others, were invaluable in highlighting weaknesses in the Jedburgh training program or in the concept itself. Another exercise conducted in March, for example, tested the command, control and communications between the Jedburgh teams, London headquarters, and the SF detachments in the field. This problem, Exercise "SALLY", resulted in some needed adjustments in staff procedures at the London and field army headquarters.<sup>60</sup>

During the last two weeks of March 1944, the Milton Hall staff began forming the three-man Jedburgh teams.<sup>61</sup> The commandant devised a unique procedure, instructing trainees to form their own teams. The only criteria was that each team would have a British or American officer, another officer of French, Belgian or Dutch nationality, and a radio operator of any nationality. The results of this informal "polling" were reviewed by the commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Spooner (Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave after 8 April), and the chief instructor, Major McLallen. The commandant made the final decisions on team composition, with considerable attention being paid to the

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, 12.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, 30; Olmsted, team DUDLEY report, 17.

<sup>61</sup>OSS, SC WD, Vol. 4, Book I, 13.

preferences of the trainees. In this way, it was felt, personality clashes in the field might be avoided.<sup>62</sup>

Once all the students had formed into teams, they began a trial period known as the "engagement". If the engagement worked, the "marriage" of the team members became official by a posting on the bulletin board. Regrettably, an occasional marriage would end in "divorce", in which case the process was started over again.<sup>63</sup> Most of the teams had been formed by the first of April. The teams went through the remaining collective training together. Adjustments were occasionally needed, though, for a number of reasons, and changes continued to be made right up to D-day.<sup>64</sup> Additionally, all French team members adopted pseudonyms, or noms-de-guerre, to allow some protection against reprisals aimed at family members in the event of capture.<sup>65</sup>

The spring of 1944 also brought SOE/SO headquarters a new and less cumbersome title. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, SHAEF Chief of Staff, issued a directive on 1 May which announced the redesignation of SOE/SO headquarters as Special Force Headquarters, or SFHQ.<sup>66</sup> Details of the

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 13-14; Colby, *Honorable Men*.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book 1, 13.

<sup>65</sup> Colby, *Honorable Men*, 37.

operational procedure for the headquarters were published later that month.<sup>67</sup> In another development that month, on the 17th, General Eisenhower tentatively set the target date for OVERLORD as 5 June.<sup>68</sup>

Another significant step was taken in expanding the control of the combined special operations headquarters. As early as the 23rd of March 1944, SHAEF had authorized SOE/SC to coordinate operations for southern France with Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers.<sup>69</sup> In early April, SOE/SC planners suggested that Jedburgh teams be sent to North Africa. From there, these teams could be dispatched to work with resistance groups in the south of France.<sup>70</sup>

Furthermore, they urged that a special operations staff be established at AFHQ to coordinate and manage the deployment of these teams. This staff, essentially, would be an extension of SOE/SC (later SFHQ), since the teams operating in southern France would eventually come under the operational control of General Eisenhower. This proposal was approved by OSS headquarters in Washington on 21 April.

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<sup>66</sup>SHAEF/17240/Ops, "Open Title for Headquarters, SOE/SC," directive dated 1 May 1944, copy in OSS, SC WD, Vol. 12, 95; also Vol. 1, 4.

<sup>67</sup>OSS, SC WD, Vol. 4, Book I, 14.

<sup>68</sup>Walter Bedell Smith, *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions* (New York, 1956), 43.

<sup>69</sup>OSS, SC WD, Vol. 2, 47.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. 4, Book I, 14.

The staff would be established in Algiers and would be known as the Special Project Operational Center (SPOC).<sup>71</sup>

Planners at SOE/SO decided that Major Fuller should deploy with 15 Jedburgh teams to North Africa to prepare for infiltration into southern France in support of both OVERLORD and ANVIL/DRAGOON. Major General Harold R. Bull, G-3 at SHAEF, approved this action on 27 April 1944. Colonel Haskell was able to report to General Bull that a combined SOE/SO operations room was established in Algiers by the first of May.<sup>72</sup>

Finally, on 2 May, 15 Jedburgh teams departed Milton Hall for North Africa with Major Horace Fuller in charge. Major Canfield also went to Algiers on the 16th to assist in completion of the operations room.<sup>73</sup> SPOC officially commenced staff operations on 23 May 1944.<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, the planners in London were working to improve SOE/SO's capability for inserting the Jedburgh teams behind enemy lines. Major Canfield wrote Colonel Haskell on 10 February giving estimated figures for aircraft

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid., Vol. 1, 23-29; Vol. 3, Book II, 162-63.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, 3, 14.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, 31, 49; Vol. 4, Book I, 14. The original group of 15 teams sent to North Africa would be joined in June by an additional ten teams.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., Vol. 1, 31; Vol. 2, 51; Vol. 3, Book II, 164.

requirements.<sup>75</sup> Based upon this assessment, OSS London asked the theater commander to increase its allocation of bomber aircraft for dropping men and supplies to the resistance. General Eisenhower approved the request for additional aircraft for SOE/SO. On 2 May 1944, he directed Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, to provide 25 aircraft, with crews and maintenance personnel, for this purpose.<sup>76</sup>

As the Jedburgh teams came nearer to deployment, collective training intensified. In May, some teams participated in a "commando hike" that took them through 100 to 200 miles of Scottish countryside. Later that month, on the 16th, the Dutch teams returned to Scotland to attend the British Commando small boat course at STS-23B, located near Tarbat, north of Inverness. This ten-day course included instruction on the use of one and two-man kayaks, four-man skiffs, and somewhat larger boats.<sup>77</sup>

During this same period, the teams bound for France undertook a "Dakota" landing course. The purpose of this course was to give Jedburgh teams the capability of

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., Vol. 2, 67.

<sup>76</sup>SHAEF/17240/1/Ops, "Allocation of additional aircraft for SOE/SO missions," letter to CG, USSTAF, 2 May 1944, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, 35; also Vol. 2, 68.

<sup>77</sup>Olmsted, team DUDLEY report, 21-25; also movement order issued at Milton Hall on 15 May 1944, photocopy in the author's possession.

receiving supplies and additional personnel, if necessary, by the landing of cargo planes on makeshift runways. The instruction in this course included the identification and marking of landing zones for the large C-47 aircraft. Students also had to learn procedures for guiding the planes in by the use of flashlights.<sup>78</sup>

Until May 1944, SOE/SO and, later, SFHQ, were British-American organizations. By the end of April, General Pierre Koenig, Commander-in-Chief of French forces in Great Britain, was insisting that the French be represented at the combined special operations headquarters. The general met with SFHQ officials on 25 May to discuss command and control of resistance forces in France. As a result of this meeting, Colonel Haskell, in a letter to Koenig, formally proposed a plan for the assignment of French officers to the SFHQ staff. This proposal was accepted by the French general on 29 May 1944.<sup>79</sup>

SHAEP issued a directive on 2 June 1944 confirming the appointment of General Koenig as Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI). The directive further stipulated that Koenig would be served by a tripartite staff. An additional directive of 6 June made it clear that orders from the Supreme Commander to General

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>79</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, 35-36; Vol. 3, Book II, 163.

Koenig would be passed to Koenig through SFHQ. The French protested against this arrangement, and changes were implemented to make Koenig's tripartite staff, EMFFI<sup>80</sup>, directly subordinate to SHAEF, with SFHQ providing air and logistical support. The Planning Section at SFHQ moved to EMFFI and became known as the Liaison Section.<sup>81</sup>

Jedburgh training was virtually completed by the first week of June. Milton Hall then became a holding area for Jedburgh teams awaiting deployment.<sup>82</sup> OSS, SOE, and BCRA had successfully recruited and trained the required number of personnel to form 100 Jedburgh teams.<sup>83</sup> As D-day drew close, the training staff at Milton Hall initiated the final and most extensive Jedburgh field training exercises.

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<sup>80</sup>Etat-Major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, the general staff of the FFI.

<sup>81</sup>EMFFI, "A Short History of the Organization of the Command of Operations Undertaken by the French Forces of the Interior" (nd.), 1-4, National Archives, RG 226, Washington History Office, OP-23, Entry 99, Folder 3, Box 2; OSS, SO WD, Vol. 1, 26, 33, 37; Vol. 2, 39; Vol. 3, Book II, 2, 167; Vol. 3, Book XIII, 138.

<sup>82</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 9, 2.

<sup>83</sup>Of the 45 American officers who had completed all training by D-day, there were a total of seven majors, 18 captains, and 20 first lieutenants. Twenty-seven of these were infantry officers, ten field artillery, three cavalry, two air corps, one engineer, one coast artillery, and one was a marine corps officer. The 40 enlisted men included four first sergeants, one master sergeant, 33 technical sergeants, and two technicians third grade (OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, 5-8).

Exercise "LASH" began on 31 May and continued until 8 June, thus continuing through D-day of the Normandy invasion. Conducted in the hilly terrain of Leicestershire, it was basically an exercise in organizing, protecting, and controlling several partisan groups.<sup>84</sup>

Procedures to be followed in the implementation of the Jedburgh plan were finalized and published in May 1944.<sup>85</sup> In accordance with these standing operating procedures, the SFHQ country section responsible for a targeted area of operation would prepare the briefing material for a Jedburgh mission. The country section would also be responsible for arranging the infiltration flight and the packing and loading of necessary supply containers.<sup>86</sup>

On the third of June, with D-day for OVERLORD only two days away, F Section directed Milton Hall to alert the first Jedburgh team to be sent to France. This team, to be known by the codename "HUGH", was alerted and transported to London for the mission briefing. They were taken to a flat on Baker Street, not far from the six-story Norgeby House, SFHQ headquarters. At the briefing, the members of team HUGH each received a personal codename. Captain L.

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<sup>84</sup> OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, 13.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 14-16.

l'Helgouach, who as a French officer had already been required to adopt the pseudonym "Legrand", was now given the codename "FRANC". The British officer, Captain W. R. Crawshay, became "CROWN". Lastly, the W/T operator, a Frenchman by the name of Rene Meyer (pseudonym: Robert Mersioli) took the codename "YONNE".<sup>87</sup>

Team HUGH would be dropped blind, without a reception committee, near the town of Chateauroux in the Department of Indre, in central France. They would be accompanied by a SAS team codenamed "BULLBASKET". This SAS team's mission was to establish a base from which raids could be launched against German lines of communication. Specifically, these attacks were to cut rail communications between Limoges and Chateauroux and between Bordeaux and Tours. The Jedburgh team's primary mission was to assist in the establishment of this base and to coordinate partisan support for the SAS team. Upon infiltration, they were to make contact with an F Section agent named "Samuel", who had been working in the Indre since April 1943. Team HUGH was also to make an assessment of the resistance in the area and act as a "pilot team" for other Jedburgh teams to be sent into the region. In this case, HUGH would arrange reception committees for these teams.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., team HUGH report, 17. Some of the standard briefing procedures described here are found in Vol. 13, pages 8-10.

The briefers also provided information on the German army and air force units in the area, and on the local police and Gestapo. They discussed curfews and other restrictions known to be in effect in the Indre. They gave a detailed briefing on the topography of the area. The Jedburghs were shown photographs of "Samuel" and other important Allied agents in the region, including the *Delegue Militaire* for Region 5 (central France), a man referred to only as "ELLIPSE". Finally, the team was briefed on actions to be taken in case of capture. In this regard, they were to expect protection as prisoners of war under the laws of war and, since they would be in uniform, they were not given a cover story. They were also provided with a "warning phrase" to be used in message traffic to secretly inform London that the team had been captured and was transmitting under duress. The briefing concluded with instructions to be followed when their area of operation was overrun by Allied ground forces, as well as actions to be taken in case withdrawal of the team became necessary.<sup>89</sup>

General Eisenhower held a special meeting for commanders at the Advanced Command Post at 0200 hours on 4 June. He announced the postponement of the invasion for at

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, 17-20, 84.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 21.

least 24 hours.<sup>90</sup> Early on the morning of 5 June, he gave the order to launch the invasion.<sup>91</sup> By this time, Plans Vert, Tortue and Violet were ready in detail, SHAEF having designated target lists for each plan.<sup>92</sup>

On 1 May, BBC had broadcast a secret message to their audience among the resistance. It told the partisans that the invasion was only weeks away. A similar message was broadcast on 1 June, indicating that the second front was to be established within days. Finally, on 5 June, following the evening news broadcast, a series of seemingly meaningless French phrases were broadcast. Each resistance group listened for the phrase that was their action message, giving the signal to attack D-day targets.<sup>93</sup>

Jedburgh team HUGH, escorted by their "conducting officer," made the two-hour ride north to Station 61 by truck. Station 61 was a large country house used as a holding area for Jedburgh teams awaiting air transportation

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<sup>90</sup>Smith, *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions*, 51.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., 28-29.

<sup>92</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 2, 14; Vol. 3, Book III, 172, 273.

<sup>93</sup>Max Hastings, *Das Reich* (London, 1981), 5. This is the story of the 2d SS Panzer Division's ordeal in trying to reach the Normandy battlefield. The division was delayed for days as a result of attacks by the resistance.

to France. After a good meal, the team went to the SOE airfield at Tempsford, Bedfordshire.<sup>94</sup>

There, in a "dressing hut", the men prepared themselves for their jump into France. All Jedburghs deployed with a similar set of equipment, although where each item was carried was more a matter of personal choice. A security officer first inspected each team member to ensure that pockets and wallets contained nothing which might provide useful information to the enemy. The kit was a mixture of American and British equipment. All team members carried American weapons--the .30 caliber M-1 carbine and the .45 Colt automatic pistol. Each packed a commando knife, a British oil compass, and a survival kit similar to that issued to bomber crew members. A musette bag carried emergency rations.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, team HUGH report; Parnell, Carpetbaggers, 3, 12. Many of the Jedburgh teams departed from Tempsford; others left from the home base of OSS's special air squadrons at Harrington, Northamptonshire. Jedburgh teams departing Tempsford flew in British bombers, Stirlings and Halifaxes, painted flat black. Occasionally, a substitute aircraft, such as a Lancaster or an American built Hudson, carried a Jedburgh team to France. Teams leaving from the American base at Harrington nearly always rode in black B-24 Liberators. At Blida and Maison Blanche airfields in Algiers, infiltration aircraft included Halifaxes, Liberators, C-47 Dakotas, and B-17 Flying Fortresses.

<sup>95</sup>Cannicott, Journey of a Jed, 24; Foot, SOE: An Outline History, 77; Olmsted, team DUDLEY report, 19-20; OSS, SO WD, Vol. 13, 11.

Jumpsuit pockets also carried codes, maps--both the 1/50,000 map of the drop zone and a Michelin road map of the area, and crystals for the Jedburgh wireless sets. Larger items, such as the two wireless sets themselves, the team members' rucksacks, French civilian clothing, and arms for the partisans, were all packed in supply canisters to be dropped with the team. Radio operators, of course, also carried the "one-time pads" for enciphering and deciphering messages. For the sake of security, brevity of messages was most important. To assist the radioman in keeping his traffic short, SFHQ communications personnel issued a 20-inch square piece of silk printed with four-letter codes for often-used phrases. They also issued each team a schedule of radio contacts to be made, designating times for both sending and receiving messages.<sup>96</sup>

Another requirement for guerrilla warfare was cash. In most cases, each officer took 100,000 francs; each W/T operator carried 50,000 francs. In some cases, every team member also carried 50 American dollars. Each team member was issued a money belt to wear under his jumpsuit.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Colby, *Honorable Men*, 24; Foot, *SOE: An Outline History*, 124-25; OSS, SO WD, Vol. 13, 2.

<sup>97</sup>OSS, Vol. 13, 8; Foot, *SOE in France*, 471. Foot wrote that only team commanders carried 100,000 francs, the second-in-command carrying 50,000. A review of Jedburgh team after-action reports, however, indicates that all officers took 100,000 francs. The teams were required, in their after-action report, to account for all money spent.

A meeting was then arranged between the Jedburgh team and officers from the special air squadrons that flew personnel and supply drop missions. These crew members gave the Jedburgh team instructions to be followed in identifying and reporting resupply drop zones once they were in France. The Jedburgh team leader would carry a piece of microfilm which, when read with a microscope, revealed a number of French phrases and a short code word next to each. When the team wanted a supply drop they were to report information on the drop zone to London, along with a code word from the microfilm. They would then listen each evening to the news broadcast on the BBC. Following the news broadcast, a series of meaningless phrases would be read in French. When the Jedburgh team heard the phrase corresponding to the code word they had sent to SFHQ, they could expect their resupply drop that night.<sup>98</sup>

Team HUGH boarded a black Halifax and departed Tempsford and England at 2300 hours, 5 June 1944. The first Jedburgh team to infiltrate into occupied Europe landed on French soil in the early morning of D-day, the sixth of June.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 13, 9-10.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., Vol. 3, Book II, 161; Vol. 4, Book I, team HUGH report, 35.

HUGH would be followed on the night of 6 June by another Jedburgh team, "HARRY", which would be dropped with a similar mission farther to the east in the Morvan Mountains. Team HARRY would operate with SAS "HOUNDSWORTH". Two other Jedburgh teams were scheduled to be dropped on the night of 9 June with almost identical missions to those of the first two. Jedburgh team "GEORGE" would accompany SAS team "DINGSON" to the Redan area of Brittany, and Jedburgh "FREDERICK" would go with SAS "SAMWEST", also into Brittany.<sup>100</sup>

Similar actions were taking place in North Africa, with teams staging out of Maison Blanche or Blida airfields in Algiers. There, the first three Jedburgh teams to be dropped into southern France, teams "VEGAMIN", "QUININE", and "AMMONIA", were alerted, briefed, and deployed.

It had been nearly two years since Brigadier Colin Gubbins had suggested the codename "Jumpers" for his proposed special operations project. Eighteen months had been spent refining the original concept into a workable plan. During that time, four months were required to recruit the men needed to carry out the plan, and to assemble them in Great Britain. Lastly, the Jedburgh teams were ready for deployment only after months of intense

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., Vol. 4, Book I, team HARRY report, 26-27; team FREDERICK report, 33-34; team GEORGE report, 39-40.

training and exercises. The result was a means of capitalizing on the growing resistance within the countries of Western Europe and guiding and nurturing that force in a manner most advantageous to the Allies.

## C H A P T E R 8

### CONCLUSIONS

In no previous war, and in no other theater during this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1945)

The first Jedburgh teams deployed to France on the night of 5 June 1944. Eventually, 99 Jedburgh missions were conducted throughout occupied France and the Low Countries from June through November 1944. Some teams completed more than one mission. Some Jedburgh personnel deployed on other special operations missions, such as the "special Allied missions", sent to the field by EMFFI.<sup>1</sup> After the liberation of France was complete, many deployed on Jedburgh missions to China.

The Jedburgh project was a bold experiment. Indeed, the very concept of a force designed to work directly with

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<sup>1</sup>The "special Allied missions" were organized similar to the Jedburgh teams and performed a variety of tasks. Some were sent to France with missions similar to those of the Jedburghs, but on a regional basis, serving more of an "area command" function. An example of this was the "ALOES" mission to Brittany. Others, such as "VERVEINE", had the mission of assessing resistance potential in an area. Still others had sabotage missions. (OSS, SO WD, Vol. 3, Book XII, 1595).

partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces was a significant departure from traditional American warfighting. The concept remains significant because it provided the doctrinal basis for our current Special Forces (SF).

President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS at the end of the Second World War. With that action, the United States lost its capability for conducting unconventional warfare. In 1950, the U.S. Army found itself unable to capitalize on the use of the anti-communist resistance groups of North Korea. Formation of the United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea (UNPF-K) only marginally corrected this. A more permanent capability was needed. As a result, in 1952, the U.S. Army Special Forces were formed through the efforts of a group of officers which included former Jedburgh Colonel Aaron Bank.

One of the models used in the development of the new organization was the Jedburgh project. According to Colonel Bank, who also served as the first commander of a U.S. Army Special Forces Group, the Jedburghs were "the building blocks upon which SF was founded."<sup>2</sup>

Although other missions such as strike or special reconnaissance often receive more attention in SF unit training schedules, it should be remembered that Special

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<sup>2</sup>Letter to the author from Colonel (Retired) Aaron Bank, 19 July 1990.

Forces' original purpose, and its primary mission today, remains "unconventional warfare", supporting partisans.

Understandably, today's unconventional warfare doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. Future conflicts will allow little time for the planning and preparation of such a force.

Some believe that a future scenario requiring such operations is unlikely. At the same time, the U.S. Army continues to train for the future possibility of war in Europe. Recent events have highlighted the popular unrest and dissatisfaction present within the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. This unrest represents a significant resistance potential.

Many lessons were learned from the Jedburgh experience. One such lesson concerned the small size of the Jedburgh teams. William Colby wrote after V-E Day that the Jedburghs were "often swamped with work" and had to leave some tasks undone in order to finish those of a higher

priority.<sup>3</sup> He recommended that, in the future, any such teams be composed of a field grade officer, four company grade officers, and 15 noncommissioned officers. This would be much larger than the Jedburgh team, but only slightly larger than half the size of an operational group. As the team of the future eventually evolved, of course, it took the shape of a 12-man SF A-Detachment.

A particularly effective aspect of the Jedburgh team composition was the addition of an officer native to the area of operation. This had not been planned originally. Initially, teams were to have been composed entirely of British or Americans. Once an assessment was made of the risks involved, however, the planners decided to include the French, Belgians, and Dutch. They surmised, correctly as it turned out, that having a native officer on the team would improve its ability to establish a good working relationship with the resistance groups.<sup>4</sup>

One aspect of the Jedburgh plan was not as successful. This concerns the lack of communications between the Jedburgh teams in the field and the conventional ground force. There was no doubt some concern on the part

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<sup>3</sup>Letter from Major William E. Colby, as Commander, Norso Group, Scandinavian Section, SO Branch, OSS ETOUSA, to Chief, SO Branch, 23 May 1945 (photocopy provided to the author by Mr. Colby, 19 September 1989). Following his experience as an officer on Jedburgh team BRUCE in France, Major Colby led a Norwegian Operational Group on a mission in occupied Norway.

<sup>4</sup>OSS, SO WD, Vol. 4, Book I, xxxi.

of the planners that a more direct command, control, and communications relationship would result in misuse of the teams. This concern may have been valid. But such misuse would probably not have resulted through the malicious waste or misapplication of Jedburgh teams by an army commander. Rather, it would have been caused by an ignorance of the capabilities and limitations of the partisans and of the Jedburghs. But one of the purposes of the SF detachments at army headquarters was to provide just that kind of counsel. The requirement for the field army commander's request for support to go to London and from London to the Jedburgh team in the field, and the reverse if a response was required, must have resulted in lost opportunities.

Courage is a word that repeatedly comes to mind when reading of those involved in the Jedburgh project. There was the courage of those who challenged traditional military thinking. There was the courage shown by the civilian and military leaders who agreed to deploy teams such as the Jedburghs, with all the military and political risks that involved. And, of course, the courageous acts of the Jedburghs themselves are self evident. These were indeed special men. Each volunteered for a secret mission, knowing that if he succeeded, his valor would be kept classified; and if captured, he would be shot with equal anonymity. But now their stories can be told, and their operations should

be the subject of future study by anyone wishing to broaden his understanding of the military art.

APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

### JEDBURGH TASKS AND TRAINING PRIORITIES

#### I. TRAINING PRIORITY A.

1. Rail cutting.
2. Attacks on enemy road vehicles and transport parks.
3. Misdirection and dislocation of road traffic.
4. Delay and dislocation of Panzer divisions.

#### II. TRAINING PRIORITY B.

1. Destruction of telecommunications.
2. Liquidation of enemy commands and staffs.
3. Interference with enemy logistics.
4. Attacks on Luftwaffe.

#### III. TRAINING PRIORITY C.

1. Destruction of electric power facilities used for military purposes.
2. Demolition of minor bridges, or major bridges already prepared for demolition by the enemy.
3. Prevention of demolitions by the enemy.
4. Observation and reporting of enemy positions, headquarters, military supply dumps, and installations.

IV. TRAINING PRIORITY D.

1. Attacks on railway facilities such as roundhouses and turntables.

2. Attacks on railway engines and rolling stock, without causing long-term damage.

SOURCE: "Basic Directive on Jedburghs, Prepared Jointly by SOE/SO," December 1943, copy in OSS, SO WD, Vol. 12, pages 38-39.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

STAFF OF THE JEDBURGH TRAINING SCHOOL (AREA D)

MILTON HALL (5 FEBRUARY - 5 JUNE 1944)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
Commandant	LTC Frank V. Spooner	British Army
	LTC G. Richard Musgrave (from 8 April)	British Army
Deputy Commandant	MAJ Horace W. Fuller*	U.S.M.C.
	MAJ Richard V. McLallen (from 3 May)	U.S. Army
Adjutant	MAJ H. L. Trebilcock	British Army
Area Admin Officer	CPT Steve W. Thornton, Jr.	U.S. Army
Accounts Officer	CPT A. W. Tew	British Army
Medical Officer	CPT George McCoy	U.S. Army
G-2	MAJ R. D. Guthrie*	British Army
Signal Officer	CPT J. G. Lewis	British Army
Quartermaster	CPT E. T. Robinson	British Army
Transport Officer	CPT J. A. Revell	British Army
PX Officer	1LT Lucien Wante	U.S. Army
	CPT Leland White (from 22 May)	U.S. Army
Cdr, Hqs. Company	MAJ John Sherwood	British Army
Cdr, A Company	MAJ Harry A. Dorsey*	U.S. Army
Cdr, B Company	MAJ M. C. M. Crosby*	British Army
Cdr, C Company	MAJ B. W. Gilmour	British Army

Chief Instructor	MAJ Oliver H. Brown*	British Army
Dep Ch Instructor	MAJ Richard V. McLallen	U.S. Army
Instructor	MAJ W. Sykes	British Army
Instructor	CPT S. Lasarewitz	British Army
Instructor	CPT A. Thornton	British Army
Instructor	CPT C. M. Ogden-Smith*	British Army
Instructor	CPT R. Fenton*	British Army
Instructor	CPT J. J. Marchant*	British Army
Instructor	CPT D. J. Nielson*	British Army
Instructor	CPT D. L. Stern*	British Army
Instructor	CPT A. W. C. Coomber*	British Army
Instructor	CPT Victor A. Gough*	British Army
Instructor	CPT J. De W. Waller*	British Army
Instructor	CPT Cyrus E. Maniere, Jr.*	U.S. Army
Instructor	CPT William B. Dreux*	U.S. Army
Instructor	CPT Bernard M. W. Knox*	U.S. Army
Instructor	CPT Philip W. Donovan*	U.S. Army
Instructor	CPT A. Cooper	British Army
Instructor	CPT G. S. Kenney	British Army
Instructor	LT L. Young	British Army
Instructor	LT Arthur du P. Denning*	British Army
Instructor	1LT I. Isaac*	British Army
Instructor	1LT Lawrence E. Swank*	U.S. Army
Instructor	1LT Aaron Bank*	U.S. Army
Instructor	1LT Lucien E. Conein*	U.S. Army

Instructor	LT R. Kirkby	British Army
Instructor	1LT Paul Brightman	U.S. Army
Instructor	1LT Gregory A. Di Giovanni	U.S. Army

\*Indicates those who deployed as members of Jedburgh teams.

SOURCE: "OSS/London: Special Operations Branch War Diaries", 1945 (Frederick, MD, 1985), Vol. 4: "Jedburghs", Book I, 1-3; Vol. 9: "Training", 9.

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

LONDON JEDBURGH STAFF

BAKER STREET (5 FEBRUARY - 5 JUNE 1944)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
Co-Director	MAJ F. O'Brien LTC Carleton-Smith (from March)	British Army British Army
Co-Director	MAJ Henry B. Coxe, Jr.	U.S. Army
Chief, Training Sec	MAJ John Tyson	U.S. Army
Admin Officer	CPT E. Buck	F.A.N.Y.
Briefing Officer	MAJ John W. Jaycox	U.S. Army
Briefing Officer	MAJ J. V. A. Horton	British Army
Briefing Officer	MAJ F. L. Young	British Army
Briefing Officer	CPT Francis L. Coolidge	U.S. Army
Briefing Officer	LT Andre V. Wastin	French Army

SOURCE: "OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries", Vol. 4: "Jedburghs", 1945 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), Book I, 3-4.

APPENDIX D

## APPENDIX D

### THE TEAMS

The following data on Jedburgh team composition was compiled from numerous sources, primarily the "OSS/London Special Operations Branch War Diaries", Volume 4: "Jedburghs", published on microfilm by University Publications of America, Inc., Frederick, Maryland, 1985. Most of the French members' noms-de-guerre were provided by Mr. Joe de Francesco.

#### MISSION

<u>RANK<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)</u>	<u>CODENAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
<b>TEAM ALAN</b>			
CPT	Robert Toussaint (Andre Gairaud)	ARIEGE	Fr
CPT	Stanley M. Cannicott	PEMBROKE	U.K.
S/LT <sup>2</sup>	Robert Clause (Francis de Heysen)	KRONER	Fr
<b>TEAM ALASTAIR</b>			
MAJ	Oliver H. Brown	KENT	U.K.
LT	Rene Karriere (R. Maitre)	DONEGALL	Fr
SGT	G.N. Smith	LINCOLN	U.K.
<b>TEAM ALEC</b>			
1LT	George C. Thomson	CROMARTY	U.S.
LT	A. Bardes (B. Allais)*	OXFORD	Fr
SSG	John A. White	COLORADO	U.S.
<b>TEAM ALEXANDER</b>			
LT	Rene de la Tousche (Richard Thouville)	LEIX	Fr
1LT	Stewart J.O. Alsop	RONA	U.S.
1SG	Norman R. Franklin	CORK	U.S.
<b>TEAM ALFRED</b>			
CPT	L.D. MacDougall	ARGYLL	U.K.
LT	Jean-Pierre Herenguel (G. de Wavrant)	AUDE	Fr
SGT	A.W. Key	WAMPUM	U.K.
<b>TEAM AMMONIA</b>			
CPT	Benton McDonald Austin	GASPARD	U.S.
CPT	Raymond LeCompte (R. Compte)	LUDOVIC	Fr
SGT	Jacob B. Berlin	MARCIAL	U.S.
LT	(Jean Verneuil)	MARCELIN	Fr

## MISSION

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)</u>	<u>CODENAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
TEAM ANDREW			
MAJ	A.H.S. Coombe-Tennant	RUPEL	U.K.
LT	E. Comte d'Oultrement	DEMER	Belg
SGT	F. Harrison	NETHE	U.K.
TEAM ANDY			
MAJ	R.A. Parkinson	FIFE	U.K.
MAJ	Verneuil (J. Vermeulen)	CARLOW	Fr
SGT	R. Loosmore	LUNDY	U.K.
TEAM ANTHONY			
1LT	Mason B. Starring	NEBRASKA	U.S.
CPT	Maurice Stasse (C. Deprez)	PERTH	Fr
TSG	John L. Bradner	PFENNIG	U.S.
TEAM ARCHIBALD			
MAJ	Arthur du P. Denning	CUMBERLAND	U.K.
LT	Francois Costes (A. Montlac)	MONTGOMERY	Fr
MSG	Roger L. Pierre	SEN	U.S.
TEAM ARNOLD			
CPT	M. de Carville (M. Coudray)	SUSSEX	Fr
LT	J.H.F. Monahan	LONDONDERRY	U.K.
SGT	A. de Ville	ESCUDO	U.K.
TEAM ARTHUR			
CPT	Cecil F. Mynatt, Jr.**	CONNECTICUT	U.S.
S/LT	Xavier Humblet (Louis Hache)	SMABRERE	Fr
TSG	Albert V. Bacik	MILLIEME	U.S.
TEAM AUBREY			
CPT	Godfrey Marchant	RUTLAND	U.K.
LT	A. Chaigneau (J. Telmon)*	KILDARE	Fr
SGT	Ivar Hooker	THALER	U.K.
TEAM AUGUSTUS			
MAJ	John H. Bonsall*	ARIZONA	U.S.
CPT	J. Delwich (J. Dechville)*	HERAULT	Fr
TSG	Roger E. Cote*	INDIANA	U.S.
TEAM BASIL			
CPT	R. Riviere (R. Raincourt)	AMBLEVE	Fr
CPT	T.A. Carew	SUTHERLAND	U.K.
TSG	John L. Stoyka	ORE	U.S.
TEAM BENJAMIN			
MAJ	A.J. Forrest	STIRLING	U.K.
LT	Paul Moniez (P. Marchand)	ULSTER	Fr
S/LT	H. Camiski (J. Camouin)	SERRE	Fr

## MISSION

RANK <sup>1</sup>	NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)	CODENAME	NATIONALITY
TEAM BERNARD			
CPT	J. de W. Waller	WIRVERARY	U.K.
CPT	Etienne Nasica (E. Prato)	ARGENS	Fr
SGT	C.M. Bassett	LANCASHIRE	U.K.
TEAM BRIAN			
MAJ	F. Johnston	ILLINOIS	U.K.
CPT	Roger Cretin (R. Francomte)	ORKNEY	Fr
SGT	N.A. Smith	LIRA	U.K.
TEAM BRUCE			
MAJ	William E. Colby	BERKSHIRE	U.S.
LT	Camille M. LeLong (Jacques Favel)	GALWAY	Fr
S/LT	Louis Giry (Roger Villebois)	PIASTRE	Fr
TEAM BUNNY			
CPT	J.F.D. Radice*	PESO	U.K.
LT	Maurice Geminel (M. Gerville)	YEN	Fr
SGT	J. Chambers	DRACHMA	U.K.
TEAM BUGATTI			
MAJ	Horace W. Fuller	KANSUL	U.S.
CPT	Guy de la Roche (Rocher)	HOPEI	Fr
S/LT	Martial Sigaud (J. Guillemot)*	CHEKIANG	Fr
TEAM CECIL			
MAJ	D.J. Nielson	DELAWARE	U.K.
CPT	Alfred Keser (A. Frayant)	LYS	Fr
SGT	R. Wilde	CENTAVO	U.K.
TEAM CEDRIC			
CPT	Douglas D. Bazata**	VESDRE	U.S.
CPT	Louis Lesne (F. Chapel)	DENDRE	Fr
TSG	Richard C. Floyd	GULDER	U.S.
TEAM CHLOROFORM			
CPT	Jacques Martin (Jacques Martino)	JOSHUA	Fr
1LT	Henry D. McIntosh	LIONEL	U.S.
CCH	Jean Sassi (J.H. Nicole)	LATIMER	Fr
TEAM CHRYSLER			
CPT	Cyril H. Sell	ELIE	U.K.
CPT	Paul L. Aussaresses (Jean Soual)	BAZIN	Fr
SGT	Ronald E. Chatten	ARTUS	U.K.
TEAM CINNAMON			
CPT	R. Harcourt	LOUIS	U.K.
CPT	Lespinasse Fonsegrive (F.L. Ferandon)	ORTHON	Fr
LT	Jacques Morineau (J.G. Maurin)	LUC	Fr

MISSION			
RANK <sup>1</sup>	NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)	CODENAME	NATIONALITY
TEAM CITROEN			
CPT	J.E. Saint C. Smallwood	ANNE	U.K.
CPT	Pierre Bloch (Rene Alcee)	LAURENT	Fr
SGT	F.A. Bailey	RETIF	U.K.
TEAM CLARENCE			
CPT	Arie Dirk Bestebreurtje (Whitfield)		Neth
1LT	George M. Verhaeghe**		U.S.
TSG	Willard W. Beynon		U.S.
TEAM CLAUDE			
1LT	Harvey Allan Todd**		U.S.
CPT	Jaap Groenewoed*		Neth
LT	M.N.K. Knottenbelt		Neth
TSG	Carl A. Scott#		U.S.
TEAM COLLODION/LOCH			
CPT	H. Hall	AUGUSTINE	U.K.
LT	Henri Marsaudon (P. Morgan)	BENOIT	Fr
SGT	Theodore Baumgold	JULES	U.S.
TEAM DANIEL			
CPT	K.D. Bennett	APOTRE	U.K.
LT	Albert P. de Schonen	ARGENTIER	Fr
SGT	Ron Brierley	FLORIN	U.K.
TEAM DANIEL II			
MAJ	R.K. Wilson		U.K.
LT	Du Bois		Neth <sup>3</sup>
SGT	G.W. Mason		U.K.
SGT	Fokker		Neth
TEAM DANIEL III			
MAJ	R.K. Wilson		U.K.
LT	Du Bois		Neth
SGT	G.W. Mason		U.K.
SGT	Fokker		Neth
TEAM DESMOND			
CPT	William H. Pietsch, Jr.	SKERRY	U.S.
CPT	Gilles Maunoury (Henri Bourriot)	SHETLAND	Fr
MSG	Robert R. Baird	HAMPSHIRE	U.S.
TEAM DODGE			
MAJ	Cyrus E. Maniere, Jr.**	RUPERT	U.S.
SGT	L.T. du Rocher	OSWALD	Can

MISSION			
RANK <sup>1</sup>	NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)	CODENAME	NATIONALITY
TEAM DOUGLAS			
CPT	Richard A. Rubinstein	AUGURE	U.K.
LT	Jean Roblot (J. Ronglou)	ANACHORERE	Fr
SGT	J.D. Raven	HALF CROWN	U.K.
TEAM DOUGLAS II			
CPT	Richard A. Rubinstein	AUGURE	U.K.
CPT	Jean Roblot (J. Ronglou)*	ANACHORERE	Fr
TSG	John T. Van Hart	HALF CROWN	U.S.
TEAM DUDLEY			
MAJ	Henk Brinkgreve*		Neth
MAJ	John M. Olmsted**		U.S.
SGT	John Austin*		U.K.
TEAM EDWARD			
CPT	Jaap Staal		Neth
CPT	McCord Sollenberger		U.S.
CPT	R. Mills		U.K.
2LT	L. Willmott		U.K.
SGT	James R. Billingsley		U.S.
TEAM EPHEDRINE			
1LT	Lawrence E. Swank*	GANTOR	U.S.
LT	Louis Donnard (L. Rabeau)	JULIEN	Fr
CPL	(J. Bourgoin)	LEON	Fr
TEAM FELIX			
CPT	Jean Souquet (J. Kernevel)	CARNAVON	Fr
CPT	J.J. Marchant	SOMERSET	U.K.
SGT	P.M. Calvin	MIDDLESEX	U.K.
TEAM FRANCIS			
MAJ	C.M. Ogden-Smith*	DORSET	U.K.
LT	Guy le Borgne (Guy le Zachmeur)	DURANCE	Fr
SGT	A.J. Dallow	GROAT	U.K.
TEAM FRANK			
CPT	I. Isaac	WESTMORELAND	U.K.
LT	A. Martelli (A. Massoni)	DUMBARTON	Fr
SGT	T. Henney	CHESHIRE	U.K.
TEAM FREDERICK			
MAJ	A.W. Wise	KINROS	U.K.
S/LT	Paul Bloch-Auroch (P. Aguirec)	VIRE	Fr
MSG	Robert R. Kehoe	PESETA	U.S.

## MISSION

RANK <sup>1</sup>	NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)	CODENAME	NATIONALITY
TEAM GAVIN			
MAJ	Joseph Jean Carbuccia(Daniel Jean-Claude)	SHILLING	Fr
CPT	William B. Dreux	SIXPENCE	U.S.
S/LT	Paul Valentini (G. Masson)	HALFPENNY	Fr
TEAM GEORGE			
CPT	Philippe Ragueneau (P. Erard)	SAVE	Fr
CPT	Paul Cyr	WIGTON	U.S.
SGT	Pierre Gay (Christien Lejeune)	RUPEE	Fr
TEAM GEORGE II			
CPT	Philippe Ragueneau (P. Erard)	SAVE	Fr
CPT	Paul Cyr	WIGTON	U.S.
S/LT	Pierre Gay (Christien Lejeune)*	RUPEE	Fr
TEAM GERALD			
CPT	Stephen J. Knerly	NORFOLK	U.S.
LT	Claude l'Herbette (Jean Luc Beaumont)	SUFFOLK	Fr
LSG	Berent E. Friele, Jr.	SELKIRK	U.S.
TEAM GILBERT			
CPT	C.G. Blathwayt	SURREY	U.K.
LT	Paul Carron de la Carriere (P. Charron)	ARDECHE	Fr
SGT	N. Wood	DOUBLOON	U.K.
TEAM GILES			
CPT	Bernard M.W. Knox	KENTUCKY	U.S.
CPT	Paul Grall (Paul Lebel)	LOIRE	Fr
SGT	Gordon H. Tack	TICKIE	U.K.
TEAM GODFREY			
1LT	Ian Forbes	RHODE ISLAND	U.S.
LT	Pierre Laval (Jacques Morhange)	ROSCOMMON	Fr
SGT	Frank A. Hanson	ROXBURGH	U.S.
TEAM GRAHAM			
MAJ	M.C.M. Crosby	HUGE	U.K.
CPT	Pierre Gavet (P. Gouvet)	CRISPIN	Fr
LSG	William H. Adams [did not deploy with team]		U.S.
TEAM GREGORY			
CPT	K.D. Bennett	APOTRE	U.K.
CPT	Albert de Schonen (P. de Schonen)	ARGENTIER	Fr
SGT	Ron Brierley	FLORIN	U.K.
TEAM GUY			
CPT	Andre Duron (A. Dhomas)	DRONNE	Fr
CPT	A.A. Trofimov	GIRONDE	U.K.
S/LT	Roger Groult (J. Deschamps)	DORDOGNE	Fr

## MISSION

<u>RANK<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)</u>	<u>CODENAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
TEAM HAMISH			
1LT	Robert M. Anstett	ALABAMA	U.S.
LT	Rene Schmitt (Lucien Blachere)	LOUISIANA	Fr
SGT	Lee J. Watters	KANSAS	U.S.
TEAM HAROLD			
MAJ	V.E. Whitty	ROSS	U.K.
LT	Pierre Jolliet (Pierre Rimbaut)	TYRONE	Fr
SGT	Harry Verlander	SLIGO	U.K.
TEAM HARRY			
CPT	D.D. Guthrie	DENBY	U.K.
LT	Pierre Rousset (P.E. Dupont)	GAPEAU	Fr
2CL	Rene Couture (R. Legrand)	CENTIME	Fr
TEAM HENRY			
1LT	Raymond E. Moore	NEW MEXICO	U.S.
CPT	Stephane Jean-Moncler (S. Montcler)	ANGLESEY	Fr
TSG	Vincent M. Rocca	WEST VIRGINIA	U.S.
TEAM HILARY			
LT	Edgar Mautaint (E. Marchant)	CHARENTE	Fr
1LT	Philip H. Chadbourn, Jr.	NEVADA	U.S.
S/LT	Roger Hervouet (R. Pariselle)	KOPEK	Fr
TEAM HORACE			
MAJ	John W. Summers	WYOMING	U.S.
LT	Georges Leclercq (C. Levalois)	SOMME	Fr
T/3	William F. Zielski, Jr.	DIME	U.S.
TEAM HUGH			
CPT	L. l'Helgouach (L. Legrand)	FRANC	Fr
CPT	W.R. Crawshay	CROWN	U.K.
CC	Rene Meyer (Robert Mersiol)	YONNE	Fr
TEAM IAN			
MAJ	John J. Gildee, Jr.	OKLAHOMA	U.S.
LT	Alex Desfarges (Y. Deslorme)	MAINE	Fr
SGT	Lucien J. Bourgoin*	MAYO	U.S.
TEAM IVOR			
CPT	J.H. Cox	MONMOUTH	U.K.
LT	Robert Colin (Y.M. Dantes)	SELUNE	Fr
1SG	Lewis F. Goddard*	OREGON	U.S.
TEAM JACOB			
CPT	Victor A. Gough*	ARRAN	U.K.
LT	Maurice Boissarie (G. Baraud)*	CONNAUGHT	Fr
SGT	Ken Seymour	SKYE	U.K.

## MISSION

<u>RANK<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)</u>	<u>CODENAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
TEAM JAMES			
1LT	John K. Singlaub <sup>++</sup>	MISSISSIPPI	U.S.
LT	Jacques de Penguilly (D. Leb)	MICHIGAN	Fr
TSG	Anthony J. Denneau	MASSACHUSETTS	U.S.
TEAM JEREMY			
CPT	George M. Hallowes	AIMABLE	U.K.
CPT	Henri Giese (H. Fontcroise)	FONTCROISE	Fr
SGT	R.A. Leney	FERNE	U.K.
TEAM JIM			
CPT	Philip W. Donovan	PENNSYLVANIA	U.S.
LT	Jose A. de Francesco (Jean Lavige)	LEITRIM	Fr
TSG	Michael F. Henely	WEXFORD	U.S.
TEAM JOHN			
CPT	D.L. Stern	BEAU	U.K.
ASP <sup>4</sup>	Maurice de Galbert (J. le Rocher)	LUCIDE	Fr
SGT	D. Gibbs	SILENCIEUX	U.K.
TEAM JUDE			
CPT	W.L.O. Evans	GLAMORGAN	U.K.
CPT	Jean Larrieu (J. Lavisme)	RENCE	Fr
SGT	A.E. Holdham	GUINEA	U.K.
TEAM JULIAN			
MAJ	A.H. Clutton	STAFFORD	Safr
LT	Marcel Vermot (Joseph Brouillard)	VERMONT	Fr
CQMS	T.S. Menzies	ESSEX	U.K.
TEAM JULIAN II			
CPT	(J. Kennevel)	CARNAVON	Fr
S/LT	Scherrer (Sauvage)		Fr
S/LT	Rene Meyer (Robert Mersioll)	YONNE	Fr
LT	Paul Valentini (Masson)		Fr
TEAM LEE			
CPT	Charles E. Brown III	PICE	U.S.
LT	Paul Angoulvent (N. Viguiier)*	SOUS	Fr
S/LT	Maurice Pirat (Andre Chevalier)	REIS	Fr
TEAM MARK			
LT	Joannes Thevenet (F.G. de Thevenet)	SYMPATHIQUE	Fr
1LT	Lucien E. Conein	INTEREADE	U.S.
SGT	James J. Carpenter	LESTER	U.S.

## MISSION

<u>RANK<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)</u>	<u>CODENAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
TEAM MARTIN			
CPT	T.A. Mellows*	BLASE	U.K.
LT	Georges Redonnet (G. Remond)	SUBSTANTIE	Fr
SGT	N.E.S. Carey	PLACIDE	U.K.
TEAM MASQUE			
CPT	Nelson E. Guillot	HARMONIEUX	U.S.
LT	Jacques Bouvery (J. Gramont)	SUCCULENT	Fr
SGT	Francis M. Poche, Jr.	IDEAL	U.S.
TEAM MAURICE			
CPT	Charles M. Carman, Jr.	UTAH	U.S.
LT	Hubert Reveilhac (Hubert Dumesnil)	VIRGINIA	Fr
TSG	Francis J. Cole	GEORGIA	U.S.
TEAM MILES			
CPT	Everett T. Allen	LIBRE	U.S.
ASP	Rene Esteve (Pierre Fourcade)	LUMINEUX	Fr
SGT	Arthur Gruen	FIDELE	U.S.
TEAM MINARET			
MAJ	L.C.M. Hartley-Sharpe	EDMOND	U.K.
CPT	P. Cros (Mutin) [did not deploy with team]		Fr
SGT	John W. Ellis	ARSENE	U.K.
TEAM MONOCLE			
CPT	J. Fiardo (J. Tozel)	IMMENSE	Fr
1LT	Ray H. Foster	SOLIDE	U.S.
SGT	Robert J. Anderson	RAIEUX	U.S.
TEAM NICHOLAS			
CPT	J.C.C. Maude	LEICESTER	U.K.
LT	Henri Penin (H. Puget)	BREAKNOCK	Fr
SGT	M.A. Whittle	NORTHUMBERLAND	U.K.
TEAM NORMAN			
LT	Konrad C. Dillow	MINNESOTA	U.S.
LT	Marc Lautier (Frederic Bataille)	WASHINGTON	Fr
LSG	Lucien E. LaJeunesse	TENNESSEE	U.S.
TEAM NOVOCAINE			
1LT	Charles J. Gennerich	MATHIEU	U.S.
LT	Jean Yves Pronost (Jean Yves LeLann)	HERVE	Fr
SGT	William T. Thompson	GILLES	U.S.
TEAM PACKARD			
CPT	Aaron Bank	CHECHWAN	U.S.
CPT	Henri Denis (C. Boineau)	FUKIEN	Fr
LT	F. Montfort	FORMOSA	U.K.

## MISSION

RANK <sup>1</sup>	NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)	CODENAME	NATIONALITY
TEAM PAUL			
MAJ	E.H.M. Hood	SHROPSHIRE	U.K.
LT	Michel Vallee (F. Cormier)	DURTHE	Fr
SGT	K.J.W. Brown	LIMERICK	U.K.
TEAM QUENTIN			
CPT	R.S. Fenton	CORNWALL	U.K.
LT	Jean Raux (J. Lasserre)	WICKLOW	Fr
SGT	D. Dawson	MERIONETH	U.K.
TEAM QUININE			
MAJ	R. Tommy MacPherson	ANSELME	U.K.
ASP	Michel de Bourbon Parme (Maurice Bourdon)	ARISTIDE	Fr
SGT	O. Brown	FELICIEN	U.K.
TEAM RAYMOND			
CPT	DeHosses (R. Waguët)	WATERFORD	Fr
LT	H. Cadilhac (H. Chaulais)	GLOUCESTER	Fr
SGT	W. Adams	KINCARDINE	U.K.
TEAM RODERICK			
CPT	Jean Preciozi (A. Paoli)	NAIRN	Fr
LT	William C. Boggs	NEW HAMPSHIRE	U.S.
SGT	Charles Mersereau	STRONSAY	U.S.
TEAM RONALD			
1LT	Shirly Ray Trumps <sup>++</sup>	BOURSIER	U.S.
LT	Georges Desseilligny (J. Dartigues)	BOUTTON	Fr
TSG	Elmer B. Esch	POUND	U.S.
TEAM RUPERT/PHILIP			
CPT	J. Liberos (J.G. de Rouen)	KINTYRE	Fr
1LT	Robert A. Lucas	CAITHNESS	U.S.
S3C	Joseph M. Gergat <sup>5</sup>	LEINSTER	U.S.
TEAM SCEPTRE			
1LT	Walter C. Hanna, Jr.	VAILLANT	U.S.
LT	Francois Franceschi (Tevenac)	INTENSE	Fr
MSG	Howard V. Palmer	DEVOUX	U.S.
TEAM SCION			
MAJ	O.P. Grenfell	SCINTILLATING	U.K.
LT	Roger Gruppo (G. Revard)	VIF	Fr
SGT	T. Cain	VIBRANT	U.K.
TEAM SIMON			
CPT	A.W.C. Coomber	COUSTARD	U.K.
CPT	Maurice Fouere (M. Fontaine)	FERNARD	Fr
LAC	C. Somers	STEPHANE	U.K.

## MISSION

<u>RANK</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>NAME (NOM-DE-GUERRE)</u>	<u>CODENAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
TEAM STANLEY			
CPT	Oswin E. Craster	YORKSHIRE	U.K.
LT	Robert Cantais (Robert Carliere)	MEATH	Fr
SGT	E. Jack Grinham	WORCESTERSHIRE	U.K.
TEAM STANLEY II			
CPT	Arie Dirk Bestebreurtje (Whitfield)		Neth
CPT	P. Vickery		U.K.
TSG	Willard W. Beynon		U.S.
TEAM TIMOTHY			
CPT	L. Moutte (L. Ambel)	NESQUE	Fr
1LT	Robert G. Munding	MARCELIN	U.S.
1LT	Robert E. Heyns	DYLE	U.S.
1SG	Donald A. Spears	ESCAUT	U.S.
TEAM TONY			
MAJ	Robert K. Montgomery	DOLLAR	U.S.
LT	Lucien Paris (Mark de Vailly)	ECY	Fr
TSG	John E. McGowan	QUARTER	U.S.
TEAM VEGAMIN			
MAJ	H. Neil Marten	CUTHBERT	U.K.
CPT	Gaston Vuchot (C.L. Noir)	DEREK	Fr
SGT	D. Gardner*	ERNEST	U.K.
TEAM WILLYS			
CPT	John C. Montague	HONAN	U.K.
CPT	G. Marchal (P. J. Granier)	SIMON	Fr
SGT	F.A. Cornick	CHANSI	U.K.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Rank indicated is that held at time of team's deployment.  
<sup>2</sup>Sous-lieutenant (second lieutenant).  
<sup>3</sup>Official reports at times list Du Bois as a Dutch officer; at other times he is listed as a British officer. The author has been unable to determine which is correct.  
<sup>4</sup>Aspirant (officer cadet).  
<sup>5</sup>Seaman 3rd Class (U.S. Navy) Gergat's name is spelled "Grgat" in official records. The family of Mr. Gergat, who is now deceased, provided this as the correct spelling.

- \*Killed in action  
 †Died of wounds  
 ††Wounded in action  
 ‡Missing in action  
 ‡‡Prisoner of war

APPENDIX E

## APPENDIX E

### GLOSSARY\*

ABC	American-British Conversations, January-March 1941.
ADMR	Assistant Delege Militaire Regional (Assistant Regional Military Delegate, FFI).
AFHQ	Allied Force Headquarters, combined Allied headquarters in North Africa.
Agent	Specially trained man [or woman] dropped behind enemy lines to obtain information, commit acts of sabotage and organize resistance (SO WD, Vol. I).
Anvil	Original codename for invasion of southern France, later changed to DRAGOON.
AOS	Air Operations Section (OSS).
Arc	Code name for General Chaban, Commandant of the FFI (SO WD, Vol. I, 119).
Arcadia	U.S.-British conference held in Washington, December 1941-January 1942.
Area "A"	OSS holding and training area (demolitions and weapons), in Virginia.
Area "B"	OSS holding area in Maryland.
Area "D"	Milton Hall, Jedburgh Training School near Peterborough, England.
Area "E"	OSS training school for SI and SO in Maryland.

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\*Not included here are the codenames for the Jedburgh teams and for each member of those teams. These codenames are included in the listing of Jedburgh teams at Appendix D.

Area "F" OSS area for CG training in Maryland.

Area "G" OSS maritime training school at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts.

Area "H" SO packing station at Holme, England, for supplies to be dropped to resistance groups.

AS Armee Secrete (Secret Army), French resistance group.

Auxiliary In unconventional warfare, that element of the resistance force established to provide the organized civilian support of the resistance movement (FM 100-25).

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation.

BCOS British Chiefs of Staff, British counterpart to American JCS.

BCRA Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Central Office for Intelligence and Action), French liaison organization between General de Gaulle and the Allied Powers (SO WD, Vol. 3, Bk XIII, Glossary).

BCRAL or BRAL Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action Londres (Central Office for Intelligence and Action, London), French agency in the UK jointly responsible with SOE and OSS for clandestine activity in France (SO WD, Vol. 3, Bk XIII, Glossary).

BEW Board of Economic Warfare (British).

Bigot Special security clearance caveat for future operations.

BOA Bureau d'Operations Aeriennes (Bureau of Air Operations), distributors of store dropping operations in the north of France (SO WD, Vol. 3, Bk XIII, Glossary).

Bolero Pre-invasion buildup of American forces in the United Kingdom.

Bowsprit Code for a 24-hour delay in execution of Operation OVERLORD.

BRAL Bureau de Recherches et d'Action a Londres  
(Office for Research and Action in London).

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CDL Comites Departementaux de Liberation  
(Departmental Liberation Committees).

CDLL Ceux de la Liberation (Those of the  
Liberation), resistance group in northern  
France.

CDLR Ceux de la Resistance (Those of the  
Resistance), resistance group in northern  
France.

CFLN Comite Francaise de Liberation Nationale  
(French Committee of National Liberation).

CIC Counter-Intelligence Corps (US Army).

CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

CinC Commander in Chief.

Circuit Group composed of an organizer, his  
lieutenant, a W/T operator and a small  
number of subordinates, infiltrated into a  
specific area of France to train, supply and  
direct locally recruited saboteurs (SO WD,  
Vol. 3, Bk XIII, Glossary).

CLN Comite Liberation Nationale (National  
Liberation Committee), French resistance  
organization.

CND Confrerie de Notre-Dame, French resistance  
group.

CNF Comite National Francais (French National  
Committee), French resistance group.

CNR Conseil National de la Resistance (National  
Council of the Resistance), in entire  
control of resistance matters in France and  
directly responsible to CFLN in Algiers (SO  
WD, Vol. 3, Bk XIII, Glossary).

COHQ Combined Operations Headquarters.

COI Coordinator of Information (predecessor of  
OSS).

COMAC Comite d'Action (Action Committee).

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan.

CPL Comite Parisien de Liberation (Paris Committee of Liberation), French resistance group.

D Section MI-6 sabotage section.

DDOD(I) Deputy Director, Operations Division (Irregular) (SOE).

DF Section SOE escape and evasion section.

D/F Direction-finding.

DGER Direction Generale des Etudes et Recherches (successor to BCRA).

DMR Delege Militaire Regional (Regional Military Delegate, FFI).

DZ Drop zone.

EMFFI Etat-major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (General Staff of the French Forces of the Interior), headquarters of the FFI.

ETO European Theater of Operations.

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, United States Army.

Eureka Allied conference at Tehran, November 1943.

F Section Section of the Western European Directorate entirely controlled by SOE/SO and operating independently of the FFI, which introduced and directed under-cover agents into France (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).

Fana, or FN Front National, French resistance group.

FANY Female Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry.

FCNL French Committee of National Liberation.

FFC Forces Francaises Combattantes (Fighting French).

FFCM                    Forces Francaises Combattantes  
Metropolitaines (Metropolitan Fighting  
French).

FFI                    Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (French  
Forces of the Interior).

FFL                    Forces Francaises Libres (Free French).

FN                    Front National (National Front), French  
resistance group.

Fortitude            Cover plan for the invasion of Normandy  
directed against the Pas de Calais area and  
northern and southern Norway (SO WD, Vol. 2,  
Glossary).

FTP                   Franc Tireurs et Partisans (Irregulars and  
Partisans), French communist resistance  
group.

FUSA                   First United States Army.

FUSAG                   First United States Army Group.

GC&CS                Government Code and Cipher School.

Gestapo                Geheime Staats Polizei (Secret State Police,  
German).

GF                    Groupes Francs (Irregular Groups).

GM                    Gardes Mobiles.

GMR                    Groupes Mobiles de Reserve, Vichy police.

GPRF                   Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique  
Francaise (Provisional Government of the  
French Republic).

GS(R)                General Staff (Research).

Guerrilla  
Force                A group of irregular, predominantly  
indigenous personnel organized along  
military lines to conduct military and  
paramilitary operations in enemy-held,  
hostile, or denied territory. (The overt  
element of the resistance force.) (JCS Pub  
3-05).

Guerrilla Warfare Military and paramilitary combat operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces (JCS Pub 3-05).

Irregular Forces Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces (JCS Pub 1-02).

JC Jeunesse Communiste.

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (American).

J-E Joan-Eleanor (plane-to-ground radio system).

Jedburgh British and American code name for specially trained 3-men team to work with resistance units behind the enemy lines (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).

Levee Code name for joint [combined] SOE/SC Command Post Exercise held March 1944, in which the Americans acted as the SO Staffs with the field armies and the British ran the control (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).

LZ Landing zone.

Maquis Name given to French guerrilla bands. Originally was given to high ground in southeastern France covered with scrub growth in which French guerrilla operated and from which they took the name (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).

Maquis Plan Plan to organize resistance in France through tripartite missions (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).

Massingham Cover name for SOE, North Africa (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).

MedTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

MEW Ministry of Economic Warfare (British).

MI-5 British military intelligence organization for internal security.

MI-6 British military intelligence organization for foreign intelligence.

Mi-9                    British military intelligence organization for assisted escape and evasion.

Milice                    French police organization which collaborated with the Germans.

Mission                    (As in "Special Allied Mission") Group composed of one American, one British, and one French officer, together with W/T operators and sometimes medical and intelligence officers, infiltrated into a specific area of France to act in an advisory capacity to the local chief of the district in organization and training of the Maquis, but not to take command of the district (SO WD, Vol. 3, Bk XIII, Glossary).

Mitchell Plan            Code name of plan to provide "safe houses" in France for the reception of Jedburgh teams (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).

MLF                        Mouvement pour la Liberation Francaise (Movement for the Liberation of France), French resistance group.

MLN                        Mouvement de Liberation Nationale (Movement of National Liberation), French resistance organization.

MO                         Morale Operations branch (OSS).

MOI                        Ministry of Information (British).

MTO                        Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

MTOUSA                    Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army.

MU                         Maritime Unit (OSS).

MUR                        Mouvements Unis de la Resistance (United Resistance Movement), French coalition resistance group.

Musgrave                 SFHQ code name for Planning Section. Originally code name for SOE Planning Section.

N Section                 SOE Netherlands section.

Neptune                    1944 operations within OVERLORD plan.

Octagon	Second U.S.-British conference at Quebec, September 1944.
OCM	Organisation Civile et Militaire (Civil and Military Organization), French resistance group.
OG	Operational Group composed of specially trained volunteers, officers and enlisted men, dispatched on missions of sabotage and guerrilla fighting (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).
ORA	Organisation de Resistance de l'Armee (Army Resistance Organization), French resistance group comprising majority of members of Giraudist groups and old Armee d'Armistice (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).
ORRA	Organisation Resistance Armee (Army Resistance Organization), French resistance group formed by former French Army officers.
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (U.S.).
Overlord	Cross-channel invasion by Allies, 6 June 1944.
OWI	Office of War Information (U.S.).
Paramilitary Forces	Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission (JCS Pub 1-02).
PCF	Parti Communiste Francais (French Communist Party).
PE	Plastic explosive.
Photo/R	Photo reconnaissance.
PIAT	Pioneer Infantry Anti-Tank, anti-tank weapon.
Plan Grenoille	Code name of plan for immobilization of locomotives in France during the invasion (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
Plan Jaune	Code name of plan for attack on ammunition dumps in France during the invasion (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).

Plan Momie	Code name of plan for the prevention of German demolitions and acts of destruction during the invasion of France (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
Plan Noir	Code name of plan for guerrilla activities against German Army Headquarters formations (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
Plan Rouge	Code name of plan for attacks of German field storage dumps in France (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
Plan Tortue	Code name of plan for road blocking on Continent at the commencement of the invasion, to prevent reinforcements reaching the coast for the Allied landings (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
Plan Vert	Code name of plan for destruction of railway communications by French resistance (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
Plan Violet	Plan for the disruption and destruction of the telephone system in France during the invasion (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).
PM	Prime Minister.
POL	Petroleum, oil, lubricants.
PTT	Postes, Telegraphes & Telephones, French postal, telegraph, and telephone service.
PW	Psychological warfare.
PWB	Psychological Warfare Branch (AFHQ).
PWD	Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF & War Dept.).
PWE	Political Warfare Executive (British).
Quadrant	First U.S.-British conference at Quebec, August 1943.
R&A	Research and Analysis division (OSS).
RAF	Royal Air Force (British).

Rankin                   Family of plans for rapid landing on the continent in response to various contingencies, such as collapse of German government.

RDF                       Radio direction finder.

Resistance Movement    An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability (JCS Pub 1-02).

RF Section               Section of the Western European Directorate dealing with the existing independent French resistance groups which maintained liaison through BCRA with French resistance (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).

Roundhammer             Intermediate cross-channel invasion plan, between ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER in scope.

Roundup                  Early plan for cross-channel assault, forerunner of OVERLORD, planned for 1943.

R/T                       Radio telephone.

SA/B                      Special Activities/Bruce (predecessor of OSS Secret Intelligence Branch).

Sabotage                 An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources (JCS Pub 1-02).

SAC                       Supreme Allied Commander.

SACMED                   Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

SA/G                      Special Activities/Goodfellow (predecessor of OSS Special Operations Branch).

Sally                     Code name for joint [combined] SOE/SO Command Post Exercise held 24 March 1944, in which the British acted as SOE Staffs in the field and the Americans ran the control (SO WD, Vol. 2, Glossary).

SAP Section d'Atterissages et Parachutages (Landing and Dropping Section), French resistance organization.

SAS Special Airborne Service, British Army airborne force for special missions, forerunner of present-day Special Air Service.

SBS Special Boat Service (British).

SC Supreme Commander.

SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Sextant Allied conference at Cairo, November-December 1943.

SF Det Special Force Staff Detachment, liaison operations detachment from SFHQ with Army or Army Group headquarters.

SFHQ Special Force Headquarters, joint and combined SOE/SO headquarters located in London, England.

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

SI Secret Intelligence branch (OSS).

SIS Secret Intelligence Service (British MI-6).

Sledgehammer Codename for a rapid landing in Western Europe in the event of Russia's collapse.

SNCF Societe Nationale des Chemins-de-Fer Francais (French national rail service).

SO Special Operations branch (OSS).

SOAM Service des Operations Aeriennes et Maritimes (Service for Air and Sea Operations).

SOE Special Operations Executive (British).

SOE/SO Special Operations Executive/Special Operations. Combined British/American special operations organization; predecessor of SFHQ.

Spartan                    General Headquarters exercise of a simulated invasion of Western Europe, held in England from 3 to 11 March 1943. Exercise in which Jedburgh concept was first tested.

Special Operations        Actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and para-military forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by nonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. They are conducted in peace, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces. . . . (JCS Pub 3-05).

SPOC                        Special Projects Operations Center, joint and combined SOE/SO headquarters in Algiers. Base for Jedburgh and other special operations to southern France.

S&T                         Schools and Training branch (OSS).

STO                         Service du Travail Obligatoire (Compulsory Labor Service).

STS                         Special Training School (SOE).

STS-6                        British operational and para-military training school.

STS-40                      Jedburgh training school at Gumley Hall, Lancashire, England.

STS-45                      Jedburgh training school at Fairford, Gloucester, England.

STS-51                      SOE/SFHQ parachute training school.

STS-54                      Training area.

STS-63                      British training school.

Subversion                 Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength, or morale of a regime (JCS Pub 1-02).

Symbol                      Allied conference at Casablanca, 14-23 January 1943.

T Section                    SOE Belgian and Luxembourg section.

TO/E	Table of Organization and Equipment.
Trident	Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington, May 1943.
Unconventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape (JCS Pub 3-05).
Underground	A covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces (AR 310-25).
USAAF	U.S. Army Air Forces.
WE Directorate	The portion of SOE or SFHQ dealing with operations in Western Europe (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).
WE Section	The portion of SO dealing with operations in Western Europe (SO WD, Vol. I, Glossary).
W/T	Wireless telegraphy.
X-2	Counter-intelligence branch (OSS).

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