Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-Service Military Operations

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

This monograph examines the adequacy of the joint task force (JTF) to operate effectively in the context of wartime uncertainty.

Military theorists have long understood the deleterious effects of uncertainty on the conduct of war. Commanders never know as much about the enemy or environmental conditions as they would like, so they decide and act on the best information available, however incomplete.

In coping with uncertainty, there are proven methods of structuring one's organization to meliorate its effects. These methods involve decentralizing command, lowering decision thresholds, and creating self-contained, semi-autonomous units.

U.S. military doctrine recognizes the need for JTFs in responding to the global commitments of the nation. Unfortunately, Service incompatibilities and parochialism often have hampered the joint commander's ability to get the job done. Congress mandated reform through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; the result has been to streamline joint command structures, thus making them better able to deal with uncertainty.

The experience of multi-Service operations during World War II confirms the wisdom of creating joint task forces when doctrinal conditions are met. My research into two of these operations -- FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands and HUSKY in Sicily -- indicate that an integrated joint command structure, akin to a modern JTF, reduces the effects of uncertainty by allowing the central headquarters to operate with less information.
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I. Introduction

The global military commitments of the United States since the Second World War have necessitated the use of multi-Service forces. With few exceptions, unilateral action by a single Service has become increasingly unlikely due to the nature of potential crises and their distance from American shores. Also encouraging joint operations is the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, which mandates the integration of air power into all ground operations. The Navy, by virtue of its strategic sealift capability, long-range fires, and amphibious forces, is also a likely participant in the joint arena. Each Service possesses unique capabilities that are essential in meeting the worldwide challenges confronting the nation. When they work together, their combined effort far exceeds the sum of what each can accomplish individually.

Perhaps the most preferred method of directing multi-Service forces is the joint task force (JTF). According to JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, a JTF is force composed of "assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force or two or more of these Services, that is constituted or so designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a CINC [commander-in-chief], or by the
commander of a subordinate unified command or an existing joint task force."¹ In the past few years, JTFs have operated in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Honduras, and elsewhere.

If the JTF is the preferred method, it is not the only way of employing joint forces. Operation "Desert Storm," the largest American military operation since the Vietnam war, saw multi-Service forces controlled centrally by the unified commander. The success experienced by American (and allied) forces affirmed that command options other than the JTF are available to a CINC. JCS Pub 5-00.2, JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures, concurs: "Where one commander may decide to use a JTF to accomplish a given mission, a different commander may use a different subordinate command option to satisfy similar mission requirements."²

The publications cited above list the three conditions for establishing a JTF.³ First, the mission should have a specific, limited objective. When the mission is accomplished, the JTF dissolves and the component forces revert to their previous commands. Second, the mission should require the close cooperation of multi-Service forces to accomplish the assigned mission. Implied here is a warning against selecting forces for joint operations based on Service equity, rather than capability and
readiness. Finally, there should be no need for centralized control of logistics within the area of operations. Were this the case, the JTF commander would have to divide his time and effort on matters not directly related to mission accomplishment; the distraction would offset the benefits of the JTF's tailored organization.

Despite this clear doctrinal guidance, seldom is the choice of command structure easy or obvious. Rarely do crises exhibit clearly the conditions listed in the manuals. Doctrine is only a guide, and commanders must use their common sense and experience to modify it where necessary.

The principal reason for the subjectivity of our doctrine is the effect of uncertainty in war. No one can divine how a human enemy will reason or react, nor is it possible to master every fact pertaining to the physical environment. Changing situations introduce added uncertainty that may confound the effort to see through the fog of war. The environment of wartime uncertainty leaves commanders but one choice: they must structure their organizations to cope with incomplete information; those who excel at it improve their chances of success in battle.

This paper assesses the adequacy of a JTF in dealing with the criteria of uncertainty. It will address the theoretical effects of uncertainty and several methods of coping with it. To test the
applicability of the theory, it will examine two historical examples of multi-Service operations -- one featuring a JTF, the other a different command structure -- and evaluate their outcomes based on the ability of the organization to operate with incomplete information. The conclusions will consider how the JTF may be expected to perform relative to alternate command structures.

II. Theoretical Effects of Uncertainty

The fundamental purpose of any military organization is the accomplishment of its assigned missions. The American military has a wide variety of missions ranging from nation building to high intensity war. It must be capable of responding to unexpected contingencies as well as execute longstanding operations plans. Furthermore, it must project effectively land, sea, and aerospace power anywhere around the globe.

Because of the variety of missions challenging the American military establishment, organizational structures must be flexible. Commanders must tailor their forces to meet changing conditions and to make the most efficient use of their combat resources. This is nowhere more important than in joint operations, where each Service brings to the contest unique capabilities that must be properly coordinated
for maximum effect.

Despite the logic of designing mission-specific forces, the task is anything but easy. Commanders and staffs must understand thoroughly the capabilities of other Services as well as their own. They must cope with interoperability problems, particularly in the field of communications, and overcome doctrinal inconsistencies. Last, but not least, they must build cohesive teams out of the forces that represent different Services and, therefore, different ways of doing business.

Organizational problems notwithstanding, the greatest impediment to effective command and control of joint forces -- or any military force -- is uncertainty. War is a most imprecise activity, buffeted by human emotions and the unpredictability of the physical environment. It therefore defies attempts at quantification or scientific analysis. "All sciences have principles and rules," noted Maurice de Saxe, but "war has none."5 It remains a cauldron of all things intangible and imponderable.

One of the recurring themes of Carl von Clausewitz's magnum opus, On War, is uncertainty. War, he wrote, "is the realm of uncertainty, ... wrapped in a fog" of doubt and speculation.6 Military intelligence reports, upon which commandcrs base operational decisions, are sometimes "contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain."7 The
general unreliability of wartime information stems from all action taking place, "so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like for or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are." Try as he might, the commander can never achieve absolute truth.

Clausewitz described uncertainty as one of the four elements comprising the "climate of war." The other three -- danger, exertion, and chance -- while they act in their own ways, also contribute to the shroud of uncertainty. Danger and exertion tax the rational thought processes of fighting men, which distort their images of reality. They must be skeptical of what they see, even less sure of what they cannot see. Chance, which defines the randomness and unpredictability of natural events, likewise adds to wartime uncertainty. "War is the realm of chance," observed Clausewitz. "No other human activity gives it greater scope."

The sources of uncertainty have grown in the twentieth century beyond those of Clausewitz's time. Major armies now operate in an "age of complexity," in which technology has pushed the limits of speed, depth, endurance, and lethality. To cope with the increased sophistication of warfare, armies have become more specialized in their organization and functions. A greater variety of people, each with
different skills, are required to accomplish military missions. The need for greater specialization has created a corresponding demand for more information to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of the whole.

While the size of command structures has grown arithmetically, however, the requirement for information has expanded geometrically. New technology makes obtaining more information possible, but the surfeit of data diminishes the ability of any one person or agency to make sense of it all. Thus, instead of more certainty there is less, regardless of the expanded size of the command structure.

Compounding the problem of specialization in modern armies is the adversarial nature of war. A commander does not apply himself against an inanimate, malleable object the way an artist models clay; he grapples instead with a thinking, reactive opponent dedicated to deceiving and confusing him. "In general," explains Martin Van Creveld, author of Command in War, "the more important the human element as opposed to the technical element in any given situation, and the more important the enemy's action in shaping that situation, the greater the uncertainty involved." Thus, even the most elaborate information processing system would have difficulty coping with so human an endeavor as war.
How does one overcome the debilitating effects of uncertainty? Unless he is blessed with an abundance of luck, the commander must rely on reasoned intuition, based on a reservoir of knowledge and experience. Clausewitz wrote extensively on this quality, which in its extreme form constitutes genius:

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term coup d'oeil; the second is determination.  

Modern military theorists, while not denigrating the idea of genius, have proposed other solutions for coping with the fog of war. One is to anticipate uncertainty and therefore meliorate its effects. This is done, according to retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd, by devising a decision-making process more efficient than the enemy's. The process begins by observing the enemy, which allows the commander to orient himself to the situation. On the basis of this data, he decides how to apply combat power and, finally, he acts. In practice the "OODA" (observation, orientation, decision, action) cycle is never ending: the commander's actions change the situation, requiring the cycle to start over.  

War is a series of time-competitive OODA cycles enshrouded in a veil of uncertainty. The side that
observes, orients, decides, and acts more quickly than
the other gains a decisive advantage. As the slower
side tries to react, it falls farther behind the
quicker, which is already acting anew. The faster
commander operates within (i.e., more quickly than)
his opponent's OODA cycle to sow confusion and fear
and to "generate mismatches" between what the enemy
observes and how he responds. The result is to push
the slower adversary "beyond his moral, mental, or
physical capacity to adapt or endure, so that he can
neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts." 17

The ultimate effect of a rapid OODA cycle is to
increase the enemy's level of uncertainty relative to
one's own. The friendly commander retains the
initiative by forcing the opposing side to respond,
usually too late, to his actions. A rapid OODA cycle,
while it may not raise the level of certainty, allows
the commander to anticipate uncertainty and use it to
his advantage.

Like Boyd, Van Creveld argues that commanders
must design their organizations and modus operandi to
cope with the level of uncertainty surrounding a given
mission. One way is to increase the organization's
ability to process information. This approach leads
to a "multiplication of communications channels
(vertical, horizontal, or both) and to an increase in
the size and complexity of the central directing
organ. It also poses the potential problem, noted earlier, of overwhelming decision makers with too much data.

A second option is to restructure the organization to operate with less information. It might entail eliminating intermediate layers of command or, more simply, changing the mission. Moreover, it leads to the "division of tasks into various parts and to the establishment of forces capable of dealing with each of these parts separately on a semi-independent basis." Of the two methods for structuring a command to deal with uncertainty, the latter "will probably remain superior . . . in virtually every case."

Van Creveld's preference for the second option stems from the potential advantages of a decentralized system over one controlled centrally. In the latter case the commander strives to reduce uncertainty by raising the decision threshold -- that is, by authorizing only senior leaders to make important decisions. While this practice may permit the commander more confidence in his own decision making, it hinders the ability of his subordinates to succeed at their level by stifling initiative and limiting freedom of action. The benefits of greater certainty at the top (e.g., more reserves, tighter control) come only at the expense of less at the bottom. Thus, the
two ways of coping with uncertainty -- centralization and decentralization -- consist "of a different distribution of uncertainty among the various ranks of the hierarchy."²¹

Some of the most successful armies in history have adhered to a system of decentralized command. Their commanders accepted the realization that "certainty is the product of time as well as information," and that success depends on the "willingness to do with less of the latter in order to save the former."²² They encouraged initiative from junior leaders by investing them with authority to exploit unforeseen opportunities. Key to such freedom of action was the issuance of minimum-objective missions, with the expectation that the subordinate would shape the fluid situation in accordance with the commander's intent. Finally, they acknowledged that uncertainty is inevitable in war and that "such confusion is not inconsistent with, and indeed may be a prerequisite for results."²³

The system of decentralized command outlined by Van Creveld evokes the German concept of Auftragstaktik developed by von Scharnhorst and von Moltke in the nineteenth century. But great commanders before and since have possessed an intuitive understanding of these principles. Recognizing that uncertainty was unavoidable, they tailored command structures to accommodate it.
Van Creveld draws two important conclusions from his analysis of uncertainty in war. First, commanders should issue mission-type orders and fix decision thresholds as far down the organizational hierarchy as possible; these measures promote initiative at the bottom of the command structure. Second, specialized assets should be distributed throughout the organization to create self-contained, independent units at a fairly low command level. These conclusions are complementary: a command climate in which subordinate leaders exercise initiative and aggressiveness will be the one which makes best use of autonomous forces.\textsuperscript{24}

The JTF embodies the principles of decentralized command as outlined by Van Creveld. The organization is specifically tailored to accomplish the mission at hand; it should have no more or no less than what is needed. The economic force design obviates unnecessary layers of command, which slow down decision making and dilute the influence of the commander. It permits decisions to be made by a commander whose sole focus is accomplishment of the assigned mission; thus, the decision threshold is lower in a JTF than it otherwise would be if the theater commander were to control operations at his level.

Besides decentralizing command, the JTF also
permits the distribution of specialized assets to where they are needed most. The JTF commander is allocated forces from two or more Services, which he task organizes to optimize their effect. He commonly segregates like forces into functional commands; aircraft from the Air Force and Navy, for example, could be task organized under a single air component commander. There are, of course, many other ways of tailoring forces, depending on the mission and the commander's preference. The key point is that decentralization permits the commander on the scene to choose the best force design for mission accomplishment.

Theoretically, the JTF offers a command structure that reduces the effects of uncertainty by enabling the organization to operate with less information. In practice, however, the success or failure of the JTF depends largely on how well the component parts function as an integrated whole. More to the point, JTF effectiveness depends on joint doctrine, which specifies the command relationships within multi-Service organizations. Given its importance, a brief examination of the evolution of U.S. joint doctrine is in order.
III. Joint Doctrine and the JTF

As a contingency unfolds in a theater of war, the unified commander considers several factors influencing the organization of his forces. First, he must understand the mission in terms of U.S. military strategy. This entails identifying all the specified and implied tasks inherent in the larger mission. Next, he must anticipate the nature and scope of operations. Depending on the threat, American forces may operate anywhere on the spectrum of conflict from peaceful competition to high-intensity war. Third, the CINC assesses the physical environment and the capabilities of the enemy that will be operating in it.25

Last but not least, the commander must consider the array of friendly forces available. At the theater level the CINC is likely to have components from two or more Services for use in contingency operations. The Service identity of these forces has much to do with how the CINC goes about organizing his forces.26

A likely command option is the JTF, a temporary organization of two or more Service components designed to accomplish a specific, limited objective. The JTF commander comes normally from the Service component with the largest committed force or most important mission. He exercises operational control (OPCON) over joint forces, which includes the
assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary for mission accomplishment. Under this arrangement, subordinate Service commanders are responsible for providing properly trained, administered, and logistically supported forces, as well as commanding those forces tactically. 27

Since World War II, unified commanders have made frequent use of JTFs to accomplish contingency missions. In most cases the joint forces have operated well enough together to get the job done, but interservice incompatibilities and jealousies almost always have hampered operations. The aborted hostage-rescue mission in Iran in 1980 and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 were extreme cases of the failure of joint operations; the 1983 Granada invasion, though ultimately successful, was little better. It seemed that the organization of American forces into independent Services, though rich in history and tradition, was increasingly unsuited to the challenges that now faced the nation. 28

In response to the problems experienced in the employment of joint forces, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The lawmakers focused on the operations in Grenada and Beirut to emphasize the need for better cooperation among the Services. In the former case,
Army and Marine forces operated with incompatible communications equipment, forcing them to report through separate channels to the JTF commander (a U.S. Navy officer) in his flagship many miles away. The invasion was ultimately successful, but the circuitous command arrangement made coordination on the ground difficult. In the latter case, operational control over Marine units was hindered by the resistance of two Services to coordinate their activities. The Marines declined to submit to security inspections by Army staff officers (from EUCOM) that might have precluded the terrorist attack; for their part, Army officials did not press the issue. Coming so close together, these examples of the lack of Service interoperability prompted Congress to mandate changes in the way the Defense Department conducted its business.

The military's fundamental problem, according to congressional reformers, was the absence of unity of command in joint operations. Unified commanders lacked effective operational control over forces placed under them from the various Services. "Component walls," erected and maintained by the Service chiefs as members of the committee-style Joint Chiefs of Staff, obstructed the CINC from properly integrating his diverse forces. Retired Army Lieutenant General John H. Cushman summed up the problem:
It was clear to the lawmakers that the CINC's responsibility to the Secretary of Defense for mission performance and the CINC's authority to meet that responsibility were gravely out of balance. The cost to operational effectiveness of this imbalance had been painfully clear during joint operations in Beirut and Grenada. Forty years of weak command authority had not only contributed to operational inadequacies, but had become habit forming. The CINCs were accustomed to these conditions; the CINCs and the conditions had become part of the culture.

The lack of unity of command in joint operations exacerbated the age-old problem of uncertainty in war. Without being able to fully integrate multi-Service forces into a cohesive whole, the effects of specialization manifested themselves; as Van Creveld noted, specialization increases the burden on the controlling headquarters to obtain and manage information. Component walls worsen the problem by obstructing the commander's efforts to organize more efficiently (i.e., weaken Service prerogative). Not surprisingly, the traditional, Service-oriented way of conducting joint operations has led to disaster since it has done little to overcome the effects of uncertainty.

The Goldwater-Nichols act strengthened greatly the power of the CINC in conjunction with reemphasizing his accountability for success or failure. It gave him authoritative direction over the operations, joint training, and logistics of subordinate commands in pursuance of the assigned
mission. It empowered him to select (and dismiss) his subordinate commanders and assign them command functions. Finally, it granted control over logistics and administration, including court martial convening authority. These unprecedented measures, designed to break down component walls, allowed the unified commander substantial authority in areas where the Services formerly had been preeminent.

Important provisions of the law ensured that the spirit of reform would not be quashed by the bureaucracy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for "developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces." To help in this task would be the Services' brightest officers, now required by law to undergo joint education or risk being passed over for promotion. The Joint Doctrine Master Plan, developed by the Joint Chiefs in response to the wishes of legislative reformers, standardized procedures by blending the separate Service doctrines into an amalgamated warfighting plan.

In fixing the problem of unity of command, Goldwater-Nichols enhanced the unified commander's ability to deal with the uncertainty surrounding military operations. It gave him more authority to organize forces, assign missions, and specify command relationships. With these enlarged powers the CINC is better able to divide major tasks into component parts.
that can be accomplished by subordinate forces on a semi-autonomous basis. Such an arrangement lowers the decision threshold and lessens the demand for information at the top.

The empowerment of the unified commander to integrate multi-Service forces has made the JTF a more viable command option. While the law did not specify the precise powers of subordinate commands, it gave the CINCs ample authority to do so. It also made abundantly clear that operational commanders were both responsible and accountable at every level. Just as Congress gave CINCs authority commensurate with their responsibility, the CINCs are committed to doing the same with their subordinates.36

IV. Historical Perspective

World War II offers abundant examples of joint operations. U.S. forces operated on several continents, in every ocean, and in the air. The size of the forces deployed, as well as the distances over which they traveled, made prosecuting the war impossible without close cooperation among the Services. The early experiences of joint forces served as the basis for joint doctrine and models for future operations. By studying these operations we might draw conclusions about the conditions best suited for the creation of a JTF.
Operation FLINTLOCK

At the May 1943 TRIDENT Conference in Washington, American strategic planners established goals for the Pacific Theater for the second half of 1943 and 1944. One of the principal objectives was the capture of the Marshall Islands, strategically located about 2,000 nautical miles southwest of Pearl Harbor (Map 1). On 1 September 1943, the Joint Chiefs tasked the commander of the Pacific Theater, Admiral Chester Nimitz, to begin detailed planning for the invasion. The target date was 1 January 1944, though it was shortly postponed to 31 January.37

Seizure of the Marshalls offered several advantages. It would threaten Japanese lines of communications while protecting those of the United States and its allies. It also promised an easier time in capturing the Carolines, with the important Japanese base at Truk. The invasion probably would draw enemy ground, air, and naval forces into a battle in which the Americans held the advantage of position. Finally, operations against the Marshalls would support offensive action elsewhere in the Pacific and Indian Oceans by diverting Japanese forces.33

Admiral Nimitz's operations plan for the Marshalls (OPLAN 16-43) received the Joint Chief's approval on 14 December 1943. Codenamed FLINTLOCK, the plan called for a bold strike against Kwajelein Atoll, near the geographic center of the island chain.
The atoll consisted of several islands clustered around Roi-Namur in the north and Kwajalein in the south, both of which were capable (just barely) of housing an airbase (Map 2). He overruled subordinates who preferred a more methodical campaign starting in the east and moving west through the islands; the only exception was his approval of a concurrent landing on Majuro, an undefended island about 250 miles southeast of Kwajalein from which supporting air could be based.

Participating in FLINTLOCK were a host of land, sea, and air forces organized into a joint command.
Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, Nimitz's direct subordinate in the Central Pacific region and commander of the Fifth Fleet, assumed command of the joint force, designated Task Force 50 (Figure 1).

Under Spruance were four functional commands. The first was Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher's Carrier Force (Task Force 58), comprised of four groups of fast carriers each with its complement of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Its missions were to gain
Figure 1: Task Organization for the Attack on Kwajelein and Majuro Atolls (Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 171)

Task Force 50
Fifth Fleet
Spruance

Task Force 58
Carrier Force
RADM Mitscher

Task Group 50.15
Neutralization Grp
RADM Small

Task Force 57
Def Forces and
Land-Based Air
RADM Hoover

Task Force 51
Jnt Exped Force
RADM Turner

Task Force 56
Exped Troops
MG Smith, USMC

Task Force 52
South Atk Force
RADM Turner

Task Force 53
North Atk Force
RADM Conolly

Hqs Spt Aircraft

Task Grp 51.3
South Def Grp

Task Grp 51.4
South Garrison Grp

Task Grp 51.2
Majuro Atk Grp

Task Grp 56.1
South Land Force
7th Inf Div

Task Grp 56.2
North Land Force
4th Mar Div

Task Grp 51.5
North Def Grp

Task Grp 51.6
North Garrison Grp 1

Task Grp 51.7
North Garrison Grp 2

Task Grp 51.8
Majuro Def Grp

Task Grp 51.9
Majuro Garrison Grp

Operational control during landing phase

Operational control after ground forces are established ashore
air superiority by destroying enemy aircraft and facilities; assist in the preparatory bombardment of Kwajelein, Roi-Namur, and peripheral islands; and furnish air support as required. Land-based aircraft made up second functional command, Rear Admiral John Hoover's Task Force 57. It was to soften the target islands prior to the arrival of the carriers; in addition, it provided air reconnaissance, mined enemy waters, and provided air support for the ground forces. The third command was Rear Admiral E. G. Small's Neutralization Group (Task Force 50.15) of cruisers and destroyers. Small's mission was to bombard the islands of Wotje and Maleolap in the eastern Marshalls and thereby deny the enemy the use of their airfields.  

The fourth functional command, commanded by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, was the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51), which included the amphibious landing forces and naval support craft. Turner controlled three attack forces: Southern (Task Force 52), assigned the mission of seizing Kwajelein and neighboring islands; Northern (Task Force 53), assigned Roi-Namur and neighboring islands; and Majuro (Task Group 51.2), assigned the island of the same name. Also subordinate to Turner was MG Holland Smith, USMC, who, in his capacity as V Amphibious Corps commander, would also command the expeditionary troops (Task Force 56) once they were ashore.
expeditionary troops included the 7th Infantry Division in Southern Attack Force, the 4th Marine Division in Northern Attack Force, and the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, (part of the 27th Infantry Division) in Majuro Attack Group; each was reinforced with engineers, communications, air defense artillery and other special-purpose units.

Spruance ensured that his joint forces received extensive training for what he believed would be a challenging operation. The 7th Division, training initially in Hawaii under the auspices of U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area (USAFCPA), learned jungle fighting techniques, developed procedures to improve armor-infantry cooperation, and conducted basic amphibious training. On 11 December 1943, MG Smith assumed operational control of the division and put it through a rigorous amphibious training program that included actual landings on Maui with coordinated naval gunfire. The 4th Marine Division and 2-106 Infantry conducted similar training under Smith's operational control. The month and a half of intense training, planned and supervised by the headquarters responsible for the success of FLINTLOCK, would pay great dividends during the operation.41

Unity of command and synchronization were the watchwords as Spruance and Turner prepared their forces for FLINTLOCK. The operations plan called for
preliminary D-Day (31 January 1944) landings on islands adjacent to Kwajelein and Roi-Namur to emplace artillery for the main assaults (Map 3). As landing forces made their final approach, fighters, torpedo bombers, and dive bombers would provide a last-minute assault against the beach defenses. Meanwhile, naval surface forces were to bombard all of the islands in the objective area to neutralize airfields, coastal batteries, beach defenses, and anti-air artillery.42

The planning for D+1, the day of the main assaults on Kwajelein and Roi-Namur, was especially detailed. Warships from both Spruance's and Turner's task forces were to bombard the target islands and
others that the Japanese might use to interfere with the operation. A variety of combat vessels, lobbing 5-inch and 8-inch shells, would hit beach targets until the amphibious forces were within 500 meters of the shore; thereafter, the fires would shift to targets on the flanks. In coordination with the fires of the surface fleet, carrier-based air was to hit the landing beaches on both Kwajelein and Roi-Namur while land-based heavy bombers struck hard targets inland. Yet another source of fire support came from the artillery batteries that had landed the previous day on the islands adjacent to Kwajelein and Roi-Namur. Having already registered their guns, the batteries were well prepared to support the amphibious assaults with pinpoint accuracy.43

The impressive array of firepower in support of the main landings was no coincidence. Only weeks before, U.S. Marines had taken heavy casualties as they assaulted the beaches of Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. There had been many planning failures in that operation, but one of the most obvious was the lack of coordinated supporting fires to suppress the deadly fires of the beach defenses. With that unnappy experience behind them, FLINTLOCK planners took pains to muster massive firepower at the right place and time.44

An important contribution to the ultimate success of FLINTLOCK was the relatively mature joint
logistical structure established by Nimitz for the Central Pacific. The Army component command, USAFCPA, was responsible for the supply, administration, and training of the 7th Infantry Division and the 106th Regiment. The Navy component command, Service Forces, Pacific Fleet (SFPF), acted in a similar capacity for the 4th Marine Division; both worked closely with Nimitz’s J4, an Army brigadier general. The logistical system was not totally integrated -- the two services requisitioned their supplies independently from the States -- but it was good enough to free Spruance from all but FLINTLOCK-specific logistical concerns. In short, with Nimitz controlling logistics at the theater level, Spruance could concentrate on the mission at hand without unnecessary distraction.

Turner’s joint expeditionary forces met all their objectives with relative ease. Amphibious forces, with few exceptions, were put ashore on schedule and with adequate fire and logistical support. Combat operations on both islands were intense, but brief. In the north, the 4th Marine Division secured Roi-Namur in less than two days; the 7th Infantry Division took slightly longer to seize Kwajelein Island. Both units spent an additional few days mopping up enemy resistance on the atoll’s small peripheral islands.

Of the many reasons for success, perhaps most
important was the command structure. Nimitz had been
tinkering with joint organization since the beginning
of the war. By the time of FLINTLOCK he had settled
on a design that offered flexibility through the
distribution of multi-Service forces to each of the
functional commands; Spruance's Task Force 50
epitomized the concept. Nimitz would use the same
joint command structure over and over again as U.S.
forces completed the destruction of Japanese war
machine.

By no means did Nimitz eliminate completely the
Service parochialism that traditionally had plagued
American (and Japanese) forces. Nonetheless, his
organization was good enough to realize a decisive
advantage over the enemy. Notes Ronald Spector,
author of Eagle against the Sun, "The Americans, to a
greater extent than the Japanese, did go far toward
achieving interservice coordination and cooperation,
particularly at the operational level." Even when
the Services clashed, the Americans, largely because
of their decentralized command structure, displayed
ingenuity by "devising courses of action which allowed
them to get on with the war."

The Pacific was not the only theater to witness
joint operations. Half way around the world in the
Mediterranean, the United States and it allies had
recently executed the largest joint operation in
history. Participating were forces of every Service,
both U.S. and British. Codenamed HUSKY, the action led to the seizure of Sicily and the eventual introduction of Allied forces to the Italian mainland.

Although HUSKY was a combined, as well as joint, operation, the lessons to be drawn concerning the management of uncertainty are no less instructive. In fact, they may be moreso, since the friction of combined operations tends to exaggerate the effects of uncertainty and therefore dramatizes the need for an efficient command structure. Whether nations fight alone or in concert, the principles of organizing joint forces remain the same.

Operation HUSKY

At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Western allies decided to invade Sicily once Axis forces were cleared from North Africa. The invasion would secure the Allied line of communications in the Mediterranean, especially to the oil fields of the Middle East. Simultaneously, it promised to knock Italy out of the war and thereby threaten Germany from the south. Finally, the move would reassure the Soviet Union that the U.S. and England were committed to relieving German pressure on the Eastern Front.52

A directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, issued shortly after Casablanca, established the Allies chain of command in the Mediterranean (Figure 2). General Dwight Eisenhower was to be the Supreme
Figure 2: Task Organization for the Allied Invasion of Sicily (D'Este, *Bitter Victory*, 583)

- Combined Chiefs of Staff
  - Allied Forces HQ
    - GEN Eisenhower
      - Force 141
      - Allied Air Forces
        - ACM Tedder
      - Allied Naval Forces
        - ADM Cunningham
      - Allied Ground Forces
        - GEN Alexander
      - Eastern Naval Task Force
      - Western Naval Task Force
      - Northwest Africa Air Force
        - Malta Air Command
        - Mid-East Air Command
        - Ninth U.S. Air Force
      - Eastern Task Force
        - Eighth Army
          - Gen Montgomery
      - Western Task Force
        - Seventh Army*
          - LTG Patton

* Until D-Day, Patton's headquarters was called I U.S. Armored Corps.
Commander for the invasion, codenamed HUSKY, just as he had been for the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942. The rest of the top positions went to the English. General Sir Harold Alexander was named Deputy Commander and charged with the "detailed planning and execution of the actual operation when launched;" in effect, he was the ground component commander. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder became commander of Allied air forces, and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was placed in charge of naval forces.

The command arrangements proved cumbersome, the main problem being the divergent command styles of the two allies. The British preferred command by committee, which they foisted upon the Americans in an unsubtle attempt to manipulate Eisenhower, for whom they had little regard as a supreme commander. As a result, Ike lacked the authority commensurate with his responsibilities; though technically he was the supreme commander, in reality his position was more akin to "first among equals." Eisenhower was infuriated by the intrusion on his prerogative and favored instead the centralized command that he believed had worked well in the North African campaign. He would have protested formally to the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not his own chief of staff, MG Walter B. Smith, convinced him that this was no time to be "creating a fuss."
Besides the problem of command structure, Ike had difficulty focusing his attention on Sicily. Ongoing was the Tunisian campaign (until May 1943), as well as the political, logistical, and administrative affairs associated with being the theater commander. He was responsible for keeping French Morocco under control and for invading Spanish Morocco should the Franco regime become less than neutral. Axis control of Sardinia and Corsica was yet another distractor, for which Eisenhower initiated contingency planning. With these pressures weighing heavily on Ike's mind, it is no wonder that the planning for HUSKY suffered. Therefore, despite his position as supreme commander, he failed to provide detailed guidance or to arbitrate effectively the disputes that arose among his component commanders.

Exacerbating the problem was the absence of a dedicated planning staff. Because the Tunisia operation was still in progress, the Combined Chiefs instructed Eisenhower to establish a separate planning staff for HUSKY within the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers. Accordingly, he formed "Force 141," a skeleton staff which was an adjunct to the G-3 section of AFHQ. When the Tunisian campaign ended in May 1943, it became the nucleus of Alexander's new 15th Army Group headquarters. To fill out the organization, the Army dispatched staff officers from
the U.S., though some were transferred from within the theater. British staffers came from the United Kingdom and the Middle East. Predictably, the personnel turbulence involved in creating the new headquarters hindered effective planning.60

If Allied organizational problems were not bad enough, Alexander, Tedder, and Cunningham each operated headquarters at different locations, none of which were collocated with Eisenhower's. Good communications could not overcome the inimical effect of distance, especially since policy decisions required the approval of the component commanders. Planning tended to be done in a vacuum, and decisions frequently represented the narrow interests of the component instead of the invasion force as a whole.61 General Sir Bernard Montgomery lamented the problem, observing that "when things went wrong, all they [the component commanders] could do was send telegrams to each other; it took time to gather them together for the purpose of making joint decisions."62

The parochialism that beset the Allied planning effort was hardly surprising considering the awkward command arrangement. Neither Tedder's nor Cunningham's headquarters was subordinate to the principal planning headquarters, Alexander's, which had been formed around Force 141. Disputes, if they could not be ironed out among the three component commanders, went to Eisenhower for final resolution.
The resulting decisions usually ended as compromises that may have smoothed ruffled feathers but at the same time made the plan ever more conservative.63

In their preliminary guidance to Eisenhower, the Combined Chiefs had envisioned using two task forces for the invasion, one British and one American. Ike decided quickly on General Montgomery, hero of El Alamein, to lead the former. For the latter he chose George Patton, commanding First U.S. Armored Corps in North Africa. Both men, Eisenhower believed, could prepare effectively for HUSKY by tapping the resources of existing planning staffs within their organizations.

Events proved otherwise. During March and April 1943, Patton had assumed temporary command of the II (U.S.) Corps as the Tunisian campaign neared its climax. Meanwhile, Montgomery's Eighth Army was busy chasing Rommel across North Africa toward Tunis. Until the successful conclusion of the campaign in early May, both men devoted scant attention to the planning being done by their staffs for HUSKY. Montgomery admitted as much in his memoirs; in late April he and his staff knew "very little about the operation as a whole, and nothing whatsoever about the detailed planning that is going on."64

The disarray of the Allied command structure had a debilitating effect on the planning and execution of
the Sicily invasion. After much disagreement over where and how Patton's and Montgomery's forces would fight, Eisenhower approved a concept that placed them side by side on the southeastern Sicilian coast -- Patton's northwest and Montgomery's northeast the Pachino peninsula (Map 4). As always, the plan was a compromise designed to placate the concerns of Ike's egotistical subordinates. Unfortunately, the result was an unimaginative, direct-approach concept of operations that relied on overwhelming power rather than speed and cunning.

Although the invasion got off to an auspicious start on D-Day, 10 July 1943, it soon bogged down. Montgomery on the right and Patton on the left advanced slowly northward for over a month in the face of a skillfully withdrawing enemy. Although Patton experimented with small-scale amphibious envelopments, for the most part both army commanders attacked frontally into the teeth of the German rearguard. Meanwhile, the Germans conducted a brilliant evacuation across the Strait of Messina, virtually unscathed by Allied naval and air forces. By the time Patton and Montgomery converged on Messina on 17 August, the Germans had escaped with all their forces (over three divisions) intact; subsequent operations on the Italian mainland would offer a painful reminder to Allied commanders of their failure to destroy German forces on Sicily.65
Eisenhower was well aware of the failings of HUSKY. Toward the end of the campaign he mused that historians would fault him for "our super-cautious approach" to the invasion. Had he to do it over again, he would have made "simultaneous landings on both sides of the Messina Strait, thus cutting off all Sicily and obtaining wholesale surrender and saving
time and equipment, particularly landing craft which would have permitted a rapid rush on the mainland itself. General George C. Marshall was equally cognizant of the planning flaws. In prodding Eisenhower to be bolder in designing the plan he commented diplomatically, "Your planners and mine may be too conservative in their analyses." After the completion of HUSKY, Ike could only agree.

Despite the failures, Eisenhower could be satisfied with the conquest of Sicily and the prospects for future gains in the Mediterranean. Perhaps more important, he had acquired invaluable experience as a supreme commander in charge of joint and combined operations on an unprecedented scale. His confidence buoyed, Ike was ready for the challenge that awaited him in Europe.

V. Conclusions

By every standard of measurement, Operation FLINTLOCK was a great success. The care taken by joint commanders to organize, train, and equip the assault force paid off handsomely as the landings proceeded smoothly and resulted in the rapid seizure of the Marshalls. The Japanese suffered over 8,500 casualties, the vast majority being killed in action; the U.S. total was 1,726, of which 332 were killed in action. Success in the Kwajelein Atoll set the conditions for Nimitz's continued advance.
through the Mariana and Caroline Islands and
MacArthur's offensive up the coast of New Guinea. In
addition, it reflected the maturation of joint
operations in the Pacific, and served as a model for
subsequent operations there and elsewhere.

In contrast, the invasion of Sicily was a victory
in name only. Attacking unimaginatively on a broad
front, the Allies permitted an entire German corps to
escape intact across the Strait of Messina. The Axis,
it is true, lost its "unsinkable aircraft carrier,"
but it still held Sardinia and Corsica with which to
harass Allied shipping. More important, the same
German soldiers who should have been in Allied prison
camps at the conclusion of HUSKY were to inflict
untold agony on American and British soldiers
advancing up the boot of Italy.

What caused the contrasting outcomes of FLINTLOCK
and HUSKY? The issue is complex, and the cursory
analysis of the two campaigns presented earlier cannot
provide all the answers. Nonetheless, certain aspects
of success and failure manifested themselves so
clearly that we might, as Clausewitz would say, use
these historical examples "to deduce a doctrine."70

An important factor in the success of FLINTLOCK
was command organization. Nimitz and his subordinate
commanders in the Pacific theater established a force
structure that reflected their joint mindset -- that
is, one that fully integrated the capabilities of assigned units. The chain of command was clear, and it led upward to a single source of authority; along the way were commanders of every Service and branch. What mattered most was not the Service identity of the forces involved, but the contributions they could make toward mission accomplishment.

The training program leading up to D-Day reflected the emphasis on joint operations. The Marine Corps commander in charge of ground operations trained Army soldiers on amphibious techniques for a month and a half before the actual assault. In support was a provisional Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO), organized to facilitate communication between ground troops and the fire support systems of the Navy and Army Air Corps. Liaison teams from the JASCO operated down to battalion level and joined in the training of the amphibious assault forces. This cooperation was endemic to a command that recognized the value of an integrated fighting force.

If command structure was a key element of FLINTLOCK's success, it was the principal cause of HUSKY's failure. Carlo D'Este, a noted authority on the Sicily campaign, observed two fundamental Allied errors: "the conservatism of the HUSKY plan and the failure of the senior Allied commanders to organize a joint command headquarters to administer it." These shortcomings were two sides of the same coin, for if
there had been a joint headquarters Ike probably would have felt more comfortable drafting a bolder plan. A joint organization, in which all the components necessary for mission accomplishment were subordinated under one headquarters, would have ensured unity of command and fostered flexibility in planning and execution.

The command structures used in FLINTLOCK and HUSKY offer examples -- one positive, the other negative -- of ways of dealing with uncertainty in war. Spruance's joint organization permitted centralized planning and decentralized execution. Commanders at every level had the power (if only because of their distance and isolation from the central headquarters) to make decisions on the basis of the current tactical situation. Spruance could cope better with uncertainty because he lowered the decision threshold within his organization. In pushing more authority down the chain of command, he required less information at the top. His thorough integration of multi-Service forces facilitated decentralization by giving each task force the assets required to accomplish their missions with a large degree of autonomy.

Eisenhower, on the other hand, presided over an organization centralized in both planning and execution. Subordinate leaders worked within a
"stovepipe" chain of command that included only forces from their own Service. This arrangement sapped initiative because any change in plan would affect forces in other components and would therefore need to be coordinated at a common headquarters; unfortunately, the only commander who could approve the change was Eisenhower himself -- the sole "joint" commander in the Mediterranean theater. The Germans who escaped from Sicily owed their good fortune to this chaotic situation.

There are abundant examples of the exaggerated effects of uncertainty on the centralized Allied command. The Allies decided on a slow-moving frontal attack because they overestimated the size of the Sicilian garrison and thus feared dividing their forces. They avoided landing at the Messina Strait because they were uncertain of gaining air superiority. They rejected an assault on the Italian mainland (Calabrian peninsula) out of fear that the Germans might have reserves poised to defeat it. Allied efforts to staunch the flow of escaping Germans never accelerated due to Tedder's unfounded assumption that his air forces were taking their toll.

Centralized organizations require abundant information at the controlling headquarters. In each of the above cases, the lack of sufficient intelligence about the enemy's strength or intentions paralyzed Eisenhower's already sluggish command.
system. Had Eisenhower been able to establish a joint command similar to Nimitz's, he might have acted more decisively, despite the absence of good intelligence.73

In Eisenhower's defense, he labored under the burden of conducting combined, as well as joint, operations. In practical terms, it often meant that political considerations outweighed what might have been militarily expedient. Making Ike's job tougher still was the condescending attitude of the British towards their American counterparts, manifested in the committee-style command arrangement with Alexander, Tedder, and Cunningham. Though Eisenhower complained about these burdens, he did so with patience and discretion; throughout his tenure as supreme commander he understood the overriding need to subordinated national pride to allied cooperation.74

* * *

Of all the imponderables in war, uncertainty is "the central fact that all command systems have to cope with."75 Ironically, the information revolution has not changed things; we are as subject to incomplete and unreliable information as our ancient predecessors in the art of war. Perhaps the only certainty is that war will remain the realm of the uncertain.

The appeal of the JTF as a command structure is
its potential for overcoming the effects of uncertainty. If the events of the last decade are a clue, future contingencies will develop in unexpected times and places that defy our ability to gather complete intelligence. American forces will have to act quickly and decisively, regardless of the inevitability of incomplete information. The characteristics of a JTF -- decentralized execution, semi-autonomous multi-Service forces, low decision threshold -- make this organization well suited to the uncertain challenges that await us.
NOTES

1 JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 1 Dec 86, 3-27.


3 Ibid., II-1; JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 3-27.

4 JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, Jan 90 (Test), III-11.


7 Ibid., 117.

8 Ibid., 140.

9 Ibid., 104.

10 Ibid., 101.


12 Ibid., 235.

13 Ibid., 268.

14 Von Clausewitz, On War, 102.


16 Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," no page number.

17 Ibid.

18 Van Creveld, Command in War, 269.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 274.
22 Ibid., 270.
23 Ibid., 271.
24 Ibid., 270.
25 JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 3-4, 3-8.
26 Ibid.


30 John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korea Command and Other Cases (Cambridge, MA: Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, 1986), 5-38 to 5-43.


33 Ibid., Sec 153(a), "Chairman: Functions."

34 Ibid., Chapter 38, "Joint Officer Management."

36 Cushman, *Carrying Out Goldwater-Nichols* ...

37 Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1955), 167. The date changed primarily because of the need for better reconnaissance and logistical support. Recent operations in the Gilbert Islands were instrumental in revealing these shortcomings in U.S. doctrine and tactical procedures.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 171-2.

40 Ibid., 170. Holland Smith's command of the expeditionary troops was conditioned by the requirement to secure Admiral Turner's approval of amphibious landings and changes in tactical plans. The reason was to ensure that the employment of ground troops was compatible with the capability and availability of supporting ships.

41 Ibid., 183-7.

42 Ibid., 174-5.

43 Ibid.


45 USAFCPA transferred the mission of training participating Army ground forces to V Amphibious Corps on 11 Dec 43.


48 The most detailed account of tactical operations in the Marshalls is Crowl and Love, *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*, chaps. XIV-XVIII, 219-332.

50 Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 560.

51 Ibid.


53 Ibid., 55.

54 Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory (New York: E. P. Hutton, 1988), 50, 71. The unflattering opinion of General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, toward Eisenhower was representative of the views held by other British military leaders. Notes biographer Stephen Ambrose in Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990): Brooke "put Eisenhower down as an affable type with no strategic sense or command ability." The British general doubted that Ike would ever be classed a "great" man (69).

55 Ibid., 71.

56 Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 11.

57 Ibid., 55. LTG Mark Clark, commanding Fifth U.S. Army in French Morocco, would have been selected to lead the American task force in HUSKY had the situation in the two Moroccos not been so volatile.

58 Ibid., 56. The low priority given to Force 141 was illustrated by the lack of a G2 section; G3 planners had to correspond directly with the AFHQ G2 section for intelligence analyses.

59 Alexander commanded 18th Army Group until D-Day of HUSKY, at which time the headquarters was redesignated 15th Army Group.

60 Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 56-7.

61 D'Este, Bitter Victory, 72.

Stephen Ambrose notes Eisenhower's innate conservatism and how it influenced the planning for HUSKY: "Eisenhower had been a staff officer for twenty years and could not shake the patterns of thought that had become second nature to him. He concentrated on administrative matters and politics, and insisted on an orderly, rather than a bold and risky, advance, even when his superiors urged him to take more chances" (Eisenhower, 87). When his component commanders clashed over operational matters, Ike arbitrated in a way that would make them all happy. Normally that entailed distributing risk more evenly; unfortunately, a less risky plan is also a more conservative (i.e., predictable) one. A discussion of the conservative aspects of the HUSKY plan, as well as the consequences, is found in D'Este, Bitter Victory, 524-7.

Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 60.

D'Este gives a detailed account of the conduct of operations during HUSKY. As the title of his work implies, he is very critical of Allied planning and execution.

D'Este, Bitter Victory, 525.

Ibid. The quote is taken from the diary of CAPT Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower's friend and military aide.

Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 66.

Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 301, 331.

Von Clausewitz, On War, 171.


D'Este, Bitter Victory, 524.


Ambrose, Eisenhower, 88-119, provides examples of Ike's ability to resolve the sensitive problems of combined command.

Van Creveld, Command in War, 268.
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