US - SOVIET COMBINED OPERATIONS: CAN WE DO IT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

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**Title and Subtitle**: US - Soviet Combined Operations: Can We Do It?

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**Abstract**: This study investigates the feasibility of conducting US-Soviet combined operations from a military perspective. The emphasis is on identifying differences and similarities between US and Soviet operational level of war concepts and coalition principles. Also investigated are the historical examples of US and Soviet military cooperation during WWII. Finally, two case studies are included to provide examples of each nation's current application of their combined operations concepts. For the US, the example is the multinational coalition of Desert Shield/Storm (1990-1991); for the Soviets, it is their intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989). There are significant differences between US and Soviet approaches to the operational level of war and coalition warfare which have the potential to adversely affect the outcome of military operations. However, US concepts appear to exhibit sufficient flexibility to mitigate the effects of these discrepancies. The study contains the details of these differences, their potential effects on the outcomes of military operations, postulated command and control and liaison structures for the conduct of combined operations between the US and the Soviets, and recommendations for further study.

**Subject Terms**: Combined operations; coalition warfare; command and control; US - Soviet comparison; US operational level of war; Soviet operational art; Persian Gulf Crisis: Afghanistan; Desert Storm/Desert Shield

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This study investigates the feasibility of conducting US - Soviet combined operations from a military perspective. The emphasis is on identifying differences and similarities between US and Soviet operational level of war concepts and coalition principles. Also investigated are the historical examples of US and Soviet military cooperation during World War II. Finally, two case studies are included to provide examples of each nation's current application of their combined operations concepts. For the US, the example is the multinational coalition of Desert Shield/Storm (1990-1991); for the Soviets, it is their intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989).

There are significant differences between US and Soviet approaches to the operational level of war and coalition warfare which have the potential to adversely affect the outcome of military operations. However, US concepts appear to exhibit sufficient flexibility to mitigate the effects of these discrepancies. The study contains the details of these differences, their potential effects on the outcomes of military operations, postulated command and control and liaison structures for the conduct of combined operations between the US and the Soviets, and recommendations for further study.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction............................................................................................... 1  
  
  Background  
  Purpose  
  Assumptions  
  Definition of Terms  
  Limitations  
  Delimitations  
  Significance of the Study  
  Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations  

Chapter Two: Review of Literature................................................................................ 16  
  
  Operational Concepts and Procedures  
  Combined Operations Concepts  
  History of US - Soviet Military Cooperation  
  in World War II  
  Case Studies  
  Summary  

Chapter Three: Methodology.......................................................................................... 24  
  
  General  
  Methodology  

Chapter Four: Soviet - American Military Cooperation in  
  World War II.................................................................................................................. 31  
  
  Introduction  
  Operation FRANTIC  
  Air Operations in Support of Soviet Ground Movement
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Natives Participating in the Multinational Coalition,
Persian Gulf Crisis, 1990-1991.................................124
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are no longer our enemies.

General John Galvin\(^1\)
NATO Supreme Allied Commander, 1990

...the USSR would regard NATO as a partner in the all-European security system against external threat...This might create conditions under which it would be useful for NATO and the USSR to join a uniform military organization.

General Geliy Viktorovich Batenin\(^2\)
Soviet disarmament expert/CPSU Central Committee, 1990

...Russia may be a potential ally against emerging new threats to the West.

William Lund\(^3\)

Background

In the not-too-distant past, no one would have dared suggest the US and the USSR could be political allies, let alone military ones. While the two superpowers have not joined forces in a military
operation since World War II, political events of the past year have brought the two nations closer together politically.

Less than two years ago, the Berlin Wall stood. Eastern Europe remained hidden behind the Iron Curtain. Not long before that, then-US President Ronald Reagan characterized the Soviet Union as "the evil empire." The Cold War appeared to be in full force as it had been for forty years.

In November of 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. Less than a year later, on 3 October 1990, East and West Germany formally reunified into a single nation. That occasion marked perhaps the most symbolic gesture of superpower cooperation and perception of shared interests.

The relationship between the US and the USSR was changing and continued to change as this study was conducted. A flurry of diplomatic and political cooperation between the former adversaries prompted Europeans to ponder the viability of NATO; announcement of unilateral troop reductions by the Soviets; and American congressional leaders to call for ideas on ways to spend the potential "peace dividend."

World hopes for a lengthy peace shattered on 2 August 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf. World condemnation was swift. Perhaps most surprising was the decision to issue a joint statement of condemnation by the two superpowers—a decision made the very day of the invasion.4
The story of superpower cooperation in the first few days of the invasion was a fascinating tale of diplomatic agreement. Throughout the early days of the crisis, Soviet efforts focused on persuading their former ally, Iraq, to abandon its plans to annex Kuwait. Cooperation between the two superpowers in the Gulf crisis remained political throughout. Twelve United Nations (UN) resolutions condemning the invasion with the goal of forcing Iraq's eventual withdrawal passed, largely due to the perception of shared interests by the US and the USSR and their common voting on those resolutions.

Significantly, statements made by the Soviet leadership in October of 1990 hinted at the possibility of future military involvement in the Gulf Crisis. As the situation remained stalemated, then-Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze was quoted as warning: "UN actions could include the involvement of Soviet troops under the flag, under the auspices of the United Nations." As US troops made up a large bulk of the foreign troops deployed to the Gulf, any Soviet military action in support of the crisis would imply some form of military cooperation with the US.

It would not be the first time US and Soviet military forces have cooperated, but it would be the first time in forty years of an adversarial relationship. The Soviet Union, of course, was a partner in what some termed "The Grand Alliance" of World War II while others, notably the US Chief of the Military Mission to Moscow at the time, termed it the "Strange Alliance." While the number of military operations actually conducted between the US and the USSR during
World War II was limited, and the conduct of these operations frequently occurred in a less than friendly environment, the fact remains the US and the USSR share a chapter in their respective military histories.

If the idea of US-Soviet combined military operations still seems far-fetched, consider this: the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Committee for State Security (KGB) have participated in joint international counternarcotics operations, including those with such capitalistic partners as Great Britain. The KGB and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have agreed to exchange data on terrorist groups, while the MVD already cooperates with the US on training and tradecraft in support of counternarcotics operations. If the superpowers' super-secret intelligence organizations can work together, is some form of future military cooperation improbable?

Purpose

My purpose is to provide a starting point for thinking about US - USSR combined military operations. In the past, we studied the Soviet Union as an adversary. When we study the Soviet military--its techniques, procedures, and concepts--from an adversarial point of view, we approach the study differently than if we studied it from the perspective of a potential ally. When studying an ally, we look for strengths to exploit and weaknesses to avoid. When studying an adversary, we look for strengths to avoid and weaknesses to exploit to our own advantage. For adversaries, we plan to counter their
doctrine and warfighting concepts; for allies, we study how to capitalize on their strengths and minimize their weaknesses.

In considering the Soviet Union as a potential ally, we need to reconsider the differences and similarities between their warfighting concepts and ours. In this thesis, I intend to identify the similarities which could facilitate conduct of combined operations and differences which could obstruct their conduct. In so doing I intend to answer the question:

Are US and Soviet approaches to the operational level of war and combined operations sufficiently compatible to enable them to conduct combined military operations?

Assumptions

The following assumptions are critical to the study. With a subject as topical, and therefore volatile, as this, assumptions take on increased importance. Certain assumptions about the future status of the USSR and its relationships with the US were critical to the premise of the study and are explained below.

1. No world crisis will occur to cause either superpower to revert to Cold War attitudes. During the Cold War, each country viewed the other as its most likely and immediate adversary in an armed conflict. As discussed above, these attitudes appear to be changing slowly. While neither country considers the other to be an actual ally (as the opening quotations indicate), neither does either country consider the other its most immediate threat. For the
purposes of this study, we must assume this period of cooperation will continue and external events will not prevent its continuance.

2. Likewise, it is essential to the study to assume no internal crisis will cause the Soviet Union to reverse the current trend of seeking closer ties with Western and developed countries. The Soviet Union needs western technology and currency to rebuild its ailing economy. This need for western aid led, at least initially, to agreement on German reunification: West Germany agreed to pay the Soviet Union some $8 billion for troop relocation.\(^8\) It is not likely the Soviet Union will solve its economic problems alone. However, with the internal dissension characterizing current Soviet politics, this assumption is, admittedly, threatened. A resurgence of conservatism could derail closer US-Soviet ties. I believe such a situation would be temporary as the magnitude of Soviet economic problems dictates some foreign assistance eventually.

3. The Soviet Union will remain a viable player in world politics. At least some portion of the Soviet Union will continue to exist as Soviet Russia. Certainly the desire of the current Soviet leadership to retain control over the Union as a single "union of socialist republics" was indicated during the course of this study. The final outcome of the attempts by the Baltic states and others to achieve independence from the Moscow government was unknown during this writing. The intent of the government seemed clear as it deployed military forces to the Baltic to enforce national law in January 1991.
4. The US and the USSR will continue to identify mutual interests as they identified shared political interests in the Gulf Crisis. At some point, the US and USSR may identify these mutual interests as vital interests and contemplate the use of military force to protect them. Combined US - Soviet military operations will then be required. While not all interests of the two superpowers will coincide in the future, the past two years have seen enough instances of superpower perception of shared interests to make this assumption valid.

Definition of Terms

Whenever comparing and contrasting the ideas of two nations, the definition of terms becomes critical. In this case, when the two nations under study do not share the same language, the problem of precise definition grows. This study is divided into two parts to mitigate these definition problems.

Part I includes those chapters outlining the scope of the study, in which the Soviet definition of terms is irrelevant (chapters one through three). In these chapters, I will use only US terms and definitions. Definitions are taken from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. These terms are those essential for understanding the scope, purpose and methodology of the study.

In Part II, I deal with the body of the study: presenting the results of research and my conclusions. In this part, understanding
Soviet terminology is crucial. I present the Soviet terms with their definitions as they occur in the text. Part II consists of Chapters Four through Seven.

Part I terms and definitions follow:

1. **Combined Operations.** An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.\(^9\) (The US further delineates between alliance and coalition warfare; these terms will be explained in Chapter Five.)

2. **Command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.\(^10\)

3. **Joint.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service participate.\(^11\)

4. **Tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objective assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.\(^12\)

5. **Operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.\(^13\)
6. **Strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan.\(^1\)4

**Limitations**

The following limitations impacted on the study. The significance of each is explained individually.

1. Not all relevant Soviet source material is available in English translations. This limitation is inherent in any study of a foreign country when the researcher is not fluent in the foreign language of the country under study. Translations of the most important works were generally available; they exist as the result of the US' long interest in the Soviets as the most capable and likely threat to US interests. In this regard, the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas offered invaluable assistance in helping me obtain translations.

2. In spite of the US' long-term interest in the Soviet Union, the very nature of that interest ensures source material is limited. The countries were, and to a large extent, remain, adversaries. Thus, they do not share information as readily as allies usually do. The traditional lack of a free press and government control of the Soviet media through the years further serves to restrict the source material available. These facts combine to mean some information of
interest to the study was simply not available to anyone outside the Soviet government.

In other cases, available sources reflected significant political bias. Because of the limited source material for some aspects of the study, I used the material anyway. As much as possible, I sought to overcome the effects of bias by finding corroborating sources and discussing the credibility of sources with experts, such as people in the Foreign Military Studies Office.

3. Few formal, authoritative and prescriptive US documents exist concerning combined operations. The few existing documents were available to me through the Combined Doctrine Office and the Center for Army Tactics, both part of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Because these documents were often in draft form, they did not reflect final and approved guidance. They did show the current US military thought on the subject and provided an indication of the probable direction of final documents.

4. Current events change rapidly. A study such as this cannot be totally dependent on the current situation or it could never be completed. This study was based on the world situation as of 1 March 1991. As much as possible, I have tried to consider the effects of current situations which differ from the cut-off date, but readers should realize time was a limitation in this study.

5. US and Soviet military concepts are changing. Again, this study was based on current published military thought as of 1 March 1991. Some comments on the evolving thought are germane. For the US, "AirLand Battle - Future" will explore the demands of warfare in
the 21st century. For the Soviets, the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" portends a more defensive, deterrent strategy. Regardless, seeds for both future concepts are contained in current concepts. Also, official military thought evolves slowly. For any country, it takes time to conceive, develop, promulgate, and train change. Therefore, current literature on present concepts should suffice for this study and for the near future.

6. There are few historical examples of US-Soviet combined military operations. Though technically allies in World War II, the US and the Soviets tended to operate independently. Additionally, access to primary source Soviet documentation on this subject was not available for this study.

Delimitations

Certain restrictions were required to ensure the scope of the study was manageable and meaningful within the time constraints available. These delimitations were also necessary to ensure the study remained coherent for the reader as well. Research and investigation into the ability, techniques and potential of combined operations between the US and the USSR are in their infancy. This study was never intended to answer all aspects of the problem, but simply to begin discussion. Specific recommendations for potential follow-on research are included in Chapter Seven. The most significant delimitations follow:
1. The study focused on operational concepts, missions, organizations, command and control, combined operations, and methods of coordination. Logistics and details of related combat support functions, such as intelligence exchange, fires planning, airspace management, deception, and others, were consciously omitted to narrow the scope of the study. Each of these functions could support another series of studies. Rather, this study attempted to describe in broad terms the differences and similarities between Soviet and American operational concepts and how these could impact on their ability to conduct combined military operations. Because of the lack of historical examples and the lack of current literature on this topic, a broad approach seemed best.

2. Air operations were included only as they applied to support of ground operations. Naval operations and Naval support were not included. The complexity of naval operations was beyond the scope of this study, although naval operations certainly are a part of the operational level of war. The closer relationship of air and ground combat, as implied by the title of current US doctrine, "AirLand Battle," mandated the consideration of air and ground operations but not naval.

3. Scenario development was irrelevant to the study. The potential scenarios under which the US and the USSR might feel compelled to conduct combined operations warrant a separate study. Current events indicate such scenarios are possible. This study focused on the ability to conduct such operations; not whether or why such operations should be conducted.
4. Historical research was limited as few actual combined military operations were conducted. Since this study did not address logistics, lend-lease operations were not addressed. Also, since this study did not address naval operations, US-Soviet convoy and anti-submarine cooperative efforts were not included. The primary operations addressed included: shuttle-bombing operations by American forces from Soviet air bases (OPERATION FRANTIC); air bombing in support of Soviet ground forces towards the end of the European portion of World War II; and the link-up of American and Soviet ground forces along the Elbe River. The Elbe link-up operation was the only example of a US-Soviet ground forces combined operation, yet it posed significant limitations when applied to this study. However, it was the only such operation conducted and merited inclusion for that reason. Chapter Four deals with each operation and its relevance to the study.

Significance of the Study

As described earlier, current events indicate the US and the Soviet Union have perceived that they may share mutual interests on occasion. Recent remarks by the leaders of both countries make real the possibility the two nations could consider conducting combined military operations. This study addresses the feasibility of such operations and serves as a starting point for discussion concerning the conduct of such operations.
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

This study found that the answer to the research question is a qualified "yes." There are similarities between US and Soviet concepts on a basic level. There are significant differences in the methods each country uses to execute its operational level concepts. Many of these differences have the potential to adversely affect combined operations or, as a minimum, to significantly degrade the effectiveness of those combined operations. Essentially, it is the flexibility inherent in US concepts for combined operations which makes US - Soviet combined operations possible. Chapter Seven contains the analysis which supports these conclusions, as well as recommendations for future studies.
FINDNOTES


9Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1989), 76.

10Ibid., 77.

11Ibid., 196.

12Ibid., 362.

13Ibid., 264.

14Ibid., 349.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

For the purposes of discussion, I classified the literature used in this study by content and format. The content categories included: operational concepts and procedures; combined operations concepts; historical examples; and case study materials. ("Case study materials" refer to the two modern examples of the application of the operational level of war: the US deployment to the Persian Gulf and the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.) Format categories included: books, articles, unpublished papers such as theses and dissertations, and government publications such as US Army Field Manuals and Foreign Broadcast Information Service translations of Soviet materials.

The following discussion identifies the adequacy or inadequacy of available source materials by content category; the types of materials which were most useful by format category; and specific materials which deserve special acknowledgement.

Operational concepts and procedures

Materials included in this category dealt with each country's view of the operational level of war and the warfighting methods
required at that level of war. Both authoritative and prescriptive official government publications, as well as opinions expressed in military periodicals were valuable in studying this category. Overall access to source materials for both US and Soviet views was good.

Current US authoritative and prescriptive material exists for the conduct of war at the operational level. These materials are readily available in the form of Army and Air Force Field Manuals and Joint Chief of Staff Publications. Unfortunately, the actual theory guiding the conduct of war at the operational level does not have a long history in the US.¹ Much more material exists concerning the tactical level of war. Some of the manuals purporting to cover the operational level of war do, in fact, emphasize tactics.

For more information on US operational theory, I relied on military periodicals. Of particular use in this field was the March 1989 edition of Military Review, which was devoted entirely to a discussion of US concepts of operational art.

Soviet operational art has been evolving as such since the 1920s. Access to Soviet historical and current writings on the theory behind their concept of the operational level of war is available through JPRS and FBIS translations. Most of this material, however, is in the form of military magazine articles, sometimes written more to stimulate debate than as prescriptive guidance. Limited access to prescriptive materials, such as the 1987 version of Taktika (Tactics) and the Voroshilov Academy lectures in translations does exist and was available for this study.
To supplement the prescriptive materials, develop the theory, and understand the Soviet writings in a western context, I relied on military periodicals again (such as Military Review and its annual edition on the Soviet threat). Of even greater use to the study were the articles written by the Soviet Army Studies Office which contain both current and historical analyses of the development of Soviet operational art.

In summary, there is a wealth of material available on this subject in the form of both military official documents and expository articles in military publications.

Combined operations concepts

These materials dealt with concepts and procedures guiding the conduct of combined military operations, also known as coalition warfare. For both countries, few prescriptive documents exist. In fact, it appears much less has been written on this subject in both countries than on the subject of operational art.

In the US, the problems of combined operations are receiving emphasis now. Most of the official prescribing documents are only available in draft form. I was able to obtain copies of these from the Combined Doctrine Office and the Concepts and Doctrine Directorate. US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. This presented an obvious limitation: approved prescriptive guidance on the conduct of combined operations is limited. However,
the draft publications do provide insight into the current thinking and trends impacting on the subject.

Similarly, few substantive articles have been written on the subject of combined operations for military periodicals. Many times, the subject of combined operations is included with that of joint operations to the detriment of the former.

The same limitation applies to the Soviet side. I found no prescriptive material concerning the conduct of coalition warfare. It appears the nature of recent plans for the conduct of such warfare meant the Soviets did not view coalition warfare as a problem. After all, under the Warsaw Pact, potential Soviet coalition partners were equipped with Soviet equipment and employed in accordance with Soviet operational concepts and command and control.

While current Soviet prescriptive documentation may be lacking, there are selected historical writings which applied. Soviet writings concerning World War II dealt with many facets of the coalition warfare practiced in that era, including the Soviet coalition with its Western partners; its Eastern partners; and analysis of problems existing in the Axis coalition. As stated before, the current Soviet reliance on World War II for lessons for today means these writings are valid for current studies of Soviet thinking on coalition warfare.

For both countries, then, relatively little has been written and officially approved on current methods of conducting combined operations or coalition warfare. Reliance on historical analyses for the Soviet view and draft documents for the US was necessary. For
the purposes of this study, these materials were sufficient and available.

**History of US - Soviet Military Cooperation in World War II**

As stated before, the US and the Soviet Union attempted to conduct few military operations together. For those they did attempt, US secondary and primary source materials were available. Fewer Soviet materials were available and many of these were secondary sources.

Of particular note is John Deane's book, *The Strange Alliance*. Deane served as the Chief of the US Military Mission to Moscow during World War II. His book was invaluable in providing a first-hand account of the military cooperative efforts of the war. He covers not only the major operations, but the details of coordination which must be effected to ensure the success of the major operations.

Primary US source materials also consisted of unit histories of those units involved in military cooperative efforts with the Soviets. These materials provided excellent insight into the attitudes of those involved in the efforts, as well as first-hand accounts of what actually happened. Additional information was available through secondary sources--books and unpublished papers such as theses--to put the events into historical perspective.

The relative wealth of information on the US view of these historical events was not matched on the Soviet side. Many of the
same articles used in researching the Soviet view of coalition warfare applied to this subject also. They were not plentiful. This may be attributable to the historical Soviet reluctance to admit they received Western assistance during the war.

Case Studies

Information dealing with current events presents its own limitation: there is no historical perspective. The two case studies were taken from current events: the US' military involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan from late 1979 to 1989. In both case studies, insufficient time has elapsed for the historians to have analyzed the actions. This limitation applies even more so to military operations for which "operations security" prevents the publication of much relevant information.

This said, the case studies used in this study were intended to provide limited insights in specific topics only. Sufficient information concerning command and control relationships was available. This was the focus of the case study analysis; information was, therefore, sufficient for the purposes of this study.

For the US, information was obtained through open sources--mostly civilian press reports. Since the operation in the Persian Gulf was ongoing during the conduct of this study, official verification of the information found in open sources was not available. Since this
subject was only a small part of the overall study, the limitation is not significant.

For the Soviets, information is slightly more available as long as one is satisfied with Western analyses of Soviet order of battle (troop lists). The fact that the Soviets did not win the conflict in Afghanistan means official histories are limited—as were our official histories in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam. The length of the conflict, however, gave Western analysts time to study and develop conclusions concerning Soviet organizations involved in the war. These were available and formed the basis of the case study.

Summary

Overall, source materials for this study were adequate and varied. They consisted of both military and civilian publications; official and unofficial government documents; primary and secondary sources. For the Soviet studies, both original source material and Western analysis of that material were available. (Soviet original source material was available through translations.)
ENDNOTES

1L.D. Holder, "Educating and Training for Theater Warfare," Military Review, September 1990, 86. As Holder points out, the 1982 version of the US Field Manual 100-5, Operations, "introduced" the concept of the operational level of war. In 1986, the field manual was updated to develop the operational level concept more fully.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

General

The study methodology is divided into four broad phases: historical research; current theory research; practical application research; and synthesis. My overall goal was to compare and contrast US and Soviet concepts of the operational level of war and combined operations, delineating similarities and differences. From this, I developed conclusions concerning the feasibility of US - Soviet combined military operations.

To support the development of the similarities and differences between US and Soviet concepts, I looked at historical examples of our previous attempts at military cooperation. I looked at historical examples as they provided insight into the types of problems encountered in the past and the willingness or unwillingness of the players to solve them mutually.

I turned next to contemporary concepts to identify the current theories which would impact on the two nations' ability to conduct such operations now. I looked at a contemporary military operation for each country to see how the concepts were implemented. For the US, I used the 1990-1991 deployment to the
Persian Gulf. For the Soviets, I used the 1979-1989 conflict in Afghanistan.

My final step was the synthesis of the information obtained in the previous three steps. Compiling the information and looking at it as a whole led to the development of conclusions to answer the research question. The steps are explained more fully below.

**Method**

My first step was to look at historical examples of US-Soviet military cooperation. The only examples of this occurred in World War II. This is fortuitous: even today, the Soviets derive lessons from the "Great Patriotic War," as they term that part of World War II conducted against Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers. As Christopher Donnelly wrote in 1988, "Unlike any Western army, the Soviet Army today is modelled very largely on the experience gained in the 1941-5 war...most developments in tactics or doctrine even today are justified by reference to the experience of the war." Therefore, any study of current Soviet military thought must account for the historical underpinnings found in the events of World War II.

The historical examples do not, however, serve to identify specific similarities and differences in the conduct of military operations between the US and the Soviet Union which can be applied to current operations. Rather, the historical examples provide insights into the potential types of problems which can occur.
when the militaries of two nations with differing political ideologies attempt to cooperate.

The political ideologies of the US and, to a large extent, the USSR, are essentially the same today as they were during World War II. Since the militaries of both nations remain subordinate to the civilian leadership (more or less), the continuity in political ideology is necessary to the study. If the political systems of either country had changed drastically, the historical examples would not necessarily have the same significance.

Using these historical examples, we can look not only for potential problem areas, but for the willingness or unwillingness of the players to solve them. We can look for potential sources of friction between the US and the Soviets as they attempted military cooperation in the past to see if any of these causes might still exist. These examples and conclusions drawn from them are summarized in Chapter Four.

Historical examples were not sufficient for this study as described above. Operational level of war concepts for each nation have evolved since World War II. Research into current operational concepts formed the next step in the methodology.

Next, I compared and contrasted US and Soviet operational level of war concepts with the goal of identifying similarities and differences. Since the study was intended to serve as an initial look at the feasibility of combined military operations between the two nations, I looked at broad categories. These categories included: operational level concepts; missions; organizations; concepts guiding
the employment of air in support of ground operations; command and control concepts; and methods of effecting coordination. I also looked at each nation's current concepts of the conduct of combined operations or coalition warfare.

Research provided objective data consisting of information gained from prescriptive documents (such as military manuals and military course materials) and opinions expressed in military periodicals.

Finally, I compared and contrasted the data obtained for each country to identify the differences and similarities. In some cases, I was able to confirm my findings through review of discussions in military publications and periodicals. I also discussed my findings with experts in the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth. In other cases, the views expressed are based on my analysis. Presentation of the research data and my findings are included in Chapter Five.

The involvement of both countries in recent operational level military actions presented the opportunity to research the practical application of the conceptual material presented in Chapter Five. I used the US deployment with a multinational force to the Persian Gulf as a model of potential implementation of the US' concept of operational level organization for combat. I used the Soviet 40th Army experience in Afghanistan as the equivalent Soviet model. These case studies and the findings I drew from them are included in Chapter Six.
My next step was to analyze all the information and findings developed in the previous steps and answer the research question:

Are US and Soviet approaches to the operational level of war and combined operations sufficiently compatible to enable them to conduct combined military operations?

My final step was to identify possible methods of coordination to use in effecting the military cooperation.

Conclusions are based on my analysis. It was not sufficient to simply count the number of similarities and differences to determine the compatibility between the concepts of the two nations. Instead, I looked at each difference and asked the following test questions to determine the potential effect of the difference on the conduct of military operations:

1. Does the difference have the potential to seriously and adversely affect operations?
2. Can the difference be avoided or mitigated? Would avoiding or mitigating the difference seriously disrupt operations?
3. Do the historical examples provide any indications of the difference's potential effect on operations; or the willingness/unwillingness of the players to take the measures necessary to overcome the difference?
4. Do the case studies provide any information relevant to the ability of the players to adjust to the difference?
5. What is the potential cumulative effect of this difference when combined with the other identified differences on the conduct of military operations?

The compilation of my answers to test question five formed the basis for the conclusions expressed in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET - AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION IN WORLD WAR II

Of all the intangibles of coalition command and control, mutual trust between coalition partners is perhaps the most important.

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Introduction

World War II represents the only historical significant instance of Soviet-American military cooperation. It occurred relatively recently (fifty years ago). The war had a profound effect on the development of current Soviet doctrine. Its postwar aftermath set the political stage for the next fifty years: the rapid transition from ally to adversary and the solidification of the Soviet-American Cold War relationships that formed the backdrop for world events.

This chapter seeks to detail the efforts of the Soviets and Americans to coordinate their military efforts and conduct coalition warfare during World War II. Four categories of operations serve as examples, each covered in a separate section within this chapter: the shuttle-bombing operation known as FRANTIC; air bombing in

31
support of the Soviet ground advance; combat support operations; and the link-up of American and Soviet ground forces on the Elbe River. Each set of operations demonstrates the detailed coordination required to effect combined operations.

Combat service support operations epitomized by the Lend-Lease program are not included for three reasons. First, logistics is beyond the scope of this study. Second, the wealth of material available and the complexity of Lend-Lease operations would overwhelm this study. People are generally familiar with Lend-Lease; this study seeks to discuss lesser-known instances of military cooperation between the two nations. Finally, because this study did not address naval operations, US-Soviet naval cooperative efforts (convoy and anti-submarine operations) also were not included.

A fifth section of this chapter discusses the Soviet perspective of the World War II Soviet-American cooperative efforts. Limitations on the amount of Soviet material available were discussed in Chapter One. Significantly, the available materials discuss generalities rather than details. Those generalities are described here in an attempt to balance the picture.

Conclusions are found in the last section of this chapter. Generally, Soviet-American efforts at military coordination were conducted against a political backdrop which did not always provide the trust and confidence necessary for immediate success. Also, military operations tended to be less than truly combined. For example, Operation FRANTIC turned out to be primarily an American operation with American goals, however much the original planners
had hoped it would be different. The link-up at the Elbe River was more an example of two entirely independent operations culminating on a shared objective. The very independent nature underlying these operations points to the significant problems inherent in coalition warfare which will be explored in detail in subsequent chapters: the issues of control and compromise.

Throughout this chapter, reference is made to the Military Missions. To facilitate coordination, the Allies exchanged Military Missions--teams of senior level military representatives and their staffs exchanged between the Soviet Union and other allies. The US Military Mission to the Soviet Union was located in Moscow and for most of the war, headed by Major General John R. Deane. Mission personnel were not exchanged at operational levels.

**Operation FRANTIC**

Operation FRANTIC was the code name given to the shuttle-bombing operation conducted by US air elements between airbases in Italy or England and the Soviet Union. The project involved 1,030 US aircraft, flying 2,207 sorties\(^2\) in a four-month period from June through September 1944\(^3\). The commonly announced objectives of the operation were: to allow US forces greater flexibility in bombing German targets by eliminating lengthy return trips; and to demonstrate the strength of the Alliance. The operation was supervised primarily by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF).
Historians writing on the subject disagree concerning the effectiveness of FRANTIC missions. In his book, *The Poltava Affair*, Glenn B. Infield argues most of the targets could have been hit without the Soviet bases.\(^4\) Deane, in *The Strange Alliance*, disagrees, averring Operation FRANTIC allowed the destruction of targets which otherwise would have been immune to the Allies and contributed to the demoralization of the Germans.\(^5\) Unpublished government documents, consisting of unit histories, seem to take the middle ground, stating tactical benefits were minor, but the strategic benefits of demonstrating tangible Soviet-American cooperation outweighed the logistical costs.\(^6\) MAAF documents continue in this vein, stating that the lessons in coordination justified the costs.\(^7\)

Coordination for Operation FRANTIC and its predecessor operation began as early as 1942.\(^8\) Most efforts were initiated by the Americans or the British, not by the Soviets. After surviving the initial shock of the German attack in 1941 and achieving some operational successes in late 1942, the Soviet attitude toward Anglo-American assistance seemed to change from a willingness to cooperate to a more cautious approach. The Soviets still evinced interest in acquiring western equipment and technology but appeared to be less enthusiastic about accepting the presence of Western troops on their soil.

On the other hand, American interest in Operation FRANTIC and its equivalents through the years, seemed, to some, to be prompted by "ulterior motives." Besides the operational-tactical military reason (to enable bombing of German targets otherwise
located beyond the range of Allied bombers) and the strategic rationale (to undermine German national will through tangible demonstration of Soviet-American cooperation), there appeared to be another pressing American concern. The US saw Operation FRANTIC as a stepping stone to a more vital operation: acquiring airbase rights in the Maritime Provinces of Siberia. Siberian bases would aid significantly in the US' war against Japan.

The Soviets, concerned over the possibility of opening a second front on their eastern border, were not enthusiastic over the idea and undertook a series of delaying tactics to preclude the American aims. Operation FRANTIC, then, took on something of a "consolation" effort; a "better than nothing" approach to Soviet-American air operations cooperation.

While the motivations for Operation FRANTIC appeared to be many and diverse, both within and without the American government, Stalin finally approved the concept in February 1944. The Americans proposed an initial contingent of 120 to 360 heavy bombers per iteration, to fly five or six missions per month from England or Italy. The bombers would hit targets enroute both to and from Soviet bases; later this would expand to include missions from Soviet airbases, returning to Soviet airbases. The Soviets would supply fuel from increased Lend-Lease shipments and bombs for those missions conducted after bombers arrived at the Soviet airbases. The Soviets also insisted on providing the air defense for the bases. Three Ukrainian bases were eventually chosen: Poltava (site of the headquarters), Mirgorod and Piryatin. All bases had been
occupied by the German Luftwaffe earlier in the war and were extensively damaged. Soviet labor provided the effort necessary to reconstruct the bases; Americans provided the materials. In four months, the airbases were rebuilt. Several authors cited favorably the enthusiasm and endurance demonstrated by the Soviet labor battalions, often composed of women.9

This may have been the only unqualified compliment paid to US - USSR teamwork in the operation. From the beginning, the American writings on this subject cite frustration and impatience with their Soviet counterparts. Deane gave some possible explanations for this disappointment. He emphasized throughout his book the centralization rampant in the Soviet Army. For example, he cited efforts to coordinate ordnance requirements, a task Deane delegated to his ordnance staff officer. On the Soviet side, even questions involving ordnance issues, much less decisions, were referred all the way to Deane's Soviet counterpart, Colonel General Nikitin. Even at the general officer level, Deane stated he could not "pick up a telephone" and coordinate with his counterparts in the Soviet Army. Instead, he had to present his questions at formal meetings, participate in their discussion, and wait for answers which came only after the meeting terminated and everyone returned to their offices. Replies could take days or even weeks.10

Deane also cited the lack of standard office equipment, such as typewriters, as a factor impeding coordination. Finally, he cited Soviet pride, which he viewed as preventing Soviet officials from
admitting they could not do something even when the request was patently unreasonable.\textsuperscript{11}

Deane's observations as Chief of the US Military Mission to Moscow are important as they contribute to explaining the difficulties encountered in effecting coordination between the Americans and Soviets. The problems cited by Deane demonstrate the potential results when disparate systems and peoples are forced to work together. Coordination, as Americans practice it, today and in World War II, is not universally accepted. Even Western European nations often register surprise at the latitude given to American subordinates to make decisions. Certainly these differences were exacerbated when Americans began to deal with a totalitarian form of government, such as Stalin's.

Deane's second point, concerning the lack of equipment, is telling. The Soviet Union of World War II was a nation which had recently been forcibly modernized by Stalin. Throughout history (and World War II was no exception), Russia tended to lag behind the Western nations in the area of technology. The difference in technological development--what equipment was and was not "standard"--combined with a nation's natural reluctance to admit any signs of "backwardness" may have resulted in misunderstandings and delays which only served to frustrate the more technologically advanced partner. This aspect of Soviet-American relations will be a recurring theme throughout the study of the cooperative efforts of World War II.
Operation FRANTIC was a complex operation: logistically, politically, operationally and technologically. In his dissertation, "Reluctant Allies" (1985), Daniel P. Bolger identified no fewer than 10 major "fields" requiring coordination; each of these 10 fields had its own sublist of matters requiring coordination. As examples of the types of matters requiring coordination, Bolger's list follows: airbase selection; logistics; introduction of US personnel into Soviet territory; language training; base operations/construction efforts; communications and air traffic procedures; meteorological support; intelligence and reconnaissance; public relations; American reciprocities for Soviet support; and target selection. For each area requiring coordination, US and Soviet officials had to decide whether to adopt one or the other of the existing systems to deal with the problem or to create a new procedure. Obviously, even this four-month operation required a significant amount of "groundwork" before the first mission could fly.

Logistically, the original concept was simple. The Soviets would provide logistical support. The Americans would increase Lend-Lease shipments of oil and fuel to cover the support to FRANTIC. Almost immediately, they had to resolve sidebar issues. For example, aviation fuel was originally supplied in 10,000-gallon drums provided by the British. The British had a shortage of these drums. Therefore, a procedure was required to ensure the prompt return of the drums in order to receive more fuel. A two-party operation quickly turned into a three-party operation.
There was also a problem with the bombs, which originally the Soviets were to provide for all missions conducted from Soviet airbases. The Soviet casings posed problems for the Americans who said they were "unsuited to the requirements of precision bombing." For the most part, Americans decided to provide their own bombs, although one of the last FRANTIC missions was flown with Soviet ordnance.

Differences in technology continued to occur throughout the operation. Another example concerned procedures to provide medical care for American personnel on Soviet soil. American hospitals were established at each airbase, because, as one document described it, Soviet medicine was at least 50 years behind. Moving on to political issues, more evidence of the complexity of the problems exists. The American failure to identify clear goals for FRANTIC may have been a root cause for some of the confusion, reluctance and frustration experienced on both sides. Certainly the belief of an "ulterior motive" could have colored Soviet willingness to cooperate. Political tensions could only have been exacerbated if, as Bolger states, the Americans sent a former member of the British anti-Bolshevik Expeditionary Force to participate in the initial coordination meetings. Insensitivity to political considerations by military personnel only increases the coordination problems in coalition warfare.

The Soviets are not "guilt-less" in this area either. In retrospect, Special Envoy William A. Harriman cited Stalin's belief in the "inevitable clash" between capitalism and communism as
clouding some of the cooperative efforts of the war.\textsuperscript{17} Even during the operation, Deane felt this conflict existed and sent a message, dated 21 May 1944, saying he believed the Soviets were slow to identify potential targets for FRANTIC because they did not want to credit their success to US shuttle-bombing.\textsuperscript{18}

The operational difficulty in obtaining Soviet cooperation on targets for shuttle-bombing missions was incomprehensible to the Americans and a source of constant aggravation. MAAF histories cite the lack of consensus between the US and USSR on target selection.\textsuperscript{19}

For the first mission, Americans proposed an initial set of targets: aircraft factories at Riga, Latvia and Mielec, Poland; and a Luftwaffe airfield at Galatz, Romania. The Soviets did not agree, preferring the oil refineries at Ploesti, which had been hit much earlier in the war and which, according to MAAF documentation, were accessible without using the Soviet airbases.\textsuperscript{20} The Soviet Air Staff referred Major Deane to the Soviet General Staff, which disapproved the American target selections.\textsuperscript{21} Eventually, the compromise target of a rail marshalling area at Debrecen, Hungary was selected. The delays inherent in the whole process led Deane to devise a procedure whereby the Soviets were informed of American targets and were not asked for concurrence. This, of course, had the effect of making Operation FRANTIC seem even more like an American operation "imposed" on the Soviets than a truly combined operation with mutual aims.

A second source of continuing frustration for the Americans was the difficulty encountered in getting US personnel into Russia.
First, Soviet protests reduced the proposed permanent American contingent by one-third (from just over 2000 to 1400). The Soviets more than made up for this difference by dedicating 1400 of their own personnel to the effort, of which many were mechanics. At least one author, Infield, viewed the Soviet motivation as less than altruistic, stating the Soviet personnel were deliberately rotated through the bases, requiring the Americans to continually train new personnel. This rotation was seen as a deliberate effort by the Soviets to spread the technological knowledge of American bombers throughout the Red Army--a sort of underhanded technology transfer. Although Infield wrote well after the fact, it is obvious distrust is a two-way street.

Eventually the Soviet Union agreed to issue group visas through their agency in Teheran--an unheard of action, according to a MAAF unit history. This remedy worked inconsistently as local Soviet officials in Teheran either never received the new instructions or were so incredulous that they could not cope with them and insisted on individual approvals. Additionally, individual exit visas were almost impossible to obtain for personnel who had entered on a group visa.

Technological differences between the two countries continued to plague the operation. Americans were accustomed to navigating by beacon, which allowed them to fly under variable conditions. Soviets feared the beacons, believing--perhaps with good reason--that they allowed Luftwaffe pilots to "lock on" to the beacon and follow the signals to the airbases.
Soviet anti-air weapons and procedures were also less technologically advanced than those of the Americans. Initially, Americans tended to disbelieve Soviet reluctance to allow certain flights when the Soviets offered the excuse of their own anti-air as a potential threat to American airplanes. In several cases, the Soviets required what the Americans perceived as inordinate advance warning of proposed flights. The Soviets stated they feared Soviet anti-air units would engage the American aircraft. Throughout the operation, this, in fact, did happen: Soviet gunners would sporadically attempt to engage lone American aircraft.  

The issue of Soviet air defense and specific anti-air capabilities came to a head for different reasons shortly after Operation FRANTIC began. On 21 June 1944, the German Luftwaffe attacked the combined airbase at Poltava, destroying 50 American "Flying Fortress" heavy bombers. Approximately 30 Soviets were killed in the attack or died trying to extinguish the flames; two Americans also died.  

In his book, Infield implies that the Soviet High Command allowed the attack on Poltava to happen. Other authors are laudatory concerning Soviet efforts to protect the airbase and the Americans stationed there. Nevertheless, the Soviet response to the attack was inadequate. Soviet aircraft at the time had no night-fighting capability. Soviet air defense weapons were of small caliber, lacked radar, and were not coordinated with searchlight batteries.  

Although the US decided to continue Operation FRANTIC, providing their own air defenses and using fighter aircraft which
were less vulnerable than the heavy bombers, the seeds of distrust were sown. Relations between the Soviets and the Americans began to deteriorate. Soviet restrictions on American servicemen were increased, until the Americans were virtually isolated on the airbases. Ugly incidents between American servicemen and local Soviet women occurred. Americans were caught smuggling disillusioned natives out of the country. Soviet mechanics looted American tools and Soviet guards refused to allow Americans access to their own planes. The distrust of the higher levels reached down to the lowest levels.

In August 1944, reductions of American personnel began at Poltava. The last FRANTIC missions, which dropped supplies to the resistance in Poland (another source of political controversy between the Anglo-American members of the Alliance and the Soviet), were flown in September. Despite the fact that front-line fighting had moved well forward, the base at Poltava remained open in a "limbo" status for one more year, as hopes for the resurrection of FRANTIC were, on the American side, slow to die. Nothing came of these hopes and the base was formally closed in June 1945.

The lessons of Operation FRANTIC demonstrate the complexities of combined operations and the necessity of trust and shared political aims between coalition partners. Operation FRANTIC's goals were ambiguous; in retrospect, it seems an operation born more of political hope than operational necessity.

From Operation FRANTIC the Soviets got the Norden bombsight—a premier piece of American technology—and permission
to operate their own small airbase in Italy. The Americans got a chance to operate on Soviet soil and essentially controlled the missions. The importance of this endeavor should not be underestimated. It represents several "firsts". Among these, the US retained command and control over their own forces even on Soviet territory and virtual autonomy over operations; they were also able to operate their own ground-to-air communications on Soviet soil.\(^3\)

The operation came too late in the war. Soviet fears of being left to fight the German onslaught on their own and doubts about their ability to successfully defeat the Germans had given way to confidence they could win. The Soviets needed American materiel support but were disdainful of American efforts to take charge of operations. It seems that by 1944 the Soviets felt no need to be "friends" with the US—aliies in the American sense of the word. What the Soviets could not control, they ignored. Nowhere was that more apparent than in the next attempted combined air operation: American bombing efforts in support of Soviet ground forces.

Air Operations in Support of Soviet Ground Movement

As the Soviet front moved west and the Anglo-American front moved east, the allies initiated efforts to coordinate air operations. Prior to 1944, no requirement to coordinate such things as bombing lines existed. The Soviets did not employ their long-range bombers in the strategic bombing role. British bomber pilots
flew only at night, while the Soviets had no night capability. The Soviet front was out of range of American aircraft.\textsuperscript{3, 4}

However, the pending convergence of the two fronts brought the Soviet front within American air striking distance in 1944.\textsuperscript{3, 5} The Americans wanted to disrupt and disorganize retreating German forces through air attacks. But coordination was essential to prevent fratricide of allied Soviet soldiers.

The American concept was to exchange liaison officers and teams at field headquarters (Soviet \textit{front} and American army) levels. Liaison teams would bring with them adequate communications to maintain contact with their parent units. The Soviet concept was to exchange liaison teams at higher levels, between the Soviet General Staff and the Allied Air Force Headquarters in Italy and England. All liaison by Americans with the Soviets would remain concentrated through Moscow as the "strategic operations of the Red Air Force were controlled by the General Staff in Moscow."\textsuperscript{3, 6}

That was the official Soviet response to the Chief of the US Military Mission to Moscow. At a lower level, General Vorob'yev of the Second Ukrainian Army, suggested to his MAAF counterpart that they send a liaison detachment to coordinate American air operations with the Soviet ground force movement west.\textsuperscript{3, 7} Vorob'yev's request through command channels to Moscow went unanswered. MAAF (specifically, the US Fifteenth Air Force) took this as assent and sent a team to General Vorob'yev's Headquarters; he let it remain.\textsuperscript{3, 8}

Conflicting reports exist as to the effectiveness of the liaison team. From the unit perspective, the team was ineffective because
Vorob'yev would not let it go forward. From the US Military Mission's perspective, the team concept worked well, as Deane wrote in his book.

Pieced together from two source documents is the following information. The team was composed of approximately 15 servicemen, led by Colonel John F. Batjer. Personnel specialists included: an intelligence officer; interpreter; communications detachment; weather specialist; and airplane mechanic. The team's charter was to:

--Exchange air support information.
--Furnish briefing materials on requested missions.
--Obtain photo reconnaissance to support planned missions.
--Pass on Soviet requests for air strikes to MAAF Headquarters.
--Maintain daily friendly situation maps.
--Exchange information on enemy dispositions.
--Exchange weather information.

The team conferred with its Soviet staff officer counterparts once or twice daily. Team members had direct communications with Fifteenth Air Force and a daily courier plane. This team was unique: liaison with the other Soviet Armies (Third and Fourth Ukrainian) was through Moscow.

Liaison in Moscow centered on one major issue: delineation of an effective bomb line. The concept of the bomb line was simple. As the Soviet offensive progressed, a bomb line would be drawn beyond which (east) the Americans could bomb; behind which (west) the Americans could not bomb for fear of fratricide to Soviet troops.
Problems occurred in timely coordination of the bomb line. Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force sent a representative to Moscow to the Soviet General Staff to facilitate coordination. This method posed problems as the Commander, Fifteenth Air Force was reluctant to send detailed information over the radio for fear the Germans would break the communications codes and know his plans.42

On 7 November 1944, tragedy struck, bringing the bomb line issue to the forefront. American P-38 fighter planes strafed a Soviet convoy, killing, among others, a Soviet Lieutenant General. In the air-to-air fight which followed, two American planes and three Soviet Yaks were lost.43

The Americans apologized for the event, which was caused by a navigational error and a similarity in terrain features between the target area and the area actually attacked. The Soviets issued a letter of protest. In the MAAF histories, the faintest tone of aggrievement occurs as the unit historians pointedly remark that the US had taken the initiative to effect coordination, but had been rejected by Moscow.44

The incident caused the US and the Soviets to reconsider ways to remedy the bomb line problem. The Soviets continued to deny American requests for liaison at lower levels. When informed of the successful liaison in General Vorob'yev's unit, Moscow ordered it to cease immediately.45 Finally, the Americans implemented a daily changing bomb line, based on easily recognizable terrain features. They informed the Soviets of the location of the bomb line daily. Although the Soviets never formally accepted the procedure, they
appeared to give it tacit approval, occasionally requesting adjustments to the line.\textsuperscript{46}

The system worked for awhile, until the Soviets realized the nature of their advance meant the bomb line allowed the British to support the Polish partisans in Poland. Again the conflict between the British and Soviet postwar plans for Poland came to the forefront.\textsuperscript{47} Also the Soviets continued to demonstrate reluctance to provide the necessary information to update the bomb line, as if they did not want their American allies to know the location of Soviet ground forces.

The Yalta Conference yielded yet another compromise solution. A limited zone, 200 miles west of the forward edge of Soviet ground forces, was established. Anglo-American aircrews were to give the Soviets 24 hours advance warning prior to entering the zone. If no objections were received from the Soviets prior to the planned operation, the British and American aircrews would proceed.\textsuperscript{48} Initially, the Soviets disapproved of the procedure; the Americans implemented it anyway. The Soviets formally accepted the procedure in March 1945.\textsuperscript{49} All coordination remained through the Military Mission in Moscow.

On 19 April 1945, per order of the Joint Chiefs, all air support provided to, or in conjunction with, the Soviets was cancelled, unless the Soviets specifically requested such support.\textsuperscript{50} The experiment in operational level air liaison was over.

The result certainly was frustration on the American side. Only rarely did the Soviets request targets. This was also part of the
American frustration: the Soviets did not seem to want American assistance.

Deane described the problem best:

Unless an effective system of co-ordination is established, clashes are unavoidable because of the difficulty of identifying friend from enemy in fast moving air situations...But what constitutes an effective system of co-ordination? It was on this question that we differed violently from our Soviet friends.51

Coordination for Combat Support Operations

Unlike the descriptions of attempts to coordinate air operations with the Soviets, attempts to coordinate combat support operations often met with tangible success. The path to such success was no less frustrating to the Americans, but success seemed to be more often realized.

One of these successes was the exchange of weather data. The Soviet Union, occupying one-sixth of the earth's land mass, was a potential lucrative source of weather data previously unavailable to the Americans. Of particular interest to the US was the data from the Far Eastern areas of the Soviet Union, as this would aid in prosecution of the Pacific War. Early on in the war effort, the two allies exchanged limited weather data (from 30 weather observation sites each) through cooperation extracted from the Soviets in exchange for American Lend-Lease aid.52
In July 1942, also as a result of Lend-Lease and in support of the Alaskan-Siberian air supply route, the Soviets added the weather station of Irkutsk and the Americans added Fairbanks to the list of weather observation sites exchanging data.\(^5\) Six months later, the Soviet Weather Bureau convinced the Soviet Foreign Office to allow a small weather mission to travel to the US, but efforts of this team to coordinate the additions of Moscow and New York to the weather data exchange list failed.\(^5\) Finally, the Allies reached an agreement to exchange weather data from 100 observation sites each: the Soviets were to provide coverage of all of Russia and the Americans were to provide coverage of the US, the Atlantic, and Western Europe.\(^5\)

The issue of the exchange of weather data was significant. It was a logical request on the part of the Americans as allies, especially as the data was vital to prosecution of the war against the Japanese in the Pacific. However, the Soviets were not at war with the Japanese and feared any action which might bring the Japanese to initiate war, causing the Soviets to have to fight a two-front war. Even the almost passive assistance of providing weather data appeared to be viewed by the Soviets as risky and it took over one year for a meaningful quantity of data to begin to be exchanged.

Another critical issue, this one requiring greater compromise on both sides, was communications. Initially, both the US and USSR had laws preventing the operation of radio stations by foreign nations on their sovereign territories. The original method of communication consisted of running communications through Africa.
by teletype. This method took too long. To enable American communications personnel to bring in radio equipment and operate an American radio station, Stalin waived his national law. He reportedly was upset to find Roosevelt could not do the same for American law and did not truly understand the constraints of the American president. This is indicative of the type of misunderstanding that can occur when a democratic government and an autocratic government conduct operations together.

Eventually, the US and the Soviets exchanged teams. Soviet personnel, under the observation of American personnel, operated a communications site capable of receiving encoded traffic for the Americans in Moscow. The Americans, with Soviet personnel observing, operated a similar site in the US Pentagon to support the Soviets.

One other success story concerns the exchange of intelligence data. Initially, the Soviets provided information resulting from their collection efforts on German war industries; the US reciprocated with documentation that the Germans had broken Soviet communications codes. The Soviets were also forthcoming in providing information on the fate of US agents dropped into Czechoslovakia along with timely warnings of unreliable agents. Liaison was conducted between the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in London and the Soviet NKVD (combining some functions of the current KGB and MVD). This intelligence liaison proved so fruitful, consideration was given to establishing an NKVD "mission" in the US and an OSS "mission" in the Soviet Union. The politics of allowing the Soviet
Secret Service to operate on American soil were too much for the US administration to handle, and the proposal was never implemented.

The above issues serve as examples of successful cooperation - cooperation which served to support military operations. In each case, the US and the Soviets overcame obstacles and undertook compromise on both sides. The comparison of these events with the apparent reluctance to cooperate and compromise inherent in the air operations examples poses the question of why? Why were these operations seemingly easier resolved?

Part of the answer lies in timing. Both nations tackled the combat support issues earlier in the war. They initiated air operations later, after the Soviet Union faced and survived the initial German onslaught -- and as her leaders perceived it, largely unassisted by the Anglo-American allies. The perceived need for outside assistance was greater earlier in the war years.

Another answer may lie in the nature of combat operations compared to combat support operations. In a US Army War College study of combined operations, the following observation occurs:

As... proved to be the case in two world wars, support troops... appeared to cooperate more readily with one another than the combat arms.... the cooperative spirit of national support contingents carries over more readily into the allied operational arena than among the more individualistic combat arms of national armies.62

The nature of support arms, accustomed to supporting combat arms may incline them to cooperate more readily. Combat arms,
accustomed as they are to directing operations (and bearing the responsibility for success or failure) may be more comfortable directing than compromising. Perhaps these characteristics of combat arms in relationship to combat support arms carry over to the types of operations each conducts.

Link-up at the Elbe

The last example of Soviet-American military cooperative efforts during World War II concerns the link-up of ground forces on the Elbe River. On 25 April 1945, US Lieutenant Kotzebue defied a recently imposed limit on patrolling and went out in search of the Red Army. He found a lone Soviet cavalryman in the farm village of Leckwitz at 1130 that same day. His patrol continued across the Elbe River to the town of Strekla where the lieutenant met the Commander of the Soviet 175th Rifle Regiment. Thus began the link-up of US and Soviet ground forces along the Elbe River.

As a pure example of a combined ground operation, the link-up at the Elbe is not a particularly good one. The operation was far more a case of the Anglo-American units operating under one commander, General Eisenhower, and the Soviet units operating under another commander, Stalin. Each set of forces moved independently, although they had a common aim: link-up. This operation remains, however, the only example of ground force cooperation from World War II. As such, it deserves attention.
According to Deane, the Big Three—Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin—first coordinated land operations to be mutually supporting in November 1943. This coordination did not imply combined operations. It simply meant the offensives would be timed to produce the maximum benefits to the Allies on both European fronts.

After the landing at Normandy, the Americans wanted to institute daily liaison with the Soviets at the field army level (US army; Soviet front). Once again, the Soviets delayed, saying the time was not yet right, but would be when the ground forces were closer to each other. General Eisenhower, in an effort to establish effective liaison and as a demonstration of good faith, began providing the Soviet General Staff with a three- to four-page summary of his actions, including his future intentions. The Soviets reciprocated by providing the US Military Mission to Moscow with an advance copy of press releases. Understandably, the Americans viewed this as another example of Soviet unwillingness to coordinate.

Deane also stated that Stalin once suggested the creation of a truly combined staff. This staff would assist in coordinating the final operations for the conclusion of the war in Europe and the eventual combined military operations in the Pacific. Stalin had long promised assistance to the American effort against the Japanese; it became obvious throughout the course of the war this assistance would not be available until the German threat against the Soviets was eliminated. (The Soviets did not intervene in the Pacific until August 9, 1945; their invasion of Manchuria coincided with the
American use of the atomic bomb.) For unspecified reasons, the combined staff was never formed.

As the Anglo-American allies moved east and the Soviets, west, it became obvious a link-up operation would be required. On a strategic level, the operations were mired in political maneuverings. The first issue in contention was the question of which country would have the honor of liberating Berlin. Over the objections of the British, Eisenhower offered this "plum" to the Soviets. Plans for the link-up line were geared towards allowing this to happen. Soviet fears of Anglo-American incursions into territory designated for eventual Soviet occupation had to be neutralized.

Another political consideration impacting on the operation concerned the issue of Germany's surrender. Throughout the move to the Elbe, German burgermeisters (mayors) attempted to surrender their towns to the Anglo-American Allies rather than let them fall into Soviet hands. The German general, Himmler, signed a letter to Eisenhower, offering to surrender in the west but continue fighting in the east, until the Americans were ready to join the Germans in the fight against Bolshevism. This only fanned the flames of Soviet suspicion that its Anglo-American partners would sign a separate peace and leave them "high and dry".

Such strategic suspicions marred operational level planning. Coordination for the link-up suffered, occurring relatively late and consisting mostly of ad hoc arrangements. As MacDonald says in his book, The Last Offensive, "Because the Russians throughout the war
had treated the Western Powers with suspicion and distrust, creating a workable liaison machinery had proven impossible."\textsuperscript{69}

As the clock wound down, the Americans and Soviets agreed to establish a common boundary along some well-defined terrain feature to serve as a limit line for advancing ground forces. On 21 April 1945, four days before the actual link-up, the Americans and Soviets agreed on recognition signals: the Soviets would fire red flares and the Americans would fire green. The commands of all the allied nations also agreed on the Elbe - Mulde Rivers as the limits of advance for all sides.

Recognition signals instructions reached some US units as late as two days before actual link-up, 23 April.\textsuperscript{70} Americans also flew armed reconnaissance missions until the 23rd, when they were finally discontinued due to the imminent link-up.\textsuperscript{71} On or about April 24 (the day before the link-up), US ground units received information concerning the aerial bombardment boundary.\textsuperscript{72} Also on this day, US artillery units were constrained to firing only on observed targets after positively identifying them as hostile. Finally, at noon, Eisenhower ordered forces to withdraw from the bridgeheads, leaving only outposts and small patrols forward to greet the Soviets. Allied Headquarters imposed a five-mile limit on patrolling for ground forces. Several American soldiers, eager to be the first to meet the Soviets, ignored the limit. Also mandated by Allied Headquarters was the public relations aspect of the operation: no announcement would be made to the press until an official
announcement was made simultaneously from Washington, Moscow and London.73

Finally, contact was made. Following closely on the heels of Lieutenant Kotzebue's triumph was Lieutenant Robertson, who made his contact at Torgau later the same day. His must have been a more anxious experience as he had no flares with which to give the recognition signal. He resorted to using a hand-made American flag. On the other hand, his Soviet counterpart fired the wrong colored flare.74

The operation concluded as a success: link up was achieved along the rivers, with no casualties. As the higher echelon commanders celebrated the link-up, there were touching moments when the acrimony of previous years seemed to be forgotten. For example, at the meeting between the commanders of the US V Corps and the Soviet 34th Corps, the Soviet commander presented his American counterpart with the battle-stained flag which had flown over Stalingrad; he also wore the US Distinguished Service Cross, awarded for his efforts there.75

Not everyone's memories of working with the Soviets would be so sanguine. Deane concluded this portion of his book with criticisms of the Soviets for never offering ways to improve the coordination. He cited the fact that Roosevelt always travelled to see Stalin and never the opposite; and he deplored the lack of observers on each others' fronts. Deane's concluding comment remains noteworthy: "Well, perhaps we were among friends, but it was difficult to believe."76
The Soviet Perspective

Reading Soviet views of the military aspects of the Alliance, one is struck by the continuous allusions to the political perceptions. In writings of the era, Soviet concern over the political implications of cooperation with the Americans bears a different tone than American acknowledgement of political problems. Soviet authors, even the military, tend to emphasize the significance of the overall conflict underlying all Soviet-American dealings: the issue of capitalism versus Marxism-Leninism.

In this regard, the tone of American accounts even at senior officer level, seems naive, perhaps reflecting the historic American reluctance to link military and political actions. Many American writers commented on the political implications behind military actions, but usually with surprised dismay that political considerations would affect military coordination. Although American writers acknowledged the effect of the issue of who would get credit for allied victory and who would get credit for the capture of major cities (such as Berlin) on military affairs, this is the extent of their effort to link political and military objectives.

Nevertheless, in Soviet writings, the actions are linked and political considerations appeared to define military actions even at lower levels.

In most cases, the Soviets are positive in their comments, citing their impression that World War II proved an unlikely
coalition could work. Lieutenant General S.I. Radziyevskiy wrote in 1985:

Also considered was the Leninist thesis that for winning a victory in the fight against a strong enemy it was essential to utilize any opportunity, even the slightest, to gain an ally, "even a temporary, shakey [sic], unstable, unreliable and conditional one." and "The experience of...the anti-Hitler coalition affirmed one of the most important principles of Marxism-Leninism on the possibility and necessity of successful collaboration among states with different social systems in the aim of resolving the historically arisen tasks of defending the freedom and liberty of peoples."77

General Gribkov set the stage for Radziyevskiy's comment one year earlier by writing "...it, for the first time in history, actually showed the possibility of fruitful collaboration between states with different social systems..."78 The basic conflict between social systems and the requirement to find justifications for the collaboration are unique to the Soviet perspective.

Soviet views of the adequacy of the methods of coordination used by the Alliance during the war also differ from the American views. For the most part, Soviet writings seem to approve of the methods. Soviet writers cite four basic methods of coordination: meetings between heads of state; personal correspondence between heads of state; coordination between the General Staffs of the countries; and coordination between the military missions.

Both Gribkov and Radziyevskiy cited the importance of the meetings between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill. The conferences at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam were mentioned as necessary for
settling not only the questions of military prosecution of the war, but political issues of the "postwar peace settlement." 79

More important perhaps, was the personal correspondence between the three heads of state. Radziyevskiy cited the fact that 800 documents were sent between the three, often containing classified information. 80

Of General Staff-level coordination, Marshal Zhukov had this to say in his memoirs, "GHQ ([Soviet] General Headquarters)...maintained effective contact with the High Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the west." 81 Gribkov cited the shuttle-bombing operation and the establishment of a ground forces link-up line as the tangible results of this coordination. 82

More detail is available concerning the role and importance of the military missions. General Shtemenko, in his memoirs, described the tasks of the military mission from his perspective. These were three: (1) secure the opening of the Second Front; (2) organize military deliveries; and, later, (3) coordinate Allied air raids on Germany. The military missions would accomplish this by "exchanging information on the enemy, exchanging combat experience, coordinate the timetables, procedures and scope of military operations." 83 After the landing at Normandy, Shtemenko maintained the Soviets also saw the need for increased liaison and undertook to inform the allies daily of the situation at the front; specific targets; "delineations for bombings by Soviet and American aircraft"; and "coordinated timetables for operations and departures of forces and fleets." 84 Both Gribkov and Radziyevskiy confirmed the
importance of the military missions for providing reciprocal information.

Although Soviet writers cited the effectiveness of these methods of coordination, they also experienced frustration. Gribkov wrote: "...one cannot help but emphasize that the duplicity and insincerity in the conduct of the leadership of the United States and Great Britain frequently complicated a settling of questions related to coordinating allied operations." The delay in the opening of the Second Front against the Germans is commonly cited as an example of this "duplicity". Both Shtemenko and Radziyevskiy mentioned the importance of the victories at Stalingrad and Kursk as motivating the Americans and the British to open the Second Front.

Soviet fear of a separate peace was another common refrain. General Chuikov in his memoirs referred to a Nazi newspaper article which stated the real threat to world stability came from the Russians and their Bolshevism. The collaboration represented by the Grand Alliance, then, would further the cause of Bolshevism. Shtemenko devoted no fewer than six pages to Soviet suspicions the Americans and the British would sign a separate peace with the Germans, leaving the Soviets and their Bolshevism to fight it out alone. Both American and Soviet historians recognize this as a real Soviet fear; the difference is the Soviets feel they have evidence to substantiate it.

Not all frustrations were political or directed towards failures on the part of the Americans or British. Shtemenko faulted the initial Soviet attempts at liaison, stating the original staff was
entirely too small to handle the flood of coordination requirements. Also, according to Shtemenko, the military missions originally were not under the Liaison Section, leading to duplicative efforts. Contacts with the allies at the beginning of the war were limited. In his view, cooperative efforts prior to 1944 were not particularly extensive. His comments are instructive as they are the most detailed from a Soviet contemporary's point of view.

Unfortunately, the Soviet sources available are not detailed. In the current era of openness, perhaps such details will become available. For now, Soviet writings are written on the macro-level and contain macro-level concerns. Even so, they provide some insights into the Soviet perceptions which led to the American frustrations so well-documented in American writings.

The Soviets appeared to be content with upper-echelon methods of coordination. Their writings acknowledge the inherent atmosphere of distrust. After all, the Soviets were working with the same countries which had tried to eliminate Soviet Bolshevism just twenty years earlier. Soviet authors also acknowledge the political necessities which sometimes create strange coalitions and that these coalitions can be successful in achieving the common goal. Soviet writings are instructive in that they do not assume such coalitions will be or should be permanent; they may be nothing more than a "marriage of convenience."
Conclusions

The examples of military cooperation during World War II are instructive for several reasons and on several levels. As examples of the specific instance of Soviet and American cooperation, they established a precedent. They also demonstrate that cooperation may not be easily achieved between capitalistic and communistic countries with different social systems and values, but it can be successful. These examples also demonstrate the pitfalls: the potential for misunderstanding at all levels; how accidents can be perceived as deliberate duplicity; how political decisions affect every aspect of military cooperative efforts. The reluctance of either country to participate in truly combined operations demonstrates how difficult it is to designate a sole control authority or to subordinate forces in combined efforts.

If the Soviets change their political system, the adverse effects of the differing political and social systems on combined operations may be somewhat mitigated. A decrease in the role, power, and influence of the Communist Party, begun by Gorbachev, may bring about a corresponding decrease in the impact of the Marxist - Leninist viewpoint which divides the world into two opposing camps: Communism vs. capitalism.

Apart from the issues inherent in a coalition of such opposing political systems, the experiences of World War II demonstrate some possibly common themes of coalition warfare. Coalition warfare is extremely complex, as demonstrated by the myriad of complex
issues involved in planning Operation FRANTIC. It is difficult to combine any portion of the militaries of two countries which are doctrinally and technologically disparate. Quite possibly, as suggested in the War College study and demonstrated by the examples cited here, support arms will generally find it easier to combine operations than combat arms. The World War II experience also demonstrates how long it takes to achieve coordination goals in ad hoc coalitions. For a simple exchange of weather data, coordination took over one year. For an operation like FRANTIC, coordination time was doubled. Finally, the World War II experience shows how operations may be undertaken more for the political benefits envisioned from the operation than for the military benefits; again, witness FRANTIC.

Nevertheless, the experiences of World War II provide a backdrop for the discussion of modern coalition warfare. World War II, again, was the first and only time the US and USSR attempted some form of military combined operations. The scale of the coalition warfare practiced during World War II was also unparalleled. For these reasons, the examination of this era is important. Subsequent chapters will further underline its importance.
ENDNOTES


4Infield, 227.


6The History of FRANTIC: American Shuttle-Bombing To and From Russian Bases 26 October 1943--15 June 1944 (Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, 1944), 1.

7M.A.A.F., Part I, 142.


10Deane, 111.

11Ibid.

13History of FRANTIC, 8.

14Ibid.

15Ibid., 15.

16Bolger, 82. According to Bolger, Colonel John Griffiths was formerly a member of the British anti-Bolshevik expeditionary force. He was subsequently reassigned from his position on the initial coordination team sent into the Soviet Union to organize FRANTIC.

17Harriman, 438.

18History of FRANTIC, 17.

19M.A.A.F., Part I, 142.

20History of FRANTIC, 19.

21Deane, 117.

22Infield, 44.

23History of FRANTIC, 6.

24Deane, 113.

25Bolger, 96.

26Harriman, 341.

27Deane, 121.

28Bolger, 213.

29Infield, 171-2

30Bolger, 214.

31Deane, 123.
32 Bolger, 212.

33 History of FRANTIC, 12.

34 Deane, 126.

35 Ibid., 127.

36 Ibid.

37 MAAF, Part II, 381.

38 Ibid., 382.

39 Ibid.

40 Deane, 136.

41 MAAF, Part II, 382 and Deane, 136.

42 Deane, 131.

43 MAAF, Part II, 383.

44 Ibid.

45 Deane, 136.

46 MAAF, Part II, 389.

47 Deane, 138.

48 Ibid., 139.

49 MAAF, Part II, 393.

50 Ibid., 398.

51 Deane, 126.

52 Ibid., 72.

53 Ibid., 73.

54 Ibid.
55Ibid., 75.
56Bolger, 87.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
59Deane, 57.
60Ibid.
61Bolger, 93.


64Ibid.
65Deane, 145.
66Ibid.
67Ibid., 153-4.
68MacDonald, 444.
69Ibid., 445.


71Ibid., 443.


73MacDonald, 447.
74Ibid., 454.
75 History of V Corps, 446.

76 Deane, 161.


79 Radziyevskiy, 35.

80 Ibid., 36.


82 Gribkov, 3.


84 Ibid., 29.

85 Gribkov, 3.


87 Shtemenko, 18.
CHAPTER FIVE

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF US AND SOVIET OPERATIONAL LEVEL CONCEPTS

The high- and mid-intensity battlefields are likely to be chaotic, intense, and highly destructive. They will probably extend across a wider space of air, land, and sea than previously experienced....Even in conventional combat, operations will rarely maintain a linear character...modern warfare is likely to be fluid and nonlinear.


Modern combined-arms battle is characterized by decisiveness, by high mobility, intensity and fluidity, by rapid and dramatic changes, by uncertainty of the situation, by the diversity of the methods of its conduct, by development of combat operations on the ground and in the air, on a wide front and to considerable depth, and by the conduct of operations at a fast pace.

Reznichenko, Taktika (Tactics), 1987

Introduction

This chapter compares and contrasts US and Soviet operational level of war concepts in the following categories: definitions and characteristics; organizations and command and control; execution (offense, defense, air operations in support of ground operations); and combined operations (principles of command...
and control and methods of coordination). For each category, similarities and differences between the concepts are identified.

Key to understanding the differences between US and Soviet military concepts at the operational level is understanding the differences in each nation's view of the meaning of the term "doctrine". The US and USSR differ in their definitions of this term.

The US defines doctrine as consisting of:

...fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives; it is authoritative but requires judgement in application. Doctrine is the accepted body of professional military knowledge. Military doctrine is based on the problems and solutions of the past as we understand them; accordingly, doctrine provides no guarantees of success for solving future problems. Even so, it serves to unify general military endeavor.\(^3\)

US doctrine, therefore, is military in nature; not necessarily prescriptive; and rooted in past successes. It standardizes the military knowledge of US military forces. The lack of prescriptiveness is critical to understanding how Americans implement their doctrine. As the US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states: "[doctrine]...must be definitive enough to guide operations, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of worldwide situations".\(^4\) In the US perspective, doctrine guides; it does not mandate specific actions. Doctrine is not inflexible or detailed as it must adapt to diverse and changing situations.

This concept of doctrine is vastly different from the Soviet concept encompassed by the term "doctrine": "...[doctrine is the]
nation's officially accepted systems of scientifically founded views on
the nature of wars and the use of armed forces in them.\textsuperscript{5} In 1987,
this definition was modified to include the concept of deterring war:
"...a system of fundamental views officially accepted in the Warsaw
Treaty Organization on the prevention of war, on military
construction, on the preparation of their countries and armed forces
to ward off aggression, and on the modes of conducting armed
struggle in defense of socialism."\textsuperscript{6} There are several key elements in
both definitions which serve to show the differences between US and
Soviet concepts concerning doctrine.

First, Soviet doctrine is a national level concept. It is not
solely the province of the military. In fact, "...military doctrine is
developed by the political leadership of the nation pursuant to
domestic and foreign policy. It is base on the \{Marxist-Leninist\}
ideology on war and the army, with considerations of the
achievements of military science."\textsuperscript{7}

Doctrine occupies a higher plane in Soviet thought than it does
in the American concept; a place more akin to the American concept
of military strategy, which is the concept of how to use the Armed
Forces to achieve strategic objectives. However, the Soviets also use
the term military strategy and this term, like doctrine, means
something quite different to them. Strategy is subordinate to
document. "Soviet military strategy is a system of scientific
information about the characteristics of contemporary wars, the
forms and types of their execution, the structure of the Armed
Forces, and the preparation of the State for war."\textsuperscript{8}
Doctrine, as the nation's consensus on the nature of war, drives strategy, which includes the scientific body of knowledge concerning war. This scientific body of knowledge drives the equipping and training of the armed forces and the execution of war. Note that Soviet strategy prepares the State for war, not simply the Armed Forces. Even before the Cold War, this concept of the preparation of the State served as the basis for the militarization of the Soviet economy. Therefore, a change in economic priorities could cause a change in doctrine; a change in doctrine could allow a change in economic priorities.

The element of science is another key difference between the two concepts. Soviet military theorists pride themselves on the scientific basis for their military theories. "Soviet military science, based upon Marxism-Leninism, seeks to understand the law-governed patterns that both explain and shape future combat requirements." This belief in the scientific approach to military operations is evidenced by the Soviet reliance on complex calculations based on historical data to compare combat potentials of belligerents to justify operational plans. While Americans perform rudimentary mathematical calculations of relative combat power, there is no American prescription for mathematical calculations of the potential for military success at lower echelons such as exists for the Soviets.

Soviet military doctrine differs from American concepts in another area. There are two aspects to Soviet doctrine: the political and the military-technical. The political basis concerns itself with
the international situation; the leadership's perception of potential enemies; and potential methods of protecting the State. The military-technical side of Soviet doctrine drives the training, equipping and the structuring of the Soviet Armed Forces and the "development of military art".¹⁰

To summarize the differences: Soviet military doctrine is developed at a higher level and is more encompassing than the American concept of military doctrine. Soviet doctrine is developed by the political leadership; it encompasses all resources of the State in preparation for war and applies equally to all branches of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine, being scientifically grounded, is prescriptive and not open to debate. American doctrine exists at various levels: from the Department of Defense (joint) level, to individual Service level, to individual small unit levels. American doctrine provides guidance; a method of standardizing the knowledge of military personnel, but not necessarily the only acceptable set of solutions to military problems.

These differences impact the concepts of the operational level of war developed by each country. These differences are especially profound as one analyzes the characteristics of the operational level of war and the command and control responsibilities in executing operations at this level.

Also important to understanding the national differences in operational level of war concepts is understanding each nation's views on the nature of modern war. As the opening quotes to this chapter show, the US and the USSR seem to share similar perceptions
regarding the nature of modern warfare. Both nations speak of the intense nature of modern war and its capacity to change rapidly. Both nations speak of the necessity to integrate air and ground operations. The requirement for such integration is implicit in the US Army’s title for its overall warfighting concept: AirLand Battle.

At the operational level, the Soviets use history to demonstrate the link between aviation and ground actions. "In close coordination with aviation, the tank armies and separate tank corps pounded the enemy front with swift strikes...tank armies...in coordination with aviation created a fast-moving ram of enormous force."11 At the tactical level, Soviets speak of the "three-dimensionality" of war and the fact that combined arms combat is becoming "...more and more a combination of ground and aerial combat that is dispersed along a front and in depth without a clearly marked line of contact between troops."12

Americans call this lack of a clearly marked line of contact, "nonlinear" war; Soviets refer to it as a "fragmented" battlefield.13 Both nations also discuss the growth of the modern battlefield, stating combat actions will occur across a wider space or front. Finally, both nations emphasize the importance of depth on the modern battlefield: the Soviets with their concept of striking to the depths of the enemy’s defenses and the Americans with their statement: "...successful deep operations create the conditions for future victory."14

With such commonality of views on the nature of modern warfare and with both nations ascribing such similar characteristics
to it, it seems that a strong argument for compatibility exists. However, there are differences in each nation's view of the role of the military in relation to the political realm that influences the way each nation intends to conduct war. As the concepts of both countries are compared, this difference in philosophy becomes more pronounced. This chapter will attempt to identify these differences for later analysis in Chapter Seven.

Definitions and Characteristics of the Operational Level of War

The definitions and perceived characteristics of the operational level of war appear, at first glance, to be similar between the US and the Soviet Union. For both nations, the operational level of war is an intermediate level, providing the link between strategy (the highest level) and tactics (the lowest). While the concepts appear similar, there is a subtle difference in perspective between the two nations.

The US definition of the operational level of war was given in Chapter One and is repeated here for clarity:

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

76
Key elements of this definition include: the concept of the link between tactics and strategy; the translation of strategic objectives into operational ones; campaigns; and sequencing.

For those who have difficulty putting the operational level of war into perspective, one American author (Lieutenant Colonel Newell, writing in Military Review) suggests this method: "Narrowing the field of view from the strategic perspective of war to include only the military element of power brings the operational perspective of war into focus." 16 Again, strategy in the American sense, includes policies about the use of all elements of national power: economic, political, military, national will, and geographical. Military strategy is the application of only one element of power. Newell also suggests that once we have isolated this element of power and have begun to identify how "to achieve military objectives in support of national goals," 17 we are dealing with the operational level of war.

Critical to the American concept of the operational level of war is this link with strategic objectives. These strategic objectives may not be military, but must be able to be translated into military objectives. This process of converting national goals into military objectives occurs at the operational level.

The concept of the campaign is fundamental to the American view of the operational level. The US defines a campaign as "A series of military operations aimed to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space." 18 Inherent in the concept
of the campaign in the American sense is the idea of a series of operations, sequenced over time and unified by an overriding strategic or operational goal.

General Saint, commander of the US Army, Europe at this writing, provides the following analysis of the operational level of war. He divides the military into fighters, integrators and shapers. Fighters and integrators fight battles or current engagements at the tactical level. Shapers "shape" the military action by: planning future operations; providing resources to ensure the success of current operations; and ensuring each current action contributes to the overall objective. Shapers, then, are operational level personnel who "...bring together disparate combat elements in sequence, over time." Again, the concept of sequencing military actions to support a common, overriding goal is seen as key to the American concept.

The Soviet definition of the operational level of war is similar to the American concept in its view of a series of military actions united by a common higher objective and its role in linking strategy and tactics. What is different is the Soviet tendency to define the levels of war by the levels (size and echelon) of the organizations involved and the level (complexity or scale) of the military activity conducted. For the Soviets, the operational level of war consists of operations conducted by large formations. Large formations include armies and fronts. Operations may also be conducted at the strategic level of war, but these are characterized by the involvement of groups of fronts and fleets, rather than armies and single fronts. The tactical level of war consists of lesser forms of combat (blows and
A strategic operation is a totality of actions united by aims and missions, designed to accomplish strategic aims and usually conducted by two or more fronts under the direction of a "Theater of Strategic Military Action" (TSMA). An operation is conducted by a single front or army(ies), designed to secure operational-scale objectives in support of strategic aims. The Soviet definition of an operation applies to both levels, but distinguishes between the two on the basis of the level of the assigned goal. An operation is, then:

...[a] totality of battles, strikes, and maneuvers of various types of forces united by mutual aims, missions, location and timing, conducted simultaneously or successively according to a single concept or plan aimed at accomplishing missions in a theater of military operations, on a strategic direction or operational directions—in a predetermined period of time.

Similarities to the American definition include the concept of sequenced actions united by a common goal. However, one difference includes the Soviet terminology of strategic and operational "directions". These are divisions of the world into geographic territories in which military formations may conduct operations. The amount of territory and the level of units operating therein, as well as the type of objectives contained within the territory, combine to determine whether the "direction" is strategic or operational. A strategic direction may contain one or more
operational directions. Either direction implies the associated land, air, and water features.

At first glance, the concept of direction appears to correlate with the US concepts of "theater" or "area" of operations. Neither of these US concepts, however, contains the idea of direction, each being more or less an apportionment of territory. Possibly the closest American concept is that of "lines of operation", which "define the directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy. Lines of operation connect the force with its operational base or bases of operation on the one hand and its operational objective on the other." Lines of operation is one of the elements of what the Americans term operational design.

Another, and possibly more significant, difference between the US and Soviet definitions of the operational level of war is the concept of time. The Soviet definition clearly states operational units (large formations; armies or a front) conduct operational level missions "in a predetermined period of time". The constraint of time is not a specific part of the American definition of the operational level of war (although it is a factor in the American definition of a campaign). While the delineation of constraints is an integral characteristic of operational level of war responsibilities, the Americans would consider the constraint of time to be simply one of many constraints (such as rules of engagement, neutral zones, etc.). On the other hand, achieving objectives within preplanned times is critical to the Soviet concept of the operational level of war.
There is another key aspect of the definitions to examine. This aspect concerns the concepts of operational art. The US defines operational art as:

...the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.... Operational art thus involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. Its essence is the identification of the enemy’s operational center-of-gravity--his source of strength or balance--and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve a decisive success..."25

Repeated in this definition are the recurring themes of the campaign and the linkage of operational and strategic level objectives. Specific to the American concept of operational art, though, is the concept of the "center of gravity". This is a Clausewitzian concept, defined by him (as quoted in the US Army FM 100-5, Operations) as: "...the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends."26 It is a central strength which, if defeated, will cause the enemy's immediate collapse. Both sides, in the American view, have a center (or centers) of gravity. The key to operational art is successfully defeating your enemy's center(s) of gravity while protecting your own.

The Soviet definition of operational art is "the theory and practice of preparing and conducting operations by large strategic formations of the armed forces."27 This definition reiterates the importance of defining the level of formations conducting the
operation. It is similar to the US concept in its reference to the application of military force, but it is significantly different in its reliance, once again, on the level of formation to define the level of military art.

Again, American definitions do not define the level (size, scale or echelon) of forces involved. In fact, the US Army states: "No particular echelon of command is solely or uniquely concerned with operational art, but theater commanders and their chief subordinates usually plan and direct campaigns."28 The American concept leaves the planning of operational level/operational art to theater level, although as shown later in the organization section, even this distinction is blurred.

The Americans, then, consistently refuse to define the level of organization involved in the conduct of operational level missions. While both nations view the operational level as linking strategic and tactical levels of war, the Americans prefer not to define the levels of war by the level (size and echelon) of the units executing the missions. On the other hand, the Soviets are clear: an army or a front plan and execute operational level missions. Both nations include the idea of sequencing subordinate operations to support a higher objective in their concepts of the operational level. These differences will be analyzed in Chapter Seven.
Organizations and Command and Control

For the US Army, "Corps are the Army's largest tactical units, the instruments with which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational level." Corps may "plan and conduct major operations..." but "The planning and execution of tactical-level battles is the major role of the corps." (Major operations, again, are characteristic of the operational level of war according to the US.)

This ambiguity concerning the corps role in the operational/operational-tactical levels of war is important to understanding the US concept of the operational level of war. The US views the corps as a tactical unit, but corps are maneuvered to accomplish operational level missions. Corps also are the highest level to which maneuver forces are assigned in peacetime. Field armies and army groups, the true operational level organizations in US concepts, do not usually exist as operational units in peacetime. The US army (as in level, not branch of service) organization is primarily a planning, administrative, and logistic organization in peacetime. The only US army organization provided for in the draft Field Manual on Large Unit Organizations (1987) was the theater army, primarily a logistic unit. A higher-echelon organization, the army group, was also introduced in the manual: an army group is a headquarters formed to control the actions of more than one army.

What exists in the US Army peacetime structure are army headquarters with planning functions and corps with maneuver units assigned. During times of crisis, forces (corps and/or divisions) will
be assigned to armies for the conduct of their operational level missions. Forces may also be assigned to a Joint Task Force, which forms another operational level organization and is discussed below.

The organization of operational level units is confusing and ambiguous in US concepts. It begins to make more sense after analyzing the role of the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC), the US' operational level commander.

The US divides the portions of the world into unified (sometimes called theater) commands, which correspond roughly to projected potential theaters of war. These theater commands are designed to "...meet the nation's regional strategic requirements for day-to-day peacetime operations and, if needed, for war or military operations short of war."31 Within these theater commands, the CINCs have broad mission responsibilities, among them (not all inclusive):

--Protect US interests.
--Establish objectives. ("CINCs translate strategic direction into military objectives that, once gained, will lead to the attainment of the strategic objectives assigned to the command."")
--Express intent. ("CINCs express their strategic intent...")
--Organize the command.
--Adapt operations. ("...adjust their operations to the evolving situation.")
--Keep superiors informed.32

A key element of the US concept of the CINC's responsibilities lies in his relationship to the strategic level of war. CINCs are tasked
with the responsibility of translating strategic objectives into
operational (military) objectives. CINCs then plan and execute the
campaign plans which will attain those objectives. This is the
essence of the US version of operational art.

To do this, CINCs organize their commands in the manner they
believe will best accomplish their intent. CINCs may establish field
armies "...to control and direct the operations of assigned corps." 33 Or
a CINC may establish an army group headquarters to provide "...the
operational direction of multiple corps" 34 or "...to control the
operations of two to five field armies." 35 Alternatively, the CINC may
establish a Joint Task Force, composed of elements from more than
one service and usually employed to accomplish a distinct mission.
Regardless of the specific organization, the important point is the fact
the CINC may organize an intermediate (operational level)
headquarters but he does not have to.

The CINC may choose to direct the employment of corps
himself. In addition, he may choose to delegate this authority to an
Army Component Commander (ACC) who, in turn, "...may be the
theater army commander, an army group commander, an army
commander, or, in some cases, a corps commander." 36

Put simply, a US CINC organizes his command the way he sees
is best and conducts the operational level of war planning and
execution with his tailored organizational structure.

It is important to note that all geographic CINCs will have
"joint" (multiple Service) and single-Service forces under their
commands. Just as a CINC will have an Army Component

85
Commander, he will, in that case, have a Nava Component Commander and an Air Component Commander. Marine Forces may fall under their own equivalent commander, a Marine Forces Commander (MARFOR); or under the Army Component Commander (in which case, the Army Component Commander becomes a Land Component Commander).

The Soviet structure differs dramatically. There are two echelons of organizations in the Soviet concept which perform operational level missions: the army and the front. The army is "...the largest peacetime operational grouping of forces." It is the lowest echelon in the operational level of war, sometimes performing what the Soviets call operational-tactical missions. It is most commonly employed with other armies to support front missions. Conversely, a front is considered by the Soviets to be an operational-strategic level organization.

When supporting front operations, the army receives mission guidance from the front commander. Unlike the broad mission guidance provided US commanders, Soviet front commanders provide specific guidance to their army commanders. "It should be emphasized in this case that the front troop commander determined not only the missions of the tank army but also the general plan and nature of its combat actions in accordance with the goal and plan of the front operation." The Soviet army role is generally similar to that of a US corps operating in concert with other US corps under an intermediate command, such as a field army or army group headquarters (or to a
lesser extent, an ACC or LCC). Under these conditions, both the US and Soviet organizations would be used to execute operational maneuver in concert with like organizations under the direction, and in support of, the goals of a larger organization. Along these lines, a Soviet front may be considered broadly analogous to a US field army or army group headquarters. However, none of these comparisons are exact. For example, a Soviet front has its own organic air army. In the US system, air "armies" (Tactical Air Forces) are subordinate to the CINC or the Air Component Commander, if one exists. This gives the Soviet front commander a capability as an operational level commander not enjoyed by his US counterpart.

On the other hand, US operational level commanders are, in some respects, also strategic level commanders in that they translate strategic (political) goals into operational (military) objectives. This gives a different flavor to the US concept of operational-strategic responsibilities than is inherent in the Soviet concept. US operational level commanders, specifically CINCs, enjoy considerably more authority than their Soviet counterparts at the highest Soviet operational level, the front. Soviet front commanders do not translate strategic objectives into operational (military) objectives; that mission is performed by doctrine and military strategy.

Translation of strategic into military objectives is done by the Soviet General Staff or Soviet High Command. "Planning c" offensive operations was carried out on the basis of the directives of Hq SHC [Supreme High Command] and the decisions of front commanders. The centralizing of all work on a front scale under the leadership of
Headquarters at the General Staff was a characteristic trait in the planning of front operations.\textsuperscript{39}

The Soviets employ an "intermediate" level of strategic command and control, which can take one of two forms. The first is the deployment of Supreme High Command representatives to forces engaged in combat. The second is the establishment of a more or less permanent High Command of Forces (HCOF) within a Theater of Strategic Military Action (TSMA). Both forms have the same mission. Armed with the authority of the Supreme High Command, they ensure the directives of the Supreme High Command are implemented at the operational level.\textsuperscript{40}

The HCOF commander would be the Soviet echelon of command most compatible with the operational-strategic level of responsibility assigned to a US CINC.

From the above, we can see distinct differences in the concepts behind operational level organization and command and control responsibilities between the US and the USSR. The US emphasizes the strategic component of the operational-strategic responsibilities of the operational level commander, the CINC. To accomplish his mission the CINC will have tactical level forces assigned to him. In the Soviet view, strategic objectives are translated into operational objectives at the strategic level. Operational level commanders are charged with executing operational level maneuver of operational level formations to accomplish the mission.
Execution: Offense

Both the US and the Soviets share similar views on the role of offense in achieving victory. What differs is the degree of importance each attaches to the offensive. This section compares the US and Soviet views concerning the purpose and role of the offense; its chief characteristics; types of maneuver; and phases of offensive operations.

For example, the US Army characterizes the offense as "the decisive form of war -- the commander's ultimate means of imposing his will upon the enemy." Furthermore, the offense is required to defeat an enemy; defensive actions alone will not ensure the enemy's defeat.

Within this concept, there are several reasons for conducting offensive operations. These reasons include: defeat of enemy forces; securing key territories; depriving the enemy of resources (such as soldiers, equipment, production plants); gaining information (such as through reconnaissance in force missions); deceiving or diverting the enemy; holding the enemy in a particular position; or disrupting the enemy's attack.

The Soviets appear to continue to view the offense as the chief means of defeating an enemy and securing friendly victory. In 1987, writing about the Great Patriotic War, General Kir'yan stated: "The war confirmed the validity of a most important tenet of Soviet military doctrine: a complete victory over the enemy can be won only as a result of a decisive offense." Also in 1987, Soviet military
theorists were quoted as saying, "Preference is given to the offensive, directed toward the complete defeat and destruction of the enemy." The Soviets conduct offensive operations to achieve the "...defeat of a major enemy grouping and the capturing of an area or line of operational significance."

While the Americans state they will conduct offensive operations for several reasons, the Soviet's primary goal is rapid defeat of enemy forces. That is not to imply the Soviets do not recognize other motives for offensive operations. What it does show is the relative importance the Americans and Soviets attach to the different goals of offensive operations. Unlike the Americans, the Soviets do not place equal emphasis on all goals of offensive operations: destroying the enemy is always the ultimate purpose of Soviet offensive operations.

A review of the primary characteristics of offensive operations as perceived from American and Soviet sources reveals several similarities. The US Army perceives the following characteristics as essential for a successful offense: "surprise, concentration, speed, flexibility and audacity." The American concept of surprise requires attack in a location or at a time unexpected by the enemy. Surprise is viewed by the Americans as a "combat-multiplier"; a characteristic or function, which, if achieved, will "multiply" the capability of existing forces and allow success with fewer soldiers and combat materiel. Concentration requires achievement of "local superiority": a quantitative and/or qualitative superiority of forces or means on the main (priority) effort. This
concentration should include not only combat forces, but the efforts of all resources at the commander's disposal. Furthermore, concentration must be achieved quickly to enhance surprise and avoid presentation of a lucrative target for the enemy. Finally, concentration must be achieved against an enemy weakness (also termed the "decisive point" in American writings).

Speed is seen by the Americans as another vital characteristic as it can "confuse and immobilize the defender until the attack becomes unstoppable." Speed is another combat multiplier as it can compensate for a numerical inferiority of forces. Flexibility is the characteristic which allows the commander to "...expect uncertainties and be ready to exploit opportunities." Finally, audacity is seen by the Americans as the ability to "Never take counsel of your fears...."

For the Soviets, the offense is characterized by surprise, rapid advance, concentration of forces, the importance of maneuver, and maneuver by fire. Of these five characteristics, three relate directly to characteristics the US also perceives as essential to offensive success: surprise, rapid advance (speed in US versions), and concentration. Historical lessons add the following characteristic: the launching of "...simultaneous strikes to the entire depth of the enemy defenses...."

There are five forms of offensive maneuver according to the US Army: envelopment; turning movement; infiltration; penetration; and frontal attack. These may be used singly or in combination.
Envelopment is seen as the "basic" form of offensive maneuver. It requires a force to avoid the enemy's front where he is likely to be strongest (most concentrated) and make the main attack against the enemy's flanks and rear. A smaller force conducts a secondary effort against the enemy's front to hold him in place, while the larger, main force maneuvers to conduct the main attack. An envelopment is not necessarily an encirclement, but may become one if the attacker is able to surround the enemy and sever his lines of escape.

A turning movement avoids the defender's front entirely, seeking to drive deep behind the enemy and force him to turn to fight the attacker. An infiltration is the covert movement of an attacking force through enemy lines to objectives in the enemy's rear and favored for light infantry forces. (Naturally, this maneuver can only be accomplished by a small force. Theoretically, since the US does not define the operational level of war by the size of the force, this could be an operational maneuver, perhaps in a low intensity conflict scenario. It is described here to show the flexibility of US thought.) The penetration is a concentration of force and attack in a narrow sector which creates a rupture in the enemy's defensive line. Finally, a frontal attack is an attack across a wide front along direct approaches ("head on", so to speak).

Soviets, on the other hand, see only two basic types of offensive maneuver: the encirclement and "deep dividing strikes" or what western analysts call an attack across a broad front on multiple axes.
The encirclement was the principal method of operational offensive maneuver in the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet's term for their participation in World War II). "The most characteristic form of maneuver for tank armies was the deep envelopment. It was used with the purpose of operational encirclement of large enemy groupings...."54 Today, the Soviets would employ this maneuver against an enemy in a prepared defense, something which they would prefer not to face. Encirclement operations may involve double encirclements, where two large formations strike on converging axes to encircle enemy forces; or they may involve "...a single enveloping strike having the purpose of pressing the enemy grouping to the sea"55 or some other insurmountable natural obstacle.

The Soviets have studied the historical examples of encirclement operations in detail. Soviet writings detail the components of encirclement operations: the importance, missions and types of formations best suited for operations on the inner and outer perimeters of the encirclement; and the specific roles of air and fire support. In all cases, the goal of the encirclement is to destroy enemy troop groupings. "When the enemy is driven back,...we have failed, and when he is cut off, encircled and dispersed, we have succeeded."56

The other basic form of Soviet operational maneuver, that of "deep dividing strikes" may be related to the American concept of a frontal attack. This form of maneuver (referred to by some western analysts as "broad front, multiple axes") may be conceived of initially
as a series of what the Americans call frontal attacks; the difference is the Soviets would conduct several of them simultaneously. Another difference is that the Soviets would also launch them against an enemy's flank or rear (creating the same effect as the American turning movement). The Soviets use this type of operational maneuver against an unprepared enemy or an enemy in a hasty defense. The Soviets learned from the Great Patriotic War that "Deep dividing strikes by tank armies made it possible to divide the enemy troops, contain the enemy's reserves and deprive him of the possibility for concentrating their use in any one sector." The goal of these operations is "...dividing the enemy grouping into separate parts and destroying them individually."

In comparison, the Soviets employ fewer forms of offensive operational maneuver than the Americans. Soviet objectives orient primarily on the destruction of enemy forces, while American objectives may include capture of terrain as well as destruction of enemy forces.

Americans and Soviets also divide offensive operations into different phases and attach different importance to each phase. US Army doctrine divides the offensive into four phases: preparation; attack; exploitation; and pursuit. The preparation phase includes preparatory fires and movement of forces to the attack. (If forces on both sides are moving at the same time, their collision is called by both the Americans and the Soviets, a "meeting engagement").

The Americans classify two types of offense: hasty or deliberate. The primary discriminator between the two is the
amount of time available to prepare for the attack. Successful attacks are followed by exploitation, which applies continuous pressure on the enemy until he surrenders or flees. Pursuit occurs when "...enemy resistance has broken down entirely....The object of pursuit is annihilation of the opposing force."60 The US Army views the conduct of large-scale pursuits as rare in conventional warfare, believing the efforts of attacking produce just slightly less debilitating effects on the attacker as they do on the attacked. At the tactical level, the pursuit requires two forces: one to apply continuous pressure to the fleeing enemy force and one to drive ahead of the enemy and attempt to encircle him.

Soviets divide the offense into the following general phases: preparation; penetration of enemy defenses and development of the offensive in depth; and pursuit.61 The first "one and one-half" phases (preparation and penetration) are similar in concept to the American versions. (Soviet writings also divide offensive operations into phases for combat support operations, such as air and fire support.) Significantly, the Soviets attach greater significance to the meeting engagement, considering it the preferable form of combat action and also considering it a possibility in defensive operations as well.

The greatest difference between the phases as identified by the two nations concerns the concepts of exploitation and pursuit. The American concept of exploitation is similar to the Soviet concept of the "development of the offensive in depth," which is a part of their penetration operations. In the Soviet view, no distinct dividing
line is readily discernible; a successful offensive, especially at the operational level, will necessarily develop to the enemy's operational depths. Otherwise, the offensive is not successful. Consequently, in the Soviet view, the exploitation is an integral part of the attack.

The Soviets also attach greater importance to the pursuit. The American view appears to be that pursuit is desirable but usually unattainable. The Soviets view pursuit operations differently. The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed "...pursuit...was the best means of completing the destruction of the enemy. The fruits of victory, Engels said, are usually harvested during pursuit of the foe. The more energetic the pursuit, the more decisive the victory."  

With their emphasis on pursuit, the Soviets delineate two types of operational pursuit, which may be performed singly or in combination. Frontal pursuit involves continuous contact with the enemy and prevention of his disengagement. Parallel pursuit requires the attacking force to drive ahead of the withdrawing enemy, along parallel routes, to periodically attack the enemy along the way. It is similar to the mission of one of the American pursuit forces, the encircling force. The Soviet view of the combination of these two methods most closely resembles the American view of pursuit operations. However, the Soviets view these pursuit operations on an operational level; the American outline of the pursuit applies to tactical level forces.

In this discussion of offensive operations, several similarities emerge. Both the Soviets and the Americans view the offense as the decisive form of battle. Successful offensive operations share similar
characteristics: they are decisive, conducted rapidly, and employ the principles of surprise and concentration.

Major differences between the two concepts include the following items. The Soviets appear to place greater emphasis on the destruction of enemy forces as the ultimate goal of all offensive operations, while the Americans appear to accept other goals as equally important. The Americans employ five forms of offensive maneuver; the Soviets only two. While the Soviet forms of maneuver incorporate elements of the American forms, neither matches exactly to American concepts. Finally, the Soviet emphasis on pursuit is at variance with the American view which is that pursuit is desirable, but not usually attainable. The effects of these differences will be analyzed in Chapter Seven.

**Execution: Defense**

Both the Americans and the Soviets view the defense as a less decisive form of war than the offense. Differences appear, again, in degrees of emphasis and methods of execution. Soviet concepts of the defense are less developed than their concepts of the offense, due to their traditional emphasis on the offense. With the change in Soviet doctrine described earlier, the Soviets appear to be reviewing their defensive concepts at the strategic and operational levels of war. Rather than comparing and contrasting US and Soviet defensive characteristics category by category, then, this section will first look at US defensive concepts as a whole. Next, it will summarize western
analysts' views concerning changing Soviet defensive concepts to-date.

The American view of the defense states:

Defensive operations retain ground, gain time, deny the enemy access to an area, and damage or defeat attacking forces. While they can sometimes deny success to the enemy, they cannot normally ensure [friendly] victory....A successful defense consists of reactive and offensive elements working together to deprive the enemy of the initiative.63

The defense is not decisive and to be successful, cannot be pure. It must contain offensive elements in the US view. In fact, "...commanders conducting defensive campaigns mix offensive with defensive tactical actions...."64 The operational level defense contains at least tactical level offensive actions.

The Americans outline six purposes for conducting defensive operations: defeat an attack; gain time: allow concentration of friendly forces elsewhere; control terrain; attrit the enemy to ensure the success of future offensive operations; and retain objectives already won.65 While there are many reasons for conducting defensive operations, the Americans view the immediate reason for any defensive operation to be the defeat of an attacker.66

The US Army prescribes four characteristics for osuccessful defensive operations. preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility. Preparation includes not only the preparation of defensive positions, but the development of plans to exploit opportunities to conduct offensive operations. Disruption is designed
to "counter the attacker's initiative and to prevent him from concentrating overwhelming combat power against a part of the defense...."67 The other characteristics are similar to those prescribed for the offense.

Finally, US Army manuals provide for two types of defense, but allow for combinations of the two. These two types are the area and mobile defenses. Area defenses are terrain-oriented; they are designed to protect terrain. This type of defensive operation may be conducted in shallow or deep sectors; and relies on fires to destroy enemy forces.68 Mobile defenses are force-oriented; they are designed to destroy enemy forces. Mobile defenses require depth and width for maneuver and employ mobile reserves to envelop and destroy enemy forces.69

Similar to the American concept, the Soviet concept also has traditionally viewed the defense as less decisive than offense. Indications exist that this may still be true:

[defense is the]...repulse of aggression. However, it is impossible to destroy an aggressor by defense alone. Therefore, after the repulse of the attack troops and naval forces must be able to mount a decisive offensive.70

For many decades, Soviet concepts of the defense implied it was a forced type of action. In other words, "Defense is assumed only when forces and means are not sufficient to attack or when gaining time may be necessary in order to concentrate forces and provide favorable conditions for the initiation of a decisive offensive operation."71 How the new doctrine may change this concept or
whether the new doctrine does change defensive concepts below strategic level remains to be seen.

As some western analysts put it the question is: will the Soviets employ a "defensive defense or an offensive defense?" Western analysts report the Soviets have identified four possibilities for a defensive strategy:

--Soviet counterattack immediately following an enemy attack
--Initial defense which draws enemy forces in; followed by a counteroffensive into enemy territory
--Counteroffensive which stops short of enemy territory
--No offensive action above tactical level; heavy reliance on fortifications.

Three of the four options would mix defensive and offensive actions (similar to American thought which repudiates the idea of a pure defense). What distinguishes the three options from each other is the degree of offensive action envisioned. In fact, the options appear to be listed in descending order based on the scale of the offensive action permitted.

According to two western analysts, Christopher Bellamy and Joseph Lahnstein, option three appears the most likely. This assertion seems to be substantiated by another western analyst, Christopher Donnelly, who wrote in Red Banner, "Their [Soviet] ability to conduct operational manoeuvre in the defence was, to the Soviets, the decisive factor which enabled them to halt the German advance at the very gates of Moscow in December 1941." From the operational perspective, what is interesting is, in their writing on
historical examples of option three, Bellamy and Lahnstein state: "The pattern of intense Soviet artillery and air support was to become a standard for offensives; in operational terms, this was in no way a defensive battle."76

A strategic defensive doctrine may, then, result in a highly active and mobile operational-level defense in future Soviet concepts. Characteristics of such a defense could include: extensive artillery and air fire support; achievement of operational surprise; aggressive maneuver; and counteroffensives at both tactical and operational level (giving the defense a decidedly offensive flavor, particularly to the objects of the Soviet counteroffensives).77 This type of defense would be similar to the American concept of the mobile defense.

However, if option four dominates, the Soviets may employ a defense much more akin to the US' concept of area defense. This concept is embodied in the Soviet term "fortified regions." One western analyst, Charles Pritchard, points out that two factors make the concept of fortifications more appealing today: nuclear weapons and the current trend towards "medium-scale" conflicts rather than the global conflict epitomized by World War II. In his analysis of fortified regions, Pritchard postulates that future Soviet fortified regions could consist of hardened sites, protected against nuclear, biological, chemical, and improved conventional munitions; manned by "machine gun/artillery divisions."78 As discussed earlier, such a defense would be characterized by the lack of operational level counteroffensives.
US and Soviet concepts of the defense appear, then, to be similar. Depending on the outcome of the current Soviet debate, the defensive concept employed by the Soviets could be similar either to the US concept of mobile or area defense, or some combination thereof. For combined operations, the impact would depend on the rigidity (or its lack) of the Soviet concept, since the American concept is characterized by flexibility. Chapter Seven will analyze this difference.

Execution: Air Operations in Support of Ground Operations

Both the US and the Soviets recognize the importance of air operations conducted to support ground operations. The fundamental differences occur in organization and the control of such operations.

The US views air operations provided to support ground operations as only one of the missions of its Air Force. The provision of such support is termed "tactical air operations." Although the US Army has some organic aviation assets, it relies on the Air Force to provide support beyond its own capabilities. These types of air missions are viewed as tactical by the Air Force and include: counterair; air interdiction; close air support; airlift; special operations; and reconnaissance and surveillance. Of these, air interdiction, close air support and reconnaissance and surveillance are made available to support ground force commanders.
While the US joint force commander (most often the CINC) commands the Air Force units assigned to his command as he does the Army units, the commander conducting the operational level maneuver does not necessarily have command over Air Force assets. Remembering the earlier discussion on organization, the US may use the tactical organization, the corps, to conduct operational level maneuver. The corps commander relies on the processes of apportionment, allocation and distribution to provide Air Force support to his operation.

Apportionment is performed by the joint force commander in conjunction with his Air Component Commander or senior Air Force officer to decide what percentage of available tactical air assets will be used in each of the three tactical air missions outlined above. Allocation is the process by which the air commander translates the apportionment decision into numbers of sorties. Finally, distribution is the Land (or Army) Component Commander’s decision as to how many sorties by type of mission will be distributed to each subordinate commander (i.e., corps).  

The Soviet process appears to be simpler due to their more centralized, integrated approach. Soviet air forces may be thought of in three groups according to the echelon which controls them: strategic (Supreme High Command and TSMA); operational (front and army); and tactical (helicopters assigned to divisions, a practice apparently abandoned for the present).

However, there is a complexity in the Soviet management of air assets. The first priority for Soviet air forces, as it is for the US, is
to attain air superiority. To achieve this, the Soviets will employ all available, capable aircraft. This includes the air assets organic to the front: "...the creation of a favorable air situation and environment...is the most important mission of the front and Air force's formations and operational formations of other Services of the Armed Forces."81

As much as 60 percent of the front aviation may be involved in air operations.82 Air operations is the Soviet term for operations designed primarily to attain air superiority. Air operations "...are the highest form of operational and strategic employment of Air forces."83 Air operations may be initiated prior to an attack by front ground forces or simultaneously with such an attack. A problem exists, of course, in that during the conduct of air operations, the front commander does not control his own aviation assets.

The Soviets recognize this as a problem. For that reason, they recommend air operations be conducted swiftly. "The reason is that by the time for commencement of the attack by Ground Forces, front air armies will have to cover and support the front forces during their attack and accomplish other missions."84

Once the air operation is concluded and the assets are returned to the control of the front commander, the Soviets can begin air support to ground forces. Soviet planning for air support occurs in conjunction with artillery planning. Air support to ground forces are phased similarly to the phases of artillery support. Traditionally, the Soviets have placed emphasis on pre-planned air targets due to the difficulties in coordinating air attack with ground movement.

104
This does not mean the exclusion of on-call targets, but suggests less flexibility than the American system.

The Americans and Soviets view the primary role of air operations as the attainment of air superiority. They are organized differently to handle the secondary mission of providing air support to ground forces. The US centralizes its assets under the operational-strategic commander, but allocates capabilities to ground force commanders executing operational level maneuver throughout operations. The Soviets assign air armies to operational-strategic commanders, but place them under strategic control until air superiority is attained.

Combined Operations

In this section, the US and Soviet definitions, principles and methods of coordination for combined operations are compared and contrasted.

When looking at definitions, a technical difference is immediately apparent. The US definition, quoted from Chapter One, essentially describes any operation involving the forces of more than one nation as combined:

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. 85
US Joint Publication 0-1, *Basic National Defense Doctrine* (draft), further delineates between alliances and coalitions as subsets of combined operations. Of alliances, the publication states these are "formal...for broad long-term objectives," while coalitions are "...informal agreements for common action in one occasion or effort or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of interest...."86 Coalitions, then, are temporary.

Soviet concepts recognize only one form of combined operation, all "alliances" being temporary and therefore, under the purview of coalition warfare. The Soviets define coalition warfare as:

...war which is prepared and conducted by one coalition of governments against another coalition or other countries. The nature and form of the participation by any one country is dependent on that country's political goals, military-economic potential, geographic position, and other factors.87

Further, the same source defines a military coalition as:

...a temporary military-political union of governments established for the preparation and conduct of war....88

While the American definition does not mention the political aspects of coalition or alliance warfare, unlike the Soviet definition, political considerations are recognized as a factor in US concepts. States Joint Publication 0-1: "Each alliance and coalition must reach a consensus regarding the common political aim, which generally represents the overlap of some of the national objectives of each of
the component nations rather than the sum total of all national objectives."89

The US and Soviet definitions of coalition warfare closely resemble each other as they describe the temporary union of states to use military force. The Soviets do not delineate between coalitions (temporary) and alliances (long-term). This is an apparently small difference, but it has significant consequences. The Soviets may actually prefer something more akin to what Americans call alliance warfare: a coalition with agreed-upon command structures in place prior to execution and a greater deal of compatibility between the national forces involved.90

Command and control considerations also differ between the two nations, although both the Americans and the Soviets place emphasis on the importance of "unity of command". However, the US experience in the World Wars, Korea and NATO, cause it to recognize the political realities of attempting combined operations with other democratic countries. "Sometimes nations agree to aims and strategy for the unified employment of their national forces without agreeing to unity of command."91 This same source continues to offer ways to achieve "unity of effort" instead and reiterates that coalitions and alliances reach decisions through achieving consensus.

Still the Americans view unity of command as the ideal. In FM 100-5, it states: "It [unity of command] is exercised in the theater of war by a supreme allied commander or commander in chief appointed by the leaders of the alliance."92 The Joint Chiefs document contains guidance for US CINCs conducting combined
operations on how to "...establish combined command relationships and authority" in peacetime and "organize the command" in wartime. However, specific guidance for the subordination of US forces to another nation's command structure is not contained in either of these documents, although FM 100-5 makes passing reference to the possibility.

It is possible then to postulate the US would prefer to maintain its forces under its own national control, although it is willing to command other national forces. This preference is also demonstrated by the US participation in bilateral command arrangements, where the national forces of two allied nations are retained under each parent nation's control.

Characteristic of Soviet writings is the insistence on unity of command. The Soviet experience in the Great Patriotic War led them to believe the only efficient method of conducting coalition warfare was to implement unity of command, with the stronger partner (assumed to be the Soviet Union) in command. Writing on the subject, General Altukhov stressed the requirement of "...ensuring unconditional subordination to the coalition command by all the allied troops regardless of their national affiliation." He continues by criticizing the Anglo-American-French coalition of the Great Patriotic War, stating, "It was a very difficult matter to ensure effective unity on the basis of voluntary concessions by each of the parties."

Echoing Altukhov are other Soviet writers who cite the alliance between the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations
during the Great Patriotic War as a far more efficient method for ensuring achievement of alliance military aims than Anglo-American methods. Under these arrangements, Allied forces (Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, for example) were made temporarily operationally subordinate to Soviet forces and commanders. Under these conditions, allied forces were sometimes assigned responsibility for a specific sector of operations within the overall Soviet sector. No specific combined commands were established; the Soviet General Staff and Supreme Headquarters provided guidance to allied forces as they provided it to Soviet forces.

Soviet and American views on the command and control of combined operations may not be as disparate as they seem in print. The Americans do allow more leeway in sharing the command and control evidenced by their participation in bilateral relationships. However, neither country offers guidance on the subordination of their own forces to another nation's command and control structure. From the writings, one may conclude that the Americans will share, but not relegate, command and control; the Soviets, however, seem even less willing to make this concession.

Methods of coordination are also similar on the surface, but differ subtly between the two countries. US writings emphasize the use of liaison personnel to achieve coordination between combined operations members. The draft FM 100-15-1 describes four methods of coordination: direct, liaison officers, conference and liaison cells (in a formal organization called the Tactical Ground Coordination System). Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0 speaks of developing
interoperable command and control systems and establishing a liaison network. Liaison is viewed by the Americans as a necessary part of all operations, not just combined, although they acknowledge the special requirements of liaison in combined operations.

The purpose of liaison is to ensure cooperation....The value of effective liaison for commanders cannot be overstated; the liaison officers provide eyes and ears as well as representation of the commanders' views and requirements at those levels of command with which he must continually cooperate but seldom can visit.98

Key to the American definition are the words "represent" and "cooperate."

The Soviets perform liaison through operations groups and General Staff representatives to subordinate and allied forces. Operations groups are:

A group of officers with communications sent out from the headquarters of a large formation or formation (army or division) to coordinate* the activities performing a separate mission separated from the main forces..., as well as to headquarters of neighboring large formations.... The composition of an operational group and its equipment depend on the purpose and characteristics of the missions to be fulfilled.

(*Note: earlier versions substituted "direct" for this word.)99

Operations groups were used in the Great Patriotic War "for ensuring control of the coalition troops...."100 In addition to operations groups, representatives of the Soviet General Staff were sent to allied armies and divisions, ostensibly with the mission of
“ensuring equal rights in resolving all questions,”\textsuperscript{101} but also to
accomplish control over the military training and combat activity of the regiments at the front.”\textsuperscript{102} This latter mission would assist the Soviet General Staff in its mission to “control the fulfillment of governmental decisions”\textsuperscript{103} and is in line with the Soviet concept of centralized control.

Thus it may be inferred the Soviet concept of liaison is more prescriptive than that of the Americans. The Soviet principle of operations or operational groups is fairly analogous to that of the American concept of liaison detachments: groups of liaison personnel representing various areas of expertise.

Finally, it is worth noting one additional principle of control espoused by the Americans in combined operations. That is the principle of employing a “national component commander” who interfaces with the combined command for all matters pertaining to his national forces. Along with this principle is the principle of analyzing each national force’s strengths and weaknesses and employing them accordingly. "Tasks to national forces are assigned commensurate with their equipment and capabilities."\textsuperscript{104}

In summary, US and Soviet combined operations concepts appear similar but contain subtle differences which could have profound effects on their ability to conduct military operations together. These differences include: the Soviet view of coalitions as temporary and the centralized nature of Soviet planning and liaison. Of particular note is a similarity which could possibly have adverse impacts on US-Soviet combined operations: the desire (inferred or
stated) of both nations to retain control over their own forces and to actually command and control the combined operation under the rubric of unity of command. These differences, as well as those listed in preceding sections will be analyzed in Chapter Seven.
ENDNOTES


2 V.G. Reznichencko, Tactika [Tactics] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), trans. JPRS, JPRS-UMA-88-008-L-I, 29 June 1988, 23. Although this is written for the tactical level, the links between levels of war means that characteristics between the levels are linked in general terms, also. For the US, the difference is not as significant; FM 100-5 applies to both the operational and tactical levels of war.

3 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1989), 196.

4 FM 100-5, 6.


8 Ibid., 55.


10 The Voroshilov Lectures, 62.

11 G.K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniaya," Volume 2, repr. I.M. Ananyev, Soviet Tank Armies in the Offensive (Moscow:

12Reznichenko, 13.

13Ibid.

14FM 100-5, 19.

15JCS Pub 1-02, 196.


17Ibid., 6.

18Ibid., 10.


21Ibid., 7.


23As defined by JCS Pub 1-02:

--"Theater: geographic area outside the Continental US for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility." (p. 370) [Unified and specified commands are those designated by the President and usually commanded by four-star level general officers or their Naval equivalents.]

--"area of operations: That portion of a theater of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations." (p. 34)
"area [theater] of war: That area of land, sea, and air which is, or may become, directly involved in the operations of war." (p. 34)

24FM 100-5, 180.

25FM 100-5, 10.

26FM 100-5, 179.

27Reznichenko, 2.

28FM 100-5, 10.

29FM 100-5, 185.


32Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test) (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1990), III-1 and III-2. The other responsibilities include: accomplish the mission; assign missions and tasks; ensure readiness; define rules of engagement; and orchestrate operations.

33FM 100-5, 185.

34Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Large Unit Operations (Draft) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1987), 5-3.

35FM 100-5, 186.

36Ibid., 28.


Kiryan, 26.


FM 100-5, 91.

Ibid., 94.


Kir'yan, 14.

FM 100-5, 95.

Ibid.

Ibid., 97.

Ibid.

General George S. Patton. Quoted in FM 100-5, 98. In full: "Never take counsel of your fears. The enemy is more worried than you are. Numerical superiority, while useful, is not vital to successful offensive action. The fact that you are attacking induces the enemy to believe that you are stronger than he is."

FM 100-2-1, 3-11 through 3-16.

Kir'yan, 1.

FM 100-5, 101.
Ananyev, 144.

Ibid., 37.

Reznichenko, 102.

Ananyev, 153.

Ibid., 37.

FM 100-5, 98.

Ibid., 100.

Reznichenko, 88, 99, 104, respectively.

Ananyev, 121-2.

FM 100-5, 129.

Ibid., 140.

FM 100-5, 131.

FM 100-5, 131.

FM 100-5, 132.

FM 100-5, 135-7.

Ibid., 134-5.


The Voroshilov Lectures, 264.


Ibid.
74Ibid.

75Donnelly, 81.

76Ibid., 27.

77Ibid., 27-29.


80Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, 1988), 148. Donnelly's categorization of Soviet air assets differs slightly from that of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the version here is a compilation of the two.

81The Voroshilov Lectures, 316.

82Ibid., 325.

83Ibid., 325.

84Ibid., 328.

85Joint Publication 1-02, 76.

86Joint Publication 0-1, III-35.


88Ibid., 3.

89Joint Publication 0-1, III-35.

90Grau, 2.
91Ibid., III-36.
92FM 100-5, 165.
93JCS Publication 3-0, IV-2 and IV-7, respectively.
94P. Altukhov, "Wartime Experience in Control of Coalition Forces" (Moscow: Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal 3, March 1982) trans. JPRS, JPRS 82190, 8 November 1982, 43.
95Ibid.
97FM 100-15-1, 24-2.
98Joint Publication 0-1, V-43.
99Volume 6, Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 50.
100Altukhov, 49.
101Ibid.
103Ibid., 12.
104JCS Publication 3-0, IV-8.
CHAPTER SIX

CASE STUDIES

But it was a great coalition of people, all of whom did a fine
job.

US General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, speaking
about the Desert Storm Coalition, 1991

Major offensives included columns from one or more Kabul
regime [Afghan army] divisions, either operating in
conjunction with Soviet units or acting independently, often
with Soviet troops in overwatch positions to prevent
desertions and to minimize Soviet casualties.

David C. Isby, writing in 1989 about the
Soviet - Afghan army relationship

Introduction

This chapter provides a limited analysis of two case studies
matched against the concepts discussed in the previous chapters.
The primary operational concept analyzed in this chapter is
command and control.

Command and control is analyzed on two levels. The first
level is "internal" command and control: the organization of the US
or Soviet military force for command and control on a unilateral
basis. The second level is
"external" command and control: how the US or Soviet military force was organized for command and control in relation to the other coalition members.

The US case study concerns US military participation in the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, also known as the Gulf Crisis and well-known in the US by its military codenames Desert Shield (deployment and preparation phase) and Desert Storm (combat phase). This conflict involved a multinational coalition, which, because of the number of nations involved, was possibly the most complex coalition established since World War II. Throughout its duration, some 28 nations participated (although not all participated during the entire existence of the coalition or in all of its military actions). For both its multinational character and contemporary quality, this coalition serves as a good example of US combined and operational level concepts in practice. On the other hand, because it happened so recently, information is incomplete and sometimes contradictory.

The Soviet case study concerns Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviets entered Afghanistan militarily in late 1979, ostensibly at the request of the Afghan regime. The Soviets conducted combined operations with Afghan regime armed forces against the Afghan rebels (mujahideen) for approximately nine years (December 1979 through February 1989). As with the US case study, the contemporary nature of this conflict makes it a good example of Soviet combined operations concepts and how they may be put into practice. This case study has several limitations, however. Also
similar to the US case study, the recency of the action means available information is limited and often contradictory. Additionally, rather than maneuvering large formations, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan was mostly a guerrilla war. In spite of these limitations, it is the only contemporary example of Soviet operational and combined operations.

**US Case Study: the Persian Gulf Crisis**

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded its neighboring Persian Gulf state, Kuwait. Iraq shortly afterwards annexed Kuwait as its nineteenth province. Fearful that it might be Iraq's next target, Kuwait's southern neighbor, Saudi Arabia, requested assistance. The US and Egypt were among the first nations to send military forces into Saudi Arabia to deter further aggression by Iraq. This duality symbolized a central characteristic of the multinational coalition which eventually formed: the inclusion of western and regional forces and their division along those lines for command and control purposes.

Actual armed conflict began in January 1991 and ended in a cessation of military operations by coalition forces six weeks later. The conflict was significant for several reasons. The US and the USSR admitted to shared interests in the Gulf, as was discussed in Chapter One. No fewer than twelve United Nations resolutions were passed, condemning Iraq's aggression and seeking to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. For the purposes of this study, the importance of the
conflict lies in the formation of the pro-Kuwait military coalition (A summary of the nations and their participation is at Table 1; in some cases, complete details were not available concerning the duration or nature of an individual nation's participation.)

The coalition began as a deterrent force, occupying defensive positions along the Saudi-Iraq border. On November 29, 1990, the United Nations passed a resolution authorizing member nations "to use all necessary means" to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. Shortly after that deadline, coalition forces began an air campaign designed to reduce Iraqi forces capable of threatening Kuwait in preparation for a coalition ground assault. In late February, coalition forces launched a ground offensive which ended in Iraq's military defeat some 100 hours later.

The US was the de facto coalition leader, militarily as well as politically. The US contributed the largest number of forces, something in excess of 400,000 troops. The US was also the only superpower providing forces throughout the duration of the coalition. Finally, the offensive plan had a strong US flavor. It incorporated a phased (sequential) air, land, and sea (joint) campaign of driving deep, quickly, to envelop and destroy Iraqi forces.

Although the US may have dominated the coalition conceptually, there was no public acknowledgement of unity of command. Quite the opposite: early in the coalition's formation, the US media disclosed that there appeared to be disagreements over the initial command and control proposals. This eventually led to the
TABLE 1: NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE MULTINATIONAL COALITION, PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, 1990-1991

Nations appear under the column corresponding to the type of forces they provided to the coalition. Not all the nations shown participated in the armed conflict of January and February 1991. This chart indicates that at one time during the coalition the nation contributed forces.

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UK = United Kingdom
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar)

Turkey provided basing rights for US aircraft.

* Extent of Soviet naval participation could not be determined. According to a Soviet source in February 1991, "There are no Soviet Navy warships or auxiliary vessels in the Persian Gulf, let alone in the multinational forces, nor are we cooperating with them." This would seem to indicate the Soviets never considered themselves part of the coalition.\textsuperscript{11}

Table 1.
establishment of a "parallel" command and control structure, with US forces under the command and control of the US Commander-in-Chief (CINC); and the "Joint Islam-Arabic" forces under Saudi command and control. In fact, when asked whether his forces would fight with US forces, Egyptian President Mubarek stated his forces would fight "...with the Saudis."

The Persian Gulf experience seems to confirm American reluctance to subordinate their forces to another nation's control. The US had two other options: it could place its forces under Saudi control or lobby for the establishment of a UN command structure (similar to that employed in Korea). Instead, the US seemed willing to sacrifice its principle of unity of command for retention of control over its own forces and the subsequent flexibility that control brings. As the US CINC was reported to say, "This is not NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], OK? There is not one supreme commander and there doesn't need to be."

The coalition was not like NATO in another important respect. Referring to the definitions contained in Chapter Five, recall the US differentiates between alliances and coalitions. NATO is an alliance: a group of allied nations which has existed for a long time, approximately 40 years. NATO forces train together and have an integrated command structure. The Persian Gulf Crisis saw the formation of a classic US coalition: an ad hoc group of nations temporarily joined to pursue a single objective. The temporary nature of the coalition may also explain US reluctance to subordinate its forces.
Other western nations faced the command and control dilemma as well. While British forces appeared to be integrated into the US command structure almost from the beginning, French forces were not under US command until January 17, 1991. Each country handled the issue differently. Great Britain considered its forces to be "technically under the command of the prime minister" but "under American tactical control." In other words, once the British prime minister concurred with their participation in the ground offensive, British forces would follow the orders of the American CINC. On the other hand, French forces were to "come under American command for a specified period and predetermined missions."

Details concerning the coordination efforts involved in establishing and maintaining the above command relations are sketchy. Early on, press reports indicated that senior US and Saudi leaders met daily, even at the CINC level. After the ground offensive began, the US CINC indicated that US Special Forces soldiers were present in every Arab unit down to battalion level. As the CINC stated:

First of all, with every single Arab unit that went into battle, we had special forces troops with them. The job of those special forces was to travel and live right down at the battalion level with all those people, to make sure that they could act as the communications with friendly English-speaking units that were on their flanks and they could also call in air strikes as necessary, they could coordinate helicopter strikes and that sort of thing.
These special forces soldiers performed liaison between Arab and English-speaking forces. The liaison requirement was made even more critical by the fact that this war was the first instance in which the US provided close air support to Saudi ground forces.21

During the conduct of the ground offensive, differences in national forces' capabilities appeared to have been solved by giving each force (or group of similar forces) a specific objective linked to specific territory. For example, Arab-Islamic forces (Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi, Emiri, Kuwaiti, Bahraini, Qatari and Omani) appeared to be grouped under Saudi or Egyptian control.22 They were assigned objectives along the coast, to include Kuwait City.23 This left them the political "plum" of liberating a fellow Arab capital city, but also meant they did not have to travel as far as fast. In all, it seems to confirm the American concept of using national forces in accordance with their capabilities.

British and US forces were also integrated. A US brigade may have been assigned to the First British Armored Division24, while the First British Armored Division was itself assigned to the US VII Corps.25 These forces conducted a massive movement west, then forward, deep into Iraq to envelop the best-equipped of the Iraqi forces.26 This was an objective well-suited to the mobility of US and British forces and reflects the interoperability the two nations practice in NATO exercises. Again, it confirms the American concept of using national forces in accordance with their capabilities.

French forces, augmented with one US brigade, also conducted a massive movement west, further west than the VII Corps. French
forces established blocking positions to protect the flank of US and British VII Corps forces.

Finally, the coalition operation involved a preliminary air campaign which was also significant for the amount of cooperation exhibited between coalition partners. Seven nations participated in the air war: the US, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Great Britain, Canada, France and Italy. Characteristic of the coordination involved in the air campaign was this comment by the Air Component Commander:

And you'll find sorties where a Saudi aircraft will be dropping bombs and be escorted by an American fighter, provided support by other aircraft, such as from the countries mentioned. [Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Kuwait]

Such coordination was possible because all members of the coalition flew in accordance with a common "air tasking order."

The above description indicates how the US applies its concepts concerning combined operations, particularly with respect to command and control. The US apparently prefers to retain control of its national forces and is willing to sacrifice its principle of unity of command in order to do so. The US appears to place a high value on maintaining, even highlighting, coalition efforts and will adapt its plans to give everyone a "piece of the pie". The US appears to view liaison as important, particularly with non-English-speaking forces and will use its best trained soldiers in that role at low echelons to accomplish effective liaison. At least in this instance, the US demonstrated a willingness to commit a numerical superiority of
forces to ensure it had the dominant role in the coalition in determining how those forces were employed.

While coalition command and control issues may seem complex and ambiguous, they appear clear-cut next to issues concerning US internal command and control structure. Part of the problem lies in the fact that there has been comparatively little coverage concerning the US internal command and control structure. The civilian press may not be attuned to the various ways in which a CINC may structure his command, leading to little coverage of the issues. At this writing (March 1991), open press sources are the bulk of available material on this subject.

What is obvious from the little available is that the assigned CINC seemed to exercise direct control over the operation. No subordinate Joint Task Force, other than the Naval Joint Task Force, was formed (and little has been written about the activity of the Naval Joint Task Force). General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, CINC, US Central Command was also the Commander for the operation in the Persian Gulf.30 US Central Command was the US command to which responsibility for the Middle East was normally assigned.

It appears General Schwarzkopf used the component command structure for the operation. Press sources list the following component commanders as subordinate to General Schwarzkopf: Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Air Component Commander; Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty, US Navy Joint Task Force, Middle East; Lieutenant General John Yeosock, Army Component Commander;31 and Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, Marine Forces
Component Commander. Although no confirmation was found, a paper circulated by the US Army Command and General Staff College also listed a Special Operations Component Commander.

It is uncertain what specific missions and responsibilities General Schwarzkopf assigned to each component commander. From press reports, he appeared to delegate most of the planning and execution for the air war to his Air Component Commander. For example, during press briefings conducted at the beginning of the air war, General Schwarzkopf briefed with Lieutenant General Horner. Also, press reports cited Lieutenant General Horner as "...orchestrating the air war...." However, little has been written about the duties of the other component commanders.

While the example demonstrates the US follows its concepts for the establishment of internal command and control structures, the point is almost moot. US concepts allow so much flexibility, it would be hard to find instances in which they could not be followed.

Soviet Case Study: Intervention in Afghanistan

In April 1978, a coup deposed the then-current ruler of Afghanistan, Daoud, and left Noor Mohammed Taraki in power. Taraki was a member of the Khalqi Communist party, one of the two dominant factions of the Afghan Communist party.

The coup appeared to be the work of the Afghan military, not necessarily the Afghan or Soviet Communists. Regardless, the net effect was to install a decidedly pro-Soviet government in Kabul, the
capital of Afghanistan. Taraki proceeded on a program of forced modernization which alienated the Afghan populace.\textsuperscript{37} The alienation led to violence. In March 1979, Afghan regime soldiers were sent to the city of Herat to quell a disturbance. The soldiers deserted and joined the rebels. In the ensuing rampage, Soviet citizens living in Herat were executed by the rebels.\textsuperscript{38}

Soviet presence in Afghanistan increased. By November, according to at least one source, Soviet pilots were actively taking part in air strikes against Afghan rebels.\textsuperscript{39} By the end of December (25-26 December), an unspecified number of Spetsnaz (Special Forces) soldiers secured the Bagram airfield, and were quickly followed by at least two divisions of ground forces.\textsuperscript{40} Taraki disappeared, replaced by Babrak Karmal, who was brought in from Moscow to take over the government. Karmal was commonly viewed as a Soviet puppet. In 1987, Karmal was replaced by another pro-Soviet Afghani Communist.\textsuperscript{41}

The Soviet position remains that they entered Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government. Their purpose, as they initially asserted, was to restore order, prevent insurrection, and protect Soviet citizens (although, in at least some Soviet military circles, the invasion is currently characterized as a "mistake"). The Soviets remained in Afghanistan for approximately nine years, during which time they fought primarily a guerrilla war.

This section examines the command and control structures established by the Soviets to accomplish their mission. As in the previous section, command and control mechanisms will be analyzed
on two levels: external and internal. The Soviets established at least a nominal coalition with the Afghan regime forces. The methods for dealing with this coalition will form the external aspect of the command and control analysis. Organization of the Soviet forces and Soviet control over those forces will form the internal aspect of the analysis.

Prior to the Soviet intervention, the Afghan armed forces had a strength of approximately 110,000.\(^{42}\) In 1988, that strength dipped to approximately 40,000.\(^{43}\) With militia, security, secret police and irregular forces added, the resulting combined strength may have reached 100,000; or the same as the prewar strength of the armed forces alone.\(^{44}\) In comparison, the estimates of Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan ranged from a low of 90,000 in 1981 and 1985 to a high of 120,000 in 1988, depending on the source consulted. The implication is clear: the Soviets, by virtue of sheer numbers seemed to have a greater interest in maintaining the current government than the Afghan people themselves.

Along these lines, it is important to note the poor state of the Afghan Armed Forces. All of the sources consulted for this study cited the high desertion rates in the Afghan army and the need for the Afghan regime to resort to press-gangs to enforce conscription requirements. As Hammond states in his book, *Red Flag over Afghanistan*, "Low in numbers and morale, the Afghan army has been doing little of the fighting and some of the officers have even cooperated with the rebels."\(^{45}\)
Whether this characteristic was the end result of Soviet domination or the cause of Soviet domination of the Afghan military cannot be determined from available sources. However, it is obvious that the Soviets controlled the coalition.

Both Hammond and Isby (author of several articles and books on the subject) cite the permeation of Afghan civil and military bureaucracies by the Soviets at all levels. Hammond quotes Babrak Karmal as saying of his Afghani ministers: "...some of them even lay all the burden and responsibility for practical work on the shoulders of the advisers." Isby also affirms that "While separate Soviet and Kabul regime chains of command are maintained, operationally and tactically there emerged one single command structure, controlled by the Soviets." Isby describes the "nominal" Kabul chain of command, which begins with the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense supervised three geographical corps which, in turn, supervised various division level headquarters. Although the Kabul regime maintained a General Staff in the mid-80s which exercised operational control over actions consisting of more than one Afghan division, it never controlled operations involving the Soviets. As demonstrated by the opening quote to this chapter, relations between the Soviet and Afghan military were often characterized by mistrust.

Other sources, such as the Department of State Bulletin, confirm the dependence of the Afghan Army at the time. Although the Afghan army is still holding on (two years later), excerpts from
the bulletins of 1987 and 1988, respectively, demonstrate the bleak condition of the army prior to the Soviet withdrawal:

After decades of Soviet training, 8 years of combat and 7 years of Soviet 'advice' and direction, Afghan armed forces remain incapable of defending the regime. [1987]

In combat operations, Kabul's forces depend on Soviet air and artillery support and Soviet advisers. [1988]

To control Soviet and Afghan Regime forces, the Soviets established two headquarters in Afghanistan: an operational headquarters in the capital city of Kabul and a logistical headquarters in the city of Termez. Overseeing the in-country headquarters from Soviet territory, was the High Command of Forces of the Southern Theater of Strategic Military Action (TSMA). The Turkestan Military District appeared to provide mobilization and logistics support, but did not appear to exercise operational control over the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The chain of command, then, appeared to run from the TSMA to the operational headquarters in Kabul and Termez.

Operational-level direction appeared to be provided by the 40th Army. Sources differ concerning the extent of the control exercised by the 40th Army over Soviet forces in Afghanistan. "Soviet Frontal [sic] Aviation assets in Afghanistan are under the command of 40th Army headquarters at Kabul, which is the overall Soviet command for Afghanistan. The senior Soviet Air Force officer
in Afghanistan is this headquarters' Chief of Aviation," wrote Isby in 1983.52

By 1989, Isby appeared to be less certain of the subordination of Soviet air forces in Afghanistan, writing: "40th Army acted as its [Soviet forces'] operational command structure alongside a command structure for air assets."

The parallel air command structure is not defined or referred to in other sources consulted for this study.

By 1989, Isby also appears to be less certain that the 40th Army always controlled the ground forces in Afghanistan and states the Soviets may have by-passed this headquarters on occasion.

"Major offensives have been marked by the dispatch of General Staff representatives from Moscow, who set up forward ground and air-based command posts, with separate dedicated communications links with Moscow."54

The employment of General Staff liaison to direct complex or important operations is certainly in accordance with Soviet concepts of command and control and methods of coordination as described in Chapter Five. This method has historical roots as well; it was a technique used in World War II. By-passing a headquarters is a technique Soviet commanders use while conducting operations; Isby's comment seems to imply they may do it in the planning stages of operations as well. This is also in accordance with the Soviet tendency towards centralized control.

The confusion over air asset subordination may be due to the lack of a front headquarters assigned to Afghanistan. The TSMA, as
its name implies, presumably provided strategic level direction to the Afghanistan operations. Without a front headquarters (which is formed only in wartime), there is no provision for control of air assets in-country unless front aviation is subordinated to the in-country army headquarters. It is possible the Soviets experimented with this procedure, at least initially. If it did not work adequately, they may have established an ad hoc headquarters to handle air taskings. This would seem to indicate more flexibility at the operational level than is generally attributed to them.

The Soviets also seemed to assign objectives to Afghan regime forces based on geography. According to Isby, the regime forces handled the border areas, while the Soviets protected objectives located in Afghanistan's interior.55

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan demonstrated one possible example for Soviet combined operations. In this case, they dominated not only the military but the government of their coalition partner. They were willing to contribute as many forces as it took to allow them the "right" and power to retain control of the coalition. They used General Staff representatives to ensure operations were conducted as planned. Finally, their internal command and control structure indicates they may have some flexibility to establish systems which work based on the requirements of the situation rather than their written concepts.
ENDNOTES


2 David C. Isby, War in a Distant Country: Invasion and Resistance (Great Britain: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), 61.


5 "Schwarzkopf", A35.

6 "U.N. Resolutions," A32.

7 "Excerpts from Briefing by 2 generals on War's First 36 Hours," New York Times (January 19, 1991), 11.


12 Ibid., A24.

13 Miller, A14.

14 "Who's in Charge There?" Time (September 17, 1990), 33.


17 "At his command," The Economist (December 1, 1990), 66.

18 Riding, A18.

19 "Who's in Charge There?", 33.

20 "Schwarzkopf," A36.


22 "Schwarzkopf", A37.


24 "At his command," 66.


26 Ibid.

27 "Two Generals," 11.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid. An air tasking order tasks all aviation units under the control of the issuing authority to perform specific missions.


32 "Secret History," 38.

34"Two Generals," 11.


37Ibid., 69.

38Ibid., 74.

39Ibid., 79.

40Hammond states the Soviets invaded on 24 December, but announced the Afghan request for intervention on 27 December. Isby, another source cited below, states the Soviets intervened on 27 December. Western analysts currently place the airborne intervention on 25-26 December, with the ground force intervention following soon thereafter.

41Craig Karp, "Afghanistan: Seven Years of Soviet Occupation," Department of State Bulletin (February 1987), 1.

42Isby, 81.

43Ibid.


45Hammond, 160.

46Ibid.

47Isby, 52 through 53.

48Karp, Seven, 9 and Eight, 11.

50 Isby, 52.

51 Ibid.


54 Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When you assemble a number of men, to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views. From such an assembly, can a perfect production be expected?

Benjamin Franklin, addressing the American Constitutional Convention

Introduction

This chapter draws on the research presented in previous chapters and offers conclusions concerning the research question first presented in Chapter Three:

Are US and Soviet approaches to the operational level of war and combined operations sufficiently compatible to enable them to conduct combined military operations?

In order to answer the research question, Chapter Five presented US and Soviet operational concepts and outlined the similarities and differences between them. In this chapter, the
significant differences are analyzed according to the "test" questions posed in Chapter Three and reiterated below for clarity:

1. Does the difference have the potential to seriously and adversely affect operations?

2. Can the difference be avoided or mitigated? Would avoiding or mitigating the difference seriously disrupt operations?

3. Do the historical examples provide any indications of the difference's potential effect on operations; or the willingness/unwillingness of the players to take the measures necessary to overcome the difference?

4. Do the case studies provide any information relevant to the ability of the players to adjust to the difference?

5. What is the potential cumulative effect of this difference when combined with the other identified differences on the conduct of military operations?

The analysis section deals with each of the significant differences identified in Chapter Five according to the above questions. In writing this chapter an anomaly was revealed in which it appeared one of the similarities between US and Soviet concepts had the potential to be as disruptive to effective coalition operations as the differences. This similarity, concerning control of national forces in coalition operations, is analyzed according to the above criteria in the analysis section, also.

Following the analysis section is the section on conclusions. Finally, a recommendations section is presented containing some ideas for future studies related to this subject.
The purpose of this study was to identify the similarities and differences between US and Soviet operational level concepts; secondly, to develop a conclusion concerning the feasibility of combined operations between them based on the compatibility of those concepts. The results of this study indicate that combined operations between the US and the Soviets are feasible, but significant obstacles to the effectiveness of such a coalition exist.

US and Soviet operational level concepts are compatible at a basic level. Among the significant similarities are: compatible interpretations of the operational level of war as the intermediate level between strategy and tactics (although not much else, including definitions, is similar); shared perceptions as to the relative decisiveness of the offense and "indecisiveness" of the defense; and mutual perceptions of the importance of liaison as a coordination method, particularly liaison conducted at high levels to facilitate the success of combined operations.

What is significantly different between US and Soviet concepts is philosophy and procedure. US concepts reflect a democratic society which emphasizes the right of the individual to participate in government. US concepts and practice exhibit great flexibility and a consensus-building approach to both unilateral and coalition operations.

Soviet concepts reflect a Marxist-Leninist, centralized society. (Although these characteristics may eventually change, their effects will be felt for some years to come.) Soviet concepts reflect a top-down approach to both unilateral and coalition operations. Soviet
experiences in World War II and Afghanistan seem to indicate that the Soviet perception of all coalitions as temporary means there is little room for trust in combined operations.

In this regard, significant differences exist between the operational level concepts of each nation which could cause problems in establishing an effective coalition between the two. The significant differences, and the single similarity which could adversely affect the conduct of operations are analyzed in this chapter. These include the difference between US and Soviet concepts of:

--command responsibilities and the importance of tying the operational level of war definitions to organizational echelon and size;
--combined operations and the similarity of their perceptions of the appropriate superpower role in multinational coalitions;
--the purpose of liaison as a coordination method;
--air operations conducted in support of ground forces;
--the importance of pursuit as a part of the offense.

As the differences are analyzed, it becomes obvious that the key to the resolution of these differences lies in the development of a command and control structure that works and is agreeable to both nations. Also important, in that it affects the ability of the command and control structure to function, is the establishment of effective
coordination and the education of personnel conducting liaison concerning the differences and similarities between US and Soviet concepts. These ideas are discussed further in the section on conclusions.

Analysis

The difference in views concerning command and control, for both internal and external issues, is critical. Each of the other differences identified above can be resolved or their effects mitigated if the command and control issues are resolved. The key to effective command and control is that it be responsive and agreed to by both parties. Without resolution of this critical issue, solutions to the other issues will probably prove impossible to implement and the effectiveness of the coalition and its operations is doubtful.

The command and control issue exists on two levels which contributes to the difficulty of resolving it. The first level concerns the difference between US and Soviet views of the role of the operational level commander. The second level concerns each nation's view of their proper role in bi- or multinational coalitions.

The study will deal with the internal issue first: the difference between US and Soviet concepts of the role of the operational level commander. Chapter Five discussed the US emphasis on the operational-strategic aspect of the operational level of command. The operational level commander translated strategic objectives into operational (military) objectives. To execute his
mission and to attain those objectives, the US operational commander employed tactical level forces, such as a corps.

In contrast, the Soviet operational level commander attained operational objectives through maneuver of operational level formations (a front or armies). The translation of strategic objectives into operational objectives was performed at the strategic, not the operational or some hybrid form of the operational, level.

There is a dichotomy. The commanders of both nations have, in some ways, both more and less authority than their counterparts. For example, in the US view, the Soviet operational level commander seems to have little more responsibility than a tactical level commander: he simply maneuvers larger forces. On the other hand, in the Soviet view, the US operational level commander cannot have as much authority as his Soviet counterpart because the US commander has only tactical level forces to maneuver.2

The issue is more complex, of course, but the comparisons above outline the differences in perceptions of the proper role of the operational level commander, particularly when the perceptions are compared. This difference could cause significant problems in attaining objectives in a US - Soviet combined operation. The difference could lead to the assignment of inappropriate tasks to either the US or Soviet commander; tasks which are either below or beyond his capability to fulfill.

Historical examples clearly demonstrate the effect of this difference. A recurring complaint among US officers dealing with the Soviets during World War II was the inability to obtain decisions at
lower echelons from the Soviets. Centralization, integral to the Soviet method of operating, was anathema to the US officers. Similar problems could occur in the future if US and Soviet commanders do not understand the national differences in identifying command responsibilities.

The case study examples do not point to solutions to this problem but serve to demonstrate that each nation implements its written concepts on the subject. That means the US fully intends to invest its operational level commanders with the responsibility to translate strategic goals into operational ones and develop the campaign plans for their execution. Conversely, the Soviets expect their operational level commanders to execute their authority by accomplishing assigned missions as tasked by controlling large formations.

The difference, while critical, is not insurmountable. Its resolution depends largely on the second level of the command and control issue: the issue of the relative control each nation has within the coalition.

As described in Chapter Five, both the US and the USSR have concepts for combined operations. US concepts exhibit great flexibility for coalition (short-term) and alliance (long-term) warfare; for bilateral, multilateral or combined command structures; for assigning missions to national forces based on their capabilities and unique talents. Also discussed in Chapter Five was the apparent American reluctance to subordinate forces to another country's control.
The Soviets, on the other hand, view all combined operations as coalitions (temporary), although they are less enthusiastic about participating in ad hoc coalitions which generally do not have the optimum level of interoperability. Finally, the Soviets do not allow for alternative command structures, obviously preferring to control the coalitions to which they belong.

Obviously, both the US and the Soviets cannot command the same forces at the same time. Again, the historical examples from World War II point to the problems inherent in attempting to operate without a formal command structure. With both nations attempting to control their own forces almost in a vacuum, few operations during World War II were actually combined. Of the few that were, cooperation was obtained at a price which consisted of patience, time and frustration on both sides.

The case studies of the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan confirm this desire of the Americans to dominate and the requirement by the Soviets that they control. In the US case study, the coalition established "parallel" command structures consisting of both US and Saudi commands. The Saudi King Fahd was the titular head of all forces within the coalition, but the reality was that it was an American plan executed to American strengths and dominated by American concepts. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan demonstrated their intention to completely control coalitions, to the point where the Afghan regime forces were, for all intents and purposes, incapable of functioning without their Soviet advisors.
Also arguing against cooperation in this area are the political implications of subordination. In this instance, both parties consider themselves to be superpowers. If one subordinates his forces to the other, who is the true superpower? Three alternatives suggest themselves: third party control; parallel command structures; and modified bilateralism.

One alternative is for each nation to subordinate its forces to a third party, either another country or an international body such as the United Nations. There are pros and cons to this solution also. In the first case, finding an acceptable third party country could prove difficult. What nation would have sufficient clout and at the same time be sufficiently nonaligned? The problems with the United Nations solution are similar; the organization traditionally has not had enough power.

A compromise solution is necessary. It may be possible to execute the third party alternative for short periods of time, if the third party serves as mostly a titular head. This could work if territorial and functional areas of responsibility for the US and the Soviets are precisely defined early in the operation. In this case, the US and the Soviets save "face" by not subordinating their forces to each other; they retain control by specifying their roles in advance; and the titular head serves to satisfy the political requirements of the coalition.

Another alternative is to employ a method similar to that employed in World War II, but at a lower level. General territorial and functional areas of responsibility could be established at the
strategic levels, with details to be accomplished at the operational level. Both countries would have to compromise: the US operational commander accepting less responsibility and authority and the Soviet commander, accepting more.

Committees would be established at two levels. The first level would consist of the US and Soviet heads of state. This committee would be similar to the method used in World War II, but under this concept would meet only when absolutely required—perhaps at the beginning and end of armed hostilities. The second level committee would be established at the (US) Joint Chief and (Soviet) General Staff levels. This "second tier" committee would meet to coordinate military objectives and assign tasks to national units. Execution would, then, be a national responsibility.

This method would partially satisfy the Soviet desire for centralized control. It would also allow each nation to retain command and control over its own forces. It would not, however, be particularly responsive. Finally, it would result in a decrease in the power of the American CINC, since decisions concerning the combined aspect of the theater's operations would be top-driven (from Joint Chief level down, rather than CINC level assessments up).

A third alternative is a sort of modified bilateralism. Unlike current (US) bilateral agreements, the arrangement would be based on contingency requirements, rather than a relatively permanent system of bilateral staffs. Bilateralism would be implemented by the exchange of liaison elements at every practical level. However, decision-making would remain in political channels.
Liaison elements would be adequately staffed with experts in the critical operational functional areas (such as operations, intelligence, sustainment, communications, and fires) and have adequate communications with their parent units. These liaison elements would work with designated representatives of the host unit, in effect forming a miniature combined staff section within the host unit staff sections. At a minimum, liaison would be established at the following levels: (These represent sample counterparts; as explained earlier, US and Soviet command levels are not necessarily equivalents.)

--(US) Joint Chief--(Soviet) General Staff
--(US) Theater commander (CINC)--(Soviet) TSMA commander
--(US) Component commander(s) or Joint Task Force commander--(Soviet) Front and aviation counterpart commanders
--(US) operational maneuver unit (usually a corps) commander--(Soviet) army commander
--Flanking units

The primary advantage of such a system is that it is flexible and responsive. Decisions can be made quickly, in accordance with the current situation, because the information is available. Direct communication with one's counterpart is feasible. From an execution perspective, this method has the best chance of success, because it
allows commanders to coordinate actions, make decisions, and react to battlefield opportunities immediately.

There are many disadvantages as well. The system would obviously require a large number of people to form the required liaison elements at all levels. The collocation of foreign military personnel presents security difficulties; in some cases, the combined element would have to be physically separated from the host element (thereby negating some of the advantages of the method). Differences between the US and the Soviet concept of suitable delegation of responsibility to subordinate commanders would have to be resolved beforehand.

None of the alternatives would be easy to implement or mistake-proof. Each has its own benefits and drawbacks. The selection of any of the above-mentioned methods would have to be based on the specific situation. Such consideration would have to include not only the type of operation planned and the military nature of the threat, but also would have to include the personalities of the leaders involved and the nature of the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union at the time.

Key to the effectiveness of any method is the issue of the differences each country brings to the concept of liaison. In Chapter Five, US liaison was described as having the principal function of coordinating and informing; Soviet liaison was perceived as a mechanism for control. This difference is key in that attempts by one nation’s forces to control another could produce resentments which hinder the conduct of effective operations. Simply the
perception of undue control could adversely affect the conduct of combined operations between the two nations.

Historical examples from World War II offer another sobering picture of the results of this difference. In an effort perhaps to prevent US control, the Soviets refused to establish liaison at other than General Staff level. In the US perspective, this unnecessarily delayed operations and hampered the effectiveness of the operations which were performed. In the Soviet view, this preserved their independence from US influence and reinforced their system of centralized control.

The case studies again reinforce the idea that each nation will put its written concepts into practice. The US employed its elite and specially trained Special Forces soldiers to conduct liaison with Arab units, down to battalion level. The Soviets infested the Afghan military with "advisors" until outsiders offered the criticism that the Afghanis could not make or execute decisions; everything became the Soviet responsibility.

Compromise again would be required. Liaison between the US and the Soviets would have to be reciprocal and designed to inform, rather than control. Liaison to the lowest level of tactical organization capable of sustaining itself in independent operations would be required; certainly, it would be required for any flanking units. The Soviet concept of operations groups conducting liaison is a good one; at higher levels, liaison groups of experts would be required. Representation from each of the operational level functional areas would be required. The American practice of using
elite forces to conduct this liaison might lead to a Soviet perception of undue influence; an effort by the Americans to control rather than inform. On the other hand, liaison personnel should be specially and specifically trained in dealing with foreign countries on a military basis (such as the US does currently with its Foreign Area Officer program).

Other issues may be resolved once the key issues of command and control and methods of coordination are resolved. One of these other differences concerns US and Soviet perceptions of the offense. While the basic role of offensive operations is similar in both countries, the emphasis on the appropriate reasons for the offense differ.

The US allows for reasons other than the destruction of enemy forces as justification for the offense. These reasons include: protection of key objectives and terrain; depriving the enemy of resources; and holding the enemy. With less emphasis on the destruction of enemy forces as a goal, US writings state that pursuit is desirable but unrealistic at the operational level.

As described in Chapter Five, Soviet writings imply that the destruction of enemy forces is the overriding goal of any offensive operation. With this in mind, the Soviets view the pursuit as an inseparable part of the offense.

In conducting operations, this difference could be critical as it could affect the end-state of an operation. A situation could evolve in which the political aims of the US and the USSR differ. The US, seemingly believing pursuit to be politically or militarily
counterproductive may wish to halt hostilities, while the USSR insists on their continuation until the common enemy is utterly destroyed. On the purely military level, the conflict could result in the overextension of a unit, leading to unacceptably high casualty rates in a unit; delay in obtaining assigned missions; or even, defeat. The recriminations in this case could destroy the coalition.

Neither the historical nor the case study examples offer specific instances of this difference in emphasis on aspects of the offense. Again, this need not be an insurmountable problem. With educated command and control—command and control which understands the national characteristics of the US and Soviet concepts of the offense—the difference may not become a problem. Political goals remain critical.

Another difference concerns air support concepts. For the US, air operations in support of ground troops form just one of many types of necessary air operations. US tactical Air Force units are assigned to operational level theater commanders (CINCs), but are not subordinate to the tactical level ground forces executing the operational level missions.

On the other hand, the Soviets view air support to ground forces as the primary goal of all air operations and assign air armies to front-level ground commanders. It is possible large and strong aviation assets may be assigned even lower (to army level, as described in Chapter Six), although this is not certain. More important is the fact that although the Soviets emphasize the ground support role for their aviation, they also experience difficulties in
coordinating air fires with ground maneuver. Such difficulties reportedly exist to the extent that Soviet air support appears to be less responsive and more centrally controlled in practice than it is in the American concept.

This difference was clearly apparent in World War II. US attempts to provide air support to ground forces were met with unenthusiastic responses from the Soviets. The recriminations which followed the American strafing of a Soviet convoy may have been made so severe, not only because a Soviet general officer was killed, but because the Soviets may not have trusted the American capability in the first place. Similar problems could occur in future operations if each country is not sensitive to the capabilities and weaknesses of the other.

The US experience as demonstrated by the case study confirmed the value of air operations conducted to support ground maneuver. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan caused them to expand the role of combat helicopters, although greater effectiveness of the resistance forces' air defense systems later in the war caused some reevaluation. The Soviet experience may lead to a greater desire for responsive, decentralized support, eventually. In that case, they might be frustrated at the relative lack of organic air assets available to the US ground commander executing operational maneuver.

Again, the problem can be resolved or its effects mitigated depending on the effectiveness of the command and control structure established. Resolution of this and the other differences discussed
above depends on a thorough understanding of the differences and similarities in US and Soviet concepts on the part of the commanders put in charge of coalition operations. Finally, coordination at the lowest tactical echelon capable of conducting and sustaining independent operations is necessary, but such coordination must be reciprocal and informative, not directive.

Conclusions

The major differences between US and Soviet concepts do not appear to be unresolvable, but, as with all combined operations, would require compromise on both sides. Two cautions apply to this conclusion.

First, any decision to conduct US-Soviet combined operations would be first and foremost a political decision. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the political scenarios which would form the possible basis for such an undertaking. It is important to realize, however, that at the time of this writing (May 1991) neither country is ruled by its military. Therefore, the decision to conduct combined operations would be political; it would be up to the military leadership to make it happen.

In conjunction with this thought, the US and the Soviets would probably engage in what the US calls a coalition as opposed to an alliance. With the difference in political systems and the historical record of animosity between the two nations, the establishment of a long-term alliance is doubtful. It is not realistic to
expect the US and the Soviets to train together, procure interoperable equipment and compromise their individual concepts in favor of a consolidated body of military thought. Rather, it seems obvious that for the near future, the US and Soviets might come together temporarily during a crisis for the attainment of a specific objective.

Even in a crisis, problems would be inevitable, Benjamin Franklin's comment notwithstanding. The basic issue which makes combined operations between the US and the USSR unique is not the fact they are both superpowers, but that both countries developed their armed forces for the primary purpose of destroying the other's forces. A military force equipped, trained and educated specifically to destroy another specific force does not readily realize the benefits of cooperating with and employing that other force. More than habit will impede the commanders charged with executing US - Soviet coalition operations.

Secondly, US concepts concerning combined operations are so flexible it is almost impossible to conclude that the US cannot conduct operations with any other country. The experience in the Gulf is indicative of this. Not only did the US devise an acceptable command structure, but the US figured out how to integrate a former Soviet-backed adversary (Syria) into that structure. If it were politically important enough, the US military would probably make it happen.

While the first point would argue against a US - Soviet coalition, the second point makes a stronger argument for it. Additionally, the similarities between US and Soviet concepts are striking when one considers they have been adversaries for over 40
years. The differences, particularly in execution concepts, are important, however. If misunderstood, they could significantly impede the successful functioning of a US-Soviet coalition.

The most significant obstacle remains the command and control issue. Again, the US experience in the Gulf demonstrates that other differences can be overcome; after all, that coalition involved up to 28 countries throughout its lifetime. The experience also demonstrated that command and control relationships can be the Achilles Heel of any coalition; remember the dissension reported over the establishment of the parallel command structure in the US case study.

Such coalition problems would be exacerbated between the two superpowers. Cooperation does not come easily to two former adversaries; compromise does not come easily to superpowers, especially when one has a totalitarian background. This single issue will determine the success or failure of a US-Soviet coalition; or whether it is undertaken at all.

The answer to the research question is, then, a qualified yes. Sufficient capability exists, although admittedly this is mostly because the US concept of combined operations is so flexible. Would such a coalition be successful or even effective? It is quite possible for a US-Soviet coalition to fail; or for coalition support efforts to be seen as not much more than nuisances (much like the efforts of World War II), if the commitment of the two nations is weak. Would it fail from a purely military, operational level perspective? Given the proper tools of workable command and control and liaison to
lower levels, it should not. But coalition warfare is susceptible to pressures other than the purely military ones; these form both the strength and the weakness of coalition warfare. More than military principles, it is the political structures which will determine the success or failure of US - Soviet coalition operations.

**Recommendations**

As mentioned above, the political considerations of coalition warfare outweigh the military. This study did not address the political conditions required before consideration of US - Soviet coalition operations could become reality. Such a study is required and should be updated periodically. Among the questions it should address are those associated with the perceived change in US - Soviet relations over the span of the Gulf Crisis, from the possibility of military participation in the coalition to apparent attempts by the Soviet Union to steer its own course in the crisis. Internal problems of both nations and their impact would also be an essential part of this study.

Since this study was designed to be a starting point for the consideration of US - Soviet combined operations, similar studies into detailed aspects of related issues would be appropriate. For instance, what are the specific differences and similarities between the US and the Soviets in the employment of operational fires? Specifically, how does each nation control their air, their artillery? How would they exchange intelligence? What should they exchange? What is the
appropriate composition of liaison cells for operations at each echelon? All these questions would become important should we decide to undertake coalition operations with the Soviet Union.

Similar issues are under research by other offices now and may be the subject of discussion between military exchange officers of the two nations as well. Although these discussions are always subject to political and security constraints, they may serve as good starting points for the development of thought concerning combined operations between the US and the Soviet Union. Depending on the nature of the relationship between the two nations and the constraints imposed at the time, simple discussion between military personnel concerning these types of coalition issues will shed light on the potential problems. Brainstorming and "what-if" sessions in which military experts simply talk together about their ideas on US-Soviet combined operations would be useful.

For greater focus, participants in military exchanges could set aside time to discuss sample scenarios with a view to discovering the differences and the similarities in the methods each country would use to solve the scenario problem. Using basic scenarios, US and Soviet military officers could talk through a simulated combined operation to seek potential problems and solutions. This would constitute an informal wargame between US and Soviet military exchange personnel, with all participants exchanging candid views and ideas on key scenario elements.

The recent example of the Persian Gulf Crisis could provide such sample scenarios. What if the Soviets had contributed forces?
How would they have employed those forces? What if either the British or French units had been replaced with Soviet units, for example? From open sources, it is obvious the Soviets contributed politically to the coalition; did they contribute otherwise, such as through intelligence sharing? If so, could such cooperation have been accomplished at lower echelons and if so, how? These are the types of issues and questions which should be asked prior to attempting such combined operations.

One of the deficiencies noted in conducting research for this study was the lack of one-on-one comparisons of US and Soviet military concepts. Sources tended to describe either US "doctrine" or Soviet "military art;" and to describe these concepts in national terms and language, rather than making specific comparisons. (A noted exception to this trend was the Hines - Petersen article, "Is NATO Thinking Too Small? a comparison of command structures," listed in the bibliography.) More work appears to be required in developing specific comparisons which pit Soviet concepts against US concepts to identify the differences and similarities; and to explain Soviet concepts using US terminology. Military exchanges could also be used to further this type of analysis.

Finally, as a methodology for analyzing the potential feasibility of combined operations between given countries, this study's validity admittedly remains in question. Without a real-world instance of US - Soviet combined operations, there are no means to test the conclusions stated in this study. Until such a coalition is attempted, this study is useful primarily as a comparison
of US operational level concepts with those of its former--and still most formidable--potential adversary, the Soviet Union.
ENDNOTES

1 As quoted in "The Waiting Game," Time (October 15, 1990), 50.

2 This idea of the relative limitation on US commanders is credited largely to an article which discusses similar ideas using NATO and the Warsaw Pact as examples. See John G. Hines and Philip A. Petersen, "Is NATO Thinking Too Small? a comparison of command structures," International Defense Review (5/1986), reprinted US Army Command and General Staff College Syllabus A352 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Academic Year 1989), 297 through 303.
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174