STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: IS A FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT CARRIER REQUIRED IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

CHARLES BOURNE, LCDR, USN
B.S., University of Kansas, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991

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Strategic Analysis of the Asia-Pacific Region: Is a Forward-Based Aircraft Carrier Required in the Post-Cold War Era?

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This thesis determines whether there is an operational requirement to maintain a forward-based aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific region. Written as a strategic paper, it presents broad operational requirements in a changing world order by examining interdependence and future international order in the wake of the Cold War. The discussion then narrows to formulate the strategic framework of the Asia-Pacific region by presenting historic influences, regional defense, and current issues affecting future U.S. naval requirements in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Key issues relate to the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippine bases, and the overarching influence of U.S. naval contingencies in Southwest Asia. The strategic criteria derives from carrier missions as they apply across the spectrum of conflict. The analysis brings together conclusions and recommends maintaining a forward-based carrier with caveats.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This thesis determines whether there is an operational requirement to maintain a forward-based aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific region. Written as a strategic paper, it presents broad operational requirements in a changing world, by examining interdependence and future international order in the wake of the Cold War. The discussion then narrows to formulate the strategic framework of the Asia-Pacific region by presenting historic influences, regional defense capabilities, and current issues affecting future U.S. naval requirements in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Key issues of the framework relate to the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the security of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippine base talks, and the overarching influence of U.S. naval contingencies in Southwest Asia. The study also examines other issues as they affect U.S. naval commitments in the region. The conclusions form the basis for the subjective analysis.

The criteria for determining operational requirements in the strategic sense derive from carrier missions as they apply across the spectrum of conflict, namely: peacetime presence, conflict response, and power projection. The study presents the current U.S. peacetime and wartime regional objectives and discusses U.S. Maritime Strategy in a changing world including the aircraft carrier's strategic role in the Asia-Pacific region.

The analysis brings together the conclusions presented in the study to formulate recommendations and caveats. This will answer the strategic question posed. The bottom line is that the U.S. should maintain a forward-based aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific region, referencing appropriate caveats mentioned in this analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his thanks to the members of his committee for their support. Additionally, the curriculum instructors of the Army Command and General Staff College provided assistance for all aspects of this naval-related paper, lending a joint perspective. I would also like to express my appreciation to my wife, Cindy, and daughter, Rachel, for their love, patience, and encouragement during the course of constructing this thesis. Finally, my thanks and a small portion of my pay goes to the Secretary of the Navy Section, Army Command and Staff College, Ann Chapman, for formatting and detailing the thesis for publication.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

Aircraft Carrier or Carrier (CV/CVN): the United States currently has twelve operational carriers projected to 1995, conventional (CV) and nuclear propulsion (CVN), divided among Atlantic and Pacific Fleets with one forward-deployed to Japan. CV is used in this thesis for CV or CVN.

Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG): consists of the carrier, its embarked air wing, and all additional United States naval vessels considered "in company" with the carrier for operational purposes according to the current CVBG task organization. This includes all helicopters and weapon systems associated with these vessels as well as all logistic support ships and helicopters.

Area of Responsibility (AOR): geographic area assigned to a unified commander under the Joint Service Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

APEC - Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation of 1989.

Asia-Pacific Region or Far East: for academic purposes, the area bounded by Guam (Northern Marianas) in the east, extending westward to include Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Thailand (East Indian Ocean) in the west, the Australian continent in the south to Northeast Asia the Kurile Islands, located northeast of Hokkaido, Japan in the north.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, and Singapore.


Carrier Air Wing (CVW): consists of eight to ten squadrons totalling 75 to 95 aircraft, including fixed-wing and helicopters, with varying and complementary roles. This will be further elaborated during Maritime Strategy.

CINCPAC - Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

CPP - Communist Party of the Philippines.

CONUS: Continental United States including Hawaii and Alaska.

DPRK - Democratic People's Republic of Korea, also North Korea.

FPDA - Five Power Defense Arrangement of 1971, signatories include: Singapore, Malaysia, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

Forward-Based: forces with home ports/facilities located in a host country and deployed there on a permanent basis as part of a written treaty or agreement.

Forward-Deployed: forces with home ports located in the Continental United States (CONUS) or forward base which are deployed to forward regions of the world on a temporary basis or as part of a deployment cycle and
returns to CONUS or their forward base upon completion of the cycle.

**Forward Presence**: Forward-based and/or forward-deployed.


**LOC** - Line of Communication (includes trade and military routes), also SLOC refers to Sea LOC.

**Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)**: specifically, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. (Also known as "Four Little Tigers/Asian Tigers").

**NFWZ** - Nuclear Free Weapons Zone, also SPNFWZ (South Pacific).

**PLA** - People's Liberation Army (of the People's Republic of China).

**PRC** - People's Republic of China, also mainland China or communist China.

**ROC** - Republic of China, also Taiwan, Nationalist China or free China.

**ROK** - Republic of Korea, also South Korea.

**South/Southwest Asia**: for academic purposes, the area bounded by western Indonesia and Thailand (East Indian Ocean/South Asia) in the west extending northwesterly to include the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea (Southwest Asia).

**ZOPFAN** - Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Purpose

This thesis attempts to determine whether there is an operational requirement to maintain a forward-based aircraft carrier (CV) in the Asia-Pacific Region.

For purposes of this thesis the term operational requirement has strategic connotations and is given objective criteria by which the author will make a subjective assessment. In terms of forward-basing an aircraft carrier versus forward-deploying the same aircraft carrier from CONUS, the relative advantages and disadvantages are weighed against these criterion in the strategic sense. They relate to U.S. regional objectives, the perceived threat and the spectrum of conflict. For purposes of this thesis, the criterion are defined by the following CV missions:

1. **Peacetime presence.**
2. **Conflict response** and/or **force sequencing.**
3. **Sustained power projection** for sea control or against land targets.

These missions derive from maritime strategy and are driven by the strategic framework of the region as a whole and U.S. policy toward the region.

Reasonable understanding of our countries historic ties and current national interests in the region provides the foundation for meaningful assessment and comparative
analysis. Additionally, the aircraft carrier's strategic role as a forward-based force is reviewed and assessed against perceived threats for the future as well as the political feasibility of maintaining this force given a changing world order.

A discussion of interdependence, international/world order and spectrum of conflict will precede regional analysis. The author views this as critical to the study of future U.S. military operational requirements especially forward-basing within the strategic framework of the Asia-Pacific region. This study references the Army Command and General Staff College Strategic Analysis Model (SAM) as a source of methodology.

The study will then identify U.S. national interests in specific regions of the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR), starting with the relevant actors in Northeast and Southeast Asia. South and Southwest Asian influences in these regions is examined as applicable.

The issue of the Philippine Naval Bases is analyzed in the Southeast Asia discussion. Talks concerning the future of these facilities is ongoing. The criticality of the outcome of these talks to discussions within this thesis is significant. The bases are inextricably linked to the strategic questions to be answered.

If U.S. policy dictates that the U.S. should maintain a forward presence in the Pacific, choices will have to be made about reducing force levels in the region or spending the money to ensure continued basing facilities on the order that have existed for the past 30-some years.¹
A discussion of U.S. maritime strategy applied to the PACOM AOR will ensue by presenting the current PACOM mission, current maritime strategy and Navy missions. Then it assesses the maritime strategy in light of the changing world. The thesis will then analyze the strategic role of the aircraft carrier and the U.S. Seventh Fleet's forward-based aircraft carrier and apply CVBG missions along the spectrum of conflict.

The thesis will shift to the comparative analysis of forward-basing versus forward-deployment. It will conclude with a brief overview, summary of findings, a full picture assessment and recommendations for further research.

Significance of the Study

Michael Howard, awarded the Chesney Memorial Gold Medal for outstanding contributions to military science, commented during his acceptance speech in 1973 about military science in an "age of peace." He stated,

...the military man is...fundamentally hidebound: that is to say, somebody who is trapped in his environment, so soaked in his problems that he finds it intellectually and psychologically impossible to lift himself out and see them in a different kind of perspective.  

He goes on to discuss the triangular dialogue of military science; operational requirements, technological feasibility and financial capability, stating that it is in discerning operational requirement where the really hard thinking occurs for the military scientist. "In
discerning operational requirements the really conceptual difficulties of military science occur."

This study addresses the relative viability of maintaining a forward-based aircraft carrier, and endeavors to give a concise perspective on how America's changing role in the post-Cold War world may affect future U.S. Navy operational requirements in the PACOM AOR, specifically as they coincide with forward deployment or basing strategies of an aircraft carrier. Additionally, long-term world and domestic reactions to Operation "Desert Shield/Storm," in terms of future U.S. naval response to regional conflicts, heightens the timing and significance of such a study. Planners at the joint level should find the subject interesting and insightful regarding future naval contingency operations and basing issues in Southeast and Northeast Asia.

Background

With the changing complexion of the Soviet threat, broad-based reduction of U.S. global influence and domestic budgetary difficulties, the United States is rethinking its military force structure and forward-basing policy. The Navy maintains significant forward-based forces and support facilities in the Far East, primarily Japan and the Philippines. The Navy's only forward-based aircraft carrier, currently USS MIDWAY (CV-41), operates out of U.S. Naval Station, Yokosuka, Japan. The
embarked air wing, CVW 5, operates out of U.S. Naval Air Facility, Atsugi, Japan while MIDWAY is in home port.

Since World War II, the role of U.S. military power to influence global events related to perceived threats from the Soviet Union and other communist and authoritarian regimes. U.S. military strategy focused on providing a strategic nuclear umbrella for the U.S. and its allies, maintaining forward-deployed/ based forces as a deterrent to aggression and maintaining freedom of vital trade routes. Maritime strategy, along these lines, was deployment of strategic missile and attack submarines to deter or impair Soviet nuclear strike capability and forward presence, and power projection, of aircraft carrier or battleship battle groups (CVBG/BBBG) and amphibious forces in reaction to regional contingencies. Generally, the U.S. domestic economy ably supported the development and maintenance of those forces as they served to deter aggression and promote economic growth of U.S. allies through regional stability. In turn, the U.S. economy flourished and economic interdependence strengthened.

The economic element of national power arose from this growing global economic interdependence. Democracies and free market economies became strong, with rare exception, while communist and authoritarian systems steadily declined toward obsolescence and social unrest. Although the Soviets continue to upgrade their military in
qualitative terms, they articulate the need for global cooperation and partnership as well as the need for reducing defenses to "reasonable" sufficiency within the international community.  

With economic interdependence came "sensitivity interdependence." In economic terms, this means individual nation or alliance trade practices and domestic economic habits combined to produce varying economic reactions and/or tensions between interdependent countries. Cooperating nations found the need to resolve unfair trade practices and internal production/consumption disparities. Accordingly, the blatant use of economic power as a threat to another nation's economic interests has increasingly no validity among such interdependent states. Obvious examples of "sensitivity interdependence" are seen between the United States and Japan. This will be discussed further in chapter 3.

In the post-Cold War environment, regional threats come from third world authoritarian powers with improved military weaponry and technology and the will to use military force unilaterally. Regional threats may also come in the form of internal disputes caused by faltering economic policies of individual nations. This breeds discord and an environment ripe for violence and instability. It is, therefore, in the U.S. and global interest to safeguard peaceful governments and free market
economies to the benefit of world economic development. Equally, it remains prudent to maintain a maritime presence in those areas of the world where free access to trade routes may be hindered or where there is a threat of aggression to sovereign nations.

Over the past two decades, global economic power has shifted to the Pacific region. This shift will continue into the 21st Century as western Europe rebuilds the domestic economies of their eastern neighbors and integrates them into the European Economic Community (EC). Currently, the United States and Japanese economies represent 40% of the world gross national product. Other East Asian nations are also nearing parity with current European powers. Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, are among these "Newly Industrialized Countries" (NIC).

It is noted that the United States played the critical role of economic partner and military guardian in the past to promote this economic growth through trade relations, regional stability, and freedom of oceanic trade routes. In Europe, the multilateral NATO military alliance protected free democracies against the perceived threat of communist hegemonic intent from the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. This strong alliance succeeded with coalition military exercises and proven force readiness, demonstrating NATO's ability to fight and win or, at least, deter aggression in Europe. In East Asia however,
the U.S. developed a complex and varying system of
relations ranging from minimal diplomatic rhetoric to
concrete bilateral security and/or economic alliances.
Other regional actors benefitted from free trade routes
and increased demand from the world's consumers for their
national resources. With few exceptions democracy now
governs and regional security has seen a significant
increase.

The Bush administration regards the ability to
project American power in support of global and regional
stability as critical to international equilibrium.
Regional security in East Asia and the Pacific rests on
harmonious relationships with key states and is centered
on our alliance with Japan. Additionally, United
States military facilities in the Philippines,

...support a continued and needed American forward
presence that benefits us, the Philippines,
regional security, and global stability.

Mutual reductions of naval force presence in the
Asia-Pacific, as urged by the Soviet Union, continues to
be rejected based on the United States' dependence on
overseas trade and the security of sea lanes vital to the
resource base of U.S. allies. With regard to military
engagements and contingencies in the middle east region
(Southwest Asia), the Bush administration promises to
maintain a naval presence and conduct naval exercises in
this area.
Over the last thirty-plus years, the aircraft carrier has been the "force of choice" in contingency missions, providing a formidable strike capability. Most of the more recent contingencies were Southwest Asia scenarios, from the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers to initial stages of Operation "Desert Shield". One of the main purposes of a forward-based/deployed carrier is to react quickly in support of national objectives and global security. The areas where the MIDWAY routinely operates, even in their local training areas, allow for quicker reaction and strike capability to most PACOM areas of interest strictly due to its forward-based location. Obviously, any carrier forward-deployed in the region from CONUS could also react, however, forward-basing provides continuous locational and strategic advantages over continuous deployments.

From a training standpoint, CVW 5 relies heavily on Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines, Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, and Wallace Air Station, Poro Point, Philippines. The air wing sends weapons training detachments to the Philippines for aircrew proficiency and weapons loading and delivery training while the MIDWAY is in home port, Yokosuka. The air wing has many limitations imposed on training in Japan. They include limited field carrier landing practice and restricted landing patterns, especially during night landing practice within the crowded suburbs of the Kanto Plains near Tokyo. This is
due to noise abatement and other petitions of the local public. Also, there are no local weapons training sites, which leads to Philippine detachments, as mentioned above and smaller detachments to Korea.

Assumptions

The most important assumption is that the Soviet Union is earnest in its peace initiatives. U.S. Forces in Japan, protected against aggression, principally, from the Soviet Union whose military strength today remains conspicuous in the Far Eastern Soviet region. The increased Soviet presence over the past two decades led to much of the current PACOM force structure, North Korea notwithstanding, to include forward-basing of an aircraft carrier in Japan during the 70's. Their incremental, yet incomplete, departure from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and a more open dialogue with Japan regarding the much disputed Kurile Islands, north of Hokkaido, are indicative of a changing strategy regarding the entire region. This is discussed further in chapter 3 under interdependence. Although concrete steps must obviously follow dialogue, this assumption seems reasonable. It falls in line with post-Cold War debate and provides better research focus for force structuring within an envisioned "New World Order" so often discussed by President Bush and other world leaders.

Additionally, it is assumed that the United States will economically support continued forward-based or
forward-deployed naval operations through its own defense budget and international burden sharing if the determination is made that forward naval presence continues to serve U.S. interests. No assumptions are made regarding the future of the Philippine bases since their fate may be decided during the middle stages of the research, therefore the author will look at conceivable options with or without full use of those facilities then adjust if events dictate.

Regarding South Asia, India has consistently shown non-alignment and felt responsibility for its backyard, the Indian Ocean. Although India has increased its military capacity and shown the will to use it in quelling regional conflicts, as in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the author feels that, for the next decade, India will continue to confine significant military activities to the Indian Ocean. However, India may fill the vacuum left by a diminished American military presence in the region. For this reason, their capabilities are assessed in the strategic framework of the Asia-Pacific region.

Limitations

Some of the research information is classified. This thesis will sufficiently answer the questions at the unclassified level.

Much of the information is of an ongoing nature. As mentioned earlier, the Philippine base talks are among these. Complete Soviet pull-out from Cam Ranh Bay has not
yet occurred but appear to be incrementally coming to fruition. The ultimate state of Soviet influence in the region is, therefore difficult to assess in definitive terms. It is better judged over time and as such the author can only offer current trends and actions in the analysis. Post-Desert Storm world opinion is not yet available and the long-term affect on U.S. forward presence depends, to some degree, on the relative success of the conflict in allied terms. Equally, Vietnamese fulfillment of its 1989 pledge to vacate Cambodia is a major factor in formulating ASEANs view of future stability to the Southeast Asia region. Although this also appears to be forthcoming, Vietnamese action over time will be judged. This thesis will, therefore, not cover the Cambodia (Kampuchea) issue in any detail and is limited by such future action.

The author does not have access to any current initiatives or developments which may be in work between the regional actors and is limited to historic trends which, as events of the last three years point out, can change quickly.

Although this thesis covers forward-based and deployed CV operations, it must be pointed out that the CV is supported and protected by myriad combatant and logistic vessels, some of which must also be forward-based. These vessels, in company with the CV form the layered defense and support base of the CVBG. Except for
discussions regarding the cruise missile in the power projection role and combatants in the sea control role, this thesis will not provide analysis of combatant/non-combatant vessels other than the CV but may use the terms CV, carrier, or CVBG throughout. The author does not deny supporting roles within the CVBG as critical, but to examine them in this forum would require extensively more time than is allotted to adequately justify.

The author will not discuss the issue of proposed "sea control ships" of smaller size and differing capabilities. Neither will the thesis discuss strategic nuclear submarines (SSBN) in the strategic framework. Although they certainly play the ultimate part in deterrence, that level of the conflict spectrum is beyond the scope of the research question(s).

A valid case can be made for a forward-based CVBG in the Mediterranean. The study will not include this region, however it will cite a previous thesis regarding this subject. Nor will the research cover forward-basing in Southwest Asia. Although an equally valid argument for forward-basing in this area is more than justified, the author will defer this to further research addressed in chapter 6.

**Delimitations**

Given the preceding assumptions and limitations the scope of the research will focus primarily on Northeast and Southeast Asian security. In Northeast Asia, the
U.S.-Japanese defense arrangement and current interdependent issues are central to the focus of this thesis since the current forward-based CV is located there. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN and the Philippines are discussed separately, although the Philippines is part of ASEAN. This is due to the Philippine base discussion and its importance to the thesis. Some mention of the relevance of forward-basing, with regard to Southwest Asia contingencies and India's existing capabilities in South Asia, is made. However, as specific regions they will not receive detailed study.

Additionally, forward-basing focuses on naval issues given the purpose of determining the viability of a forward-based carrier in the Pacific. To the degree that forward-based Air Force and Army activities influence this controlling idea, these issues are discussed.

In as much as possible, this study will present regional perspectives regarding U.S. presence. U.S. interests are usually obvious to U.S. strategists. However, if we are, in fact, going to emerge as the world leaders of a proposed international order of "peace and cooperation," then we must see them in a different perspective. This perspective should be one that respects the region as a whole and on terms amenable to the preponderance of the actors. This is especially true regarding the Philippines base issue. The Philippine "anti-base" supporters have valid contentions which the
U.S. must not blindly pass off as "unappreciative."
Therefore, this issue will receive attention and focus
from a naval perspective.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid.


6 Toshiki Kaifu, "Japan's Vision," Foreign Policy, No. 80, Fall 1990, 33.


8 Ibid., 47.

9 Ibid., 66.

10 Ibid., 48.

11 As seen in Operation "Desert Shield/Storm," the term force-sequencing more adequately describes the CVBG's role in escalating conflicts rather than force of choice in limited or low-intensity operations as a reactionary political instrument.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction/Research Questions

The purpose of this thesis, stated in chapter one, derives from, and is in consonance with a basic research question, namely;

Is there an operational requirement to maintain a forward-based aircraft carrier in the PACOM AOR as part of the forward presence aspect of U.S. national strategy?

The subordinate questions consider national interests, threats, and the strategic role of a forward-deployed or based aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific Region and include the following:

What are the strategic considerations involved in forward-basing of an aircraft carrier within the Pacific Command Region?

What are the broad national interests in the region?

What are the current threats to security within the region and perceived threats for the future?

How does the strategic role of a forward-based aircraft carrier apply to regional stability?

Falling out as further supporting questions are:

What are the historic ties and treaties which affect current strategy and forward-deployed/based naval forces in the region? One critical discussion will center on the status of talks involving the future of United
States Navy and Air Force facilities located in the People's Republic of the Philippines

What are the current economic and military interests in the region?

How will the diminished Soviet threat affect the requirement for forward-based naval forces?

What are the strategic capabilities of the aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG)?

What are the broad training and readiness issues unique to the current forward-based carrier air wing?

What facilities routinely support the air wing's training and what are their capabilities?

Where are the critical sea lanes and contingency areas of interest based on the previous discussion of regional economic and military interests?

Is it less expensive to operate from the current overseas homeport location than to deploy from the continental United States? (In other words, are there any overwhelming detractors from one strategy over the other?)

Interdependence and International Order

The broad definition of "operational requirement" in chapter one involves strategic elements. This requires identifying regional interests, trends in international relations, and the changing threat environment, then applying the conclusions to refine the forward-basing strategy applicable to an aircraft carrier. As the study began, it became evident that critical questions of
post-Cold War military strategy involve more than identifying unilateral U.S. interests. To consider them alone, given the changing political and economic environment of the last few years, would slant the research and provide unrealistic conclusions.

In order to provide this insight, the author studied two periodicals, *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*, as the basis for further research. Additionally, an initial review of pertinent research papers was completed to ensure the study had not already been accomplished. The papers are discussed in a later section of this chapter involving military and maritime strategy.

*Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy* provide a wealth of information from various viewpoints regarding global and regional issues. One element of international relations receiving emphasis was economic and policy interdependence. Most articles reference work by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, specifically those attempting to structure future economic or security scenarios.

Keohane and Nye's collaborative book, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, provides a definitive discussion of interdependence theory and its applicability to international order. Although written in 1978, its implications are significant as we move toward the 21st Century. They explain the changing nature of the international system and patterns of national action. The
increasing difficulty of disentangling domestic and foreign policy is also emphasized.¹ Their study provides characteristics of "Realism and Complex Interdependence." Of specific note for this study is the diminished role of military force within the web of complex interdependence and the increased need for functional international organizations. The two major issue areas developed are Oceans and Money. Elaborating further, Oceans refers to the historic development of international "Laws of the Sea" regarding contiguous ocean space and resources with the resultant changing agenda of oceans politics (regimes). Money refers to international monetary policy and regime changes.

In the Oceans issue area, it is pointed out that force plays a much more direct role than in the monetary realm.² They note that the large states generally have not used force in conflicts with small states over oceans resources, or when force was used, it was not always successful. However, this does not mean that force could not deter aggression resulting from conflicting claims. In the Asia-Pacific region there are potential conflicts involving jurisdictional claims of islands and ocean resources. Therefore, this aspect of the book fell out as further reference on this subject.

Economic interdependence plays a critical role in the Asia-Pacific region due to the strong integration between not only the U.S. and Japan, but also the NICs,

²
ASEAN, and, increasingly, China. In the international realm, monetary organizations have formed over the course of the last fifty years in an attempt to ensure fair and free global trade and other monetary issues.

A collection of research papers and policy studies entitled, *Pacific-Asian Economic Policies and Regional Interdependence*, from the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, provides indepth economic analysis of the region. For purposes of this study, however, the capsulized introduction by Robert A. Scalapino and the last study entitled, "Organizing the Pacific," by Miles Kahler provide sufficient information to aid in understanding the economic framework of the region.

Bobby L. Childress' article in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College *Joint and Combined Environments* entitled, "Interdependence: Issues and Concepts," was actually the first exposure of the author to interdependence theory. Written as a condensed essay, it provides definitions and implications of interdependence in understandable terms, relevant to the security aspects of the research. Specific to today,

As security concerns weaken, it is more difficult, especially in democratic states, to establish domestic consensus with interdependence which serves national security interests while benefitting some at the expense of others.

The principal assumption of this thesis revolves around perceived future intentions of the Soviet Union.
After making this assumption, the author felt it critical to validate the assumption within the study of interdependence and international order. This was important from the perspective of U.S. interests and the changing threat environment. There was, of course, no shortage of new literature or articles on this subject.

A recent book entitled, "Superpower Politics: Change in the United States and the Soviet Union," by Michael Pugh and Phil Williams, evolves the thought of interdependence in Soviet thinking and global politics during the last two decades. They offer various possibilities of future international "blocs," but state that "...globally significant shifts will probably not be manifested in dramatic realignments." Additionally, they mention that the,

...shrinking relevance of bipolar preoccupations require...more realistic distribution of responsibility...to preserve stability.

Relevant to conflict resolution is,

...the 'superpowers will be obliged to seek a new force equilibrium, one which will have to reflect a retreat from power projection in furtherance of bipolar confrontation.

Noting that Desert Shield/Storm, while it was large-scale power projection, was not done so in furtherance of this confrontation, but in consultation.

Another recent book entitled, **Defending America's Security**, by Frederick Hartmann and Robert Wendzel provides insight across the broad spectrum of the paper.
They mention early in the book that the U.S. needs, "...much clearer ideas on what can be brought about without active intervention," and that, "...inflexibility is one of the most serious problems with any decision to commit forces to support an interest." From their perspective, naval power is a versatile and powerful element providing accurate strike capabilities, thus providing increased flexibility.

The authors also emphasize that in analyzing the threat (which they call a power problem), three views must be considered; unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral, each with its own use, but, "...each omit(ing) something in order to do justice to its own analytical framework." Threat is defined as capabilities and intentions. The book also delineates four cardinal principals for controlling threats. Of significance is the principal of "past-future linkage." This principal could come into play in the near-term security order, in that the threat of force (in this case, presence of a carrier) may carry more weight in the wake of the Desert Storm "air power demonstration." Other aspects of the book are addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Regarding specific articles from Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, several stand out, but are mentioned below in the order of use within chapter 3.
Richard Pipes, "The Soviet Union Adrift," feels the Soviet Union's disintegration as a union, ...seems fairly certain, all the more since a substantial portion of the Russian population does not wish to remain in it.14 However, he warns that a coup is possible which may reinstitute central authority for a short-term. He also mentions that two-thirds of the population favor democracy and free-markets but are poorly organized, and disenchanted about reforms.

Michael Mandelbaum's, "The Bush Foreign Policy," expresses the view that the post-Cold War international agenda, "...is not likely to be dominated by military confrontations."15 However, he points out that, in the post-Cold War era, American military forces in East Asia, as in Europe, can serve as a buffer among countries that, while no longer avowed adversaries, continue to be suspicious of one another and might conduct more aggressive foreign policies without a reassuring American presence.16 He also discusses the U.S. agreement to withdraw fighter aircraft from Clark Air Base in the Philippines. This loss of air strike power in Southeast Asia, makes naval air that much more significant in response to conflicts.

Charles Krauthammer's, "The Unipolar Moment," provided a key quote, i.e., "...International stability is the product of self-conscious action by the great power(s)."17 He focuses on the risks of American abdication of its unique superpower role in the aftermath of the Cold War. He also defines the new threat as the
"Weapon State"\(^{16}\) and that this threat makes international order a matter of sheerest prudence.\(^{19}\)

Finally, he finds the best hope for safety is in, "...American strength and will - the strength and will to lead a unipolar world."\(^{20}\)

William Pfaff's, "Redefining World Power," states that, "...the new rivalries contain none of the lethal threat of the old," but, as in the last article, he also mentions the threat of the "Weapon State."\(^{21}\) His article finds a world, where conflicts can be resolved in a United Nations forum, is an attractive one, with America as the natural coalition builder.\(^{22}\) This vision of international order, he contends, "...presumes UN opinions will prove consistent with American opinion."\(^{23}\) This is consistent with interdependence theory, in that issue areas and decisions of international organizations are affected as much by domestic consensus as by international referendum, especially in a democracy. At the same time, he emphasizes that no nation dominates as individual nations have dominated in the past.\(^{24}\)

Regarding Japan, he comments that Japan currently lacks the ambition or Asian backing to take the lead commensurate with their economic strength.\(^{25}\) This is elaborated further in the interests section.

Hans W. Maull's, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," discusses security aspects of the
post-Cold War and how interdependence shapes the new international order. They cite Keohane and Nye's complex interdependence regarding the precondition of a security framework which permits, "...sustained focus on interdependence." Additionally, they acknowledge that military power has become a residual element of international politics, although war and civil war have become more frequent and destructive in the Third World.

The following articles, although not specifically cited in the chapter, provided corroborative and additional viewpoints.

C. Michael Atlo and Bruce Stokes article, "The Year the World Economy Turned," supplies pertinent comments on security concerns in the wake of the precarious economic times ahead. They note that, "A world with three roughly equal economic powers may have no country willing to take responsibility for collective security." Also, regarding the security of future global energy, they feel this area continues to be a time bomb which must be,

...defused through development of an allied consensus over what constitutes threats...and how the burden of paying for that security should be shared.

Finally, Earl C. Ravenal's, "The Case for Adjustment," indicates that in,

...political-military terms the United States and the Soviet Union themselves will increasingly be confined to their own regions.
He also lists characteristics of the new international system as follows:

1. High probability of troubles.
2. Increasing interdependence.
3. Absence of ultimate adjustment mechanism in the form of any supranational institution or arrangements that can authoritatively police the system, dispensing justice and granting relief.
4. An interim conclusion to the first 3 characteristics emphasizing unilateral actions to enhance security.
5. The diffusion of power beyond some ideal geometry of powerful but responsible states over the next 15 to 30 years and the growing impracticability (but not uselessness) of using military power...for political purposes.
6. Absence of domestic support for military intervention in most countries during the next 30 years.¹¹

Taken at face value, this may argue against forward naval presence in the long-term. However, this thesis must partially determine if characteristic number three can be minimized through forward presence of deterrent U.S. naval forces in the Asia-Pacific.

This concludes the literature review of interdependence and international order. There were numerous other sources of information which could have been studied, however the purpose was to understand the implications and apply them to the focus of the thesis, namely discerning operational requirements of forward-basing in a changing world order. This focus next shifts to the spectrum of conflict.
Spectrum of Conflict

The preceding discussion of a new world order and its emerging threat proceeds into a brief description of the spectrum of conflict in broad terms. This provides the reader with some common definitions and also an introduction into the environment of low intensity conflict. The purpose is to give a brief historical snapshot of the era of "violent peace" which existed during the Cold War and should exist into the foreseeable future. Additionally, it presents the operational categories of low intensity conflict. Finally, it presents the strategic criteria presented in chapter one which equate to CVBG missions within the maritime strategy. The following manuals, books, and articles provided the author with the definitions and common dialogue associated with the spectrum of conflict.

Larry H. Addington's, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, is quick reference and provides concise historical information. For purposes of this section, his discussion of the early Cold War and the Kennedy years provided pertinent information into the development of U.S. military strategy emerging in the wake of nuclear technology. Although not cited, Russell F. Weigley's The American Way of War, provided additional insight into NSC-68 and its implications as well as the Flexible Response doctrine developed during the Kennedy presidency. As noted in Foreign Policy and the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, the subsequent derivations of the Flexible Response doctrine is still applicable to the post-Cold War era.

For a definition of terms and current doctrine, the author quoted the 1990 U.S. Army and Air Force joint Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. This manual is extremely well written and organized, in addition to being current. For purposes of the thesis, chapter five of the manual entitled, "Peacetime Contingency Operations," is most relevant. The major operations in this area of conflict, applicable to a CVBG, include shows of force and punitive air strikes, however, it may also be useful in peacemaking operations.34

Limited excerpts from a 1986 article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, by Admiral James D. Watkins, entitled, "The Maritime Strategy," complemented the discussion with a representative figure of the spectrum of conflict.35 This article along with a more recent, 1991, article entitled, "The Way Ahead," from the principle sources for the strategy section of chapter four and are reviewed more completely in that section.

Strategic Framework of the Asia-Pacific Region

The author determined the best approach toward studying the region was to start broad then narrow to the specifics. This approach proved very beneficial because many of the cited references in the broad strategy
writings provided specific information for this thesis. Again, the best initial sources were current periodicals and books on East Asian security or Asian-Pacific strategy. Prior to this study, however, the author needed to gain more basic historical insight into the Korean Peninsula, China, and Southeast Asia. The principal sources for the first two was *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century* by Larry Addington and *The American Way of War* by Russell F. Weigley. For purposes of the thesis, Southeast Asia was best covered by a thesis entitled "Security of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member-States in 1995: Is a U.S. Military Presence Necessary?" written by Major Micheal Lim Teck Huat of the Singapore Armed Forces. This also provided necessary information for current ASEAN security issues and is discussed further in this section.

**Periodicals**

The annual *Strategic Survey* provides succinct accounts of significant security issues for all regions of the world. This related, not only to military issues, but to government policies as well as significant economic and social conditions within regional countries. As such, it proved to be a valuable source for the entire strategic framework and it corroborated well with other sources. The most significant contributions to this thesis are the discussions of
Northeast Asia. Regarding the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement, it notes that,

The Japan-U.S. relationship revolves as much around defense and security arrangements as it does economic interdependence...but the spillover from economic tensions strains popularity of the security treaty.\textsuperscript{36}

And regarding Japan's global role in the future the author's note that Japan's increasing economic aid is meant to demonstrate their willingness to assume a more positive global role. Additionally, Japan's overall aid overtook the U.S. in FY 90.\textsuperscript{37} There is also a good explanation of U.S.-Japanese economic tensions and the failed Fighter Support-Experimental joint project.

The Survey discusses Tiananmen Square and its effect on Chinese foreign policy. Besides its effect on Chinese relations with the west it also points out that, although Taiwan urged a hard stance against the repression, it maintained significant amounts of trade across the Taiwan Strait.\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, North Korea receives close study over whether they are in a period of moderation or retrenchment with respect to foreign policy. Noting their isolation in a changing world, it acknowledges some observers' beliefs that North Korea's 80 year-old leader, Kim Il Sung, will soon reach accommodation with South Korea. At the same time, they point out the military preparations in the North belie the claim that it no longer represents a threat to the South.\textsuperscript{39} From a general standpoint, the Survey

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discusses the budgetary pressures and congressional debate about the U.S. military shifting from heavy to light and from forward-deployed to rapid reinforcement.

*Foreign Affairs* again offers a comprehensive article by Bernard K. Gordon entitled, "The Asia-Pacific Rim: Success at a Price." This article notes the U.S. preparedness for a 10-12 year phased withdrawal from the Philippine bases, especially from Clark Air Base. This would subsequently come out of later articles in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* citing the fifth round talks of U.S. Senior Negotiator Rich Armitage and Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus. The Gordon article went on to discuss the "non-base" alternatives noting a November 1989 U.S. agreement for fighter aircraft access and limited naval maintenance in Singapore, with similar discussions taking place in Thailand and Brunei. The article also presents other issues related to Soviet-South Korean diplomatic and economic relations as well as Soviet-Japanese proposed discussion of the disputed Kurile Islands, potentially during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991. It also confirms the Soviet's vacating of Cam Ranh Bay and hints from Hanoi that the U.S. could again use facilities there for a price. Since the article is more current than the *Survey*, it provides updated information about the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, noting that China took steps to ameliorate international opinion, especially
U.S., during the months after the "incident/tragedy." Of significance to North Korean discussions, Gordon points out that Pyongyang refused to sign a nuclear safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. He contends that this underlies the incendiary circumstances which exist on the Peninsula. Gordon also shows that Japan's trade surplus is misleading because the U.S. market is twice as large and that the per capita import value in each country is nearly the same. He also discusses Japan's burden sharing of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, stating that within 2-3 years they will be paying all yen-related basing costs while the U.S. will retain salaries and operations costs. Finally, he references a Department of Defense report entitled, "A Strategic Framework for the Asia-Pacific Rim," written in April 1990. Therefore, this was a logical source to continue the broad regional study.

The "Strategic Framework" article by DoD lays out the parameters for force restructuring and reduction in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade. It focuses on military burden sharing by Japan and South Korea, but notes that growing economic tensions strain U.S.-Japanese relations. As with all other articles, it points out that this relationship is the linchpin in U.S. regional strategy. Regarding Southeast Asia, the paper points out that the military growth of regional powers, such as India, is leading to regional anxiety.
discussion of U.S. regional role and objectives provides elements for study within the Maritime Strategy discussion of this chapter.

The next article came from a U.S. Department of State Dispatch of an address by Richard H. Solomon given to the University of California at San Diego on October 30, 1990. It provides a policy statement consistent with the preceding research. He states that U.S. strategy for the region consists of a 10-12% reduction of forces, but was quick to point out that even if the Soviet presence in East Asia were to disappear, other vital missions and the historic U.S. balancing role would remain of fundamental importance to the security of the region. He continues by examining the emerging architecture of the region noting that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a central stabilizing factor in the region and that they could only benefit from a thorough reassessment of their security interests. He also confirms Hartmann and Wendzel's discussion of the China's relative loss of strategic significance in the wake of the Cold War. Of significance to the Philippine Base discussion, he reaffirms U.S. commitment to maintain a security presence in Southeast Asia regardless of the outcome of the Philippine base talks. He concludes by noting the economic dynamism which has formed under the defense arrangements of the past and points to the future
structure in the form of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

By emphasizing economic progress rather than defense issues, as the basis for regional integration, we can provide a more broadly acceptable framework for assuring security in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.48

The Asian Survey gives more specific country information. Although not cited in the thesis, the "U.S. and Asia" article written by Paul H. Kreisberg notes that easing East-West tensions produced lessened uneasiness about overt regional military cooperation with the U.S. by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.49 There were other relevant articles in this periodical. The author cited two, namely; "China in 1990: The Year of Damage Control" by David Shambaugh and "Taiwan in 1990: Finetuning the System" by June Teufel Dreyer. Shambaugh discusses the post-Tiananmen international isolation and strained state/society relations. However, he also notes that the damage control by the Chinese government went well. He points out successes such as restored diplomatic ties with Indonesia and Singapore, accommodation with Vietnam and the Soviet Union, reciprocal trade offices opened with Israel and South Korea, and rapidly expanding ties across the Taiwan Strait. This confirmed the previously cited articles regarding the increasing levels of interdependence between China and Taiwan with reunification a distant goal.50 Near the end of the article, Shambaugh states,
Even the most hardline leaders were forced to the realization that China's economy is now heavily dependent on the outside world, that the international community is capable of making life difficult for China, and that the PRC is really a marginal player in world affairs.\textsuperscript{51} Dreyer's article gives an account of Taiwan's growing influence in international affairs, with many foreign nations increasingly willing to ignore Chinese protests over dealings with Taiwan. She also notes that the newly elected Taiwan President, Lee Teng-hui, is carefully maneuvering with China by increasing channels of communication. However, China refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan or help Taiwan enter the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, insisting Taiwan be treated as a provincial government.\textsuperscript{52} Dreyer also states that some Taiwanese officials feel that Lee has abandoned the Kuomintang's goal of "recovering" the mainland. Reunification is still a top priority but the method toward it is changing.

The last periodical article of an overall regional nature, was "Towards the Pacific Century" in the Far Eastern Economic Review, written by Sueo Sudo. It gives a good account of Japan-Southeast Asian relations during 1990, noting that a new political framework is likely to emerge in the region over the next few years as demonstrated by several recent events which point to more Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia. Regarding Japanese military involvement, "Japan could provide
indirect assistance to modernize the defense systems of ASEAN." The article also discusses the U.S. system of bilateral naval exercises, stating that recent exercises seemed to have proved that "integrated bilateralism" is possible in the security realm.

Books

Five books proved useful in the historical accounts and current issue discussions. The first was *East Asian Conflict Zones: Prospects for Regional Stability and Deescalation*, written by Lawrence Grinter and Young Whan Kihl. Released in 1987, it provides clarification of East Asian conflict and tension areas with a fairly recent perspective. It goes beyond this, however, by suggesting practical options and means toward deescalation, especially on the Korean Peninsula. The author gained insight into the Kurile Islands dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan with the bottom line being that the islands do not have sufficient strategic and economic importance worth sacrificing the loss of Japanese investment and trade. The other three issues cited in this thesis regard Sino-Soviet relations, deescalation potential on the Korean Peninsula, and Philippine insurgency. As the book was written prior to many recent world events, these discussions still provide good continuity and a more current historical base. The author gained an understanding of the origin of the Sino-Soviet conflict, China's threefold conditions for
normalization with the Soviet Union, and China's "Principles of Independence" stated as a shift in Chinese foreign policy during the early to mid-1980s. Grinter and Kihl also note that China's increasing dependence on the west reinforces a relaxed mood toward China in America. The most significant discussion pertained to deescalation on the Korean Peninsula. The book gives a detailed appraisal of this area, citing the strengths and weaknesses of both North and South Korea, noting the biggest vulnerability of the North lies in the potential for political instability during a succession of power after the demise of President Kim Il Sung. The discussion further offers future scenarios and policy options with a possible resolution involving confidence building measures, reduced regional exercises, and a true demilitarization agreement. Additionally, they note three factors which will promote resolution, namely; inter-Korean interdependent ties, policies of major powers, and the respective domestic political situation of each country which may spillover into the other. Regarding the Philippine insurgency, the discussion gives a complementary historical base to two other references cited later.

The second and third books complemented each other. The first of these was also written in 1987 and entitled Arms Across the Pacific: Security and Trade Issues Across the Pacific. Written by Malcolm McIntosh,
it discusses regional sensitivities in the South Pacific toward nuclear weapons, citing the years of testing on the numerous islands and atolls by the U.S., Britain and France. Although the U.S. and Britain stopped testing in the early ’60s, the French continued. This produced more anxiety and further reinforced a "nuclear free" upswell of opinion, leading to the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985 and a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). A more recent book entitled, The South Pacific: Emerging Security Issues and U.S. Policy. Written as a special report in 1990, it combines four articles written by different authors/experts. An executive summary provides excellent bulletized conclusions pulled from the articles. They deal with regional concerns and U.S. interests. These issues relate to marine resources encroachment, nuclear weapons testing and residual colonialism. It states that activities by the larger powers are, at times seen as threatening by the island states. It also discusses the trust territories and freely associated territories. One of these, Palau, is being considered along with other territories for buildup as an alternative option to the Philippine bases. Since "nuclear free zones" are gaining regional popularity it could come more into play in the future. As such, it is cited in the thesis along with ASEANs desire for an eventual realization of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).
The fourth book referenced in the research was *The Philippine Bases: U.S. Security at Risk* by James A. Gregor, written in 1988. This book was also referenced in two alternate basing theses as well as the ASEAN thesis mentioned previously. It provides a good discussion of the history of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, a comprehensive description of the Philippine bases, and the three broad basing alternatives. These options are cited and expanded on in two of the alternate basing theses written after this book and cited in the Philippine bases section. For this thesis, the discussions of the potential port facilities and air-to-ground weapons training facilities relate to aircraft carrier basing, supply, maintenance, and air wing training in the region.

Finally, John F. Cooper's *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* written in 1990, discusses the growth the Taiwan and the impossibility of it being isolated since it has become the model for economic and political development in the region. Cooper also discusses the current state of U.S.-Taiwan relations, stating that, although there is strong feeling in America against a war in Asia, the U.S. might potentially order naval forces to the Taiwan Strait in the event of an invasion attempt by the PRC.

After reading and highlighting the preceding periodical and book discussions, the author further
refined and updated the research by studying the specific interest areas emphasized in the basic sources along with the recent alternate basing and ASEAN theses. Additionally, the Army Command and General Staff College offered an elective class, "U.S. Interests in the Pacific," which complemented their Joint and Combined Operations core course and provided numerous sources for specific research. Much of the current political framework was taken from articles in *The Economist*, *Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter*, and *Far Eastern Economic Review*. The specific opinions of cited articles are discussed in the applicable sections of this thesis.

Regarding military capabilities of the regional actors, *The Military Balance, Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter: 1991 Annual Reference Edition*, and the Naval Institute *Proceedings* provide current capabilities and defense issues. The *Summary of Japan* gives a brief account of Japanese Defense Policy and capabilities along with issues affecting their security. After reviewing these publications, several issue areas became the focus for discussing interests and threats in the Asia-Pacific region. These fall out as the headings within chapter four as noted in the table of contents. Further, the ASEAN thesis cited earlier provides six options for ASEAN security, recommending a combination of these options which involves a U.S. military presence in the region.
The culmination of this study provided the strategic framework of the region and allowed the author to draw conclusions of a general nature regarding the utility of U.S. naval/aircraft carrier peacetime presence, conflict response, or power projection in the Asia-Pacific post-Cold War environment.

Maritime Strategy

The next milestone became reconciling the above conclusions with U.S. regional objectives and the U.S. Maritime Strategy in the changing world environment. Then, to answer the research question, the study would have to determine which strategy, aircraft carrier forward-basing or -deploying, best served U.S. interests but also the overall regional environment.

The initial section of chapter five, includes the Pacific command mission. Since that mission is to support U.S. regional objectives, these were also listed. Again, the DoD report "A Strategic Framework for the Asian-Pacific Rim" provided these. Maritime Strategy, as it evolved throughout the 1980s and which led to the concept for a "600-ship Navy" centered around 15 carrier battle groups, was best summarized in two articles from Proceedings in January 1986. Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, wrote "The Maritime Strategy" as it related to national military strategy and international order in an era of violent peace. He notes that sea power is relevant across the
spectrum of conflict and he examines the different phases of conflict which the elements of sea power apply across this spectrum. Of course, this was directed against the large Soviet threat and predicated on the requirement of a 600-ship Navy in order to carry out U.S. global requirements. The other article, from the same publication, was written by John F. Lehman, Jr., then Secretary of the Navy, further delineated the 600-ship concept by discussing the various fleet commitments within the geographical areas of the world and refining this to specific CVBG requirements of fifteen total with two in the Seventh Fleet during peacetime and five to seven during wartime.

Since world events overtook this strategy in numbers, the question is how should it be modified to maintain the requisite capabilities in a changing world. The purpose of the last chapter was to discuss the regional perspective of U.S. naval presence, focusing on CVBG application. Therefore, chapter five concentrated, not so much on the overall Maritime Strategy, as how aircraft carrier forward-basing versus forward-deployment in the Asia-Pacific would fit into the implementation of a tailored strategy. Richard Armitage's "U.S. Security in the Pacific in the 21st Century" discusses U.S. force structure in the Pacific and the replacement of the USS MIDWAY with the USS INDEPENDENCE as the forward-based carrier, stating that it shows America's intention to
remain a major factor in the Pacific region. Further, Martin L. Lasater's "U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific in the 1990s," given the perfect title for the research, provides definitive points in that the strategy in this region remains relevant. Additionally, the strategy should maintain its forward, global, allied, and joint structure regardless of the diminished Soviet threat for reasons related to the role the U.S. Navy plays as the "honest broker," a role supported by most major powers of the region.

The most recent article is entitled "The Way Ahead." Written as a joint Navy/Marine Corps article by the CNO, SECNAV, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, it provides the current view which hedges, as it should, against the future threats to U.S. security, noting that the U.S. CVBGs are now free from their "deployment hubs." As such, this allows more freedom of operations to respond more effectively to crises situations in a regional context.

The final document researched related to the cost analysis of forward-basing versus forward-deploying an aircraft carrier. A thesis written at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1981 discusses the potential of forward-basing in the Mediterranean and examines the various costs associated with this option. It then compares it with forward-deploying and the costs associated with this course of action. The author
decided to apply the research, not as a detailed cost analysis for this thesis, but as a determinant into any overwhelming detractors associated with either option.

This concludes the literature review for this thesis. The next chapter convers interdependence and international order.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 100.


6 Michael Pugh and Phil Williams, Superpower Politics: Change in the United States and the Soviet Union (United Kingdom and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 186.

7 Ibid., 193.

8 Ibid., 8.


10 Ibid., 43.

11 Ibid., 47.

12 Ibid., 209.

13 Ibid., 52.


16 Ibid., 13.

18 Ibid., 30.
19 Ibid., 32.
20 Ibid., 33.


22 Ibid., 43.
23 Ibid., 46.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.


27 Ibid., 103.


29 Ibid., 175.


31 Ibid., 12-13.


34 U.S. Army and Air Force, FM 100-20/APP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990), 5-1 and Watkins, 6. The term peacemaking refers to unilateral imposition of military force to quell a violent conflict or return a situation to diplomatic negotiations. Successful peacemaking
operations may result in a return to multilateral peacekeeping operations.

35 Watkins, 6.

36 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1989-90 (London: Brassey's, 1990), 139.

37 Ibid., 142.

38 Ibid., 130.

39 Ibid., 148-149.


41 Ibid., 148.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 149.

44 Ibid., 150.


46 "When Dragon's Stumble," The Economist 313 (February 23, 1991), 246.

47 Ibid., 247. Hartmann and Wendzel also discuss the "Strategic Triangle" developed between the U.S.-USSR-PRC after Nixon's visit to Peking. Solomon, like many others notes that with the reduced East-West tensions, the PRC lost its position as strategic counterweight in U.S.-USSR relations and policy decisions.

48 Ibid., 248.


51 Ibid., 49.


54 Ibid., 17.


56 Ibid., 44.

57 Ibid., 110.

58 Ibid., 117.

59 Ibid., 19.

60 Malcolm McIntosh, Arms Across the Pacific: Security and Trade Issues Across the Pacific (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 147.


62 John F. Cooper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 120.

63 Ibid., 122.


CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

Introduction

"Outdated or oversimplified models of the world lead to inappropriate policies."¹

This chapter will develop reader awareness of interdependence and its significance in the post-Cold War, post-Desert Storm international order. No attempt is made to calculate future events but, merely, to provide a building block which assesses trends in international relations against the long-term operational requirement of U.S. forward-basing in the Asia-Pacific region.

Global interdependence is a key feature of the late twentieth century. In economic life, regional integration, the high mobility of capital, and the activities of international institutions and multinational corporations, have reinforced transnationalism.²

Interdependence

This discussion will define interdependence, give some historical perspective and relate interdependence implications to U.S. security interests in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region.

Simply stated interdependence is a state of mutual dependence.

Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.³

It takes various forms: economic, social, and policy (including military), cutting across distinctions between
domestic and foreign policy. Critical to understanding interdependence is that actions taken, in any form mentioned, produce significant reciprocal effects on interdependent actors. A state of interdependence does not exist merely from the volume of transactions unless, in turn, they produce significant reciprocal effects.\(^4\)

The importance of interdependence to national policy is the increased governmental requirement to balance policy actions with effects as the degree and complexity of interdependence increases. U.S. policy advisors constantly attempt to discern or measure the degree of interdependence associated with policy actions throughout the world and equate them to terms understood by domestic and foreign policymakers.

Two dimensions of interdependence, sensitivity and vulnerability, determine the relative power positions of nations involved. Sensitivity interdependence exists when the reciprocal effect of a transaction by one actor requires a policy adjustment by the dependent actor in order to correct a resulting negative imbalance. If policy instruments are insufficient to correct the imbalance, then the affected actor is in a state of vulnerability interdependence even before such a transaction occurs, by virtue of the known or perceived ramifications.\(^5\) However, a state of "deterrence" may exist if adjustments or policy instruments exist which
could offset the transaction's effect or incur a cost to the other actor beyond the perceived benefit.

There is no intention to paint a picture of interdependent transactions as coercive political instruments. Although this is certainly an option, the long-term effect may be detrimental among cooperating states. To better understand this, it's important to differentiate between single and multiple channel interdependence.

Interdependence at low levels of complexity generally exist across single interstate channels and possibly in only one form, such as military policy. In this condition, political integration is sufficient to deal within the confines of the single channel. Also at this level, the state is the dominant actor in any transaction. In this environment force may be a more usable and effective instrument, therefore military security is the predominant feature of national policy. The "realist" school tends to define politics in this light and it is most relevant to vital issues of national interest.

When interdependence occurs across multiple channels and in the various forms mentioned, a state of complex interdependence exists. If it crosses all issue areas, then its highest state of complexity exists. Other characteristics include the lack of hierarchy associated with interstate issue areas or agendas and the diminished
utility of military force as an instrument of policy between cooperating states. International organizations, under multiple leadership, replace the nation-state as the dominant actor.

Economic and informational elements predominate and military power diminishes within the web of complex interdependence. However, military force remains an important element of power with governments or rival blocs outside of this web. Additionally, a critical precondition of complex interdependence is, "...a security framework that guarantees systemic political stability (permitting) a sustained focus on interdependence."  

The new order, ushered in after World War II, was the Cold War of deterrence. The rival blocs in Europe, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact, primarily dealt in military terms. This single channel interdependence was the central policy element for the two principal actors, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., overshadowing all other policies. In the Asia-Pacific region, the primary concern of the U.S. was maintaining access to resources, preventing the spread of communism, and developing layered defenses through a forward-based/deployed military strategy. The linchpin became the close alliance forged by the U.S. with Japan, as well as U.S. base complexes developed in both Japan and the Philippines after the war. The result was a security framework satisfactory to most of the region, which was occupied by Japan during the war. In this security
framework, Japan and later South Korea surrendered much of their sovereignty for collective security.

Nationalism in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region was giving way to internationalism. "International organizations, economic and security, established from the need to coordinate." As communications and transportation technology advanced, channels of interdependence increased and became more complex. Within this web of interdependent "free-market" economies, the security "umbrella," afforded by forward-based/deployed U.S. forces, allowed regional governments to pursue economic goals and compete on the international marketplace as their political ideology allowed.

Naturally, the U.S. began to lose its unbalanced economic lead in the world market as Europe and Asia rebounded from the war.

In 1945 the United States accounted for over 50 percent of the world's wealth in industrial production, by the 1980s it had fallen to about 20 percent. The character of the U.S. economy became less "self-reliant" as strengthened trade ties allowed for increased growth to meet demands beyond domestic production capabilities and, in some cases, competitiveness.

During the 1960s, the U.S.S.R. expanded their foreign policy in East Asia and their military presence throughout the 1970s. As the U.S. reshaped its foreign policy following the strategic failure of Vietnam, the
U.S.S.R. stepped up this presence. In 1978, the U.S.S.R. negotiated for rights to base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay to offset the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet in Japan and the Philippines. However, during the mid-1970s, "...Soviet appreciation of global interdependence began...between scientists and politicians."\(^{11}\)

The economic success revealed in the free-market nations had an impact. Slowly it was perceived that,...

"global problems would continue to be the object of competition and cooperation between capitalist and socialist systems.\(^{12}\)

By the 1980s, the Soviet Union was feeling the pressures of its own "imperial overstretch" and an economy straining to accommodate parity with an expanding U.S. military budget outlay during the Reagan years.\(^{13}\) By then, also, the Soviets had failed to achieve strategic success in their expansion efforts toward the Middle East through Afghanistan. During the mid-1980s, "...the new Soviet appreciation of the relationship between diversity and interdependence..." translated into revisions of, "...military doctrine and security policy."\(^{14}\) The former zero-sum game became an expanding sum game, meaning that major attempts were being made to cooperate regionally, vice playing the balance-of-power (realist school) politics of the Cold War.

During the late 1980s, Soviet President Gorbachev, ...elevated the general idea of interdependence to the point of making it a universal principle on the basis that nuclear weapons and global environment crisis impose objective limits on the possibilities
for class confrontation and general antagonism in the international arena.\textsuperscript{15}

The Red Navy reduced its presence of naval combatants by 10-20 percent and restricted naval deployments in Japanese and more distant waters.\textsuperscript{16} Also, their forward presence in Cam Ranh Bay reduced significantly from 1989-91.\textsuperscript{17} Over the last year, relations with China have improved.

The mutual trust between the two great neighbours, the Soviet Union and China, is growing steadily today; relations between the two countries are determined by their efforts to promote bilateral contacts in many fields and demilitarization rather than the military presence on both sides of the border.\textsuperscript{18}

The Soviet Union has also affected ties with South Korea and is improving relations with Japan. This will be discussed further in chapter 4.

This exhibited trend toward regional cooperation and dialogue formed the basis for why this thesis was conceived. If the Soviets should retreat from their domestic and foreign policy reform efforts there is potential for retrenched policies to follow. In this case, the options narrow toward maintaining the forward-based structure of the Cold War.

However, this thesis assumes the scenario requiring a new approach. It considers bilateral and multilateral views in the wake of the expanding interdependent character of the Asia-Pacific region and the inclusion of the Soviet Union in multiple channel interactions.
deemphasizing military confrontation. It recognizes that events may produce backward steps or even disintegration of the Soviet state as a union. It also recognizes that threat is the combination of capability and intent, the first of which remains formidable, the second being difficult to fully assess.\textsuperscript{19}

Soviet economists assert that there have been no meaningful cutbacks and that the military sector continues to enjoy the highest priority in the economy.\textsuperscript{20}

The author assesses this as the momentum of the military industry and inefficient bureaucracy of the Soviet Union and not to government intent. Our rivalry with the Soviet Union,

\ldots contain(s) none of the lethal threat of the old\ldots they still concern national influence, but influence that is obtained through commercial success and industrial and scientific leadership.\textsuperscript{21}

International Order

"International stability\ldots is the product of self-conscious action by the great power(s)."\textsuperscript{22}

It is appropriate, at this point, to discuss international security in the aftermath of the Cold War and the most recent coalition war against Iraq. If balance-of-power relationships are dissolving into the web of complex interdependence then there should be fewer major conflicts. In a paradoxical way, however, the tension of the Cold War,

\ldots maintained global stability as each superpower restrained its allies and clients and avoided direct military confrontation.\textsuperscript{23}
Additionally, another characteristic of complex interdependence, related to international order is, ...lesser states involved in regional rivalries and nonstate terrorist groups may find it easier to use force than before.27

As such, the new threats are likely to be more vague and come from less industrialized Third World countries desiring to improve their position by acquiring the military hardware beyond reasonable defense requirements. Many of these countries are typified by authoritarian governments whose leaders pursue radical or unpredictable policies inconsistent with international order. If the country possesses a valuable resource, like oil, the regime is afforded the economic opportunity to obtain advanced weaponry.

Post-Desert Storm negotiations will evolve around arms control issues. It is inconceivable that the results will provide comprehensive and verifiable limits on arm sales in the near-term, except to Iraq. This "Weapon State" characterizes, "...a new strategic environment marked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."24

Saddam Hussein is justifiably viewed in many unfavorable ways, but one must also realize that he was a regional threat only because his military capability fueled his aggressive intents. He acquired this capability, not only from the Soviet Union, but also from private western companies, including the U.S., with
understandable profit motives and lack of discouragement early in the Iran-Iraq War.

During the discussion of interdependence, it was noted that role of military power diminishes as interdependence becomes more complex. Why then, did Iraq invade Kuwait, whose regional ties with Kuwait were extensive? Part of the answer lies in the authoritarian nature of the regime. For major states, the use of force is more costly by four conditions:

1. Risk of nuclear escalation,
2. Resistance by people in poor or weak countries,
3. Uncertain or possible negative effects of achievement of economic goals, and/or
4. Domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force.25

Authoritarian regimes are characterized by a state apparatus which dominates civil society and domestic opinion.26 In a case where the state structure is also sustained by profits from oil resources and/or extreme religious ideology, the fourth condition is nullified. If the probability of first three conditions is assessed as low, then the perceived benefits of military action may exceed the perceived cost. In this case, the use of force was chosen by Iraq.

A fifth condition, applicable in this discussion, is international opinion opposed to the use of force. Secretary of State Baker, after the failed peace talks with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz, commented to the
effect that, Saddam Hussein miscalculated in his decision to invade Kuwait, because he did not foresee the international reaction opposed to his aggression or the resolute leadership exhibited by the world community in the wake of the Cold War.

Through much of the 19th Century, international order was achieved through Britain's efforts to maintain a global balance of power. "America tended her vineyards, but only behind two great ocean walls patrolled by the British navy."28 At the turn of the century, America crept out of its isolationism, retreating after World War I, then establishing itself as the post-World War II interventionist. The underlying reasons were economic capability and ideological commitment. Since the Cold War, America has emerged as an economic power capable and willing to lead the international community.

As the world looks toward the 21st Century, however, and the possibilities of international peace, the prospects for security center on the United Nations Security Council. However, a collective security force, carrying out U.N. mandates, must have the capability to meet the threat to that peace. When the rules of international law carry sufficient capability and collective intent, they have validity against those regimes who would violate them. Without the capability and international resolve to respond to aggression, the
U.N. could issue mandates without an adjustment mechanism sufficient to counter the threat.

What then is required of America for future international order and security? The war with Iraq is seen by many as evidence that the U.S. is the "international police force," bearing most of the burdens of maintaining that force. To a great extent this is true, but it is a position borne from Cold War preparedness and security arrangements bolstered by a rich economy. The relative global reduction of the U.S. economy causes domestic concern. However,

American concern about losing preeminence confuses leadership with dominance and economic strength with economic monopoly.29

Clearly, the U.S. must clean up its internal economic problems, work toward totally free international trade and address burden sharing within its collective and bilateral security arrangements. These issues will predominate as the dynamics of interdependence shape international relationships. At the same time, the only economic power with the military capability to properly effect collective security, in the near-term international order, is America. Until a truly international security arrangement becomes effective, America must maintain ready forces, able to respond decisively across the spectrum of international conflict.

In a world of Saddams, if the U.S. were to shed its unique superpower role, its economy would be gravely wounded. Insecure sea lanes, impoverished trading partners, exorbitant oil
prices, explosive regional instability are only the more obvious risks of an American abdication.²⁰

How does the preceding discussion of interdependence and international order relate to the research question? First, East-West tensions will continue to subside if channels of interdependence develop and strengthen. Given the assumption that this will occur, the author must reassess the operational requirement of forward basing in a changed world order and against a new threat focus. Additionally, since the author assumes the overall trend toward interdependence is increasing, then the relative value of directly applying military force is decreasing. It follows that regional U.S. interests will increasingly involve interdependent transactions and that regional threats emerge as states with few channels of interdependence and with the military capability to interfere with the vital interests of these interdependent states.

Focusing on the research question then, it must be determined if forward-basing a CVBG achieves strategic benefits over forward-deploying, given this new world order, specifically in the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to addressing the strategic framework for this region, however, the next section will present a brief discussion of the spectrum of conflict, focusing on the direct and indirect application of military force.
The political object, as the original motive of the war, should be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.1

As mentioned in the preceding section, the tensions of the Cold War maintained security from large-scale military confrontations. However, increasing incidents of localized crises became a new characteristic of this security framework. Consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Soviet Union fostered revolutionary change and supported military Third World surrogates to channel the course of history.2 This led to the increased U.S. awareness that internal conflicts could escalate beyond sovereign borders and/or involve U.S. or allied interests.

Prior to the Korean War, many U.S. policymakers saw the need for increased conventional military readiness, in addition to strategic nuclear deterrence. With the nation recovering from total war in Europe and the Pacific, nuclear forces presented the American public and top policymakers with a sense that conventional forces could be significantly reduced because of our strategic nuclear monopoly. However, the Soviets tested their own nuclear device in 1949, years ahead of predictions. This put an early end to this U.S. monopoly and began the Cold War. The National Security Council presented NSC-68 to President Truman six months prior to the Korean War urging the development of a fission nuclear capability (H-bomb).
and expanded conventional military forces. America entered a nuclear weapons race with the Soviets and the Korean War entered her into limited conventional warfare with this overarching nuclear deterrence.

The U.S. continued to face the Soviet threat with revised policies, from the "New Look," which substituted nuclear firepower for manpower, to the implementation of "flexible response," designed to direct strategic nuclear weapons at military targets while sparing cities. Flexible response, as President Kennedy envisioned it, also raised the prospect of maintaining strong conventional forces with a tactical nuclear capability as a last line of defense. Essentially, U.S. combat forces of the Cold War operated under this flexible response policy.

The spectrum of conflict refers to the entire range of world conflict conditions along an operational continuum, with routine peaceful competition among states and strategic nuclear war as the endpoints. Low intensity conflict is that area just above routine peaceful competition but below limited conventional war. The term is a product of America's involvement in conflicts short of war, but requiring the indirect or limited use of force in flexible response. The lessons learned from these involvements shaped the attitudes of policymakers and military planners alike. When George Bush was Vice President, he stated,
The most active threat we face (today) is not high intensity, but low intensity—the war in the shadows—this threat is manifested in a stream of hostage crises, terrorist attacks, local conflicts and insurgencies.36

The major difficulty of low intensity conflict is measuring success in non-military terms. In this environment, military forces are applied indirectly and in support of other elements of national power to return a conflict situation to routine peaceful competition.37 However, military success in the short-term may not be the most favorable to long-term routine peaceful competition if the conditions causing the conflict are not resolved.

Low intensity conflict is divided into four basic operational categories; namely,

1. Insurgency/counterinsurgency
2. Combatting terrorism
3. Peacekeeping operations
4. Peacetime contingency operations38

Although a CVBG has limited utility in the first three areas, peacetime contingency operations have, historically, required the introduction of carriers because of their proximity and capability to react quickly and remain on station for extended duration. Contingency operations at the low end of the spectrum consist of operations such as non-combatant evacuation operations. In this area, the CVBG has some limited helicopter assets to provide assistance. However, in the upper end of the spectrum of contingencies, the CVBG's strike capability is
most suited and supports forward naval presence. This is elaborated further in the next chapter.

The spectrum of conflict may be further refined from broad categories to more narrow points along the continuum which equate to, in the case of this thesis, CVBG missions within the maritime strategy. The following lists those which are discussed later in the analysis of the thesis and introduced in chapter one:

1. **Peacetime presence** covers the spectrum of conflict up to peacetime contingency operations, by indirect means, as a deterrent to conflict and a show of commitment to our allies.

2. **Conflict response** and/or **force sequencing** in response to contingency operations involving the indirect or direct use of force or, as a sequential introduction of U.S. forces in an escalating conflict.

3. **Sustained power projection** for localized sea control or strikes on land targets in support of wartime objectives.

The CVBG operates within the entire spectrum of conflict. If measuring success in low intensity conflict is difficult, then measuring the success of peacetime presence is equally as difficult. Does peacetime presence provide peace and stability or does it promote regional tensions? Predicting scenarios which could occur without this presence requires knowledge of potential threat.
capabilities and future intent as well as the interests of interdependent allies in the region.

The purpose of the next chapter is, therefore, to determine U.S. interests reconciled against regional interests, then to analyze potential threat capabilities and perceived intent. This provides the framework to discuss the strategy of forward presence in terms of CVBG basing or deployments. The preceding discussion of the spectrum of conflict is then applied in each area of the region, to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action in chapter five.
ENDNOTES


2 Michael Pugh and Phil Williams, Superpower Politics: Change in the United States and the Soviet Union (United Kingdom and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 177.

3 Keohane and Nye, 6.


5 Ibid.

6 Keohane and Nye, 23-27. Discussion differentiates two extremes, the realist level and the complex interdependence, and notes characteristics of both noting that most forms occur somewhere in the middle.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., also this specific quote is cited in a current article regarding post-Cold War order; and Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers, Foreign Affairs: Winter 1990/91 69. No. 5 (1990): 102.

9 Childress, 65.

10 Pugh and Williams, 2.

11 Ibid., 148.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 3. "Imperial Overstretch" in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Mentioned in Pugh and Williams' discussion of America's overstretch, in that its global interests and obligations become larger than the country's power to defend them. It is used here as an analogy also to the Soviet Union.

14 Ibid., 151.

15 Ibid., 149.


23 Pipes, 70.

24 Krauthammer, 30.

25 Keohane and Nye, 228.

26 Krauthammer, 30.

27 Keohane and Nye, 228.

28 Krauthammer, 29.


30 Krauthammer, 27.


34 Ibid., 272. The initial Flexible Response Doctrine was announced by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in January 1961. It called for a counter-force doctrine on the strategic level which affected preparation to meet regional aggression. Kennedy's vision of increased conventional forces came from arguments in B.H. Liddell Hart's book Deterrent or Defense (1960).


36 Ibid.

37 FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, iv.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 1-6.

40 Watkins, 5, 6. Actual terminology used is Peacetime Presence, Crisis Response, and Warfighting.
CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Introduction

For many of the high priority items on the foreign policy agenda today, calculating the balance of military power does not allow us to predict very well the outcome of events.1

The preceding chapter addressed the changing world order and the spectrum of conflict. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the strategic framework of the Asia-Pacific region in terms consistent with the research question. The conclusions form the basis by which the author will evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of forward-basing versus forward-deployment in the strategic sense.

This chapter discusses regional interests, threats to those interests and security strategies focusing on historic perspectives, military capabilities, and current issues affecting future U.S. naval presence in the region. It relates U.S. interests to interdependent issues and analyze vital interests consistent with national purpose and international order. U.S. interests and reevaluation of the threats focus on those areas listed in delimitations; namely, Northeast and Southeast Asia. South and Southwest Asian influence in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole is applied as applicable. States emerge as potential threats due to relatively low levels of interdependence with the U.S.
combined with the military capability and perceived intent to interfere with U.S. or allied interests. A low level of interdependence results from divergent economic policies, ideological or cultural differences, or simply misinterpretation of national actions, fomenting diplomatic mistrust. In authoritarian regimes, it may also be the result of the ideals or contradictory actions of the government hierarchy. Military capability is examined in objective terms, i.e., numbers of ships, types of weapons, etc. Next, intent is discussed based on regime style, actions, and diplomatic rhetoric.

The Philippine base issue is discussed in relevant terms to forward-basing and air wing training. This strategic framework will provide the foundation for the ensuing analysis. Based on this framework, the author will examine the U.S. maritime strategy and the strategic role of the CVBG and forward-based CVBG and apply carrier missions across the spectrum of conflict in the next chapter.

U.S. Interests and Threats in the Asia-Pacific

The 21st Century has been referred to as the "Age of the Pacific" by economists, political scientists, and military strategists. The region is the largest U.S. trading market, accounting for over 300 billion dollars in 1989, nearly 70 billion dollars more than Europe.³ Our level of interdependence in this region is complex. Only
Canada has more multiple channel ties with the U.S. than the Asia-Pacific region.

The U.S. remains a Pacific power with wide-ranging interests in East Asia, a region whose global importance continues to grow each year.\textsuperscript{3}

As such, U.S. interests in the region continue to intensify.

One definition of national interests is:

The fundamental objectives and ultimate determinants that guide the decisionmakers of a state in making national policy. These include self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being.\textsuperscript{4}

In general terms, U.S. interests in the Pacific are similar to those pursued in the past:

1. A healthy and growing U.S. economy and the strengthening of interdependent regional ties,
2. Regional stability and security,
3. Maintenance of strong alliances,
4. Promotion of human rights,
5. Promotion of democratic institutions,
6. Support of free-markets throughout the region, and maintaining access to vital resources.

For the most part, these are complementary interests. By achieving the bottom five, the U.S. positively influences achievement of the first. Any interest, however, "...can change radically in its worth as it is pursued."\textsuperscript{5}

Additionally, regional states have interests which may compete or conflict with U.S. interests. It is critical
to identify these potential problems and applicable elements of national power in order to develop feasible scenarios and possible U.S. courses of action. This is the heart of strategic analysis by which recommendations and caveats are made.

Elements of national power includes political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Informational instruments refer to the national will of the people formed by the rapid and abundant flow of information from the media and computers. The impact of informational instruments of national power can be seen in the weight carried by domestic and international opinion in government actions. In an interdependent world, these opinions spill over into national policy and cannot be ignored in determining interests and vital interests.

Vital interests are ones which decision-makers are willing to use force to protect. They derive from national purpose,

...the enduring aspirations of a nation for its security, well-being, and development as determined within its cultural and ethical values and by the principles (through) which it conducts its affairs.7

Applying interdependence theory and conclusions regarding international order from the preceding chapter, the author further developed vital U.S. interests as follows:
1. National sovereignty, to include the lives and of its citizens at home or abroad as well as its sovereign territory.

2. Another nation in a state of complex interdependence or possessing a collective security agreement with the U.S.

3. Similarly, a nation possessing strong demographic ties with the U.S., significant enough to arouse domestic opinion to events affecting that nation.

4. Unnecessary human suffering in which the U.S. military could provide relief or assistance. This is also driven by domestic opinion. However, domestic opinion is influenced by interdependence factors, such as demographic ties.

If a scenario unfolds which negatively impacts on one of these vital interests, the indirect or direct use of military force as an element of national power may be appropriate. In the perceived new world order, this application of force should be consistent with domestic and, increasingly, international opinion.

The following sections will briefly discuss interests and threats in specific areas of the Asia-Pacific region.

Northeast Asia

This section addresses U.S. interests in Japan, the Korean Peninsula, China and Taiwan, and discusses current issues affecting U.S. forward-basing in the area. As
noted in the delimitations section of chapter one, Japan receives more detailed study, consistent with its role as the linchpin to East Asian security and due to the fact that the forward-based aircraft carrier is located there. Additionally, North Korea's receives more analysis as a threat due to its current low level of interdependence, potential for aggression and emergence as a weapon state.

**Japan**

The U.S. invested heavily in Northeast Asia after World War II, in economic, political and military terms. Consequently, and as a product of their own ingenuity, Japan emerged as a well-developed democratic state with a thriving market-oriented economy, second only to America. As mentioned previously, the U.S. and Japan combined to provide 40 percent of the world's GNP in 1990. Additionally, Japan has took the world lead in foreign development assistance and direct foreign investments, principally along business channels within the Asia-Pacific region. They also became the world's leading creditor.

In 1960 the U.S. and Japan signed a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, article five of which provided for joint military action against an armed attack on Japan. Article 6 provided for the status of U.S. forces in Japan which, "...contribute to Japan's security and that of the Far East." Although this treaty provides for the security of Japan, the Japanese
government realizes that U.S. naval forces in Japan help maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula and security throughout an interdependent Asia-Pacific region. Japan is extremely import dependent when it comes to vital energy and mineral resources. As such, the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) from Southeast and Southwest Asia is of vital interest to Japan. The maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of this security arrangement is, therefore, one of the two pillars of Japan's defense policy today. The second is the administration and operations of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF). From Japanese and U.S. government perspectives, the key element of the new international order is the maintenance of close ties and cooperation under the security arrangements provided for by this treaty.

Japan's Constitution, written largely under U.S. auspices during the post-World War II occupation, upholds pacifist principles. Article nine renounces war, espouses non-possession of offensive war potential and denies the right of belligerency of the state. It does not, however, deny the right of the state to self-defense against direct or indirect aggression.

The abandonment of war-making capabilities and the belief in democratic government have been central elements of Japan's post-war political philosophy, which sought to build a country in which all are free to exercise their creativity and talents.
The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are divided into maritime, air and ground elements. In 1990, Japan successfully completed their fourth buildup program under the "National Defense Program Outline" adopted in 1976. Their military expenditures rank third in the world, behind the Soviet Union and the United States, even though their military budget remains near only 1% of their GNP as compared to approximately 5-6% expenditure by the U.S. and up to 15% by North Korea, regionally.

Japan's defense posture has four objectives; namely, to prevent:

1. Land invasion from the sea,
2. Attacks by naval or air units,
3. Obstruction of maritime traffic, or
4. Any combination of the three.

To accomplish this, they increased their capabilities in all areas, especially from 1985-1989. During this time they improved their surface-to-air missiles, with the Patriot update to the Nike-J and HAWK sights, and significantly improved their air intercept capability with the addition of F-15s to their F-4 inventory for a total of 360 fighters. Additionally, they maintain E-2C airborne early warning aircraft and an improved ground radar capability. Overall, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is considered the best equipped air force in Northeast Asia outside the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Regarding the Ground Self Defense Force, the northern division of Hokkaido modernized with the addition
of T-74 tanks to eventually replace the T-61. They also improved their surface-to-surface missile capability, shore and field artillery, and armored personnel carriers. They admit, however, to being behind in air reconnaissance, airlift capability, and logistic support, with ammunition stockpiles sufficient for only a few days.\textsuperscript{17}

Regarding their maritime capabilities, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force continues to make major improvements. With a complement of nearly 60 destroyers and smaller frigate and escort ships, they rank near Britain and France in naval capability. By 1993, they will commission four front-line American AEGIS (air-defense and sea combat control technology) vessels, ranking them behind only the U.S. and the Soviet Union in overall naval programs.\textsuperscript{18} Their anti-submarine capability is comparable to U.S. regional assets of the Seventh Fleet, maintaining 50 P-3C long-range maritime anti-submarine aircraft, 30 P-2J maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and 100 HSS-2B helicopters being incrementally replaced by the SH-60J since fiscal year 1988.\textsuperscript{19} Their frigates and submarines round out this formidable warfare capability.

Four ocean straits surround Japan. They are significant to the trade and security of Northeast Asia and the control of potential crises on the Korean Peninsula. Regarding CVBG access into the Sea of Japan:
in the South, the Tsushima or Korea Strait lies between the main island of Japan, Honshu, and the southeastern tip of South Korea, at Pusan. In the North, the Tsugaru Strait lies between the Japanese island of Hokkaido and the northern tip of Honshu while the Soya Strait, frozen much of the year, lies between Soviet Sakhalin Island and northern Hokkaido.²⁰

Extending out 1000 miles from southern Kyushu, are vital trade routes along the Taiwan Strait between mainland China and Taiwan and the Bashi Channel between northern Luzon in the Philippines and the southern tip of Taiwan. The significance of the 1000 miles is the recent bilateral study by the U.S. and Japan for the defense of these vital SLOCs by Japanese Defense Forces.

Japan's assumption of responsibility for, and creation of the wherewithal to accomplish, the defense of certain SLOCs will greatly aid its ability to help cordon off the Japan Sea in a crisis.²¹

There are nearly 50,000 U.S. service personnel stationed in Japan, not counting U.S. Navy and Marine personnel embarked on ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Dispersed among 105 sites in Japan, they consist of roughly 25,000 Marines; 16,000 Air Force; 7,000 Navy; and 2,000 Army. Planned reductions of 5,000 personnel are mainly from among the 22,000 Marines stationed in Okinawa.²² The Air Force has two tactical fighter wings, one located at Misawa Air Base, on northern Honshu,
and the other at Kadena Air Base, on the southern island of Okinawa.\textsuperscript{23}

The U.S. Seventh Fleet command ship, USS BLUE RIDGE, the forward-based aircraft carrier USS MIDWAY, and other U.S. ships are based in Yokosuka, while the embarked air wing of the MIDWAY, CVW-5, is located at the Naval Air Facility Atsugi. Sasebo, on the island of Kyushu, provides additional naval elements including logistics and amphibious assault ships with the addition of the USS PELELIU in 1995.\textsuperscript{24} Additionally, Yokosuka provides the U.S. Navy with the only Far East drydock which can handle major ship repairs required of a U.S. aircraft carrier without severely disrupting personnel and operation schedules.

Current issues affecting Japan’s security fall into two categories. The first is defense and the second is security of vital trade routes which provide critical resources, including oil. Regarding defense, the preceding discussion provides Japan’s basic framework. However, many voices in Japan and the U.S. are calling the U.S.-Japanese defense arrangement into question, given the easing in East-West tensions and the increased capabilities of both Japan and South Korea to defend their territories. Regarding security of trade routes, the new 1,000 miles SLOC defense initiative provides additional relief for U.S. naval commitments inside this area and
allow increased deployment to other vital areas which also serve the interests of Japan.

Another issue, to be addressed in 1991, is the status of the disputed Kuril(e) Islands. After World War II, the Soviet Union occupied these islands claimed by Japan. This is addressed because early resolution of the issue would open the way toward increased interdependence between Japan and the Soviet Union. Should this occur, domestic and political attitudes in Japan may lean towards relaxing U.S. military ties within the framework of the treaty. Therefore, it is a factor to consider, not in unfavorable terms, but as an objective matter in the research.

The following addresses current issues as they pertain to the future perception of U.S. maritime requirements under the U.S.-Japan security arrangement addressed above.

Kurile Islands. The Kurile Islands extend from the northern tip of Hokkaido in Japan to the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula along the entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk. The four closest to Japan; namely, Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu, are a major stumblingblock in normalized relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. As mentioned, the Soviet Union and Japan both lay claim to these islands but, in 1945, the Soviets occupied and fortified them.
Throughout the last 45 years, this issue occupied the diplomatic rhetoric between both nations and raised negative Japanese domestic opinion toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets traditionally claim there is "no issue" regarding these islands, however they use it as a wild card in diplomacy with the Japanese. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze played this card in September 1990, expressing the potential to discuss the issue during President Mikhail Gorbachev's proposed April 1991 visit to Japan. This was followed up later by unofficial confirmation and then denial by Moscow.25

The northern two islands hold some strategic significance, with or without the Cold War, for the Soviet Union. Maintaining these islands gives the Soviets 'de facto' control over the Sea of Okhotsk, making it a virtual Soviet lake. Additionally, the Etorofu Straits, on the north or south of Etorofu Island become the only plausible exit for Soviet submarines in an East-West confrontation. Therefore, the offers to date mention only the return of the smaller Habomai and Shikotan islands. Officially, the Japanese uphold that any talks concerning this issue must address the eventual return of all four islands.

Given that the Soviets should continue to promote more open lines of interdependence, i.e., Japanese economic relations and joint development of Siberia, then this wild card may be played. The Kurile Islands,
...do not have sufficient strategic and economic importance to be worth the sacrifice (of losing potential Japanese economic and technological trade).26

Should this occur, it will make a positive impact on Soviet-Japanese relations.

Part of the resolute attitude expressed by the Japanese government regarding the U.S.-Japanese military alliance is a reflection of their continued perception of the threat posed by the Soviet military, positioned miles from their shores. Toshiki Kaifu, Japanese Prime Minister, stated:

(Japan) considers it important that the Soviets take as many concrete steps as possible to demonstrate their support for Asian-Pacific peace and stability and further improvement of East-West relations.... In this context, we intend to continue pursuing a more normal relationship with the Soviet Union, expanding our ties in a balanced manner while devoting our utmost energies to settlement of the issue of Japan's Northern Territories (Kurile Islands)....27

Should favorable negotiations occur, regarding the Kurile Islands, along with a concrete reduction of Soviet naval presence in the Sea of Japan, pressures for reduced U.S. naval presence will likely build. These diplomatic pressures have been a part of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue since the easing of East-West tensions. These pressures, coupled with potential Japanese and U.S. domestic desires for a reduction in U.S. overseas presence, could portend the future loss of the forward-based aircraft carrier in Japan.
U.S.-Japanese Relations. There are other factors, however, including Japan's perception of the new world order and the relationship of the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to international stability. Additionally, Japan must consider their future role, as a leader in this new world order. As mentioned, Japan presently considers their treaty relationship to the U.S. as beneficial to regional and world order. Therefore, other precipitous events would have to occur to impact on this relationship.

At the same time, there is a regional perception that, "...the U.S. tends to view Japanese-American relations strategically, in light of American global needs." Also, the growing economic tensions between the two countries are negatively influencing both countries' domestic opinions about the other.

The combination of growing Japanese anti-Americanism and a changing geostrategic environment, in which the need for the U.S. nuclear umbrella is disappearing, renders it no longer implausible that the United States might push Japan too far and even fracture the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

However, on the U.S. side, Japanese hesitation and reluctance to aid the U.S. led coalition during Desert Storm is exacerbating anti-Japanese sentiments in the U.S.

In chapter one, the author noted the blatant use of economic elements of national power against another interdependent actor as improbable and unbenefficial. However, opinion polls in the U.S. claimed 87% of
Americans viewed economics as the threat, with positive attitudes toward Japan decreasing from 85% in 1985 to near 65% in 1990. Japanese attitudes are also on the wane in 1990 with only 66% feeling "generally friendly" toward the U.S. and only 31% desiring to continue to rely on U.S. military power. So, although the blatant use of the economic element of power is improbable, the resultant perceptions have caused the information elements of national power to collide. Opinion polls can be misleading, however, and used to the advantage of the writer, depending on his slant. In the Summary of the Defense of Japan, 1989, it is noted that 70% of the Japanese people gave an affirmative opinion of the Self-Defense Force and U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Even with the most optimistic figures, it is evident that these opinions are negatively impacting on the long-term future of the treaty and, hence, forward-basing.

Economically, Japan is listed as one of three countries deemed as unfair in trading practices with the U.S. under the "super 301" provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu endeavored to head off potential trade wars in a March 1990 summit and made at least diplomatic progress on some of the structural impediments.

The most recent round of international talks, launched in Uruguay in 1986 on the General Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs (GATT), is intended to prevent
increased protectionist pressures from undermining the multilateral trading system. From Japan's perspective, U.S. business has lost much of its international competitiveness and now desires government protection from an increasingly efficient and productive market. From a U.S. perspective, excessive Japanese consumer savings, high land prices, exclusive business practices, and a complicated Japanese distribution system are impediments to free trade and exacerbate a U.S. trade deficit accounting for one-third of the U.S. total.

Militarily, there are many in the U.S. Congress who believe that the U.S. should, ".. reallocate...from forward-deployment to rapid reinforcement." There is also increased domestic pressure to reduce overseas commitments as Japan and South Korea are seen as capable, increasingly, to contribute more to their own defense. Burden sharing initiatives, aimed at reducing the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan saved the U.S. $2.4 billion in 1989, not including the salaries of 22,000 Japanese workers employed on the U.S. bases and paid by the U.S. However, even these employees may fall under the burden sharing agreements by 1991, amounting to another $400 million paid by Japan, as the U.S. Congress turns up the pressure toward 100% share by Japan for maintaining U.S. forces. An endeavor, touted as the ultimate in defense cooperation, the Fighter Support-Experimental
(FSX), also proved too difficult for U.S. and Japanese during the summer of 1989. The resultant spillover from economic tensions, pressure from the U.S. toward more burden sharing, and problems in high visibility joint projects, strains popularity of the security treaty. Carrier Air Wing. Air wing landing practice, which maintains pilot proficiency and safety, is conducted in Japan while the carrier is in home port, Yokosuka. As time nears for carrier deployments from Japan, this practice goes well into the hours of darkness to increase night landing proficiency. As noted, the Naval Air Facility is located in Atsugi, a crowded suburb just southwest of Tokyo. As such, the noise generated by the night landing practice impacts on the lives in thousands of Japanese homes and businesses nearby. This yields numerous local petitions, regarding noise abatement, which are brought before the highest levels of the Japanese government. The pressures to restrict these flights to the minimum level causes potential safety problems associated with carrier landings, arguably the most difficult task for a naval aviator, especially at night. The U.S. and Japanese governments are perfectly aware of this problem and are taking active steps to improve the situation. "The solution of this problem is vital to the effective maintenance of the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements."40
Investigations into providing a landing site suited for this specific type of training resulted in the determination that Kiyakejima Island, off the Japanese coast near Tokyo was ideal. However, village authorities and inhabitants strongly oppose this and are causing delays. Pending completion of an agreement on Miyakejima, Iwo Jima Island is the proposed interim site and the Japanese government embarked on construction of facilities during fiscal year 1989.41

Japan's Regional Role in the New World Order. Japan is in the midst of bridging a crossroads towards a global political role. Many say that Japan currently lacks the ambition for this role and that persistent resentments from World War II exist in Asia, precluding regional acceptance of Japan in the East Asian security framework.42 This, accompanied with the aforementioned Japanese hesitation and reluctance to aid in the Gulf War, would lead to a conclusion that this is the case.43 In perspective, however, it should be noted that Japan is still emerging from its post-World War II tutelage by the U.S. and the understandable Asian resentments toward Japanese World War II atrocities. Also, there is a trend towards an increased Japanese awareness for the need to cooperate along security channels with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional partners. "What seems to be occurring is an unexpectedly rapid growth of Japan's
political role in Southeast Asia." This enlarged role, with its security implications, is possible only with ASEAN's endorsement.

Given the increasing interdependence between Japan and ASEAN, the time is ripe for Japan to launch other economic cooperation initiatives. This, in turn, will pave the way for a greater Japanese political role in the region.

Regarding regional security, however, ASEAN is in the midst of their own debate regarding the potential vacuum generated by the partial withdrawal by the U.S. from the bases in the Philippines. Japan still has to overcome the mistrust of these countries before it can become a full player in any regional security framework.

Japan, as previously mentioned, is actively involved in the security of vital sea lanes out to 1000 miles. With their technical expertise in mine-sweeping and counter-measure, as well as anti-submarine warfare, they could provide technical advice to ASEAN countries which protect the vital trade routes of the South China Sea; namely, the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits. These types of efforts coupled with increased interdependence, could portend Japanese security cooperation in Southeast Asia within the next 10 to 20 years.

Regarding Japanese relations with the Koreans, Japan normalized relations with South Korea in 1965, with the payment of $300 million in "compensation" for World War II. Japan is currently attempting to complete the
normalization of relations with North Korea through aid and "compensation." There were some political repercussions to this 1990 initiative, however, due to U.S. and South Korean pressures against potentially unsafe North Korean nuclear programs. This seemed to undermine those pressures. Nevertheless, it gave the perception of continued trends toward cooperation in Northeast Asia, albeit somewhat altered in direction. Obviously, U.S. facilities in Japan serve to enhance South Korean security against the North. Normalized relations in Northeast Asia, therefore, may further affect regional and U.S. attitudes toward long-term U.S. presence in this area.

Another initiative to fit Japan into a multilateral security framework throughout the West Pacific was introduced by Canada in preparing its own plan for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue. It would start with broad matters in the hope that dialogue about military matters would ensue.48

As previously mentioned Japanese aid overtook the U.S. in fiscal year 1990. Although most of this was regionally oriented, Kaifu's offer of $2 billion to Poland and Hungary was meant to demonstrate Japan's willingness to play a positive global role.49

The overall actions indicate that Japan is slowly building a consensus regarding their role for the long-term which could eventually lead to a more reduced military role for the U.S.
Japan's consensual mode of decision making and the leadership style it dictates have the inherent tendency to inhibit radical departure from the prevailing norms, (thus) causing inaction in the face of pressures of events. (However), once a consensus is formed, it feeds on itself and gathers on irresistible momentum.

To protect against the inherent regional misperceptions caused by a "global" Japanese policy, the U.S.-Japanese agreement can and does, act as a perceived safeguard during the transition. Democracy in Japan today may not be perfect, but it looks strong enough to prevent any return toward militarism, fascism or nationalistic authoritarianism. Japan is the first global civilian power and their integration in a broader security context ensures regional stability. However, Japan's sense of responsibility must be shaped around its alliance with the United States.

As such, **visible peacetime presence** by the U.S. in Japan displays both U.S. commitment to regional stability and Japanese commitment toward an increasingly strong and cooperative global role into the 21st Century. This also precludes any potential overshadowing of Japanese regional diplomacy by their World War II record in East Asia.

**Korean Peninsula**

The following addresses the Korean Peninsula in somewhat lesser detail than Japan, although the U.S. has significant economic and security ties with South Korea and is working toward improved relations with North Korea. Regarding peacetime presence in Northeast Asia,
the Kore-- Peninsula provides the only tangible security threat in all categories mentioned at the beginning of the chapter; namely, capability, intent, rhetoric and actions. North Korea emerged from the Cold War, still fighting the Cold War and continuing the rhetoric of that era. The Soviet Union and China both recognized South Korea, to the dismay of North Korea, and U.S. security relations with South Korea continued to go relatively well as of 1990. The result is an isolated North Korea under an 80-year old leader, Kim Il Sung, and a potentially unstable transition by the North Korean government after his death.53

On August 8, 1945, Soviet Russia entered World War II against Japan in fulfillment of its Yalta Conference, agreement and for obvious political reasons. Stalin perceived the opportunities for regaining and extending Soviet borders and influence in the Far East. Red Army troops advanced on Manchuria, Korea, and southern Sakhalin Island.54 At the close of the war the U.S. and Soviets agreed that Korea would be temporarily divided into Soviet and American occupation zones at the 38th parallel. Soviet forces withdrew from Korea in 1948, but left behind a People’s Republic under Communist Kim Il Sung. America withdrew in 1949, leaving President Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea below the 38th parallel. Both claimed to be the official government of Korea and by 1950 the possibility of war was real.55
When North Korea attacked the South in 1950, American interests in the Far East centered on the containment of Communism and the continued restoration of Japan along democratic lines. The Korean War also involved the first real test of the United Nations and involved the contributions of a sizable number of countries, contributing nearly 44,000 troops. The war concluded in 1953 with an armistice, not a treaty, and the border was sealed by a heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) leading to the separation of some 10 million Koreans from family members and friends.

Throughout the Cold War, North Korea aligned itself with China and the Soviet Union. Kim Il Sung's domestic status went from leader to that of one resembling a king, establishing a way of life for his people, termed juche, or self-reliance, which, in the post-Cold War era, has come to mean isolation. At the same time, the South aligned with its war allies and emerged by the 1970's as an interdependent economic partner. Along with other Far East export-led free market systems, South Korea became one of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC), displaying double-digit economic growth throughout much of the 1980's.

In September 1990, the premiers from both North and South met for the first time since 1953 to start talks aimed at relaxing tensions on the peninsula. However, the DMZ remains the most highly militarized area in the world.
today. Both sides still remain divided into two ideologically incompatible states, finding it difficult to adjust to a new world order.\textsuperscript{58}

A Rand Study conducted in 1985 identified strengths and vulnerabilities of both North and South Korea.\textsuperscript{59} Listed as strengths for the South were human resources, a strong economy, growing international prestige, and resolute fear of attack and defense from the North. Listed as the North's strengths were its controlled political structure, potent military structure, and the absolute control of \textit{Kim Il Sung} overarching the rest.

The vulnerabilities of the South, pointed out in the report, were the fragile state of political institutions, and dependence on external factors. For the North, their economic weakness and declining international position relative to the South, declining support from their allies, and the potential for political instability during a succession of power after \textit{Kim's demise} were listed.\textsuperscript{60}

The sources of influence on the Korean Peninsula are traditionally geographic, noting the great power balance that exists around it with China, the Soviet Union, and Japan within miles of its borders. Of course, the U.S. is entrenched, both militarily and economically, with a vested interest in promoting a peaceful reunification and regional stability.
The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. all claim that reducing tensions is their objective on the peninsula. Actions over the last four years tend to bear this out, as the Soviets and Chinese both recognized South Korea and urged the North Koreans to proceed with steps toward peaceful negotiation with the South. The North Koreans were recognized by both the U.S. and Japan with offers of increased economic ties.

The military disposition on the DMZ remains ominous, however, with nearly one million troops facing each other only miles north of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Almost 60% of North Korea's 930,000 man army, the fifth largest in the world, is concentrated in this area and they have logistics and munitions for four months without resupply. North Korea is also acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and has reverse-engineered the Soviet Scud-B. Additionally, in March 1990, the South Korean military discovered a fourth infiltration tunnel in their territory. North Korea has the capability to produce its own weapons, such as tanks and artillery, but it has to rely on outside supplies for strategic items such as fuel.

Although their economy is dismal, North Korea continues to increase their defense spending, estimated at $4.17 billion in 1989. The Soviet Union was North Korea's traditional supplier for major weapons and strategic supplies, but as the Soviet economy slipped and
East-West tensions eased, this vital source of materials severely declined. This has offset any attempt by North Korea to improve their relative military capability. Of most concern, however, is their refusal to sign a nuclear safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.67

The North Korean Air Force maintains nearly 70,000 personnel with 650 combat aircraft, including 10 Soviet SU-25s and 24 MIG-29s, and 115 armed helicopters, including 50 MI-24s. Their surface-to-air capability consists of SA-2/3/5 missiles. Their navy, primarily coastal, operates a small variety of aging Soviet diesel submarines, patrol and attack craft. It also maintains nearly 170 torpedo and 40 minewarfare craft, however as a regional navy they are nearly insignificant and show no sign of improvement.68

Since 1962, North Korea's military policy has been to arm the people, fortify the entire country, and embark on military modernization programs.69 During the 1980's, their strategy had three key features, combining a regular Soviet style with a Maoist style guerrilla warfare, formulating a Blitzkrieg advance on Seoul, and ending hostilities with a quick decision.70 The warning time for such an attack has been predicted to be as low as six hours.71

Standing opposite this threat is a smaller, but increasingly formidable, South Korean military. Their
army numbers 550,000, mainly infantry, supported by Western equipment and munitions. The South Korean Air Force numbers approximately 450 combat aircraft, not including 25 combat naval aircraft and 35 armed naval helicopters.\textsuperscript{72}

During 1990, the South Korean Navy made a quantum leap in tactics and weapons proficiency, participating in the Rim of the Pacific (RimPac)-90 exercise off Hawaii. Korean shipyards are busy with the production of frigates containing much improved technology. Their weakness still remains in anti-air warfare (AAW) capability, but initiatives are on the way for an enhanced AAW program after refurbishing their inventory of frigates. Additionally, an ambitious program of German-Type 209 submarine purchases is under way, with three projected to enter service in 1991 then subsequent South Korean construction to proceed for an additional six more. In December 1990, the South Koreans announced the order of eighth P-3C Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft from Lockheed for a 1995 delivery.\textsuperscript{73}

South Korea's defense choices expand as their capability improves. Their most likely choice will be to shift toward high-technology weapons and incrementally reduce manpower by some 25%. Their Defense Ministry called for an 18% increase in the 1991 budget, putting it at $11 billion, to improve capability and the soldiers' welfare.\textsuperscript{74} At the same time, due to North Korea's
missile capability and potential for nuclear weapons, South Korea will most likely join the U.S. on their Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) anti-missile program.\footnote{75}

Combined with the South Koreans, are the U.S. Forces of Korea, including some 14,000 personnel, mostly Army and Air Force. The U.S. Air Force presently maintains three tactical fighter wings with 72 combat aircraft. However, as part of the U.S. initiatives toward burden sharing by its allies and because of South Korea's increased capability to defend itself from attack, the U.S. is going from a leading to a supporting role on the peninsula.

In a visit to Seoul in February 1990, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney announced that 5,000 non-combatant U.S. service personnel would be withdrawn by 1993. Additionally, the 1991 U.S. defense budget contained provisions to shut down U.S. Air Force operations at three bases and the withdrawal of 2,000 additional personnel.\footnote{76} With this shift, U.S.-South Korean relations are moving toward reduced military ties, but increased economic interdependence into the 21st Century.\footnote{77}

Given the military balance and economic strength of South Korea coupled with improved ties with both the Soviet Union and China by the South, North Korea is, regretably, being pushed into an unhealthy isolation.\footnote{78}
North Korea and a few South Koreans believe, however, that U.S. presence on the peninsula is responsible for the nation's division and is a major impediment to unification, factual or not. The reduction of U.S. forces on the peninsula and a potential halt of the annual U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit military exercise may, therefore, reduce North Korean's feeling of isolation.

Some observers believe that Kim Il Sung will soon recognize the necessity to accommodate. Additionally, South Korean's current President, Roh Tae Woo, shifted from confrontation to accommodation with the North. The fact remains that Kim Il Sung remains hostile in both rhetoric and action. The South routinely takes on the initiative toward peaceful normalization through cultural and family means, while Kim makes "demands" of political unity first.

...the South (is) preoccupied by (peaceful) German process but over in the North, they want a Vietnam type of process (achieved through conquest).

Additionally, North Korean policy prevents either the North or South from joining the U.N. as separate members.

While Kim Il Sung remains entrenched in the rhetoric of communism, South Korea is making rapid strides in democracy. This year, 1990, marked their fourth anniversary of civilian rule since a 1980 coup when, then General Chun seized power and that same year 200 anti-government protestors were killed by South Korean paratroopers. Economically, they have reached a
downturn, suffering their first trade deficit in years, but continue to be the world's 13th largest trading nation.

With this dichotomy of political and economic systems on the Korean Peninsula, the only true path toward reunification is to establish paths of interdependence and reduce the level of military activity along the DMZ through a series of confidence building measures. The problem is in the dictatorial regime of Kim Il Sung and the legacy which will remain after his death.

Foreign observers (judge) substantial change to be highly unlikely within the lifetime of President Kim Il Sung and perhaps for some time thereafter.... The DPRK maintains the fifth largest army and may become a nuclear power. What it chooses to do is central to U.S. interests and to stability in Northeast Asia.

Relating this discussion to the research question, then, the author will briefly summarize. As stated, the Korean Peninsula offers the only threat as defined by capability, intent, rhetoric and actions. Both Japan and South Korea possess high levels of interdependence with the U.S. Although, Japan and the U.S. have improved diplomatic relations with the North Koreans, their political and economic systems do not offer significant potential for either policy or economic interdependence.

North Korea also fits the description of the Weapon State as suggested in chapter three. They possess a well developed and completely dominant state apparatus, sustained by an extreme ideology under Kim Il Sung, with
deep grievances against the West. Additionally, they most likely possess nuclear capability, which they refuse to allow the International Atomic Energy Commission to inspect for safety. If they, in fact, proliferate this capability into surface-to-surface missile weaponry, they are then a threat across the full spectrum of conflict to an interdependent ally and U.S. forces remaining in country.

South Korea and Japan are clearly vital interests to the U.S. through interdependent and, increasingly, demographic ties. The forward presence of a U.S. aircraft carrier in Northeast Asia may serve the peace time presence conditions set forth in the discussion of Japan. Additionally, its peace time presence and show of force in the Sea of Japan with the potential for power projection into the North clearly represents a deterrent to North Korea as the number of U.S. Air Force bases declines on the peninsula. Given the short invasion lead time predicted, and the rapid potential arrival at Seoul, reaction time for South Korea must be quick and the force violent.

Until such time as a resolution to the tensions on the Korean peninsula exists, through confidence building measures and reduced levels of ground forces on the DMZ, the U.S. should maintain some form of deterrent and usable power projection capability. This capability should be effective across the spectrum of conflict from peace time.
presence, to shows of force or a potential punitive air strike on military targets in a low intensity environment with clear political objectives. It must also be able to conduct sustained local sea control and power projection ashore. Given the North's Blitzkrieg strategy, this capability would aid in neutralizing deep operational or strategic military targets, to include any chemical or nuclear weapons sites.

Although this discussion does not directly answer the research question, it provides a framework for this area of Northeast Asia and the conclusions and comments are referred to later in the analysis. Next, in the strategic framework of Northeast Asia, the study discusses U.S. interests in China and Taiwan.

China and Taiwan

The following presents a brief history of China, since 1911, and "divided" China, since the Nationalists retreat from the mainland in 1949. Current issues and initiatives along with the future roles of both governments in regional order are then examined. The objective is to provide historical perspective into current issues relative to China and Taiwan and whether U.S. naval presence in this area could play a positive future role. "China is another major factor in the Asian security equation...a modernizing China at peace with itself and its neighbors is essential to stability and prosperity in Asia." 64
A forty year period of civil and external war plagued China during the early 20th Century. After the collapse of the Chinese monarchy in 1911, many Chinese desired a central form of government. This came in the form of the Nationalist (Koumintang) Party, founded in 1921. General Chiang Kai-shek took the leadership of the party in 1925 and formed an extreme right-wing regime. His aim was to unite China and control it under a Nationalist rule. In the process, he purged left-wing factions and the independent war lords, who still ruled much of China. Among the left-wing factions were Marxists under Mao Tse-Tung (Zedong) and Chu Teh. Escaping the Nationalists purge, they formed a guerrilla movement from the mountains between Hankow and Canton.

The Nationalist army severely defeated the war lords in the late 1920s and Mao in the early 1930s, forcing Mao and his forces to make the historical "Long March" to the north in 1935. Chiang was now in a position to unite China under a central government. Japan severely hampered these efforts by invading Manchuria in 1931 and then, in violation of the Nine-Power and Four-Power treaties, launching an undeclared war on China in 1937.

The Japanese occupied much of eastern and southern China in the next few years during, what became known as, the "China Incident" prior to World War II. Both Chiang and Mao resisted the Japanese occupation.
Nationalist China proved to be weak in their efforts against Japan, due to the corruption within Chiang's bureaucracy and poor military organization, compared to the Japanese.

As previously mentioned in the Korean discussion, the Soviets entered the war against Japan just prior to the Japanese surrender, occupying Manchuria. As in North Korea, they withdrew, leaving arms with the communist regime of, in this case, Mao Tse-Tung. Mao's forces launched civil war on the Nationalists in 1946, driving them off the mainland in 1949. Mao signed a mutual aid pact with Stalin and the U.S. continued to recognize Chiang's government, confined to the island of Taiwan (Formosa)\(^9\)

With the successful communist campaign in China, the U.S. felt that further communist expansion undermined U.S. interests and future world stability. The Korean War challenged both U.S. resolve against communism and the mission of the newly formed United Nations. U.N. forces, under General Douglas MacArthur, prepared for a final series of offensives near the Yalu River in November 1950. As the Yalu River forms a natural border between North Korea and Manchuria, Mao considered actions near the river as intolerable to Chinese security.\(^{91}\) Therefore, when U.N. forces neared the river, three hundred thousand People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers launched a massive counteroffensive.
During this time, the U.S. Seventh Fleet preserved the "neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait from attacks by either the mainland or the Nationalists. MacArthur felt the Nationalists could relieve pressure on his forces by being allowed to cross the strait and conduct operations against the mainland. He requested this from the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with plans for broadening the war, specifically against North Korean bases in Manchuria.92

Truman decided to limit the war to the Korean Peninsula and maintain the neutrality of the Taiwan strait. As the counteroffensive wore down and U.N. forces again regained territory, negotiations and the war entered the trenches, taking nearly two years to reach an armistice. The Chinese would receive nearly 900,000 casualties as a result of their involvement in the Korean War.93 Additionally, their ideological ties with the Soviets grew increasingly strong in the post-war years.

In 1954, the U.S. and Taiwan signed a Mutual Defense Treaty. Accordingly, Sino-Soviet relations gained further strength and the U.S. feared the resultant "communist monolith" would proceed with Euro-Asian hegemony. Such were the beginnings of the Cold War mentality which carried through the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies and accounted for the concept of preparing for two and one-half wars.94

However, toward the end of America's involvement in Vietnam, Sino-Soviet relations ebbed. During the 1960s,
Mao's China became increasingly tense toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who felt the Chinese Marxist movement was subordinate to their own. In addition to this ideological conflict, there were increased territorial disputes along the Sino-Soviet border in Manchuria, resulting in an armed clash in 1969. Both the Soviets and the Chinese recognized a need to begin seeking better relations with the U.S. In 1972, President Nixon made a historic trip to Peking to,

...confer de facto diplomatic recognition of Mao Tse-Tung's government and to join Mao in a declaration opposing Soviet hegemony in the Far East.

China was in a geographic position to relieve pressure on NATO's western front by applying pressure to the Soviet Far East. Additionally, China's nuclear missile capability could strategically influence the Soviets. As such, a "strategic triangle" formed out of Nixon's visit, with America gaining a perceived advantage over the Soviet Union through this "third party." Equally, China's new position gained them elevated global status and influence throughout the remainder of the Cold War. President Carter recognized the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) as the official government of China in 1979.

During the 1980s, China welcomed economic reforms and promoted more open dialogue with the West regarding educational and cultural issues. The decade would see
increased Chinese dependence on the outside world resulting in qualitative changes to its economic growth and increased public political awareness.\textsuperscript{96}

In 1982, however, China adopted an "Independent Foreign Policy." Because of continued Soviet support to Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia, invasion of Afghanistan, and increased buildup along the Sino-Soviet border, China conditioned Sino-Soviet normalization based on reversals of these Soviet involvements.\textsuperscript{99} At the same time, the Chinese developed a new framework for U.S. relations, using the U.S. stance on Taiwan against the U.S. in the same manner as they used the "three conditions" against the Soviets. In essence, their policy reassured both the Soviets and the U.S. while enhancing their own sense of autonomy. Their principles of independence in international affairs stressed equality, mutual respect and \textbf{non-interference in each other's internal affairs}.\textsuperscript{100}

China's military involvements from the mid-70s to the mid-80s included an increased buildup along the Sino-Soviet border and a border war against Vietnam in 1979, meant as a punitive measure after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. This prompted the aforementioned Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese and the resulting compensatory access to Cam Ranh Bay by the Soviet Far East Fleet.\textsuperscript{101} Additionally, the Chinese engaged in territorial disputes with Vietnam over islands in the...
South China Sea, using force once in 1974 over a dispute in the Paracel Islands. This led to a PRC naval buildup with the intent toward increased power projection in this area. In 1984, the PRC conducted naval exercises near the Vietnamese Spratly Islands as a demonstration of this capability.

The critical issue of jurisdictional claims is addressed further in the discussion of Southeast Asia. Although this is also important to discussions of Northeast Asia, analysis is deferred to the Southeast Asian study as a separate discussion. Before addressing current issues, the next few paragraphs discuss Taiwan policy and economic growth during the Cold War.

Taiwan, interchangeably referred to as the Republic of China (ROC), based their Cold War-era China policy on the "Three Noes"; namely, no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation. Essentially, they took the stand that they were the rightful government of China. Therefore, they did not pursue "independence," rather, unification with the mainland under the government control of the ROC. As mentioned, President Carter recognized the PRC as the official government of China in 1979 and ruptured diplomatic ties with Taiwan, terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.

However, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act prior to the termination of the treaty. This re-normalized relations and provided quasi-defense
commitment to the ROC. Basically, it allowed official ROC representatives into the U.S. with the same diplomatic status afforded other sovereign nation representatives. The defense commitment provided for arms sales and maintained America's "capacity to resist" an attack on the ROC based on determination by the U.S. President and Congress. Essentially, it became a "conditional treaty" giving no written commitment of U.S. forces to defend Taiwan, yet carrying the same weight. Subsequently, it was interpreted by the PRC as a defense treaty. It should also be mentioned, however, that the PRC maintained its stated intention of reunification by force, if necessary.

Economically, Taiwan led the world in overall growth during the 1970s and '80s. They became the model of development for the NICs, mentioned earlier, and since 1975 their growth doubled even that of the Japanese. Taiwan's exports went to the developed Western countries, which accounted for 75% of its market. "Political modernization followed in the wake of its economic development and (resultant) rapid social change." As a consequence of their dependence on Western trade, particularly with Japan and the U.S., Taiwan's economy also became very sensitive to the economic, health, and trade policies of these trading partners.

Regarding natural resources, and momentarily shifting the discussion to the present tense, over 70
minerals are found in Taiwan, but only coal is comparatively abundant. Taiwan also has some rich offshore fishing grounds. They, like China and several other East Asian nations, maintain jurisdictional claims to several islands in the East and South China Sea which provide the basis for oil and mineral rights in the underwater areas surrounding these islands. Like Japan, Taiwan imports over 90% of its oil, yielding economic vulnerability to significant oil price increases. Also, like Japan, Taiwan's foreign aid within the region is further heightening its importance and influence in regional affairs.

It does not seem likely that a nation that is the model for economic and political development, that is now in the foreign aid business and one of the world's largest trading nations (bigger than the PRC), can be isolated.

Citing this historic synopsis, the following relates current issues to East Asian security with the future role of both PRC and ROC in world order and the implications to U.S. forward naval presence. Again, the author attempts to assess issues in interdependent terms and based on a new world order.

The normalization of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, over the last four years, invalidated the "strategic triangle" politics mentioned above. This significantly increased the marginalization of the PRC in world affairs, meaning their relative global influence markedly decreased because they no longer held the
position of counterweight in the post-Cold War environment.  

Because of a decade of reforms within the PRC and a new political awareness, domestic perceptions of their overall standard of living and lack of personal freedoms gave rise to disquieted attitudes among the people. Coupled with perceived slow economic reforms and high inflation in 1988, disquieted workers and students intensified outward protests. These protests culminated in large scale, but mostly peaceful, demonstrations in the capital city of Beijing. The aging PRC government hierarchy began feeling the pressures of mixing a planned and market economy coupled with this new domestic upswell, opposed to their basic ideology and eager for more rapid reforms.

By May of 1989, the number of demonstrators rose to one million and, although there was some high level government opposition, martial law ensued. Inspired by new Soviet policies and East European reforms, the protests continued, culminating in a confrontation between government military forces and the demonstrators at Tiananmen Square. On 3 and 4 June 1989, the confrontation resulted in the deaths of hundreds and the arrests of hundreds more. Amnesty International estimated that 1300 demonstrators were killed.

The impact on short-term Chinese foreign relations was immediate and negative. The world community,
generally, condemned the violent government action which China referred to as merely an unfortunate incident. The U.S. banned military sales, sheltered dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, extended visas of visiting students, and cancelled all high level contacts. Internationally, the PRC suffered economic sanctions and political disdain.

President Bush, realizing the potential long-term danger to East Asian stability of an "isolated" China, moved toward a dialogue. He sent National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy Security of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, to Beijing in December 1989 in an effort to ensure that diplomatic ties remained. Additionally, the U.S. resumed export-import financing and President Bush vetoed a bill guaranteeing residency rights for Chinese students.

Economically, 1990 saw slow growth and high unemployment in the PRC for the first half of the year. The government imposed its "economic austerity programs," which severely tightened credit. This had the effect of reducing inflation to only 4%, however, unemployment increased rapidly. Although China lost a vast amount of foreign currency, through tightened lending, foreign investors continued to invest and many joint ventures enjoyed record success. The problem came more on the domestic side as consumers kept currency out of the marketplace causing overstocked inventories. This
"passive resistance" forced the government to ease lending restrictions, which resulted in economic growth rising from 1.8%, in the first half, to almost 6% by the end of 1990.\textsuperscript{121}

Taiwan, although urging a hard stance from the international community regarding Tiananmen, maintained a near $4 billion trade across the Taiwan strait.\textsuperscript{122} Additionally, as the PRC attempted to ameliorate the U.S., by publicizing the release of political prisoners and lifting martial law, President Bush responded by lifting opposition to large-scale loans and U.S. grain sales. Consequently, trade rose to $21 billion in 1990. Also, Japan and the EC eased economic restrictions but maintained limitations on military sales.\textsuperscript{123}

Politically, the central task of the PRC government was to heal both domestic and international wounds but maintain the hardline, as stated in the Sixth Plenum of March 1990. Although retired in November 1989, Deng Xiaoping retained much influence in governmental decisions. At home it appeared that the populace would wait for the aging leaders to die and hope for more reform, however, there were still some worker demonstrations, as peasants suffered their second consecutive year of real income decrease. To stem any return of Tiananmen, the People's Armed Police (PAP), increased in numbers and training, became more visible.\textsuperscript{124}
As noted above, the people resisted indirectly through their apathy in the marketplace. Educationally, the government required more ideological indoctrination and military training. Freshman students at Beijing and Fudan universities began this new syllabus in 1990. The hardline of the Sixth Plenum warned against "bourgeois liberalization" and discussed the need for strengthening the "functions of the dictatorship of the state apparatus." However, the four factions of the government did not line up exactly and by the Seventh Plenum in December 1990 deep divisions existed.125

Internationally, Beijing succeeded in several diplomatic areas. Sino-Soviet relations, which eased in the initial months of the post-Cold War, continued to improve since the mid-May 1989 summit ended nearly 30 years of enmity.126 In September 1990, mutual force reduction talks ended with quantitative results and even the possibility of Soviet military aircraft sales. Sino-American relations remained tense. However, the Chinese U.N. vote condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the authorization of sanctions, including $2 billion from the PRC itself, along with efforts by President Bush to ease restrictions on the PRC, improved its standing.127 By the fall of 1990, Indonesia reestablished diplomatic ties and Saudi Arabia recognized the mainland government. Even Sino-Vietnamese relations improved as talks persisted toward a resolution of the Cambodian issue, although
jurisdictional claims in the Spratly Islands remains tense. Additionally, since the PRC recognized South Korea, trade and political ties increased and reciprocal offices are now located in both countries. Of special significance to Taiwan, was the passing of the Hong Kong Basic Law by the PRC government, providing for "one country, two systems" when Hong Kong reverts from British to Chinese control in 1997. However, Beijing has indicated that pro-democracy factions have no place in the Hong Kong of the future. In other words, the PRC wants the economic benefits of a free market without the domestic underpinning of free government. PRC-ROC relations and potential for reunification are discussed later.

Militarily, much of the major land force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are now being mobilized for internal security and the budget is being spent on crowd control items such as tin helmets, shields and rubber batons. The reduced tensions along the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia and talks on mutual reductions have lessened the requirement for concentration in this area. Group Armies and a Quick Reaction Force are being funded to meet conventional needs and for potential use in defense of the occupied Spratly Islands. The Navy and Air Force are also receiving increased funding to improve their capability to defend the Spratly Islands as well as patrolling the air and sea LOCs in the South China Sea. As a safeguard,
China's current nuclear policy is to retain their eight inter-continental ballistic missiles and improve their capability as a deterrent force, however, the CSS-1 medium-range ballistic missile is retired and there are currently no other developments in the nuclear field. Additionally, their production of additional ballistic missile submarines is going extremely slow, with only one Xia-class in commission.

Although China is concentrating its efforts on the Spratly Islands, its current naval and air projection capabilities are progressing slowly. This is due, in large part, to U.S. military sales and modernization program being cut off in the wake of Tiananmen. A newly-formed Chinese Marine battalion is based on the Spratly Islands and has already been involved in "incidents" with Vietnamese troops. Their surface fleet made some improvements in surveillance capability by fitting some Luda-class destroyers with Dauphin helicopters and improved radar. The difficulty rests in the lack of funding for effective replenishment tankers, which greatly restricts any capability for extended deployments. Neither do they have any real command ship, amphibious landing or helicopter transport ships necessary in the projection role which the PRC desires.

However, there have been amphibious landing practices on the small island off Hailin near Taiwan which are watched closely by the Taiwanese.
Regarding the PRC Air Force, their in-flight refueling capability is suffering from a lack of technical experience, therefore, their reconnaissance time over the Spratlys is of minimal duration. As previously mentioned, the PRC is attempting to acquire Soviet aircraft and equipment due to the restricted international military sales. The Soviets offered the advanced SU-27, which, if coupled with an in-flight refueling capability gives the potential for operations in the Spratlys.

Regarding personnel, the PLA has seen recent changes in the senior officer corps and intensive political indoctrination of the lower ranks. Of significance, 3500 officers are under investigation related to pro-democracy demonstrations.

Finally, regarding the PLA's potential use against Taiwan, some Taiwanese feel that the "old guard" on the mainland are becoming impatient, making force more rather than less likely. However, the opposition feels that, although the threat exists, the actual use of force is unlikely.

This leads into the final discussions of China and Taiwan. The first deals with Taiwan's defense capability. Next, is a discussion of Taiwan's current policy on reunification with the mainland. Finally, the author discusses the future role of China and Taiwan in regional stability and the relative benefits, if any, in retaining forward U.S. naval presence in the East China
Sea area, disregarding, for the moment, the jurisdictional claims issue discussed in the next section.

Militarily, Taiwan is extremely capable of defending its sovereignty. The military establishment of Taiwan is vast and well-budgeted, receiving 35% of the national government outlay. Because of their strong economy, however, it does not represent a large part of their total resources. Technologically, ROC military forces are modernizing, with updated Green Bee and Sky Horse surface-to-surface missiles. The Green Bee is guided by an infra-red night vision device. Additionally, their navy is updating submarine and surface fleet capability with construction of eight modified frigates (FFG-7-class) involving an enlarged design. The ROC is also negotiating an option on four to six West German Type 209 submarines to augment their two modern Dutch-built submarines. The navy's immediate need appears to be in minesweepers. Regarding amphibious projection capability, they have 26 landing ships and a command ship. As far as long-term deployment capability, they maintain four support tankers which could aid their fleet in regional on-station deployments. Nothing much is written on their Air Force, however, they maintain 469 combat aircraft, mainly F-5s and F-104s, with search and rescue and transport aircraft. Additionally, there does not appear to be an in-flight refueling designated aircraft for long-range surveillance.
Regarding Taiwan's defense, Japan referred to Taiwan as within its defense perimeter in a joint communique issued with the U.S. in 1969. It has never repudiated (or clarified) this statement. However, along with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and Taiwan's own capabilities, there appears to be sufficient perceived military deterrent from any mainland attack on the island.\(^{144}\)

Recent political dialogue emanating from Taiwan suggests that the "Three Noes" policy, mentioned above, is moderating significantly. Newly elected President Lee Teng-Hui's inauguration address pointed out the need for actively promoting the reunification of China.\(^{145}\) He also declared the end to most of the "temporary provisions" which maintained the aging government of the KMT in office even before their retreat to the mainland. This is planned to occur in December 1991, opening the way for completely democratic elections.\(^{146}\) Additionally, President Lee is scheduled to declare that Taiwan is no longer at war with the mainland. This would indicate that he has abandoned the KMT goal of recovering the mainland. Considering the economic per capita disparity of the two systems, Taiwan is in a position to wait out the aging PRC leadership and negotiate any reunification plan with potentially more reform-minded officials.

The PRC currently desires the "one country, two system" solution be applied to Taiwan, similar to plans
for Hong Kong. Additionally, they have yet to renounce the use of force against the island. Taiwan, on the other hand, would be satisfied with a "one country, two government" approach.\textsuperscript{147} The ROC's standing among the international community is very strong. Foreign nations seem willing to ignore any PRC protests over dealings with Taiwan. Even the PRC, itself, invited Taiwan athletes to the Asian Games, held in China in September of 1990. For the most part, 1990 saw continued improving of relations between China and Taiwan, including increased trade, transportation and postal ties, consular entities, and the repatriation of criminals.\textsuperscript{148} The ROC allowed indirect investment on the mainland for the first time in 1990. They also found common ground in defending a shared jurisdictional island claim versus Japan in the East China Sea.\textsuperscript{149}

Regarding the future role of China and Taiwan in regional stability, neither China nor Taiwan is inclined to attack the other, PRC rhetoric aside. Although the possibility exists, given the actions at Tiananmen Square and the aging PRC leadership, the author feels that the interdependent ties between the two, and the West, are already too complex to make the costs acceptable.

Beijing's great dependency on Western technology, credits, and investment further reinforce a relatively relaxed American mood.\textsuperscript{150}
Even domestically the passive resistance of the people taken in the wake of Tiananmen, required modification by the PRC government.

Economically, the U.S. remains Taiwan's leading trade partner and source of investment capital. Additionally, Taiwan avoided the U.S. "Super 301" list through quick action on tariffs and currency revaluation which helped the U.S. market. Although suffering a predicted downturn in 1990, they will remain the second largest Asian capital exporting country, behind Japan. Therefore, their security and stability is in the interest of the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific region.

The PRC's stability is also in the interest of all concerned. Therefore, a patient, more complete integration of the PRC into the world economy may, in the long run, initiate the political and social reforms desired. The stumbling block remains the PRC leadership, which has not renounced its potential use of force against Taiwan. As mentioned, this seems unlikely, however the rhetoric remains. Although the PRC lost some of its global influence, as the "strategic triangle" collapsed,

...the need for strategic engagement with Beijing endures as China's international role evolves to encompass a broad range of global and regional issues: from missile and nuclear non-proliferation to cooperation on the gulf crisis to resolution of the regional conflicts in Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula.

The question to answer, for this thesis, is whether U.S. naval presence and forward commitment produces
sufficient benefits to security in this area of Northeast Asia. The author contends that the forward-based carrier in Japan is negligible to the perceived cost and the low risk of a mainland attack on Taiwan. Taken alone, forward naval presence may enhance the deterrence of a potential Chinese aggression but makes the cost of maintaining this commitment unfeasible and takes away from other naval commitments. These other commitments, however, offer security of the trade routes from Southwest and Southeast Asia, providing economic stability for the ROC. U.S. presence may, also enhance any Chinese fear of a militarily "resurgent" Japan, as discussed earlier.

To conclude, the author offers the following bullets regarding the impact of a forward-deployed or -based U.S. aircraft carrier on Northeast Asian security:

**Japan.** The forward-based aircraft carrier stationed in Japan offers *peacetime presence* as a commitment to the defense of Japan, the stability of East Asia, and the vital trade routes connecting Japan with its resources. Additionally, it stabilizes regional sensitivities, still opposed to a perceived military "resurgence" of Japan. This commitment is subject to changing domestic and regional opinions in the U.S., Japan, and other Asia-Pacific nations. These opinions are shaped by interdependent factors and issues presented in the discussion. Based on those factors, it is apparent
that the presence of a forward-based aircraft carrier in Japan should be viable up to the 21st Century.

The Korean Peninsula. Until the demise of North Korean President Kim Il Sung, with the subsequent government transition, the potential for meaningful confidence-building measures and deescalation along the DMZ is moderate. The role of the PRC and Soviet Union in advising North Korea, along with increased economic ties with South Korea, Japan and the U.S., may accelerate this process, however. The forward-deployed or -based aircraft carrier offers peacetime presence, with the potential for conflict response or power projection ashore, to complement South Korean and remaining U.S. forces. This presence is heightened by the future reduction of U.S. Air Force forward-basing in the region. As in Japan, the security of trade routes, ensures the availability of vital resources, thus maintaining the economic stability of South Korean markets.

China and Taiwan. No inherent reason requires significant U.S. naval presence in this area. However, the presence in other Northeast Asian areas, along with the Taiwan Relations Act, offers de facto commitment to help deter any potential forceful reunification by the mainland. Again, as with Japan and South Korea, the security of vital trade routes, stabilizes the economic market.
General. The author attempted to highlight the historic factors which formed the regional ties, commitments, or left over animosities affecting regional stability. The viability of the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the focal point for discussing the forward-based carrier. As illustrated in the discussion, domestic opinions, financial constraints, or new world realities may significantly change the real or perceived requirement to maintain this capability beyond the 21st Century. The other key issue regarding a forward-based carrier in the Asia-Pacific is the Philippine base issue. The next section discusses the Southeast Asia framework by analyzing jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea and ASEAN security. This is then followed by analysis of the Philippine base issue.

Southeast Asia

The following section discusses Southeast Asian security. It begins with the issue of jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea and the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in post-Cold War regional security. The ASEAN discussion integrates two South Pacific security agreements, namely the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) and the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). This section is followed by a discussion of India's capability and perceived intent to fill a vacuum left by a reduced U.S. naval presence. A
...control or influence over (the Southeast Asia Region) enables outside powers to...protect the right of passage of their merchant shipping and more importantly, their military vessels through the SLOCs.153

Jurisdictional Claims in the South China Sea

The South China Sea is a potential conflict zone due to the numerous regional claims over two principal island areas, the Paracels and the Spratlys. The degree to which this issue affects U.S. and allied interests, however, is difficult to fully assess. The following discussion focuses on a brief history of the "Law of the Sea," the interpretation and stand of regional actors regarding jurisdiction, and the effect, if any, on regional security and U.S. naval presence.

In 1945, President Harry S. Truman declared "jurisdiction and control" over water area out to the continental shelf of the U.S. By 1958, the U.N. established the first agreement on criteria governing the jurisdiction over offshore resources. This was the initial "Law of the Sea" conference and it attempted to legally and geographically define the continental shelf. Without going into the specifics, the determination was that two adjacent countries should determine shelf boundaries by mutual agreement. If no agreement was made, then the boundary became the median line between the
respective territorial sea base points, unless another boundary line was justified by special circumstances.\textsuperscript{154}

This resulted in controversial legal disputes over which islands validated or invalidated respective base point determinations. The most difficult problem became the dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) in the East China Sea, briefly mentioned in the discussion of China and Taiwan. In 1969, the International Court of Justice interpreted the 1958 Geneva convention, to the effect, that offshore boundaries should be drawn out to the natural prolongation of its land territory. As the largest continental land mass in the Asia-Pacific, China had, and has, much to gain from the potential oil and mineral resources throughout the region. However, it chose to retain diplomatic flexibility through, "...the option of claiming the entire shelf, tempered by a carefully hedged readiness for compromise."\textsuperscript{155} It should be pointed out that China maintained the claim that the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea Islands belong to China and, "...we (China) will never permit others to put their fingers on them."\textsuperscript{156}

After the U.N. defined national economic zones extending out to 200 miles, China interpreted the natural prolongation terms, mentioned above, as taking precedence over this zone since it extended well beyond 200 miles. Although this applied to the East China Sea, where China faced the island nation of Japan, it was difficult to
apply in the case of Korea or Vietnam, which are contiguous land masses.

As mentioned previously, 1990 saw consistent agreement between Taiwan and China regarding the Diaoyutai Islands, defining them as Chinese soil. Additionally, given the increased interdependence of Japan, Taiwan, and China, political accommodation in the East China Sea is more likely than armed conflict. However, in the case of the South China Sea, the issue of 200 mile economic zones, applied to islands, causes serious territorial disputes and offers the potential for armed conflict escalation.

The South China Sea lies between the Philippine Islands and the Asian land mass with the six nations of ASEAN, Cambodia, Vietnam, and both Chinas as littoral states. As such, it is the major body of water connecting trades routes from Europe, Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia. These trade routes enter through the narrow and territorialized Malacca and Sunda Straits, in the south, and the Bashi Channel and Taiwan Strait in the north. It is also a potential oil and mineral resource area, yet to be fully explored. Under the current Law of the Sea Treaty, the South China Sea is considered a "semi-enclosed sea" and the littoral states are "encouraged to cooperate."

There are nearly 175 islands, in the South China Sea with approximately 100 in the Spratly chain, and 50 in
the Paracels. Realistically, many of these are merely specks of land or just a rock above the low water mark. Although there are several claims, only five nations maintain holdings in the Spratlys. South of the Spratlys, Indonesia occupies the Natuna Islands, maintaining some defensive fortifications. Indonesia's defense buildup in the late 1970s and early 1980s placed great strategic emphasis on developing capabilities to project power into its economic zone and to provide for a first line of defense in the air and sea space north of these islands. This is discussed further in the ASEAN discussion.

At the Colombo Conference in 1974, China claimed inalienable sovereignty over all the islands of the South China Sea and, subsequently, garrisoned the Paracels. This was met with protests from both the South and North Vietnamese, resulting in China's use of force over the dispute. China improved their naval capability from coastal patrol to out-of-area from 1974 through 1984 and, out of all the claimants, only China and Vietnam maintained threatening postures.

In 1987, Vietnam constructed a small naval base and airstrip in the Spratlys. China countered with naval maneuvers in the area, spurring protest from Vietnam. In March 1988, China attacked Vietnamese freighters, dislodged the Vietnamese from several islands and fortified two of them.
While the Soviets maintained a major presence in Cam Ranh Bay, they aided Vietnam in improving their power projection capabilities. Because of the Soviet withdrawal of forces and much needed aid, however, Vietnam suffered in operational efficiency and technical support.\textsuperscript{162} As mentioned in the previous section, China's extended deployment and aerial reconnaissance capabilities are also less than effective in their current state. Presently, Vietnam occupies twenty islands in the Spratly Islands and China occupies six, but the reduced Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia has eased the potential for armed conflict with China.

In August of 1990, China exercised their "flexibility," by proposing the removal of all military forces and the joint development of the entire South China Sea area.\textsuperscript{163} This is in the best interest of China since they would be a party to all potential dealings. It also improves their international position, by promoting reduced military tensions in this area.

Currently, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines maintain military forces on the Spratly Islands and have shown the willingness to maintain patrols in defense of their holdings. Additionally, there are many ASEAN holdings offering disputes and the potential for conflict. However,

...the reduced possibility of an Asian land war has lowered the number of unresolved issues regarding exclusive economic zone limits and sovereignty...disputes over islands such as the
Spratly group still are a possible cause for concern in this decade.\textsuperscript{164}

The potential of escalating territorial disputes to the security of Southeast Asia diminished in the wake of the Cold War and the reduced tensions in Indochina. Prior to these events, ASEAN expressed concern about the potential for violence and the pursuant instability this could bring to the region. The U.S. introduced significant stability with forward-deployed naval forces in the Philippines and the forward-based aircraft carrier in Japan, which conducted, and conducts, extensive operations and training in the area.\textsuperscript{165}

No definitive conclusions are presented, at this point, regarding jurisdictional claims as they pertain to U.S. naval presence. Neither the Spratlys nor the Paracels offer any major strategic advantages to the occupant. However, some of the larger islands could accommodate more extensive military bases. Taken singularly, and in the current state of eased tensions, this issue is not significant enough to warrant major U.S. naval presence, in the form of an aircraft carrier, except for occasional presence operations or bilateral exercises (discussed later). This is said, in light of discussions to this point. Therefore, the study proceeds to develop the remainder of the framework for Southeast Asia.
ASEAN Security

ASEAN consists of the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. As an organization, it is "...an increasingly central factor for stability and economic growth in Southeast Asia." The U.S. maintains treaties with two ASEAN members, namely; the Philippines and Thailand, under separate arrangements. The following paragraphs briefly examine ASEAN in the Cold War, then focus on issues affecting ASEAN security in the post-Cold War era.

ASEAN formed in 1967 after many failed attempts at a regional treaty organization. One of those attempts was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of 1954 which included, the U.S., U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Although the organization failed, the treaty survives today in a form called the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The U.S. also maintains a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines.

The essence of the ASEAN agreement was to develop the internal structures of the member countries under an umbrella of superpower non-alignment. This was understandable, given the regional power balance of the Cold War and the perceptive need for enhanced economic strength to improve standards of living, thus creating internal stability of the member states. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 basically called for common action to
promote regional cooperation through the economic and social stability of each member. The Bali Summit of 1976 further expressed, as a "code of conduct," to respect each member nation's independence and sovereignty.168 As a result of the security umbrella provided by U.S. forces in the Philippines, the members chose to build their economies instead of their militaries as the internal threat of communist insurgency was greater than the perceived external threats.

ASEAN members were able to sidestep their vast cultural, religious, and historical differences to promote cooperation. Although little substantive progress was made early on, the products of dialogue and consultation provided a workable political framework. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, ASEAN stood together as a common voice in the U.N. This issue brought ASEAN leaders together and provided greater mutual respect, trust, and consultation over the duration of the Vietnamese occupation. As a regional force, ASEAN gained international recognition through its persistence at isolating Vietnam and bringing pressure toward a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and a political solution to the problem.169

The discussion now shifts to issue affecting ASEAN in the post-Cold War era, but maintains its historical perspective. It starts with a general paragraph on ASEAN economics and further discusses jurisdictional claims as
they apply to intra-ASEAN relations. Then it discusses the proposed Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) as well as creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Current issues focus on the ANZUS alliance, assessment of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), and naval capabilities of major regional actors.

Economically, ASEAN is the world's leading producer of tin, bauxite, rubber, and palm oil. It is also one of the world's major rice producers. Of the members, the small state of Singapore is one of the NICs, with Thailand also nearing that distinction. Other member countries maintain slower growth due to the competition of similar commodity exports. Although this growth is slower, it is sustained, with the lone exception of the Philippines. The problem is that the, "export of raw materials as opposed to finished products makes the non-industrialized countries of ASEAN more vulnerable to fluctuations in (an interdependent) world economy." Additionally, the Philippines are extremely sensitive to oil price increases due to their oil import dependence.

The only members which suffer any major intra-ASEAN tensions are the Philippines and Malaysia regarding a jurisdictional dispute over Sabah. "The Philippine claim to sovereignty over Malaysia's North Borneo, Sabah, state was initially advanced in 1962, and while not actively pursued in recent years, still after a quarter of a century, irritates normal relationships between Malaysia
and the Philippines.

There are other intra-ASEAN territorial disputes stemming from Philippines and Indonesian archipelagic Law of the Sea interpretations. However, member states continually exhibit the ability to settle their boundary issues cooperatively.

At this point, it should be noted that the South China Sea disputes were only part of the overarching politics of ASEAN-Indochinese dialogue over the future of Cambodia (Kampuchea). Point four of a 1981 Indochinese statement presented to the U.N. General Assembly pertained to this maritime question. It expressed the same notion as ASEAN's proposal for a ZOPFAN. As ASEAN-Indochinese tensions declined, this proposal elevated in importance.

In 1984, ASEAN formed a working group to discuss this concept. The group agreed that one of the first steps toward a ZOPFAN was a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). This concept was not new, as the momentum toward a nuclear-free regime also existed in the South Pacific. This was due to the years of nuclear testing throughout the Pacific during the early years of the Cold War by all five nuclear powers.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s the U.S. and U.K. discontinued these tests, but France continued for twelve years at Mururoa Atoll and still conducts these tests in the South Pacific today. This produced most of the groundswell opposition leading to the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. Signed in 1985, it applies only to the signatories and does not limit transit or port calls by nuclear-propelled or -weaponed vessels. However, this is left to the discretion of the signator.

New Zealand chose to deny port calls to any vessels possessing nuclear weapons or nuclear power. The U.S. policy was, and is, to "neither confirm nor deny" the existence of nuclear weapons onboard its vessels. As such, the denial to port access caused the U.S. to suspend obligations to New Zealand under the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) Treaty. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's and PRC's adherence to the treaty produced additional resentment toward the U.S., among the South Pacific states, because the U.S. did not sign the protocols of the treaty. This was due to the U.S. not seeing any of its major security goals being served by the treaty. The conflicting policy/treaty relationships continued to hamper diplomacy between the U.S. and South Pacific states, except Australia. However, in 1988 and 1989 the U.S. increased its diplomatic presence and increased its development assistance to South Pacific states on a bilateral basis. Also, "...U.S. military disaster relief and civic action programs have been important in regaining the goodwill lost over the course of several years."
The ANZUS pact of 1951 established as a trilateral security arrangement after World War II due to the demise of British sea power in the region. The reliability of this arrangement through the 1960s and '70s generated a tendency of the U.S. to take it for granted. Additionally, with the domestic memories of World War II fading and few subsequent conflicts to unite the alliance, relationships among the three nations were principally trade, sports, and culture—not security.177

Because of New Zealand's disruption of ANZUS, the U.S. grew more aware of Australia's importance to security in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Today, the level of intergovernmental consultative processes and defense cooperation are high. Additionally, Australia routinely hosts port visits by forward-deployed CVBGs, including the forward-based carrier from Japan. Regarding the current U.S. stance on the Treaty of Rarotonga, on October 31, 1989,

...the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House of Representatives approved a proposed concurrent Congressional resolution urging that the U.S. sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga.178

In essence, the resolution provided seven points of justification for a U.S. endorsement, including the non-conflict of the Treaty with the "neither confirm not deny" policy. Although it was not signed by President Bush, the trend is toward eventual signing of the treaty.
U.S. strategic and security interests in the South Pacific are mostly derived from the SLOCs in Southeast Asia and as an alternate route south of Australia to Southwest Asia. This is because South Pacific security is essentially satisfied by existing arrangements which include, not only ANZUS and the FPDA (mentioned later), but also modest U.S. defense cooperation with Papua New Guinea and Tonga.\(^1\)\(^7\)\(^9\) The U.S. also entered into treaties of friendship with Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Cook Islands which preclude bases from being provided to third countries without prior American consultations, and require consultations should threats be perceived to the islands' security.\(^1\)\(^8\)\(^0\) This may be a response to the increased diplomatic inroads gained by the Soviet Union with Papau New Guinea and fishing rights agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu.\(^1\)\(^8\)\(^1\)

ANZUS and FPDA both contribute to the security of ASEAN. The FPDA, comprised of Singapore, Malaysia, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, formed in 1971. It is a regional system of defense established to compensate for British military withdrawal "east of the Suez." As Australia and New Zealand are parties to both arrangements and ASEAN members, Singapore and Malaysia, are both members of the FPDA, the two alliance systems theoretically cover all Southeast Asian and South Pacific SLOCs.\(^1\)\(^8\)\(^2\)

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After a 1988 FPDA naval exercise, "Australia pledged a higher stake in the naval defense of Singapore and Malaysia." Australia commands the air defense system which protects Singapore and Malaysia. During the last two years, Singapore began replacement of their Mirage III fighters and started deployment of newer F/A-18 Hornet (fighter/attack) and F-111 long-range bombers to both states. They also maintain a detachment of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft in Malaysia. Britain also participated in the 1988 exercise with an aircraft carrier group.

There is increased evidence that ASEAN is pursuing stronger security measures within ASEAN as well. Mentioned earlier, in the jurisdictional claims discussion, was Indonesia's buildup of the Natuna Islands. Malaysia and Indonesia defined a common security objective as maintaining the defense of their jurisdictions. Noting that ASEAN was not formed as a military alliance and discouraged bilateral military exercises with its members, it did not preclude members from possible bilateral agreements or other military alliances. At the core of what ASEAN called its "regional resilience" was this strategic alliance between Malaysia and Indonesia.

Additionally, there are recent indications of increased naval buildups of ASEAN members to bolster or even, as Indonesia recently proposed, replace FPDA.
Thailand General Sunthorn Donsompong feels there is a pressing need for overall military cooperation among the ASEAN states and proposed the bilateral arrangements, of member states with the U.S. and FPDA, shift to a multilateral emphasis. \(^{185}\) A recent article in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* stated,

...the ASEAN states have been independently pursuing well-ordered programs of development that have radically improved their capability to defend themselves by land and sea.\(^{186}\)

Specifically, the naval capabilities of all ASEAN states, except the Philippines, grew over the last 10 years from coastal defense to offshore and sea lane defense. Additionally, ASEAN nations view that the, "...self defense measures (of member states) should be welcomed by all."\(^{187}\) At the same time, Singapore and Malaysia stopped short of agreeing with Indonesia’s proposal to replace FPDA with a trilateral intra-ASEAN agreement.

Rather than go into details of specific ASEAN member naval capabilities, the author provides highlights of recent exercises and technological buys in the following paragraphs. The research indicates that the improved self-defense capabilities of ASEAN nations is a regional trend which will become more formidable in the next decade.

During 1990, coordinated naval efforts and improvements among ASEAN nations reached new high levels. The Indonesian Navy conducted a "...multiship tour of
Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei under designation Safari '90 in May and June." They also plan further Harpoon fits and a U.S. Navy shipboard-launch-system buy on their surface units, presently being built at the Indonesian facility in Surabaya. Malaysian and Thai ships worked together frequently during 1990. Additionally, the Royal Malaysian Navy held a successful International Fleet Review involving 61 ships from 18 nations and commissioned a new naval air station at Lumut.

The Royal Thai Navy set in motion the acquisition of a 7800-ton patrol helicopter carrier. The Thai government also approved the acquisition of three U.S. Navy P-3B maritime patrol aircraft. Although their frigate fleet is obsolete, they approved a plan to acquire some Chinese frigates as trainers and two more-advanced Western frigates for operational patrol. Even the Philippines seems to be marching on a more ambitious maritime building plan with the acquisition of the first of thirty fast patrol boats arriving from the U.S. in 1990.

Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia improved their trilateral cooperation in 1989 and 1990, signing a Memorandum of Understanding, "...which included arrangements for Singaporean armed forces to train in Indonesia." The Singaporean Air Force also received its first eight U.S. F-16 aircraft in 1989.
As previously mentioned, Australia plans more close air and naval links with ASEAN. In 1989 and 1990, the Australian Navy worked with FPDA nations and navies of the Philippines, Brunei, and Thailand. They also improved their defense cooperation with Indonesia by increasing bilateral naval and air exercises.\textsuperscript{193} Of significance, two major Pacific exercises, have seen the increased cooperation of Japan and Australia. The Japanese-Australian role in these exercises were, "...small enough and operational interests similar enough to make interaction relevant for both sides."\textsuperscript{194} This is seen as the best way to involve Japan, due to the sensitivities mentioned previously. As Thailand was not occupied by Japan during World War II, their recent proposals of joint Thai-Japanese naval exercises are also aimed at enhancing Japan's peacekeeping role in the region.\textsuperscript{195}

These combined factors, namely; FPDA enhancement, improved intra-ASEAN navies and air forces, and the reduced threat from the Soviet Union and Vietnam seemingly leaves little justification for the U.S. to maintain significant presence in the South China Sea. However, the U.S. has been at peace with ASEAN and the South Pacific nations since World War II and, due to increased ASEAN interdependence with the U.S., broad regional security interests correspond. Additionally, the presence of the Seventh Fleet does two critical things:
First, it fills a vacuum which ASEAN perceives would be occupied by Japan, China, a combined Japanese-Chinese arrangement, or India, none of which are desirable to ASEAN. There is also some long-term potential for arms escalation within ASEAN, should this not be filled by the proposed ZOPFAN or one of the external powers listed. However, the potential for a regional hegemon is viewed as low, given the interdependence and historical commitment to peace by ASEAN since its formation.

The second reason for U.S. naval presence is the staging and training facilities located in the Philippines which provide quick reaction capability and logistic supply for contingencies in Southwest Asia, in addition to its location at the hub of the Asia-Pacific SLOCs. Again, this is compatible with regional interests because ASEAN, especially the Philippines, is sensitive to oil price fluctuations caused by its interdependence with western markets.

Regarding external powers filling the vacuum left by a reduced U.S. presence, the author discussed Japan and China in the Northeast Asia section, however India is also perceived by ASEAN as a potential external threat. Therefore, the next section discusses India's capabilities and perceived intent, applied to Southeast Asia, prior to the critical discussion of the Philippine bases. This section ends with summarized conclusions about future Southeast Asian security and its relevance to the study.
Chapter 4 will then conclude with a summary and formative conclusions for application to the analysis of Chapter 5.

**India**

India poses a potential long-term threat to ASEAN which disturbs ASEAN leaders. In fact, much of the reason for current ASEAN naval buildups result from the increased Indian presence and fortification of Nicobar and Andaman Islands, at the mouth of the Malacca Strait in the Indian Ocean.\(^1\) The third assumption of this thesis was that India should remain in its backyard of the Indian Ocean, given its historic non-alignment, regime style, and the author's early review of the literature regarding India. The fact remains, however, that India's naval expansion program and more recent emphasis on power projection capabilities portend a future potential for conflict with ASEAN. Therefore, the following paragraphs examine Indian naval capabilities and evaluate future intentions.

The recent status quo on India's northern borders with China and Pakistan, allowed India to focus on its concerns about potential superpower confrontation in the Indian Ocean and security of its offshore oil facilities and island territories of Sri Lanka and the Maldives.\(^1\) As such, India felt compelled to exert greater influence in the Indian Ocean through a naval buildup program over the last several years.

Currently, the Indian Navy has the following composition:
The two aircraft carriers provide only limited area air defense with older AV-8 Harrier vertical take-off and landing aircraft and H-3 anti-submarine helicopters. Projecting out to 2010, however, the Indian fleet plans to build a third carrier with catapult and arresting gear systems for a new Indian combat aircraft to complement their Harrier capability. Similarly, their 10 amphibious ships have only a battalion size capability and their strategic airlift has only Indian Ocean range, hardly threatening to ASEAN in the next decade. Again, however, India's expansion of tank landing ships (LSTs) and new amphibious assault ships (LPDs) would given them a long-range naval lift of one division assault-echelon by the first decade of the 21st Century.

India's surface escort and submarine fleet is also improving. The indigenous Project-15 frigate building program should produce six additional frigates to form the balance of surface escorts. Although India's indigenous building of submarines is becoming too costly and, currently, too difficult for India to reconcile, there may be plans to add eight additional Soviet Kilo-class attack
submarines in 1991 for a total of fourteen of this relatively new class of vessel. They currently have two "leased" Soviet Charlie-class nuclear attack submarines, but do not desire any more.

Regarding India's future intentions, it is clear that they have progressed from a limited coastal navy to the leading regional naval power in the Indian Ocean in a relatively short timeframe. India attests to the fact that they are compelled to protect a 7,000 km long coastline consisting of over two million square kilometers of Economic Zone. Along with their island territories, this protects 50% of India's oil needs and 80% of their gas needs. Additionally, 97% of India's trade comes from overseas. Therefore, this is at least as valid as any other "maritime" nations contentions to defend their SLOCs and island territories.

India's official Navy missions do not include power projection, except for safeguarding interests in contiguous waters of the Indian Ocean, North Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal, which includes the Indian islands of Nicobar and Andaman. Also, their involvement in the internal problems of neighboring Sri Lanka and the Maldives seems directed at preventing these conflicts from spilling into mainland India, rather than at flexing their military muscle.

Several events are somewhat more ominous however. The naval base on the Andaman Islands is located at a
critical point for control of the SLOCs coming from the Malacca Straits. Additionally, in 1989, India decided to sell some defense production units and assembly lines to Vietnam and, subsequently, volunteered to send troops as part of a UN peacekeeping force in Cambodia. The combination of these events possibly signals Indian desire to gain more influence in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{207} ASEAN is also concerned with India's support for Indian citizens and immigrants of various states. As stated, India considers itself non-aligned, although it does have a 1971 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. This treaty continues to give ASEAN leaders concern, however this concern was lessened by the Soviet's withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

India's government allowed U.S. aircraft, with non-lethal cargoes, to land and refuel during Operation Desert Storm. As the U.S. is an ally of India's long-time rival, Pakistan, this could be interpreted as Indian eagerness to further weaken ties, thus reducing the military aid supplied to Pakistan by the U.S. In much the same way as China lost some of her global significance with the end of the Cold War, Pakistan lost strategic influence upon the Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan. In fact, the U.S. recently decided to sell the Cray supercomputer to India and help India get credits from the International Monetary Fund while reducing military aid to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{208} Improved U.S.-Indian relations, while
potentially increasing levels of interdependence with the
U.S. and ASEAN, still causes ASEAN to feel further
threatened by the potential loss of the status quo.

In summary, India is building an improved naval
capability which, within 10-20 years, could be considered
out-of-area power projection. During this time they are
predicted to have three small aircraft carrier battle
groups with eight escorts per battle group. The two
current carriers are principally anti-submarine and local
air defense capable, while the third indigenous Indian
carrier should provide improved air strike capability in
the future. Their amphibious force should be sufficient
to embark one division of assault troops by the year 2010,
but their logistics plans to support this force beyond its
"backyard" are unknown.

Regarding intentions, India seems historically
concerned with the defense of its contiguous areas only.
However, Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie at the mouth of a
strategically vital choke point and major trade route from
Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. As such, it
represents a perceived threat to ASEAN. With respect to
India's concern for Indian citizens in foreign lands,
those citizens in ASEAN are economically comfortable and
"not in need of external assistance." Therefore,
potential Indian projection for this reason is assessed as
low. ASEAN also perceives that increased Indian influence
in Southeast Asia will be gained through improved
U.S.-Indian relations.

Finally, the combined ASEAN perceptions of India as
a threat to Southeast Asian security, combined with their
potential, but limited, capability to project power in
Southeast Asia by the 21st Century add up to threat in
ASEAN's view. Therefore, taken singularly, the U.S.
should maintain some form of naval presence in Southeast
Asia until ASEAN-Indian interdependent ties increase or
ASEAN threat perceptions ease. The next section discusses
the Philippine base issue as it pertains to Asia-Pacific
security and forward CVBG operations.

**The Philippine Bases**

Thus far, the framework of Southeast Asia included
jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, analysis of
ASEAN security, and the perceived threat of India to the
stability of ASEAN. Additionally, some broad conclusions
were made regarding U.S. naval presence in the area. The
following discussion covers the Philippine base issue
which, as previously mentioned, is a critical part of the
strategic framework for the entire Asia-Pacific region.
Therefore, this topic concludes, not only Southeast Asia,
but also the Asia-Pacific as a whole. The summary at the
end of the chapter lists the broad conclusions, previously
arrived at, regarding forward U.S. naval presence and any
ancillary references to the forward-based carrier in
Japan. These are carried over to the next chapter for use in the analysis.

The discussion of the Philippine bases begins with the most current status of the negotiations between the U.S. and the Philippines. After a description of U.S. facilities in the Philippines, the discussion presents a brief history of U.S.-Philippine relations as well as the Philippine communist insurgency and its current status.

Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recently stated the following regarding Philippines:

Our defense relationship with the Philippines has been a key element in regional stability. It is our fundamental objective, as we pursue a new accord to replace the expiring 1947 military bases agreement, that whatever else results, we will build a new, more balanced relationship with the Philippines reflecting the broad range of our shared interests. But let there be no doubt of our commitment to sustain a security presence in Southeast Asia regardless of the future status of U.S. forces at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station.

As of February 15, 1991, the 5th round of the Philippine base talks between U.S. Senior Negotiator, Rich Armitage, and Philippine Foreign Secretary, Raul Manglapus, concluded with two main issues still unresolved. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, the impasse was compensation and lease duration. Basically, the U.S. offered $360 million per year for a 10-12 year period. Economic Support Funds (ESF) comprise $200 million, while Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
accounts for the remaining $160 million. Money for a
Multilateral Assistance Initiative, ostensibly for debt
relief, accounts for an additional $160 million not
counted in this figure. The Philippine counter included a
comprehensive $825 million per year deal for a 17-year
period to involve $425 million for debt reduction
assistance and $400 million cash bond package applied to
regional security in a burden-sharing concept with ASEAN,
Japan, and possibly Saudi Arabia. These offers
followed the U.S. announcement, in November 1989, of the
withdrawal of the tactical fighter wing from Clark Air
Base within the next year.

There are many underlying complexities to the
U.S.-Philippine base talks which relate to the facilities
themselves, the historical context of the base agreement,
and the overall security framework provided by U.S.
military presence in the Philippines. The U.S. facilities
in the Philippines serve several purposes. For this
thesis, Subic Naval Base, Cubi Point Naval Air Station,
Crow Valley weapons range, Wallace Air Station, and San
Miguel Communications station are covered.

Subic Naval Base sits on nearly 62,000 acres and
possesses extensive facilities. It consists of three
wharves, housing portals and floating cranes, which
service and repair nearly 65% of the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s
requirements. The Naval Supply Depot and Naval Magazine
are among the largest in the world. The fuel handling
capacity is nearly four million barrels per month while it can store 110 million gallons of petroleum, oil, and lubricants. Besides ship repair and storage, the obvious locational advantages allow quick reaction to East Asian or Southeast Asian contingencies by naval carrier task forces.

In 1979 and 1980 the U.S. Navy increased its presence in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea in response to contingency requirements imposed by threats to U.S. and allied interests from Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Diego Garcia is a joint U.S.-U.K. facility located in the Indian Ocean which provides thirty days of contingency supplies. Without the Subic Bay complex, the Navy would either have to substantially increase the number of support vessels or deploy east coast task forces through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope, below South Africa, to augment Diego Garcia's capabilities. Deployment through the Suez Canal is feasible as long as other countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are non-hostile. This occurred during Desert Shield/Storm as three CVBGs operated out of the Red Sea.

Cubi Pont Naval Air Station accommodates as many as 200 aircraft at a time. It is the primary operating site for visiting carrier air wings of the Seventh Fleet during carrier supply and repair visits accompanying the CVBG's deployment cycle. It is part of the Subic Bay complex.
setting opposite the major piers. However, it also maintains one carrier pier adjacent to the airfield. Additionally, there is a major naval air rework facility, providing essential depot level maintenance for air wing aircraft. This is especially important for the forward-based air wing since the Naval Air Facility in Japan does not maintain this type of facility. Cubi Point also maintains long-range P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft for ASW and surveillance of the Southeast Asian SLOCs, carrier on-board delivery aircraft, and a target towing squadron for air-to-air training and certification.

The 46,000 acre Crow Valley weapons range provides gunnery and aerial bombardment training for both Air Force and Navy aircraft with mock surface-to-air missile sites to enhance this training. It is a joint-use facility of the U.S. and Philippines. The forward-based air wing maintains its weapons delivery readiness through exercises conducted principally at Crow Valley during carrier in port periods and temporary duty detachments while the carrier is in its home port at Yokosuka, Japan. Wallace Air Station at Poro Point provides the control and support of the range and maintains target drones and remotely piloted vehicles at their 454 acre site. Additionally, Wallace controls the over-the-horizon coverage for the Southeast Asian SLOCs. Finally, San Miguel Communications Station provides a radio-teletype and microwave communications network for the Seventh Fleet.
It is one of three nodules in East Asia, along with Japan and South Korea, and forms the Hawaii link to military satellites over the Indian and Pacific Ocean.\textsuperscript{215} Although the U.S. withdrew fighters from Clark Air Base, it may still be used as a major staging point for personnel and aircraft, depending on the base agreement's final framework. In order to assess the base agreement properly, a history of the U.S.-Philippine relationship precedes the discussion of alternatives to these facilities.

U.S.-Philippine relations date back to the Spanish-American War of 1898 when the Philippines transferred to U.S. control after Spain's defeat. The Philippine people, fresh from one revolution for independence, proceeded on another. Although, initial independence efforts were defeated, a legacy of animosity remained. By 1934 the U.S. acknowledged the future independence of the Philippines through the Tydings-McDuffe Act as a ten year process toward self-government under U.S. tutelage.\textsuperscript{216} Of course, plans for independence suspended with Japan's invasion and occupation in 1941. However, two years after Japan's 1944 defeat at Leyte Gulf, the Philippines gained their independence and a year later, in 1947, a 99-year "rent free" military base agreement and military assistance pact were signed. The essence of the agreement granted the U.S. all rights for reasonable use, giving such broad
power to the U.S. that it produced misgivings among many Filipinos. The understandable contention was that the U.S. bases were inconsistent with true Philippine independence.

The same year the Philippines gained their independence, a nine-year communist insurgency began. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) formed in 1930 as a Maoist Chinese faction, gaining enough strength after World War II to mount an insurgency. Although the party fell in 1955, it reestablished in 1968 and in 1969 the New People’s Army (NPA) formed under Bernabe Buscayno.\(^2\)\(^1\) Ideologically, the CPP/NPA followed a Leninist form and throughout the 1970s downplayed armed struggle, as Philippine capitalism was strong and conditions for revolution were unfavorable. Maintaining its political struggle, the CPP/NPA found opposition to the U.S.-Philippine base agreement to be a central rallying point. However, other political and public factions also opposed the base agreement. These critics arose during the 1950s and in 1959 the base agreement was amended to terminate in 1991, thus mollifying the opposition.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^8\) There were other movements in the early 1970s involving increased civil disorder. In 1972 Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos, declared martial law and one year later the CPP established the National Democratic Front (NDF) initiating a successful program of recruitment.
During this same period of time, the bases elevated in status due to their staging, logistics, and locational importance to the U.S. in Vietnam. Additionally, as the Soviets increased their naval and air presence in Southeast Asia, U.S. base in the Philippines provided a counter to this threat.

Severe economic problems arose in the Philippines, starting with the oil embargo of 1973. As previously mentioned, the Philippines suffer extreme sensitivity interdependence regarding oil. As such, their economy suffered proportionally when oil prices rose. Additionally, their commodity-based export market suffered as the bottom went out during the mid to late 70s. Compounding these problems were non-performing projects underwritten by the Marcos government. President Marcos gained increased constitutional powers and opposition mounted against his corrupt, authoritarian-style government. By the late 1970s, the vocal minority became strong and even many conservative politicians and intellectuals sided with more radical groups in a common agreement opposed to U.S. basing in the Philippines, associating it with the Marcos government. One of the opposition leaders, Benigno Aquino, was assassinated at Manila Airport in 1983 upon his return from self-imposed exile. That same year, his widow, Corazon Aquino, formed UNIDO under the "Principles of Unity" which espoused the removal of U.S. bases.
After elections in 1986, it was revealed that the Marcos government fixed the results. Subsequently, he lost U.S. support and enraged the Philippine people. Corazon Aquino became the new president with the help of opposition military leaders and support of the U.S. government. Marcos left the country in exile to the U.S.

President Aquino's first acts were to release CPP prisoners and set about economic and constitutional reforms in hopes of clearing the slate and getting her country on the path to growth and prosperity. However, the public debt was phenomenal and the NPA reached a high of 30,000 armed insurgents with an effective support base. Between 1986 and 1988 there were four coup attempts for varying political or military reasons. By 1988 the NPA insurgency reached its peak as the effects of new constitutional reforms were not yet being felt and released prisoners were reorganizing their infrastructure. Although Aquino began moving to the right in her counterinsurgency program, she made it a military priority vice a national priority by neglecting to combine economic, social, and military programs toward a common goal.\textsuperscript{220} Even with these problems, and two more coup attempts by December 1989, the Aquino government remained in power. The NPA lost the support of its intellectual factions when the Soviets initiated reforms and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed.
In 1989, the economy showed its fourth straight year of modest growth. Additionally, President Aquino began moving away from the hardline anti-base platform and became more accommodating, but still demanded more compensation if the U.S. expected to stay. As the NPA saw its power waning, it promoted more terrorist activities in opposition to the base talks, selectively assassinating U.S. servicemembers and a Philippine businessman supporting pro-base rallies during 1989 and 1990. However, Philippine authorities arrested several key CPP/NPA leaders in 1989 and 1990, further eroding the organization of the insurgency.

At the heart of the U.S. base agreement is the perception that it is a "rental" agreement. On the Philippine side, they see negotiators attempting to make agreements based on U.S. "best efforts" to provide security assistance. However, only Congress can make actual commitments through the annual appropriations process. Since the Philippine base agreement is not a rental agreement, there is no set monetary commitment. As such, the Philippines, and other countries which receive U.S. security assistance and have base rights agreements, often feel the U.S. is reneging on this perceived commitment. In 1990, the U.S. fell 26.6% short on its "best effort" commitment to the Philippines. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense accounts for 3-5% of the Philippine Gross Domestic Product. This
includes the salaries of some 35,000 Philippine workers, totalling approximately $330 million per year, and $60 million per year spending by U.S. service personnel.\textsuperscript{223} This discussion leads to alternate basing options in the event that the current negotiations fall through. It necessarily focuses on carrier and air wing support facilities.

The U.S. has three broad alternate basing options or a combination of the three, namely; transfer facilities to other existing U.S. Pacific Bases in Japan and Guam, develop new facilities in U.S. trust territories in the Marianas and Micronesia, and/or negotiate with new host countries for basing or access rights.\textsuperscript{224} Cost estimates to fully replace facilities range from 1983 quotes of $4 billion to as much as $10 billion.\textsuperscript{225} Although no option or combination of options could fully replace the facilities in the Philippines, it is assessed that a workable solution would allow sufficient access to resupply and repair facilities in the region. At the same time, "...the United States cannot afford to lose military access to its current expanse of islands and atolls without having to radically rethink the strategy of forward deployment in the Pacific."\textsuperscript{226} This is hampered by desires of the islands to move toward "free association," vice remaining trust territories, and is further complicated by potential NWFZ agreements, discussed in the conclusions.

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For purposes of this thesis, the first option combines facilities in Yokosuka, Okinawa and Guam. As mentioned previously, Yokosuka has the only facility on a U.S. base in East Asia which can bring a carrier into drydock to conduct major repairs, Hawaii being the next closest. Although Subic Bay cannot do this, it has more storage capacity and can crane aircraft off the ship for repair at the naval air rework facility in Cubi Point. Even if Yokosuka could provide craning, a rework facility would have to be built and manned at Yokosuka or the aircraft would need to be broken down and transferred by flatbed truck to some future rework facility at Atsugi. Regardless, the reworked aircraft would require post depot-level test flights at Atsugi prior to being flown onto the carrier. Additionally, it is uncertain if burden sharing agreements would cover the larger capital equipment and labor costs associated with Yokosuka compared to Subic. This option, although complicated, is possible. Personnel and equipment could be moved from Cubi Point, undoubtedly a crane could be constructed and costs could fall under part of the burden sharing agreements.

This option mainly considers the routine overhaul requirements of the forward-based aircraft carrier. Forward-deployed carriers would not need the drydock or aircraft rework facility unless the carrier had major structural damage as a result of an accident or an air
wing aircraft suffered major structural damage requiring depot level transfer. This is because their deployment cycle is timed to ensure that the routine overhauls are conducted in CONUS. Without a forward-based carrier the cost effectiveness of this effort, although prudent from a readiness standpoint, may not be plausible. The above scenario would provide sufficient, though more limited, services to the forward-based carrier. Air wing weapons training would be accomplished at Korea, Okinawa, Misawa or a future Japanese site, although not to the degree of the Crow Valley range.

U.S. naval and air facilities on Guam could host a carrier air wing unless airlift assets displace from Clark Air Base to Guam. Although the naval base could handle some of the operations from Subic, the shallow and narrow harbor could not accommodate a carrier unless plans for a future expansion and dredging operation were approved. This is unlikely for, not only monetary reasons, but also weather reasons, as Guam sits in the center of the Pacific typhon belt. However, Guam could potentially accommodate a weapons range for air wing detachments. Additionally, the supply storage is adequate to handle the support and ammunition requirements of the Seventh Fleet in Southeast Asia. Politically, Guam is a U.S. trust territory desiring commonwealth status and higher levels of self-government but with continued U.S. sovereignty. Therefore, it offers no near-term
political difficulties or opposition. It is located approximately 1200 miles east of Manila, too far to provide adequate surveillance of the Southeast Asian SLOCs without sacrificing naval assets for deployment to other areas or increasing deployment lengths or assets.

The next option is the development of new facilities on currently leased property located in the Marianas and Micronesia. Tinian and Saipan, in the Northern Marianas, along with Palau in Micronesia could combine to provide moderate port and storage facilities along with a small live fire impact area. It is unknown if the harbor facility planned for Palau could accommodate an aircraft carrier. Additionally, the live fire range, while providing an area for weapons delivery training, would not provide adequate overland navigation or terrain flight training. Full facility operations would take 10 years to realize as no facilities presently exist. Palau could eventually host air strips and take over most of the air capability from the Philippines. Although Palau is 600 miles southeast of Manila, it would provide adequate coverage and quicker reaction to Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean contingencies than Guam. Again, maintaining coverage in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean at current levels would require increased deployment lengths or assets. This definitely requires increased afloat support capability for Southwest Asian contingencies.
Additional implications of building new facilities in this region relate to the previously stated trend toward ZOPFANs and nuclear free zones such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). While this eventually may provide legitimate regional security beyond the 21st Century, it seems doubtful within the next decade. However, as the proposed facilities would take nearly 10 years to build, regional conditions may persuade these islands to adopt the nuclear free zone initiative during this period. The U.S. would either have to rethink its "neither confirm nor deny" policy or negotiate stipulations protecting it from denied access before the facilities are constructed.

The option of relocating to a new host nation also carries some complications. The three options usually listed are the ASEAN nations of Singapore or Thailand, the PRC, or Taiwan. Of the three, only facilities in Taiwan or PRC's Hainan Island could accommodate an aircraft carrier and provide adequate air operations areas. While facilities in Taiwan are suited to handle most ship repairs and resupply, drydock repairs would still have to occur at Yokosuka, Hawaii, or CONUS. Additionally, aircraft craning would be complicated. Of significance to the forward-based air wing, Taiwan possesses a live fire training area comparable to Crow Valley. Hainan Island also provides excellent locational advantages for Southeast Asia SLOC security. However, the
U.S. would require a major investment in air facilities development. Politically, of course, the situation is still tenuous for locating U.S. facilities or providing U.S. access in either the PRC or Taiwan. However, as mentioned in the Northeast Asia section, U.S. forces provide stability which serves both the PRC and Taiwan. As political conditions dictate, this option may gain more favor.

ASEAN believes that

Aquino and her foreign secretary have missed opportunities to develop broader support for the bases, especially in an ASEAN context. They regard the bases as important for regional stability and are not anxious for an American departure. In fact, Singapore has been the most receptive toward allowing U.S. access.

...in Tokyo, outgoing Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and VP Quayle signed an agreement for regular flights of F-16 and 18 aircraft to Singapore, as well as some naval maintenance. Several hundred personnel will be based in Singapore...similar discussions took place in Thailand and Brunei.

As noted in the literature review, two recent theses recommended Thailand as the best alternative, politically and locationally. Thailand offers several obvious advantages, namely; it is closer to the major SLOCs and provides more rapid reaction time than even Subic, the U.S. has the treaty agreement mentioned in the ASEAN section, and U.S. forces have conducted numerous exercises with Thai forces and have an infrastructure dating back to America’s involvement in Vietnam. The
facilities recommended include the Phuket/Phang Nga area, involving major investment and construction, or a minimum cost option in Sattahip/U-Taphao. There are no current facilities which could accommodate a carrier. However, Phuket offers the best locational advantages, being located near the mouth of the Malacca Strait in the Andaman Sea. It also has water depth 3 miles northeast of its port facility to accommodate a carrier sized vessel. This would require immense investment to facilitate any future use however. U-Taphao airfield was originally constructed to handle American B-52s during Vietnam and can handle any U.S. aircraft and could handle a carrier air wing after repairs to ramp and hangar facilities. More likely, it would be used as a major staging base for Southwest Asia contingencies.

On February 24, 1991, Thailand underwent its 17th military coup since 1932. Although this would seem to project internal instability, the change has been modest and bloodless. Regarding U.S. basing in Thailand, however, there is continued opposition by Thai officials to any such proposals.

All indications point to a gradual decrease in U.S. naval presence in the Philippines, regardless of the outcome of the talks. Among the alternative options, a moderate combination of expanding the existing facilities in Japan and Guam, increased access to other ASEAN facilities in Singapore, and constructing new facilities
on currently leased land may be the most flexible option. Japan offers major ship repair and has the potential for increased aircraft servicing. Weapons training detachments of the forward-based air wing would be hampered because no facility could provide the realistic training provided by Crow Valley. Therefore, some arrangement should be made for continued access to Cubi Point or Clark Air Base as part of a U.S.-Philippine joint use of Crow Valley. Otherwise, this training would have to be dispersed through various locations in Japan, Korea, Palau (in the future), and potentially Guam. Although Australia was not discussed, this option is addressed in the conclusion under further research. Given the strong ties mentioned earlier and the potential facilities, Australia could offer benefits in all categories except comparative location.

This concludes the discussion of Southeast Asia. The following summarizes specific conclusions made throughout the Southeast Asian discussion.

**General.** U.S. interests in Southeast center on the economic interdependence of ASEAN with the U.S. and other U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. The structure of ASEAN historically promoted regional peace through non-alignment, encouraging economic growth of its member nations, and through its persistent efforts to prevent regional hegemony. Southeast Asia also serves as the conduit of vital energy resources from Southeast Asia to
East Asia through the choke points connecting the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Three issues were presented regarding Southeast Asia.

Jurisdictional Claims. The South China Sea is a potential conflict zone due to the numerous regional claims over island territories. China retains the option to the entire shelf, but tempers this with a readiness for compromise. The only persistent antagonists are China and Vietnam although other regional actors maintain conflicting claims. China, Vietnam, and Indonesia have fortified some of their claimed territories. The reduced possibility of an Asian land war lowered the tension regarding claims and for the most part the regional trend is toward negotiation. As such, U.S. naval presence is seen as a deterrent to conflict during the negotiation process. However, the size of this presence does not need to be large. Therefore, routine training in the South China Sea along with naval transits to and from the Indian Ocean should provide requisite deterrence.

ASEAN Security. ASEAN is the central factor for stability and economic growth in Southeast Asia. The U.S. has formal treaty relations with the Philippines and South Pacific actors, especially Australia, are active in the security framework of Southeast Asia through the FPDA and, indirectly, through ANZUS. Additionally, ASEAN members are increasing their own level of defense and intra-ASEAN security cooperation in the wake of the
Cold War. ASEAN currently desires U.S. presence as a stabilizing influence to deter not only the previously mentioned territorial disputes, but more importantly, to prevent a power vacuum in the region.

In line with the Rarotonga Treaty framework, calling for a SPNFZ, ASEAN desires a ZOPFAN to eventually replace any dominant power in the region, however they perceive this as unworkable in the short term. This is because of their perception that Japan, China, a combined Japan and China, or India would fill the vacuum and potentially become aggressive at some future time. All of these options are presently undesirable to ASEAN. Regional security should fall more in the hands of regional actors and alliances with the South Pacific. India is not assessed as capable of significant power projection until after 2010, however, U.S. presence eases ASEAN's perceptive fear of Indian intentions. In February 1990, Malaysian Air Force Chief of Intelligence, Major-General Datuk Raja Rashid, said that

...the situation around us is not stable yet. The smaller countries still cannot feel secure yet. American presence is certainly needed at least to balance other powers in the region.238

Another potential long-term arrangement to aid in the stability of the region is a Japan-Australia framework. With Japan continuing its economic assistance in the region and interacting with Australia to enforce any future ZOPFAN arrangement it would eventually overcome...
regional stigmas. U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific are highly dependent on oil imports or are sensitive to the interdependent affects of oil price increases on its trading partners. Japan receives 55% of its oil from the Persian Gulf, South Korea 59%, Australia 29%, the Philippines 46%, and Thailand 20%. As such, stability in Southwest Asia and secure trade routes emanating from the Persian Gulf are vital to economic stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, and therefore to an interdependent America. The U.S. bases in the Philippines, combined with the Diego Garcia storage and preposition facility in the Indian Ocean, provide quick reaction and sustainment capability to contingency and warfighting forces in the Southwest Asian region.

The Philippine Bases. The current state of U.S.-Philippine negotiations on the U.S. bases, leads the author to the conclusion that there will be a gradual reduction of U.S. naval forces in the Philippines over the next 10-12 years. This may change if the U.S. accommodates some of the Philippines economic requests and the Filipinos gain an appreciation of U.S. "best efforts" budgetary processes. Barring this, however, the U.S. has sought alternatives and reached some agreements within the region to maintain the presence and contingency capabilities required by the short- and mid-term state of international order. These alternatives, while not fully
capable of replacing the Philippine complex, provide sufficient levels of readiness in the post-Cold War era.

**Summary**

The following bulletized summary relates directly to the application of this chapter to the research question. These are carried forward to the next chapter for analysis.

- U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific are based on economic interdependence and commitment to the continuation of routine peaceful competition within the region. This further serves to identify vital interests which are increasingly determined by interdependent factors and the informational/psychological element of national power formed by the perceptions of the U.S. and regional actors. The official U.S. position was stated by Richard Solomon as he spoke of the recently organized Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), he said:

  APEC can build shared benefits through economic expansion. And by emphasizing economic progress rather than defense issues as the basis for regional integration, we can provide a more broadly acceptable framework for assuring security in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.\(^\text{240}\)

- U.S. naval forces in Northeast Asia serve as U.S. commitment to regional stability for the reasons discussed in the study. These forces apply across the entire spectrum of conflict from *Peacetime Presence* to *Conflict Response* and *Power Projection*. Again, it must be emphasized that in an increasingly interdependent world
the value of indirect force in the form of Peacetime Presence or Conflict Response in Contingency Operations, coupled with wartime readiness, is systemic to any multilateral security framework.

- The Southeast Asian security framework centers on jurisdictional claims, the eventual ZOPFAN to fill a regional vacuum, and U.S. Peacetime Presence during the perceived long-term implementation of such a zone. Additionally, as with Northeast Asia, U.S. readiness to respond to conflict in Southwest Asia, through its contingency capabilities maintained in the region, supports economic stability of the region and, therefore, supports interdependent U.S. interests.

With these conclusions the study will examine U.S. regional objectives, the maritime strategy applied to PACOM in a changing world order, discuss the diplomatic aspects of the peacetime presence of an aircraft carrier, and then analyze and compare a forward-based carrier versus a forward-deployed carrier in the Asia-Pacific region.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FORWARD-BASED VERSUS FORWARD-DEPLOYED

Introduction

It is my strongest belief that not only is the U.S. a Pacific power, but that only the United States is suited uniquely to influence this region, while threatening none.¹

This chapter presents the "strategic" mission of the Pacific Command (PACOM), lists regional objectives, and discusses changing U.S. maritime strategy applied to the Asia-Pacific. The maritime strategy section also presents current projections of CVBG force levels. The thesis then centers on the analysis of aircraft carrier forward-basing versus forward-deploying in the Asia-Pacific. It incorporates previous conclusions, U.S. regional objectives, applies the spectrum of conflict criteria, and provides recommendations with appropriate caveats.

Mission of the Pacific Command

PACOM stretches from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. The Unified Command Plan defines this area of responsibility (AOR) and establishes combatant commands for the unified commander (CINCPAC). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, formulated within the Joint Strategic Planning System, provides tasking to all unified commanders, apportions forces, and provides guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² U.S.
national military strategy links national purpose and interests to the "strategic" missions assigned to the unified commanders. During the discussions of the spectrum of conflict and interests, the author mentioned the elements of national power, discussed the definition of national purpose, and defined interests and threats as they applied to the Asia-Pacific region. Within those discussions, it was noted that military power increasingly serves in a supporting role, as interdependence strengthens, by providing a systemic security framework to interdependent nations. The unified commander's task is to formulate the direct or indirect application of military power in pursuit of national interests within the assigned AOR. The result is a theater-specific operations plan and/or concept plan which serves as the guide for military response across the spectrum of conflict both directly and indirectly.

The current mission assigned to CINCPAC is:

...to maintain the security of PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance national policies and interests of the United States and discharge United States military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean, and; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of PACOM in consonance with the directives of higher authority.3

After the implementation of NSC-68, mentioned in chapter three, U.S. national military strategy centered around three pillars: deterrence through flexible
response, both nuclear and conventional, forward defense, accomplished through forward-basing and forward-deployments to serve as a reminder of U.S. commitment to collective security, and strong alliances which formed the political-economic-social-military ties previously described. As put forth in the international order discussion, there is no reason to believe that this will, or should, change in the short- to mid-term. The principal elements of the U.S. strategy toward Asia were forward-deployed forces, maintenance of overseas bases, and the bilateral security arrangements as mentioned in chapter four. These elements remain and the U.S. continues to play the role of "honest broker" because our military presence sets the stage for our economic involvement in the region.4

PACOM, although vast in area, is an economy of force theater, employing only about 16% of the active U.S. military strength, and 6.3% of the total forward-deployed forces.5 Slightly over half of these forces are naval (Navy and Marine) and the other half include Army and Air Force. The expanse of ocean between the U.S. and East Pacific, coupled with the projected force reductions mentioned in chapter four, will make the forward presence of naval forces that much more critical in securing regional policy objectives. These objectives derive from regional interests. The Department of Defense lists the
following peacetime and wartime objectives in the Asia-Pacific region:

**Regional Peacetime Objectives:**

- continue our strategy of forward presence in Asia for the foreseeable future to deter potential aggressors;

- maintain and broaden access to facilities throughout the region;

- maintain regional stability and reduce tensions where possible;

- limit proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, especially on the Korean Peninsula;

-- continue to encourage our Asian allies to assume a greater share of the responsibility for regional security and stability; and,

- encourage security cooperation among countries based upon agreed mutual interests.

**Regional Wartime Objectives** include, but are not limited to:

- defending Alaska, Hawaii, and the connecting lines of communication (LOCs) to the continental United States;

- assisting our allies in regional defense as appropriate;

- maintaining the security of the LOCs throughout the Pacific, especially to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and the East, and South China Seas; and,

- protecting U.S. territories and freely associated states for which the U.S. retains defense responsibilities.6

The discussion now focuses on the changing maritime strategy and the forward-based aircraft carrier's strategic role in securing the above-mentioned policy objectives.
U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

The U.S. Maritime Strategy was formulated in the early 1980's and functions today, although the basic nature of that strategy existed for decades. It supports national military strategy and regionally supports the unified commander in securing policy objectives. The Maritime Strategy is a product of our involvement in the Cold War and is often summarized as being forward, global, allied and joint. Its effectiveness depends on the power projection capabilities of Navy CVBGs and Marine Expeditionary Forces. However, with the end of the Cold War and the increasing levels of global interdependence, this strategy may be seen as irrelevant.

The author's discussion of international order provides the conclusion that the U.S. should maintain its leading military role until multiple channel interdependence sufficiently diminishes the role of military force, both regionally and globally, to the point where the strategic cost outweighs the benefit of its employment. However, this type of environment is unlikely in the next few decades, especially with the emergence of Weapon States which threaten regional peace. Additionally, regional perceptions in the Asia-Pacific currently emphasize the need for a military framework to avoid an undesired power vacuum. As pointed out, this framework will continue to be maritime in nature. This is
further necessitated by the phased force reductions in the region and the potential loss of access to the Philippine bases in the future. Therefore, based on previous conclusions, the basic elements of this strategy are still relevant in the Asia-Pacific region.

The question then is not whether the Maritime Strategy is relevant, but whether the method of applying that strategy continues to be valid. Large deck aircraft carriers are expensive to build and operate and, as mentioned in chapter three, their utility in many areas of low intensity conflict is limited. This is because large deck carriers fulfill mainly a power projection role. However, in the critical area of contingency operations, this capability is well-suited. Additionally, when all capabilities of a CVBG are taken together, they cover the entire spectrum of conflict. The Navy has three basic missions, namely: power projection, sea control, and strategic sealift. Mission focus during the Cold War was on power projection of the CV. However, this necessitated control of the seas to deliver this capability. Therefore, the concept of a "battle group" arose to organically protect power projection assets against aircraft, missiles, surface, and subsurface threats. As such, the CVBG became exceptionally well-suited for sea control and power projection. Chapter three and four concluded that the U.S. should maintain a sea control and power projection capability in the post-
Cold War Asia-Pacific region. Although the CVEG concept arose as a consequence of the Cold War, the inherent capability of this force will render it the principal instrument of the Maritime Strategy as the subtle nuances of its specific structure are tailored in the future.

But the (eventual) fate of the Maritime Strategy might not rest on its merits. Budget constraints could weaken the Navy's force structure in the Western Pacific to the point where the Maritime Strategy can no longer be carried out. Should that occur, the Maritime Strategy will probably be (focused) on protecting SLOCs, convoys and amphibious operations. However, no matter what mode America's power projection capabilities take on, "...sea and air superiority will (remain) the keys to (America's) ability to deliver materials when and where needed."!

As mentioned in chapter one, this thesis assumes that U.S. policymakers will economically support the power projection capabilities of a certain number of CVBGs in the Asia-Pacific. However, this is not to say that they will support the Cold War numbers of aircraft carriers. During the U.S. naval buildup of the 1980's, 15 carrier battle groups were determined to be necessary to fill the minimum requirements of five separate theaters. With the end of the Cold War, this number will most likely decrease to approximately 12 active CVBGs within a few years.

While critics might argue for fewer carriers, few have argued that they should be eliminated altogether. As a result, we might see the number of carriers in the Pacific reduced by one, or perhaps two, but at least one will remain forward-deployed in the Western Pacific (East Asia) and
perhaps three others will be in the Eastern Pacific. 13

In this regard, forward-deployed means the same as defined by this thesis, namely; deployed to forward regions from the CV's home port, be it CONUS or a forward-base.

Since its first around-the-world cruise in 1907, the U.S. Navy's battle fleets, especially its large combatants, have served a vital diplomatic mission in peacetime. Some in Congress are now arguing that this "show the flag" mission could be served by fewer and less expensive warships. The peacetime presence spoken of in the spectrum of conflict, and mentioned in the strategic framework of the region, includes this mission.

Objectively measuring the strategic effectiveness of peacetime presence is difficult. Other than saying that this presence produces stability, as indicated by the lack of conflict or the economic growth of free market systems within the region. But, as in measuring threats, U.S. commitment is measured by capabilities and intent.

Presently, the CVBG's power projection capability consists of smart-munitions and general-purpose armament delivered by carrier-based attack aircraft and cruise missiles launched from cruisers or subs. The combined effect was demonstrated throughout Operation Desert Storm. Not only did it reaffirm CVBG capabilities, it verified America's intent to exercise these capabilities.
thus giving future presence operations more weight in the indirect application of its force.

Given the high number of bilateral military agreements associated with the Asia-Pacific region, the forward-deployed or forward-based CVBG serves as the projection of U.S. power and reinforces regional commitments to a degree which smaller naval elements could not do. Considering the regional hesitation toward Japan's military role, the forward-based aircraft carrier also serves as a mollifying instrument until these tensions subside in the future. Additionally, distinguished visitors from regional nations are courted aboard and receive demonstrations of carrier operations. The influence this has on policy is not known, but it serves a diplomatic function that is unique to the U.S. Navy alone because of its distinction for maintaining the largest and most powerful warship in the world. This is not to say that technology may not make the large deck carrier obsolete in the future. However, the reality is that current technology continues to make it the state-of-the-art today.

Analysis

This section answers the research question using the conclusions from the strategic framework, the U.S. peacetime and wartime regional objectives, and the criteria derived from the spectrum of conflict. First, it presents the conclusions under criteria headings with
near-term country, area, or regional security perspectives as applicable. Next, it compares each option's ability to satisfy the broad U.S. security objectives listed in this chapter. Any redundancy in these comparisons results from interdependent interests. Additionally, a comparative cost analysis, derived from previous research, is applied to determine if there are any significant U.S. monetary benefits or degraders involved in continued forward-basing. Finally, it recommends a course of action and provides caveats generated in the regional framework which could affect the opinions shaping future security perspectives.

Peacetime Presence. (As it pertains to regional presence and the implication of this presence on extra-regional contingencies which support the security of trade routes and resource supplied to the region.)

(Japan)

- The forward-based carrier offers commitment to the defense of Japan, the stability of East Asia, and the security of vital trade routes connecting Japan with its resources when forward-deployed. Additionally, it stabilizes regional sensitivities, still opposed to a perceived military "resurgence" of Japan. More importantly, it maintains the viability of the 30-year U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security from Japan's perspective.
A forward-deployed CONUS carrier could not provide this type of commitment, except in occasional port visits or bilateral exercises. However, it offers comparable security of Japan's resource base. This type of presence could be sufficient to Japan in the future.

(Korean Peninsula)

- The forward-based carrier offers a presence to complement South Korean and U.S. forces, when it is operating in the region or located in its Japanese home port. This presence is heightened by the future reduction of U.S. Air Force forward-basing in the region. As in Japan, the security of trade routes ensures the availability of vital resources, thus maintaining the economic stability of South Korean markets.

- A forward-deployed carrier offers comparable presence if directed to the region. It also offers trade route security but does not offer the benefit of home port proximity.

(China and Taiwan)

- The forward-based carrier offers no significant strategic benefits in this area, but may be viewed by both China and Taiwan as stabilizing in the South China Sea. Additionally, the ancillary benefit of maintaining a forward-based carrier in Japan, along with the Taiwan Relations Act, may help prevent any thoughts of naval encroachments or forceful reunification by the PRC, as perceived by Taiwan. As with all other industrialized
countries in the region, U.S. forward-deployments to Southwest Asia offer stability and security of trade routes and resources.

- A forward-deployed carrier would not normally be assigned to this area as the potential for conflict is low. However, its presence as a consequence of regional exercises or transits would be sufficient. Additionally, its presence serves to secure the resource base of Taiwan equally as well as the forward-based carrier. (ASEAN)

- The forward-based carrier and air wing conducts much of its training in Southeast Asia. Regarding jurisdictional claims within the region, no significant presence is required. Therefore, the presence generated by this training, regional port visits, and routine transits provide requisite deterrence. With respect to ASEAN security, however, the return of the forward-based carrier to CONUS would send an undesirable signal to ASEAN, as they view significant U.S. naval reductions in the region with apprehension. This is because of their perceptions of the vacuum being filled by undesirable options including an increased intra-ASEAN arms buildup. This would potentially stifle ASEAN attempts to establish a regional ZOPFAN. Additionally, U.S. presence in Japan serves as a mollifying factor to ASEAN because of its latent fear of Japan's future intentions. Therefore, U.S.
loss of access to the Philippine bases would heighten the requirement for a forward-based carrier in Japan.

A forward-deployed carrier offers comparable presence and trade route security. Any major reduction would send a similar sign to ASEAN as mentioned above. However, the perceived difference between losing the forward-based carrier from Japan or reducing forward-deployed carrier presence from CONUS would be significant to ASEAN. This is because the comparative level of regional commitment associated with forward-basing is greater than forward-deployment in ASEAN’s view.

**Conflict Response.** (Only as it applies to regional contingencies.)

(Northeast Asia)

- The forward-based carrier provides conflict response and force sequencing capability should North Korea attack across the DMZ. The rapidity of this attack would require an equally rapid show of force or other form of flexible response. The proximity of the forward-based carrier, during training or in its Japanese home port, greatly decreases reaction time to the Sea of Japan or Yellow Sea area. However, operations of the forward-based carrier, while forward-deployed to the Indian Ocean, does not provide this advantage. From South Korea’s perspective, the U.S. forward-based carrier deters escalation on the Peninsula and provides punitive strike capability. This deterrence also benefits overall
regional stability, as neither the PRC nor the Soviet
Union would benefit from a Korean War and could be torn
between ideology and economic interdependence.

- A forward-deployed carrier offers comparable
capabilities if it is operating in the area or conducting
a port visit.

(Southeast Asia)

- The likelihood of a conflict in Southeast Asia,
requiring the rapid response of a U.S. aircraft carrier,
is low in ASEAN's view. However, this is predicated on a
sufficient level of peacetime presence exhibited by the
U.S. in the area. This is because of the potential
combination of jurisdictional claim tensions, ASEAN
member-nation arms buildups, and internal economic
difficulties resulting from the destabilizing economic
effect of a reduced U.S. presence. In other words, as
long as there is sufficient U.S. presence in the region,
the deterrent effect reduces the potential for conflict in
ASEAN's view. Regarding the analysis, refer to the above
discussion of ASEAN under the peacetime presence heading
and the caveats at the end of the analysis.

Power Projection. (As it applies to the region. The
potential application of this capability in extra-
regional contingencies relates to the peacetime presence/
conflict response aspects of the carrier from a regional
perspective.)
- North Korea offers the only potential regional threat mandating the additional air superiority and power projection assets of a U.S. aircraft carrier (forward-based or forward-deployed). Again, this is more significant given the reduced U.S. Air Force presence predicted over the next few years. In South Korea's view, the additional assets of an aircraft carrier would enhance their sea control capability along with air superiority and power projection to the deep operational targets in North Korea. The PRC would most likely look on U.S. intervention as unnecessary involvement in the internal affairs of Korea. However, this could be tempered by international opinion and the fact that a return to routine peaceful competition would be in the interest of the PRC and the rest of the region. In this light, the PRC would seek U.N. assurances that force would not be used to overthrow Kim Il Sung or the DPRK. Regarding the analysis, see the Korean Peninsula discussion under the peacetime presence and conflict response headings above.

Forward-basing versus Forward-deployment: Abilities to satisfy U.S. regional security objectives. (As previously listed in this chapter.)

It is important to note that Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney decided to replace the current forward-based carrier, USS MIDWAY, with the USS INDEPENDENCE in the summer of 1991. Therefore, this option is already
seen by policymakers as serving current U.S. regional objectives. The author's intent is to present this assessment as an aid in formulating the recommendation and caveats.

(Peacetime)

- Undoubtedly a forward-based carrier in Japan satisfies the objective of continuing a regional strategy of forward presence better than a forward-deployed carrier from CONUS. The distance from either San Diego or San Francisco, California to Japan is approximately 6,000 miles and to the South China Sea is nearly 7,000 miles. This equates to between 10 and 17 days transit time to Japan or 12-20 days to the South China Sea, given a 15-25 knot steaming speed. Maintaining the forward presence strategy without a forward-based carrier in the region would, therefore, increase deployment lengths. This problem would be further exacerbated given the predicated reduction of Seventh Fleet carriers.

- A forward-based strategy confirms access to facilities and sets conditions for broadening regional access in the future. Any retreat from this strategy would contradict the stated objective.

- A forward-based carrier aids in maintaining regional stability moreso than forward-deploying from CONUS. See regional perspectives above and caveats.

- Although the forward-based carrier deters aggression on the Korean Peninsula, it offers no direct
benefits toward limiting nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons over that of a forward-deployed carrier.

- Forward-basing, because it ensures greater security of regional allies, does not directly encourage them to assume a greater share of the responsibility for that security.

- Maintaining a forward-based carrier presents offsetting advantages and disadvantages regarding encouragement of security cooperation among regional countries with mutual interests. On one hand, the numerous bilateral exercises it conducts with regional navies and air forces diminishes the need for cooperative intra-regional exercises. At the same time, the presence mission afforded by a forward-deployed or -based carrier helps provide an environment which encourages defense cooperation among regional navies instead of a regional arms race from a perceived vacuum.

(Wartime)

- Defending Alaska, Hawaii, and the connecting SLOCs is the most critical wartime objective. However, the potential for any encroachment in this area by a hostile power is low in the foreseeable future. Although forward-basing does not directly support this objective, it does provide forward defense as a deterrent to any attempted violation of connecting U.S. SLOCs from the West Pacific.
The forward-based carrier offers assistance to our allies in regional defense more than a CONUS forward-deployed strategy. See regional perspectives above and caveats.

Forward-basing more completely satisfies maintaining the overall security of the LOCs throughout the Pacific, to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and the East and South China Seas for reasons previously mentioned, unless the Navy increased deployment lengths of CONUS carriers to make up the presence deficit.

As the forward-based carrier is a permanent regional capability, it protects U.S. territories and freely associated states for which the U.S. retain defense responsibilities more so than a forward-deployed strategy could, barring increased deployment lengths.

(Cost Comparison)

A cost comparison of forward-deploying an aircraft carrier from CONUS or forward-basing the same type of carrier, with notional personnel and equipment data, was completed in 1981. The study considered many factors. First, the costs incurred from a carrier deploying from CONUS related to the increased transit costs of steaming a conventionally-fueled carrier (non-nuclear propulsion) to a forward-deployed location plus the CONUS housing allowances for families of deployed members. The costs of forward-basing an aircraft carrier related more to the costs of personnel/family travel and transportation.
constructing base facilities, and maintaining these facilities at the forward-based location. This thesis does not attempt to complete a cost analysis of this type, but looks for any overwhelming detractors which could influence a continued strategy of the forward-basing a carrier in Japan.\textsuperscript{15}

The study looked at the transit of a John F. Kennedy conventional carrier from Norfolk, Virginia to the Mediterranean. The distance for this transit is approximately 4,000 miles. The study estimated the cost of a one-way transit, at a peacetime transit speed of 16 knots, as $1 million. This was based on fuel costs of $1.33/gallon and total one-way fuel consumption of 759,574 gallons. However, applying this to a Pacific transit gives markedly increased figures. As noted above, the distance from San Diego to Japan is approximately 6,000 miles. This increases the one-way transit costs by a factor of 1.5 or roundtrip by a factor of 3.0 for every deployment. Applying the figures presented in the study, this equates to nearly $6 million fuel cost for every deployment cycle above the cost of a similar forward-based carrier with the same deployment requirements. Based on a ten-year period, and using the DoD 10\% discount table, this yields approximately $39 million additional fuel cost for forward-deployment versus forward-basing in Japan.\textsuperscript{16} There are other factors involved in this computation. If deployment lengths are not increased to
meet forward presence objectives, then cycle turnaround times would be decreased, resulting in more transits. This increases the figure substantially. In either case, the results are increased ship and personnel deployed time, which historically results in reduced personnel retention.

The increased costs of pay, travel and transportation, and facilities must be considered in forward-basing costs. The study necessarily examined the construction of new base facilities in the Mediterranean. However, in the case of Japan, these facilities already exist. Additionally, the operating costs of much of the base complex falls under the burden of Japanese expense and would not be an overriding factor. It should be noted, however, that this is based on the burden sharing discussion in chapter four and the author's recent experience as a servicemember in Japan. The overriding cost is travel and transportation with the most significant cost elements being dependent travel and household goods transportation. Additionally, the forward-based air wing training, discussed in chapter four, adds an additional allowance cost associated with these temporary duty assignments. The combined figures are significant but are mostly offset by the transit costs of forward-deployment. See the endnote for further discussion.17

Although forward-basing in Japan may incur more cost, the author feels the offsetting costs of transits
aid increased deployment lengths or decreased turnaround
cycle times substantiates forward-basing in the current
environment and provides no overwhelming monetary
detractors. Again, this type of study is a thesis in
itself and there are many other intangibles which the
author defers to further study.

Recommendation and Caveats

Recommendation

The U.S. should retain a strategy of forward-basing
an aircraft carrier in Japan into the 21st Century. In
answer to the research question, there is an operational
requirement to maintain this capability for at least the
next decade, as determined by the strategic analysis of
the region in the post-Cold War era.

Caveats

- Given the current state of East-West relations and
trends in international order, the U.S. should still
maintain this force.

- This is based on regional perspectives and current U.S.
interests in the region which derive from interdependent
factors.

- In Northeast Asia the following caveats apply:

  - (Japan). The resultant spillover from a
resolution of the Kurile Islands dispute, economic
tensions, pressure from the U.S. toward more burden
sharing, and problems in high visibility joint projects
may strain the popularity and the perceived viability of
the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. However, this is considered unlikely for the foreseeable future.

- (Korean Peninsula). Significantly reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula, demonstrated by demilitarization of the DMZ, various confidence-building measures, increased interdependence of South Korea with the PRC and Soviet Union, and North Korea with the west, may eliminate the need for U.S. presence in this area. This is considered unlikely until the demise of Kim Il Sung, a peaceful transition within the DPRK, and a more reasonable policy regarding nuclear safety.

- (China and Taiwan). U.S. presence in this area is unnecessary. Reduced tension is considered likely, even in the aftermath of Tiananmen, due to interdependent factors listed in the analysis.

- In Southeast Asia, the following caveats apply:

  - (Jurisdictional Claims in the South China Sea). Taken singularly, and in the current state of eased tensions, this issue is not significant enough to warrant major U.S. naval presence, except for training, bilateral exercises, and transit to the Indian Ocean.

  - (ASEAN Security). Unless ASEAN's perceptions change concerning the impending vacuum produced by an American withdrawal, forward-basing a carrier in Japan and training substantially in the South China Sea remains desirable to ASEAN. Much of this depends on basing
alternatives should the U.S. and Philippines fail to successfully negotiate basing rights.

- (Philippine Bases). While U.S. forward presence strategy could not effectively continue without the U.S.-Japanese agreement, the U.S. has alternatives to the Philippine bases. These alternatives could not replace the capabilities of the Philippines, but flexible dispersion of facilities throughout the region is workable.

- Finally, the overarching security which the U.S. provides to the Asia-Pacific region's energy resource base is vital to economic stability of the region and therefore to an interdependent America.

This chapter discussed U.S. regional objectives, the mission of PACOM, maritime strategy in the wake of the Cold War, focused on different strategic aspects of a U.S. aircraft carrier, and provided the comparative analysis of the thesis. The following chapter concludes the thesis and provides further research suggestions related to this topic.
ENDNOTES


5 Statement of former CINCPAC, Admiral Huntington Hardisty before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense on March 1990. It is noted that after implementation of the CFE agreement, U.S. Forces in the European theater will reduce to levels which may not allow the term "economy of force" theater to apply to PACOM in the future.

6 Framework, 6.


8 Ibid.


10 Lasater, 26.

11 H. Lawrence Garrett, III (Secretary of the Navy), Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II (Chief of Naval Operations), General A. M. Gray (Commandant of the Marine Corps), "The Way Ahead," Proceedings 117 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, April 1991), 44.
For purposes of this thesis, the author considers only one deployment roundtrip cycle per year. This would increase if turnaround times decreased. The following examines the ten-year transit cost adjustment as a result of the increased distance which a forward-deployed carrier from CONUS travels in the Pacific over the previous study which examined an Atlantic transit.

### Cost Analysis of Transit Costs over 10 Years

<table>
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<th>Yr</th>
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<th>Cost (\times 10^6)</th>
<th>Discount Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td><strong>2.45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\$39.05 million

The study considered many elements including privately-owned vehicles (POVs). In the case of Japan, personnel rarely ship POVs. However, travel costs are slightly more expensive to Japan than to the Mediterranean. Therefore, the author determined to use the 100% notional numbers associated with the previous study's sensitivity analysis since the object was not to discern exact figures but to pull out any major elements which could detract from favoring either option and since the notional numbers were worst case figures for forward-
basing expenditure. Discarding construction costs of facilities already in existence in Japan yields a combined cost of $56.6 million for travel and transportation and allowances. Additionally, since the author personally worked on the forward-based air wing temporary additional duty (TAD) budget from 1988 to 1990, an educated estimate of TAD expenditures discounted over 10 years and using the same discount table as above, yielded another $10 million bringing the total for forward-basing to an estimated $66.6 million.

For forward-deploying, costs of family separation allownace are an additional expenditure. However, in the case of the forward-based air wing in Japan, this cost also applies. Therefore, these values cancel each other out leaving variable housing allowance (VHA) as the only other significant forward-deployment cost. Since the authors of the study again used high notional figures, this value was used and amounted to $6.8 million over the same 10-year period. Therefore adding the minimum cost transit figure of $39 million to the VHA of $6.8 million yields $45.8 million. The resultant difference between forward-basing costs and forward-deployment is, therefore a maximum cost figure of $20 million over the ten-year period. This cost results from forward-basing as opposed to CONUS forward-deployment with one deployment cycle per year average for a conventional carrier. It should be noted that this results in less carrier presence. Therefore, either deployment lengths must be increased or turnaround times in port must be decreased if the U.S. decides on forward-deployment over forward-basing while maintaining the current forward presence strategy.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether there remains an operational requirement to maintain a forward-based aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific region. The question was posed due to decreased East-West tensions, relative global reduction in U.S. influence, and the proposed reduction in U.S. aircraft carriers. The author viewed this as a strategy paper not an operational analysis.

Overview

The author determined the need to study and convey international order concepts in the wake of the Cold War as a necessary introduction into the strategic framework of the region. As the author began the study, it became evident that interdependence plays a major part in international relations and directly influences policy actions. It also became apparent that the level of usable military power is diminishing relative to other elements of national power. As such, military power serves more in a supporting role and places greater emphasis on the low end of the spectrum of conflict while maintaining requisite warfighting capabilities. Therefore, the peacetime presence, show of force, and punitive strike missions of an aircraft carrier take on increased importance. However, these roles carry no weight without
the power projection capability possessed by the carrier strike force. Therefore, the determination was made to use these CV missions as the basic criteria for assessing operational requirements in the region.

The strategic framework chapter presented U.S. interests and examined broad issues which influence regional perceptions. Historical discussions developed these issues and provided the basis for analyzing future U.S. naval presence requirements in the region. The author delimited the study to Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. However, Indian and Southwest Asian influences could not be overlooked. For specific conclusions see the summary of chapter four.

The next chapter narrowed to a discussion of U.S. regional defense objectives and the mission of PACOM. This was followed by a brief examination of U.S. Maritime Strategy in the post-Cold War era and focused on the strategic role of the aircraft carrier. It also gave a brief explanation of the intangible peacetime presence role served by the forward-based carrier in the Asia-Pacific region. The preceding conclusions and discussions served to provide contributing factors in the strategic analysis of forward-basing or forward-deploying an aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific. A brief discussion of comparative costs focused on any overwhelming benefits or detractors to forward-basing. It concluded that forward-basing costs associated with
personnel travel and transportation is significantly higher than forward-deploying. However, this is sufficiently offset by the increased cost of transiting a similar carrier as a forward-deployed force from CONUS.

The author recommends the U.S. maintain the forward-based carrier in Japan into the 21st Century. There are several caveats to this recommendation and they are listed in chapter five.

**Recommendation for Further Research**

Specific to this study, the author recommends a detailed cost analysis based on historic expenditure and future presence needs of the forward-based carrier versus a forward-deployed carrier in the Asia-Pacific region. Reference the thesis completed in 1981, which is mentioned in the literature review and chapter five, for specific cost formulas and methodology. Additionally, there are factors associated with the forward-based carrier in Japan which negate some of the requirements of the previous study, such as previously constructed facilities and burden sharing agreements. However, there are other factors which enter into the equation, such as high temporary additional duty costs associated with air wing detachments, or new facility construction with the potential loss of the Philippines bases. The author views this as the most essential future research.

A more detailed study of the alternate basing issue should proceed as soon as possible. Although the author
noted several research papers or books addressing this area in general terms, specific engineering, cost, and operations analysis projects must be completed to determine the viability of the general options addressed. As part of this, Australia should not be discarded as an option. See the discussion of alternate basing in the Philippine bases section of this thesis. As a follow on to this, forward-basing alternatives in the Indian Ocean or Southwest Asia should be reviewed. This is currently a limited option. However, the research would provide a foundation for future study if the option becomes feasible at a later date.

**Contribution**

The author feels that this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge regarding national security affairs and naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The significant reduction in bipolar tensions provides greater potential for regional and global peace in the long-term. However, it also provides increased risk of regional confrontation, impacting interdependent U.S. allies and, therefore, the U.S. itself. The inherent flexibility of naval power heightens the need to maintain American naval capabilities borne of the Cold War. These capabilities, in the form of carrier battle groups, provide application across the entire spectrum of conflict. It is recognized that in certain areas of low intensity conflict, the utility of naval power is limited. However, it is also
clear that, because of the changing threat environment, carrier battle groups may now be tailored to a specific threat while maintaining its requisite sea and air supremacy capabilities.

Aircraft carriers have a definite role to play in international stability for the foreseeable future. In the Asia-Pacific region, it maintains economic stability by easing fears of intra- and extra-regional aggression. This promotes an environment of free trade and investment which directly impacts on U.S. economic vitality. Additionally, it provides stability and security of regional energy access from Southwest Asia.

The dilemma is that the reduction in carrier numbers, either reduces presence or increases deployed time. The first violates regional objectives, the second severely degrades personnel retention. It also impacts the competitive costs of ship building as multiple source competitors dwindle to a single-source producer. This environment existed in the 1970s and took years to recover from. The author is not suggesting the perpetual existence of a disproportionate American war machine, but one which continues to meet the needs of the foreseeable future with the best possible capability.

Closing Quote

The author would like to conclude this paper with the following quote from Richard Armitage regarding Asian-Pacific security:
The Pacific is not an American lake nor is it a Soviet one.... But for the foreseeable future the United States must, in the interest of its own security and regional stability, serve in the role of "honest broker" and the pivot for Asian-Pacific security.
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