SEMINAR ON
LOGISTICS
IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

STUDIES, CONCEPTS, AND ANALYSIS DIVISION
J-4 DIRECTORATE
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (OJCS)

19 NOVEMBER 1986
A SEMINAR REPORT

LOGISTICS
IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

19 November 1986

Conducted by
Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division
J-4 Directorate
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PREFACE

On 19 November 1986 the J-4 Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a one-day seminar on logistics in low intensity conflict. The seminar provided an opportunity to examine logistic problems the United States must cope with in developing and providing support capabilities in low intensity conflict. Participants included representatives of Service headquarters plus representatives of several commands and agencies which had requested to participate in the seminar.

The seminar was productive in exchanging information among the Services on current initiatives, studies, and other development efforts. In addition to logistic programs being developed to support operations in low intensity conflict, other initiatives have been undertaken that are not labeled "low intensity conflict" but will have a significant influence on supportability and capabilities of military forces operating in this lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

The seminar began with a review of the low intensity conflict environment to establish a basic understanding of the issues and problems involved. It identified several logistic concerns that must be addressed in low intensity conflict planning.

This summary of the seminar discussions is provided to assist logistic planners in developing the required logistic concepts, procedures, and systems to meet the challenges of low intensity conflict. OJCS/J-4 will continue to provide assistance to the joint logistic community in this endeavor. However, discussions summarized in this report do not necessarily reflect the position of any Service, agency, or department.

RICHARD L. STONER
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Plans, Concepts, and Analysis, J-4
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Overview. A seminar on logistics in low intensity conflict was held with Service representatives on 19 November 1986 by the Studies, Concepts, and Analysis (SCAD) Division of OJCS/J-4. The agenda is at Appendix A.

Approximately 20 people attended the seminar. In addition to representatives from the Service staffs and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), other participants included representatives of the Air Force Logistics Management Center; the US Army Logistics Center; the US Army-US Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict; Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education; and the Army Materiel Command. Two unified commands -- US Central Command and US Southern Command -- also provided representatives. An attendance roster is at Appendix B.

The meeting was held to discuss ideas concerning the role of logistics in low intensity conflict and explore opportunities that could lead to enhanced joint and combined logistic warfighting capabilities. The session was also held to establish contacts, coordinate efforts, and exchange information about current initiatives being taken by the Services and the US Army-US Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. Slides used in discussing the seminar's objectives and goals are included in the set of seminar slides at Appendix C.

UNDERSTANDING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

To develop an understanding of issues involving low intensity conflict, the seminar began by reviewing results of previous conferences, research projects, and other related efforts.

Low Intensity Warfare Conference. A Low Intensity Warfare Conference was sponsored by the Department of Defense at National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, during 14-15 January 1986. Principal speakers included Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of State Shultz, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and General Gorman (USA, Ret.). Conference sessions focused on the low intensity threat and military response, domestic political considerations in low intensity conflict, and civic action in low intensity
conflict. Proceedings of the conference have been published by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

DIA Symposium. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) held a symposium on low intensity conflict at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC, from 13 to 16 May 1986. The symposium was held as a forum to discuss the intelligence component of low intensity conflict. Major topics were policy and planning perspectives, lessons resulting from recent low intensity conflict situations, and concerns of the unified and specified commands. A classified report of the symposium has been published by DIA. Agencies interested in obtaining a copy should refer to report #DDB-2300-21-86, September 1986.

Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project. On 1 July 1985 the US Army Chief of Staff directed that the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) undertake a Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project. The goal was to examine low intensity conflict issues with a focus on Central America to:

- Develop a common low intensity conflict data base,
- Develop lessons learned, and
- Identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for low intensity conflict.

The project report was published in two volumes on 1 August 1986. Volume I presents background on the environment, threat, and US policy and strategy concerning low intensity conflict. It also discusses the various types of low intensity conflict operations and contains an analytical review by functional area (including logistics). Volume II discusses specific recommendations for more than 60 issues. The project also established the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base. The data base provides reference to research efforts, including books, articles and papers.

The chapter in Volume I of the project report that discusses the logistic analyses, issues, and recommendations is included in Appendix E.

Center for Low Intensity Conflict. The US Army-US Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) was activated at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on 30 January 1986. Its formation as an Air Force center was recommended by the Air Force Innovation Task Force in February 1985 and an agreement between the US Air Force Chief of Staff and the US Army Chief
of Staff in September 1985 led to its development as an Army-Air Force center.

The mission of the CLIC is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low intensity conflict, to elevate awareness through both services of the role of military power in low intensity conflict, and to provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint or interagency activity. Approximately 30 personnel are assigned to the CLIC to:

- Act as the Army and Air Force focal points for low intensity conflict;
- Develop operational concepts and conduct operational analyses for both services; and
- Propose initiatives for improved equipment, manpower, testing, tactics, and training.

The CLIC includes experts in several functional areas such as intelligence, security assistance, and politico-military affairs. It also includes a logistics branch which addresses logistic issues and problems. Activities of the CLIC are directed by an Army and Air Force executive council composed of three general officers from Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift Command, and Training and Doctrine Command. A fact sheet on the CLIC is at Appendix F. A briefing on the CLIC presented by Major Furr is at Appendix G. An copy of another CLIC briefing which is included in this report for additional information on the CLIC and its activities is at Appendix H.

At the meeting of the Joint Logistic Techniques and Procedures Board (JLTPB) on 29-30 October 1986 at the Belmont Conference Center in Elkridge, Maryland, a briefing was presented by the CLIC on its organization, mission, and activities. During the meeting, the JLTPB directed that the Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division of OJCS/J-4 maintain contact with the CLIC in the development of joint logistics doctrine for low intensity conflict. Minutes of the JLTPB meeting have been disseminated by the Logistic Planning Division of OJCS/J-4.

The CLIC executive committee will meet in December and may consider a proposal for the CLIC to develop an initial concept for logistics in low intensity conflict that expands the logistics doctrine recently developed by the US Air Force and the initial operational logistic concept developed by the US Army Logistics Center.

Definition. The seminar also discussed various definitions of the term "low intensity conflict," including the one which
was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 November 1985 (see Appendix D) which is as follows:

**Low Intensity Conflict:** A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC.

**JOINT INITIATIVES**

**USSOUTHCOM Symposium.** US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is sponsoring with the Army Materiel Command a Low Intensity Conflict Symposium during 3-5 March 1987 at the Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida. The symposium will be conducted with administrative support of the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA) and will be held as a planning session for industry.

USSOUTHCOM's goals for the symposium are to solicit industry's resources and innovation for developing technology for low intensity conflict. Specific objectives are to review the threat, explain the nature of low intensity conflict, articulate US and allied needs, and identify industry opportunities.

OJCS/J-4 will discuss "Logistics Initiatives for Meeting Low Intensity Conflict Challenges" at the symposium. USSOUTHCOM has also requested presentations from its component commands, the Army Materiel Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other agencies on such topics as: Global Low Intensity Conflict Threat; Latin American Experience; Doctrine, Training, and Combat Development Initiatives; Security Assistance Implications; and Materiel Implications. ADPA will publish a symposium brochure when USSOUTHCOM has completed the agenda and other arrangements. Agenda and registration information can be obtained from ADPA, 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 900, Arlington, VA 22209-1942 or by calling (703) 522-1820.

**Logistic Systems Development Guide For International Use.** OJCS/J-4 is sponsoring a project that has been undertaken by the US Army Logistics Center to prepare a guide for use by US friends and allies in examining and improving their logistic
The guide will also be useful in assisting developing nations in determining their requirements for logistic systems or improving their procedures. Many developing countries face similar problems in logistic management, training, system design, procedures, planning, documentation, and command emphasis. It will emphasize the importance of logistics and will present basic tasks, principles, support concepts, and common data elements.

A draft has been prepared that is now being coordinated with the Services, commands, logistic schools, and agencies that are concerned with international logistic activities. When published, it will fill a major shortcoming in advice available from the United States. It will be translated into Spanish, French, and Arabic and used internationally as a guide for developing or improving logistic systems and for training personnel in basic logistic concepts.

Special Operations Forces Logistics Conference. A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Logistics Conference, jointly sponsored by the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) and OJCS/J-4 was held at the Pentagon from 10 to 12 September 1986. The purpose of the conference was to provide a forum for updating the SOF community on logistic support for SOF and to open a dialogue to seek solutions to common logistic problems. Major issues identified during the conference included:

- The need for more logisticians with a special operations background;
- Procurement leadtime for critical special operations materiel;
- Scheduling special operations airlift assets for exercises;
- Fencing SOF operational projects stored in the continental US and the need for prepositioned training weapons; and
- Sources and procedures for obtaining nonstandard special operations materiel.

Minutes of the conference have been provided by the Logistic Resources Division, OJCS/J-4, to the Services and commands.

Other Joint Initiatives. Other OJCS activities were reviewed, including participation with other federal agencies
on studies, concepts, strategies, and definitions concerning low intensity conflict. Initiatives were discussed that have been directed by recent Congressional action such as the reorganization of special operations forces, establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and creating a Board for Low Intensity Conflict in the National Security Council.

**IDA Study.** The Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) has undertaken for the Secretary of Defense a research project on long-term threats to national security from adversaries other than the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. This examination of "lesser adversaries" aims at the following:

- To formulate a statement of relevant national security policies and strategy;
- To determine implications for Department of Defense programs, including research and development and force structure; and
- To identify relationships which exist or should exist between Defense Department programs and those under the purview of other Departments or agencies, such as security assistance or intelligence exchanges.

**SERVICE INITIATIVES**

The seminar then reviewed several current initiatives of the Services. These include concepts, handbooks, programs, information networks, and studies.

**Field Circular 100-20.** The US Army Combined Arms Center has published Field Circular 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict. The document provides basic principles for operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and augments existing doctrine. It discusses basic missions in low intensity conflict, provides worksheets for use as planning tools, and lists related publications that provide additional information.

**Operational Concept.** The US Army Logistics Center is preparing an Interim Operational Concept for Logistics Support in Low Intensity Conflict. A draft of the concept is being coordinated within the Army. The final document should be published in mid-1987. It will provide guidance for the employment of logistical support for US Army forces in low intensity conflict. Its objective is to provide a basic document from which organizations, procedures, and equipment
can be defined to enhance the capability of logistic elements in low intensity conflict.

The concept is divided into four parts:

- Terrorism Counteraction,
- Peacekeeping Operations,
- Foreign Internal Defense, and
- Peacetime Contingency Operations.

The concept discusses logistic subjects such as supply and services, maintenance, and transportation in general terms for each part, and emphasizes those logistical applications that differ from existing doctrine.

Air Force Doctrine. In December 1985, Air Force Manual (AFM) 2-15, "Combat Support Doctrine," was published by the US Air Force. The manual establishes doctrine for the combat support (logistic support) of Air Force forces and describes the nature of logistic support and its relationship to aerospace power. This document is being used to develop a draft joint logistic doctrine publication by the Logistic Planning Division, OJCS/J-4. Copies of AFM 2-15 can be obtained from HQ USAF/LEXY, Washington, DC 20330.

The Air Force is developing an adjunct of AFM 2-15 to address logistic doctrine for low intensity conflict. This initiative will be conducted with related activities involving the other Services and commands and should be ready for coordination within the next six months.

Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook. The Air Force Logistics Management Center (AFLMC) has published a handbook to guide contracting officers in supporting deployed units. It outlines legal authorities; discusses funding issues; and presents contingency contracting procedures, responsibilities, and practices. It also includes a checklist of essential items that contingency contracting officers must consider. Copies of the handbook can be obtained from the AFLMC.

LICNET. The US Army Command and General Staff College has developed a computer network to exchange information and assist in coordinating low intensity conflict activities. Access requires a modem. Additional information can be obtained from LTC Thompson, Autovon 552-2347.

Materiel Programs. Army initiatives also include developing scenario-based logistic programs for low intensity conflict and testing field requisitioning systems. Other Army programs for low intensity conflict include the Logis-
tics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and the Local Area Materiel and Services (LAMS) program. In addition, the Army Materiel Command is also developing research and development programs to test new concepts with application in low intensity conflict.

Army Seminar. A seminar on low intensity conflict will be held on 6 December 1986 at the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It will be sponsored by the 2070th US Army Reserve Forces School and will address the special operations command, lessons of Afghanistan, low intensity conflict doctrine, special forces capabilities, and other topics. Further information can be obtained at Autovon 354-1711 or (703) 664-1171.

Other Studies and Articles. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) is sponsoring a research project, "Supporting Third World Nations in Low Intensity Conflict Logistically." The project is being conducted by the AFLC-sponsored research associate at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. The project will be completed by mid-1987.

The Summer 1986 issue of the Air Force Journal of Logistics has several articles that focus on logistic issues in low intensity conflict. These articles include "The Advantages of Predetermined Palletization During Low Intensity Conflict" and "Low Intensity Conflict: Thinking Beyond the SOF."

USSOUTHCOM is also developing a paper to address the differences of logistics in its command and to explore some of its unique support problems. This study will be completed in 1987.

OTHER DISCUSSION

Characteristics. The seminar discussed various characteristics of low intensity conflict that are important to logistic planning. These include:

- Duration -- can be a long-term, protracted process;
- Arena -- usually involves developing countries;
- Importance -- has regional and global security implications;
- Participants -- often includes multiple participants with numerous supporters;
- Intensity -- ranges from subversion to use of armed force;
Constraints -- limit weaponry and tactics which, in turn, may increase the use of logistical support as a means of response.

Issues. Several major issues were identified during the seminar and key points discussed include the following:

- Fundamental logistic principles apply across the spectrum of conflict, but greater flexibility in applying them in low intensity conflict may be required because of its unique characteristics and environment.

- The use of military sales and security assistance must be tailored to provide more appropriate technology. Equipment must be within the ability of the recipient to use and maintain. It must also be appropriate to respond to the threat posed to the receiving nation.

- Technologically sophisticated weapons and equipment may not be suitable for low intensity conflict because they may be too complicated to operate and maintain for the environment. Support for indigenous forces must be commensurate with their needs and capabilities.

- Interoperability of logistic systems and procedures is necessary to respond effectively to challenges in low intensity conflict.

- Coordination among the Services is needed in developing logistic handbooks, guidebooks, and concepts for low intensity conflict to take advantage of previous experience and to gain other insights.

- Logistic preparation of the battlefield is a prerequisite to the introduction of combat troops in low intensity conflict. An adequate logistic infrastructure is needed before operations can be conducted.

- Logistic planning is a key element of any planning for low intensity conflict. Time sensitivity and security restrictions should not preclude logistic considerations for low intensity conflict activities.

- US presence in host nations needs to include strong logistic expertise to meet the support requirements in low intensity conflict.

- US training provided to friends and allies must include emphasis on logistic techniques, systems, concepts, and procedures.
Strengthening the logistic infrastructure of Third World nations can assist in developing greater indigenous capabilities to support low intensity conflict operations.

Conclusion. Low intensity conflict is one of the most important challenges facing the United States. As the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project Final Report noted, logistics often becomes "the nose, not the tail, of any direct United States involvement."

The participants concluded that the seminar was beneficial in providing an exchange of information on current initiatives and projects. Several logistic programs are being developed which are not labeled "low intensity conflict" but will have a significant influence on the supportability of low intensity conflict operations. The participants agreed that the seminar was a worthwhile initiative and requested another session in early 1987.

APPENDICES

A. Agenda
B. Attendance Roster
C. Seminar Briefing Slides
D. SM-793-85, 21 November 1985, "Definition of Low Intensity Conflict"
E. Extracts of Joint Low Intensity Conflict Final Report
F. Fact Sheet, Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 30 July 1986
G. Briefing, Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
H. Briefing, Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Peace Through Action
I. Distribution
Appendix A

AGENDA
AGENDA

0820-0830 Convene in OJCS/J-4 Conference Room
0830-0845 Purpose and Objectives
0845-0910 Understanding Low Intensity Conflict
0910-0930 Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project
0930-1000 Center for Low Intensity Conflict
1000-1030 Joint Staff Initiatives
1030-1130 Service Initiatives
1130-1200 Other Initiatives and Current Studies
1200-1245 Lunch
1245-1315 Low Intensity Conflict Issues Involving Logistics
1315-1345 Logistic Problems in Low Intensity Conflict
1345-1430 Logistic Concepts for Low Intensity Conflict
1430-1500 Future Directions
1500 Adjourn
Appendix B

ATTENDANCE ROSTER
# ATTENDANCE ROSTER

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>OJCS/J-4 SCAD</td>
<td>LTC George Alexander</td>
<td>225-9212</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LTC Ray Linville</td>
<td>225-9234</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-4 SMD</td>
<td>LTC Joe Berardino</td>
<td>227-4711</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-5 PD</td>
<td>LTC Dave Crowell</td>
<td>224-3681</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ DA/DALO-PLO</td>
<td>LTC T. K. Keller</td>
<td>227-1537</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ USAF/LERX</td>
<td>LTC Claude Cavender</td>
<td>227-0126</td>
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<td>LTC Tom McDaniel</td>
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<td>Wg Cdr Alex Buchan, RAF</td>
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<td>CNO/OP-402C</td>
<td>Cdr John McWilliam</td>
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<td>HQ USMC/LP</td>
<td>Lt Col Tom Hayden</td>
<td>224-1917</td>
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<td>Lt Col Jim Butler</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT/CCJ-4/7-PL</td>
<td>Maj Bob Lehman, USA</td>
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</tr>
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<td>USCINCSO/SCJ-4-LPP</td>
<td>Maj Costa, USMC</td>
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<td>CLIC/CLO</td>
<td>Maj Bill Furr, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>USALOGC (HQ AMC/AMCGS-L)</td>
<td>Col Bill Norman</td>
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<tr>
<td>USALOGC/ATCL-CFV</td>
<td>Maj Michael Gentile</td>
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<td>AFLMC/LGX</td>
<td>Capt Robert L. Fuller</td>
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<td>AU CADRE/RIC</td>
<td>Maj Pettersen</td>
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<td>Ft Belvoir RD&amp;E Center/STRBE-POLIC</td>
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<td>ICAF</td>
<td>LTC Hal Burch, USA</td>
<td>335-1861</td>
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Appendix C

SEMINAR BRIEFING SLIDES
PARTICIPANTS

- JOINT STAFF
- SERVICES
  - ARMY
    - US ARMY LOGISTICS CENTER
    - ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
  - NAVY
  - MARINE CORPS
  - AIR FORCE
    - AIR FORCE LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER
    - CENTER FOR AEROSPACE DOCTRINE RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
- COMMANDS
  - USCINCCENT
  - USCINCSO
- SPECIAL AGENCIES
  - CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
  - ICAF
ISSUES AND CONCEPTS

- MISSIONS OF LOGISTICS IN LIC
- DIFFERENCES, IF ANY, IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT DURING LIC
- NEED FOR JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE FOR LIC
- REQUISITIONING/RESUPPLY
- LOGISTIC PLANNING FOR LIC AND DATA BASE REQUIREMENTS
- AGREEMENTS FOR INTERSERVICE SUPPORT IN LIC
- SITE SURVEY REQUIREMENTS
- THIRD WORLD LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS
- CLASSIFICATION/SECURITY CONCERNS
- JOINT/SERVICE COORDINATION FOR LOGISTIC LIC INITIATIVES
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: A LIMITED POLITICO-MILITARY STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES. IT IS OFTEN PROTRACED AND RANGES FROM DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL PRESSURES THROUGH TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IS GENERALLY CONFINED TO A GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND IS OFTEN CHARACTERIZED BY CONSTRAINTS ON THE WEAPONRY, TACTICS, AND THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. ALSO CALLED LIC.
LOGISTICS SUMMARY
VOLUME I, CHAPTER 13

- IMPORTANCE AND KEY ROLE OF LOGISTICS
- USE OF TECHNOLOGY
- FIVE BASIC ISSUES
  - USE OF COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AS LEAD ELEMENTS IN LIC TO PAVE THE WAY FOR COMBAT FORCES
  - SUPPORT OF BATTLEFIELD LOGISTICS WITH INTELLIGENCE
  - FEASIBILITY OF LOCAL RESUPPLY AS ALTERNATIVE OR SUPPLEMENT
  - NEED FOR JOINT LOGISTICS DOCTRINE FOR LIC
  - REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT REQUISITIONING FOR JOINT TASK FORCE
SPEECHES BY: SECDEF WEINBERGER  
SECSTATE SHULTZ  
GEN GORMAN  
AMB JEANE KIRKPATRICK  
AND OTHERS

TRANSCRIPT OF DISCUSSIONS IN THREE SESSIONS

- LIC THREAT AND MILITARY RESPONSE
- DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
- CIVIC ACTION IN LIC

SUPPORTING SPEECHES AND ARTICLES
13-16 MAY 1986

FORUM TO DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF LIC

FOUR SEGMENTS

POLICY AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES

INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT AND PERFORMANCE

CONCERNS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

EXECUTIVE SESSION RECOMMENDATIONS

REPORT #DDB-2300-21-86, SEP 86
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SYMPOSIUM

SPONSORED BY U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

WITH ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION (ADPA)

AS A PLANNING FORUM FOR INDUSTRY

OBJECTIVE: TO SOLICIT INDUSTRY'S RESOURCES AND INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPING LIC TECHNOLOGY

REVIEW GLOBAL THREAT
EXPLAIN NATURE OF LIC
ARTICULATE US AND ALLIED NEEDS
IDENTIFY INDUSTRY OPPORTUNITIES

3-5 MARCH 1987
AT NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, ORLANDO, FLORIDA

BROCHURE BY ADPA
ROSSLYN CENTER, SUITE 900
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET
ARLINGTON, VA 22209-1942
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SYMPOSIUM

AGENDA

- BEING WORKED BY USOUTHCOM
- TENTATIVE TOPICS INCLUDE --
  - GLOBAL LIC THREAT
  - ORGANIZATIONS FOR ACTION
  - SECURITY ASSISTANCE IMPLICATIONS
  - POLITICAL-MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ON LIC
  - LATIN AMERICA EXPERIENCE - COUNTRY TEAM PANEL
  - DOCTRINE, TRAINING, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
  - C3I NEEDS AND ARCHITECTURE
  - BROWN WATER REQUIREMENTS
  - ENGINEERING AND CIVIC ACTION REQUIREMENTS
  - LOGISTICS INITIATIVES FOR MEETING LIC CHALLENGES
LOGISTICS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL USE

- OJCS/J-4 INITIATIVE WITH ASSISTANCE FROM US ARMY LOGISTICS CENTER
- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FACE SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN TRAINING, SYSTEM DESIGN AND PROCEDURES, PLANNING, DOCUMENTATION, REPORTS, FUNDING, MANAGEMENT, AND COMMAND EMPHASIS
- ASSISTANCE NEEDED IN DEVELOPING LOGISTICS SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE COST-EFFECTIVE SUPPORT
- GUIDE TO EXAMINE AND IMPROVE LOGISTICS SYSTEMS OF THIRD WORLD
- EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF LOGISTICS
- PRESENTS PRINCIPLES, BASIC TASKS, AND CONCEPTS
- DRAFT BEING REVIEWED BY SERVICES, SCHOOLS, AND COMMANDS
- WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO FRENCH, SPANISH, AND ARABIC
LIC SYMPOSIUM AT FORT BELVOIR

- Saturday, 6 Dec, beginning at 0800
- Hosted by 2070th US Army Reserve Forces School
- Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) Auditorium
- Topics Include:
  - Doctrine
  - Joint Planning Aspects
  - Soviet-Afghan Lessons Learned
  - International Factors
- Open to Public
- Additional Information: (703) 664-1711
Appendix D

DEFINITION OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict

On 20 November 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following definition for inclusion in JCS Pub 1:

low-intensity conflict—A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DAVID HANCOCK
Colonel, USMC
Secretary

Action assigned to J-1 per DJS
Appendix E

EXTRACTS OF THE JOINT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT FINAL REPORT
CHAPTER 13
LOGISTICS

GENERAL

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It incorporates supply and services, maintenance, transportation, ammunition, construction, and medical services. This chapter covers logistics support to United States forces only. An even more important aspect of logistics is that of training of host nation forces and support for development. These emerging roles are the basis for a new logistics concept. Developmental aspects of logistics are discussed in Chapter 11.

Logistics is a critical part of any operation. As one military historian noted:

The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation. It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won only by taking risks.1

Mao Tse Tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap reiterated the belief that logistics has a decisive impact on the outcome of military campaigns. After the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, General Giap said, "A strong rear is always the decisive factor for victory in a revolutionary war."2

The importance of logistics was demonstrated during the early stages of the Vietnam conflict. As early as 1962, the establishment of a centralized United States logistical organization was proposed but disapproved. Had a system been established in country to help develop and strengthen the Vietnamese logistical system, United States combat forces may never have been required. Not until 1 April 1965 did the United States activate the 1st Logistical Command in Saigon to support United States forces. Prior to this, logistical support in Vietnam was fragmented. Once the command was activated, it found that the ports and airfields were
inadequate and that no logistics organization for supply, transportation, or maintenance troops existed in country. Logistical planning was further complicated because to establish an adequate logistics base, logistics troops and units were deployed at the same time rather than in advance of tactical forces.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The logistics function is a key element in the development of a United States response to low-intensity conflict. It has a vital and innovative role to play in support of host nation developmental activities and in its traditional role of supporting United States forces. An operational concept needs to be developed to provide the basis for development of both these roles.

Recent experiences have emphasized the importance of logistics. We must include logisticians early in the planning of any operation to ensure that the operations plan is effectively supported. During Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, no logisticians at either the JCS level or from the Joint Deployment Agency were involved in the planning of the operation. Consequently, the services had to fend for themselves, causing confusion and duplication of effort. Vice Admiral William Cowhill, JCS Director of Logistics at the time of the Grenada operation, said, "You've got to get the logistics in early. You get different forces from different services and it causes overlaps and shortages. Unless you get the staffs together early, you can't do the proper coordinating."

In low-intensity conflict, United States combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) elements will play a major role. They will most likely support joint or combined operations and may provide support to, or receive support from, other United States government agencies. United States logistics elements must be task-organized to support the variety of missions included in low-intensity conflict.

Security assistance programs designed to develop and train host country CS/CSS elements will reduce the need for direct involvement of United States forces in combat operations. The United States will be successful when it can achieve its national objectives without the protracted commitment of forces in a combat role.
TECHNOLOGY

Technology must be appropriate to the environment. User-friendly, lightweight equipment that is highly reliable and easy to maintain and transport is required. The respective services are examining equipment needs. For instance, the Army Materiel Command's Minor and Unconventional Warfare Project is tasked with identifying equipment requirements in low-intensity conflict. We must recognize, however, that high technology does not always ensure success.

During the Vietnam conflict, United States reliance on high-technology weapons and our inability to resort to "primitive tactics" caused serious problems. These facts were key to our reaction to the tunnel warfare in Vietnam. The tunnels represented a key logistical network for the North Vietnamese. They housed arms factories, rice stores, hospitals, conference rooms, and headquarters. The tunnels enabled the guerrillas to pre-position arms and supplies, to assemble troops, to take cover from bombing attacks, and to literally disappear from view.

The United States attitude initially was that technological inferiority, poverty, and stupidity somehow came together inside the tunnels. Rather, the tunnels reduced the enemy's logistical signature and prevented the United States from denying the enemy its logistical base--a critical factor in winning in counterinsurgency.

SUPPORTING UNITED STATES FORCES

In addressing logistics support to United States forces, five basic issues emerge:

- The use of CS and CSS as the lead elements in low-intensity conflict operations to pave the way for combat forces.
- The use of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to support battlefield logistics functions.
- The feasibility of local resupply as an alternative or as a supplement to the austere organic support capability of United States forces operating in undeveloped theaters.
- The effect of inadequate joint logistics doctrine on logistics support to deployed United States forces.
- The requirements for direct requisitioning of logistics support to a joint task force operating for an extended period.

E-3
Section F, Volume II, discusses in detail the concept for logistical support to United States forces. Chapter 11 and Section D deal with further ideas for the logistics role in an overall program for low-intensity conflict.

COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The latest concept of "logistics preparation of the battlefield" provides new roles for CS/CSS. Logistics takes on an added dimension. No longer is it in its traditional and more passive role of the supporting force. Rather, it takes on an active role as the lead element into the theater, becoming the supported force or the logistical "nose" as opposed to the traditional logistical "tail."

This new role of "preparing the battlefield" is two-dimensional. The first, or direct role, is that of emplacing the logistics system and upgrading the area to prepare for the possible arrival of United States forces. Early deployment of CS/CSS is optimal in count-rinsurgency operations and in preparation for an exercise involving United States forces. The second, or indirect role, is that of assisting the host country to develop its own logistical base, to provide training to indigenous forces, and to assist the host country in developing its infrastructure. This second role is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

Issue F1, The Use of Combat Support/Combat Service Support as the Lead Elements in Low-Intensity Conflict Operations, recommends doctrine be developed to support this latest concept and calls for testing of the emerging doctrine during exercises in Central America.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Viable logistics intelligence is essential in low-intensity conflict. The United States Army Logistics Center (USALOGC) has developed a system to provide this data. A computer model, called "Foraging," provides the framework for logistics intelligence. The program is currently available but has not been incorporated into contingency planning.

Issue F2, The Use of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) to Support Battlefield Logistics Functions, makes recommendations concerning--

- Responsibility for implementing the program.
- Training on use of the system.
- Incorporating the Foraging Model in contingency planning.
LOCAL RESUPPLY

Local support offers unique opportunities in low-intensity conflict. While military supplies and services may not be available on the local economy, the option needs to be exploited when possible to conserve critical air and sea assets during deployment. To do so requires assignment of qualified contracting personnel, flexibility in adapting procedures, and including this option in contingency and exercise planning. Problems in this area were demonstrated in Operation URGENT FURY.

Issue F3, The Feasibility of Local Resupply in Undeveloped Theaters, recommends--

- Modifying the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to provide the flexibility needed in contingency operations.
- Amending the joint planning process to provide for contracting.
- Continuing present United States Army Logistics Center efforts to provide for contracting.
- Providing necessary training procedures for contracting.

JOINT LOGISTICS DOCTRINE

A central theme throughout this report is joint operations in low-intensity conflict. Future conflicts will almost certainly require a coordinated effort from two or more services. Currently, no joint logistics doctrine exists. Logistics is a service responsibility and the planning is often accomplished in a vacuum. The result is often confusion and a duplication of effort.

Issue F4, The Need for Joint Logistics Doctrine for Low-Intensity Conflict, examines this issue and one specific doctrinal issue—the extended JTF. It makes recommendations concerning--

- Developing joint doctrine.
- Establishing uniformity in JTF assignment policies.
- The need for unit fill in JTFs.
DIRECT REQUISITIONING

Recent experiences in logistically supporting Army elements of a joint task force for extended periods highlight doctrinal deficiencies in the way the Army sustains itself in an austere theater. Supplies, especially repair parts, ordered through the existing supply system were not received in a timely manner. This affected the CONUS-based units deploying to JTF-B in Honduras in the performance of their mission. The Army logistics community is developing and testing a direct-supply requisitioning capability to provide needed supplies with the minimum order ship time. Much has been accomplished to date, but further refinement is needed to make this system deployable worldwide.

Issue F5, The Need To Improve Logistics Doctrine To Support a Joint Task Force Operating for an Extended Period, discusses direct requisitions and makes recommendations concerning—

- Examining performance of the remote area support pipeline.
- Determining the adequacy of current logistics procedures.
- Developing doctrine for support of United States forces in low-intensity conflict.

SUMMARY

The importance of logistics throughout low-intensity conflict is best summed up in the thought that military power can only achieve its full potential when operations and support (logistics) come together in unison. Strategy cannot succeed unless it can be executed tactically, and the tactics cannot succeed without modern and sustainable systems. Therefore, the strategy and tactics of combat operations depend on combat logistical support. In essence, they are inseparable.
NOTES


SUBJECT: Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC)

PURPOSE.
To provide information on the activation, mission and charter of the CLIC.

FACTS.
1. The CLIC activated 30 Jan 86 at Langley AFB, Virginia.
2. The CLIC's mission statement and charter are:
   a. To improve the Army/Air Force posture for engaging in low intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army/Air Force of the role of the military power in low intensity conflict -- including the capabilities needed to realize that role -- and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.
   b. The CLIC will serve as the Army/Air Force focal point for matters relating to military operations in low intensity conflict and civil-military activities related thereto. The CLIC will propose initiatives to optimize Army/Air Force force structure for tailored responses in low intensity conflict. The organization will, in coordination with the MACOMs/MAJCOMs, develop joint operations concepts, identify requirements, assess current Army/Air Force capabilities in low intensity conflict, identify shortfalls, and forward recommendations to the DCSOPS/DCS P&O for approval. The Center will:
      (1) Advise Army/Air Force decision makers and educate Service personnel in the principles of military force employment in low intensity conflict, in both combatant and noncombatant roles.
      (2) Orchestrate MACOM/MAJCOM operational test and evaluation efforts to refine current and validate new capabilities for low intensity conflict.
      (3) Represent the Army/Air Force in joint and interagency low intensity conflict fora.
      (4) Minimize duplication of effort through cooperative use of existing Army/Air Force operational, analytical, and academic resources.
3. The JCS approved definition of LIC is:
   A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC.
4. Operationally, the CLIC interprets LIC to include the following activities:

a. Insurgency
b. Counterinsurgency
c. Peacekeeping
d. Peacetime Contingency
e. Terrorism Counteraction
f. Drug Interdiction

In essence, LIC incorporates all those situations involving the use of or the threatened use of force short of direct, sustained combat between conventional forces.

5. The CLIC is located in Building 714, Langley AFB, Virginia, 23665-5000. Phone numbers are per attachment. Message address is: CLIC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//. For more specific addressing, replace "CC" with three letter office symbol per attachment.

FREDERICK C. BOSSE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

POC List
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Appendix G

CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Briefing
by Major Bill Furr
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC)

U.S. Beirut Embassy Bombed
American envoy injured; suicide driver responsible
State Dept. HQ gets barricades

U.S. beefs up security at UN mission
WHAT IS LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT?

A LIMITED POLITICO-MILITARY STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES. IT IS OFTEN PROTRACTED AND RANGES FROM DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOSOCIAL PRESSURES THROUGH TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS GENERALLY CONFINED TO A GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND IS OFTEN CHARACTERIZED BY CONSTRAINTS ON WEAPONRY, TACTICS AND THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

- MILITARY INTERVENTION
- INSURGENCY
- FORCE DEPLOYMENTS
- TERRORISM
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
- POLITICAL VIOLENCE
- SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE
- SABOTAGE
- ASSASSINATION
- DISCONTENT
- PROPAGANDA
- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC
- CULTURAL, COMPETITION
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
WARFARE OF THE 80'S

"THE SCOURGE OF TERRORISM WORLDWIDE; THE STRUGGLE FOR
NICARAGUA BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE AND
COMMUNIST REGIME; IT IS THE INSURGENCIES AGAINST THE
SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA; THE
CIVIL WAR AND TERRORISM IN LEBANON; OUR RESCUE OF
GRENADA; AND THE CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE AGAINST THE
VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION."

SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

- NOT A NEW FORM OF WARFARE
- BI-POLAR WORLD FOSTERS LIC
  - SUPERPOWER VITAL INTERESTS NOT AT RISK
  - ENTRY COSTS LOW
  - MODERN COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDE PUBLICITY
  - AVAILABLE TO ANY NATION OR GROUP
  - RETALIATION DIFFICULT
- HIGH PROBABILITY REQUIRES INCREASED EMPHASIS
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TODAY
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

- Risk of LIC to vital national interests is relatively low
- Probability of LIC occurrence is relatively high

PROBABILITY

RISK

TERRORISM  UNCONV'NL WARFARE  COUNTER INSURGENCY  THEATER CONV'NL WARFARE  THEATER NUCLEAR  STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
RISE IN TERRORISM

NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS OCCURING IN 1985 SURPASSED ALL PREVIOUS YEARS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

TRADITIONAL RESPONSE = SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

OTHER RESPONSES APPROPRIATE

- ALL FORCES HAVE ROLE
- CONVENTIONAL
- SUBS TO SATELLITES
- MUST INTEGRATE WITH
- STATE DEPARTMENT
- CIA
- OTHERS
CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (CLIC)

- FEB 85 -- AF INNOVATION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDED:
  - FIND WAYS TO USE ALL FORCES
  - AVOID LOSING VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

- JUL 85 -- CSAF PROPOSED JOINT LIC CENTER TO CSA

- SEP 85 -- CSAF/CSA AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN ARMY/AIR FORCE CENTER -- JFDI 35
CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ESTABLISHED AT LANGLEY AFB 30 JAN 86
CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

- MULTI-SERVICE ACTIVITY WITH ARMY/AIR FORCE MEMBERS
- SUBORDINATE TO ARMY/AF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
- MANNED WITH 30 PERSONNEL
- EXPECT NAVY/MARINE CORPS MEMBERSHIP IN FY 87
- INTERAGENCY MEMBERSHIP LATER
CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

PURPOSE:

- ACT AS ARMY/AIR FORCE FOCAL POINT FOR LIC
- DEVELOP ARMY/AIR FORCE OPERATIONS CONCEPTS
- CONDUCT OPERATIONAL ANALYSES
- PROPOSE INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVED EQUIPMENT, MANPOWER, TESTING, TACTICS AND TRAINING
- ADVISE AND EDUCATE DECISION-MAKERS AND PERSONNEL
ARMY-AIR FORCE FOCAL POINT

UNIFIED CINCS

REPRESENT ARMY/AIR FORCE IN LIC FORUMS

CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LIC INFO

MINIMIZE DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS

LIAISON

CLIC CONFERENCE

LIC DATA

XPJU
CONDUCT OPERATIONAL ANALYSES

- IDENTIFY LIC REQUIREMENTS
- ASSESS CAPABILITIES
- MAXIMIZE USE OF EXISTING ASSETS
- EVALUATE TRAINING
- IDENTIFY OVERALL CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS
PROPOSE INITIATIVES

POLICY/MILITARY STRATEGY

OPERATIONAL

COMBATANT AND NON-COMBATANT ROLES

INITIATIVES

- EQUIPMENT
- MANPOWER
- TESTING
- TACTICS
- TRAINING

SERVICES

UNIFIED CINC'S

NATIONAL AGENCIES

COMBINED FORCES
CLIC OBJECTIVE

OPTIMIZE FORCES FOR A TAILORED LIC WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
... AND PREVENT THIS.
Appendix H

BRIEFING
ARMY/AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
PEACE THROUGH ACTION
ARMY/AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (CLIC) PEACE THROUGH ACTION
GENESIS

- ONE OF SEVEN INITIATIVES RESULTING FROM THE AF INNOVATION TASK FORCE
  - APPROVED IN CONCEPT BY CSAF IN FEB 85
- AF CLIC ACTIVATION PLAN APPROVED BY CSAF IN JUN 85
- CSAF PROPOSED A JOINT ARMY/AF CENTER TO CSA IN JUL 85
- CSA/C SAF AGREED ON 19 SEP 85 TO ESTABLISH AN ARMY/AF CLIC UNDER AUSPICES OF JFDI 35
- ARMY/AIR FORCE CLIC ACTIVATED 30 JAN 86
MISSION

- IMPROVE THE ARMY/AIR FORCE POSTURE FOR ENGAGING IN LIC

- ELEVATE AWARENESS THROUGHOUT ARMY/AIR FORCE OF THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN LIC

- PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR TRANSITION TO JOINT/INTERAGENCY ACTIVITY
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT DEFINITION

A LIMITED POLITICO-MILITARY STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES. IT IS OFTEN PROTRACTED AND RANGES FROM DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL PRESSURES THROUGH TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS GENERALLY CONFINED TO A GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND IS OFTEN CHARACTERIZED BY CONSTRAINTS ON WEAPONRY, TACTICS, AND THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.
AN OPERATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF LIC

A VIEW FROM THE CENTER

- INSURGENCY
- COUNTERINSURGENCY
- PEACEKEEPING
- PEACETIME CONTINGENCY
- TERRORISM COUNTERACTION
WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

- NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
  - POINTS OF CONTACT ESTABLISHED
  - FOUR-SERVICE PARTICIPATION

- CINCS
  - SOUTHCOM COMPLETE
  - REDCOM FY 86/4
  - OTHERS

- COOPERATION WITH:
  - DEPARTMENT OF STATE
  - CIA
  - COAST GUARD
  - FAA
CLIC AREAS OF FOCUS

- Conflict Analysis
- Collective Security
- Force Application
- Doctrine, Training, and Exercises
- Education/Awareness
CONFLICT ANALYSIS

- PROVIDE REGIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

- DEVELOP ANALYTIC METHODOLOGIES TO FORECAST INSTABILITY AND INSURGENCY SITUATIONS

- DEVELOP UNIFIED INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT REGIONAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES

- SERVE AS THE FOCAL POINT FOR INTELLIGENCE RELATED ISSUES
COLLECTIVE SECURITY

- FID CONCEPTS OF OPERATION IN LIC
- REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
- MEDICAL MISSIONS IN HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN LIC
FORCE APPLICATION

- INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
- CONCEPT OF ARMED OBSERVATION/SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
- ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF C³I
- JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER
DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND EXERCISES

- FORMAL COORDINATION WITH UNIFIED COMMANDS
- JOINT OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR LIC
- JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER
- JCS EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS
EDUCATION/AWARENESS

- EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS
- WARGAMES AND SIMULATIONS
- DATABASE/NETWORKING
- BULLETIN/NEWSLETTER
- RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
SOLVING THE LIC DILEMMA

DOD SOF REORGANIZATION A FIRST STEP BUT NOT THE TOTAL SOLUTION

REQUIRES EFFECTIVE DOD/INTERAGENCY PLAN

REQUIRES PROPER ADVOCACY FOR LIC REQUIREMENTS

REQUIRES FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
"...the most active threat we face today is not high intensity, but low intensity -- the war in the shadows... this threat is manifested in a stream of hostage crises, terrorist attacks, local conflicts and insurgencies. This is our most active threat for the remainder of the century..."

VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
28 MAY 1986
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LRD
LPD

J-5 PD

ARMY

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Peterson AFB, CO 80914-5001

OTHER
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