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AC/RC FORCE INTEGRATION

BY

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Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) Force Integration is critical in today's Total Army. The Army of soldiers, Active and Reserve, exists to play a key role in deterring aggression, and if that fails, to fight and win on the battlefield. This study starts with a look at the initiation of the Total Force policy and then on to the CAPSTONE program of today. The study then discusses statutes governing command and control issues. The essence of the study is a detailed analysis of a Reserve COSCOM comprising 247 subordinate units equally divided among the three Components. These units are located in 37 states, commanded by 15 state governors and 5 CONUSAs. The study focuses on the question, is the force structure conducive to training as the Army intends to fight? The conclusions are varied and among them are: wartime commanders are not assuming responsibility for their CAPSTONE units, peacetime requirements are distracting from wartime mission, and there are numerous unresolved training challenges. The study closes by recommending new peacetime command and control arrangements, increasing the involvement of the wartime chain of command, and the introduction of a new training initiative.
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AC/RC Force Integration

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) Force Integration is critical in today's Total Army. The Army of soldiers, Active and Reserve, exists to play a key role in deterring aggression, and if that fails, to fight and win on the battlefield. This study starts with a look at the initiation of the Total Force policy and then on to the CAPSTONE program of today. The study then discusses statutes governing command and control issues. The essence of the study is a detailed analysis of a Reserve COSCOM comprising 247 subordinate units equally divided among the three Components. These units are located in 37 states, commanded by 15 state governors and 5 CONUSAs. The study focuses on the question, is the force structure conducive to training as the Army intends to fight? The conclusions are varied and among them are: wartime commanders are not assuming responsibility for their CAPSTONE units, peacetime requirements are distracting from wartime mission, and there are numerous unresolved training challenges. The study closes by recommending new peacetime command and control arrangements, increasing the involvement of the wartime chain of command, and the introduction of a new training initiative.
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INTRODUCTION

We train the way we intend to fight because our historical experiences amply show the direct correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield.

The training focus is on wartime missions.

Peacetime relationships must mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible.

Base training on wartime mission requirements.

Senior leaders must personally observe and evaluate the execution of training at all echelons.

Realistic training requires organizations to train the way they will fight or support on the battlefield.¹

These quotations from Training the Force, FM 25-100, focus on the greatest challenge facing today's integrated Active and Reserve force and their ability to function in a mutually-supporting role in peace and war. Is the present command structure conducive to train the way we intend to fight? To answer this question, a study of the 103d Corps Support Command was conducted to look at peacetime and wartime command structure as it relates to the wartime mission. The study also examines past training practices and discusses the impact the present structure has on the ability to conduct effective wartime training in a peacetime environment. The study concludes with recommendations for the Army's leadership to consider for further integration of the three components.
Background

For decades, leaders have been searching for effective ways of integrating the Active Army and the Army's Reserves into a Total Force. The search hinged on one question, how can the United States organize its Reserve Forces to maximize their warfighting potential while at the same time comply with political, economic, and social realities? The answer to this question, in 1973, was the Total Force policy. Adoption of the Total Force policy signified that the defense forces of the United States would consist of an essential Active Army force level required to maintain the peace, supported by a well-trained and well-equipped Reserve. Today, many refer to this as the "One Army" concept.

Since its initiation, Total Force policy has mandated new training programs, new equipment, and a heightened urgency for Reserve readiness. In the late 1970s, CAPSTONE came into existence to align AC and RC units to meet the Total Army's wartime requirements. The alignments are tailored specifically to each war plan. This allows for detailed theater planning and provides the basis for commanders to enter cohesive planning and training associations with their designated wartime commands. It also is the basis for resource allocation by the peacetime chain of command to meet wartime requirements.

CAPSTONE did not change the command structure of the Army. Separate peacetime and wartime chain of command still remain. CAPSTONE did, however, give more training responsibilities to the CAPSTONE chains of command (which is synonymous to wartime chains.
of command), but does not have the total authority to execute those responsibilities.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433), provides the authority to Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) to accomplish those responsibilities designated in the CAPSTONE program. The Act requires the Secretary of the Army to assign all Active and Reserve Army forces to a unified or specific commander (CINC) with the intent to strengthen a CINC's authority over the forces he will employ in wartime. Until each Army unit is assigned to its wartime gaining command in peacetime, thus making the wartime and peacetime chains of command one command line, the full intent of Goldwater-Nichols will not be realized.\(^3\)

Keeping in mind the intent of the Total Force Policy, CAPSTONE Program, and Goldwater-Nichols Act, the present command structure of the U.S. Army Reserve is examined as depicted in Figure 1. The majority of USAR Troop Program Units (TPUs) are commanded by Forces Command (FORSCom) except for designated Special Operations Forces (SOF) units which are commanded by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Army National Guard units are commanded by their respective state governors until federalized by Presidential Executive Order. In the Pacific, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), commands all assigned USAR troop program units (TPUs). In Europe, the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR) commands all assigned USAR TPUs. Army reservists that are not members of TPUs belong to the Army Reserve Personnel Center.
U.S. ARMED FORCES
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

CSA

DCSOPS  DCSPER  DCSLOG  COMPT  CNGB  CAR

SOCOM  USAREUR  WESTCOM  FORSCOM

UNITS  ARCOM  UNITS

UNITS

CONUSA

READY RESERVE
- IMA
- IRR
- AGR

RETIRED RESERVE

STANDBY RESERVE

TRAINING DIV  ARCOMS  GOCOMS

UNITS  UNITS  UNITS

ARCOMS - RESERVE COMMANDS
GOCOMS - GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDS

Figure 1
(ARPERCEN) either in an Individual Ready Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Retired Reserve, or Standby Reserve status. Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) are major subordinate commands of FORSCOM. Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs), made up of Training Divisions, Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs), and separate General Officer Commands (GOCOMs) report to the numbered CONUSA having command of their geographical area, only for training, operations, mobilization and deployment as shown in Figure 2. This examination of the Army Reserve command structure shows a layering of peacetime relationships (FORSCOM to CONUSAs to ARCOMs), none of which is in the wartime chain of command. This is not in compliance with intent of Army policy and doctrine.

On 1 October 1990 the United Army Reserve Command (USARC) was established to command and control all the USAR units in FORSCOM. USARC's primary missions are providing resources, training support, personnel, administration. USARC's schedule for assumption of its mission is as follows: USAR units in Fourth Army by 1 October 1991, units in First and Second Armies 1 July 1992, and Fifth and Sixth Army units on 1 October 1992. Furthermore, with the advent of the USARC, FORSCOM and CONUSAs' roles in the peacetime chains of command are no longer necessary.

103d COSCOM Visit

In order to analyze and gain an understanding of the Total Army force structure integration, both peacetime and wartime, a visit was made to the 103d Corps Support Command (COSCOM), United
USAR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENT

- NGB
- TAG
- ARNG UNITS

- HQDA
- FORSCOM
- OCAR

- CONUSA
- USARC
- MUSARC TPU

- RG

**Figure 2**

**Legend:**
- **O** OPCON FOR TNG, OPNS, MOB AND DEPL
- **C** COORDINATION
- **A** TRAINING SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE
- **R** USAR RESOURCE FLOW
States Army Reserve (USAR), in Des Moines, Iowa. The 103rd COSCOM visit was spent examining two items: command relationships and training.

The 103rd COSCOM is one of 47 MUSARCs in the Army Reserve. The COSCOM's wartime chain of command includes 247 units spread over 37 states, 2 territories, and 2 countries. The COSCOM wartime chain of command is divided equally between the components: Active, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The units are commanded in peacetime by any one of a variety of Headquarters CINCUSAREUR, FORSCOM (thru 5 CONUSAs and the USARC) and 15 state governors. The total strength of the 103rd wartime command is 29,875. It is the largest major subordinate command of V Corps. To make things worse, the 103rd COSCOM has averaged over 35 percent turbulence in its wartime chain of command the past 3 years. Turbulence is any change in command relationship of units in the chain of command.

The 103rd COSCOM's mission is to provide direct support and general support to nondivisional units in the corps area of operation and backup direct support and general support to the divisional units in the corps. The support provided includes: maintenance, transportation, supply, medical support services, and services such as laundry, bath, and renovation. This mission is executed by a coordinated effort of all the major subordinate commands illustrated in Figure 3. Only the Material Management Center (MMC), Movement Control Center (MCC), Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC), Public Affairs Detachment (PAD), and the Data Processing Unit (DPU) are both peacetime and wartime aligned units, totaling approximately 750 soldiers.
103d COSCOM Chain of Command

MCC - Movement Control Center
MMC - Material Management Center
HHC - Headquarters & Headquarters Company
PAD - Public Affairs Detachment
DPU - Data Processing Unit
Med Bde - Medical Brigade
Trans Bde - Transportation Brigade
Ammo Group - Ammunition Group
Spt Group - Support Group
Petro Sup Bn - Petroleum Supply Battalion
HNS - Host Nation Support

----- Denotes "Obligatory" Cooperation

Note: Host Nation Support Unit is a German Army Reserve Support Unit comparable in size to a U. S. brigade. Through U. S. and German government agreement it will assist 103d COSCOM in its support mission.

Figure 3
Not shown in Figure 3, are the brigades' and groups' battalions. The battalions have three to six companies and in some units detachments in their wartime chain of command.

A comparison of the 103d wartime chain of command and the peacetime chains of command show few similarities. Peacetime chain of commands are usually organized geographically, not according to wartime chain of command. To illustrate this difference, both a peacetime and wartime chain of command chart for each specific unit needs to be compared. For example, Figure 4 illustrates the 394th Ammunition Battalion, in the 103d COSCOM wartime chain of command, with one Active component company, one Army National Guard company, and one USAR company. In comparison, Figure 5 shows the 394th peacetime chain of command. Not one unit is in the same chain and, even worse, not one unit is an ammunition company. The staff of the 394th is not augmented with supply, military police, signal, and maintenance officers to assist in training its peacetime units. Higher headquarters are not adequately staffed in these specialties either. Adding to the above problems, the 394th's peacetime units are located in six different towns, ranging from 40 miles to 150 miles from the 394th's headquarters.

The Ammunition Group, the higher wartime headquarters of the 394th, has 27 units under its peacetime command and control. Not one unit in the Ammunition Group's peacetime chain of command is in its wartime chain of command.
394th AMMO BN
WARTIME CHAIN OF COMMAND

CINC USARUER

CORPS

COSCOM

AMMO Group

39th AMMO BN

AMMO CO
AC

AMMO CO
NG

AMMO CO
USAR

Figure 4
394th AMMO BN
PEACETIME CHAIN OF COMMAND

HQDA

FORSCOM

CONUSA

USARC

88th ARCOM

372d EN Grp

394th AMMO Bn

312th GS Co

404th Sig Co

872d Mt Co

875th Rep Det

4249th MP Co

816th Mt Det (Recovery)

844th Mt Det (Engineer)

868th Mt Det (Artillery)

OPCON for TNG, OPNS, MOB, and DEPL

Figure 5
The transportation brigade and the three support groups in the 103d wartime chain of command have similar mismatches between wartime and peacetime chains of command.

The other major subordinate commands in the 103d wartime chain of command, medical brigade and petroleum battalions, have several units in both chains of command, although the majority are not. Since the majority of the units in the peacetime chain of command of the 103d wartime major subordinate commands are not in their wartime chain of command, it is very hard to focus on wartime training because the peacetime chain of command fosters a focus toward peacetime administration. Peacetime commanders, but not the wartime commanders, have the responsibility for selecting commanders, authorizing funds, rating subordinates, promotions, command inspections, supply accountability, unit readiness, training, strength, retention and many more responsibilities. This peacetime relationship, in many instances, degrades the wartime focus.

Realistic training requires the 103d COSCOM to train the way they will support on the battlefield. For this to happen, all 103d wartime chain of command commanders and staffs must participate in preparing and conducting training. This multi-echelon approach to training has proven to be the most efficient and effective way of training within limited periods of time and resources.

To examine the effects that the mismatches of wartime and peacetime structure have on realistic wartime training, a detailed review of 103d COSCOM training was conducted. The
review indicates the 103d COSCOM participated in the following significant training events over the past 2 years:

- Phase I of the Combat Service Support Training Program (CSSTP), the equivalent of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Division Level, was conducted in Des Moines, Iowa in April 1989. Key 103d staff and wartime MSCs participated.

- Phase II, CSSTP was held at Fort Lee, Virginia between 9-16 September 1989, for 103d COSCOM and its wartime MSCs. During this training exercise, appropriate Logistical Exercise (LOGEX) documents were drafted, staffed, and approved.

- Participated in PROUD EAGLE, a mobilization exercise, in October 1989.

- Key staff from the 103d COSCOM participated in V Corps BCTP Training Program for Warfighter in November 1989.

- Forty-five personnel from the 103d COSCOM and key staff from wartime MSCs participated in REFORGER-90 in the Federal Republic of Germany between 6-27 January 1990.

- Phase III of CSSTP was a Staff Training Exercise held in Des Moines, Iowa between 23-25 February 1990 with wartime MSCs participating.

- Participated along with wartime MSCs in the Support Command Refresher Course between 23-27 April 1990.

- Fifteen soldiers from the 103d participated in the WARFIGHTER Exercise with V Corps between 5-17 May 1990. This exercise was in support of V Corps ARTEP using computer simulations.
Battle Book Exercises were conducted in V Corps Area of Operations between 5-19 May 1990. Forty-nine 103d COSCOM wartime units participated.

Between 9-23 June 1990, the 103d COSCOM culminated its CSSTP by participating with its wartime MSCs and their wartime battalions in LOGEX 90 and successfully completed an ARTEP utilizing ARTEP 54-22 and an approved METL from V Corps. This exercise, a combination of CSSTP, LOGEX 90, and ARTEP, was the first of its type. Units participated from three locations. Fort Lee was the location of the Medical Brigade with its subordinate units, as well as one of the Support Groups with its units. The forward deployed Support Group with its subordinate units participated from its home base in the Federal Republic of Germany. The 103d COSCOM and the balance of the units were located at Fort Pickett, Virginia. This added realism in time, distance, i.e., Ft. Lee to Ft. Pickett, and communication. In addition to tactical communications to Germany, the 103d Commander videotaped commander's guidance and After Action Reviews daily. These were sent by air daily to the 103d Liaison Officer in Germany to update the forward deployed units participating.

The 103d COSCOM conducts a conference annually for their wartime MSCs and battalions. The Conference provides short and long-range planning and training guidance to the commanders.

Hosted a V Corps conference between 30 Mar-1 Apr 1990 for all V Corps major subordinate wartime Commands to include
combat and combat support units. Key briefings were provided and each unit had an opportunity to brief the V Corps Commander.

In the 103d COSCOM's peacetime role, it is the Fourth Army's executive agent for planning, coordination, and execution of Combat Service Support Tactical Army Readiness (COSSTAR) for Annual Training at Fourth Army installations. COSSTAR is a program designed to train Corps CSS units in support of combat and combat support units conducting Annual Training during the same time period. This program gives CSS units the opportunity to participate in multi-echelon training under tactical field conditions. An effort is made to task organize the CSS units according to wartime chain of command for this training, but due to the dispersion of the wartime chain of command's units across the country, this is not always possible.

In analyzing these significant training events in concert with the 103d COSCOM it is apparent the Headquarters, 103d COSCOM provided realistic, multi-echelon, wartime training opportunities. It is also apparent that the Headquarters, 103d COSCOM kept its focus on wartime training, as evidenced by the significant training events. The most obvious deficiency in this multi-echelon training is the lack of incorporating the entire organization in the training. The detachments, companies, and battalions must train together to support effectively in war. Not very apparent, but very important, are the following problems that inhibited good wartime training:
Due to the frequent contacts with and requirements of the peacetime chain of commands, the focus in many of the wartime subordinate units is on peacetime commanders' guidance. This was shown by low attendance of some units based on peacetime conflicts, such as alternate Annual Training with peacetime units, peacetime staff meetings during scheduled CAPSTONE conferences, and peacetime post support missions.

The lack of funds being allocated by peacetime chains of command for wartime planning and training was another reason given for missing wartime training events.

The enormous layering in the peacetime chains of command make it very difficult to conduct timely coordination with wartime units.

The high level of turbulence in the wartime chains of command makes it very difficult to develop a habitual training relationship and progress to higher levels of wartime readiness.

Annual Training Evaluations (FORSCOM 1-R) are of limited value to the wartime units due to the fact that many of the evaluators are not from the wartime chain of command. This lack of wartime chain of command background limits their ability to evaluate the unit on Mission Essential Tasks derived from wartime guidance.

A lack of understanding the Army Reserve training environment on the part of the Active Component soldiers, evaluators, advisors, and trainers, was evident in several training events.
The lack of sufficient full-time staff required Troop Program Unit members to take extended leave from their civilian jobs to accomplish the training missions.

Conclusions

After this examination of force structure integration, both peacetime and wartime, and the effects it has on wartime training, the following conclusions were arrived at from the study:

- The peacetime chain of command is filled with excess layers of bureaucracy and lack of focus on wartime mission.
- Army Reserves are assigned to several CINCs around the world based on their peacetime geographic location, not on wartime mission, with one exception, SOCOM.
- Peacetime requirements and administration distracts from the wartime training mission.
- Wartime training is enough to fill the limited time available to train in the Reserves.
- Use of computer-driven simulation, electronic communication, and automation can assist in wartime multi-echelon training without the units relocating to the same area.
- Wartime gaining commanders have not assumed their responsibility of command over all their wartime units, thus not complying with the intent of Goldwater-Nichols Act.
- Turbulence of the units in the wartime chain of command distracts from the habitual relations needed to work as a team.
The lack of sufficient funds and full-time staff remains a problem.

The United States Army Reserve Command and Control Study (The Richardson Study) validates this conclusion and make the following points:

- "There are never sufficient funds to accommodate all the demands of the USAR."
- "The USAR remains critically short of full-time unit support."
- "The command and control structure itself, with the layering fostered by the CONUSA's, has been extremely bureaucratic."
- "The numerous activations, inactivations, and organizational changes have hampered chances for stability."
- "Layers of command hinder the ability of the USAR to get work done on time, to orient on warfighting issues, to get adequate resources to do the job, and to have a sense of participation in the decision process."
- "The wartime gaining commands are not the drivers for the USAR, and yet they should be. The peacetime administrative headquarters - CONUSAs and ARCOMs - are the real drivers."
- "The USAR commanders are torn between the wartime gaining commanders wants and the peacetime chain of command through the ARCOMs and the CONUSA's demands. The result is a USAR oriented toward the peacetime structure. The panel believes that the USAR unit's primary orientation should be toward the wartime (CAPSTONE) structure."
Finally, based on this study and the points of agreement from the Richardson study, it is easy to conclude that the present command structure is not conducive to train the way we intend to fight.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Wartime gaining commanders, from CINCs on down to company, should have operational control (OPCON) for training readiness, with rating authority and 1-R evaluation responsibilities for subordinate units.

2. Inactivate the five CONUSAs.

3. Have the USARC report directly to CSA.

4. Place all USAR soldiers under the command of USARC through its subordinate commands. This includes OCONUS and SOCOM reservists.

5. Phase in a requirement for AC officers to have Reserve experience, similar to Goldwater-Nichols Joint assignment requirement, to assure quality officers are assigned to the Reserves for the promotion of mutual understanding.

6. Develop a year-round wartime mission-driven exercise to maintain wartime training focus. For example, in the European theater of operations expand Crested Eagle or WINTEX to 39 days, which equals one weekend per month and 15 days Annual Training. Using the 103d wartime chain of command as an example, all (Active and Reserve) V Corps units would participate in the
exercise on the first weekend of each months and the first 2 weeks of June. This type of exercise should be flexible enough to be performed at peacetime locations or field locations in CONUS as well as OCONUS so units do not have to travel to Germany to participate.

Implementation of these recommendations will assist greatly in integrating the AC and RC in the Total Army structure and will improve the overall readiness of the Army.
APPENDIX

Verbatim Extract from Richardson Study

Statutes Pertaining to USAR Command and Control

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433), required the SA to assign all Active and Reserve Army Forces to a unified or specified commander ("CINC"). The only exception are forces performing "secretarial" functions, e.g., recruiting, training and equipping. The Act reflects the intent of the Congressional authorization committees to strengthen a CINC's authority over the forces he will employ in wartime.

A CINC has full authority to organize and employ commands and forces assigned to him as he considers necessary to accomplish his assigned missions. These include increased authority in selecting subordinate commanders, training forces, and participation in planning, programming and budgeting cycles.

For USAR forces assigned to a CINC, the Secretary of the Army's authority is subject to that of the CINC (Change to JCS Pub 2, dated 11 May 1989). The command structure must reflect a single Army Component commander for the CINC's Army forces who is responsible for providing administration and support to the CINC's forces.

Consideration.

Title 10 USC 162 (a) (1) requires the Service Secretaries to "assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to these commands." The designation of forces to commands will be directed by the NCA (SecDef/President). This provision of law applies to both Active and Reserve (e.g., USAR and ARNG) forces.

Title 10 USC 162 (a) (2) provides that forces to be assigned to a combatant commander ("CINC") by the Service Secretaries do not include forces that carry out functions of a Service Secretary listed in 10 USC 3013 (b) pertaining to recruiting, organizing, supplying, training, etc. For example, there is no statutory requirement to assign USAR training divisions to a CINC, although the Secretary of Defense could so direct.
CINCFOR, CINCSOC, and other CINCs command all assigned Reserve Forces. JCS Pub 2 refers to such command authority as "combatant command" (COCOM), a term that subsumes all lesser degrees of command such as operational control and tactical control. The extent of a CINC's command is specified by law and JCS Pub 2 and includes increased authority in specifying the organization and command relationships of subordinate forces and in participating in PPBS decisions.

The Secretary of the Army (SA) retains authority over USAR forces assigned to a CINC to the extent required to fulfill the duties prescribed in Title 10 USC 3013 (b) and to provide the necessary administration and support to a CINC's Army forces as required by Title 10 USC 165. The law does not specify the details of how the SA and CINC "iron out" conflicts that may arise when each exercises statutory functions, except to say that if the CINC believes he has insufficient authority, he is to report the matter to the Secretary of Defense.

JCS Pub 2, paragraph 3-26b provides that a Service Component Commander of a CINC "consists of the Service Component Commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under his command that have been assigned" to the CINC. Paragraphs b(1) and (2) envision a single commander for all of the Service forces assigned to a CINC for meeting the SA's responsibilities, and he is also responsible for carrying out the CINC's operational missions. The assignment of the Service Component Commander is subject to the concurrence of the CINC.

Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, CINCs were "wartime gaining commands." That is no longer the case; CINCs have current, peacetime command over assigned USAR forces. Additionally, CINCSOC has (pursuant to Title 10 USC 167, as implemented by the Secretary of Defense) separate budget and acquisition authority for program 11 items for USAR SOF forces. To comply with Goldwater-Nichols, proposed options must reflect the CINC to which particular USAR forces are assigned in wartime and that the CINC's combatant command over those forces is exercised through a single Service Component Commander. Moreover, command lines from HQDA to such forces must reflect that the authority exercised is subject to that of the CINC's, e.g., "command (less combatant command)."
The intent of the Act was to give the combatant commanders greater authority in the preparation of their forces for war. In the case of the USAR, this means those units that would belong to wartime gaining commands upon mobilization and deployment. The fact that the USAR units in CONUS are currently assigned to FORSCOM, which is not a combatant CINC, is irrelevant. Until each USAR unit is assigned to its wartime gaining command in peacetime, thus making the wartime and peacetime chains of command one command line the full intent of Goldwater-Nichols will not be realized. Short of that, any command and control arrangement which links the USAR units closer to their wartime gaining commander (through the CAPSTONE Trace) is a step in the direction intended by the Congress.
ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-100, pp. 1, 1-3, 1-5, 4-1, 4-3.


3. William R. Richardson, et.al. "United States Army Reserve Command and Control Study," pp. 35-38." (See Appendix A for verbatim extracts from Richardson study.)


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