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JFACC; A QUESTION OF COMMAND OR COORDINATION

by

M. Scot Craig

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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
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**Abstract of
JFACC; A QUESTION OF COMMAND OR COORDINATION**

No issue burns brighter within the joint arena than that of the "Joint Forces Air Component Commander" concept. An issue which is at the heart of the CINC's ability to gain a synergism of forces he needs to ensure victory. The question most often raised concerning the concept has been whether the JFACC requires the autonomous control of all air assets or is coordination the key. Through a look at history, doctrines, and present issues the use of JFACC will be clearly seen as one more tool the Joint Force Commander can use as the situation or mission warrants. Command, as will be emphasized, is the JFC's prerogative and it will be his estimate of the situation which will determine the extent of the JFACC's authority. Coordination of the service's air assets will be a critical issue and it is the JFACC that will make that possible for the commander. The JFACC is an important part of today's joint operations and it is a concept that can allow the CINCs to gain the synergism of forces. This is true only if the commander clearly defines the JFACC's role and ensures the JFACC understands that coordination is the key.



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JFACC; A QUESTION OF COMMAND OR COORDINATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Of all the issues still receiving attention within the joint arena, none has concerned the services more than the "Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)." A subject, which although accepted as a joint doctrine, still has been open to debate as to how the concept would be integrated into the complex arena of air command, control, tasking, and planning.

Presently, the JFACC concept is receiving a baptism by fire in the deserts of Saudi Arabia. From this test the JFACC concept will either be validated, modified, or at minimum provide a clearer, more defined base for the doctrine. But, until that time, the how of JFACC employment must be answered if the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) is to use his air power in the most effective manner. Through evaluation of joint doctrine, historical examples, and the individual service's perspective, a conclusion will be drawn that the JFACC concept must be flexible and not locked into a set definition of commander or coordinator. The Joint Force Commander must decide the JFACC's role based on the situation so the best each service has to offer is integrated into a cohesive overall effort.

To fully understand why the establishment of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander created such a controversy we must go beyond service parochialism. Questions such as why the position was created, what the challenges were to the JFACC's role, did history shed light on what form the JFACC should take, and finally, should this position fit into an immutable mold or

should it be a flexible tool used as the JFC sees appropriate, must be answered. Justifiably, these questions have been the basis for the continuing debates. Each service's air force fulfills a specific mission and traditionally has resisted any doctrinal or structural change which would prevent them from accomplishing that mission. In 1986 the Goldwaters/Nichols Act was enacted, aimed toward changing these views and strengthening the authority within the chain of command of the unified commanders.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Definition and Description

The JFACC has evolved since World War II until today, where due to the emphasis on jointness the concept has become doctrine. The Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986 actually drove many joint issues and forced the services to become more interoperable on the premise the sum of the services efforts would be greater than the parts. In other words, unity of effort was required. Interoperability and cooperation in the air arena was a major concern of joint commands. As a result, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander concept was developed and became doctrine in 1986. JCS Pub 1-02, the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms defined JFACC as follows:

The joint forces air component commander derives his authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint forces commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas./1

Certain portions of this description need to be highlighted which are critical to the JFACC's role. First, all of the

JFACC's authority is derived from the JFC, indicating the JFACC's authority is not an absolute. Additionally, the word "normally" is found throughout this description indicating that JFACC was not intended to be an inflexible concept but one used by the JFC as the situation warrants. Coordination is also mentioned throughout, which is key to the JFC's ability to ensure unity of effort. Lastly, it is the responsibility of the commander to provide guidance to the JFACC so that a coordinated air effort is established.

Omnibus Agreement

An introduction of the JFACC subject would not be complete without a discussion of the only JCS approved caveat to the JFACC doctrine. This addition was provided by the Marine Corps which clearly stated the primary purpose of Marine air within the joint arena. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore, as it was designated, is found in JCS Pub 3-01.1, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. It reads as follows:

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force(MAGTF) Commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking through his air component commander for air defense, long range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force Commander in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g. the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR

sorties when it has been determined by the Joint Force Commander that they are required for higher priority missions, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Pub 2./2

The Omnibus Agreement created a great deal of controversy which will be discussed in a later section, but first, one point should be noted. The word "normally" was used in this document as it was used before in the JFACC description. This ultimately grants the joint force commander the authority to use all forces assigned, including Marine TACAIR, as he sees fit. This authority was clearly echoed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in White Letter 4-86, where he stated, "the issues involved in formulating the decisions above have been put to rest. Let's give the Joint Force Commanders our enthusiastic, professional support in ongoing efforts to enhance all aspects of warfighting."/3

JCS Publications

Joint publications on all areas of warfare have saturated the services since the Goldwaters/Nichols Act. A common thread throughout these publications has been the emphasis on maximum interoperability and cooperation. The Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF), JCS Pub 0-2, could be considered the Bible in providing the base principles and doctrines to govern joint activities. Three areas in the UNAAF relate directly to the JFC's use of JFACC. Paragraph 3-10(b) explains,

organizational integrity of service components should be maintained in so far as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities./4

This basically acts as a reminder to the JFC, to ensure he does not arbitrarily mix forces for the sake of jointness. Some situations may call for functionally tasked organized forces requiring the integrity of a service component to be violated but normally the service expertise within specific warfare areas will dictate organizing as service components. The JFACC concept fits into either of these organizations and in each, service component coordination remains his prime responsibility. The UNAAF identifies coordination as a very necessary part of joint operations, giving specific guidance on the exercise of coordination authority. This authority is describe as follows; "A coordinating authority may be established by a joint force commander at any level for the purpose of obtaining coordination of specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces."/5 JCS Pub 1-02 adds, the coordinating authority does not have the authority to compel agreement. The JFACC concept definately fits in the category of a coordinating authority. Finally, the UNAAF authorizes the JFC to form a joint staff and organize it as he sees fit. An obvious omission in paragraph 3-57, Joint Staff Function, is any reference to a JFACC as a possible staff member. This may infer the JFACC is intended to be a functional commander under the JFC as defined in paragraph 3-26 (a). However, the JFACC can easily assume a special staff member's role, but in either case the JFACC's position will be based on the situation and/or the mission. For instance, a small Joint Task Force would most likely require the JFACC to be special staff officer to assist the JFC in air operations vice establishing an entirely separate staff.

The primary publication for JFACC doctrine is JCS Pub 3-01.1, Joint Doctrine for the Theater Counterair Operations. It is purposely emphasized in this publication because counterair operations requires the maximum cooperation and coordination between the services, The JFACC provides the key to this precise execution. The JFACC, as defined previously, is normally assigned additional responsibilities by the JFC. These may include the Area Air Defense Commander and the Airspace Control Authority; each in itself demanding precise coordination between the services. The specific duties of each of these are found in both JCS Pub 3-01.1 and 3-52, Joint Theater Airspace Control. Which service the JFACC comes from remains the prerogative of the JFC but, "will normally be from the service which has the preponderance of air assets within the JFC's theater of operations."/6 The enormous responsibility the JFACC assumes must include knowing the capabilities, limitations, missions, and requirements of all the service's air components to ensure the commander bases his guidance on a clear picture of the air situation. This will require a well coordinated joint air staff.

JFACC is also described in JCS Pub 3-04, Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air). The publication explains how the JFACC will integrate into the Composite Warfare Commander concept whether the JFACC is a Naval officer or from a different service. The authority and responsibilities given the JFACC in this publication, all corresponds with other joint publications and specifically directs component commanders to coordinate support of Joint Maritime Operations (Air) in accordance with the procedures and the agency or command designated by the JFC. The

Officer-in-Tactical-Command, Composite Warfare Commander (OTC-CWC), with the support of his Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC), "will endeavor to meet the requirements of the JFC, the JFACC, other elements or components of the joint force, and the warfare commanders."/7

To summarize, the JFACC doctrine is fully integrated into the JCS publications and has given the necessary leeway to the Joint Force Commander to form his staff and to organize as he best sees fit. However, one weakness can be found within the joint publication's system. There is no suggested structure for operating a JFACC's staff which results in an ad hoc arrangement for each operation. Formalizing a structure is not as critical as having a reference to guide the forming of a JFACC's staff in a crisis situation. JCS Pub 5-00.2, JTF Planning, was designed for this and could easily accomodate a JFACC's staff structure checklist.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

By reviewing the historical basis for the establishment of JFACC, much of how and when it should be used will be answered. This chapter will review three areas; (1) Air Coordination in Past Wars, (2) Air Coordination in Past Operations and, (3) Doctrinal Development.

Korea

The use of joint forces over the years has taken on great significance in the strategies we use to support our national objectives. Since World War II the growing pains experienced by all the services and the inevitable turmoil in the interservice arena produced many black days in the military's ability to support the Commander-in-Chief. Jointness was an anathema and it was heresy to speak joint within each service. As a result the service's needs drove the overall effort and the various CINCs needs were forgotten.

This was readily apparent in Korea as TF 77's carriers, primarily supporting the Marine forces, were diverted to support the desperate Eighth Army in the Pusan perimeter. The Fifth Air Force was supporting the Army at that time but more support was required. This immediate need could not be directed by the Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, but required not only the General's approval, but in addition the approval of LtGen Stratemyer (Commander of Far East Air Forces) and Admiral Turner Joy (COMNAVFE). The long, cumbersome chain of command

hindered the Supreme Commander, delaying needed air support at a critical time. Better command relations were attempted during the war through improvements in joint planning and an exchange of liaison officers between TF 77 and the Joint Operations Center./1 In this situation, a JFACC could have assisted only if General MacArthur had had command over all air assets within the Korean theater, but unfortunately, this was not the case. As a coordinator, the JFACC would have ensured all air efforts within that theater were coordinated and in concert with the commander's intent.

Vietnam

Vietnam brought unique difficulties to the area of air tasking and coordination. In this war much of the controversy involved the tasking of Marine air assets by the Air Force. The history behind the USMC Omnibus Agreement can be found in the many issues raised during this war. In 1962, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) as the unified commander, established a subunified command, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). However, the subunified command was not given like Air Force and Navy Component Commands. He, therefore, was forced to go to CINCPAC to obtain any air support for his command. In 1967, General Westmorland (USMACV) assigned a JFACC, General Momyer, Commander, Seventh Air Force. He explained this position provided a single manager for tactical combat aviation for all South Vietnam. He also stated the JFACC was created to allow flexibility in concentrating the air effort to improve

the efficiency of tactical airpower as a whole./2 There was no previous doctrine to base his decisions on but as the subunified commander he could organize his command as he saw fit. General Cushman, Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Force, objected to the decision due to the detrimental effects it would have on the integrity of the MAGTF. Gen Cushman based his objection primarily from JCS Pub 0-2, UNAAF, which stated, "organizational integrity of service components should be maintained in so far as practicable."/3 So heated was the argument that it required resolution by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard, who informed both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and CINCPAC to comply with General Westmorland's request. After the establishment of JFACC, COMSEVENTHAF exercised fragging and operational direction of all First Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) strike and reconnaissance aircraft. 1st MAW also reported all preplanned, fixed wing sorties for Air Force approval and assignment. Not only did the Marine commander disagree on the basis of breaking up his MAGTF, but he also felt the new system was complicated and degraded the responsiveness his ground commanders had long enjoyed./4 The reason for less responsiveness was due to the additional layers of command created by this system for the tasking process. A compromise was finally reached with the signing of MACV Directive 95-4 which retained the JFACC but made the system much more flexible./5

The JFACC seed was planted. However, in it's present state, unity of air effort was still not occurring. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided concerning the JFACC concept, so it would take an additional 20 years for the issues to be resolved.

General Overview of Past Operations

Command relationships and procedures for changing the command relationships between the JTF and component and supporting commands, should be specified by the applicable commanders before deployment begins./6

This paragraph is taken from the JCS Test Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, and emphasizes that command relationships should be clearly understood prior to conducting an operation. This single factor has had the greatest impact on the degree to which an operation has succeeded or failed and can directly effect many of the principles of warfare. The following operations will show how command relations, specifically in the air arena, can affect the overall success of each.

Operation Urgent Fury

On 25 October 1983, the United States conducted an operation on the island of Grenada in order to rescue U.S. citizens, eliminate a growing threat to the U.S. and reestablish law and order to the island. A joint task force was created, JTF 120, under the command of Admiral Metcalf who at the time was also Commander, Second Fleet. An established subunified command and OPPLAN was not used thus requiring an additional burden to be placed on the crisis action planning process in a very constrained timeframe. Most of the planning was conducted by Admiral Metcalf's Second Fleet staff. Air assets, numbering over 200, involved in the operation came from the Navy (fixed wing), the Air Force (fixed wing) and the Marine Corps (rotary wing). Neither a single air nor land component commander was established

for the operation and minimal augmentation to the Second Fleet Staff took place which greatly affected the air operations and to a lesser degree the ground battle. Coordination within the area's air space was basically an ad hoc arrangement established once the air war began. The E-3A, AWACCS, was the primary means whereby aircraft entering the area of operations (including MAC aircraft) were identified and routed. These aircraft were not always passed to CJTF-120 who was located on board his command ship. This resulted in the Navy intercepting inbound aircraft on several occasions. Air support for the ground commander either passed through the Navy's Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or the EC-130, Airborne Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC) aircraft, for coordination. This caused confusion within the airspace resulting in near collisions and even worse no support to the ground commander./7 Another factor which resulted in poor coordination was the lack of communication equipment's interoperability and cryptographic material's compatibility. Without this interoperability the coordination between the services would be impossible./8 By designating a JFACC from the start, most of these issues would have been solved or at a minimum identified. In this case, coordination was all that was needed, not command of all air assets. This operation also identified the requirement to develop joint contingency plans which would include the designation of a joint airspace control and coordinating authority and would delineate component and supporting command sectors of responsibility. Operation Urgent Fury's missions were all accomplished due to the resourcefulness of subordinate officers and the devotion of the troops, but much

improvement in the joint arena would be necessary before executing subsequent operations.


Operation El Dorado Canyon

Two and one-half years later another operation would take place, again requiring joint planning and execution. The operation was called El Dorado Canyon and would include both an Air Force and Navy component. Unlike Urgent Fury, time for planning was available. In this situation, the Joint Force Commander (COMCENTMEDOPS), who was also COMSIXTHFLT, established an exchange of liaison officers and coordinated the planning between the Naval Force, CTF-60, and the Third Air Force Strike Force. This would allow for the successful integration of both forces./9 The operation succeeded even without the assignment of an overall air coordinator or commander. The JFC in this case controlled the air, and rightfully so, since the mission was a small, highly focused air operation. Was a JFACC warranted for this operation? To keep the command relations simple and the JFC's organizational chain of command small, the JFACC was not included. This was the correct decision and should point out the JFACC concept was not designed for inclusion in all situations but was flexible enough to be used how and where the JFC saw fit.

Operation Just Cause

The last example used will be Operation Just Cause which was initiated on December 20, 1989. As seen with El Dorado Canyon, this operation had sufficient planning time resulting in a well coordinated plan between the services. However, in this case

only one service, the USAF, provided fixed wing air support lessening the likelihood of procedural or system interoperability problems. Although not identified as the JFACC, the Commander of 12th Air Force seemed to have served in that capacity for CJTF South during the operation. Figure (1) shows the command relations.




Source: Army Magazine, March 1990

A Joint Air Operations Control Center (JAOCC) was established which allowed for airspace management and was the clearing house for air support requests. However, problems surfaced as JSOC air and conventional air operations occurred simultaneously but under separate control requiring some type of coordination arrangement. Responding to this concern, JSOC liaison officers were assigned to the JAOCC which seemed to have resolved most of the problems. Was this operation truly joint in the air arena even if both Army and Air Force assets were involved. By the Air Force's horizontal view of the battlefield, rotary wing operations are not considered within the JFACC's purview thus making this a single service air operation. Therefore, no matter how

successful the air command and control aspect of this operation may have been, the JFACC concept had yet to be truly tested. Having said that, it must be seen that CJTF South saw how his force should be organized and how the command relations would be established. This was the key to the operation's success.

Operation Desert Storm

Full information has not yet been received on the specific organizational arrangements of the JFACC in Operation Desert Storm. However, it is known that COMCENTAF, General Horner, is designated the JFACC for CINCCENT and is producing a single air tasking order encompassing all joint and combined air assets. He is additionally designated the airspace control authority. Figure (2) presents the present chain-of-command for air tasking and airspace coordination.



Source: "Saudi Arabia: 1990," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1990, p. 45.

What authority he has been given by CINCCENT and if he is exercising OPCON over any assets other than Air Force was not known during this writing. However, it is clear the air war has been well coordinated among the services to this point. One must note that close air support has not been used as of yet and there has not been a true naval threat requiring large assets to be diverted to fleet protection. It is not until these areas become issues will the JFACC role be truly tested. This is where service coordination and JFC's guidance will become key to the attainment of the CINC's mission.

Lessons Learned

In summary, each operation has required the joint force commander to establish an organization tailored to the situation and the mission. A JFACC may or may not have a role in each situation but the JFC must ensure this decision is consciously made. In any case, coordination in the air arena is essential, and whether the JFC facilitates this or it is delegated to a JFACC is not important as long as it is done. Coordination continues to be the key, not command of the assets.

Doctrinal Development

As historical examples have indicated, the JFACC concept has moved toward a single management system. However, as late as 1984 when CINCCENT published his Operations SOP, COMUSCENTAF was designated the coordinating authority for air assets, the airspace control authority, and the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)./10 This involved no operational control of air assets

but it did involve authority to establish a joint airspace management system. Additionally, as the AADC, he coordinated and integrated air defense operations within the commander's area of operations. COMUSCENTAF was also responsible for common air tasking which required a plan for all excess sorties provided by each service. A precursor to the Omnibus Agreement is also found in this document in addition to an explanation of the authority of a Commander of an Amphibious Task Force (CATF) as it relates to air within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). According to the CINCCENT SOP the CATF retains complete authority within the AOA with current doctrine stating, a JFACC may be assigned to his staff and may in some cases not be a Naval officer./11

With no JFACC doctrine established until 1986 it was previously up to the CINC to coordinate with each service component and determine what command relationships were best for the situation. JFACC has now given him an additional tool to use in the accomplishment of his mission.

CHAPTER FOUR

SERVICE'S PERSPECTIVE OF JFACC

As one may guess, each service has a stand on the JFACC concept. The different perspectives normally revolve around the issues of:

1. Who will perform the duties of JFACC?
2. What authority will the JFACC have?
3. Should the joint forces commander organize his forces under a functional or component command structure?

These issues still separate the services, though to a lesser degree, and all depend on the joint force commander's desires and personality.

United States Air Force Perspective

As the service concerned primarily with air operations as defined by Title 10 USC 8062, the USAF naturally looks at air power from a much higher plane. Emphasis is placed at the theater level, centralizing management at the highest level in order to bring its weight to bear at specific points within that theater. Air Force Doctrine seeks a single management system through functionally organizing the joint force which is more in line with the NATO environment./1 Overall, the United States Air Force desires a functionally organized joint force so that all theater air assets may be controlled by a single manager. As stated by AFM 1-1, "centralized control allows an air commander to focus an air effort on those priorities which will lead to victory."/2 Additionally, the manual adds, "As a critical element of the interdependent land-naval-aerospace team, aerospace power can be the decisive force in warfare."/3

United States Navy Perspective

The Navy still maintains a concern that if the JFACC is not a Naval officer a full appreciation of the complexities of fleet defense may unknowingly restrict or limit carrier options or syphon sorties to other missions resulting in unnecessary damage to or sinking of ships. The Navy, therefore, advocates command relations along the lines of service components so their primary mission of sea control can be fulfilled. As can be seen, the JFACC's role under the Air Force preference of functional command versus the Navy's preference of service component command would require entirely different relations. In one case the JFACC would possibly have command authority over the other services assets whereas the other would be concerned more with coordination. In either, the Navy would need to integrate the JFACC into their composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine as discussed previously in the JCS Publication section.

United States Army Perspective

The Army recognizes the JFACC in its Large Unit Operations Manual, FM 100-6. They also recognize operational conditions will heavily influence the structure of a theater war. Coordination with other component commanders is emphasized throughtout the manual and it directs the theater Army commander to coordinate with the air component commander in the communications zone for all air defense, air based defense, and airspace control./4 With this said, historically the Air Force has established a horizontal division of the battlefield, concerning themselves with airspace above fifty feet. Helicopter

operations have traditionally been separated from the fixed wing operations with the JFACC concerning himself with only the latter. This has left the Army supporting the JFACC doctrine but along more of a service component command structure. Ultimately, the Army supports any doctrine which allows corps control of air resources that are delegated by the theater or JFC which is in line with their Air-Land Battle Doctrine.

United States Marine Corps Perspective

As will be expected, the Marine Corps view is very different from the other services. Title 10 USC 5013 states, "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet...in the prosecution of a Naval campaign...and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct."/5 From this tasking the Marine Corps was formed deriving its combat power from the combination of all its arms. The Marine Corps argues against centralized management of their assets because Marine Air is tailored to a specific mission for the MAGTF rather than for general theater air warfare. It is designed and is responsive to the Marine ground combat commander. The Marine Corps has stated, that it enthusiastically supports joint operations and the JFACC doctrine but feels the best way to attain the joint force objectives is through the employment of service components in a manner consistent with their design and optimum warfighting capabilities./6

Service Perspective Summary

To summarize, each service has made it clear what it feels is the best way to support the Joint Force Commander. Concurrently, each service continues to support the JFACC doctrine. The Marine Corps has further stated its position through the Omnibus Agreement. But it is still clear that only the Joint Force Commander will decide what his organization will look like and what responsibilities the JFACC should be given.


CHAPTER FIVE

JFACC'S ROLE

Up to this point I have tried to show that the JFACC is a position which will mold to the situation as the JFC sees fit. Presently, there is no CINC staff with a permanently established Joint Force Air Component Commander. With this in mind, the JFACC may be established early in the planning stage or may not be selected until it is time to execute. JCS Pub 0-2 (UNAAF) does not mention JFACC in its discussion of joint staff but may be easily included as a part of the JFC's special staff. Therefore, as a special staff officer, his main responsibilities would include advising and coordinating; responsibilities identified in the DOD definition of JFACC. A wiring diagram for this case may look something like this:

FIGURE 3


JFACC Within a JFC's Staff



This command relationship may be desired if a situation such as El Dorado Canyon is encountered. Another extreme may take place, such as Desert Storm, where a JFACC may have command authority as well as coordination authority. This command authority is as

extensive or as restrictive as the JFC desires and does not necessarily include operational control (OPCON). The following diagram depicts this relation.

FIGURE 4
JFACC Within a JFC's Command Structure



Therefore, whether the situation involves a protracted land campaign, combined maritime/land operation, or a single service exercise, the JFACC is a flexible tool the joint force commander can use as the situation warrants.

Joint Force Commander's Requirements

Most OPPLANS and CONPLANS which are on the shelf today designate command relations. This should include how C2 will be organized within the air arena and what responsibilities and authority the JFACC will have during planning and execution. This is of course what we strive for but as we have seen, historically does not occur. Operations such as Urgent Fury gives us a good example that every plan is subject to change. Commanders change and situations change requiring OPPLAN changes which may or may not occur. The result many times is an exercise of the crisis action planning cycle versus an execution of previous deliberate planning. Which method is used is not the

issue but through each, the Joint Force Commander must ask the following questions when establishing a JFACC under his command:


1. Which service air forces are involved in the operation? If only one service is involved, the JFACC requirement is a mute point.
2. Which service has provided the preponderance of air and air defense assets? Or which service possesses the best air control capability? By definition, the service with the preponderance of air assets in theater should provide the JFACC.
3. According to JFC's mission which air functions will be considered the most critical? For example, if rotary wing operations are the most critical, the JFACC should obviously come from either the Marine Corps or the Army.
4. Will the joint force be functionally or service component organized? If functionally divided, does this degrade the effectiveness of a service to a point where it will affect the overall forces ability to accomplish the mission? This question is the most difficult for the JFC to answer. But he must always be aware of the dangers associated with breaking the service's integrity when those forces have the most to offer as a whole.
5. How much command authority should the JFACC be given to properly carry out his duties? The JFC must determine if OPCON is necessary for the JFACC to carry out his assigned mission or will tasking and allocating authority be sufficient.
6. Finally, what responsibilities should the JFACC be given (i.e. airspace control authority, area air defense commander, air allocation authority)? These responsibilities must be clearly stated in the JFC's directives to ensure all these functions are accomplished.

The JFC must make these decisions and clearly express them in the OPPLAN or OPORDER if the proper command and control structure is to be established.

To be successful the JFACC must immediately form a joint air staff that has a thorough knowledge of each services capabilities and limitations. Each service component's representative must be

able to clearly relay the requirements of their component commander and ensure the JFACC is fully aware of those needs. Through commander's guidance, effective representation from each component, and close coordination with each component, the JFACC's decisions will normally be in concert with the component commanders. To illustrate this process the following figure is given:

FIGURE 5
Air Coordination Sequence



Note: Numbers represent sequence of events

-----Liaison

JFACC'S Duties and Responsibilities

Now that the JFC has determined a JFACC is necessary whether through the deliberate planning process or because a changing operational environment has dictated its use, the duties and responsibilities must be clearly delineated. The following list of responsibilities includes some of those that may be considered but are not necessarily required in each case. They are as follows:

1. Coordinate with all service components to ensure their requirements are identified.

2. Establish an appropriate joint air staff ensuring all services are properly represented.
3. Be familiar with all limitations and capabilities of each service's air force.
4. Be familiar with the mission of each service component.
5. Ensure interoperability and compatibility of the service air component's communications, tactics, and cryptographic material in order to allow for joint operations.
6. Recommend to the Joint Force Commander apportionment of air sorties to specific missions or geographical areas.
7. Plan, coordinate, allocate, and task air assets based on the Joint Force Commander's guidance.
8. If so designated as Airspace Control Authority, establish a coordinated airspace management system within the JFC's theater of operation.
9. If so designated as the Area Air Defense Commander, coordinate all air defense within the JFC's theater of operations.

These have been but a few responsibilities the JFC may assign the JFACC and may be expanded or reduced depending on the extent the JFC envisions his use of the JFACC.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The military faces many challenges today and each service is trying its best to evaluate the threat and organize and train to meet that threat. The rhetoric of the past concerning jointness is slowly fading and each service has recognized the need to support the Commander-in-Chief in whatever way they can to accomplish the overall strategic and political goals. The military service must continue to cooperate in the joint arena if the full power of the United States is to be brought to bear in any future situation. The Joint Force Air Component Commander is just one concept that will allow the various CINCs and Joint Force Commanders the ability to ensure a coordinated effort is attained. Coordination between the services is the critical issue and the JFACC can be the conduit in which this is possible. However, it remains the responsibility of the Joint Force Commander to organize his force the way he sees fit and within that organization the JFACC, if designated, will command as much authority as the JFC decides to delegate. The JFACC's primary responsibility will continue to be coordination of the service's air forces and should never assume that command of those assets is necessary. Various steps, such as establishing crisis planning checklists, can be taken to assist the JFC in deciding whether a JFACC is necessary or not and those steps must be taken. Operation Desert Storm has shown jointness is a reality and how well the services perform together may be the key to winning the war.

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