PREPARING THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
FOR THE NEXT OUT-OF-AREA CAMPAIGN:
LINKING NATO AND THE WEU

Thomas-Durell Young
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COMMENTS

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FOREWORD

The DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM campaign demonstrated once again the inherent strength of the Western Alliance to respond to challenges to common security interests. Nonetheless, the efforts on the part of the Western European Union (WEU), while supportive of the overall goals of the Western Alliance, were disruptive in regard to command and control during the allied buildup in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The question U.S. officials and planners must now confront is how the WEU can be brought into a framework whereby its interest in meeting security challenges outside of Europe can be closely coordinated with North America and existing expertise in NATO. This study argues that one possible solution would be to form a joint NATO-WEU planning headquarters for the purpose of maintaining interoperability and general plans for such campaigns, should the political authorities of alliance members so agree.

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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as a contribution to the ongoing debate to reform the institutions of the Western Alliance.

Karl W. Robinson
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has been a National Security Affairs Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1988. Prior to this appointment he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland; his M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
Introduction.

The current phase in East-West detente has had a fundamental effect on the Western Alliance. NATO's institutional structure, basic strategy and doctrinal concepts are all under review, and for good reason. After all, it is clear that future security challenges to the Western Alliance, even in the form of a hypothetical Soviet threat, will be faced by the West under completely different political circumstances and geopolitical conditions. While NATO military structures and national defense and diplomatic bureaucracies have produced a large number of proposals to bring NATO into line with the evolving political realities in Europe, one issue has complicated alliance efforts to reach agreement on these needed reforms. The August 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait forced the alliance to confront once again the perennial and almost insoluble problem of "out-of-area" conflicts at a time when the alliance is in the midst of review and restructuring. Most importantly, it is quite likely that the outcome of the Persian Gulf peace settlement could have a major effect on the eventual outcome of reforming NATO.

The problem that has continued to plague NATO since its inception is that the alliance's applicability is limited by the North Atlantic Treaty's reference to geographical boundaries as stated in Article 6. Whereas there is no limitation to what individual member states, or any collective body of them, can do outside the alliance's area of application, there is no legal, let alone as yet political, basis for joint responses under the rubric of the alliance. The existence of this problem has long been identified by Europeans and has resulted in reviving the hitherto "sleepy" Western European Union (WEU). The WEU is the sole Western European organization, as defined by its
charter treaty (the 1948 Brussels Treaty, modified by the 1954 Protocol), which is concerned with collective self-defense and has no geographical limitations. Under the leadership of its current Secretary General, the former Dutch Defense Minister Dr. Willem van Eekelen, the WEU has attempted to fulfill two new roles. These are the response to threats to members' collective security outside of the geographic area covered by NATO, as well as that of serving as the basis for the strengthening of the European defense pillar. Other proposals for institutional reform have included changing the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for out-of-area contingencies, as well as merging NATO and the WEU.

It is simply too early to estimate exactly what type of changes, if any, the heads of government of the respective NATO countries will agree to in the existing institutional structure and the strategy of the Western Alliance. Yet, this should not imply that attention should not be directed toward, and reforms effected concerning, the issue of improving the "West's" ability to respond to out-of-area contingencies. One would think that, given the extremely sensitive nature of this issue, it is inconceivable that now would be the proper time to bring attention to this divisive matter. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why the alliance would be well served to address the problems associated with out-of-area deployments at this point.

First, in view of the overwhelming support that exists in Europe for the United States to remain diplomatically engaged in the affairs of the continent, and for it to continue to maintain a forward military presence, it would be wise for European officials to ensure that Washington does not reach the conclusion that NATO has become atavistic and no longer accommodates U.S. security requirements. A good hypothetical example of this specific type of problem would result if the ongoing NATO strategy review process produced a new strategy that is eminently well-suited to meeting residual and increasingly less immediate military threats from the Soviet Union, while ignoring the more realistic likelihood of threats to common Western interests emanating from North Africa and the Middle East. At the very least, such an eventuality could
encourage Washington to review closely the option of initiating bilateral defense arrangements with NATO members that share Washington's security objectives, which could be at the expense of NATO collective activities and programs.  

Second, despite the views of some in Europe that such contingencies will not elicit a response from Western Europe, there are strong rationales to suggest that instability in the south will increase in frequency and intensity in the near future. Population growth that outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome (vide: Christian) East Europeans who are willing to integrate themselves into European society. At the same time, West European investment and aid is being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an increasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists with increasing access to long-range weapons of mass destruction. This situation is fraught with risk for Europe, as well as for the United States, and should be addressed in common.

If then, one assumes that there is a need to make NATO (or whatever metastatic organization that replaces it) relevant to its principal members while at the same time addressing European political sensitivities regarding relations with their neighbors, there would appear to be limited political room within which to maneuver. Moreover, one can assume without any doubt that regardless of whatever alliance reform produces concerning the out-of-area issue, the principle of noncommitment prior to the existence of an accepted threat will continue to prevail in NATO. In consequence, it can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that alliance members will continue to address these scenarios in their traditional ad hoc way. In spite of these seemingly severe limitations, this essay will argue that there may be a basis for alliance activity in an important area of defense cooperation that would facilitate NATO member states' out-of-area deployments. Moreover, by assessing a major problem that has plagued the deployment of allied forces to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia during the build-up prior to the Persian Gulf War, i.e.,
the command and control (C²) controversy, it will be argued that the consequences of not initiating such cooperation between Western countries would outweigh their potential political costs in some alliance countries.

From this requirement to cooperate regarding out-of-area contingencies, two points need to be understood. First, the cooperation envisaged in this essay would solely facilitate allied joint out-of-area deployments. It would not imply from any governmental a priori political commitment or agreement to supply forces to any contingency. Rather, what it would do is ensure that in the event of political consensus to act between any number of alliance members, there would be the military basis for all members of the Western Alliance to participate in allied ad hoc joint deployment and operations. Second, such cooperation could be accomplished within whichever organizational structure felt comfortable to the participating members. In other words, this cooperation which would consist of basic staff planning to enable the creation of scenario-specific plans and periodic combined exercises could conceivably be carried out under the auspices of either NATO, the WEU, or conceivably the best solution jointly between these two organizations. What must be recognized by the alliance as a whole is that given the growing sophistication of some Third World military establishments it would be exceedingly imprudent to assume that the preparation time the coalition against Iraq enjoyed will be available in future contingencies. Indeed, it will be argued that the Iraqi case should be interpreted by members of the Western Alliance as highlighting the clear need to establish the foundation for allied force projection. Since without such a basis, the current circumstances suggest potentially devastating results could occur in future campaigns.

National Command and Operational Control Defined.

At the outset of this discussion, a distinction needs to be made concerning "national command" and "operational control" and how this is dealt with in coalition warfare. In essence, national command concerns the internal administration, unit training, logistic support, management, and discipline of armed forces by national authorities.
Operational control, on the other hand, relates solely to the actual employment of armed forces for designated objectives, and this can be exercised either by national or allied commanders. Wartime C² structures have long been in existence in NATO which allow for the "chopping" of national units to NATO military commands for their employment. For instance, the German Army's 12th Panzer Division would to be given operational control over a U.S. Army brigade from VII Corps in a wartime situation. At the same time it needs to be stressed that no government surrenders national command of its armed forces to any other country or organization.¹² This important distinction is well accepted in the Western Alliance by all of its participants since it allows, in principle, for the most efficient use of allied forces.¹³ As a general rule, in a crisis situation national units of an allied formation will operate in a loose association with the central command authority. As conflict becomes more likely, the command association incrementally becomes more firm to the point where operational control is exercised by an allied headquarters once conflict actually commences.¹⁴ However, to be effective, both militarily and politically, clear high level arrangements need to exist among allies. "Unity of command," after all, is one of the principles of war as defined by the United States. In the best of wartime C² circumstances, arrangements should be established and tested in peacetime in both field and command post exercises to ensure that they do indeed function. John Collins argues that these arrangements serve four essential purposes:

- "They establish mutually acceptable lines of responsibility and authority.

- They reduce the likelihood of serious misunderstandings in emergency.

- They increase the likelihood that collaboration will be close and continuous.

- They affirm the sovereignty of individual states."¹⁵
At the same time, coalition participants are not disposed to allow the use of their forces in situations that could jeopardize their immediate security, or their own specific national interests and objectives. Consequently, rules of engagement (ROEs), both national and coalition, as well as national guidelines, are issued to commanders which "delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force is initiated and/or continued with other forces encountered."

According to Ashley Roach, ROEs "ensure armed force is used to achieve and not to defeat the desired political goal." In a coalition setting, allied commanders and associated formations must understand the ROEs of foreign units which have been "chopped" to them so as to prevent potentially disastrous consequences. National commanders have the right, and indeed the responsibility, to ensure that the specific operational tasks assigned to them by their coalition commanders conform with their own national roles and missions. A contemporary example of the employment of national guidelines in a conflict within a coalition is found in the explanation of the use of Italian aircraft in the Persian Gulf War. Italian Defense Minister Virginio Rognoni stated in the press that it is only after a particular mission had been determined for Italian forces that operational control was transferred to "American" command. He continued, "It is up to the Italian command to decide which target is suitable for our forces. And since the targets are to be attacked by integrated forces, the coordination can only be American."

It is standard practice in the Western Alliance that any disagreements that arise between allied command and national units are referred to the alliance and to the respective national government for resolution. While this may appear at first glance to constitute a major impediment to the judicious and efficient employment of force, it needs to be recognized that combined operations necessitate the existence of consensus among the members if they are to have any aspirations for success. Fortunately for the Western Alliance, it has forty years of experience dealing with this nettlesome issue, albeit problems remain.
Command and Control in the Persian Gulf Crisis.

While the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War offers an excellent example of the difficulties faced by any coalition of states oriented against a common enemy, in one sense it does present the Western Alliance with an unusual situation for the purposes of future planning that ought to be of immediate concern. The anti-Iraq coalition had the unusual, if not extraordinary, ability to deploy forces against Iraq, indeed right up to the border of Kuwait, with a complete absence of enemy interference. In other words, it would be exceedingly imprudent to assume that future contingencies will have the unusual combination of an unhindered ability to deploy and mass forces, complemented by the existence of modern and extensive port and transhipment facilities which allowed the anti-Iraq coalition to concentrate its forces in theater. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the time delay between the initial deployment of forces and the United Nations' January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraq to evacuate Kuwait enabled the coalition to sort out allied C² and coordination of ROEs. Without a doubt, had Baghdad chosen to launch a preemptive strike against the coalition's forces in November or December (at which time the issue of C² was apparently being resolved), the lack of a clear C² structure and standardized ROEs, at least among the members of the Western Alliance, would have impeded a coordinated, and possibly successful, defense.

Admittedly, the politically sensitive character of C² and ROEs does not, however, always lend itself to the resolution of difficulties a priori of the existence of a conflict. The reason for this, of course, is that every contingency warranting a coalition military response is different. In the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was assembled what must be considered a sui generis coalition of forces, literally from around the world. Therefore, the establishment of an acceptable C² structure was no facile task.

While many details of the anti-Iraq coalition's command and control structure have not been released publicly, it is possible to glean from press reports a sense of the general difficulties faced by the coalition during the pre-conflict
deployment period. The coalition's forces were apparently commanded by the Strategic National Committee, which was chaired by the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Lt. Gen. Khalid bin Sultan and U.S. Commander-in-Chief Central Command General Norman Schwarzkopf. Under this body were two component command committees. One was comprised of senior commanders from the Western forces and chaired by General Schwarzkopf and the other, made up of the Joint Arab Islamic Force (JAIF), was commanded by Lt. Gen. Sultan. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, France exercised national control over its forces, while in close cooperation with the JAIF. (It was only just hours prior to the outbreak of hostilities on January 16, that the French government announced that its forces in the theater would come under U.S. operational control "for a specific period and [for] predetermined missions.") A Coalition, Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center was established to provide a liaison structure between these two commands. According to one source, it was not determined whether this center would indeed serve a command function in war, although subsequent events would appear to demonstrate this was indeed the case.

Clearly, despite apparent difficulties associated with predictable command problems with French forces, the primary challenges to unified C² were associated with the coordination of Western and Islamic forces. albeit even British forces under U.S. operational control experienced their own comparatively minor difficulties. Parenthetically, according to press reports, these difficulties were extenuated by the nonexistence of a national Saudi C² structure. Reportedly, prior to the August invasion of Kuwait and the allied build-up, there was no effective C² above the brigade level and even basic command procedures were inadequate. The solution to this conundrum was to allow national ground forces to fight independently at the operational level within NATO's "layer-cake" concept of essentially dividing the potential battlefield between forces and thereby assigning each nation its own territorial area of responsibility.

One exception to this general situation was the close relationship between the British and American armed services.
So close was this relationship that the British Army’s 1st Armoured Division was given tactical operational control over a U.S. brigade. One would expect this sort of arrangement between two countries with a long association of peacetime cooperation, both within NATO, as well as at the bilateral level. The question is, how can this particular aspect of $C^2$ cooperation be institutionalized for other future contingencies where other Western forces are involved? To be sure, it is unlikely that Western ground forces could attain the high degree of interoperability of Western and Western-equipped air forces. The use of the anti-Iraqi coalition’s air forces, under the operational control of U.S. and Saudi AWACS aircraft and employing common tasking orders, flying approximately 2000 sorties a day during the first days of conflict, demonstrates the incalculable value of equipment and doctrinal standardizations; a condition NATO armies are far from achieving. But as demonstrated by reviewing the experience of the coordination of Western naval forces in the Persian Gulf, a case can be made that it is not existing operational doctrines, but rather the political basis for cooperation that requires reform.

That the navies of the Western Alliance were confronted with operational control difficulties is unusual since Western navies, like their air force counterparts, are very much international in disposition, equipment and consequently, orientation. For instance, when circumstances require the coordinated activity of two allied ships, standard operating procedures hold that the senior officer present, irrespective of nationality, assumes operational command of the formation. In the Persian Gulf War, however, operations between Western naval forces were hindered as a result of ineffectual political coordination at the highest levels in Europe.

Some, but by no means all, European naval forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf following a meeting of WEU foreign and defense ministers in Paris on August 21, 1990, almost three weeks after the invasion of Kuwait. These forces were to join up and coordinate with U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian forces that were already, or soon to be, operating in the Gulf. Their purpose was to help enforce
the naval blockade of Iraq in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. A week later, a WEU meeting of the Chiefs of Staff and several Chiefs of Naval Staff was held in Paris to set up procedures for the cooperation of WEU forces. This resulted in a three tier mechanism being adopted, similar to that used in the WEU deployment in 1987, which included the creation of an ad hoc group of experts from foreign and defense ministries, naval points of contact in capitals and permanent coordination in Paris (with each navy represented by a senior officer), and coordination between operational commanders. French naval headquarters in Paris evidently provides for WEU C2 coordination and intelligence sharing for members' vessels operating in the Gulf.

According to press reports, actual operational coordination was not decided upon until a conference was held among the WEU navies, which took place on board the French vessel the Dupleix, in the area of the Hormuz Straits, from September 10-14, in order to establish zones of operation. Five were subsequently established. What is interesting from the perspective of this study, however, is that this arrangement was only agreed to on September 18, following the French Navy's inability to reach agreement on September 13 with representatives of the Royal Navy on a geographical sharing of patrol zones. Apparently, the WEU, under French pressure, wanted to create its own regional C2, while leaving the U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Navy and Canadian Maritime Forces to coordinate activities among themselves. Command coordination among all allied navies was reportedly created for joint action in Bahrain during a meeting held aboard the French frigate, Montcalm, on September 9 and 10. Here it was decided that the French would coordinate French/WEU force activity and the United States would coordinate all the others. This situation apparently did not sit well for one member of the WEU, the British, who at some point early on joined forces with their Anglo-Saxon naval colleagues under U.S. Navy C2.

Moreover, at least from the perspective of one Congressional Research Service study published on September 21, coordination among Western naval forces
remained insufficient. Even as late as the end of December, according to another Congressional Research Service report, Western naval forces enforcing trade sanctions against Iraq were doing so under national command and there was still "...no formal command arrangement; a situation that would not suffice in the event of armed conflict." The same report also claimed that the WEU only played a limited role in coordinating deployment of its members’ naval forces and had not established an operational command arrangement. This critical assessment of the much publicly touted WEU deployment is in agreement with a remarkably frank assessment of the deployment found in a WEU Assembly report, issued on November 7. This report noted that WEU forces did not possess an accepted tactical command structure (and, therefore, lacked the capability to effect coordinated and directed responses) and still had not achieved coordination of national ROEs or logistic support functions. The document also made a startling claim that it was discovered in the midst of actual operations (much to the surprise of WEU forces), that U.S. forces in the area were using a fourth channel in their Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.

The WEU’s ultimate failure to create an effective naval C^2 structure can be seen by the Dutch government’s decision of January 9 to place its frigates deployed to the Gulf under American command (with the task to help protect U.S. aircraft carriers) in the event of war. This left French naval C^2 authorities, upon the commencement of hostilities, exercising operational control over Belgian, Spanish, and their own ships in the war zone. The WEU was therefore unable to coordinate effectively and in a timely manner a modest naval deployment, which is recognized by its Secretary General as being easier to achieve than air and ground force coordination. Thus, the WEU’s inability to meet its members’ security objectives ought to be obvious.

It seems inexcusable for the navies of the Western Alliance to experience these C^2 and interoperability difficulties. Clearly, the problem rests at the political level and not with the military forces in the Gulf. After all, the navies of the Western Alliance have had forty years of experience in peacetime cooperation
and coordination of their operational procedures, not to mention the existence of Allied Tactical Publications and Allied Communication Publications. They also regularly conduct a wide range exercises, have participated in standing naval formations since the 1960s, and deployed to the Persian Gulf together in 1987 and 1988. In view of this disorganization, in a conflict needless lives and equipment could be lost, both to enemy action, and quite likely from avoidable fratricide. The case of the navies is clearly indicative of an even more serious problem which could have faced Western ground forces in Kuwait and Iraq. One can easily contemplate that in some future hypothetical contingency where there would be a larger Western ground force presence, the combat implications of poor planning and coordination could have the terrible result of destroying the fragile political consensus which exists among our allies for future out-of-area deployments. Notwithstanding the WEU’s value for providing a framework for ad hoc cooperation between its members and North America, the Gulf crisis demonstrates that a more formalistic structure is required beyond the current two-pillar arrangement.55

Imperatives for Reform.

The Western Alliance, therefore, needs to ascertain to what degree political consensus exists on this issue to enable it to avoid these operational impediments. One would think that given the vast success NATO has been able to achieve over the years to improve interoperability, create wartime C^2 structures and harmonize national ROEs, it should be a relatively simple exercise for the West to draw on this body of extant expertise, doctrines, and procedural manuals to facilitate future out-of-area deployments. What is needed, therefore, is to develop a politically acceptable method by which NATO "assets," as argued by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, can be made available to alliance members engaged in out-of-area contingencies. After all, continues Woerner, the North Atlantic Treaty "...does not limit the scope of our security planning or coordination; nor does it exclude joint action."56

The impediment to accomplishing this seemingly obvious requirement is, of course, European sensitivities about
becoming unwilling participants in "adventures" deemed critical by other alliance members that are of little concern to them. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that Western European countries are becoming increasingly anxious with potential threats to their common security on their southern and southeastern flanks. The condemnation by the North Atlantic Assembly of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait and NATO's formal ministerial meetings and daily coordination sessions on the crisis were unprecedented, and indicate a sufficient basis for a more formalistic common approach to this issue.

Numerous Western European countries are far advanced in the development of forces for these types of contingencies. The French created the Force d'Action Rapide in 1983 for the purpose of providing a hard-hitting mobile force for both European and Third World operations. The Italian Army subsequently created the Forca di Intervento Rapido in 1985 and the Spanish in 1988 tested for the first time its Fuerze de Accion Rapida, a formation modeled on the French and Italian examples. Albeit lacking in sufficient indigenous airlift, the British have designated their 24th Airmobile brigade as their Mobile Force for these types of operations, along with the 5th Airborne brigade. There is no logical reason why these efforts should not be coordinated in NATO and exercised on a regular basis.

Despite the fact that NATO is currently in the throes of institutional reform and perhaps in search of new missions in the post-cold war world, there is sufficient reason to assume that it would be fruitless for the United States, or any other member for that matter, to press for the formal inclusion of such out-of-area operations within the alliance's purview alone. There is too much emotional baggage, particularly in Europe, for such an eventuality and it would also most likely exclude the one European country most interested and militarily prepared to contribute to such operations (i.e., France), from the arrangement. The final chapter in the history of the cold war has yet to be written and the events in the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union in winter 1991 point toward the likelihood that NATO will continue to have relevance to its members for some time to come. Thus, given the importance of maintaining
consensus for the continuation of NATO for its most important mission, introducing such a divisive issue as out-of-area planning, at a time when the alliance is undergoing what could be fundamental reform and reorientation, could well be counterproductive.

At the same time, it is evident that other options are limited. During Italy’s presidency of the Commission of the European Community (EC), Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis proposed that the role of the WEU be shifted to the European Political System’s framework in order to give the EC a foreign and security purview. In this vein, the EC summit held in Rome in December 1990 gave unreserved approval to the “principle of a common foreign policy achieved by majority vote within a single decision-making body.” It is interesting to note that De Michelis’ proposal was subsequently rejected by the Assembly of the WEU out of fear that such a move might weaken NATO. Yet, it must be accepted that even within this proposed framework, the EC would still be far from being an appropriate body within which to deal with security issues in Europe proper, let alone outside. The reluctance of Denmark and neutral Ireland to support the inclusion of foreign and defense issues within the EC does not portend well. Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have expressed opposition to this proposal, since it excludes the United States and NATO. Moreover, the desire on the part of Austria to have its application to join the EC decided in 1993 will require the Community to choose whether it is to be a true political unity or, as stated by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, merely a “Zollverein.” In the final analysis, therefore, the EC has to define its own vision of itself before it can seriously begin to consider adopting new and politically controversial roles.

Linking NATO and the WEU.

Short of the creation of some new security organization that will deal with the issue of extra-regional security, it becomes apparent that the WEU, from the perspective of Western Europe, is the appropriate forum in which to discuss these issues. As the sole Western European organization that 1) concerns itself with its members’ security, and 2) has no geographic limitations in its applicability, the WEU is well
situated to play a leading role in addressing its members' security concerns. While it is problematic whether the WEU can rightly claim to have served as a catalyst for its members responding to events in the Persian Gulf in 1990/91, the fact remains that the organization is the only one capable of providing the essential political support for these endeavors, as well as wanting to deal effectively with the issue. The WEU also deserves credit for having been largely responsible for garnering Western European support in 1987 to respond jointly to the mining of the Persian Gulf. Thus, while admittedly the WEU naval response to the Gulf, as analyzed above, is far from being the grand operational success the WEU may wish us to believe, the fact remains that at least the organization, no matter how ill-prepared it currently may be, has attempted to coordinate its members' response to out-of-area contingencies.

If one assumes that the WEU is the appropriate organization to direct Western European engagement in out-of-area operations, a major problem becomes apparent in regard to what role the United States and NATO are to play. In addition, it is also necessary to define what type of cooperation and planning are politically acceptable and militarily sufficient. These are two different, but closely related issues, which would be best dealt with separately.

In terms of institutional structure, it would appear to be both reasonable and possible that, at a very minimum, a formal liaison relationship and joint military body needs to be created between NATO and the WEU. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it would enable the Western Alliance to benefit from an enormous amount of military expertise that exists in NATO, without necessitating replication. To be sure, power projection and sustainment over potentially vast distances is not an area with which NATO has overly concerned itself, and would require substantial doctrinal and conceptual assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Nonetheless, the basis for cooperation and coordination between defense forces does exist within NATO and should be utilized. Secondly, a joint institutional arrangement would not limit either of these two bodies from engaging in
reorganization and reform, both at the moment or in the future. Both organizations play important roles in their respective principal areas of responsibility and should not be hindered in any way from reforming themselves to meet changing security and political conditions. Thus, should the EC and WEU wish to merge at some point, the WEU’s correspondent relationship with NATO under this proposal should not impede further European political and security integration.

The purpose of achieving a liaison between these two organizations basically would allow the WEU to provide the necessary political framework for WEU nations to engage in out-of-area cooperation, while employing largely existing NATO expertise. Nonetheless, there could be potential problems which can be identified early on. For instance, there are some in Europe, particularly the French, who see an enlarged WEU, independent of the United States and NATO, as a supplement for NATO and particularly for Washington’s leadership position of the Western Alliance in Europe. In this respect, a number of rather ambitious proposals have been put forward by the Assembly of the WEU for that organization to take a leadership role in Europe in a number of specific areas, e.g., developing a satellite verification capability to monitor Soviet compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty and to track potential out-of-area threats. It is interesting to note that despite the enormous amount of self-congratulation which emanated from the WEU following its decision to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf, its track record of coordinating allied efforts there has been unsatisfactory. And in any case, it does not make sound sense in this era of finite defense resources to replicate what already exists in NATO or what that organization is well situated to create in the short term. For instance, contrasting the enormous C3I structure of NATO with the WEU’s secretariat in London, which does not even possess secure communications to NATO headquarters, should demonstrate that both organizations should limit themselves to what they are best equipped to do.

Finally as regards institutional issues, it is recognized that the membership of the WEU does not include a number of European countries in NATO. It is interesting to note that in
spite of the WEU's strong interest in out-of-area contingencies, its membership does not include NATO members outside of the Central Region; i.e., Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey. This should not present any major legal or political impediments since one of the purposes of creating a joint liaison body between NATO and the WEU would be to enable participation by NATO members who are not part of the WEU. One would think that the mere existence of coordination between those countries in NATO wishing to participate in developing the capability of conducting out-of-area contingencies could serve as a catalyst for further Western defense integration. To be sure, it can be predicted that French sensitivities would have to be assuaged. Since a wartime C^2 structure and hierarchy would not have to be predetermined prior to an agreement by participants to deploy forces, this structure would not have the same political "baggage" that has alienated France from some NATO military activities in the past. Finally, in view of Paris' interest in out-of-area threats to its security, a strong case could be made to encourage France to take a major leadership role in the establishment and development of this liaison body.

Indeed, to ensure a definite WEU "flavor" to this combined structure (which may be essential for its acceptance), it would be wise to limit the planning headquarters' staff to seconded field grade officers from WEU members. In time of crisis, the staff would be complemented by personnel seconded from participating states and these officers would take the lead in planning for the contingency. Planning within this framework to respond to specific contingencies as directed by political authorities would be greatly facilitated if countries commenced, solely as a national endeavor, out-of-area contingency planning. Thus, if release of these plans were allowed by national political authorities, an enhanced planning basis could be provided to the joint planning staff. The small permanent staff would act as custodians of alliance interoperability with the task of simply maintaining and testing it through periodic exercises, and in crisis, providing a basis for expansion. This cadre staff could also prepare force tailored packages to operate in various conditions, e.g., desert, jungle, over-the-beach, airmobile, airborne, etc. It may also be wise
to have this body serve as the headquarters of a rapid reaction corps, made up of WEU members, whose creation was recently suggested by Dr. Van Eekelen. This could provide an important impetus to Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand’s efforts for the WEU to serve as a vehicle to formulate common EC security and defense policies.

As regards the actual type of military "planning" that would facilitate future joint responses to out-of-area contingencies and possibly avoid the problems faced by the current Western contingent in the anti-Iraq coalition, very little would be required. As long as the NATO military structure continues in existence and NATO forces conduct regular field, command post, and logistics exercises, the actual military requirements of this joint NATO-WEU body would be very modest. What could be required, and this could be easily carried out within existing NATO structures and programs, would be to hold more airtransportable/airmobile and amphibious maneuvers, as well as logistics projection and sustainment exercises among countries possessing these capabilities.

In the specific area of "planning," given the uncertainty of world events and the political sensitivity concerning conducting scenario-specific contingency planning, staff work should be largely limited to creating force tailored packages and particularly establishing a standardized planning methodology. Such a system has long existed among the United States, Australia and (until 1985) New Zealand, within the context of the ANZUS Security Treaty. What would be prudent for the proposed NATO-WEU joint body to replicate from the ANZUS experience would be to adopt, for instance, an agreed upon planning manual with explicit provisions for C2 and ROEs specifically for out-of-area conditions. Wherever possible, existing NATO procedures, standards and methods would be employed to avoid duplicating efforts within the alliance and adding a needless new layer of procedures to be employed by allied defense forces.

The purpose of this planning methodology would be to provide the bare basis for allied forces to plan and conduct operations outside of NATO's geographic area of application. Actual contingency planning for specific scenarios would only
take place once political consensus existed among alliance members to respond to a specific threat. It needs to be clearly understood, and would have to be carefully explained to the publics of alliance members, that participation in developing this type of planning methodology would by no means imply a nation's precommitment to support any specific out-of-area operation. Rather, it would merely enable alliance members' armed forces to have an existing military means to conduct joint out-of-area operations in instances where the political leadership of each individual country felt national interests so dictated. The actual organizational body in which this planning would take place would be very modest and could conceivably be done within an existing NATO headquarters facility slated for closure as part of the streamlining of alliance military structure. The necessary military capabilities for these types of operations would remain a national requirement, and therefore, the establishment of this joint body would be left to the participants. One would think that these capabilities would complement current thinking in NATO which is attempting to direct more attention to the security requirements of the flank countries who have not seen any diminution in the Soviet military threat. With few exceptions, if any, the requirements for campaigns on the flanks would be very similar to out-of-area requirements.

Conclusion.

The above proposal would be, without a doubt, a controversial one in some European countries where the mere suggestion that the alliance ought to address threats to security beyond the geographic boundaries of the alliance treaty produces responses just short of hysteria. However, if the Persian Gulf War has demonstrated nothing else, two points are clear. Firstly, such basic elements of preparing to fight in coalition, which are taken for granted in NATO military structures, are absolutely essential if military operations are to be successful and casualties are to be minimized. Secondly, Third World military establishments are becoming more sophisticated and, therefore, will increasingly require a likewise sophisticated, joint and combined-arms response by Western nations should a conflict develop. In view of the likely distances
involved and accompanying logistical challenges, it is increasingly clear that the WEU nations alone would find it very difficult to meet the dual challenges of power projection and sustainment. For example, according to van Eekelen, the logistical challenges of deploying ground forces to Saudi Arabia resulted in European nations being advised only to dispatch self-supporting forces. Whether Europeans appreciate it or not, the involvement of the U.S. military could be crucial in worst case scenarios, and very welcome indeed in less challenging contingencies. And, should for instance only the members of the WEU decide to participate in an out-of-area campaign, the necessary basis for planning and operations would exist.

That the world is not entering into a new phase of universal peace and tranquility becomes increasingly evident with the passing days. Conflict in the Persian Gulf, the possibility that President Gorbachev’s reform process will be reversed, and seemingly never ending conflicts throughout the Third World, demonstrate that there is no shortage of potential trouble spots that could seriously threaten common Western security interests. At best, the adoption of a joint NATO-WEU institutional approach, as outlined above to deal with out-of-area scenarios, would manifest a new and more mature approach to a long-standing divisive issue in the Western Alliance. From the perspective of the United States, said cooperation would be in line with long-standing U.S. policy, since it would help encourage greater European defense cooperation, but not at the expense of damaging existing trans-Atlantic security arrangements. At worst, the creation of such an organization would be seen by those who are fundamentally opposed to this type of cooperation in Europe as a symbolically important concession in the perennially acrimonious trans-Atlantic burdensharing debate. Nonetheless, those in this camp in Western Europe would be well-advised to consider that nations who have interests everywhere, but responsibilities nowhere, run the serious risk of relying on others for their protection with little or no influence as to the manner in which these conflicts are handled. Until such time as the "state of nature," as defined by Thomas Hobbes becomes more like that envisaged by John Locke prior
to the creation of property by man, the Western Alliance would
be best advised to adopt a unified approach and a strategy of
deterrence, as opposed to continuing to hope that its traditional
ad hoc approach to these crisis will meet its security needs in
the uncertain future.

ENDNOTES

1 In view of the recent and sensitive nature of this reform process,
many specific initiatives are not widely available in the open literature. For
an excellent assessment of German views and possible policies regarding
alliance reform see. Karl Kaiser. “From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated
Conflict Control.” Survival. Volume 32. No. 6, November-December 1990,
pp. 483-496.

2 See, for example, The Washington Post, September 16, 1990; and,

3 For background on the renaissance of the WEU see. Daniel Colard.
p. 75. 89. and, Alfred Jean Cahen. “The WEU and the European Dimension

4 See the interview with the WEU Assembly’s President Robert
August 21, 1990.

5 See Willem van Eekelen. “Building a New European Security Order:
18-23.

6 See Frankfurter Allgemeine. December 5, 1990; and. Der Spiegel.

7 See. for example. Assembly of Western European Union.
Communiciqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers.

8 I argue this point in my monograph. The New European Security
Calculus: Implications for the U.S. Army. Carlisle Barracks. PA: Strategic


12. See, for example, French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement’s comments on this topic in, Antenne 2 Television (Paris), September 20, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-90-184, September 21, 1990, p. 7.

13. For example, following the announcement by the British Defence Minister Tom King that British forces in Saudi Arabia would operate under American operational control, the Labour Party’s Defence Spokesman, Martin O’Neill, responded, “It is what we expected. It means we will be one of the people the Americans consult before any action is taken.” See, Press Association (London), September 21, 1990, in FBIS-WEU-90-184, September 21, 1990, p. 5.

14. For details of this particular aspect of C² relating to the Australian contribution to the Gulf see, The Telegraph Mirror (Sydney), January 14, 1991.


22. Regarding the issue of the importance of the early establishment of clear C² structures, WEU Secretary General van Eekelen writes that this could be achieved once a conflict occurred. Air Chief Marshall Sir Paddy Hine, RAF, head of the joint command of Operation Granby in the United


24. Ibid.


29. Note that apparently most of these reported "problems" were resolved following the decision by the British government to deploy a division-size force, thereby enabling British forces to conduct more independent operational missions. See, *Press Association* (London), November 23, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-227*, November 26, 1990, p. 6.


42. See, van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 528.


70. As suggested by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, the WEU could well serve as a bridge between the EC and the United States. See, The New York Times, December 26, 1990.


72. See, for instance, WEU, Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait, p. 8.

73. See, The New York Times, December 26, 1990. It should be noted as well that there is far from being a consensus within the WEU to engage directly in establishing standing military formations. For instance, at the April 1990 council of foreign and defense ministers, a proposal to create multinational formations was defeated. See, Agence France-Presse (Paris) April 23, 1990 in, FBIS-WEU-90-079, April 24, 1990, p. 1.

74. As argued in, WEU, Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait, November 7, 1990, p. 25.


