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**TRAINING THE TRAINERS: MISSION ANALYSIS AND  
SUPPORT FOR USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS**

BY

**COLONEL HOWARD T. TAYLOR, JR.**  
United States Army

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
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TRAINING THE TRAINERS: MISSION ANALYSIS  
AND SUPPORT FOR USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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25 March 1991

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## ABSTRACT

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TRAINING THE TRAINERS: MISSION ANALYSIS AND  
SUPPORT FOR USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS

INTRODUCTION

The United States Army, as the land component of the nation's military establishment, has a specific mission as mandated in Section 3062(b), Title 10, U.S. Code:

To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas...

This land component is made up of the Regular Army or Active Component (AC) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) of the United States, while in the service of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). The latter two elements constitute the Reserve Component (RC).

The AC's ability to expand its warfighting capacity in the event of a national emergency or war lies in a 2 tier process; the phased mobilization of the existing, already trained, RC units and individuals, and the creation of new units through an expansion of the training base. Both methods require additional soldiers; "filler" personnel needed for mobilizing RC units to bring them up to full strength and new soldiers required for the creation of new units. Beyond these manpower needs there is an additional requirement to provide replacement soldiers due to casualty losses. The critical element for both of these actions is training and the source of this effort comes from one area: the U.S. Army's training base. The AC training base, however, has a finite limit due to personnel and if more soldiers are needed then USAR training divisions are mobilized and deployed to expand existing training centers or to create new centers. This paper will explore the uniqueness of these training units and

review their contributions as a strategic asset in the United States Army. It will further discuss the training methods that maintain readiness and make recommendations, where appropriate, for the improvement of training.

#### THE ARMY AND MOBILIZATION

While the size and structure of the current Army force, both AC and RC, is predicated by national interests and will, risk assessment and budget; its ability to expand and meet new threats or to reduce levels of risks is through mobilization. This process, depending on the type of mobilization announced or authorized, can bring RC units into active service, reinstate the Selective Service System, and form new units for the Army. This expansion of strength is a major element of the Army and is at the core of its mission.<sup>2</sup>

A mobilization base to support the armed forces and to serve as a reserve during mobilization is fundamental to the effectiveness of these forces, especially the Army forces.

There is no doubt that there will be a much greater reliance on RC units to support and expand the AC in the future under current force structure trends.

President Bush, in his National Security Strategy of the United States (March, 1990) has stated that "our Total Force policy has placed a significant portion of our military power in a well-equipped, well-trained and early mobilizing reserve component."<sup>3</sup> This fact has been evident in the early mobilization of RC units in Operation DESERT SHIELD. In fact the deployment of military forces to the Middle East would have been very difficult without this selective call-up. The primary value of reserve forces and their deployment lies in what the Commander-in-Chief called "hedging against uncertainties"<sup>4</sup> Reserve forces can and often do make the difference in both deterrence and active hostilities. In all, 1003 RC units were activated or mobilized including 67 units to support training base operations and replacement training.

Expansion of the Army is a key factor in the mobilization concept. How and where the expansion takes place are critical questions as well as how much expansion is needed for regional contingencies or for total victory in a non nuclear, conventional global conflict. In today's climate, forward presence forces are usually insufficient for the majority of threats that they face. Thus it is imperative that they be supported and reinforced by a comprehensive system of mobilization. This fact has been voiced by the Chief of Staff of the Army:<sup>4</sup>

This critical responsibility will be of singular importance as we shape the reserve components in the future. Should a crisis call for larger forces than are available in the active or reserve components, the Army must be able to expand rapidly, a task that will require quality leaders and soldiers to mobilize, train and employ large numbers of citizens for the fight.

#### CURRENT THREAT STATUS

The recent events of the world have caused serious reconsideration of the size and structure of the U.S. military forces. The tumbling of the Berlin Wall, the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the establishment of democratic governments in previously authoritarian or communist East European countries have certainly reduced the traditional threat of an Soviet invasion of Europe. With the possible collapse of the USSR as a collective government and the trend to create fifteen independent republics the threat may have been merely dissipated throughout the USSR rather than focused at the European border. The question as to whether the republics will take it upon themselves to resolve old border disputes or to initiate regional conflicts is unknown. Conversely, there is strong evidence that the Soviets have redirected their military power to a "sufficient defense" policy and strategy which will require continued vigilance on the part of NATO and other allies.<sup>5</sup> There is no doubt that the Soviets still maintain a large and comprehensive military structure which is still a potential threat to the United States.

Certainly the threat in the rest of the world has not diminished, and in many cases, it has escalated. The conflict in the Middle East with the DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM operations is merely the latest in series of regional disputes and protection of U.S. vital interests. Panama, Lebanon and Grenada, for example, were all combative conflicts. With unrest in the Philippines, the return of Hong Kong to Peoples' Republic of China rule, the irrationality of North Korea, the rampant international drug trade, growing state sponsored terrorism and the increased possibility of chemical, biological or nuclear terrorists acts, the threat is more diffused and unstable than ever. The bipolar strategy focused consistently on one geographic area with one identified enemy is no longer the norm. Now the threat is multi-polar, multi-regional and includes all compass points.

With the stabilization of relationships with the Soviet Union and current and past agreements on nuclear weapons providing less reliance on their use a new paradigm is emerging. The recent European scenario was built on an intense short war with a 10 division reinforcement within 10 days. With less reliance on nuclear weapons, conventional forces must now be prepared to fight a protracted war or a variety of regional conflicts through out the world, thus increasing reliance and need on RC units.

#### RESERVE COMPONENTS ROLE

The removal, altering, or shifting of the Soviet threat does not relieve us from existing, or future, treaty and alliance obligations throughout the world. The United States currently is signatory to 43 different security obligations and is likely to become involved in others. Likewise there has been no change in the Army's mission or specific assignments. The nation as a whole and the Army, in particular, needs to be ready to meet all threats to its

citizens, vital interests, obligations and to defend its democratic role model for the rest of the world.

While all indications, thus far, would indicate that there will be a smaller Active Force there is much debate on the build down or build up of the RC structure. If the "Army of the Future" is to be: (1) Trained and Ready; (2) Deployable, Lethal and Versatile; and (3) Smaller, but Expandable, then a trained and ready RC must be maintained for expansion and as a force multiplier.

Thus the RC have a critical part in the Total Army Concept and in the future ability of the Army to meet its assigned missions. There are 2 major roles that are assigned to the RC. First is the immediate expansion of the Army by the activation and deployment of already trained and organized NG and USAR units. The second role, and the focus of this paper, is the expansion of the Army by the creation of new units and the training of citizens as replacements for soldiers in existing or new units: i.e. "training base expansion."

This expansion has traditionally been used for full mobilization, however, given the build-down profiles of Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD),<sup>2</sup> mobilization expansion is a key factor in Limited Mobilization<sup>9</sup> or Graduated Military Response<sup>10</sup> theories of application. These partial mobilizations fit well into deterrence and regional conflict scenarios as DESERT STORM has shown.

#### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Mobilization training base expansion, whether full or partial, is the responsibility of a very specific type of unit- the training division. Currently there are 12 training divisions, 3 separate training brigades and 2 separate training battalions in the force structure, all of which are assigned to the USAR.<sup>11</sup> These units are a critical asset to the Army and the only means it has to expand beyond the deployment of already established and existing RC units.

This paper will explore the origins, organization and missions of training divisions to reinforce their critical value to the Army for expansion of ground forces. Recommendations will be offered for the improvement of their special skills, training opportunities and employment upon mobilization. Some suggestions for realignments in the face of the changing military strength posture will also be made. Finally, the paper will offer arguments that any reductions or inactivations to these units would severely restrict the ability of the Active Army to continue to train its own needs, or to expand and be the "Army of the Future."

#### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This section will provide an overview of mobilization followed by a review of initial Army training; training in times of mobilization; the nature of training civilians and the relationship between AC and RC training units. The development and origins of training divisions will conclude the section.

#### OVERVIEW OF MOBILIZATION

Any review of the history of the RC, or for the specific purposes of this paper- the USAR, cannot be discussed without involving mobilization. Mobilization, in the broadest sense, is defined as the "act of preparing for war or other national emergency through assembling and organizing national resources."<sup>12</sup> It is the process that marshals the military, industrial, human, government and economic resources needed to support a United States response to a national security threat either global or regional. Thus the spectrum of response may range from a Presidential call-up to total mobilization. To the Army, mobilization carries a much more succinct meaning:<sup>13</sup>

Behind the regular army must always stand the great reserve army consisting of the able-bodied men of the nation, so trained as to be promptly available for military service if needed, but following their normal occupations in time of peace.

More importantly, "mobilization is an act of political will."<sup>4</sup> It, therefore, should be an action not only taken by the President but supported by the Congress and the people.

In the broadest sense, mobilization covers 4 large classes of actions,<sup>5</sup> all of which are present in full or total mobilization, and some, or all, may be used to a lesser degree in a partial mobilization. They are military expansion through the RC and Selective Service; industrial base initiation and expansion; civil defense planning and preparedness; and the establishment of alliances for host nation support and diplomatic efforts.

There are also several distinct phases of mobilization that the President and Congress may evoke in the event of national interest threats or emergencies. These 5 phases are authorized by congressional resolution or by public law (Section 671-675, Title 10, USC and PL 99-661) and they are:<sup>6</sup>

1. Presidential Call-up of 200,000 Reservists: (10 USC 673b, PL 99-661). The authority of the President to augment the active forces by "activating" (not mobilizing), reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) of the Selected Reserve, up to 200,000 individuals, for up to 90 days. The President must notify Congress of this activation and any extension beyond 90 days. There is no declaration of national emergency.

2. Selective Mobilization: (10 USC 3500, 8500). Used only for a domestic emergency to deal with a situation whenever there is an invasion or threat of invasion, a rebellion, or threat of rebellion against the government of the United States. It is not associated with contingency plans to meet an external threat to the national security.

3. Partial Mobilization: (10 USC 673a). Upon declaration of a national emergency the President or Congress can "mobilize" up to 1,000,000 Reserve

Component personnel (individuals and units) of the Ready Reserve for up to 24 months.

4. Full Mobilization: (10 USC 671a, 672, 672a1, 675). Mobilizes all RC units, all individual reservists and the resources to expand forces to meet the approved force structure. It is initiated by Congress passing a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency.

5. Total Mobilization: (10 USC 671a, 672, 672a1, 675). Upon Congressional authorization the active Armed Forces are expanded beyond the approved force structure by organizing and/or activating additional units to meet the emergency. The industrial base would also be fully mobilized at this time.

The Army planning documents for these mobilization phases are found in the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) which is published in 5 volumes and is governed by AR 500-5, the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System. Volume III of AMOPS provides specific guidance for the mobilization and deployment of RC forces.

Each major command also issues mobilization planning guidance such as the Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Mobilization and Operations Planning System (TMOPS). TRADOC is the Capstone Headquarters for all the training divisions and brigades thus the TMOPS, (Vol. III), plus other peacetime chain of command guidance, is incorporated into each unit's Mobilization Plan.<sup>1</sup> These plans are also coordinated with the unit's Mobilization Station (MS), which is a Forces Command (FORSCOM) or a TRADOC installation responsible for assisting the unit in its activation. In the case of training divisions, the MS is also the site where the unit establishes or augments a training center.

The mobilization process is a continuum of activity contingent on the nature of the threat and the will of the people and Congress. The President has

specific powers for activations and must work in concert with the Congress for national emergencies and declarations of war. Traditionally the powers of mobilization have been used in the total or global sense but there is an increased emphasis on limited mobilizations due to deterrence, flexibility of response and reduced AC personnel end strength.<sup>13</sup>

The total Army force required during mobilization is divided into several components or groups of forces. Some elements currently exist while others are initiated at selected points during mobilization. These components are:

1. Component 1: All Active Component Army units.
2. Component 2: All Army National Guard units.
3. Component 3: All USAR units. All training divisions are located here.
4. Component 4: Unmanned and unequipped units for which a requirement is identified in the Total Army Analysis (TAA). This is the portion of the approved force structure requirement that cannot be afforded within the Army's peacetime budget. Component 4 units are activated during the Full Mobilization phase.
5. Component 6: (There are no Component 5 units) Units outside the Army's force structure that must be formed and trained upon Total Mobilization.

In summary, the Department of Defense is responsible for developing and executing national defense plans which means that careful and detailed planning must be achieved by the services. This planning must cover a wide range of response from limited call-up to total mobilization. Given the growing reliance on RC units for deterrence strategy and to share the burden of AC missions and responsibilities it is critical that there be complete, detailed and thoughtful planning for the spectrum of mobilization. This critical reliance concept is now part of joint planning in that "All gradations of mobilization must be considered and planned for as part of responsible defense preparations."<sup>14</sup>

## INITIAL ARMY TRAINING

In any mobilization expansion of the AC, untrained civilians must be recruited or drafted and then be given basic training in military skills and service orientation. Further levels of training may be provided within the initial training window or may be obtained when assigned to the gaining unit.

"The training function is the vehicle for accomplishing the orderly transition from civilian status to military life."<sup>20</sup> The current concept of this transition usually begins, in peacetime, at a U.S. Army Recruiting Station where a contract to join the Army is completed. If the Selective Service system is involved (upon declaration of a national emergency or war) than individuals will be identified by draft lottery number.

Both volunteers and draftees are processed through Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) and based on aptitude, enlistment contract and needs of the services a training sequence is established. This sequence identifies the time and place for Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) or a combined program of One Station Unit Training (OSUT). This level of training is followed by further advanced training or assignment to a unit. All AC and RC soldiers complete the same training under the Initial Entry Training (IET)<sup>21</sup> concept and all training is taught at designated U.S. Army Training Centers (USATC) or Mobilization Army Training Centers (MATC).

Upon arrival at the USATC the new soldiers are met by the personnel of a reception battalion. This unit receives and processes all enlistees and certain categories of prior service personnel reporting for active duty in the Army. Examinations, immunizations, clothing issue and the establishment of basic military records are conducted in the reception battalion. This process normally takes about 3 days until a "company fill" is reached. At this time the cadre

from the receiving training company pick up the new soldiers and begin the formal training cycle in the company.

During this basic training all newly processed civilians will be taught the discipline, drill and practices of the military. Basic Combat Training is 8 weeks of basic military skill building including basic marksmanship, physical and mental conditioning, field exercises and the development of discipline, spirit and commitment. Collectively, the process is known as "soldierization".<sup>22</sup>

Advanced Individual Training occurs after the completion of BCT and varies in length (4-51 weeks) according to the complexity of the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) being taught. The MOS training at AIT may be continued at the USATC, be taught in a formal TRADOC school, or be provided by supervised On-the-Job (OJT) training in the gaining unit.

Some military specialties such as combat arms and some selected combat support are taught in the OSUT mode. This training is conducted at one site, with the same cadre and company, and one Program of Instruction (POI). OSUT provides common-skills and MOS-specific training in a single continuous program of approximately 13 weeks.

#### TRAINING IN TIMES OF MOBILIZATION

The current training process of molding civilians into soldiers is fairly clear and well tuned for today's accession rates. These rates do not exceed the capacity of the AC's USATCs except for "summer surge",<sup>23</sup> and equipment to train is usually not a problem. Historically, from a mobilization aspect, this has not been the case. The past is full of situations where the expansion needs have outstripped the capacity to produce it. Additionally, history has shown that soldiers usually can be trained faster than they can be equipped. For example, on the eve of World War II, the Army, used to 23 years of peacetime soldiering in

the United States, was "ill-prepared to clothe and equip troops for global conflict..."<sup>24</sup> Likewise the general shortage of equipment (often the fill rate was only 20%) became a serious handicap to training and led to makeshift alternatives such as trucks for tanks, wooden blocks for mines, pipes for mortars and "sticks...used in the absence of rifles."<sup>25</sup> Lack of equipment, inadequate training facilities and limited strategic transportation all hindered the rapid deployment of units overseas.

Shortages of equipment for training are not a new phenomenon and are unique to almost all rapidly expanding armies. An obvious method to prevent it is the stockpiling of equipment for expansion, however, the procurement and storage of weapons, clothing and training equipment is costly and the equipment rapidly becomes obsolete as new technological advances are made. The British "Kitchener Armies" of World War I trained for months without rifles, equipment and even uniforms until supplies from industrial expansion or Lend-Lease could be made available.<sup>26</sup> Likewise the significant logistic problems of the U.S. Army in World War II actually impaired mobilization due to limited facilities, no provision for reception centers and ill-prepared cadre barely able to provide adequate training for new soldiers.<sup>27</sup>

Training materials, aids and literature were also major problems in World War I as the Army was completely unprepared in this field when the war began. Many publications were rapidly put together by drawing on French and British training and technical publications. This effort and those during the intervening years between World War I and World War II helped expedite the mobilization process during World War II in terms of training literature.<sup>28</sup>

The problems occurring during the Civil War made the World War I and II experiences look positive by comparison. It was at Camp Curtin, a Union Army

"Camp of Rendezvous", near Harrisburg, PA that volunteers learned that the life of a soldier was one of discomfort and frustration. The following passage was written describing a recruit's experience in the camp:<sup>39</sup>

Camp Curtin was his first and last camp. Here he underwent a physical examination; it was here where he slept in his blanket upon some meager straw, or on the bare hard ground; it was here where he first learned to take a meal in a primitive fashion; where he received his first training in the manual of arms; and where he became isolated from his friends, family and old associates...

These experiences, which started at dawn, included three hours of drill with the remainder of the day spent in formations, company police and the individual preparation of meals. The official uniform was that set of clothes which the new recruit had on when he arrived. Army uniforms were normally not issued until a few days before the unit was due to ship out. In return for this service a new private in the Union Army received a little over \$10.00 a month.<sup>30</sup>

Mobilization and expansion of training bases has improved significantly since the Civil War but not by much over the twenty years after World War II. The activation of a USAR training division, the 100th Division (TNG), during the Berlin Crisis in 1961 clearly indicated that the Department of the Army (DA) and subordinate commands were not prepared for its mobilization and, in some cases, appeared to not care if the mobilization succeeded. Last minute changes of mobilization stations (Fort Polk, LA to Fort Chaffee, AK), condemned buildings, little or no equipment and an indifferent higher headquarters command structure all were major obstacles.<sup>31</sup> Credit must go to the personnel of the 100th Division (TNG) for its exemplary efforts in training over 30,000 soldiers in the face of its own service's planning inadequacies and lack of operational support.

This situation was not limited to just RC units. When the AC expanded its training bases, in lieu of activating training divisions during the Vietnam Conflict in 1966, it found a similar situation. Training centers at Fort Lewis,

WA, Fort Campbell, KY and Fort Bragg, NC were all activated with poor facilities, limited equipment and minimal personnel which caused serious problems in organizing and conducting training.<sup>32</sup> These types of problems are still prevalent today but are now officially recognized. Field Manual 25-5, Training For Mobilization and War, identifies resource strategies to deal with shortages of equipment, weapons, ranges ammunition, vehicles and facilities. The IET mobilization program of instruction (MOB POI) now accounts for these shortages.

#### THE NATURE OF TRAINING CIVILIANS

The nature of training civilians has also changed radically over the years. The days of "three hots and a cot" have been largely replaced by space efficient, air conditioned "starship" barracks and the physical punishment, high injury rates, and "by the numbers" replaced by drill sergeants who now not only provide basic combat skill development but also mentoring and counseling. The Army since becoming an All Volunteer Force has enlisted some very capable individuals, however it is still a place for young men and women who "...lack the basic capacities- literacy, knowledge of workplace expectations and basic job skills- needed to obtain and keep almost any job."<sup>33</sup> The drill sergeants have the responsibility to shape these undirected but determined young men and women into well-trained and motivated soldiers.

Initial Entry Training is intense, rigorous and demanding. It is "...not like anything anyone has done before becoming a soldier."<sup>34</sup> and many individuals have a history of quitting. While the recruits of today are almost all in the top three categories of enlistment ability (Category I, II, and III) there are still many adjustment problems. Some recruits come from broken homes, had difficulty in high school or moved from job to job. Basic training is very difficult and requires self-discipline, good physical condition and high levels

of motivation; ingredients often missing in the average youth of today.

George Wilson, in his insightful overview of new soldiers and the training process of the All Volunteer Army, observed:<sup>35</sup>

I watched the drills interact with their troops day after day, week after week, month after month in the field and in the barracks. I saw that it was a taxing relationship. Neither could escape the other. The drill father, unlike the civilian father, could not go off to work and leave his wife, school teachers or cops to deal with his sons. The drill had his Army sons day and night whether he wanted them or not.

This pressure creates an environment that is totally authoritarian, physically demanding and anxiety inducing. The drill sergeant has a training standard to meet, a relatively rigid sequence of training events and the statistics of the End of Cycle and physical fitness tests to worry about. He is also working with young people from all walks of life; some who have had trouble with discipline for most of their lives, and in many cases, have not adapted well to society. The youth, however, are highly resilient and:<sup>36</sup>

...the harsh training and life in the Army turns most of them into effective, loyal men and women, despite the hardships. "Nobody ever gave a shit about me until I got in the Army" is a repeated refrain that goes to the heart of the new Army's success.

Inherent to current training is the advanced state of technology that new soldiers must learn. In World War I and II the major concerns were facing movements, troop formations, discipline, basic weaponry and marksmanship. Today's soldiers must also be familiar with all of the above and further must master antitank and antipersonnel mines, an anti-tank rocket (AT-4), a variety of machine guns (M-60, SAW, M2 .50 Cal), use complex radio gear and communications methods and protect themselves in a hostile chemical, biological or nuclear environment. Each succeeding generation of soldiers has a greater degree of knowledge to learn and a greater complexity of equipment to use. This complexity also makes greater demands on the cadre: the drill sergeants and

Training Group instructors, who must teach and reinforce these skills in a relatively short period of time.

#### ACTIVE AND RESERVE RELATIONSHIPS

While the nature and methodology of training new soldiers has varied and grown more complex through the years, the openness of the AC to accept and support the RC, in general, has been divergent. This fluctuating orientation of the AC is often based on its view of the readiness of the RC who will join them in times of crisis. These views are often parochial due to the nature and personalities of the Army structure at the time. At the core, however, is the fact the Army, traditionally and historically, has been the keeper of the brotherhood of arms' profession. "It (the Army) takes pride in being the keeper of the essential skills of war that must be infused into the citizenry when they are called upon to fight."<sup>31</sup> Therefore an attitude often exists of "back-up" or "second-string" towards RC units rather than partners in the Total Force Army.

This attitude is a subtle but prevalent one in the IET community as indicated by a major 1987 study which surveyed AC and RC training company and battalion commanders. A significant majority (93.6%) of USAR commanders felt their units would be fully proficient to conduct IET after one training cycle whereas only 45.9% of the AC commanders held a similar view.<sup>32</sup> However, given demonstrated RC performance in a variety of real-time mission assignments in the past few years this attitude may be shifting on the part of the AC commanders.

More importantly, the current utilization of USAR training divisions to support and supplement the existing AC USATCs has greatly improved the performance factor and the image of the training divisions. It is also the only way that all accessions (US, USAR, and NG) can be trained today. The projected capability of the AC down-sized structure and the projected programmed accession

load will continue to cause a difference in the lack of training base capacity. This current difference (7-9,000 soldiers) has been identified as a specific training division mission through Mobilization Army Training Center (MATC) or Training Base Expansion (TBE) mission assignments.<sup>39</sup> While this number may decrease, training divisions will still assume a greater role in the training of all new soldiers entering the Army structure today due to AC training unit reductions. As the USAR training divisions are the only means for training base expansion it is worth while to look at the origins of these unique units. They are units whose mission is to train and whose soldiers are professional trainers.

#### ORIGINS OF TRAINING DIVISIONS

Raising armies in time of national emergency or war has always been a difficult proposition. Shortages of facilities, equipment and trainers usually are immediate problems to overcome. America's history of raising armies has been varied but almost all past efforts have included the use of a cadre or the unit's leadership to train the unit. Armies were expanded by taking a cadre of trained regulars, forming a unit, and filling it with volunteers or conscripts.

The Civil War provided an opportunity to organize Camps of Rendezvous and Instruction for training and expanding the Northern Army. These camps, principally located at Harrisburg, PA, New York City, Elmira, NY, and Cincinnati, OH, were primarily for organizing men into units. Instruction was sparse at best, orally provided and given to fill up the time while the units was waiting to ship out. There was no prescribed length of training nor official training program thus some men were in camp for a few hours while others were there for months.

World War I followed a similar pattern in that American soldiers, with few exceptions, were trained as integral members of infantry divisions, the standard combat unit. Some depot brigades were used but as far as possible new recruits

were put into combat divisions. The United States entered the war in 1917 with approximately 128,000 regulars distributed into Regular Army divisions numbered from one to twenty. These divisions were brought to wartime strength by draftees and enlistments. The National Guard divisions were numbered from 26 to 42 and were filled by the states militia and some draftees while the National Army divisions were numbered from 78 to 92 and were filled by the Selective Service. On August 7, 1918, a War Department order eliminated all these designations and assigned all units to the United States Army.<sup>40</sup>

The average World War I division had been organized 8 months before shipping to France. Upon arrival it received another 2 months of training before entering a quiet sector of the lines, however the individual soldier may have had much less training which was based on the time he was assigned to the unit.

Replacements for combat losses were not initially planned for and this lack of foresight resulted in the emergency measure of having to break up existing trained units in order to utilize their soldiers as replacements for others. This demoralizing activity continued until April 1918 when replacement training camps were organized in the United States and replacement depots created in France.<sup>41</sup> Nine replacement training depots were activated (6 Infantry, 2 Field Artillery and 1 Coast Artillery) in camps vacated by divisions after they sailed to France. The depots, while an answer to a serious problem—replacements, did not contribute as much as was expected.<sup>42</sup>

Training at the centers was thrown into constant confusion by emergency drafts, and the training was poorly conducted. The replacements they turned out received, on the average, less than a month of training.

Mobilization plans prior to World War II included the use of replacement training centers and reception centers, the latter for the initial processing and classification of volunteers and draftees. These centers were distributed among

the stateside corps with nineteen replacement training centers identified and organized to provide basic branch training and administrative and combat specialties. These centers opened in March, 1941 about 6 months after the establishment of Selective Service system and were to allow the regular Army divisions the opportunity of staff field maneuver training while the replacement centers trained their filler soldiers in basic combat skills. The War Department declared that "supplying all replacements for the ground forces from replacement training centers is far superior to the system of furnishing replacement direct to units...from reception centers."<sup>43</sup>

When World War II started in 1941 the United States Army was composed, officially, of 36 divisions: 16 Regular Army, two Army of the United States (Reserve) and 18 National Guard.<sup>44</sup> During 1942 a total of 37 new divisions (26 were Organized Reserve Corps divisions) were created to meet the war effort. When the decision was made to increase the number of combat divisions it was also concluded that a commensurate increase in replacement training centers was not feasible. Thus these divisions were formed through a cadre system "whereby experienced officers and enlisted men were withdrawn from existing divisions to form the training and organizational nucleus of new divisions."<sup>45</sup> Total World War II organizational strength was 90 divisions.<sup>46</sup>

The use of the "cadre system" was a return to the World War I Army expansion in which 26 Divisions and support units were created out of the Organized Reserve Corps into the "National Army"<sup>47</sup> The same 26 divisions were mobilized and served in World War II. Due to the lack of an expandable training base and the significant demand to have trained men and units available for overseas deployment it became the practice to strip less filled units of their personnel to fill earlier deploying units. After stripping units at random with

disastrous morale results it was decided that 2 divisions (the 76th and the 78th) would be identified as replacement pools. They received recruits from the replacement training centers and trained them in collective tasks pending personnel requisitions.<sup>48</sup> These 2 divisions are still in the training arena, as training divisions in the current USAR force structure.

The Army at the end of World War II stood at 8,268,000 personnel. By the start of the Korean War its total was 593,000 as a result of a massive demobilization. Thus the Army was critically short of men to fight another conflict and the Korean War saw the first official use of "Training Divisions" rather than cadre divisions, only they were to come from NG combat divisions. Eight NG divisions were activated for the conflict with 2 serving in Korea (40th and 45th), 2 in Germany (28th and 43d) and 4 (31st, 37th, 44th, and 47th) retained in the United States and used exclusively as training divisions.<sup>49</sup> Individuals were rotated in and out of these divisions, designated as Personnel and Training Centers, to supplement the Army's rotation policy. One of the key learning points from the Korean mobilization was that there must be a rapid increase in training capacity during the time of a national emergency. Thus in 1955 the Department of the Army directed Continental Army Command (CONARC) to have USAR Infantry Cadre Divisions operate Replacement Training Centers upon mobilization.<sup>50</sup>

From 1946 to 1953 USAR strength included 25 combat divisions. These units were inactivated or reorganized during the period 1953-1965.<sup>51</sup> These actions have currently left the USAR combat arms structure at 3 infantry brigades, 2 Special Forces groups and 3 field artillery brigades. Following a decision in 1956 to adopt multi-branched, multi-phased Replacement Training Centers, twelve USAR combat divisions were reorganized to conduct the mission. These Replacement

Training Divisions were organized under DA Pamphlet 20-555, which called for a unit strength of 4,330 and a capacity to train 12,000 soldiers at a time.<sup>51</sup>

In FY 1958-59 the major USAR divisions included 10 Pentomic infantry divisions (which were soon inactivated) and 13 training divisions.<sup>52</sup> Twelve training divisions are now currently serving in the USAR force structure.<sup>54</sup> In addition, there are also 3 separate training brigades and 2 separate training battalions in the USAR force structure. The separate units, activated or reorganized during the past several years, include the 5th Brigade (AR), Lincoln, NE; the 403d Brigade (FA), (attached to the 84th Division); the 8830th Brigade (MP), Ft. Meade, MD; the 1-353d Battalion (CH), El Dorado, AK; and the 2-353d Battalion (CH), Homewood, IL. Figure 1 identifies the 12 training divisions.

#### CURRENT TRAINING DIVISIONS- USAR

Training Division	Date Activated	Activation Location	WW II Service	Conv To Tng Div	Home Station
70th	18 Jan 43	Camp Adair, OR	15 Jun 43- 11 Oct 45	1 May 59	Livonia, MI
76th	5 Aug 17	Camp Devens, MA	15 Jun 42- 3 Aug 45	1 May 59	Hartford, CT
78th	5 Aug 17	Ft. Dix, NJ	15 Aug 42- 3 Aug 45	1 May 59	Edison, NJ
80th	5 Aug 17	Camp Lee, VA	15 Jul 42- 4 Jan 46	6 Mar 59	Richmond, VA
84th	5 Aug 17	Camp Zachary Taylor, KY	15 Oct 42- 21 Jan 46	18 May 59	Milwaukee, WI
85th	5 Aug 17	Camp Custer, MI	15 May 42- 25 Aug 45	1 Jun 59	Arlington Heights, IL
91st	5 Aug 17	Camp Lewis, WA	15 Aug 42- 1 Dec 45	1 May 59	Sausalito, CA
95th	4 Sep 18	Camp Sherman, OH	15 Jul 42 15 Oct 45	1 Apr 59	Oklahoma City, OK

98th	23 Jul 18	Camp McClellan, AL	15 Sep 42- 16 Feb 46	1 May 59	Rochester, NY
100th	23 Jul 18	Camp Bowie, TX	15 Nov 42- 10 Jan 46	17 Apr 59	Louisville, KY
104th	24 Jun 21	Salt Lake City, UT	15 Sep 42- 20 Dec 45	10 Jun 59	Vancouver Bks, WA
108th	15 Jul 46	Atlanta, GA	15 Jul 45- 15 Mar 47	30 Apr 59	Charlotte, NC

Source: Army Lineage Series. Center of Military History, US Army, 1987

Figure 1

### TRAINING MISSIONS AND METHODOLOGIES

This section will discuss a variety of topics ranging from the training divisions' relationship with TRADOC and the Mobilization Station to a review and analysis of the training division missions and methods of training. Also discussed will be critical impact areas such as installation support, drill sergeant training and impact of the recent IET Strategy.

#### TRAINING DIVISIONS AND TRADOC

With the 1972 reorganization of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) into TRADOC and FORSCOM, the mission for the training of new soldiers remained with TRADOC's while the command and control of training divisions, U.S. Armed Forces schools and reception battalions was given to FORSCOM. Upon mobilization these units will revert from FORSCOM control to TRADOC. The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST) has as one of its primary goals the responsibility "to train individual soldiers and units to fight and win". This is done under the motto of "Train the Force to Fight."<sup>55</sup> The training occurs in TRADOC schools and USATCs, the latter being the focus of training for new soldiers.

There are currently 8 AC Army Training Centers: (Forts Benning, Dix, Jackson, Knox, Leonard Wood, McClellan, Bliss and Sill)<sup>56</sup> and they provide IET

in specific, installation assigned, BCT, AIT or OSUT programs of instruction. Initial Entry Training is the collective term for the training given new soldiers and its purpose is identified below:<sup>57</sup>

Initial entry training develops soldiers who are disciplined, motivated, physically fit, technically and tactically competent and deployable. Initial entry training is tough training to high standards.

Each USATC has 1 or more BCT and/or OSUT or AIT brigades and the mission of the brigade(s) is to provide the prescribed training in the program of instruction (POI) for individuals entering the Army. The brigades are organized into training battalions and companies with the latter being the core unit for training. Each company "receives, equips, quarters, trains and provides limited administration for approximately 200 trainees"<sup>58</sup> The drill sergeants assigned to the company provide the major portion of the training related to basic combat skills and soldiers. There is also a Committee or Training Group in each USATC which provides subject experts and instructors for selected subjects in the POI.

#### MOBILIZATION TRAINING BASE EXPANSION

TRADOC is the Capstone, and thus, the wartime headquarters for the USAR training divisions. In peacetime, it provides guidance and coordination for these units and their assigned wartime mission. While FORSCOM is the peacetime chain of command for training units both TRADOC and FORSCOM coordinate the training and readiness aspects of the units as the mobilization mission occurs on both TRADOC and FORSCOM installations.

Upon activation and mobilization the training divisions and their other allocated units (reception battalions and U.S. Armed Forces schools) either expand existing TRADOC USATCs or establish new USATCs at FORSCOM posts. The level of expansion is based on a number of issues including the Commander-in-Chief's intent, the severity of the emergency facing the United States and the

estimated duration of the conflict. To react to these and other national interests the DOD has a Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). This system computes time-phased wartime manpower demand and supply and provides shortfall calculations for all services. This data is used by the U.S. Army for internal planning to establish the need for personnel assets through the development of the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT).

The MOB ARPRINT is the mobilization version of the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). The ARPRINT is a peacetime automated information system designed to provide training requirements, objectives and programs for all Army components. More specifically it calculates the number of new personnel (accessions) the Army needs each month which, in turn, determines the fill rate to the USATCs. The ARPRINT also determines the number and mix of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) needed to equal the projected authorization at the end of the fiscal year.

The ARPRINT authorizes the number and type of accessions thus giving the Recruiting Command goals to recruit new soldiers. The MOB ARPRINT provides the authorization for a significantly greater number of new soldiers which will meet the expanded capacity of the AC training units and training centers as determined by the Mobilization Training Base Output Requirement (MTBOR). The MOB ARPRINT is a time-phased, requirements driven plan for the expansion, continuation or phase out of training base courses upon mobilization. It prescribes the input of students to training base courses and lists all the courses for the training work load. The input for the MOB ARPRINT is similar in nature to the ARPRINT but it has 4 specific input documents which make it a MOB ARPRINT. These 4 sets of data includes Casualty Assessments, Personnel Asset Assessment, Force Structure Analysis and the MTBOR. The MTBOR details the number of graduates from the

training base required to meet Army needs for fillers and replacements for the first 90 days of mobilization.

Training base expansion is designed to be a graduated response to the various levels of mobilization and is comprised of three phases:

1. Phase I: The MOB ARPRINT initiates the expansion process by maximizing the company fill levels and mobilizing the training divisions and reception battalions assigned to expand TRADOC training facilities.

2. Phase II: The number of USATCs will be increased by the mobilization of the remaining training divisions and reception battalions at the 6 pre-identified FORSCOM installations.

3. Phase III: Additional USATCs will be established at posts, camps and stations in the United States. These units will be Component 4 units and will be based on the FORSCOM deployment and unit activation schedules.

The mobilization training base is responsible to insure that trained soldiers are prepared to arrive overseas in a ready-to-fight level of preparation. As mobilization is phased and training base expansion is a lengthy process there are typically no RC training units in the 200K Presidential Call-Up. However upon initiation of a Partial Mobilization selected TRADOC USATCs are expanded or augmented by USAR training units. Upon Full Mobilization all TRADOC training centers are expanded and new training centers are established at FORSCOM posts by other training divisions. Each of these training divisions has a reception battalion and 1 or more U.S. Armed Forces schools attached to it for the mobilization mission.

Due to the demands of the conflict which created a Full Mobilization, IET time will be reduced by the use of a MOB POI and other wartime measures such as 10-12 hour days in a 6-7 day a week training schedule and double shifting will

be implemented. Likewise the fill of training companies will be pushed to the maximum capacity of 275 for BCT and OSUT and 360 for AIT. As has occurred in every other conflict that the United States has been involved in, there will be a significant shortage of training equipment, training aids and ammunition until the industrial base is able to catch up with the need. The use of selected resource strategies must be used during this critical expansion phase.

In addition to training new soldiers there is also a need for update or refresher training for the individual ready reserve (IRR) soldiers being activated. This has recently been done for Operation DESERT STORM by the activation of several USAR training brigades at various posts. These IRR soldiers, depending on the recency of their military service, will be provided update training or they may be required to transition through IET. Other sources of personnel will be prior service personnel not in the IRR pool, civilians with needed skills, and military retirees. Each group will need some type of refresher or reclassification training. One other personnel source, individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) will not need additional training as they have been performing annual training in their mobilization assignments.

Both FORSCOM and TRADOC provide planning guidance for mobilization through documents issued to RC units. Volume III, Training Base Expansion, of the TRADOC Mobilization and Planning System (TMOPS) has detailed guidance on the expansion of existing USATCs and the establishment of new USATC at FORSCOM posts. This document also provides the key training missions of the USAR training units. A synopsis of the training division missions, their mobilization station and their technical and operational sponsors is presented in Figure 2. TRADOC Regulation 140-4 contains the most recent mission and sponsor assignments.

**USAR TRAINING UNIT MISSIONS AND SPONSORS**

<b>Training Unit</b>	<b>Mission/MOS</b>	<b>Number of Brigades</b>	<b>Technical Sponsor</b>	<b>Mobilization Station</b>	<b>USATC Opn Sponsor</b>
70th Div	OSUT 11B/C/H/M	4	USAIS	Benning	Benning
76th Div	BCT/OSUT 11B/C	3	USAIS	Campbell	S111
78th Div	BCT/OSUT 11B	3	USAIS	Dix	Jackson
80th Div	BCT/OSUT 11B	4	USAIS	Bragg	Jackson
84th Div	BCT/19E/D Be prepared 19k & SL3	1 2	USAARMS	Hood	Knox-AIT L. Wood-BCT
85th Div	BCT/19D/E 19K AIT & SL3	2 1	USAARMS	Bliss	Knox-AIT L. Wood-BCT
91st Div	BCT/OSUT 11B	4	USAIS	Ord	Jackson
95th Div	OSUT 11B/C/H/M	4	USAIS	Polk	L. Wood
98th Div	BCT/OSUT 51/62/63B/ 88M/12B/C	4	USACES	L. Wood	L. Wood
100th Div	BCT/19D/E/K AIT SL2/3 19D/E/K	3	USAARMS	Knox	Knox
104th Div	BCT/OSUT 11/B/C/H	4	USAIS	Lewis	L. Wood
108th Div	BCT/OSUT 11B/C	4	USAIS	Jackson	Jackson
5th Bde	19D AIT Be prepared SL3 19D	1	USAARMS	Hood	Knox
402d Bde	OSUT 13B	1	USAFAS	S111	S111

8830th Bde	95B	1	USAMPS	McClellan	McClellan
1/353 Bn	54B		USACMLS	McClellan	McClellan
2/353 Bn	54B		USACMLS	McClellan	McClellan

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Total equals 46 brigades

Figure 2

The USAR training divisions are the critical element in any training base expansion as once the capacity of the current AC structure is exceeded there are no other trained personnel or units available for expansion. The USAR units are unique in the force structure because of their organization, mission and personnel. The company NCOs are IET trainers who are Skill Qualification Identifier (SQI) "X" qualified drill sergeants (E-5 or above) and who must meet rigid physical and schooling demands.

As part of their current training mission USAR training units are augmenting the existing AC training base process due to AC personnel limitations and the number of accessions to be trained. Training units work in a variety of ways to train IET soldiers as part of their own readiness and training. Training base expansion is a complex, demanding process that requires highly trained units to be immediately ready to assume their mobilization mission: that of training IET soldiers. The training divisions, and no other units, have that capability and organization.

#### MISSION ASSIGNMENTS AND ANALYSIS

The specific mission of an USAR training division is to expand or establish (dependent on assignment) an USATC upon mobilization. This mission would start 15 days after mobilization and would require that upwards of 400,000 new soldiers be processed and trained based on MOB ARPRINT requirements. Training units have a capacity to train 20-30,000 trainees (dependent on the number of brigades

assigned) once all companies in the division are filled. This mission is identified in the unit's Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) and other documents. Paragraph 1-4a of TRADOC Reg 140-4 states the mission as follows:

Be prepared to establish or expand a USATC and conduct basic combat training (BCT), one station unit training (OSUT), or advanced individual training (AIT) in assigned military occupational specialties (MOS) as directed by the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) and TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning System (TMOPS) Vol. III.

This mission implies that the MOB POI will be in effect and that the unit will move in phases to their designated MS to establish or expand the USATC.

As Figure 2 depicted, the training unit missions are for specific combat and combat service MOSs at designated installations. There are currently 8 divisions who have an infantry (11B) or combination of infantry skill (11B/C/M/H) missions while 3 divisions and one brigade (5th) have an armor (19D/E/K) mission. The remaining training division (98th) has responsibility for combat engineers. There is one military police (95B) brigade (9830th) and one field artillery (13B) brigade (402d). The two remaining units are chemical (54B) training battalions. This mix supports a conventional land war expansion and provides filler personnel for newly forming combat units and replacements for battle casualties.

While the official mission of these units is to expand or establish USATC there are some implicit missions that are, or could be, a reality depending on the severity and nature of a regional or global conflict.

1. MOS Refresher and Classification: A specific implicit mission is the training of IRR soldiers for either refresher training in assigned MOS and combat skills, or reclassification into another MOS. Replacement Operation Centers (CONUS Replacement Centers) are established at the same time as training base expansion, by TRADOC and selected RC units, at USATC sites. Their purpose is to process and equip non unit-related individual replacements for final preparation

for overseas replacement processing. Training divisions are already providing both MOS refresher training and Combat Task Training (CTT) for IRR soldiers (primarily Recently Trained-12 month, [RT-12], personnel) being mobilized in Operation DESERT STORM. TRADOC has also implemented three CONUS Replacement Centers (Forts Knox, Benning and Jackson) even though no training base expansion has occurred via increases in IET accessions. The MOS refresher programs are currently from 2 to 4 weeks in length. Likewise, MOS reclassification is an already defined annual training (AT) mission for the training divisions and is an expected mission as an outcome of using IRR personnel in Operation DESERT STORM. Implementation would have to be prioritized with the training needs of IRR soldiers based on the type and mix of the IRR mobilization. Training time for reclassification is expected to be 9 and 1/2 weeks. Both missions are needed for any IRR call-up. Related missions would be refresher training for prior service personnel and military retirees with "hip-pocket" recall orders.

2. Cadre Division Orientation: A possible mission that is often discussed but has never been made official is the treatment of the training division as a cadre division. This would allow the division to fill and train soldiers, then conduct further training in unit maneuvers and deploy much as the historical examples in World War I and II have shown. Equipment and support organizations would have to be resolved but a cadre division conversion is a real possibility. A recent Army War College study proposes that one brigade per training division be converted to a cadre brigade with a full equipment compliment.<sup>50</sup> There has also been a recent DA study on cadre divisions and its implementation in the USAR or ARNG.<sup>51</sup> To date no decisions have been made as to the creation of cadre divisions as the history of their use in World War I and II has not been positive. The most recent cadre division activation was the 9th Infantry

Division at Fort Riley, KS during the Vietnam War. While the division eventually filled with BCT graduates, trained and deployed to Vietnam, the process was a lengthy, difficult experience for all concerned.

3. Casualty Replacement: A third possibility is activating a training division and then, upon mobilization, transferring unit personnel to overseas units as replacement personnel. As the majority of positions in a training division are senior Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and company grade officers who have a combat MOS, the unit could become a desirable pool of qualified personnel. Within the current aggregate training division structure there are 36,246 personnel assigned as of 30 September, 1990.<sup>62</sup> This total includes 30,928 enlisted personnel of whom 9737 are qualified drill sergeants or are in the process of becoming qualified. There are also 3660 NCOs assigned to instructor duty with training or committee groups. The remaining enlisted personnel include administrative, operations, food service, supply and technical personnel as well as some non MOS qualified soldiers. This is a significant pool of currently trained and qualified soldiers, who are available at a much earlier date than IRR soldiers whose skills have deteriorated.

4. Foreign National Training: A final implied task that has been discussed is the use of selected training brigades to conduct BCT overseas. In this effort foreign nationals would be trained in their homeland rather than sending them to the United States or having them trained by their own military. It would supplement the efforts of the foreign government to quickly increase the number of its basic soldiers in time of war or national emergency. A related mission is now ongoing with Kuwaiti citizens receiving IET at Fort Dix, NJ.

#### ANNUAL TRAINING MISSIONS

Training divisions, like other RC units, perform an AT period each year of

14-17 days duration. The purpose of AT is unit training which emphasizes the mobilization mission. TRADOC has identified 6 AT missions for training divisions:<sup>53</sup>

1. Initial Entry Training: By conducting IET with real soldiers and under specific standards units gain excellent training in POI instruction and the soldierization process.

2. Mobilization Exercises: Testing and exercising mobilization and operational plans allows for the effective moving to the MS and initiation of the assigned mission.

3. ROTC Advance Camp Support: Supporting Advance Camps within the various ROTC regions exercises instructor training groups and staff functions.

4. Professional Development: Mission preparation may include individual professional development and leadership training for NCOs and officers.

5. MOS Reclassification: Training units are often called upon to provide MOS reclassification for units who have had mission changes or who have been reorganized into a new branch. Skill Level 1 training is provided with drill sergeants and instructors.

6. Train-Up: Train-Up allows a training division to spend an AT period in an individual, rather than collective, training mode. NCO and officer education, weapons qualification and MOS training are key elements. During Train-Up the training division is taken out of the AC USATC support rotation schedule.

All of the AT missions are designed to enhance the readiness and preparedness of the training division to successfully meet its mobilization mission. Constant rotation of missions help develop all personnel and exercise staff and command functions. The successful completion of the AT missions will provide the proper level of readiness provided that personnel are up to strength.

## ARMY TRAINING CENTERS: TRADOC VERSUS FORSCOM POSTS

Training divisions are assigned to both TRADOC and FORSCOM posts for their mobilization missions. While the posts are very similar in terms of structure and organization there are some key differences which can impact the mission accomplishment. These differences lie mainly with the 6 FORSCOM posts and require units mobilizing there to insure that adequate coordination is conducted.

Units going to TRADOC installations to expand or augment the Training Center generally join a process already in progress. The training division reports in, obtains pre-assigned facilities, draws selected training equipment and materials, and proceeds with IET instruction with the next company fill after minimal post mobilization training. As the installation is already a TRADOC Training Center, base operations, firing ranges, training areas, medical and transportation needs, trainee reception and operations coordination are already established and in place. These support functions must be augmented by other RC units, additional civilian hires or the recall of retirees to fill identified positions. These additional personnel needs are identified in the installation's Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDA). TRADOC USATCs, since they are already in existence and operating, have procedures and processes in place for the training of new soldiers and post base operation personnel know and appreciate the special problems of IET.

Training divisions assigned to establish a USATC at a FORSCOM installation have a different situation. The installation has had FORSCOM units assigned to it that have deployed or are in the process of deploying. Likewise the installation is also serving as a MS for RC units (as are TRADOC posts) that have been activated and are in the process of finalizing training prior to overseas deployment. These activities put a tremendous strain on the base operations and

support agencies but FORSCOM installations also have a MOBTDAs to expand their personnel needs.

The key problem, however, for a training division establishing a USATC is that the installation is oriented to a FORSCOM mode of operation not a TRADOC one. For example, training areas are geared toward unit training and maneuver, many of the firing ranges do not support the IET POI, medical support that is left after deployment is not accustomed to the volume and type of trainee injuries, and transportation and ammunition support capabilities must be greatly expanded. Internal procedures and post regulations for IET generally do not exist and post base operations personnel typically do not have an appreciation of IET needs, i.e. sufficient public pay telephones for trainees to use, the need for installation armorers and small arms repair services and specific, IET related materials and literature required to be available and stockpiled at the Training Aids Support Center (TASC). Record keeping is also a problem in that TRADOC uses several computer systems and programs that are not used by FORSCOM thus they are not available on a FORSCOM post unless there happens to be a TRADOC tenant activity assigned that has the computer lines installed. If not, then special computer lines must be installed.

The mission, whether at a FORSCOM or a TRADOC post, demands that the training division be prepared and ready to accomplish its assignment. This means that sufficient qualified drill sergeants and instructor personnel are in the unit, that the commander and staff can immediately execute their wartime mission and that all concerned are familiar with the implementation and support of the POI. The units designated to the 6 FORSCOM posts must also have achieved a level of coordination and rapport to effectively work with, and sometimes direct, base operations in support of the POI and the IET mission. TRADOC posts must insure

that the MOBTDAs are accurate and that the expansion plan is well coordinated. FORSCOM installations must also insure that MOBTDAs are correct and that the base operations section fully understands and is coordinated in detail with the incoming training division. With the recent removal of Logistic Groups from the training division TDA, base support is even more critical to training divisions.

#### METHODS OF TRAINING

Of the 6 AT missions, the IET and MOBEX missions are the primary ways of achieving unit preparedness and there are several methods by which training divisions can perform them. Currently there are three methods of training but a brief historical review of other methods is helpful.

When the USAR combat divisions were converted to training divisions in 1959 a significant requirement to be accomplished was to convert the NCOs from platoon sergeants and squad leaders to drill sergeants. Drill sergeants are individuals who are physically fit, proficient in their MOS, provide exemplary role models for new recruits and who have thoroughly mastered the instructional aspects of the IET POI. Other NCOs became Training Group or Committee instructors in which they became subject matter experts (SME) for designated subjects in the POI.

The initial training took place in drill sergeant and instructor courses designed to provide the theoretical concepts and to allow presentation practice. After certification there was a need to maintain the skill levels in the units. This is a significant problem for training divisions as the key training aid needed is a new soldier. Unlike other units who have equipment and training areas to practice skills during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) at a USAR Center, the training divisions are not able to truly practice their mission. Unit drill weekends were focused on the practice of presentation skills and reinforcement of classroom principles. Only during AT are training units able to fully train.

Prior to 1985, training division AT was limited to a concept called planning and training association and satellization. The association principle supported pre-CAPSTONE relationships between units that would go to war together (i.e. units expanding TRADOC Training Centers) and encouraged direct interaction between geographically close AC and USAR training units for technical support. Training units were also directed to train at USATCs to become familiar with standard operation procedures (SOP) and training techniques. In 1983 some USAR training units conducted IRR refresher training for the first time.

Satellization focused on the relationship of the training division to the USATC during a period of AT. Its objective was for battalion sized units of training divisions, brigades and reception battalions to perform the IET mission directly with an AC training units. Units would "piggyback" or "satellite" with an existing AC unit and observe and participate to the maximum extent that qualifications and status would permit. RC unit personnel were encouraged to perform as many of the tasks as possible under the guidance and supervision of the AC cadre. Likewise members of training committees and leadership academies would participate in "counterpart" training which allow them to share instructor and staff responsibilities.

During the years following conversion from combat to training divisions this relationship worked reasonably well. However as training divisions became more proficient their responsibility level was still minimal due to the AC cadre oversight. Likewise the question of actual mobilization performance was still unknown. Unanswered was the ability of a training battalion to perform its mission without AC cadre help or a training brigade to supervise its battalions through a cycle of new soldiers from entry into the Army to graduation from BCT or OSUT. To answer these questions several new training methods were implemented

in the mid 1980s, all with excellent results. These methods (Unit Displacement, PRO-TRAIN and MATC) have now become the standard for training units' AT.

Unit Displacement: The first effort to improve unit responsibility and performance was a concept called unit displacement. This was linked also to the specific orientation of Inactive Duty Training (IDT) for leader and individual training in preparation for mobilization. Unit Displacement (UD) is now the primary mission training divisions during AT.

The objective of a UD is to replace AC USATC units with like-sized USAR units, not replace AC individuals with USAR individuals as was done during satellization. The integrity and identity of the training company is maintained in this process. The UD mission allows USAR units to exercise command and control of USATC units and to assume total responsibility for the training of new soldiers. One AC drill sergeant remains with each platoon and one AC company representative remains at company headquarters for the purpose of providing continuity, technical advice and evaluation of the unit. In UD the USAR commander and his staff officially assumes command of the IET unit, with UCMJ authority, and is responsible for all unit functions for 2 weeks. The 2 week AT cycle usually begins and ends with a change of command ceremony before a trainee formation with the incoming and outgoing commanders.

There are two types of UD. One is Horizontal Unit Displacement (HUD) and the other is Vertical Unit Displacement (VUD). A HUD consists of the sequential rotation of USAR companies, battalions and brigades upon like-sized AC training units throughout an entire BCT, or the last 8 weeks of an OSUT, IET cycle. The most effective unit of rotation is the battalion as the brigade must spread itself over the 8 week period for continuity and command and control. Battalions in HUD have the opportunity to provide critical linkage and continuity training

whereas the brigade headquarters is not as effectively used.

In a VUD, the USAR brigade headquarters and all 4 battalions are in the same 2 week AT period and command a slice of the training base. This exercises the brigade staff and allows the USAR brigade commander to command and control his battalions. In a VUD there is no attempt to train an entire cycle as each USAR battalion replaces an AC battalion where it is in the training cycle.

In both cases the USAR units have complete responsibility for the training of the trainees and the operation of the unit. AC participation is minimal and USAR brigade commanders and staff have command and control functions. Successful completion of UD rotations allow USAR training units to move to a more sophisticated form of AT called Provisional Roundout Training (PRO-TRAIN).

PRO-TRAIN: The opportunity to conduct a PRO-TRAIN exercise during AT occurs when the force structure of the AC training units is reduced and the ARPRINT load remains the same. An AC training battalion is placed in a caretaker structure with minimum personnel similar to a UD structure. One or more USAR training divisions are assigned the PRO-TRAIN mission for a year's cycle. The first PRO-TRAIN was held at Fort Jackson in 1987 due to the inactivation of one of the AC training battalions and it has been the primary training post for the conduct of such exercises. Task Force Lion is the AC skeleton battalion at Fort Jackson used for evaluation and assistance purposes. Fort McClellan is currently configuring to become a PRO-TRAIN post.

Each of the selected training division's brigades rotate through PRO-TRAIN with each of its battalions taking a 2 week training slice until an IET cycle is complete. Using 4 brigades a year, 4 IET cycles can be completed with 4 battalions conducting 2 weeks of training each. AT is extended to 17 days for these units to allow for overlap and continuity exchange. The USAR commander

takes over the unit with complete responsibility for training and command and control just like a UD rotation. Trainee loads and fill are the same as for other AC training units on the post. The AC core cadre are assigned for continuity, technical assistance and evaluation with one AC drill sergeant per platoon and one AC evaluator in the company headquarters.

In a PRO-TRAIN rotation the USAR battalion commander reports directly to the AC IET brigade commander. The USAR training brigade headquarters is heavily involved in planning and coordination but does not directly supervise its battalions during AT. This is a disadvantage for command and control and staff coordination but it is a good time to conduct Command Post Exercises (CPX) or an MOS/individual training cycle. Staff supervision and coordination visits to the PRO-TRAIN exercise are also conducted. A key advantage to PRO-TRAIN is that a USAR brigade can complete an IET cycle and work as regular training battalion in doing so. They literally replace an AC battalion for the cycle.

A PRO-TRAIN rotation is an excellent preparation for the most complex and highest level of AT training: the Mobilization Army Training Center (MATC) or Training Base Expansion (TBE) operation. These activities are major exercises using all divisional elements and also tests the unit's mobilization plan.

MATC/TBE Exercises: A MATC operation is the implementation of the training division's mobilization plan at a FORSCOM installation while a TBE is same mission for training divisions who mobilize at TRADOC posts. In both cases the training division is responsible for the complete training cycle of 2-4 companies of BCT or OSUT trainees. The trainees are diverted from the normal intake flow to the MATC or TBE and the division receives, trains, graduates, and ships out some 600-1000 new trainees during the course of the exercise. The division's battalions are rotated through on a 17 day cycle similar to a PRO-TRAIN AT. MATCs

and TBEs are the training divisions' equivalent of the National Training Center.

The objectives of a MATC or TBE are to:<sup>4</sup>

1. Test and evaluate both the installation and training division mobilization plans for expanding the training base.
2. Provide additional peacetime training capacity during the surge period.
3. Exercise the division and brigade staffs in planning, preparing and executing its wartime mission and the staffs of CONUSA, FORSCOM and TRADOC headquarters and installations in supporting training base expansion activities.
4. Upgrade facilities at posts responsible for hosting an expansion USATC.
5. Exercise USAR brigade and battalion staffs in command and supervision of subordinate units; exercise USAR reception battalions assigned to the division, and all of the divisional elements such as the training group, logistical support units, finance, military records and food service.
6. Provide USAR training companies and training groups with a realistic opportunity to conduct IET.

This type of exercise allows a USAR training division to establish or expand a USATC at its mobilization station for the purpose of processing and training new soldiers in an IET POI. All elements of the division, including the reception battalion and training group, are also part of the exercise. Units are rotated on a 2 week cycle as in a UD but the USAR division provides a core USAR cadre for the training cycle to provide the continuity previously provided by AC personnel. A small group of AC personnel are on hand for evaluation and technical assistance but have no direct operational control. The AC personnel include one AC drill sergeant per each training company, a senior evaluator and two other officers.

Assisting in the process are technical and operational sponsors to the

training division. Technical sponsors are the TRADOC training school for a MOS group, i.e. Fort Benning is the technical sponsor for all infantry MOSs. They are responsible for improving readiness and providing the POI and training support material required by the POI. Operational sponsors are from TRADOC installations who operate an USATC providing the same MOS as the training division. They are responsible for supporting AT and special USATC oriented missions.

Operational sponsors normally provide Mobile Training Teams (MTT) during the year prior to a MATC or TBE to assist in improving performance efficiency. Technical sponsors will certify the training of the G-3 Test personnel, who in turn, certify the individual drill sergeants of the division. All USAR units must be validated the year prior to a MATC or TBE by the successful completion of a UD or PRO-TRAIN mission. OSUT MATCs or TBE will be further validated by MTT visits during the year from the technical sponsor.

MATCs and TBEs are normally scheduled 3-5 years in advance so that training divisions may be placed in an AT cycle designed to enhance their readiness. This cycle usually involves a year of individual or professional development followed by a year of UD and then a MATC, TBE or PRO-TRAIN mission. Most units are then scheduled for a Train-Up year after a MATC to attend MOS and NCOES schools. This rotation cycle is depicted in Figure 3.

The initial MATC operation (BALTIMORE EXPRESS) took place with the 2053d Reception Battalion (80th Division [TNG]) from Baltimore, MD. In October 1984 it processed 700 new soldiers at Fort Bragg, NC, its mobilization station. These soldiers were diverted to the 2053d at Fort Bragg and shipped to BCT at Fort Jackson, SC. The exercise helped build the model for reception battalion mobilization and tested FORSCOM's site support abilities




Figure 3

During June to August, 1986, the first training division MATC (ONAWAY EAGLE) was conducted by the 76th Division (TNG) at Fort Campbell, KY, its mobilization station. The exercise trained 576 new soldiers in BCT and established many of the procedures and processes for future MATCs. Of particular note were the problems between FORSCOM and TRADOC computer nets and the incompatibility of some of the programs to deal with trainee records. ONAWAY EAGLE II was conducted in 1988.

In the summer of 1987, the 95th Division (TNG) conducted their initial MATC (LONE IRONMAN) at Fort Polk, LA and in the fall of 1988, the 80th Division (TNG) conducted its first MATC (OLD DOMINION FORWARD) at Fort Bragg, NC. The first true test of a TRADOC Training Base Expansion came in 1989 with the 108th Division (TNG) conducting a TBE at Fort Jackson, SC. Other initial and recurring MATCs and TBEs are planned with the ideal pattern of a training division participating in a major exercise every 3-4 years, providing funding is available. TRADOC and FORSCOM are working on a schedule of 2-3 MATCs per year. There is no doubt that MATC and TBE exercises provide the most realistic experience training divisions can obtain.

## INSTALLATION SUPPORT

As a result of the initial MATCs and TBEs there were many important lessons learned in terms of installation support and base operations, especially at FORSCOM posts. Areas such as logistics, budget, facilities, computer support, initial issue points, medical health services and transportation are but a few of the key areas that needed significant attention.

The most significant learning point was that there was no concise planning document for training base expansion activities and operations. All the players: training divisions, CONUSAs, installations, FORSCOM and TRADOC found that it took an actual live operation to really identify, and resolve, these problems. As each successive MATC or TBE occurred the players became more proficient in support, coordination and training. Familiarity with process and confidence in the ability to support or to operate also emerged as key factors.

As a result of the early learning experiences host installations are now required to enter into an interservice support agreement (ISSA) between the installation and the training division running the MATC/TBE to identify the installation support to be provided to the exercise. They are also required to prepare memorandum of agreements (MOA) to supplement the ISSA and define responsibilities of the USAR division staff for obtaining installation support. Other requirements include a letter of instruction (LOI) defining responsibilities of the installation staff agencies and the MATC exercise and providing adequate required buildings, training ranges, training areas, facilities and installation property to support the exercise requirements.

A final, but significant change was that a MATC on a FORSCOM post will operate as a tenant activity and a TBE on a TRADOC post will operate as a subordinate activity. This allows direct coordination between the installation

and the MATC or TBE training division and allows for direct control and operations of budget and funding.

These activities plus specific procedures for the training divisions have been placed in a TRADOC MATC Handbook, co-authored by the 80th Division (TNG) and TRADOC's Individual Training Division, which is now in draft form. The Handbook covers a broad array of information including topics such as budgeting, medical support, training aids and equipment, and planning milestones. It is a significant accomplishment and a systematic planning guide for MATCs and TBEs.

#### DRILL SERGEANT TRAINING

The critical asset of any training division or USATC is its drill sergeants. These men and women (dependent on MOS being trained) are tough, dedicated, professional NCOs who are the role model for trainees to emulate. Their appearance, proficiency and actions must be beyond reproach and their work hours are the most demanding of any training environment in the Army.

Qualified drill sergeants have a Skill Qualification Identifier (SQI) "X" and hold the rank of Sergeant or above. They must also meet rigid physical and schooling demands. All AC and RC drill sergeants are trained under the same AC drill sergeant POI which is comprehensive program administered by certified drill sergeant leaders with an instructor-student ratio of 1:5. RC drill sergeant candidates may attend the AC school at an USATC or may participate in a training division sponsored school.

All AC and RC drill sergeants are governed by the same regulation (TRADOC Reg 350-16, Drill Sergeant Program). The only difference between AC and RC drill sergeants is that RC drill sergeants may attend the RC Drill Sergeant School, but it must be completed within 14 months of starting. The other exception is that USAR training divisions may utilize drill corporals. These individuals have

completed the Drill Sergeant School but do not meet the Time in Service (TIS) or pay grade requirements thus they cannot hold the "X" qualifier yet. Drill corporals may be used for a variety of drill sergeant tasks but they must have a drill sergeant supervisor. A current plan under review is a specific drill corporal POI which would give credit for subjects completed when the drill corporal attends Drill Sergeant School.

While drill sergeants are the critical asset to training divisions they are also the most difficult to recruit, train and maintain. They are, in fact, the biggest problem facing any training division commander. Because of the demanding requirements of the job and the extensive prerequisites and schooling, the MOS is only for truly motivated and dedicated individuals. The drop-out rate for candidates in Drill Sergeant School is high, even with mentoring and support.

Moreover the process takes time. If a non prior service individual is recruited for the position it will be a 3-5 year process depending on: when BCT/AIT or OSUT can be scheduled; when the individual is MOS qualified at the proper skill level; when the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) is completed and when the individual can start Drill Sergeant School (must be a CPL or SGT) or Drill Corporal School. All of these requirements must be accomplished to receive the "X" SQI. Most commanders prefer to take a prior service individual so that the time to train is reduced because of grade and time in service (TIS). However, this is not always feasible in the local recruiting area of the training division.

USAR drill sergeants are 100% volunteers whereas a significant number of AC drill sergeants are "drafted" (involuntary assigned). AC drill sergeants serve 2 years with an extension option for a year. RC personnel are drill sergeants for as long as they remain in the duty position. This creates one of

the key concerns between the AC and RC drill sergeant. The average age of a USAR drill sergeant is around 34-38 years of age whereas the AC drill sergeant is about 22-26 years old.

This situation often creates a more physically capable AC drill sergeant but a more experienced RC drill sergeant as the RC individual may have 10-12 years of on the job experience. However most training divisions put specific emphasis on the ability of the senior drill sergeant to remain as physical fit as his younger AC counterpart. With the recent clarification of cardiac screening and commander's liability, extensive physical fitness programs are the norm in training divisions. One other difference to be noted is that of proficiency pay. AC drill sergeants receive it and RC drill sergeants, when on Active Duty for Training (ADT), do not. This has been a continuing point of discussion and it can become a critical recruiting and retention tool for USAR training divisions, however no decision has been made as of yet.

Drill sergeants are the foundation of the Army for they have the unenviable job of forcing ill-prepared teenagers to relate to something bigger than themselves- their squad and platoon and all that it conveys in a cohesive, well coordinated and functioning unit. George Wilson, in Mud Soldiers, relates to the heavy responsibilities of the drill sergeant:<sup>65</sup>

They were given too much to do at Benning, by Army leaders at the Pentagon, by us civilians at home who leave it to the drills to train soldiers to protect us. No foreman, no father, I concluded, with such power over his workers or children and constant exposure to them could keep his perspective and temper if he had to work the crushing hours of a drill in the dangerous, demanding environment of an infantry training center. The drills' dawn-to-dark workdays explained to me why so many of them had been divorced and became estranged from their natural children.

It takes a special person to be a drill sergeant; not everyone can do it. Likewise it takes special people to support or command drill sergeants as the

training environment at a USATC is one of the most demanding anywhere in terms of rigid standards, long hours and physical stamina. These are additional qualities that make USAR training divisions unique assets to the Army.

#### IMPACT OF IET STRATEGY

IET is the critical conversion of civilians to soldiers through the orderly process of BCT and AIT or OSUT. It is the introduction of basic military skills required of all members of the Army. The IET POI is taught at a USATC by AC or RC drill sergeants and units. The methodology of teaching the POI subjects has been termed the IET Strategy and it has been the focus of some recent concern within the training base.

The IET Strategy refers to a combination of methods to improve the training of new soldiers and was directed to be used as of May 1989 by the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training. Some of these changes were quite significant. For example, it made the training unit company commander directly responsible for training on site even if committee instructors were involved such as on a Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) range. First Sergeants were now expected to be in the field supervising drill sergeants instead of conducting administrative work in the company headquarters. A more radical change was that drill sergeants were to be the primary instructor for all subjects, including all the committee taught subjects such as Individual Tactics, Hand Grenade, BRM, Communications or First Aid. This was an effort to expand the drill sergeant role and at the same time reduce the structure of the Committee or Training Group to a selected handful of "subject matter experts" (SME). This was a critical action for USAR training divisions because it implied the elimination of the instructors (Training Groups) from the training divisions TDA as well as down sizing or eliminating the AC Training Groups.

Other changes were more supportive of effective learning. A very strong effort was made to move from platform taught (lecture) instruction to hands-on (experiential) training and to move from large group instruction (company sized) down to small group (platoon size). Simultaneous to this was a strong effort for reinforcement of tasks, standards and conditions of the learning by the drill sergeant. By reinforcing training continuously the heavy preparation time for the phase tests and end-of-cycle test would be reduced.

The implementation of this strategy was hampered by many factors, one of which was facilities. As platoon instruction was now the standard, locations of this size were very scarce. The Army over the last 10 years has built very modern and efficient, battalion sized, training barracks. Each company has its own wing, storage units, arms vault and inclement weather assembly areas. It also had its own company-sized classroom. Trying to accommodate 4 platoons into one classroom created a serious scheduling problem and it also demanded 4 times the amount of training aids, television monitors, instructor presentations, etc.

The IET Strategy was also to have been implemented in defined, time controlled, phases over a 6 year period. Unfortunately some USATC commanders went immediately to later stages while other commanders followed the schedule. As a result the USAR training divisions were forced to deal with a different standard at each USATC. The AC Training Center was in step with itself, but none of the USATCs were in step with each other. This fact, plus the anticipated loss of instructors from the Training Groups, caused a great deal of concern among USAR training division commanders. Several of the USATC commanders likewise had reservations as to some the strategy items.

In November 1989, the CG, TRADOC issued new guidance in that all USATCs would hold in place as to their implementation of the IET Strategy and they were

to not proceed past Phase I unless they had already started it. A joint RC/AC comprehensive review was conducted in January 1990 and new guidance issued. It was determined that the basic principle that the RC units should use was built upon the foundation of "In peacetime, train as close as possible to the way we (RC) will train during mobilization."

Based on the recommendations of the joint review the TRADOC CG announced a series of changes for the AC and USAR units. It clarified what drill sergeants would teach and for what subjects committee instructors were responsible. USAR drill sergeants were given a more limited scope of teaching responsibility. These changes were made to the USAR units because of anticipated differences of the training environment during mobilization, i.e. availability of facilities, drill sergeant turbulence and initial drill sergeant strength.

The AC units were advised also to make no attempt to force or advise the RC training divisions to deviate and "be just like the AC." The RC process is now also part of the annual training evaluation as it is a mobilization strategy. Finally all USATCs were to stabilize at Phase I implementation until further notice. Since these changes have been made a much smoother AT period is occurring for the training divisions and the installations feel much less pressure for facilities, training aids and audio-visual support.

#### CURRENT AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

This section will look at the current situation facing USAR training divisions including the BRAC and Vanguard studies. Potential new missions and the recent adjustments to force structure will be discussed with training support concerns ending the section.

#### ACCESSION TRAINING RATES

Any future role or analysis for USAR training divisions will depend on the

budget allocated and the force structure decisions of both the AC and RC. Operation DESERT STORM notwithstanding, the personnel level of the Active Army is scheduled to be reduced from 732,000 to approximately 520,000 by FY 1995. What will happen to the RC structure and particularly the USAR training divisions is in the hands of Congress and the force structure planners. While it is obvious that accessions for the AC will eventually go down, accessions for the RC may in fact go up if the RC troop strength is increased. In the meantime force structure cuts from Quicksilver actions amount to the loss of almost 8500 personnel from USAR training divisions and 35,000 total for RC forces.

RC enlistees form a significant part of the workload of the active recruit training establishment. Recruit training for the USAR and National Guard will account for 25 percent of all DOD recruit training in FY 1991 and 24 percent in FY 1992. This is an increase from 16 percent in FY 1980. RC training also accounts for 39 percent of all Army OSUT scheduled for FY 1991 and 37 percent in FY 1992.<sup>51</sup> Figure 4 below shows the DOD computed, average monthly accession training load rate for the Army recruit training from FY 1980 to FY 1992 and Figure 5 identifies OSUT monthly accession training loads for FY 1985 to FY 1992.

MONTHLY RECRUIT TRAINING LOADS, FY 1980-1992 a/b/

Svc Comp	FY 80	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
AC	10,453	10,853	11,288	11,481	10,091	11,102	11,649	10,885	10,115
USAR	2,339	3,621	3,442	3,487	3,528	3,405	4,036	4,241	3,932
NG	2,661	3,113	3,257	3,972	3,559	3,516	4,065	3,845	3,582
TOTAL	15,453	17,587	17,987	18,940	17,178	18,023	19,750	18,971	17,629

a/ FY 1990, 91 and 92 are estimates.

b/ Data do not include OSUT Training Loads.

Source: Department of Defense Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1991, p. III-2

Figure 4

MONTHLY OSUT TRAINING LOADS, FY 1985-1992

Svc Comp	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
AC	11,983	10,223	8,099	9,018	8,081	9,209	10,636
USAR	1,961	1,960	1,225	1,179	1,848	1,967	2,055
NG	5,278	4,505	4,154	3,211	3,669	4,011	4,117
TOTAL	19,022	16,688	13,478	13,408	13,598	15,187	16,808

Source: Department of Defense Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1991, p. III-9

Figure 5

As can be seen by the above statistics, BCT monthly accession rates have grown steadily since FY 1980 and only started to taper off in FY 1990. For OSUT, monthly training volume dropped slightly in FY 1988-90 but is on the increase for FY 1991 and 1992. The figures for FY 91 and 92, however, are subject to change and to constant refinement. For example the total annual training load (BCT and OSUT) for FY 91 varies considerably depending on who is making the estimate: i.e. the DOD FY 91 training estimate for the Army (March 1990) is 18,173; the TRADOC annual training load estimate (March 1991) is 162,908 and the U.S. Recruiting Command accession mission is 140,000 (February 1991).

Obviously the accession rate will go down but it may be increased by 2 key items. The first is the additional training impact of the IRR soldiers for Operation DESERT STORM. There has already been an increase of 400 percent in the USATC training load for February, 1991 and steady growth projected over the next 12 months to take care of IRR refresher and MOS replacement training.<sup>22</sup> Whether IRR refresher training will be part of ongoing mobilization training readiness remains to be seen and is dependent on the manpower needs of DESERT STORM.

The second major impact will be the partial replacement of all "Stop-Loss" personnel. With a freeze on release from service for both enlistments and

retirements due to Operation DESERT STORM a large pool of personnel ready to leave the service is growing steadily. While some of the loss will be absorbed by personnel reductions due to downsizing, there will still need to be replacements for the lower enlisted ranks. This will drive accession rates up for a period of several months. Currently there are not realistic ARPRINT figures until DESERT STORM is completed and major force structure questions are answered.

#### VANGUARD STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

A significant question will be the size of the accession rate after equilibrium is restored and how that rate will affect both the AC and USAR training unit structure. Some considerations may be seen within the recent Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) study on TDA reductions. This study, called the Vanguard Study, has been recently completed but not all of the recommendations have been accepted or approved. Those recommendations relating to the training base include the reduction of training centers offering BCT from 4 to 3. Forts Leonard Wood, Jackson, Sill and Knox now offer BCT and Fort Knox has been identified as to lose BCT. It will, however, keep its armor OSUT mission and the reduction will not occur until annual BCT training loads drop to 90,000 recruits.

Other major points include the reduction of U.S. Armed Forces schools (which assist training divisions upon mobilization) by 40 headquarters. The number of instructors will remain the same but headquarters will be consolidated. Likewise the Master Physical Fitness School at Fort Benjamin Harrison will be eliminated. These above actions have been informally endorsed by DA.

Other recommendations are more radical and have not been resolved yet. The first of these is to use USAR training divisions to replace AC training units. This, in fact, has been already in process with PRO-TRAIN missions replacing AC training unit personnel losses from the AC. MATCs and TBEs also provide trained

recruits for the AC by USAR units. USAR training divisions have also been tasked to train the recruit "summer surge" of approximately 5000-7,000 trainees for the AC training base. Positive action on the recommendation would help maintain the current force structure of the USAR training divisions and at the same time allow the AC end strength to be reduced by the elimination of some AC training units. This act, however, contradicts the mobilization mission of USAR training divisions. If they are training recruits annually as a specific mission assignment then there will be limited future expansion capability as the units are being used to produce the current workload. There is no doubt, however, that there will be greater reliance placed on USAR training units to perform and support AC training requirements.

Another Vanguard proposal was to convert 2 AC MTOE divisions to IET or cadre divisions. Proposed is a 2 brigade heavy force at Fort Knox and a 2 brigade light force at Fort Jackson. During peacetime the units would provide IET and upon declaration of a national emergency the units would fill, train in both IET and maneuver, and deploy as divisions with RC round out units added. This effort would keep two division flags in the AC structure and its impact on reductions to the USAR training division force structure is unknown. This proposal is different from BG Christman's recent Cadre Division Concept Study in that Vanguard supports AC cadre division while the Christman study advocates them for RC units; specifically the conversion of 1-3 training divisions. The history of poor performance of cadre divisions must be carefully considered. TRADOC has been tasked to establish an IET Study Group to review these recommendations.

One other impact source is the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commissions. BRAC-I, which is now public law, will close Fort Dix as a training center. BRAC-II, an Army study, which recommended the closure of Fort McClellan.

among other actions, has been set aside and a new BRAC-FY91 Commission has been appointed to review the findings. In the meantime the CSA has set professional leader development and IET as the top 2 Army training priorities and established a Total Army Basing Study (TABS) which will consolidate all Quicksilver and Vanguard recommendations and actions.

#### NEW MISSIONS

Finally, with the build down of the Army and the entry into a new era of strong congressional control a move may be seen towards more domestic support in order to better use taxpayer's monies. Evidence of this already exists in the counternarcotics interdiction mission recently given to DOD and the use of both AC and RC troops for support to national emergencies such as earthquakes, forest fires and civil disturbances. It is not too difficult to imagine other new missions which would be assigned specifically to AC and/or USAR training units. Missions such as operating Drug Education Camps for drug offenders, Prison Boot Camps for first time offenders and economic or environmental training projects similar to the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s come immediately to mind in a domestic mission orientation.

A recent Rand Corporation study also looked at Army missions in our changing world and concluded that military duties may no longer be linked directly to the battlefield. Potential new missions and directions offered were acting as advisors or providing basic training to foreign countries; patrolling and protecting the nation's borders; performing construction projects under adverse conditions and protecting the environment.<sup>49</sup> Likewise a study conducted by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute identified emerging Army missions relating to environmental cleanup, drug war support, multinational forces and the creation of a Domestic Policy Support Force to work on civil

affairs, health, engineering, transport, intelligence and military police functions."

PCTC regional camp support will continue as well as MOS reclassification missions. The majority of effort will still be the IET of new soldiers but it is difficult to determine the demand level over the next few years due to Congressional and Operation DESERT STORM impact. The traditional missions and selected new ones will be on the future menu of training divisions.

#### FORCE STRUCTURE

The current force structure plan for training divisions is the down sizing of the current force by approximately 8500 personnel. This is being done by the elimination of Logistic Groups in each training division and the restructuring of the Training Brigade to become a Training Support Brigade. Additional cuts will reduce the number of companies in each battalion from 5 to 4 or the elimination of a battalion in each brigade. The most drastic step, based on Quicksilver FY93, is the elimination of 3 training divisions (the 76th, 85th and 91st) as their MS are receiving consideration for removal in the BRAC studies.

The training divisions are truly unique organizations and have professional personnel that require a significant training program to be completed. Thus reduction in force structure that eliminates personnel should be avoided. Given the potential reduction of AC training base personnel it would make more sense to double up training divisions at TRADOC posts in order to save the organizational and personnel experience and to support the current training base. These are units that are not easily replaced and take a long time to achieve maturity in performance. The risk factors of mobilization needs versus cost savings should be weighted heavily in favor of mobilization expansion.

The lack of AC training units to provide IRR refresher training for the

20,000 RT-12 personnel resulted in the call-up of almost 20% of the USAR training base to include 4 Training Brigades, 20 Training Battalions, 3 Training Groups, 6 Reception Battalions, 5 USARF schools plus 29 other support companies and detachments. Almost 6400 USAR training base unit personnel were activated. With approximately 73,000 IRR replacements authorized for call-up, more USAR training units will be needed. This demand is for a one front regional conflict. Should a second front develop or another regional conflict start every available USAR training unit will be needed. The Army leadership must be made aware of the significant shortfall of training base expansion assets that would exist by the elimination of the 3 training divisions.

#### TRAINING SUPPORT CONCERNS

Finally there are a number of minor concerns expressed by the USAR training divisions. While none are critical in terms of being training stoppers, they nevertheless constitute real problems for USAR training divisions. Funding is a key concern as reduced budgets mean less dollars for MS coordination, Mobile Training Team use, unit coordination travel and extra drills. Funding losses also translate in a broader view to force structure reduction. Many support positions have already been lost as well as the training officer from each training company. This latter cut is especially crucial because these individuals are tomorrow's leaders. Funding also affects the availability of equipment to train (Minimum Essential Equipment to Train -MEET) and equipment to perform the MATC mission. Items such as squad automatic weapons (SAWs), antitank weapons (AT4, Dragon and TOW), mortars, infantry fighting vehicles and special training aids all are scarce commodities.

Other concerns deal with the lack of opportunity to use the MOB POI, which will be required upon mobilization and the strength cap placed on units. Most

training divisions would like to see a 110-115% over strength allowance for drill sergeant positions. Drill sergeants are the most significant problem that commanders have as they require a significant amount of time to recruit and train. Retention is also difficult because of the extraordinary demands placed on drill sergeants and the fact that RC drill sergeants are not eligible for proficiency pay as are their AC counterparts.

Differences still exist between installations and evaluators. Even though the IET strategy has been stabilized there are still posts interpreting and applying it differently. Differences are also evident in the standards and expectations placed on training units because of interpretation between posts. There is also considerable variation in the Form 2-R evaluation comments for AT. Fort Jackson has made significant progress with their training and evaluation guidelines and other posts should try to emulate this effort.

Another problem is the constant changes to the POI and other documents. Suggestions have been made to have these posted on an annual basis because of the time and effort that it takes to implement the changes in the USAR training units. AC training units can make the adjustments much easier because the process of training is continuous. With USAR training units, the training process is inconsistent dependent on availability of troops to train and AT and drill dates. Finally, most units would prefer to be directly assigned to TRADOC in peacetime rather than the current structure of FORSCOM command and reverting to TRADOC command upon mobilization. This is not to say that FORSCOM is not providing adequate or proper supervision and control but it means there is another layer of command between TRADOC and the training units. Ultimately the USAR training units must meet TRADOC guidance and requirements thus logically they should report directly to TRADOC headquarters.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions and recommendations are offered based on the review of the literature, discussions with training base unit personnel and operational experience in training base units. While there are many alternative being generated for AC and RC force structure the ability of the Army to expand to meet an enemy threat in a timely and proficient manner must be preserved. That means exists today with USAR training units.

### CONCLUSIONS

The United States now faces a multi-polar and multi-regional range of threats and concerns to its national security. The focus, once clear and defined, is now diffused and difficult to anticipate. The threat level has not diminished but has only grown more diverse and dispersed. National interests have not changed and are still formulated towards insuring that democracy is a viable option for those nations and cultures that wish to pursue it.

Due to the reduced superpower threat against the United States, Congress and others have sought a "peace dividend" via reduced military strength, budget and equipment. While certain reductions are understandable and certain risks are acceptable, there must be a fine balance between the ability of the nation to positively respond to an national emergency and protect national interests; and its inability to project power because of limited force structure. The current regional conflict in South West Asia clearly has severely stressed the nation's ability to project power with the current force structure. There is no doubt that the AC will be smaller and CONUS based. This means that a greater responsibility will be placed on the RC structure to support, supplement and, in some cases, integrate with AC forces. There is also no doubt that the RC structure must exist in such a way to be well trained, competent, ready to

mobilize rapidly as well as to increase the force structure by training base expansion.

The mobilization and deployment of the existing RC units will depend on the threat, force structure, and degree of readiness. These units cover the spectrum of combat, combat service and combat service support and there are multiple units from which to choose. The implementation of the IRR call-up will become a more viable option but there are key training requirements for these individuals. The expansion of the Army after existing RC units and IRR are used can only take place by the increase of accessions into the service.

The number of AC training units and their training production level is finite and their personnel levels will be reduced as force down sizing takes place. While accessions may be reduced in peacetime there is no way to increase IET fill during hostilities without USAR training divisions. These units are unique in the force structure as they have MOS qualified NCOS who are also professionally certified trainers (drill sergeants). They are the only units structured to immediately expand the force. They are also the units which will provide refresher training to the IRR soldier and conduct MOS reclassification training. They additionally are the units that currently support the AC structure by training 5,000-7,000 new recruits a year to the same standards as AC training units.

USAR training divisions must remain a viable force within the Reserve Component structure. To reduce the number or size of these units directly increases the risk level for partial, full or total expansion of the Army. Such risk assessments must be very carefully weighed and measured, and must not be an arbitrary decision to satisfy a budget goal. The United States cannot afford to reduce its strength to a level that the initial battle of the next war will

result in a military loss from which it may be difficult to recover. The history of first battle defeats of the United States is quite consistent and cannot be allowed to become part of the next war's formula.

USAR training divisions are a good investment both from a fiscal and a performance perspective. They are capable of achieving their mobilization mission because they perform it every AT period. The USAR training divisions have a significant role in training manpower both for the current force structure through AT mission support and upon mobilization through training base expansion. Using them significantly reduces the risk levels and they become a true force multiplier. Losing them increases the risk levels, reduces current accession training and severely negates force structure expansion. Readiness and the efficient transition to war must be promoted and maintained by the use of these training units.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations come from a variety of sources. Some are direct observations of the author, others come from the review of the literature for this paper and several were brought forward by key members of the leadership and trainers of USAR training units. While there are many suggestions that could be made, the following recommendations reflect a general feeling or concern within the RC training unit community. They are offered for information and for consideration of future activities or implementation.

1. Force structure cuts should be kept to a minimum for RC training units. The relative low cost of maintaining 12 divisions versus the inability to expand the training base for partial, full or total mobilization supports a strong reserve structure. The current DESERT STORM operation (a regional conflict) has thus far taken over 45% of the current AC strength and over 1000 RC units (including 67

RC training base units). Over 161,000 RC soldiers have been placed on Active Duty and some 76,000 are in the South West Asia theater. There must be a level of readiness to meet a variety of threats and risk. The greater the level of responsiveness, the lower the level of risk. Meeting the expansion needs of the Army with RC training units affords maximum risk protection with comparative minimal expenditures.

2. TRADOC operational plans (OPLANS) for Force Package Requirements need to be reviewed and broadened. The current set of TRADOC operational plans include 3 global OPLANS and 1 regional OPLAN. The global plans assume a full mobilization will rapidly follow a partial mobilization and the regional plan assumes that force requirements will not go beyond partial mobilization. Unfortunately there was no OPLAN for South West Asia or U.S. Central Command. OPLANS need to be reviewed against the lessons learned from Operation DESERT STORM and the Commander-in-Chief's procedural processing of the 200,000 Call-up and Partial Mobilization with large IRR contingents. More importantly, OPLANS or Conceptual Plans (CONPLANS) should be prepared for the key regional areas of the world that are the most sensitive to intervention. Likewise Volume III of TMOPS and the IRR refresher POIs must be reviewed and rewritten to include the lessons learned.

3. Maintain training division structure but reduce major subordinate commands where, and if, needed. Given the difficulties of drill sergeant recruitment in some geographic areas consideration should be given (if reductions are necessary) to down sizing divisions rather than eliminating divisions. A training division with 2 brigades at or near full strength is easily expandable in time of war and is more desirable than a training division with 4 brigades each of which is at 50% strength. The full strength brigades can perform both AT and mobilization missions whereas partially qualified brigades have difficulty doing either.

Maintaining the structure in the long term for partial, full or total mobilization is more supportable than having to create training divisions from the onset.

4. Cadre divisions are not a viable alternative for training divisions. The history of cadre divisions and the time needed to mobilize, fill, train, equip and deploy such units does not support this alternative. More importantly the training provided to new soldiers will be of considerably less quality if the cadre is not IET and drill sergeant certified. USAR training divisions are not equipped, and storage and maintenance facilities are not available, to make them cadre divisions. The conversion of an AC division to a cadre concept is more viable because of the maintenance and equipment support available at major installations. In either case the key question that must be answered for the cadre division is training. Without troops, very little training, other than individual tasks, can be done. An RC cadre training division can perform an IET AT but can not operate as a maneuver unit; neither can an AC cadre conversion. Perhaps the best place for a cadre division is in the IRR structure where upon mobilization both troops and cadre would prepare together for a deployment 10-12 in the future. By falling in on stockpiled and prepositioned equipment the cadre division personnel would all start at the same level and progress through individual, collective and unit training together.

5. Consider the mission realignment of some training divisions. Operation DESERT STORM has shown the critical demand for combat service and combat service support units as well as IRR refresher training. The conversion of 1-2 training divisions to a Combat Support Division may directly support future regional conflicts. A training division with three or four brigades (transportation, quartermaster, maintenance and military police) plus a training support command

would have been very useful. Support could be given to AIT training, IRR refresher training and MOS reclassification. Likewise conversion of 1-2 divisions to BCT would help provide feeder personnel into the combat service and combat service support AIT programs. It is unlikely that all 6 FORSCOM posts will remain as training base expansion posts. By concentrating training divisions at TRADOC posts for TBE and maintaining 2-3 FORSCOM posts for cycled MATC exercises a more immediate expansion model is available with additional future training expansion conducted at selected FORSCOM posts .

6. Maintain current levels of MATCs and TBEs. The most significant experience any unit can receive is to perform its assigned mission. Units performing MATC or TBE missions specifically prove their capability to perform at the locations they are to operate upon mobilization and exercise all elements of command, staff and training elements. MATCS and TBEs are the training divisions' National Training Center. Training divisions demonstrate this ability every time they conduct a major expansion exercise and they are among very few units in the RC structure who can have the opportunity to precisely perform their mobilization mission and to prove their capacity to do it. Even the AT period of conducting IET for the summer surge replicates the mobilization mission. No other type unit in the USAR can do the same; be as prepared to perform its wartime mission. The mobilization of the 100th Division (TNG) in 1962 and the current training unit mobilizations for DESERT STORM clearly demonstrates this fact.

7. Be prepared for other training missions. Training division missions should support current AC training activities or RC mobilization activities. The current AT missions which allow a training division to actually train IET soldiers should be retained at all costs. With reductions in the AC training base personnel, more IET mission support will be given to USAR training divisions. Through PRO-

TRAINS, MATCS and TBEs training divisions not only practice their mobilization mission but also directly support AC, NG, and USAR recruit training. They perform real time missions unlike other RC units. Other related missions such as ROTC Summer Camp support, annual IRR refresher training, MOS reclassification training, foreign national training and potential new, non traditional, domestic missions should supported and planned for as AT missions. These missions, however, should not replace nor disrupt the primary mission of providing instruction to IET soldiers.

8. PRO-TRAIN should be expanded to other training installations. If a MATC or TBE mission is not available because of schedule or budget the next desirable mission is PRO-TRAIN. Each TRADOC IET installation should have the capability to support a PRO-TRAIN or a TBE operation. With forthcoming AC personnel cuts PRO-TRAIN is an even more attractive alternative for USAR training division support. Fort Benning, Fort Knox and Fort McClellan are key installations for PRO-TRAIN or TBE implementation and could be accomplished with minimal effort.

9. All USAR training units should perform Unit Displacement or higher missions. Units with minimal drill sergeant assets often revert to satellization or the operation of minimum companies within the RC battalion during AT. Requirements should be initiated so that the RC battalion replaces the AC battalion with as much RC strength as available and the RC battalion commander and his staff are responsible for the supervision of all RC and AC companies in the unit. Likewise, RC company commanders and first sergeants who are short of RC drill sergeants can still command AC training units for an AT period to gain command and company administrative experience. This would also provide capable leadership training for mobilization when personnel assets become more available. Every USAR training unit needs to experience a true displacement at every AT.

The number of drill sergeants, supply sergeants, armorers or other personnel in the unit should not be an excuse for not displacing an AC unit. The displacement can be done with what RC assets are on hand and filled in with AC personnel. Finally units should strive for PRO-TRAIN, MATC or TBE missions in place of UD, if available, due to the greater unit involvement and mission demands.

10. Review and resolve enduring training issues. Several items of concern should be reviewed for resolution. They include the following:

A. Train against the TRADOC IET standard not the interpretation of the standard by an individual post.

B. Continue to minimize changes to the IET POI and allow training units to use the MOB POI. Likewise standardize the Form 2-R completion by having a TRADOC set of standards.

C. Due to lengthy training time for drill sergeants and the recruiting and retention problems associated with it, allow training divisions to recruit and retain drill sergeants at 110-115% over strength.

D. Training units and installations should review their TDAs and MOB TDAs to incorporate DESERT STORM lessons learned.

E. Funding needs to be adequate to prepare for and to accomplish the assigned missions. There must be a resolution to the concept of posts charging for every service rendered. While funding line items can be maintained, the AC, RC and the installations are all part of the Total Army Force and should be treated accordingly.

## ENDNOTES

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6. Jacob W. Kipp, "A Gde Zhe Ugroza? (Where Then Is the Threat?): Soviet Military Doctrine In the Post Cold War Era," Military Review, December, 1990, p. 14.
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11. U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Reg 140-4 / FORSCOM Reg 140-5, 38-39 (hereafter referred to as "TRADOC Reg 140-4").
12. Ralph Sanders, and Joseph E. Muckerman, II, Mobilization and the National Defense, p. 8.
13. Leonard Wood, MG, Our Military History, Its Facts and Fallacies, pp. 226-27.
14. Foster and Hoerber, p. 448.
15. Ibid.
16. U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, 1990-1991, p. 12-20,21.

17. During peacetime the U.S. Army Reserve Training Divisions and Separate Brigades come under the command of FORSCOM. Upon activation they revert to TRADOC control thus TRADOC is the Capstone HQS for these units. This structure may change with the soon to be implemented Chief of Army Reserve Command and Control Plan.
18. Ralph Sanders and Joseph E. Muckerman, II. "A Strategic Rational For Mobilization." Strategic Review. Summer 1984. p. 57.
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22. Soldierization is an Initial Entry Training concept that provides for continuity of control and discipline throughout the training cycle. At beginning it is very rigid but as the new soldiers learn and gain an appreciation for the training process greater independence and freedom is granted. The ultimate goal at the end of the training cycle is to have a physically fit, well trained, and motivated soldier ready to be assigned to a field unit.
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43. Ibid, p. 171.
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47. U.S. Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 140-7, The Role of the Reserve In the Total Army, p. 45.
48. Palmer, Wiley and Keast, p. 179.
49. Stuckey and Pistorius, p. 13.
50. Crossland, p. 21.
51. DA Pamphlet 140-7, p.45.
52. Crossland, p. 21.
53. Richard B. Crossland, LTC and James T. Currie, MAJ, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983, p. 131.
54. Association of the U.S. Army, "Command and Staff Directory," Army 1990-91 Green Book, October 1990, pp. 235-236.

55. Training and Doctrine Command. A Perspective, TRADOC FY 88-89. p. 2-24.
56. Ft. Dix has been identified on the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignments and Closure (BRAC) (Public Law 100-526) with a projected completion of closure in FY 93. Ft. McClellan appears on the 29 January 1990 (Round Two) BRAC list and is scheduled for closure also in FY 93. This, however, is being reviewed by the new BRAC 91 Commission. The final impact by the BRAC and Vanguard studies on the operation of TRADOC's Army Training Centers and the level of the Army's accessions is unknown at this time.
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