The Principles of War and Campaign Planning:
Is There a Connection?

A Monograph
by
Major Paul E. Melody
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Second Term, AY 89/90

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
The Principles of War and Campaign Planning: Is There a Connection? (U)

The author analyzes the principles of war, seeking to determine how and why they were adopted. The author also analyzes post-World War II American campaign doctrine. The analysis reveals two key points: First, despite what JCS Pub. 3-0 states, there is not a common set of principles of war. Rather, each service has a unique view of the principles of war. Second, campaign planning doctrine has never used the principles of war in campaign design. As a result of these two points, the author feels that there is, at best, a tenuous relationship between the so-called joint principles of war and current campaign planning doctrine. In his conclusions, the author suggests that due to this tenuous relationship, coupled with the complex and unique nature of campaign planning, the principles of war should not be part of current campaign planning doctrine or design. Instead, current doctrine should focus on broader themes, themes that were evident in earlier campaign doctrine and literature, such as the 1942 and 1950 versions of FM 100-15.
Title of Monograph: The Principles of War and Campaign Planning: Is There A Connection?

Approved by:

Lieutenant Colonel Lowell L. Day, M. Ed

Colonel William H. James, MA, MMAS

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted this 7th day of June 1990
ABSTRACT


The principles of war have been a part of US Army doctrine since 1949. In 1989 with the publication of JCS Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, the principles of war also became part of Joint doctrine. However, other than their reference in JCS Pub 3-0, the principles of war are not mentioned in any of the other current discussions of campaign planning.

With this in mind, the author analyzes the principles of war, seeking to determine how and why they were adopted. One key point to surface in the analysis is the fact that the Army chose the principles of war rather arbitrarily in 1921. Unlike J.F.C. Fuller's principles of war (upon which they were modeled), the American principles of war were not accompanied by a comprehensive theory of war.

The author also analyzes post-WWI American campaign planning doctrine. This analysis reveals two significant points. First, despite the statements in JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, there is not a common set of principles of war. Rather, the services each have a different view of the principles of war. As a case in point, one service (the Navy) does not even recognize their existence. Second, campaign planning doctrine has never used the principles of war in campaign design. As a result of these two points, the author feels that there is, at best, a tenuous relationship between the principles of war and current campaign planning doctrine.

In his conclusions, the author suggests that due to this tenuous relationship, and the complex and unique nature of campaign planning, the principles of war should not be a part of current campaign design. Instead, current campaign doctrine should continue to focus on standard procedures to enhance understanding during planning and execution. The elements of campaign design should focus on broader themes, themes that were evident in earlier campaign doctrine and literature such as the 1942 and 1950 versions FM 100-15.
I. INTRODUCTION

My first encounter with the principles of war occurred in 1973 with my introduction to small unit tactics when I was a freshman at the US Military Academy. Little did I realize then that my experience with the principles of war over the next seventeen years would reflect the changing role the principles of war have undergone in the US Army since 1969. Our tactics instructor, told us that to be successful in tactics, both at West Point and in the "real Army", we had to use our heads and apply judiciously the principles of war. He then showed us a simple way to commit them to memory by the use of a long acronym: MUSSMOOSE. Additionally, we were expected to memorize the pithy explanations that defined each of the principles. Once we began to prepare our platoon attacks and defenses, the instructor evaluated the plan using the principles of war. This process continued until we finished the required tactics courses in our junior year.

With this as my basic understanding of tactics, I was very surprised when I started my Infantry Officers Basic Course (IOBC) in 1977. At IOBC we did not use the principles of war; we used something new -- the "Active Defense". I only heard the principles of war referred to in unofficial side conversations. Apparently, the "real Army" didn't use the principles of war, it used the principles the "Active Defense".

In 1983 at the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course
(IOAC), I once again encountered the principles of war. In a special class entitled, "The Principles of War", I watched a video tape of General Don Starry, then Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), explain the importance of knowing and understanding the principles of war. General Starry stressed that the principles of war were the foundation of our (then) new doctrine, "AirLand Battle" (ALB). Following the tape, a colonel, the director of the Combined Arms and Tactics Department (CATD), took the stage. He informed us that so long as we remained faithful to applying the principles of war we would not go wrong during our tactics instruction.

On the first day following the colonel's class, our first day in tactics, we learned the tenets of ALB, the elements of combat power, and the combat imperatives. Over the course of the next few weeks, we also learned the characteristics of the defense, the offense, and the principles of retrograde operations. We only heard of the principles of war when an instructor would critique an unsatisfactory plan. "You've failed to mass your combat power!", or "You've failed to insure simplicity."

Years later, at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in 1988, my experience with the principles of war was the same as at IOAC. There was always a reference to the principles of war in the instructor's critique. During the planning we used "doctrine": the tenets of ALB, or the imperatives of modern combat. Why was there this dichotomy?
The instructors never gave a very coherent answer to this question. I suppose it was due to the fact that the instructors felt more comfortable with the principles of war than with the tenets of ALB.

Unlike other schools (IOAC, CGSOC), where the principles of war were used routinely, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) rarely discussed the principles of war. To be sure, the students used various principles of war in tactical discussions, as well as in elaborating on certain campaign proposals. Moreover, during the school's theory course, the genesis of the US Army's principles of war were not discussed at all. Specifically why they were not discussed at SAMS is not the focus of this paper. What is essential is the fact that the principles of war are not currently a deliberate part of the specifics of campaign planning doctrine; they are not part of the key concepts of operational design.

Despite the fact that SAMS does not specifically address the principles of war in campaign planning design, current Joint Doctrine for campaign planning does recognize a set of principles of war. Moreover, it asserts them to be the basis of all joint doctrine and, "to act as the focal point for unified and joint planning and operations". With this in mind, this paper seeks to answer a specific question: What is the relationship between the principles of war and campaign planning?

As will be shown, analysis of current joint planning
doctrine reveals that there is, at best, a tenuous relationship between the principles of war and campaign planning. This can be attributed to two factors.

First, within the individual services the principles of war have different roles. They are either not recognized, as in the US Navy. They are currently being de-emphasized or abandoned, as apparently is happening in the US Marine Corps. They are rather ambiguous, as is the case of the US Army. Or, finally, they are merely the source of doctrine, as is the case of the Air Force.

Second, and perhaps most important, within joint service campaign planning discussions and doctrine development, the principles of war are rarely and only partially addressed. This appears to be a reflection of the fact that until the 1989 version of JCS Pub 3-0, the principles of war have not been a doctrinal part of campaign planning.

To explain the first point, the principles of war have been analyzed in some detail. The evolution of the principles of war as we know them are addressed first. This is done to place the principles of war into their proper historical and doctrinal context. Concurrent with this, the strengths and weaknesses of the principles of war are also considered.

The second point -- the specific role that the principles of war have played in US campaign planning doctrine in the 20th Century is follows the analysis of the principles of war. Specifically, the goal is to determine the historical linkage between the US principles of war and US
campaign planning doctrine.

Finally, the paper concludes with some observations and recommendations regarding the principles of war, campaign planning and joint doctrine.

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The current version of the US principles of war is a product of the mid-20th Century. As they have come to be defined, at least in Great Britain and the United States, the principles of war are a brief list of fundamental truths concerning the timeless nature and conduct of war. The US principles of war are unique in that they are all inclusive, rather few in number, and are accompanied by pithy descriptions for each principle. In order to better appreciate the principles of war, and to put them into their unique historical position, a brief review of their evolution is useful.

Although the US principles of war are unique, the search for fundamental truths of war is not a new concept. In the 18th Century two major works appeared that attempted to identify and explain the principles of success in war. These two works were: My Reveries Upon the Art of War by Maurice de Saxe, and History of the Late War in Germany Between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies by Henry Lloyd. These works were widely read as the authors attempted to address the numerous problems commanders would encounter on campaign. Lloyd and de Saxe did not offer
their readers a short, definitive list of principles of war, nor did they accompany the principles they did discuss with a brief definition. Finally, and most importantly, they did not consider the principles they discussed to be all inclusive. Rather, the authors left room for other considerations too. Apparently, de Saxe and Lloyd sought to help soldiers understand the nature of war in a general sense. For them, it was good enough to share their knowledge and musing concerning the fundamental nature of war. It was for later theorists to attempt to determine an exact number of principles and their precise content.

Although the search to understand the fundamental nature of warfare was certainly part of the 18th Century and the Enlightenment, the search for specific principles of war increased in intensity with the emergence of Napoleon Bonaparte. Because of Napoleon's tremendous successes, soldiers longed to emulate him. Furthermore, soldiers were keen to devour everything he said about war. It was this near adulation of Napoleon that the codification of the principles of war as we know them began. Specifically, the search for universal principles of war can be attributed to the fact that Napoleon himself often referred to principles of war:

Remember always three things: unity of forces, urgency, and a firm resolution to perish with glory. These are the three great principles of the military art that have brought me success in all my operations.

The two most influential interpreters of Napoleon and military theorists in the 19th Century were Antoine-Henri
Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. Although both of these men have been credited with the honor of articulating the antecedents to our current principles of war, this popular belief is incorrect. Of these two men, Jomini can be said to be the grandfather of the current principles of war. Moreover, both men had very differing views on the role of military theory. Most importantly, their two views have affected how soldiers have thought about war ever since.

Jomini was a prolific writer and enjoyed a huge following both in life and in death. His works were translated into every major European language. Part of his success as an author can be attributed to his reputation as the soldier who understood why Napoleon was successful. Furthermore, he was convinced that it was possible to do two things. First, it was possible to determine the fundamental and unchanging truths about the nature of war. Second, it was possible to use them to be successful on the battlefield. As a result, Jomini’s writings sought to provide soldiers with a clear exposition of what to do on campaign and battle. He offered a method with which soldiers could be as successful as Napoleon.

Throughout his writings, Jomini addressed certain maxims, rules, and principles. (He used all three words interchangeably.) Although he didn’t specify, "the" most important principles of war, Jomini came close to stating such a list with his, "fundamental principle of war":

1. To carry the greatest part of the available forces of an army on the decisive point....
2. To operate in such a manner that this mass is not only present at the decisive point, but that once there, it is also skillfully put into action.9

Even if Jomini did not articulate a specific list of principles of war similar to our own principles of war, it is clear that he reinforced the proposition made by Napoleon that there did exist an exact list of fundamental truths concerning war.10 It is this point, perhaps more than any other, where Jomini and Clausewitz differed the most. Since popular belief mistakenly credits Clausewitz with being an originator of the current principles of war, it is useful to examine his position on this point.11

Recent scholarly works on Clausewitz's by Peter Paret, (Soldier and the State), Raymond Aron (Clausewitz: Philosopher of War), and Azar Gat (The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz) have helped to dispel the notion that Clausewitz felt there could exist a list of certain immutable principles of war that could guide a commander to success on the battlefield. Still the myth persists today that Clausewitz produced such a list of principles.12

The mistaken connection between Clausewitz and a list of specific principles of war can be attributed to an abbreviated English translation of his book's title as: The Principles of War instead of its more accurate, The Most Important Principles for the Conduct of War.13 With one quick reading, and the more accurate title, it is clear to see that
Clausewitz wrote the work solely as a means to help educate the young heir to the Prussian Throne - who had no battle experience, a not uncommon occurrence for nobility of the times - in fulfilling his duties as a battlefield commander. Later writers, apparently looking for a means to garner respectability, or to corroborate their thoughts, likened their own principles of war to those they could extrapolate from Clausewitz's so-called *The Principles of War*.14

There are similar thoughts in *The Principles of War* with those of his classic *On War*, though Clausewitz never intended for it to suggest that there could be an easy or quick way to learn about or to act in war. Although Clausewitz did acknowledge that there were fundamental truths - certain principles - about war, he never felt they could be easily and simply reduced to a few pithy statements, and that they should then guide a commander on the battlefield. Rather, Clausewitz felt that once on the battlefield, principles and rules could never take the place of recognizing the needs of the actual situation. On the battlefield, the general had to use his own judgment and insights - the result of years of preparation and talent - and not theory or rules.15

As a result of Jomini's and Clausewitz's differing views on warfare and the use of military theory, by the late 19th Century, the major European armies tended to be either Jominian or Clausewitzian in outlook. England and France were Jominian (as was the United States) in that they be-
lieved that there could exist a list of principles of war that should guide commanders on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{16}

As a result of this orientation, France and England produced a military system based on sets of principles. These principles were not the principles of war we know today. Rather, they are closer to what we would call doctrinal principles. However, unlike our doctrinal concepts, these principles were to followed exactly.\textsuperscript{17}

Prussia alone was Clausewitzian. As such, the Prussians did not adhere to the concept of immutable principles of war. Clausewitz’s influence tended to discourage the elaboration of fixed principles. Von Moltke, as an example, firmly believed that rules or principles applicable to all cases was nonsense. Rather, he, along with other Prussian military thinkers, adhered to "the method of the concrete cases."\textsuperscript{18} However, some Prussian military writers did subscribe to the proposition that war could have certain principles - though they were certainly not the key to all aspects of war. The most well known and well read Prussian theorists was Colmar von Der Goltz.

In the various books he wrote, von Der Goltz addressed various principles that he deduced were essential for success in war. However, he felt that it was not possible to enumerate all of them. Despite this acknowledged shortcoming, he did identify those he considered the most essential for success: economy of forces and "to make every effort as strong as possible at the decisive point".\textsuperscript{19} In his later works, von
Der Goltz identified two principles of modern war. The first principle was that the enemy's main army should be the primary objective around which one must focus all of one's efforts. The second stemmed from the first principle: "to concentrate if possible, all power for the hour of decision." As with the French and English, these were closer to what we would call doctrinal principles rather than principles of war. Significantly though, and unlike the French and British principles, the principles Von Der Goltz spoke of were intended to provide understanding and not guidance on the battlefield.20

In sum, the Prussians felt that while one must be aware of the enduring nature of war, acting in concert with certain fixed principles, as opposed to the existing conditions that confronted one on the battlefield, was wrong. On the whole, the Prussian military culture tended to be more pragmatic than dogmatic about warfare.21

Eventually, the two views of warfare, Jominian (France) and Clausewitzian (Prussia) clashed in 1870 with the Franco-Prussian War. Prussia won a stunning victory. As a result, other nations were quick to adopt what they mistakenly thought was the Prussian "system."

In reviewing its failure in the war, the French army came to several conclusions. First, France had failed to account for the moral elements of war, which their principles, in true Jominian fashion, did not address. As a consequence, the French began to include the human element in war, while
continuing to highlight lists of principles. Second, the French recognized a need for better officer education and military planning. As a result, the French established a new school, a senior military school, like the Prussian Kriegsakademie. Additionally, the French established a General Staff that outwardly looked like the German General Staff. Unfortunately, the French did not change their philosophy in following fixed principles. 

Perhaps the best example of the French failure to change their thinking is General Foch's 1904 work, *The Principles of War*. Although Foch did not provide a definitive list of principles in his work, he did list four: economy of forces, freedom of action, free disposition of forces, and security. (To emphasize the fact that these were not all inclusive, Foch concluded his list with the word "etc."). Foch's work was actually his vision of a theory of war and how to act in war. It attempted to explain war in its entirety, but did not try to simplify or reduce it to a definitive list of manageable and immutable principles. It still supported the idea that soldiers could be guided by key principles.

In the years prior to World War I (WWI) not a single army subscribed to a list of definitive, fixed and immutable principles of war. In fact, the term "principles of war" apparently had the connotation of "the fundamental truth of the nature of war" rather than a precise, definitive, and relatively short list of principles with which a soldier
could be sure of following to success. It appears that the current belief that such a list could be codified came about as a result of WWI - particularly in armies with a strong Jominiarn tradition, like those of the United States and Great Britain.24

3. The Codification of the Principles of War

The final step to codifying the principles of war, as we currently know them, can be most immediately identified with the need to train huge, nastily raised armies for "modern", total war, as was first encountered in WWI. In the years immediately preceding WWI, all European armies began to produce doctrinal literature. This literature sought to help train soldiers in as efficient manner as possible. As a consequence, the previously held belief that the principles of war were innumerable and required years of reading, thinking and experience to understand fell to the practical need to quickly train troops and junior officers for war. Despite this change in thinking, there was no single list of officially sanctioned principles of war. Rather, whenever the principles of war were addressed, they were said to be "neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse" - not a very practical statement to be sure.25

However, once WWI began, many country's manuals listed various rules or principles for the conduct of certain aspects of fighting. These principles varied in number from as few as four to as many as twenty five. As a consequence, the
idea that war could be regulated by a few fundamental principles gained acceptance - at least in the British and American armies. However, the final acceptance, the codification, of a single and official list of these fundamental truths did not take place fully until after WWI.26

The British army was the first army to list official principles of war. Although popular belief credits J.F.C. Fuller with their articulation, the first official list was published in the British Field Service Regulations (FSR) in 1920 by a committee of British officers. However, Fuller did have a great deal of influence on the committee. 27

Although Fuller's influence waned in the British army, particularly in regards to the principles of war, his list of principles spread overseas quickly. His writings had a direct impact on the eventual adoption of the principles of war in the American Army in the 1920s.28

In summary, one can see that the principles of war as we know them are a unique product of the 20th Century. Their roots can be traced to theoretical proposition, initially and most strongly sanctioned by Jomini, that war could be reduced to a few number of enduring and immutable principles. The codification of such a list of principles was assisted by the necessity to mobilize and train great numbers of leaders and soldiers in WWI. Additionally, one can see that concurrent with Jomini's view of war came a different view of war, namely, that of Clausewitz. This school of thought rejected the premise that war had a few fundamental and enduring prin-
ciples that in and of themselves gave soldiers the key to victory. Rather, this view held that while principles may help soldiers to understand the nature of war, they could not provide the means to victory on the battlefield.

4. The Adoption of the American Principles of War

Most US Army officers probably know that the Army's principles of war can be linked to J.F.C. Fuller, as this fact is stated in the current Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. However, fewer officers are probably aware of how and when the principles were first introduced; that they did not remain in doctrine for very long after their introduction; or that they were not an official part of the US Army's doctrine during all of WWII. In and of themselves these facts are relatively unimportant. However, in considering these facts, one will also gain an understanding of the role the principles of war have played in Army doctrine.

Although this section deals with the "American" principles of war, the Army's principles of war receive most of the attention. This is done for two reasons. First, the Army was the first service to adopt a set of principles of war. Second, the current "American" principles of war, those articulated in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, are essentially those articulated by the Army.29

The US Army adopted the principles of war in 1921. Given the strong Jominian tradition that existed in the
American Army, this is not surprising. Two people seem to have been primarily responsible for their actual adoption: Major Hjalmar Erickson and Colonel William K. Naylor. Both men were instructors at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The principles of war were published in the Army's Training Regulation 10-5, Doctrines, Principles and Methods and contained the eight principles Fuller had articulated in 1913, with one addition - simplicity. The explanations that accompanied each of the principles of war were nearly identical to those in the British regulations.

The first public explanation for the newly adopted American principles of war appeared in Infantry Journal in two 1921 articles by Colonel William K. Naylor entitled, "The Principles of War". In the articles, Naylor made several points concerning the principles of war. First, he stated that the principles of war were similar to any other principle in that they were a profession of faith. Why Naylor thought this to be important is unclear - except perhaps that the principles were new and unproven. Second, he wished to distinguish the new principles of war from rules of war. In this view, the former required judgment, the latter did not. Third, Naylor stated that the principles were not doctrine, nor were they theory, nor maxims. In today's language, they would seem to be mental constructs about the nature of war at both the strategic and the tactical levels. As such, Naylor felt the principles of war could do two things for soldiers.
First, they could provide insights into the nature of war. Second, if correctly applied, the principles of war allowed commanders to make correct decisions. This latter point clearly reflects Naylor’s Jominian leanings. Despite the wonderful things that he felt the principles of war could do for soldiers, Naylor’s justification for the US Army’s principles of war was based on rather flimsy evidence. Primarily, Naylor used a few Napoleonic maxims and a relatively few, sketchy, and selectively chosen historical examples to explain each principle. Moreover, the principle "surprise" (the one principle that differed from those codified by the British Army) was selected, in good measure, as a direct result of the very brief American experience in WWI, and not upon a comprehensive survey of warfare. As such, this principle would seem to be closer to a doctrinal principle rather than an immutable and timeless principle of war.

In his concluding comments, Naylor stated that the principles of war in themselves were incomplete. He emphasized that one had to consider other aspects of warfare as well: discipline, leadership, chance, and morale. (Unlike Fuller’s principles, the American principles of war were not inclusive of these factors.) Though Naylor was an ardent supporter of the concept of immutable principles of war as guides to action, he recognized their incomplete nature – at least as codified in the United States Army.

Despite their acceptance in the Training Regulation,
the principles of war had many critics. (Considering Naylor's article, this is not hard to understand.) As a result, by 1928 the principles of war had fallen out of US Army doctrine. They would not reappear officially until the 1949 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. Why they fell out is unclear. It would appear that the validity of the concept and necessity of "immutable" principles of war was rejected. It is possible that within the American Army some very influential officers disagreed with adopting a set of universal and immutable principles.

Once such officer appears to have been General George C. Marshall. In the much publicized, Infantry in Battle, produced under Marshall's direction in the early 1930s, the following statement introduces the book:

The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice...in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits...the leader...must close his mind to the alluring formulae that well meaning people offer in the name of victory....he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these.

As one can see, this belief in the dictates of the situation was similar, if not identical, to the Prussian/German view of war of the "concrete cases". In the light of this observation, it is not surprising that the 1933 FM 100-5, the version that guided the American Army into WWII, was a virtual copy of the 1933 German FSR
Truppenführung. Considering these two points, it is also not surprising that the next time the principles of war appeared in American Army doctrine was after General George C. Marshall had retired and the German Army had been defeated.

When the principles of war returned to the Army's doctrine in 1949, -- nearly five years after Marshall had retired and the German defeat in WWII -- they were nearly identical to those listed in 1921. From their reintroduction in the 1949 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, until the 1976 FM 100-5, Operations, the US Army used them as fundamental and prescriptive doctrinal concepts.

In the 1949 FM 100-5, the principles of war appeared as an introduction to the chapter entitled "The Exercise of Command". They were not accompanied by any explanation or instruction on their intended use. Although, by their position in the chapter, one can deduce that the principles of war were to guide commanders in the formulation of plans and orders. As with their initial publication in 1921, each principle was accompanied by a terse explanation. With only a few adjustments to these explanations, the US Army's principles of war have remained virtually the same since 1949.

Their use as a prescriptive tool in the formulation of plans and orders continued in the 1954 FM 100-5. Specifically, this version of FM 100-5 included an introduction to the principles of war, stating:

The principles of war govern war the prosecution of
war. Their application is essential to command...[and] to the successful conduct of war...[their] degree of application varies with the situation.

As one can see, this point is an elaboration on their implied role in the 1949 doctrine. Significantly, the 1954 manual did not contain principles other than the principles of war.

The next edition of FM 100-5 appeared in 1962. In this version, the relationship between the principles of war and operational concepts was even more pronounced. The chapter containing the principles of war was entitled "Principles of War and Operational Concepts", and stated:

The development of combat power relates directly to the principles of mass and economy of force. The application of combat power is qualified by the intelligent application of the remaining principles of war.

The next edition of FM 100-5, which appeared in 1968, repeated verbatim the 1954 comments regarding the principles of war, with one addition:

In applying the principles of war, the development and application of combat power are essential to decisive results.

In brief, by 1968 the principles of war had become an intimate part of the Army’s doctrine. US soldiers applied the principles as doctrinal fundamentals, as vital keys in tactical planning and execution. By the middle 1970s and the publication of the 1976 FM 100-5, however, this approach suddenly ended.
The 1976 FM 100-5 was a significantly different manual than any produced in the Army's past. General William DePuy, the first commander of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was responsible for this change. He felt that the existing strategic situation in Europe - the Army's primary mission, he thought - required a new doctrine, a doctrine that would insure an outnumbered American Army would win a war against the Warsaw Pact. He insured the new manual contained clearly articulated tactical principles that soldiers could apply in combat. In this sense, DePuy was very Jominian in his outlook. It is ironic, therefore, that the manual did not list the principles of war. This point, along with many others, was widely criticized.

In response to the criticism that the 1976 FM 100-5 did not contain or refer to the principles of war, a new manual was published that did list them: FM 100-1, The Army. In it, the principles of war were defined as:

"...fundamental concepts, the result of centuries of tradition and experience. These principles are interrelated...the emphasis on any will vary with the situation."

The reappearance of the principles of war placated some critics of the 1976 FM 100-5. But, their reappearance also produced a new situation, one that begged the following questions: Did the principles of war replace the doctrinal concepts and principles so clearly outlined in the existing doctrine? Was the Army to use the principles of war and the doctrinal principles simultaneously? If so, how and why?
These points were not answered in the 1978 FM 100-1.

In 1981, the Army published a revised edition of FM 100-1. It attempted to clarify the role of the principles of war in Army doctrine. In doing this, the principles of war status changed significantly. For the first time since their adoption in 1921, the Army no longer considered the principles of war as immutable, although they were still considered to be the key to understanding battle success in the past. As equally important was the fact that FM 100-1 stated that the principles of war were not to be applied prescriptively. Additionally, their new role varied, depending on what level of war they were used at. In all cases, however, FM 100-1 considered the principles of war to be a frame of reference. At the strategic level, they provided a set of questions. At the tactical level, they provided an operational tool to provide thought in combat ("...if understood and applied properly."). In short, the 1981 FM 100-1 stated the principles of war could be used in conjunction with existing operational and doctrinal concepts. Most significantly, however, the principles of war were no longer the key tactical and operational concept as they had been between 1949 and 1975.

In 1982, a year after the revised FM 100-1 was published, the Army adopted a new doctrine - AirLand Battle (ALB). In good measure, ALB answered all the criticisms of the old Active Defense. Continuing on the idea of formulating specific doctrine started in 1976, the 1982 FM 100-5 outlined
four key doctrinal principles or tenets - the tenets of ALB: agility, initiative, depth, synchronization. With ALB, the Army also introduced three levels of war (the strategic, the operational and the tactical), combat imperatives (the modern applications of the principles of war, combined with certain moral principles of fighting not covered in the principles of war), and offensive and defensive characteristics (fundamentals). With the appearance of these new doctrinal tenets, the principles of war usefulness, at least as described in the 1981 FM 100-1, seemed superfluous or unnecessary in operational issues. As though to highlight their new and less than central role, the principles of war were not even included within the body of FM 100-5 itself; they were placed in a separate annex in the back. Their role would become even more unclear with the revisions to ALB in 1986.

Although well accepted, the 1982 FM 100-5 was revised in 1986. Most of these modifications were refinements on the basic concepts addressed in 1982. Unlike the 1982 manual, the 1986 FM 100-5 did not directly link the principles of war to the ALB imperatives (which were revised from seven in the 1982 manual to ten in 1986, and renamed the imperatives of modern combat). Although the 1986 FM 100-5 cited the principles of war as being fundamental to US Army doctrine, it preceded this by stating doctrine, "must [also] be rooted in time tested theories." It also stated that the principles of ALB reflected past and modern theorists of war. In essence, the principles of war were but one of many sources of doc-
trine. As a result, their role in the new FM 100-5 was different than in the past. In FM 100-5 they seemed to serve as a purely didactic tool rather than a doctrinal concept to be used in planning or execution. In this role, the principles of war did not have the authority that the early advocates of a definitive and immutable list of principles envisioned in 1921. Most importantly, they were not the key doctrinal concepts that they had been from 1949 to 1976. This role fell to the tenets of ALB. However, so long as the current FM 100-1 (the 1986 edition) suggests the principles may be used as an operational concept, their role will remain rather ambiguous.

In summary, one can see that the principles of war are a rather recent addition to the US Army's tactical doctrine. It can also be seen that the principles of war have not been clearly justified since they have been adopted. Since their introduction in 1921, the US principles of war have never been explained within a comprehensive theory of war. This is rather interesting, for J.F.C. Fuller, whose writings apparently influenced the two officers who were responsible for the US Army's principles of war, wrote an entire book outlining his principles within a theory of war. One can also see that after their reintroduction in 1949, the principles of war became a doctrinal concept that American soldiers used to guide them in tactical planning and execution. This process remained rather simple and straightforward until the principles of war were displaced by newer doctrinal principles of
the Active Defense. When, as a result of field criticism of the Active Defense, the principles of war returned to doctrine, their role collided with the newer principles of the Active Defense. This conflict was not settled even with a new doctrine in 1982. On the contrary, with a revised FM 100-5 in 1986, the principles of war's role became clearly ambiguous. In FM 100-5, they served as a part of the theory of war. In FM 100-1, they served as both theory and doctrine. As a part of doctrine in FM 100-1, they serve as tools in planning and execution. As such, they suggest an alternative to the concepts and tenets already articulated in FM 100-5.

5. The Principles of War - An Assessment

Now that the development and role of the principles of war have been briefly addressed, it is fitting and useful to assess their utility. The intention is to gain an appreciation for their strengths and weaknesses.

As already discussed, the principles of war are the result of a military theory first proposed by Jomini in the 19th Century. He believed that it was possible to extract from history key fundamentals that when properly applied would insure success in battle. As such, for a list of principles to be true "principles of war", they must have two essential characteristics. First, they must be a list of timeless, immutable, and definitive principles derived from a study of history. Second, the list must be used by soldiers to guide them in making decisions in war. In essence, the
principles of war must serve as a sort of mental checklist in creating or evaluating a plan or decision.

In order to assess the principles of war, it is necessary to evaluate their essential characteristics. First, are the principles of war timeless? From their first acceptance following WWI, proponents have attempted to prove their timelessness with a variety of historical examples, usually involving one of the Great Captains. They have also extrapolated each principle from the works of well respected military theorists, to include Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. (Both men, by the way, never produced a list of definitive and immutable principles of war to guide soldiers in war.) In short, advocates of the principles of war have, in the words of the noted historian Michael Howard, abused military history to support their views.7

Are the principles of war immutable? If one accepts the fact that certain principles have been evident in all successful military actions and in the majority of military histories since recorded time, the answer would seem to be yes. Proponents add that though these principles have manifested themselves differently over the centuries, their essential qualities have remained consistent. Again, this argument rests on the manner in which one uses historical "proof". Just as it is relatively easy to cite proof for the principles, it is just as difficult for one to disprove their existence.8

Are the principles of war definitive? It is this point
- more than any other - that seems to undermine the theoretical proposition and strength of the principles of war. One example illustrates this point nicely. In 1953, the US Army tasked a group of captured former German general officers and General Staff officers to evaluate the 1949 FM 100-5. When the Germans covered the principles of war, they asked a simple question: "Why did you exclude defense from your list of principles of war?" To the Germans, omitting the defense exaggerated the importance of the offense and diminished the importance of the defense (a fact their own army experienced in the early days of WWI). Furthermore, they thought any comprehensive discussion of warfare had to address both the offense and the defense. Moreover, an army's doctrine had to keep them in balance. Besides this illustration, the existence of differing principles of war in other countries suggests that the lists are not definitive. Proponents quickly add, however, that for the list to be manageable, it must exclude some of the less important principles and focus on the most essential. 

As a result of this brief analysis, one can see that the principles of war can be loosely argued to be immutable and perhaps timeless. But, one is hard pressed to prove they are definitive. This leads to the next consideration. Can the principles of war insure success on the battlefield? And, should soldiers make decisions based on established, immutable principles of war?

Proponents for the principles of war argue that the
Great Captains have employed them in their own time. As stated earlier, advocates for the principles of war have quoted Napoleon as proof of their existence and utility in guiding one's action on the battlefield. As recently as the early 1980s, an American author, Colonel (Ret.) Harry Summers suggested that the US Army lost the war in Vietnam, in part, because it failed to follow the principles of war.\textsuperscript{90}

Perhaps the best known opponent to the concept of a list of definitive principles of war is Carl von Clausewitz. Although he did admit that there was utility in identifying certain principles or fundamentals about the nature of war, he did not think that they could or should be used as the source for judgment on the battlefield (particularly by generals). Clausewitz thought that at higher levels of command, generals always faced unique situations, particularly in designing campaigns. As a result, historical truths, such as the principles of war, could not suggest a solution or answer.\textsuperscript{51}

Inspite of their shortcomings, the principles of war do have some positive aspects. First, in and of themselves, they are not incorrect. Surprise, as just one example, has certainly given armies who possessed it an advantage in battle. Second, provided the principles of war are uniformly known, they can act as a shorthand for certain aspects or characteristics of fighting. This allows professional soldiers to discuss plans and orders with a similar outlook. Third, if an army wishes to have a standard method of fight-
ing, the principles of war can act as operational concepts. In this way, they are an army's operational doctrine. Of course, if the army already has a set of doctrinal concepts, the principles of war can cause some confusion. Such a situation begs: does the army use its doctrinal concepts or does it use its principles of war? This situation would appear to be the case in the US Army today, as described in the introduction to this paper.

6. CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

This chapter analyses the relationship between the principles of war and contemporary campaign planning. As a result of this analysis, it is apparent that there is, at best, a tenuous relationship between the two. This conclusion is supported by three facts. First, there is no common service belief in either the existence, utility, or codification of the principles of war. Second, contemporary campaign planning literature does not discuss the principles of war as a part of operational design. Third, until the publication of JCS Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (Final Draft 1989), the principles of war have not been a part of campaign planning doctrine. Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

The first point addresses the fact that there is no "common" set of principles of war, contrary to what JCS Pub. 3-0 states. In reality, the services each have a unique view of the principles of war.

At the current time, the Navy does not recognize any
set principles of war. In the 1950s, the Navy had twelve principles of war, but has dropped them from the literature since then. Rather, the Navy currently operates primarily around tactical and operational principles for submarine, surface, and carrier forces. The Navy does not see the utility in, or the necessity for, such a list. Consequently, it does not educate its officers in using a set of principles of war in naval planning or operations. 

As late as 1988, the Marine Corps officially recognized the same nine principles of war as did the Army. At the present time, however, it appears that the Marine Corps is changing its views on the utility or wisdom of accepting and adhering to a set of definitive and innumerable principles of war. Some years ago, the Marine Corps began to explore what it calls "maneuver warfare".

Maneuver warfare borrows heavily from perceived German Army concepts. As such, the belief in the existence of fixed principles of war is considered counterproductive. Rather, the concept revolves around the idea of maneuvering the enemy into such situations that his further resistance is pointless.

In 1989 and 1990, the Marine Corps published two new manuals: Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting and FMFM 1-1, Campaigning. These manuals are intended to direct how the Marine Corps fights and trains. FMFM 1 is the Marine Corps theory of warfighting; it contains no rules, nor any prescriptive principles. Importantly, it does not address any
principles of war. FMFM 1-1 applies the theoretical concepts in FMFM 1 to the operational level of war. As with FMFM 1, this manual does not identify any set principles of war. As a result, one can conclude that the Marine Corps has dropped the principles of war as the basis of their doctrine. The purpose is apparently to shed the procedural and Jominian outlook that accompanies a list of principles of war. In their place, the Marine Corps has apparently substituted a more general theory of "maneuver" warfare. **

The Air Force has recognized its own principles of war since it became a separate service in the late 1940s. Like the Army, the Air Force has also dropped its principles of wars from its doctrine at one time or another. Currently, however, the Air Force recognizes twelve principles of wars. In addition to the Army's nine, the Air Force has timing and tempo, cohesion, and logistics. The Air Force clearly states that the principles of war are a didactic tool to help airmen think about the nature of war. However, they do not consider the principles to be immutable or to reflect all aspects of war. Finally, the Air Force considers the principles of war to be a primary source for the formulation of aerospace doctrine. Just as with the Army, there does not exist any theoretical work which specifically explores the Air Force's principles of wars. As such, the principles of aerospace doctrine guide planning and operations rather than its principles of war. **

Finally, the Army recognizes the principles of war
listed in JCS Pub 3-0. This is logical as the two lists are identical. In the Army, the principles of war act simultaneously as a source of doctrine -- part of the theory of war -- but, they serve also as a framework for planning. Consequently, the Army, alone of all the services, appears most inclined to use and accept the principles of war in unified planning and in the formulation of campaigns. However, as will be discussed, given the Army's specific doctrine on campaign planning, this may not be the case. In short, what is clear is the divergent views the services hold in regards to the principles of war. With such a divergence of views on the principles of war, to state they are common doctrine -- as JCS Pub 3-0 does -- is rather ridiculous. More specifically, since campaign planning is a multiservice effort, the differing views the services have on the principles of war attenuate any legitimate role the principles of war play in campaign planning.

The next point concerning the tenuous relationship between campaign planning doctrine and the principles of war focuses on contemporary operational doctrine. Despite the deluge of both doctrinal and personal material that has been written on operational art and campaigns since 1982, almost none of it specifically addresses the principles of war. JCS Pub 3-0, the new capstone manual on joint doctrine and planning, makes only one general comment on their role in unified planning. The principles of war, "...should be the focal point for unified and joint planning and operations." The rest of
the publication talks about various aspects of the theater commander's duties in regards to planning, in war and peace. It also discusses important aspects of a campaign plan, but it does not reference the principles of war again. 63

FM 100-5, Operations, the Army's capstone warfighting manual, does not include the principles of war in its discussion of operational design. This is not surprising, since FM 100-5 links the principles of war to its theory of war. Rather, FM 100-5 focuses on three key concepts which it assert should be an essential consideration in campaign planning: center of gravity (also in JCS Pub.3-0), culminating point, and lines of operation. 64

Similarly, FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations (Coordinating Draft, 1987) does not use the principles of war as a specific planning consideration. In fact, the principles of war are addressed in the manual only as individual concepts, as part of a larger discussion of fighting. However, FM 100-6 does identify certain principles of campaign planning. Most notable is a specific list of campaign tenants, one of which is to attack the enemy's center of gravity. 65

Although not official Air Force doctrine, Colonel John Warden's The Air Campaign reveals an aerospace perspective on operational planning. Certain principles are apparent -- such as the principle of air superiority -- but, the principles of war are mentioned only once. In the conclusion, Warden mentions them, but with the connotation of understanding, "the essence of war", rather than as a list of specific principles.
In sum, contemporary campaign planning discussions do not use principles of war as a specific planning consideration. Other than JCS Pub 3-0, which references them once, the literature focuses on broader themes.

The third and final point that reveals the tenuous relationship between campaign planning and the principles of war is historical. Prior to their recent publication in JCS Pub 3-0, with one rather unofficial publication in 1936, US campaign planning doctrine did not recognize or employ the principles of war as a part of campaign design.

The Army's first campaign planning manual, A Manual for Commanders of Large Units, published in 1930, did not discuss campaigns in terms of the principles of war. This rather brief work attempted to present a general but comprehensive discussion of the many issues inherent in conducting a campaign. The manual discussed the nature of theater strategy, campaign planning, and the conduct of battles. It also addressed logistics, command and staff problems, and training of large units. Since it was not a prescriptive manual, there were no lists of principles, tenets or planning guides. Rather, its descriptive focus aimed to present the nature of fighting large ground formations (Army and Army Groups) in the conduct of a campaign.

The only manual concerned with campaign planning that listed the principles of war, prior to the 1989 JCS Pub 3-0, was a CGSC student text, The Principles of Strategy for An
Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations. In the opening chapter on the conduct of war, the manual stated that success or failure in war had always depended upon the correct application of the principles of war. It further states that from the history of war one could deduce certain "basic and immutable" principles:

The ideas formulating our doctrine of war guide all our military procedures [to include campaigns]...While it is not possible to prescribe the exact method of applying these ideas in war, the general application may be pronounced as stated in [the following] paragraphs...

Each paragraph enumerated one of seven principles of war. These included a list similar to our principles of war today, minus simplicity and objective.

Despite the apparent prescription of these principles, the manual concluded the discussion with the following rather ambivalent note:

In war we deal with concrete cases. For this reason the principles of strategy [the principles of war mentioned above] can serve only as a sort of general guide. Each campaign must be thought out and analyzed in all its parts. Out of this analysis should come the decision which can never be deduced from preconceived abstract principles.

In 1942, the Army published FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, superseding the 1930, A Manual for Commanders of Large Units. Unlike its predecessor, it was a joint manual. Moreover, the manual stated that it was not a treatise on war, but, "a guide for commanders and staffs of air forces, corps, armies, or a group of armies." Additionally, it pointed out "the fundamental doctrine" that suc-
successful "modern military operations demand air superiority." In short, it was a very modern manual.

It discussed all aspects of campaign planning, to include branches and sequels (though not stated as such, but meaning the same thing). It included discussions on "Strategic Maneuver" which entailed both offensive and defensive maneuver, a concept not included in current campaign design. Most importantly, nowhere does the manual list or consider the principles of war or any tenets. Rather, it discusses various aspects of operational warfighting and sustainment. Finally, this was the doctrine that guided the formulation of the numerous campaigns of WWII.

In 1950, FM 100-15 was rewritten. It reflected the many lessons learned in WWII about the conduct of campaigns. For example, it included the evaluation of the effect logistical support would have on the development of the plan. Interestingly, despite the fact that the principles of war had become an official part of Army doctrine (they were published in 1949 FM 100-5), the 1950 FM 100-15 did not include them. Why they were not included is unclear. However, one might conjecture a reason. In 1950, -- indeed since 1939 and the first publication of FM 100-5 -- the Army considered FM 100-5 to be a tactical manual. It was the manual for the conduct of combined arms and the division. Conversely, FM 100-15 was a manual for the operational and strategic level. Could it be that the Army did not consider the principles of war to be a useful doctrinal tool at so high a level of command? If one
remembers the admonition from the 1936 *Principles of Strategy* -- namely to consider campaigns as unique situations and not subject to arbitrary principles of war -- one might see the reason why FM 100-15 did not include the principles of war as a part of campaign design. The 1942 FM 100-15 discussed the nature of war at higher levels of command. It focused on issues and not on selected principles.

As the years passed FM 100-15 was rewritten. In subsequent editions, it became less concerned over the issues of campaign planning and focused instead on specific procedures of a Field Army. By 1963, it was no longer concerned at all with warfighting at the operational level. With the renewed interest in campaign planning in the 1980s, FM 100-6 has taken over FM 100-15's original role.\textsuperscript{75}

In summary, it is clear that there is, at best, a tenuous relationship between the principles of war and contemporary campaign planning doctrine. This can be traced to three facts. One, the services do not informally agree on the existence, utility, role, or codification of the so-called joint principles of war. Since campaign planning is a joint activity, such a disparity in outlook undermines the assertion that the principles are a joint doctrine. Second, the majority of contemporary campaign planning doctrine does not use the principles of war as an element of operational design. Third, customarily campaign planning doctrine has not used the principles of war as an element in operational design, even after the Army adopted its own principles of war.
7. CONCLUSIONS

This paper sought to determine the relationship between the so-called US principles of war (those listed in JCS Pub 3-0) and contemporary campaign planning doctrine. It concludes that, at best, there is a tenuous relationship between the two. However, within the paper another issue has been raised, namely, the necessity and the utility of the principles of war themselves.

The history of the principles of war have been briefly reviewed. From this, one can see that the principles of war are a relatively new addition to US military thought. Moreover, it is clear that they are the legacy of the 19th Century military theorist Jomini. They are the legacy of a belief in the existence of a set of principles with which a soldier can secure victory in battle. Many serious soldiers over the years have doubted the validity of this theory — most notably Clausewitz.

The principles of war were not official in the US Army until 1921, and were not really accepted until 1949. From then until 1976, the US Army used them as a doctrinal concept to guide soldiers in preparing orders and making tactical plans. In 1976, the Army adopted a new set of doctrinal principles to guide soldiers in the formulation of tactical plans. These new principles were collectively called the Active Defense. These new tactical principles were not claimed
to be timeless like the principles of war. Rather, they were
principles for modern war, based in measure on the experi-
ences of the Arab-Israeli 1973 war. This, along with some
other issues, caused an uproar in the Army. In all this up-
roar, no one thought to mention that the recently deleted
principles of war did not do or add anything that the much
maligned principles of the active defense did not do -- ex-
cept, perhaps, alleviate a perceived overemphasis on the de-
fense. In any event, the Army reintroduced the principles of
war. Since then, the Army has not reconciled clearly the
principles of war's role in doctrine. The principles of war's
role became even more ambiguous with the refinement of
AirLand Battle Doctrine. According to FM 100-1, the prin-
ципles of war can be used as an operational planning tool; in
FM 100-5, however, they are part of the theory of war, a
source of doctrine. Clearly, the two manuals do not agree on
the role the principles of war play in Army doctrine. In
short, the manuals are ambivalent. As a result, the doctrine
is ambiguous.

The US Army has arguably moved in a Clausewitzian di-
rection with the development of AirLand Battle Doctrine. This
is most easily evidenced by the use of certain Clausewitzian
concepts, most notably, center of gravity and culminating
point. Exactly why the Army has gone in this direction is a
matter of conjecture. But, the doctrinal use of two other
Clausewitzian concepts, namely the "fog" and "friction" of
war, may help explain why. When one compares them to the
uniquely American principle of war "simplicity", the difference becomes obvious. Fog and friction say so much more about the nature of war than "prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding" as the principle of war simplicity suggests.

Lastly, this paper has shown that to think seriously about campaign design, one does not need to rely on a list of principles of war. Particularly a list that has never rested on a comprehensive theory of war, and that was arbitrarily chosen sixty years ago. To prove this point all we need do is look at our own past. As an Army, in WWII we successfully fought some of the most difficult campaigns in the history of war. We did it with a doctrine, particularly a campaign doctrine, that did not rely on a list of principles of war. It would seem then that we could leave the simplistic lists at the tactical level, the level where even Clausewitz would find utility in them. These lists, if we choose to develop them, however, should not be the general, pithy, now customary, statements in our principles of war. Rather, they should be principles derived from a theory of modern war.

At the operational level, our doctrine should not be aimed at developing simplistic lists with which to guide men -- senior military men at that -- in developing campaign plans, plans that must, by their very nature, be unique. With this in mind, when one acknowledges the multitude of issues commanders must consider in developing a campaign plan, the simplistic and incomplete principles of war reveal themselves
as inadequate for campaign design. That they are a part of our current joint planning doctrine (JCS Pub 3-0), and, therefore, strictly speaking, part of campaign planning doctrine, is unfortunate. Rather, our campaign doctrine ought to focus on facilitating cooperation between services, to reducing friction in planning and execution, and enhancing the understanding of all the forces involved. If we look at the progress of our joint doctrine, in particular the bulk of the 1989 JCS Pub 3-0, it appears that this is the current trend. Joint doctrine is focusing on establishing common procedures to facilitate joint planning and execution. However, the inclusion of the so-called "common" principles of war is a symptom of an attempt to prescribe a simplistic approach to campaign design. Our own historical experience with campaign design should keep us from, "the alluring formulae that well meaning people offer in the name of victory."
NOTES

1. Each letter represented a particular principle of war: mass, unity of command, surprise, security, maneuver, objective, offensive, simplicity, and economy of force.


4. Ibid.

5. Alger, 17; one can also see Napoleon's difficulty in defining these principles in a concise manner; his maxims numbered one hundred and fifteen.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid, 17.

11. Ibid, 183.

12. Ibid.

13. Alger, 186; Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War,


18. Ibid, 60-62;


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid, 52-71.


24. Ibid, 97-117.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid, 125.


34. Alger, 139-142.


40. FM 100-5, (1968), 5-1 to 5-7.


42. FM 100-1, (1981), 13-19.

43. Ibid.


45. FM 100-5, (1986), i, 6, 173.

46. Alger, xxvi-xxviii.


52. Specifically, the principles of war are those listed in JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Final Draft), 1989, 1-6, A-1.

53. Ibid.


55. In this case, "operational" means the employment of a force and not the operational level of war.

56. Interview with Lt Cdr Eugene P. Bernard, US Navy, acting Chief Navy Liaison officer at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 12 April 1990.

57. Mr. William Lind, the former military advisor to Senator Gary Hart and the author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, has been an advocate of what he calls "maneuver warfare". He has had a relatively close association with the USMC since the early 1980s.


62. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JCS Pub. 3-0 (Final Draft), (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989), I-6, A-1. The inclusion of the Army's principles of war in JCS Pub 3-0 may be the result of the fact that JCS Pub 3-0 was written by the US Army for the JCS, see Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas," Parameters, June 1988, footnote number 39.

63. JCS Pub. 3-0, (1989), I-6, A-1.

64. FM 100-5, (1986), 2, 10-11, 29, 179-183.

65. FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations (Coordinating Draft, 1987), 3-1 to 4-11.


68. The Command and General Staff College, The Principles of Strategy for An Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1936), 9.

69. Ibid, 14.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid, 4, 8-46.

73. Ibid.

74. The specific and differing roles played by FM 100-15 and FM 100-5 in earlier Army doctrine is rather easy to see if one reads the Preface to either the 1942 or the 1950 FM 100-15. For an interesting discussion of the fusion of these two manuals - one with a tactical and the other with an operational focus - into the current FM 100-5 see, Stephen A. Bourque, "Maneuver and Destruction: A Refinement of Operational and Tactical Offensive Doctrine." M.M.A.S., Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1983.
75. FM 100-15 is now FM 100-15 Corps Operations (1969), a tactical manual.

75. FM 100-5, 177.

1. Books


2. Articles


3. Government Documents


Field Manual 100-6, Large Unit Operations (Draft). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1987.


4. Unpublished Theses and Monographs

