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**Fortified Regions: What is the Operational
Significance of the Employment of Fortified
Regions for NATO and the United States?**

**A Monograph
by
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Field Artillery**



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The contemporary significance lies in the probable composition of Soviet forces in the 1990s. Fortified regions would replace motorized rifle corps in combined arms and shock armies of Warsaw Pact forces. The monograph concludes with a discussion on the significance of the Soviet employment of fortified regions for NATO and the United States. The Soviets will probably employ fortified regions with a stated defensive purpose; however, the Soviets can quickly convert fortified regions from the defense to the offense to perform the operational roles of either economy of force or operational maneuver group.


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
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The Vistula Oder and Manchuria WWII strategic offensives in 1944-45 provide historical evidence for the operational employment of fortified regions in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles. The writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Soviet theorists Triandafillov and Tukhachevskiy provide the theoretical foundation for employing economy of force and operational maneuver groups.

Fortified regions are evaluated for effectiveness using the operational operating systems--operational maneuver and movement, operational fires, operational command and control, operational protection, operational intelligence and operational support. Commanders of fortified regions effectively execute the first four of the systems, but not the latter two.

The contemporary significance lies in the probable composition of Soviet forces in the 1990's. Fortified regions would replace motorized rifle corps in combined arms and shock armies of Warsaw Pact forces. The monograph concludes with a discussion on the significance of the Soviet employment of fortified regions for NATO and the United States. The Soviets will probably employ fortified regions with a stated defensive purpose; however, the Soviets can quickly convert fortified regions from the defense to the offense to perform the operational roles of either economy of force or operational maneuver group.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction	page	1
a. Problem statement	page	1
b. Methodology	page	1
c. Background	page	2
II. History of Fortified Regions	page	5
a. East Prussia	page	6
b. Vistula Oder	page	7
c. Manchuria	page	9
d. Summary	page	17
III. Theory	page	17
a. Sun Tzu	page	18
b. Jomini	page	20
c. Clausewitz	page	23
d. Triandafillov	page	25
e. Tukhachevskiy	page	27
f. Summary	page	29
IV. Evaluation	page	29
a. Operational maneuver and movement	page	30
b. Operational fires	page	32
c. Operational protection	page	33
d. Operational command and control	page	35
e. Operational intelligence	page	36
f. Operational support	page	37
g. Summary	page	38
V. Contemporary Significance	page	38
a. Defensiveness and reasonable sufficiency	page	39
b. Combined arms and shock armies	page	40
VI. Conclusion	page	42
Appendix A Definition of key terms	page	46
Appendix B Soviet armies	page	48
Appendix C Composition of fortified regions	page	49
Appendix D Maps	page	50
VII Bibliography	page	53

I. INTRODUCTION

In February 1989, Soviet Defense Minister D.T. Yazov discussed with Western journalists, President Mikhail Gorbachev's December 1988 address to the United Nations General Assembly. In the address, President Gorbachev spoke of a new Soviet "defensive strategy" and a reduction of conventional forces in Europe. Defense Minister Yazov elaborated on Gorbachev's address and proposed that fortified regions would be revived to compensate for Soviet troop reductions and existing motorized rifle units would convert to fortified regions. (20:875) A fortified region is a corps level organization consisting of artillery and machinegun formations with combat support and combat service support units. (10:37)

Defense Minister Yazov's announcement concerning the revival of fortified regions sent Western military analysts and historians to their history and reference books to research the employment of fortified regions. The operational significance of the employment of fortified regions to replace motorized rifle corps is the topic of this monograph and frames the problem statement--What is the operational significance of the employment of fortified regions for NATO and the US Army?

To answer the problem statement a methodology based on history, theory, and contemporary issues is used. Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) troop reduction talks between the Soviet Union and the United States provide the impetus for the revival of fortified regions in the Soviet force structure. For historical insight, this paper analyzes the operational employment of fortified regions as economy of force and operational maneuver groups by the Soviets during the Vistula Oder and Manchurian campaigns of World War II. In addition, the concept for employment is examined through the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and Soviet military theorists Triandafillov and Tukhachevskiy. Using operational operating systems as criteria, the effectiveness of employing fortified regions is evaluated.

The proposed force structure of 1992 will be the background for the paper. Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has announced that the USSR would unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men by the end of 1990. This represents a reduction of ten percent of the total Soviet strength of 5,100,000 men. (28:10) Of particular interest to NATO and the United States is the proposed reduction of forces in Eastern Europe which amounts to 200,000 troops. General Secretary Gorbachev also announced an immediate withdrawal of 50,000 troops, 5,000 tanks, six tank divisions, assault landing (airborne) troops and

assault crossing (engineer/bridging) units. For forward-based Soviet forces, the 50,000 man cut represents a nine percent overall reduction; six divisions represent a twenty percent reduction in total divisions (forty percent of the tank divisions); 5,000 tanks equal twenty five percent for Warsaw Pact tanks or fifty percent for Soviet tanks. (28:11) These reductions could result in a reorganization of Soviet armies, corps and divisions in the Warsaw Pact territory. Following the Soviet lead in reorganization, the Warsaw Pact countries of Hungary, Poland, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria could also advocate a reduction of their forces. Romania is now likely to follow suit.

This December 1988 announcement by Gorbachev laid the foundation for new and promising discussions between the USSR and the United States regarding conventional arms reduction. These continuing discussions have been labeled as Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) talks. The common areas of agreement for these talks are in goals and verification. The areas for agreement are: promote stability in Europe; eliminate the possibility of surprise attack or large scale offensives; reduce the potential of military confrontation and eliminate asymmetries. The area of agreement for verification is one of extensive, on site inspections and checkpoints. (28:10)

The goal of eliminating asymmetries is defined as both the US and USSR maintaining forces of equal numbers creating parity. The parity level is the key issue in CFE discussions. Currently the USSR maintains about 500,000 troops in Eastern Europe, while the U.S. has about 300,000. To demonstrate sincerity, Gorbachev immediately announced the withdrawal of 50,000 troops and President Bush reciprocated with an announced withdrawal of 30,000. The withdrawals still do not reach the goal of eliminating asymmetries.

To achieve better symmetry, CFE discussions must result in the Soviet's withdrawing another 180,000. If the Soviets are serious about lower levels of military confrontation, eventual parity may exist at 250,000, 150,000, 100,000 or at some number below 100,000. The majority of the remaining troop strengths may be allocated to the revived fortified regions.

To most military historians, the Soviets' proposed return of fortified regions to their force structure indicates a willingness to change from an offensive to a defensive orientation. However, these fortified regions are corps level troop organizations that perform operational functions both in the offense and the defense. (22) Therefore, American military analysts must clearly understand the employment of fortified regions. (Appendix A contains the definitions of the key terms used in this

monograph--fortified region, economy of force, operational maneuver group and operational art.)

In conclusion, this monograph will analyze the employment of fortified regions. This analysis uses the initial use in WWI, the Soviet World War II campaigns of 1944-45, military theory, contemporary issues, and the operational operating systems to determine the operational significance of employing fortified regions.

II. HISTORY

Fortified regions first appear in the Soviet force structures of the Russian Civil War and WWI. Forty-five separate fortified regions existed and were used to block axes of advance during the defense. A single fortified region was typically responsible for a frontage of sixty kilometers and depth of fifty kilometers. Its organization consisted of machine guns, mortars and artillery units supported by engineers, signal and medical elements. (20:896) This structure proved to be very successful in WWI and remained in the force structure during the interwar years. With the onset of WWII the primary purpose of fortified regions was to block the invading German axes of advance. Toward the latter part of WWII, 1944-45, fortified regions evolved into an operational level force quite different from the earlier years.

To understand this evolution, we will analyze three Soviet strategic offensive operations: East Prussian (1944), Vistula-Oder (1945) and Manchurian (1945). This analysis will not recount the day by day or unit by unit actions, but will focus on the operational use of fortified regions by Front commanders. The uses of fortified regions prior to June 1944 are excluded from this analysis because the current Soviet military doctrine is based on the more mature experiences of 1944-45.

In June 1944, the Soviets were preparing to conduct strategic offensives in Eastern Europe aimed at destroying the German forces defending in the Balkan States, Ukraine, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. These Soviet strategic offensives included the Manchurian, East Prussian and Vistula-Oder operations of late 1944 and early 1945. While the Soviets were conducting these offensives in Eastern Europe, the Allies were advancing across France causing the German Army to fight a two front war.

The first of these three strategic offensives was the East Prussian. In this offensive, two Soviet Fronts, the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian, were deployed against the in depth German defenses across East Prussia. Marshall Cheryakovsky commanded the 3rd Belorussian Front which numbered about one million men and occupied a frontage of about 200 kilometers. (32:300) Only one fortified region, the 152nd Fortified Region, was documented in the Soviet order of battle for the East Prussian offensive.

Marshall Cheryakovsky positioned the 152nd FR (an assemblage of machine gun and artillery battalions) on the extreme northern flank of the 3rd Belorussian Front in an economy of force role. (32:304) The 152nd FR defended a frontage of forty kilometers, about one-fifth of the entire Front. Using the 152nd FR in an economy of force role allowed the Front commander to concentrate the bulk of his forces (5 of 6 Armies) along a narrow front for the main attack. This concentration enabled Marshal Cheryakovsky to double or triple his force ratios achieving operational superiority. In eight days, the 3rd Belorussian Front overpowered the well prepared German defenses to a depth of 160 kilometers which reached the Baltic Sea. (32:304)

The second strategic offensive was the Vistula-Oder. The Vistula-Oder operation was the largest and most successful of the three Soviet strategic offensives. The Vistula-Oder operation was a classic example of the Soviet use of deception to defeat the German Armies East.

(32:502) Front commanders employed fortified regions at the operational level of war to assist in achieving deception, surprise and integration of forces. The 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front operations used fortified regions in an economy of force role to obtain operational superiority and assist in deception.

The 1st Belorussian Front, under the command of Marshall Zhukov, conducted major operations on a front of 170 kilometers on a line from north of the city of Warsaw to the southeast. The operations consisted of establishing two bridgeheads and then conducting two separate penetrations to the west through the partially prepared German defense. Marshall Zhukov established one bridgehead at Magnusher where he concentrated four of his eight armies along a front of fifty kilometers. On the northern flank of the bridgehead, Zhukov positioned the 119th FR in an economy of force role over a frontage of twenty kilometers. This employment enabled Zhukov to mass his armies to achieve operational superiority in the bridgehead from which he conducted the penetration. (32:512)

In the southern part of the 1st Belorussian Front, Zhukov established the Pulavy bridgehead. This bridgehead was much smaller in size than the Magnusher bridgehead; its frontage was twenty four kilometers. Within the Pulavy Bridgehead was a concentration of two armies. The 115th FR was positioned on the southern portion of the bridgehead in an economy of force role to allow the two armies in the bridgehead to mass for the penetration.

The 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshall Konev was assigned Breslau as a campaign objective. Konev's operational plan called for the establishment of the Sandomierz bridgehead and the concentration of the

majority of his forces (7 of 10 armies) in the bridgehead.

(32:511)

On the northern flank of the bridgehead was the 77th FR occupying a frontage of forty kilometers; the bridgehead itself was on a front of about 100 kilometers. The use of the 77th FR as an economy of force enabled the Ukrainian Front to obtain operational superiority in the bridgehead prior to the penetration.

The 77th FR occupied the northern portion of the 1st Ukrainian Front while 115th FR occupied the southern portion of the 1st Belorussian Front. Therefore, these two fortified regions were adjacent, each anchoring the boundary between the two Fronts. Together, these two fortified regions occupied an area of about sixty kilometers. Each performed economy of force missions for its Front allowing the armies to concentrate forces in the bridgeheads (Sandomierz, Pulawy, and Magnushev) to achieve operational superiority, operational surprise and operational maneuver.

The third and last strategic offensive was the Manchurian. This August 1945 Soviet offensive against the Japanese in Manchuria employed about 1.5 million men and culminated more than four years of conflict with Germany and a similar period of concern with Japan. The forces for the Manchurian offensive were organized into the Far East Command, commanded by Marshall A.M. Vasilevsky. This

Command consisted of three Front headquarters: The Trans-Baikal Front, commanded by Marshall Malinovsky; the 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Marshall Meretskov; and the 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General Purkayer. (6:37)

The Far Eastern Command was configured specifically in consideration of the enemy strengths and dispositions, the terrain on which the units were to operate, and the speed of the operation. The 1st Far Eastern Front received heavy firepower to attack heavily fortified Japanese positions. The Trans-Baikal Front received integrated motorized support to conduct rapid movement over the extended open terrain. (6:41)

Of particular interest is the Far East Command's use of twenty-one fortified regions in tailoring the forces of the three Fronts. The 1st Far Eastern Front had fourteen fortified regions attached; the 2nd Far Eastern Front had five fortified regions; and the Trans-Baikal Front had two fortified regions. (6:42) The 1st Far Eastern Front received about seventy percent of the available fortified regions since it was attacking the heaviest defended area. The Trans-Baikal Front's mission required rapid mobility and thus only received two fortified regions. An analysis of the battle maps and overlays indicates that fortified regions varied in size and composition in each Front. Available literature does not specifically describe the

composition of fortified regions more than a note referring to assemblages of artillery and machine gun units.

During the Manchurian offensives the Fronts and their armies practiced operational art employing deep operations, rapid operational maneuvers, surprise, coordination of all arms and concentration of forces to achieve superiority. Front and army commanders in Manchuria employed fortified regions at the operational level to assist in crushing and destroying the four Japanese armies during August 1945.

The Far Eastern Command directed the Trans-Baikal Front to attack eastward into Western Manchuria while the 1st Far Eastern Front attacked westward into Eastern Manchuria. The 2nd Far Eastern Front would conduct a supporting attack into Northern Manchuria and drive southward. These attacks would result in a strategic envelopment of the Japanese forces. (6:71) The operational uses of fortified regions by the Trans-Baikal and 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts are discussed below.

The Trans-Baikal Front commander tailored an operational maneuver group consisting of two rifle divisions and two fortified regions (31st & 32nd FRs). (6:89) This operational maneuver group performed two operational functions. First, its position on the Front's left flank in an economy of force role enabled the front commander to concentrate four armies for the main attack on a narrow front. Second, as the main attack progressed, the

operational maneuver group maneuvered to achieve operational depth to break Japanese resistance, moved eastward to secure the critical rail line, and assisted the other Soviet forces in breaking the heavy Japanese resistance in the Hailar fortified area. (6:98) Captured Japanese rail lines and railheads were especially critical to the Soviets in transporting huge quantities of supplies from Trans-Siberia to Manchuria to support this massive strategic offensive.

While the Trans-Baikal Front was attacking in Western Manchuria, the 1st Far Eastern Front attacked into Eastern Manchuria. The 1st Far Eastern Front, consisting of the 5th Army, 25th Army, 35th Army, and 1st Red Banner Army, had the task of penetrating the most heavily defended Japanese area in Manchuria. The Front used rapid movement over difficult terrain--terrain the Japanese considered impossible to traverse-- and bypassed or isolated fortifications to drive deep into eastern Manchuria to preempt the Japanese from establishing a viable defense on the border. (6:109) To assist in this offensive, the Far Eastern Command assigned fourteen fortified regions for use at the operational level to assist in achieving operational depth, bold maneuver, surprise, coordination of all arms and concentration of forces.

The Front assigned the 105th FR to the left flank in the 5th Army area as an economy of force measure to enable the 5th Army commander to concentrate three rifle corps along a front of forty kilometers for the attack. Additionally, the 105th FR augmented with assault engineer units, was to seize the critical railroad tunnels on the main rail line into Manchuria after its economy of force mission. (6:115) The 105th FR performed its economy of force role along a front of about thirty kilometers between the 5th Army and 25th Army.

The 25th Army received seven fortified regions: 7th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 110th, 111th, and 113th. (6:201) Colonel General Chistyakov, commander of 25th Army, concentrated his rifle corps along two principal axes to gain operational superiority over the Japanese forces. These two axes were widely separated, about 180 kilometers apart, and in between were five fortified regions in economy of force roles. The remaining fortified regions occupied the left flank of the southern axis also in economy of force roles.

Two of the above fortified regions, the 108th and 113th, were also used as an operational maneuver force on the 25th Army's left flank to make the Hunchun and Tumer rivers operate as obstacles against the Japanese defense. (6:129) Christyakov deceived and surprised the Japanese forces which opposed him. He reinforced and supported the

113th FR with a rifle division and later with a rifle corps to create an operational maneuver group to crush rapidly the entrenched Japanese forces and achieve operational depth. (6:135)

The 1st Red Banner Army of the Trans-Baikal Front received two fortified regions, 6th and 112th. Colonel General Beloborodov, commander of 1st Red Banner Army, concentrated his two corps in a sixteen kilometer sector for the main attack. The 6th and 112th FRs on the Army right flank were responsible for a frontage of about fifty kilometers and performed economy of forces roles enabling Beloborodov to concentrate his forces. Later, the 6th & 112th FRs, reinforced with a rifle regiment, each conducted a supporting attack to secure Japanese installations in concert with 35th Army forces. (6:122)

The Far Eastern Command assigned the 8th and 109th FRs to the 35th Army Commander enabling him to concentrate his forces along a front of forty kilometers. On his right flank, with a frontage of seventy kilometers, were the fortified regions. Once the 35th Army attacked, the fortified regions assaulted across the Ussuri River and advanced to reduce the difficult Hatou fortress, an operational objective. Heavy artillery units and a rifle regiment supported the 109th FR in this task. (6:129)

The Far Eastern Command commander assigned the 2nd Far Eastern Front the mission to conduct a supporting attack into Northern Manchuria. The Far Eastern Command tailored the 2nd Far Eastern Front, under the command of General Furkayev, with five fortified regions. Furkayev deployed his forces (3 armies, 1 air army and front units) in three sectors with separate axes of advance and distinct objectives across a front of 300 kilometers. (6:139)

The 15th Army used the 4th and 102nd FRs in economy of force roles allowing the concentration of rifle divisions on the three axes of advance. The fortified regions also protected key rivers and occupied fronts of twenty and fifty kilometers each.

The 2nd Red Banner Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front received one fortified region, the 101st FR. The 101st FR performed an economy of force role between the two operational maneuver groups created in the 2nd Red Banner Army sector. The operational maneuver groups concentrated their forces in two areas and remained on the defense during the first two days of the Manchurian offensive, awaiting to exploit successes of the other armies in the 2nd Far Eastern Front. The 101st FR advanced as a third operational maneuver group when the other two operational groups transitioned to offensive operations. (6:148)

The remaining two fortified regions were attached to the 16th Army. The 16th Army, consisting of the Amur Flotilla and its attached fortified regions (103rd & 4th), had an on order operation against the Japanese forces on southern Sakhalin Island. (6:141) The Amur Flotilla was primarily a naval force. The literature for the Manchurian campaign does not elaborate on the 16th Army's on order mission.

The 1st Far Eastern Front also created the Chriguesk Operational Group under the command of Major General Zaitsev. The group consisted of two rifle divisions and two fortified regions, 150th and 162nd. (6:201) This group was listed in the order of battle for the 1st Far Eastern Front, but was not discussed in the literature. This operational group may have been part of a deception plan to confuse the Japanese.

Deception and surprise techniques in the Vistula-Oder and Manchurian campaigns are considered masterpieces by military analysts. These techniques included: creation of false groupings of forces, masking of actual force composition, and concealed regrouping of strategic reserves. (10:42) Fortified regions in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles were important to these deception and surprise techniques as they were employed to confuse the Japanese about the type of force confronting them.

In summary, the East Prussian, Vistula Oder and Manchurian campaigns allocated fortified regions to the Fronts based on operational objectives. The Fronts employed fortified regions as operational resources to perform economy of force and operational maneuver group roles during strategic offensive operations. In an economy of force role, fortified regions occupied extended frontages allowing Front commanders to concentrate their armies along narrow frontages to achieve operational superiority. Fortified regions employed as or part of operational maneuver groups enabled the Front commanders in Manchuria to achieve operational depth. Lastly, fortified regions augmented with maneuver units (rifle regiments) enabled Front commanders to deceive and surprise operationally the Japanese concerning the mission and composition of the Soviet forces in their area. Appendix D contains maps depicting the employment of fortified regions in Manchuria.

III. THEORY

This section examines classical writings to provide a theoretical foundation for the operational significance of economy of force and operational maneuver groups. This is accomplished through analyzing the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and Soviet military theorists

Triandafillov and Tukhachevskiy. While less contemporary theorists (Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu) did not use the terms fortified region, economy of force, and operational maneuver group, their maxims, concepts and principles decidedly advocate the use of forces in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles. Their writings stress the importance of operational surprise, deception, depth and superiority in the use of forces. The Vistula-Oder and Manchurian strategic offensives employed fortified regions at the operational level of war as economy of force and operational maneuver groups to achieve deception, surprise and operational superiority. The first classical writer to discuss concepts relating to economy of force and operational maneuver group roles was Sun Tzu.

Sun Tzu stated that a "skilled general must be master of the complementary arts of simulations and dissimulations and while creating shapes to confuse and delude the enemy he conceals his true dispositions and ultimate intent." (23:41) Sun Tzu's shapes apply to his assault forces and containing forces, and how each of these can become each other--containing forces become assault forces and assault forces become containing forces. The containing force could be interpreted today as economy of force. Fortified regions were used masterfully as both a containing force (economy of force) and an assault force (operational maneuver group) in the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts in the Manchurian offensive.

Sun Tzu stated in his "Offensive Strategy" that "he who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious." (23:82) The Soviet Front and army commanders thoroughly understood and applied this maxim by concentrating their forces along a narrow front and using their fortified regions (small forces) in an economy of force role. Sun Tzu's Chapter 4, "Dispositions," THE ART OF WAR, also discusses quantities and dispositions and their direct relationship to victories. (23:80) Quantities and dispositions can be equated to using forces in an economy of force role in order to obtain operational superiority for the main attack.

Sun Tzu's fifth maxim of energy states: use the normal force to engage and the extraordinary to win. (23:91) The Soviets used operational maneuver groups, which included fortified regions in several offensives, to obtain operational depth both at the Front and army level. The fortified region can be considered the extraordinary force. In both the Vistula Oder and Manchurian offensives, fortified regions were employed at the operational level as an economy of force, operational maneuver group component, and as a force to create deception and surprise.

Sun Tzu discussed in Verse 9, Chapter VI, "Weaknesses and Strengths," that one must make the enemy see your weakness as strength by "concealing your track and keeping silent." (23:97) Equating this to the Soviets in

Manchuria, it is evident that they used fortified regions in economy of force roles (Soviet strengths) while secretly concentrating their forces for the main attacks. Sun Tzu also discusses concentration of forces: "if one is able to use many to strike few at the selected point, then those being struck are in dire straits; the enemy must not know where battle will be given, thus he prepares in many places and I fight in one place and win." (23:98) Here again is the value of using forces in an economy of force role to achieve concentration or operational superiority to gain the victory.

In summary, Sun Tzu understood the value of dispositions (a reference to economy of force), extraordinary forces (fortified regions used as operational maneuver group and economy of force) and deception in the art of war. These were his keys to victory.

About two thousand years after Sun Tzu, Jomini published his book, THE ART OF WAR. Jomini's analytical compend in THE ART OF WAR gives advice to generals of armies and to statesmen on how to conduct operations using various combinations. Even though Jomini does not specifically address the terms, "economy of force and operational maneuver group," he does discuss the concepts. His chapters on "Strategy", "Grand Tactics", and "Formation For Combat" contain articles, maxims and principles dealing with the use of the economy of force and operational maneuver group.

In Chapter III, "Strategy", Jomini's discussion of the fundamental principles of war included combinations of forces for maneuvering in such a manner to match one's mass or concentration against fractions of the hostile army without endangering one's own. "Without endangering one's own" may refer to using forces in such a manner (economy of force) to protect frontages on either side of the area where maneuvering is occurring to mass or concentrate forces. (11:80) Jomini also discussed using a concentration of forces at the decisive point that can be put into action with energy and concert to produce a simultaneous effort. This force for simultaneous effort may be a theoretical reference to operational maneuver group. Jomini's simultaneous effort would exploit the successes of the concentrated force and strike at the operational depth. (11:80)

In his seventh maxim, "Lines of Operations", Jomini established that interior or central lines were preferable to exterior lines for coordinating and combining the assembly of massed forces to insure the success of a campaign. A corps of observation (economy of force) was necessary to achieve the strategic maneuver for massing of forces. The corps of observation would hold the enemy in check and not seriously engage. Jomini also cautioned against the use of the corps of observation--extending in excess or too great a distance enabling the enemy to gain

success against the corps of observation. A corps of observation which engaged in serious combat, attacking the enemy instead of checking, endangered the principal army maneuvering for mass. (11:127 & 138)

Article XXVII of "Strategy" describes the use of "great detachments" in strategic operations. Great detachments perform several functions: cover important points in a zone of operation; protect the line of operation; support the principal effort by protecting its left and right front; strike decisive blows; hold in check fractions of the enemy army while the principal effort strikes at other portions of the hostile arms; and carry an important point upon the communications of the enemy already in retreat. (11:175-9)

Economy of force and operational maneuver group concepts are evident in Jomini's discussion of great detachment. He used the term great detachment and corps interchangeably in describing the functions. This is Jomini's strongest theoretical support for the concept of fortified regions.

(22)

Jomini's discussion of supporting the principal efforts by holding the hostile army in check in a given area and protecting the lines of operation relates to an economy of forces role. His delivery of decisive blows upon the communications of the enemy already in retreat relates to using an operational maneuver group role for obtaining operational depth. (11:198)

Finally, Jomini in his discussion of "Fronts of Operations" describes pivots of maneuver as being essential while the concentrated mass of the army conducts an envelopment or other great enterprise. Pivots of maneuver provide support and are essential to strategic operations. (11:105) The Soviets used fortified regions in the Vistula-Oder and Manchurian campaigns as pivots of maneuver in conducting operational envelopment of both the German forces and the Japanese forces.

In summary, Jomini's discussion of maneuvers to mass or concentrate forces, corps of observation, great detachments, pivots of maneuver, and protection of forces has application for the employment of fortified regions at the operational level in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles. Jomini's maxims, articles, and principles of war have merit in the use of fortified regions in the Soviet force structure of 1992.

Jomini and Karl von Clausewitz both wrote theoretical works concerning war in the early 19th century. Clausewitz in Chapter 14, Book Three of ON WAR, discusses economy of force as a means to preoccupy some of the enemy's forces and reduce his overall strength. Economy of force is employed as a corollary to concentration of forces in space, unification of forces in time, and the use of a strategic reserve. (2:213)

Clausewitz's original definition of the economy of force (preoccupying some of the enemy forces and reducing his overall strength) has evolved into a different concept in present day principles of war. The term today applies to using "the minimum necessary strength for the task, a concept that makes sense only for diversionary or holding operations, where the object is to maximize concentrations elsewhere." (2:665) Clausewitz discusses concentration and the superiority of numbers as the first principle of strategy in his Chapter 8, Book 3. The most important feature in superiority of numbers is the possession of strength at the "really" vital or decisive point. (2:195)

To achieve superiority of numbers (force ratios) at the decisive point, the Soviets employed fortified regions in economy of force roles in the Vistula-Oder and Manchurian offensives. Front commanders assigned fortified regions to army commanders for use in concentrating forces for the offensives. Additionally, fortified regions as part of operational maneuver groups in Manchuria enabled Front and army commanders to achieve superiority of numbers at the decisive point in the breakthrough to obtain operational depth.

To achieve superiority of numbers requires the commander to understand the calculation of time and space. Time and space are the most essential aspects in development of strategy and the use of forces. (2:196) The

Soviets had a thorough understanding of superiority of numbers and the use of time and space as they employed economy of force and operational maneuver group roles in their campaigns of late 1944 and 1945. The Soviets also drew insights into the superiority of numbers from the writings of Triandafillov.

V.K. Triandafillov in his NATURE OF THE OPERATIONS OF MODERN ARMIES set forth the theoretical foundations for Soviet operational art for future war. His discussion on the concepts for "shock" army, massing of forces, deep operations, force composition and flank units reflects the principles for the use of fortified regions for economy of force roles and operational maneuver groups. The shock army must be capable of "conducting successive operations from start to finish" and have the resources to permit it, without loss of time, to achieve operational depth. (24:109 & 110)

The Front commander must resource the shock army with the forces necessary to obtain mass concentration for operational superiority in the main sector while the frontages (flanks) to the left and right of the main sectors are protected. Triandafillov used the term "auxiliary action" to describe the forces in the sectors adjacent to the "main blow" sector of the operational engagement. (24:126) The auxiliary action force for the operational engagement occupies extended frontages allowing

the other forces to concentrate on a narrow front to achieve operational superiority. Using fortified regions as auxiliary action forces is a prime example in Triandafillov's concept of the operational engagement of a Front.

The shock army must also be capable of achieving operational depth with the immediate infliction of second, third and subsequent "blows" after the initial "blow." These deep and crushing blows will lead to the destruction of the entire enemy army and the enemy state. (24:157) To deliver these blows, the flanks of the main blow must be secured using economy of force (auxiliary action units), and an operational maneuver group is necessary for the subsequent or final operational blow. The Manchurian and Vistula Oder strategic offensives used fortified regions in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles. In addition to operational superiority and operational depth, Triandafillov provided principles for "operational victory."

Triandafillov's "operational decision" analysis set forth principles for the operational commander to achieve the "operational victory." These principles are: "correct selection of the axis and form of the blow; proper organization of the instrument; the army formation which the commander will employ to accomplish the mission; quantity of different combat arms (artillery, tanks,

aviation, etc.); material and personnel resources; and degree of command and control." (24:205) The Front commanders in Manchuria and Vistula Oder followed Triandafillov's operational decision principles in selecting and assigning fortified regions to the armies for use in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles. Another Soviet writer who influenced Soviet operations in WWII was Tukhachevskiy.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy is the Soviet military theorist credited with establishing the theoretical infrastructure of the Red Army which secured victory in World War II. He commanded armies and Fronts, formed a network of schools and academies, and formulated the unprecedented depth and tempo of Soviet military strategy. (25:5)

Tukhachevskiy did not specifically address the terms economy of force, operational maneuver group or fortified region, but he discussed the related concepts. His articles on operational containment, offense and defense, operational forms, and strategy, outline the basis for using fortified regions in the Manchurian and Vistula Oder strategic offensives.

Operational containment of an enemy force requires varied operational forms in preparing for an offensive operation. The containment of the enemy beyond the front of the main attack has operational importance: first, to insure that forces for the main attack can concentrate in

mass; and second, to insure that the enemy does not have the opportunity to withdraw forces and transfer them in the direction of the main attack. The operational form for such a containment is Tukhachevskiy's security zone. The force in the security zone must be capable of occupying large frontage and have sufficient firepower. (25:5) Fortified regions can fulfill this security zone requirement when used in economy of force roles. This security zone lays the framework for superiority of numbers.

Tukhachevskiy's discussions on converting the passive defense to a rapid offense striking a decisive attack on the enemy forces emphasized the superiority of numbers in wars. His calculation of numbers concluded that one sixth of the force--economy of force--could be employed in defensive sectors while allowing the remaining five-sixths of the force to concentrate in mass in the decisive direction. This sector defense is an operational employment used in offensive operations and is not to be confused with defensive operations. (25:36 & 46)

His "Strategy" articles stated that commanders-in-chief must prepare and create the strategic conditions for campaigns and winning battles. (25:62) These conditions included providing the forces or units to combined arms army commanders to achieve the strategic objectives. Such was the case with the assignment of fortified regions in

the Manchurian campaign to Soviet armies for use in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles.

In summary, this section on theory has examined the writings of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, Tukhachevskiy, and Triandafillov for a theoretical foundation for the employment of fortified regions in economy of force and operational maneuver group roles. Even though the writings do not in all cases use the terms economy of force, operational maneuver group and fortified region; the principles, maxims, articles and concepts apply to the employment of fortified regions at the operational level of war.

IV EVALUATION

TRADOC FAM 11-9 lists six operational operating systems at the operational level of war. I have chosen the operational operating systems because their functions and tasks are possible starting points for evaluating and developing doctrine, training and organizations. Additionally, these functions and tasks provide a basis for establishing performance requirements necessary for the successful execution of a mission or operation. (31:1-1) A fortified region, as an organization, is evaluated using each of the six operational operating systems keeping in mind that the primary roles (specific set of conditions) of

the fortified regions are economy of force and operational maneuver group. Operational operating systems (OOS) are defined as "the major functions occurring in the theater (or area) of operation performed by operating forces, for successfully executing campaigns and major operations to accomplish the best possible objectives." (31:4-1) These are operational movement and maneuver, operational fires, operational protection, operational command and control, operational intelligence, and operational support. The purpose of this evaluation is to see if the fortified region can have a significant operational impact.

The operational movement and maneuver operating system concerns the disposition, movement and deployment of forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operations. (31:4-2) A fortified region as an operational force is well suited for securing the operational advantage of position before the battle is joined. As an economy of force unit, fortified regions control terrain, stop movement of enemy operational formations, and facilitate the movement of major operational formations to achieve operational superiority. As an operational maneuver group, fortified regions are ideal in exploiting tactical success to achieve operational results and operational depth. Fortified regions perform adequately in achieving positional advantage over the enemy.

Fortified regions enhance operational mobility for friendly operational forces by overcoming operationally significant obstacles. In WWII, fortified regions were successfully employed to reduce significant obstacles in the Manchurian strategic offensive enabling forces to achieve operational depth. (6:98) For controlling operationally significant areas, fortified regions were specially designed to control large frontages allowing other forces to mass on a narrow front to obtain operational superiority as evident in both the Vistula-Oder and Manchurian offensives.

Providing operational counter-mobility is another function well suited for fortified regions. A fortified region with its artillery, machine gun, tank and engineer formations can select and emplace obstacles while performing its economy of force role.

In summary, fortified regions are very capable of performing operational movement and maneuver as evident in the Soviet Manchurian and Vistula Oder strategic offensives of 1944-45. Fortified regions in economy of force and operational maneuver groups roles secure the operational advantage of position and create the decisive impact in a campaign or major operation.

To execute operational movement and maneuver, operational fires are a necessity. Operational fires are "the application of fire power (provided by assets other than those required for

routine support of tactical maneuver) to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation."

(31:4-4) Operational fires are planned "top down" by the operational commander whereas tactical fire support is initiated at the lowest level and reconciled at each successive higher level. Operational fires have decisive implications for the campaign or major operations and focus on facilitation of maneuver to operational depth, isolation on the battlefield by the interdiction of uncommitted enemy forces, and the destruction of critical operational functions and facilities. (31:4-6)

However, operational fires are largely provided by theater air forces and surface delivery systems capable of reaching long range targets. (31:4-6) Using this caveat, fortified regions cannot provide operational fires. However, the fires provided by fortified regions are sufficient to support the economy of force and operational maneuver group operational roles.

Today, fortified regions have three or four artillery/machine gun brigades and one air defense brigade. (20:896) Fires provided in the economy of force role for fortified regions enable other friendly forces to mass on a narrow front to achieve operational superiority. These fires isolate and interdict uncommitted enemy forces or logistics support preventing them from maneuvering to counter the attacking forces. At the same time, fires are initiated at the lowest level, ("bottom up"), to counter

any direct threat to the fortified region. Fires in support of the operational maneuver group role facilitate maneuver to the operational depth. This entails the destruction of critical functions or facilities. By applying the definition of operational fires from the above paragraph, fortified regions can provide both operational fires and fire support. Operational fires along with operational protection safeguard friendly organizations.

Soldiers, systems and operational formations must be protected from the enemy firepower and maneuver. Operational protection includes the actions taken to conserve the fighting potential of a force so it can be applied at the decisive time and place. Operational protective actions provide operational air defense, safeguarding of operational forces, operational security, and deception. All these actions have an operational effect. (31:4-6 & 4-8)

Fortified regions in economy of force roles provided operational protection in both the Vistula Oder and Manchurian offensives. They secured large frontages adjacent to the narrow areas where the Soviet Fronts were massing their armies to achieve operational superiority for the main effort. By securing these large frontages, fortified regions conserved the fighting potential of the massing armies in order that the potential may be applied at the decisive time and place. Fortified regions

countered the enemy's firepower and maneuver, making the massing armies difficult to locate, strike and destroy. These actions of fortified regions provided an operational effect.

In an operational maneuver group role, fortified regions provide the same type of operational protection discussed in the previous paragraph. Instead of protecting the massing armies, protection is provided for the operational maneuver group conserving it for application at the decisive time and place.

The operational air defense aspect of operational protection does not have a historical example for fortified regions from WWII. However, the fortified region in the proposed Soviet force structure of 1992 contains a surface to air missile or air defense regiment. (10:37) These assets will protect operational forces from air attack, destroy the enemy's air attack capability and defend critical points and facilities.

In summary, fortified regions are structured to provide more than adequate operational protection. They protect forces conducting operational maneuver, conserve the force for application at the decisive time and place, and counter the enemy's firepower (to include air) and maneuver. In the economy of force role, fortified regions conduct deception activities for the protection and survivability of operational forces to include their own forces.

The operational command and control of these operational forces is crucial. Operational command and control actions include: acquiring and communicating operational information, maintaining that information, assessing the situation, determining actions and leading operational forces, and employing command, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM). (31:4-12)

Soviet Front commanders in the Vistula Oder and Manchurian campaigns assigned operational missions to fortified regions. These missions were to conduct economy of force and reinforcement of operational maneuver groups. The commanders of fortified regions planned the operational mission considering the strategic aims, constraints, restraints, and resources available. Fortified region commanders controlled operational movement and maneuver, and coordinated and synchronized mutually supporting efforts.

In the economy of force role, commanders of fortified regions coordinate and synchronize mutually supporting efforts with the commander of the forces massing for the main effort. The same actions occur in the operational maneuver group role except coordinating and synchronizing occur in the exploitation to the operational depth. Occurring simultaneously with these actions is C3CM-- denying the enemy commander the command and control of his forces.

In summary, commanders of fortified regions have the capability, as evident from historical accounts, to exercise effective and efficient operational command and control. Modern technology has enhanced this command and control capability. The Soviet fortified region force structure of 1992 contains the combat, combat support and combat service support infrastructures necessary to accomplish operational command and control for economy of force and operational maneuver group missions. (10:37)

The one element lacking in the support structure is an operational intelligence capability. Operational intelligence is "the evaluation and analysis of information; integration of the resulting intelligence to yield enemy commanders' intentions, centers of gravity and high payoff targets; development of indications and warning; and identification of friendly vulnerabilities." (31:4-14)

Commanders of fortified regions do not execute the functions of operational intelligence because they do not own the resources to collect, analyze, identify and locate the enemy's centers of gravity for successful attack. However, fortified regions do play an important role in operational intelligence. As an economy of force, the fortified region may interact with the mind of the enemy commander who may alter his decision making process and modify his operational maneuver. The enemy commander must

be convinced that the force opposing him, the fortified region, is not an economy force. The intelligence OOS does not include deception; deception is one of the subfunctions of operational protection. (31:4-6 & 4-8)

Fortified regions are integral parts of operational intelligence in the planning of campaigns and major operations at army level. However, they do not have the capability as a single entity to collect operational information, process operational information and prepare operational intelligence reports. Augmented with intelligence assets from the army, commanders of fortified regions can perform operational intelligence.

The last operational operating system evaluated is operational support. Fortified regions contain the logistical units necessary to support a campaign or major operation. The material support brigade in a fortified region can perform the operational support functions of arming, fueling, fixing, manning, moving, maintaining, and sustaining the force. (10:37& 31:4-15) The functions of conducting civil affairs and evacuating non-combatants from the theater of operation were not discussed in the literature and remain questionable.

The fortified region can perform operational support while acting as an economy of force or an operational maneuver group. It is capable of providing operational support on a continual basis during operational movement to

the operational depth and all other phases of a campaign or major operation.

In summary, fortified regions are quite capable of performing the functions and subfunctions of operational maneuver and movement, operational protection, operational command and control and operational support. Fortified regions do not have full capabilities to perform the functions of operational fires and operational intelligence as defined in TRADOC PAM 11-9.

V CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

The Soviets are continuously restructuring and reequipping their military forces. Historically, this restructuring and reequipping has been the result of changes in their doctrine and the perception of their prospective enemy. However, today the changes in their military structure to include forces, equipment and doctrine are the result of political and economic necessity. (10:1)

Today's Soviet military force structure is centered on the combined arms army consisting of corps and divisions supported by combat, combat support and combat service support elements. The combined arms armies are subordinate to Soviet Fronts or army groups and the number of combined arms armies in each Front or army group varies according to

mission. "Defensiveness" and "reasonable sufficiency" since 1987 have determined the force structure. (10:13)

This structure is in response to political, economical and social conditions both internally and externally as perceived by the Soviets.

The "defensiveness" and "reasonable sufficiency" stance coupled with Conventional Force Europe (CFE) troop reduction talks indicate major changes are coming in future Soviet force structure. One formation that is being recreated or reintroduced into the force structure is the fortified region. In WWII, fortified regions performed economy of force roles in offensive and defensive operations in the Vistula Oder and Manchurian strategic offensives. Additionally, fortified regions operated as part of operational maneuver groups. In either role, they were an operational level of war force enabling Front and army commanders to concentrate or mass their forces along a narrow front for the main effort and to conduct maneuver for achieving operational depth. (10:19)

As the Soviets restructure their military forces they will satisfy the requirements for the future battlefield and simultaneously assume "defensiveness." This restructuring will produce multi-purpose formations capable of any offensive or defensive role or mission. The basic formations will be the combined arms army, tank army, and mechanized army with the combined arms army being the

principal formation. The new tank and mechanized armies will perform operational maneuver, as either counterattack forces or operational maneuver groups. The combined arms army will perform multipurpose offensive and defensive roles to include operational maneuver. (10:20,38,47,49, & 51)

The combined arms army, shock army and guards army--each consisting of 2 & 4 corps size units--can be configured either defensively, offensively or balanced depending on the mission. Fortified regions or corps will be the basic unit in each army. See appendix B for variants of these armies.

Fortified regions configured in combined arms armies can be deployed forward in Eastern Europe or remain within the Soviet Union. Forward deployment of fortified regions in Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) may find the 3rd Shock Army converting its three motorized rifle corps into three fortified regions or two fortified regions and one motorized rifle corps. The 8th Guards Army could likewise convert its three motorized rifle corps into three fortified regions or two fortified regions and one motorized rifle corps. The remaining mechanized armies of GSFG would retain their structure of tank and mechanized corps. (10:47-9)

In the Central Group of Forces (CGF) fortified regions will replace, in part or all, the corps in combined arms armies. These combined arms armies will consist of three fortified regions, or two fortified regions and one mechanized corps, or one fortified region, one mechanized corps, and one tank corps instead of its current three mechanized/tank/tank corps. (10:47-9) Similar infusion of fortified regions may occur in the combined arms armies, guards, and shock armies of the Soviet Group of Forces (SGF) and Northern Group of Forces (NGF). The eventual force structure of NGF, CGF, SGF, and GSFG will be influenced by CFE discussions or Soviet unilateral withdrawals.

Any discussion of Soviet force structure and operational art is not complete without considering deception. Deception is part of every Soviet military operation and must be included in orders and plans. The Vistula Oder and Manchurian campaigns of WWII are masterpieces of the uses of deception in conducting offensive and defensive operations. These WWII deception practices included: creation of false grouping of forces, masking of actual force composition, concealed regrouping of strategic reserves and other forces, and maldeployment. (10:42) The Soviets have continued to use deception in their force structures since WWII. The current withdrawing of forces, restructuring of armies and renaming of forces

may involve some form of deception since the Soviets adhere to their maxim of using deception in every military operation.

The questions that now arise are what roles do the reintroduction of fortified regions into the Soviet force structure play in deception and CFE? Will fortified regions be employed offensively or defensively? Will they be employed defensively with a quick conversion to an offensive force? Appendix C contains two examples of how fortified regions can be configured in combined arms, shock or guards armies.

VI CONCLUSION

The Soviets have publically stated that fortified regions will be reintroduced into their force structure of the 1990's. (20:875) Fortified regions are Soviet army group level assets assigned to combined arms and shock armies as operational resources. Operational commanders can employ fortified regions in either economy of force or operational maneuver group roles.

In the current Soviet era of "defensiveness" and "reasonable sufficiency" coupled with CFE reduction talks, fortified regions most likely will be employed in economy of force defensive roles at combined arms army level in GSFG, CGF, SGF and NGF. Fortified regions, in this role,

will occupy large frontages filling the voids caused by the reductions of forces from CFE. The Soviets will probably vary the composition of combined arms armies and replace most motorized rifle corps with fortified regions.

Combined arms armies variants would include: three fortified regions, two to four rifle corps or fortified regions, two motorized rifle corps and one fortified region, or two fortified regions and one tank or mechanized corps plus support elements. (10:20, 38, 47, 49, & 50)

Likewise, shock armies would replace their motorized rifle corps with fortified regions. Many variants of fortified regions and motorized rifle corps are possible, similar to combined arms armies.

With the Soviets replacing motorized rifle corps with fortified regions at combined arms and shock armies level, the Soviet posture may appear benign and incapable of offensive operations to NATO and the United States. However, NATO and the United States must be cognizant of the historical offensive employment of fortified regions and how the Soviets have based their current military doctrine and strategy on their experiences from WWII.

During the Vistula Oder and Manchurian strategic offensives, the Soviets employed fortified regions in economy of force roles to occupy and hold large frontages enabling armies to concentrate their forces on a narrow frontage to achieve operational superiority at the decisive

time and place and to assist in operational surprise and deception. During these offensives, the Soviets also employed fortified regions as operational maneuver groups to achieve depth and to attack significant obstacles at the operational level. Through elaborate deception, the Soviets made the Germans believe the Soviet forces were on the defense.

To answer the "so what" and "implications for NATO and the United States" questions, one must analyze the historical operational employment of fortified regions and realize that deception is part of and included in every Soviet operation. The Soviets can employ fortified regions in economy of force defensive postures, occupying large frontages and replacing motorized rifle corps in combined arms and shock armies. This employment projects to NATO and the United States a sense of defensiveness, not offensiveness, and compliance with CFE reduction talks, and ultimately creates an atmosphere of complacency.

By studying the employment of fortified regions in WWII, we learn that fortified regions have an operational significance for the offense. Fortified regions can be deployed defensively in Eastern Europe during peacetime serving three operational purposes: an economy of force occupying large frontages, a deception force (operational maneuver group), and a defensive force with a quick conversion to an offensive force. Thus, for NATO and the

United States, the fortified region is a multipurpose, operational formation capable of both defensive and offensive action. It is not solely a defensive force.

In summary, this monograph has presented the background for the reintroduction of fortified regions into the Soviet force structure of the 1990's, their historical employment, the theoretical foundation, an evaluation of fortified regions using operational operating systems as criteria, and the contemporary significance of these organizations. The conclusion outlines the significance for NATO and the United States and presents some concerns with CFE, deception and defensive formations which are really offensive in nature.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Fortified Region: "Urkreplennyi raion". The term in the Soviet force structure of 1992 does not refer to geographical areas or zones with barbed wire, land mines and tank ditches. It applies to corps level troop formations or organizations. A better translation would be "fortified corps" used in the same context as tank, mechanized and motorized corps. An assemblage of artillery and machinegun units with combat support and combat service support units is a more efficient definition. Fortified regions perform operational level of war functions both in the offense and defense. (22) The different references used for this monograph had their own definition of fortified region. Each definition was slightly different, but the concept and employment were the same. Fortified Region is abbreviated FR.

Economy of force: This is the minimum force employed in an area other than where the main attack is intended. The use implies some prudent risk in selecting areas to achieve numerical superiority in the decisive area.

(30:174-75)

Operational Maneuver Group: This operational concept fulfills the Soviet maneuver requirement of striking fast and deep to achieve operational depth. (33:2-7) The

operational maneuver group exploits the success of first echelon units. The operational maneuver group concept is both a mission and a role assigned to an organization. (22)

Operational Art: FM 100-5 defines operational art as "the employment of military forces to obtain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations;" it also includes the fundamental decision about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. (30:10) The operational commander must interact with strategic guidance and determine the operational military conditions to satisfy policy aims within the limits imposed by resources, restrictions and constraints. (14:52)

APPENDIX B

Variants of combined arms and shock armies.

1. Combined Arms Army
 - 2-4 motorized rifle corps or fortified regions
 - 1 Tank or mechanized corps (optional)
 - 1 Air assault corps
 - Support elements
2. Combined Arms Army
 - 3 Fortified Regions
 - Support elements
3. Shock Army and Guards Army
 - 3 Fortified Regions
 - Support elements
4. Shock Army and Guards Army
 - 2 Fortified regions
 - 1 Motorized Rifle Corps
 - Support elements
5. Combined arms army
 - 2 Motorized rifle corps
 - 1 fortified region
 - Support elements (10:20,38,47,49,& 50)

The combined arms, shock and guards armies can be configured to many variants using fortified regions, motorized rifle corps, tanks corps and mechanized corps. Only a few appear above since the variants are too numerous to list.

APPENDIX C

The fortified region (corps) configured to the combined arms army, shock army or guards army will probably appear in one of the following two forms below:

Fortified Region (corps)

- 2-3 fortification brigades (31 tanks each)
- 1-2 motorized rifle or mechanized brigades (62-82 tanks)
 - 1 artillery brigade
 - 1 sam brigade
 - 1 reconnaissance battalion
 - 1 engineer-sapper brigade
 - 1 chemical defense battalion
 - 1 material support brigade

Total: 155-226 tanks (10:37)

NOTE: Tank corps has 395 tanks.
Mechanized rifle corps has 372 tanks.
Motorized rifle corps has 269-291 tanks.

Fortified Region

- 3 Machine gun artillery regiments
- 1 antitank regiment
- 1 air defense regiment
- 1 tank regiment
- 1 engineer battalion
- 1 signal battalion
- 1 air assault battalion
- 1 medical battalion
- 1 chemical battalion
- 1 transportation battalion
- 1 supply battalion (20:896)

APPENDIX D-1





Figure 1. Soviet Typical Offensive Combat Formation: Combined Arms Army

(6261)

APPENDIX D-3

Map 34. Soviet 35th Army Advance to Mishan, 9-15 August 1945



(6:126)

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