U.S. STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM: SHOULD THE U.S. AND USSR DEVELOP A JOINT STRATEGY BASED ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION?

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U.S. STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM: SHOULD THE U.S. AND USSR DEVELOP A JOINT STRATEGY BASED ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION? (UNCL)

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U.S. policy toward terrorism has evolved incrementally. Its basic premises are that the United States will make no concessions to terrorists, pay no ransoms, release no prisoners, or agree to other acts that might encourage terrorism. For the past several years the United States has tried through diplomatic means to encourage its Western European Allies to participate in a joint international counterterrorist strategy. Future U.S. policy probably will depend on the level of terrorism and the extent to which international states are willing to cooperate strategically. This paper will propose that a better national strategy for combating international terrorism must include "international cooperation," specially with the Soviet Union. At present, the American foreign policy community is actively engaged in a review of U.S. diplomacy toward the Soviet Union's "new thinking." The idea that terrorism might be an area of possible cooperation between East and West unquestionably warrants exploration.
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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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U.S. policy toward terrorism has evolved incrementally. Its basic premises are that the United States will make no concessions to terrorists, pay no ransoms, release no prisoners, or agree to other acts that might encourage terrorism. For the past several years the United States has tried through diplomatic means to encourage its Western European Allies to participate in a joint international counterterrorist strategy. Future U.S. policy probably will depend on the level of terrorism and the extent to which international states are willing to cooperate strategically. This paper will propose that a better national strategy for combatting international terrorism must include "international cooperation," specifically with the Soviet Union. At present, the American foreign policy community is actively engaged in a review of U.S. diplomacy toward the Soviet Union's "new thinking." The idea that terrorism might be an area of possible cooperation between East and West unquestionably warrants exploration.
INTRODUCTION

The subject of international terrorism has gained the considerable attention in recent years of governments, academicians, and the media. It has become a frequently dominant concern of Americans and many foreign decision makers. Yet, considerable ambiguity persists in the perceptions of these officials, as well as academic commentators, concerning the issue, the nature of the threat, and the proper response to it. Academic literature on the subject, while increasingly voluminous, has not contributed significantly to clarification of fundamental conceptual and policy dilemmas. Much of the current literature and commentary simply focuses on the spectacular aspects and manifestations of terrorism. Media treatment frequently is purely sensationalist. And finally, we find that most studies quantify the events without dealing critically with strategic issues.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

The lack of a commonly accepted and unemotional definition of terrorism has contributed to governmental confusion, avoidance, and ineffectiveness in formulating appropriate policy responses. Terrorism is in fact a phenomenon that is unquestionably easier to describe than to define. Such ambiguity contributes to a lack of international consensus on how to meet the challenge. One could start by saying it is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further
political objectives. Generally it is intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies. The range of violence includes hostage taking, aircraft piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, and indiscriminate bombings or shootings. Some view terrorism as the lower end of the warfare spectrum, a form of low intensity, unconventional aggression. Others refuse to dignify it by referring to it as war but prefer to believe it to be the lowest form of criminal activity. They feel that if it is treated as a form of warfare, terrorist acts may be placed within the context of accepted international behavior. This argument forms much of the basis of the difficulty in coming to an accepted definition within the international community. One man's terrorist could be another man's freedom fighter, a view prevalent throughout the Third World. Dr. William Farrell, a former professor at the Naval War College and noted specialist on terrorism, suggests the following operational definition:

Terrorism is a purposeful human political activity primarily directed toward the creation of a general climate of fear designed to influence, in ways desired by protagonists, other human beings and, through them, some course of events.  

Coming up with an acceptable definition has serious implications for developing a strategy within the international community. Labels such as freedom fighter, liberator, or revolutionary do not make aggression against innocent civilians an acceptable form of warfare. The only practical approach available for the civilized world to combat such acts is to hold
nations accountable for permitting these activities to take place. It is a problem that faces the United Nations today in developing a more coherent and forceful approach. Actions have been united to agreements in outlawing the various manifestations of terrorist activities. The debate is sure to continue as long as terrorism can be an effective tool for many governments to achieve their aims when no other options are available.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This paper will propose that a better national strategy for combatting international terrorism must include "international cooperation," specifically with the Soviet Union. At present, the American foreign policy community is actively engaged in a review of U.S. diplomacy toward the Soviet Union's "new thinking." The idea that terrorism might be an area of possible cooperation between East and West unquestionably warrants exploration.

CURRENT U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Since no country is immune to terrorism, it is imperative that governments have the appropriate policies, intelligence and flexible response options to deal effectively with terrorism. The United States' counterterrorism policy was initially developed during the 1970's. The basic principles remain as valid today as when first articulated. The February 1986 Vice
President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism clearly expresses current policy.

The U.S. position on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms and wherever it takes place. Several National Security Decision Directives as well as statements by the President and senior officials confirm this policy:

* The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.

* The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to its national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.

* States that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country, the United States will take measures to protect its citizens, property and interests.

* The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.

* The United States will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles, and encourages other governments to take similar stands.

U.S. policy is based upon the conviction that to give in to terrorists' demands places even more Americans at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of ensuring the safety of the greatest number of people.  

Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, February 1986
L. Paul Bremer III, Ambassador at Large for Counter-terrorism, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 1989, proposed that subsequent to the Vice President's Task Force Report, U.S. policy on combatting terrorism had clearly been refined to the point where it now stands on three solid pillars. First, the U.S. will not accede to terrorist demands. We will not pay ransom, pardon convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give in to terrorist demands. In other words, we will not make deals. But we will talk to anyone authoritative, anywhere, anytime, about the welfare and unconditional release of our hostages.

Second, the U.S. has taken the lead in pressuring states/governments which support terrorist groups and use terrorism as part of their foreign policy. The United States will not tolerate their aiding and abetting terrorist groups by supplying them with weapons, money, passports, training bases, and safe houses.

Third, we are imposing the rule of law on terrorists for their criminal actions. Good police work is catching terrorists, and they are being brought to trial. The U.S. now has on its books a law which enables our law enforcement agencies to better combat terrorism. Popularly called a "long-arm" statute, the law makes it a federal crime to kill, injure, threaten, detain, or seize an American citizen anywhere in the world in order to compel a third person or government to accede to a terrorist's demands.
So we have a relatively comprehensive counterterrorist policy. However, we have to ask the question: How is it working? A logical approach might be to examine the question from Bremer's perspective. First the "no concessions" element of our policy should be reviewed. There is much debate as to what damage our policy did suffer as a result of the Iran-Contra affair. However, since that time, the administration has attempted to make it clear that our government is steadfastly committed to the "no deals" principle. It appears that the international counterterrorism community understands our position, and there is strong bipartisan support here for our policy of firmness in dealing with terrorists.

Paul Bremer as well as a number of other noted experts on terrorism posit that we have enjoyed an important measure of success on the second ingredient of our policy, that is pressuring states which support terrorism. As a result, some of the more notorious state supporters of terrorism have attempted publicly at least to distance themselves from terrorism.

Our 1986 airstrike on Libya's terrorist camp was a key event in the fight against terrorist-supporting states. European nations followed our lead against Libya by imposing political, economic, and security measures against the Qadhafi regime. European nations expelled more than 100 Libyan "diplomats" and restricted the movements of other Libyan "diplomatic" and consular personnel. All indications are that these moves severely damaged Libya's European network dedicated to supporting international terrorism. In fact, Libya's involvement in
terrorism declined from 19 incidents in 1986 to six in 1987 and another six in 1988.\footnote{7}

Syria, another long-time supporter of terrorism, also felt the pressure of our counterterrorism strategy. In late 1986, British and West German courts established Syrian complicity in terrorist attacks in London and West Berlin. Together with Great Britain, the United States joined an international campaign employing diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions to convince Syria to reduce its link to terrorist groups.

These efforts were effective. In 1985, Syria was implicated in 34 terrorist incidents, but in 1986 only six. In 1987, a year after U.S. pressures, Syria was implicated in only one incident and none in 1988.\footnote{8} Moreover, Syria expelled the violent Abu Nidal Organization from Damascus in June 1987. This has to be viewed as a victory for counterterrorist policies.

The third and final element (pillar) of U.S. counterterrorism policy, that being using the rule of law against terrorists and encouraging others to do the same, is evolving into a potent weapon for two basic reasons. First, there has been a change in international attitudes toward terrorists. Second, governments have decided to provide law enforcement agencies the resources necessary to deter terrorism.\footnote{9}

Not long ago, many usually responsible countries granted terrorists dispensation for their crimes. No longer does this appear to be true. Terrorists began to lose this international indulgence as they widened their circle of targets and their brutality in the late 1970's. And as popular disgust mounted,
politicians finally insisted on action to counter the terrorists. As a result, more and more terrorists are being brought to trial and convicted. For example:

* In 1989 a Maltese court sentenced the sole surviving terrorist in the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner to 25 years imprisonment—the maximum sentence under Maltese law.

* In late 1988, a French court convicted in absentia the notorious Patah (the military arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization) terrorist Colonel Hawari to 10 years in prison for complicity to transport arms, ammunition, and explosives and for criminal association. Hawari’s sentence was the maximum allowed under the French law.

* In February 1989 a court in Switzerland sentenced a Lebanese terrorist to life imprisonment for hijacking an Air Afrique flight the previous year.

* In May 1989 a West German court sentenced Lebanese terrorist Muhammad Hamadei to life imprisonment for hijacking, hostage taking, and the murder of an innocent American seaman.

* In March 1989 in Washington, D.C., a court sentenced Lebanese terrorist Fawaz Younis to 30 years for hijacking a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight in 1985 and for taking hostages, including American citizens.

* In January 1990 terrorist trials took place in Paris and in Stockholm. In Paris an operative of the May 15 Middle Eastern terrorist group was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and other charges for his involvement in a series of bombings in that city and in London during 1983-85.

* In Stockholm four members of the Palestine Popular Struggle Front were sentenced to terms up to life imprisonment for their bombing campaign in 1985-86 in Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.

So our policies do give the appearance of being sound, and step by step we are having success. Now we have to ask ourselves, What else must we do to make even greater progress toward developing a more effective strategy to combat terrorism?
To answer this question we only have to refer to the Public
Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating
Terrorism:

The national program to combat terrorism operates
before, during and after an incident. Any strategy
must include measures for deterrence, crisis management
and response options. The first line of defense in
every phase is international cooperation.

International cooperation offers the best hope for
long-term success. More and more states recognize that
unilateral programs for combating terrorism are not
sufficient. Without a viable, comprehensive,
cooperative effort, terrorism and its supporters will
benefit from the uncoordinated actions of its victims.
International cooperation alone cannot eliminate
terrorism, but it can complicate the terrorists' tasks,
deter their efforts and save lives. In fact, numerous
actual or planned attacks against U.S. or foreign
targets have failed or were circumvented through
multinational cooperation.12

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THE USSR

Violence on national, ethnic or religious grounds
must no longer be tolerated. . . . No support or
sympathy should be extended to the so-called movements
that allow actions humiliating other nations, or use
terrorist, barbaric and inhuman methods in waging their
struggle.

Eduard Shevardnadze
September 26, 1989

The highest values of our own culture require that we never
abandon the search for a basis for cooperation with the USSR,
while at the same time defending our own rights and interests.
The proven involvement of the Soviet Union in some aspects of
terrorism, therefore, should not preclude the possibility of
reaching an agreement with Moscow on issues where there are
common interests.
The timing for such a coalition is right. Never before has there been a more opportune period for the establishment of a joint body between superpowers to combat international terrorism. Supporting this premise is the reevaluation of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev. It is referred to as the "new thinking" which has produced a new Soviet attitude and apparently a different behavior toward terrorism. Since President Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet Union has expressed a new and specific interest in reducing international terrorism. The Soviets have proposed bilateral cooperation with individual Western countries in talks with various leaders and have proposed an international conference on combating terrorism as well. Moscow has sought to be included in Western meetings on the subject and in January 1989 hosted an unofficial conference by a U.S.-Soviet task force of experts who agreed to produce a joint study, including recommendations to their respective governments, on terrorism. A top KGB official publicly expressed his willingness to cooperate with British, U.S., and Israeli intelligence, following Soviet-Israeli cooperation in handling a terrorist incident in December 1988. Soviet-East European officials reportedly have provided the West with intelligence information on known terrorists and occasionally have taken action against the facilities and operatives of Libya and of the Abu Nidal group working inside the Soviet bloc.\(^{13}\)

There are other signs that the "new thinking" contains a new approach to terrorism. As early as the end of 1985, well before the indications of a change regarding armed struggle in general,
the Soviet Union changed its position in the United Nations. For the first time, on December 6, 1985, the Soviet bloc voted with the United States in the General Assembly (in a vote 118 to 1) and later in the Security Council for resolutions condemning as "criminal" all acts of terrorism from whatever source. The General Assembly resolution called for the strengthening of measures to "facilitate the prevention, prosecution, and punishment of all acts of hostage taking and abduction as manifestation of international terrorism."

Such a turnabout, after years of haggling in the UN Committee on terrorism created in 1972, may have been prompted by the kidnapping of four Soviet diplomats in Beirut three months earlier. It was also, however, a harbinger of the policy to be announced by Gorbachev at the February 1986 CPSV Congress, in which the new Soviet leader called for the drawing up of effective measures for preventing international terrorism, including security for the use of international land, air, and sea communications. Indeed, according to some reports, Gorbachev had already raised the subject with President Reagan at the Geneva summit in November 1985, promising more than mere declaration. The subsequent UN resolution reportedly was agreed to in principle by the two leaders at that time.

In 1987 Gorbachev again spoke about the subject, expanding slightly on the direction he intended the Soviet Union to take. Once again he condemned crises and conflicts as the "seedbed" for international terrorism and linked the elimination of the
phenomenon to the elimination of the reasons for the conflicts themselves:

The Soviet Union rejects terrorism in principle and is prepared to cooperate energetically with other states in eradicating this evil. It is expedient to concentrate this work within the United Nations. It would be useful to establish under its aegis a tribunal for investigating acts of international terrorism. During a bilateral dialogue with the Western countries (in the past year there was a major exchange of views on this score between us and the USA, Britain, France, Federal [Republic of] Germany, Italy, Canada and Sweden) we came out for the elaboration of effective measures to combat terrorism. We are prepared to conclude special bilateral agreements. I hope that the common struggle against international terrorism will broaden in the years to come.\textsuperscript{17}

Professor Aleksander Kislov of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow argues that terrorism "has now become one of the most acute international problems, constituting a serious threat to the cause of peace, security, and international cooperation.\textsuperscript{18}

The Soviet Union now appears to recognize that national security is related to the mutual interdependence of nations and the necessity for restraint.

Respect for the norms of international law becomes a matter of mankind's survival today because the security of each state depends on the security of other states and the whole of mankind, and not on the quantity and even quality of their own weapons and armed forces.\textsuperscript{19}

Furthermore,

All states today face a fundamental task: without closing their eyes to the social, political and ideological differences they must learn to act with
restraint and circumspection on the international scene, to live in a civilized way, and to behave correctly in international communication and cooperation.20

These changes seem to be more than rhetorical to knowledgeable observers. For example, Neil MacFarlane argues that under President Gorbachev's leadership, Soviet attitudes and policy are entering a new phase.21 Official comment on the Third World in general has become rare, and even less notice is given to revolutionary movements outside the Soviet Union. Expressions of willingness to provide military assistance for revolutionary movements are few; in general revolutionaries are advised to help themselves. The Soviet Union appears sensitive to the potentially damaging consequences for relations with the United States if competition in the Third World is conducted at acute levels.22 Neil MacFarlane states: "The impression one gets is that Soviet experts have come to see the Third World as far more complex and dangerous terrain than they had previously thought."23

Further supporting this line of thinking is the fact that the Soviet Union has expressed interest in a nonmilitary solution to the Arab-Israel conflict as well as in the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel which in fact is a reality today.

The Israeli analyst Galia Golan agrees that since Gorbachev there has been "an almost total absence of references to national liberation movements."24 The Soviet Union shows little interest in commitments to national liberation struggles, possibly because of the risks such involvements create for other policies, the
lack of solid returns on these investments of scarce resources as well as lessons of Afghanistan.

What other evidence is available that supports the premise that the Soviets are serious about a cooperative approach to combating international terrorism? To answer this question we can examine the Soviet reaction to specific incidents of anti-Western terrorism which signal stronger condemnation of such tactics. In 1985 the Soviet Union called U.S. anger over the Achille Lauro hijacking and the murder of passenger Leon Klinghoffer "understandable and just," and called for severe punishment of the terrorists, who were members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). In response to the September 1986 hijacking attempt by the Abu Nidal faction (Fatah Revolutionary Council) against a U.S. airliner in Pakistan which resulted in 21 deaths, a commentator in Pravda issued a sharply critical statement:

No matter what the motives of the people who committed this evil deed, there is no justifying it. A resolute stop must be put to terrorism of all sorts. These criminal actions must not be allowed to end people's lives, jeopardize the normal cause of international relations, severely exacerbate some situation or other, or engender violence.

Furthermore, the Soviet reaction to American military retaliation against Libya in 1986 for its complicity in international terrorist activity was muted. Although the Soviet Union protested by cancelling a summit planning meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz, still Moscow failed to warn Libya of the impending raid despite
the fact that "implicitly the prospect of American retaliatory action had been discussed in advance with the Soviets." President Gorbachev appeared unwilling to allow the raid to impede the normalization of relations with the United States, especially since Soviet relations with Libya were already strained, as indicated by earlier Soviet refusal to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Ronald Bruce St. John, an analyst, noted:

Quaddafi can find little solace in the Soviet response. While denouncing the attack, the Soviet government was careful to maintain a certain distance from Quaddafi, apparently unwilling to risk a conflict with the United States over what has proved to be a most unpredictable partner.

In this same manner, the Soviet Union did not react to charges that its longtime ally Syria was involved in anti-Western terrorism. These accusations were made by the Italian, West German, Spanish, and UK governments in October 1986 and eventually culminated in the United Kingdom government's severing of diplomatic relations with Syria. In fact, in the United Nations in December 1987 the Soviet Union and many Third World nations joined the West in the General Assembly to defeat a Syrian proposal that many countries considered a highly provocative attempt to legitimate international terrorism. Syria had called on the United Nations to convene an international conference to define the difference between terrorism and the legitimate right of oppressed peoples to fight for national freedom. Soviet opposition to the proposed conference was apparently a strong signal for isolating Syria.
The result was a compromise resolution that reaffirmed the earlier United Nations stand against international terrorism.

It was also in 1987 that the Soviet Union undertook something of a campaign to bring about international talks on combatting terrorism. Presumably a major Soviet motivation was the desire to cleanse Moscow's reputation and demonstrate its new policies. Taken in conjunction with the reports of actual cooperation addressed in previous paragraphs, however, the new Soviet proposals may have not been entirely propaganda-oriented. The campaign began with a proposal by the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) talks in Vienna in February 1987, in which the Soviets termed all acts of terrorism "criminal" regardless of their perpetrators. The Soviets also approached individual West European governments with this idea and with suggestions for negotiating extradition agreements. The proposal, which was brought to the UN General Assembly in the summer of 1987, called for international endorsement of a number of principles on the subject. The suggestion to the United Nations, however, was quite general, with at least implied criticism of Western use of force; it recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of national liberation movements and condemned the use of force and international terrorism regardless of its source. Ironic, considering what is happening in the USSR today!

Most recently, from January 23 to January 27, 1989, the Soviets held their own international conference on counterterrorism. Although it was sponsored by Literaturnaia
Gazeta rather than by a governmental body, it was attended by a number of midlevel government officials and opened with an official greeting by the deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's legal department. Presumably to downplay any official character of the meeting or perhaps to protect the involvement of some with the issue of terrorism, Soviet reporting of the conference mentioned only six participants from each side and omitted any reference to the Soviet officials present.33

That the Soviets intended the conference to serve more than propaganda purposes was suggested by the invitation of serious Western experts on terrorism, including some not noted for their favorable attitude toward Soviet involvement and many who serve as consultants to the U.S. government. Moreover, the conference was agreed to by both U.S. and Soviet participants to be part of an ongoing cooperative project called by the Americans "The U.S.-Soviet Task Force for the Prevention of Terrorism." The Soviets called this a "Soviet-American Society for Jointly Fighting International Terrorism," thus downplaying again any official involvement and explicitly opening up the conference to representatives of other countries. After a number of meetings, the two delegations did decide to produce a "joint book" and to represent their findings and recommendations to their respective governments.34 The proposed volume, which would include recommendations for preventing and dealing with terrorism, would be published simultaneously in the Soviet Union and the United States.35
Particularly noteworthy was the fact that at this first conference of the task force, the Soviet participants reportedly described their major concern about terrorism. That was the possibility that a terrorist incident could provoke a conflict resulting in a nuclear confrontation. The scenario might include U.S. action against a Soviet client that Moscow might feel obliged to defend. When we consider Gorbachev's connection of terrorism with regional conflicts, the Soviets expressed their fear that terrorism could lead to wider conflict, as had already occurred in the Middle East (Israel/PLO). The Soviets reportedly were also afraid that the terrorist methods of Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East could spread to the Soviet Union's own Moslem population or ethnic minorities. It appears that the Soviets also were concerned about possible terrorist use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

Equally important along with the Soviets' publicly expressed concern about terrorism at the conference was the fact that conference participants were able to reach agreement on at least a "working" definition of terrorism without confusing the issue with a discussion of the use of violence by national liberation or other movements supported by either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Probably the most important issue that was spawned by the conference was the agreement that some acts should be universally prohibited, for example, attacks on civil aviation, attacks on internationally protected individuals (such as children or diplomats), and attacks on ships or sea platforms or the mining
of sea lanes. Beyond this, the participants agreed upon the following recommendations, which they apparently intended to present to their respective governments:

* Creation of a standing bilateral group and channel of communications for exchange of information on terrorism—in effect, a designated link for conveying requests and relaying information during a terrorist crisis.
* Provision of mutual assistance (information, diplomatic assistance, technical assistance, and so forth) in the investigation of terrorist incidents.
* Prohibition of the sale or transfer of military explosives and certain classes of weapons (such as surface to air missiles) to non-governmental organizations, and increased controls on the sale or transfer to governments.
* Initiation of bilateral discussions on requiring chemical or other types of "tags" in commercial and military explosives to make them more easily detectable and to aid in the investigation of terrorist bombings.
* Initiation of joint efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or other means of mass destruction.
* Exchange of anti-terrorist technology, consistent with the national security interests as defined by each nation.
* Conduct of joint exercises and simulations in order to develop further means of Soviet-American cooperation during terrorist threats or incidents.
* Joint action to fill the gaps that exist in current international law and institutions, including the establishment of a United Nations Standing Committee on International Terrorism.

Even if they were unofficial, the very convening of this conference and the creation of the joint task force were significant events in themselves. Still more significant were the above recommendations, particularly because many of the Soviet participants were directly involved in the definition and even treatment of terrorism.

At this point in our analysis of the Soviets' new attitude, I believe it is accurate to state that the Soviet Union has unquestionably demonstrated an interest in strengthening a climate of cooperation in combatting international terrorism.

CONCLUSION

No one can promise a world free of terrorism, but through hard-learned experience our country has finally shown signs of success against international terrorism. Paramount to this success has been U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Surely the evidence
presented in previous paragraphs is persuasive in that a common interest exists between East and West in dealing with international terrorism.

The appropriate forum for future East-West discussions is still a point of debate. However, the aforementioned January 1989 Soviet-sponsored international conference on counter-terrorism referred to by the Soviets as "Soviet-American Society for Jointly Fighting International Terrorism" may very well be the genesis for a permanent framework to orchestrate future cooperation. Regardless of the framework or forum agreed upon, it is obvious that effective international cooperation has to be based on a mutuality of interest. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have a strong interest in a stable international system. Failure to cooperate to control terrorism presents many risks. Not only is there the likelihood that uncurbed terrorism will increase in scope and destructiveness, perhaps even to the extent of nuclear or chemical threats, but also that frustration will compel states to resort to military force in order to preempt or retaliate, resulting in escalation to regional or global conflict. As referenced previously, the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism called international cooperation "the first line of defense" and the "best hope for long-term success" against terrorism." This coupled with the persuasive evidence that at least on the surface Gorbachev's "new thinking" does contain a new attitude toward terrorism presents hope that international cooperation between the superpowers may grow to greater proportions. This paper attempted to assess the
status of international cooperation and the prospects for American-Soviet agreement. Bottom line is that the United States and the Soviet Union must use "international cooperation" as the genesis for developing future national strategy to combat international terrorism!
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 3.

10. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 53.


20. Ibid.


23. MacFarlane, p. 3.


35. This information on the Moscow Conference is based on the following: accounts of participants Brian Jenkins, John Marks, Robin Wright, and Michael Stohl in the *Washington Post*, March 5, 1989, and in the *Los Angeles Times*, January 27 and 28, 1989.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.
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