AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE

Thomas-Durell Young, Ph.D.

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### Personal Author(s)
Young, Thomas-Durell

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### Abstract
This essay argues that the previously strong orientation in Australian defense planning toward achievement of self-reliance, and the heretofore major influence of the armed services in force development, have combined to produce a defense force structure incapable of meeting stated Australian politico-military objectives in its own region. The current force structure review, coordinated in the office of the Chief of Defence Force, has the potential to remedy these shortcomings.

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NOTICES

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COMMENTS

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717) 245-3911, or AUTOCAM 242-1911.
As the political upheavals continue their course in Europe and progressively more attention is directed to the Persian Gulf crisis, little attention has been given in this country to potentially fundamental changes that could be underway in Australia's defense policy. As vividly demonstrated by the almost immediate commitment by Canberra of forces to the Persian Gulf in August 1990, Australia remains a strong ally of the United States and the Western Alliance. It therefore behooves defense officials in this country to understand better the current direction of Australian defense planning.

This short essay was initiated by the Strategic Studies Institute. The author, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, contends that the previously strong orientation in Australian defense planning toward achievement of self-reliance, and the heretofore major influence of the armed services in force development, have combined to produce a defense force incapable of meeting stated Australian politico-military objectives in its own region. He argues, however, that the ongoing force structure review, managed by the office of the Chief of Defence Force, has the potential to remedy these shortcomings.

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KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE

Since the 1930s there has been consistent tension, which has varied in intensity, over Australian defense policy formulation, as officials with a regional orientation have struggled with those with a more global outlook to redirect that country's security posture. As a member of the British Empire/Commonwealth and later the Western Alliance by virtue of the 1951 ANZUS Security Treaty and 1954 Manila Treaty, Australia's strategic orientation has historically been dictated by the principal challenger to the existing global status quo. Therefore, in the 1930s and during the Second World War, the Axis Powers were assumed to be the potential and later very real enemies, both to Australian interests and territorial security. Nonetheless, questions were raised during the 1930s as to whether Australian defense force structure should continue to be sublimated to British standards and requirements (supported by the navy), as opposed to more specific Australian security needs (supported by the air force and army).1

Following the end of the Second World War and the commencement of the cold war, Australia adopted the view that the Soviet Union and "Communism" represented the principal threat to its vital security interests. Despite an occasional note of dissent from the Australian Department of Defence, the issue of regional, as opposed to global, defense orientation did not emerge as an open issue until the latter 1960s and early 1970s. During this period Canberra was confronted with the fact that its principal allies, the United
Kingdom and the United States, intended to withdraw their respective substantial military forces from Australia's region, thereby eviscerating the collective defense strategy it had faithfully followed since the late 1940s. Yet, in spite of the fact that regional, or in some cases "continental," considerations rose in importance in the formulation of force structure and the purchase of equipment, the need to maintain capabilities for out-of-area contingencies (to support Australia's forward defense strategy), in conjunction with Australia's allies, remained. From the early 1970s until the present, these two motivations, projection of force in conjunction with allies and regional specialization of defense capabilities (possibly operating independently), have produced divergent pressures in the development of Australian defense policy and force structure.

One would expect, therefore, that the new phase of superpower détente, the lowering of tensions between the two blocs, and the diminution in the level of Soviet naval activity in the Southwest Pacific would produce conditions by which the proponents of a continental/regional defense orientation would attain ascendancy in this policy debate. After all, in a world with less bloc tensions, the logic of concentrating finite resources and attention to the defense of Australia proper would appear to be overwhelming. There is indeed a remarkable consistency in the primary Parliamentary, officially-commissioned and governmental statements published during the past decade apropos the likely environment in which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will operate. The Australian government claims that by directing attention to the defense of Australia, the ADF also develops capabilities that will enable it to contribute forces to allied
operations, to include outside of Australia's immediate region. Finally, in spite of these claims and Australia's Department of Defence position that contributions to allied contingencies are still allowed for in defense planning, throughout the 1980s it has become increasingly clear that particularly in the case of the Australian Army, the ADF's prime mission is continental defense.

Surprisingly, this realignment in favor of the self-reliance school has not taken place and is unlikely to do so. The reduction in superpower tensions has coincided with a major internal review within the Australian defense establishment on the issue of force structure. What is being reviewed is the fundamental precept established by the 1987 defense White Paper that defense capabilities will be procured only if they are of direct relevance to the defense of continental Australia. Additionally, as identified by Paul Dibb in his seminal review of Australian defense capabilities, Australian defense planning has long been plagued by the lack of effective joint planning, thereby obviating the establishment of priorities in terms of the acquisition of new, and maintenance of existing, military capabilities. The May 1990 announcement by Minister for Defence, Senator Bob Ray, to initiate a review of force structure, could have a fundamental impact on the orientation of Australian defense policy, through the definition of force structure requirements.

The purpose of this essay is to describe why Australian defense policy has produced an unbalanced force structure in the ADF, which has not been responsive to Australia's politico-military objectives. It will be argued that the "self-reliance" school took the strong position it did in
order to override very strong service forces intent upon maintaining "traditional" capabilities. These traditional capabilities have largely stressed procuring sophisticated equipment to enable power projection in conjunction with Australia's allies. The ongoing force structure review, by establishing priorities to fit stated government defense objectives, could well produce needed reform by providing coherent guidance to enable the ADF jointly to meet the challenges of regional security in the post-cold war world. If the Labor government's strongly pessimistic view of future regional security as outlined in its December 1989 white paper holds true, these challenges could be formidable indeed.

Background

A central problem that has plagued contemporary Australian defense policy has simply been that of defining goals and objectives. While admittedly a rather basic requirement, Australia's singular geographic situation has made this task very difficult. Given the country's historical experience and world-wide economic, political and cultural interests, Australia has long been sensitive to global political and security developments. Albeit geographically isolated from its cultural roots and political sympathies, Australia has historically been quick to answer the call to protect the existing world order from which it has benefited. The almost surreal image of two Royal Australian Navy (RAN) frigates and one fleet tanker sailing to the Persian Gulf from Western Australia in September 1990 to the sound of a band playing "Waltzing Matilda" conjures up memories of 1915 when a more naive young country sent the flower of its youth to defend the mother country and its interests, only
to be slaughtered in the Levant and on the fields of Flanders under inept British generalship. This strong sense of responsibility to contribute to the protection of first British and later Western allied vital interests, while at the same time needing to provide for the country's immediate security, has complicated defense planning.

Until approximately 1970, the definition of defense requirements was somewhat straightforward in that Australia's security orientation was all but completely in support of British and American strategy ("forward defense") in Southeast Asia. The threat was initially defined as the Soviet Union, which later shifted to Chinese sponsored Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. This scenario nicely dovetailed with the traditional Australian anxiety over Asian threats emanating from its north. The correctness of this scenario was borne out in the view of many with the radicalization of Indonesian external policy under President Sukarno and Jakarta's flirting with Communist governments and assuming a leading role in the nonaligned movement. Force development planning under these circumstances was, consequently, relatively straightforward and simple to effect. From the end of the Second World War until 1957, Australia modeled its forces largely on British standards. Britain was replaced by the United States following the Suez debacle, when on April 4, 1957 Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced that American standards and equipment would serve as the future guide for the Australian armed forces. In reality, the Australian armed services became an amalgamation of characteristics of their British and American sister services, which continues to this day in some areas. The individual services exercised considerable power in their force
development policies, with the main objective being maintaining an interoperability with their British and American counterparts, as opposed to developing national joint capabilities. Australian officials judged this situation to be satisfactory since Australian forces could easily integrate themselves into allied formations where, not unimportantly, expensive combat support and combat service support could be provided by British or U.S. forces. Complemented by the stationing of Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore (and later Vietnam), Australian strategy during this period supported Canberra's foreign policy, both regionally and globally, within the Western Alliance.

Rationales for Reform

The strategic basis for defense planning, however, took an abrupt turn in the latter 1960s and early 1970s following the British announcement of its intention to withdraw its forces from east of Suez, the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine by President Nixon and the growing awareness that the ANZUS strategy of intervention in the Vietnam conflict would not succeed. The combined implications of these events resulted in a review of the fundamentals of Australia's security, in which the Department of Defence, as opposed to the armed services, took the lead.\textsuperscript{14} Despite the fact that the 1959 Strategic Basis Paper prepared by the Department of Defence argued for a depreciation of the threat to Australia posed by the People's Republic of China and the need to improve independent defense capabilities for Australia's immediate region,\textsuperscript{15} it was not until the publication of the 1972 defence White Paper that official sanction was given by Cabinet to the concept of developing greater defense independence.\textsuperscript{16}
The only problem Canberra faced was where to begin? To the uninitiated observer, the rationale behind the long-held proposition that Australia is unable to defend itself without the assistance of "great and powerful friends" becomes clear when one assesses the geographic, demographic and domestic political elements which comprise the basis for Australia's defense planning. Australia has a relatively small population of 16.7 million, the majority of which live in the southeastern corner of the continent, with which to control a vast island continent of 7,682,300 square kilometers, in addition to supporting Australian territorial claims in Antarctica and meeting its security commitments to Papua New Guinea. Moreover, despite the "outback" image that is often cultivated amongst Australians for themselves and for external consumption, the fact remains that Australia is one of the most highly urbanized countries in the world. Complicating defense planning is the traditional reluctance of the Australian body politic to appropriate sufficient funds for national defense (2.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1990), in spite of these formidable challenges. It is germane to note that while the Australian defense budget for financial year 1990/91 amounts to the apparently large figure of $A8.97 billion, it must be recalled that 42 percent is allocated for personnel costs.\footnote{17} Finally, an important consideration in the force development process has been the need to maintain interoperability with allies, as well as some capability to deploy sophisticated forces out-of-area in conjunction with allied forces if so required. This has not proven to present major difficulties, to date, for the RAN and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), since their equipment is predominantly U.S. or
Western European in origin. Given the sophistication of modern aircraft and ships, U.S. and NATO operating procedures and doctrines have generally been adopted by these services. What has proven to be the case in a number of instances is that force projection and interoperability considerations have not always been complementary to efforts to achieve defense independence (e.g., in the Australian Army), and consequently have produced conflicts in the ADF’s force development calculus. This dichotomy in force development has also had the negative side effect of inhibiting the development of true jointness in the ADF, since the basic operational orientation of the three services remain ill-coordinated.

"Defence Self-Reliance"

The decrease in the Soviet naval presence in the Southwest Pacific\(^1\) and the corresponding diminution in Soviet threat perceptions in the region have produced an interesting situation in Australian defense policy. As long as the Soviets remained confrontational to the Western Alliance, the emphasis has been on maintaining ADF capability both to provide for the alliance’s contingency defense of the Southwest Pacific, as well as to maintain capabilities to deploy out of region to fight alongside Australia’s allies.\(^2\) In recent years, however, with the ascendancy of the self-reliance school as manifested in the 1976 defence White Paper,\(^3\) considerable, if not prime, emphasis in defense planning has been placed on defending Australia proper and its immediate region.\(^4\) According to an October 1989 statement by the previous Minister for Defence, Mr. Kim Beazley, Australia was developing, for the first time in its history, a capability to defend itself independently of allied assistance.\(^5\) One
would think that given the diminished requirement to focus attention on meeting Soviet threats to the region, the "continental defense" school should unquestionably become the prime force in the ADF's force planning.

There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with Australia attempting to develop a greater capability to defend itself, independent of allied assistance. Given the fact that defense self-reliance, as stated in the 1987 defense White Paper, "has long been an Australian aspiration," critiques of this policy have not been extensive. This is surprising since self-reliance, either in its continental sense, as articulated by Paul Dibb and Desmond Ball, or within the wider context of the Western Alliance, which is the thrust of the 1987 defense White Paper, has not been "achieved," at least in terms of findings from major field exercises held in recent years. Of course, judging success is dependent upon how one defines it. In the case of the previously quoted 1989 statement by Beazley, this meant that for the first time in its history, Australia was developing the capability of conducting independent operations to defend itself. What is interesting is that then-Minister for Defence Beazley failed to continue his statement and explain exactly what kind of threat Australia was capable of being defended against.

If the lessons learned from the large field exercise Kangaroo 89, held in north and northwest Australia in the Southern Hemisphere winter of 1989, are of any relevance, and surely they are, the ADF was shown to be capable of defending northern Australia against low-level incursions in the short term, but only with assistance in key areas from the United States. Moreover, albeit rarely done, the issue of the almost
unquestioned credibility of low-level incursion threats needs to be
examined. The preeminent focus on this specific threat scenario conjures up
past images of the period of Confrontation with Indonesia from 1963 to 1966,
without considering whether such fears are justified in the contemporary
world.31 Retired Air Marshall David Evans, RAAF, for example, is one who
argues that Indonesia has the capability of launching an air portable attack
on Australia.32 However, if Kangaroo 89 demonstrated anything, it was
that while Australian and U.S. defenders had considerable difficulty
operating in the inhospitable north, invaders, foreign to the environment
and vast distances from their home bases, would be equally, if not more so,
challenged to conduct successful offensive operations in the region.

Admittedly, a prime objective of any military force should be the
physical defense of national territory. As a means of training and
manifesting sovereignty, ADF operations in the north make very good sense
indeed. Nonetheless, in view of the other nationally defined requirements
of the ADF, one could question the considerable focus which has been placed
on defending the north and northwest, particularly within the context of
force development in the Australian Army.33 The prevailing view has been
that the maintenance of a traditional military structure would be inadequate
for low-level operations in the north and northwest. In consequence, the
Australian Army's force structure, doctrines and tactical concepts have been
altered to suit these envisaged operations.34 The accompanying negative
aspect of this policy has been that essential capabilities to transport and
support Army operations in Australia's defined "area of direct military
have not been procured, since the RAN and RAAF continue to envisage their missions differently from that of the Army.

**Defense Planning Shortcomings**

As a guide for force development, the self-reliance school has fallen considerably short of achieving its objective of improving, as opposed to achieving, self-reliance for two reasons. First, Australian governments have been either unwilling or unable to create within the central defense bureaucracy the requisite power to establish priorities in the field of capital equipment acquisition. This issue in itself manifests two separate problems. Firstly, the armed services, as in most countries, continue to exercise a considerable degree of influence and control over their capital equipment programs and therefore their operational missions, even though they no longer exercise direct operational control of their forces. Secondly, despite efforts at rectifying this problem, progress to improve the "joint" aspect of the ADF has been varied. For instance, as late as November 1987 a Parliamentary review of the ADF found that the joint planning process and the development of joint doctrines and procedures were unsatisfactory. Even the operational command and control functions of Headquarters ADF were reportedly inadequate to conduct centralized planning and provide advice on strategy options and force development.  

Second, too great a focus has been directed at developing capabilities to defend the Australian mainland at the expense of acquiring combat service support and supply stocks. Naturally, as in many countries, logistic support is often ignored because it is expensive and is not seen by the general public as a direct manifestation of national interest.  

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defense. Simply put, it isn't sexy. The ADF has traditionally been weak in the area of logistics and supply support; this did not matter prior to the declared self-reliance policy since it was assumed, and rightly so, that these support functions would be provided by Australia's allies. For example, following the withdrawal of the Australian Army from Vietnam, the support structures of the Army were reduced to pre-conflict levels.\(^3\)

A contemporary example of procuring combat, at the expense of improving support, capabilities is seen in press reports in 1989 that Cabinet would be requested to approve the procurement of two additional Kockums Type-471 submarines to bring to a total of eight the submarines the Australian government is manufacturing at Port Adelaide, South Australia.\(^3\) At approximately the same time, it was reported in the press that an internal defense study plan presaged rejection of a proposal to procure a helicopter support vessel, which would support Army amphibious and logistics over the shore operations, unless it could be demonstrated that such a vessel could be directly employed in the defense of Australia proper.\(^4\) It should be noted that the need for the Army to procure an over the shore capability was identified at least as long ago as 1980.\(^4\) Subsequently, the Australian Army was almost involved in three operations in the South Pacific, twice in Fiji in 1987\(^4\) and once in Papua New Guinea in 1990,\(^4\) both to evacuate civilian nationals. These contingencies demonstrated the requirement for a dedicated helicopter support ship to support such operations. That the Department of Defence would countenance procuring additional strike assets at the expense of obtaining a transportation platform to support military operations in Australia's
immediate region suggests a severe misjudgment of priorities, if not misunderstanding of stated government politico-military objectives.

Furthermore, the development of support functions and capabilities have often fallen victim to short-sighted financial imperatives. Support capabilities and defense infrastructure are expensive and require a long-term commitment if they are to be expanded and upgraded. Unfortunately, too often they have been sacrificed due to expense and perhaps domestic political pressures. For instance, despite the clear and explicit announcement by the Hawke government in its 1987 defense White Paper that it intended to create a two ocean navy, it has failed to support this concept financially by granting ship repair contracts to Australian Ship Repair Industries in Fremantle, which was largely established to support the RAN in the Indian Ocean. Specifically, although the government eventually envisages basing progressively more of the RAN submarine fleet at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, it declined to grant a refit contract to Australian Ship Repair Industries in mid-1990. Instead, the work is to be done in Sydney, despite the obvious requirement to have in place a ship repair facility on the West Coast, if a two ocean navy is to become a reality.

It should not be construed, however, that Australia does not require the capability to conduct surveillance of its extensive Exclusive Economic Zone, territorial waters, coasts, and landmass. Such operations are absolutely essential in order to manifest state sovereignty. And, in the case of Australia, these tasks are formidable indeed in view of the large sea and land areas in question. Nonetheless, one needs to recall that these
missions are in actuality civil as opposed to military missions. Obviously, Australia's limited financial resources in relation to the tasks at hand necessitate the employment of military assets in these missions. Yet, as observed by W. J. Meeke, the use of the ADF in these missions represents significant overkill in terms of using highly sophisticated and expensive platforms and trained personnel for missions better suited to civil operators. It is questionable, therefore, whether it is appropriate to base the development of key defense capabilities on meeting these civil missions. It is little wonder that the "Jindalee" over-the-horizon-radar system has been embraced by the government and Department of Defence as providing a cost effective means of providing surveillance over extended land, sea and air areas. Current plans envisage the creation of three stations in central and northern Australia which will provide radar coverage of particularly the air, and to a lesser degree, the sea approaches to Australia. Employed in conjunction with an AWACS system (which has yet to be procured), Jindalee is expected to provide Australia for the first time in its history with an extended area air defense system. Early indications are, however, that the Jindalee system may have been oversold by its proponents and it is alleged that it is incapable of providing essential target information, let alone identification of radar contacts.

Changing Character of Regional Security

In sum, the impact of the Hawke government defense program has been to shift resources, primarily within the Army, for operations in the north and northwest of Australia, while maintaining a sophisticated capability to deploy modern warships and aircraft outside the region if so required (the
deployment of two RAN FFG-7 frigates to the Persian Gulf in September 1990 being a case in point). This thrust in defense policy, however, has had its negative effect; the continued underdevelopment of joint operational capabilities, support, sustainment, and transport formations. The implications of this mixed record of achievement in defense at the time of the ending of cold war are not insignificant. To wit, at a time when Canberra was focusing attention and resources on the defense of the north, a significant regional arms race has taken place in South and Southeast Asia. A number of countries have striven to acquire modern weapon systems and platforms. The case of India is the best— but not the only— example of this rush to arms. New Delhi's high-profile defense modernization program has resulted in it being accused by some of initiating this arms race.49

During approximately the same period, the South Pacific has proven not to be the tranquil region it was once thought to be. Since the mid-1980s, there have been a number of outbreaks of domestic political turmoil and ethnic strife. The instances of internal conflict in Fiji and more recently in Papua New Guinea demonstrate where the ADF has come very close to deployment for the purpose of rescuing stranded nationals.50

In the particular case of Fiji a subsequent review of the ADF plan to rescue Australian nationals in 1987, "Operation Morris Dance," demonstrated severe shortcomings in the ADF's structure. For instance, despite a large concentration of RAN vessels around Fiji, to include the navy's principal helicopter carrying ships, Matthew Gubb argues that there were insufficient helicopters to lift the one infantry company the vessels carried and the hundreds of possible evacuees. The RAN's amphibious vessel, HMAS Tobruk,
was also found to be deficient for operations of this type in the South Pacific. Even the Army's Operational Deployment Force was shown to have placed too much stress in its training on the defense of mainland Australia, as opposed to more varied contingency operations. For instance, the infantry company deployed for Operation Morris Dance had never trained to secure an airfield, nor had it ever exercised with the RAN. While improvements have been made in the Australian Army following the experience of Fiji, Michael O' Connor, in reflecting on the possibility that the Army may need to evacuate Australian nationals from the troubled province of Bougainville (according to press reports, an Army battalion was within hours of being sent in January 1990), identified a number of severe shortcomings. For example, the Army is equipped to fight on the Australian mainland and in long-range combat in open country. Consequently, combat uniforms are designed for concealment in the Australian scrub, as opposed to being jungle greens, and new more appropriate fatigues have only slowly made their way to units. Moreover, and probably most damning, O'Connor asserts that given the lingering negative historical memories of participating in the Vietnam conflict, the Army no longer trains enough of its forces for jungle warfare. One supposes these lacunae in the Army's force structure could be accepted if the Army were sufficiently capable of doing that for which it is primarily designed: the defense of Australia. Regrettably, this is not the case. No less an authority than the former Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Laurie O'Donnell, has acknowledged that the Army could not mount a sustained defense in northern Australia against a low-level attack. The General's suggestion that the
Army should be increased by 10,000 to enable it to accomplish its stated tasks was later met with rumors in the press in April 1990 that the sizeable RAN and RAAF capital equipment programs might necessitate a 3,000 man cut in the 32,000-strong Regular Army.\(^5\)

Australia's recent defense policies and problems have not gone unnoticed in that country, despite a traditionally high degree of public apathy for defense. The country's political far left has long opposed Australia's traditional adherence to a policy of collective defense with the United States and the procurement of sophisticated weapon systems.\(^6\) Indeed, a recent publication has garnered considerable attention in the press by its argument that the Beazley defense modernization program has resulted in a period of new Australian "militarism."\(^7\) While proposals to "de-militarize" Australia on the political left range in sophistication, there is an underlying consensus that the country's security could be better achieved through the abandonment of strike capabilities (F-111 aircraft and submarines), in favor of the development of defense forces that would exploit the country's peculiar environmental conditions and allow Canberra to adopt a truly independent defense capability exclusive of its security relationship with Washington.\(^8\) An assessment of Australia's security situation in the post-cold war era, however, leads one to conclude that the opposite position to the left's thesis is required.

The diminution in the potential Soviet naval and aerial threat to the Southwest Pacific region and the current phase of superpower détente coincide with the development of potential regional security challenges and possible future threats to Australian interests, if not to its national
territory. While perhaps a contentious view, the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry, both of Eastern and Western origins, has produced a situation whereby Western developed nations will be unable to rely as much as in the past on maintaining a military technological advantage over developing countries with whom they might come in conflict. The example of the proliferation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and their acquisition by, for instance, India, demonstrates how developing countries are acquiring capabilities previously only possessed by developed countries. While rational defense planning must be based upon the principle of assessing both national intentions and military capabilities, it would be remiss for Australian governments to predicate their defense planning on the assumption that Australia will continue to live in a benign security environment in the years to come. In this respect, to focus finite defense resources and attention to the actual physical defense of the north and northwest appears to be of lesser importance in view of the changes taking place in Australia's region. After all, it is recognized that defense forces serve both to protect national sovereignty, as well as vital national interests, exclusive of territorial integrity. As the episodes of Bougainville and Fiji have clearly demonstrated, the ADF and particularly the Australian Army have key defense roles to play in the defense of national interests far removed from Australia's north.

Post-Cold War Defense Planning Challenges

What is lacking in Australian defense planning as the Soviet naval and aerial presence and potential threat to the Western Alliance diminishes, is a rethinking of the basis for Australian strategy and the establishment
of priorities. The premise established in the 1987 defense White Paper, that Australian defense policy should be based on the principle of self-reliance and improving the ADP's ability to defend Australia, could leave the ADP ill-equipped and poorly prepared to deal with future threats to that country. In other words, the strategy of "defense in depth," as embodied in the 1987 defense White Paper, cannot yet be met by the ADP.61

Shortcomings could be most pronounced in the Australian Army, where considerable effort has gone into developing doctrines and concepts best suited for low-level threats to Australia proper. The current writer remains skeptical that the Army will be able to retain the capability to operate outside of Australia, alone or in coalition, if it continues to focus too intently upon the north. For instance, the Army's main battle tanks were found to be very effective in Kangaroo 89 when dispersed to support infantry formations as opposed to operating together in a traditional armor-mechanized formation. If the Royal Australian Armoured Corps chooses, or is forced, to concentrate on this type of training, their employment in more traditional conflicts would be hampered. As stated previously, there is less likelihood that this particular type of problem could develop in the case of the RAN and RAAF. Nonetheless, the creation of the RAAF's Air Power Studies Centre in September 1989, with the objective to create air doctrine specifically for Australia's particular security requirements, could eventually set the RAAF apart from Allied air forces.62

If defense policy is indeed a subsidiary function to foreign policy, then the political basis for this refinement in Australian strategy has already been provided by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans' December 1989
statement, Australia's Regional Security. In this White Paper, the government presages a rather pessimistic view of future regional security challenges to Australia. There is no 10 year, no-threat rule to guide defense planning to be gleaned from this government White Paper. The Labour government tacitly acknowledges that military intervention may be conceivable in "unusual and extreme circumstances."63 In view of the past political sensitivity in Australia over intervention in the Southwest Pacific,64 this statement is indeed remarkable, especially coming from a Labor party government.

The key unresolved defense resources issue focuses upon where finances will be found to enable the ADF to acquire the necessary capabilities to allow it to respond unilaterally to regional events. In view of the Federal government's economic effort to cut public expenditures wherever possible, and the already low current defense expenditures level of 2.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product, it is clear that additional monies are unlikely to be forthcoming for defense. The Labor government has already locked itself into its current equipment modernization program (primarily, helicopters, patrol frigates and submarines), which can only be abrogated at unacceptably high political and financial costs.65 The spread of high-technology weapons in South and Southeast Asia, and the necessity to modernize, especially the RAN, necessitates the procurement of these systems. If one accepts the conclusions from the June 1990 review of the ADF and the Australian community written by Alan Wrigley, restructuring the ADF to farm out certain logistic and supply functions, as well as creating a "Total Force" by upgrading the reserve forces, could possibly
result in significant savings. Moreover, at the time of the publication of the Wrigley report, it was announced that the Department of Defence's logistics and supply structure was to undergo the most comprehensive shake-up since the end of the Second World War. This restructuring is expected to result in the release of some 1500 employees, save $A450 million over 10 years and, in effect, improve the ADF's supply and support structure. Whether the ADF is allowed to utilize the savings it achieves through reorganization and restructuring for new and needed capabilities is yet to be seen. However, if effective restructuring is achieved, then ADF capabilities over the coming years could be significantly improved.

A final consideration, and one directly related to the ending of bloc tensions in the world, relates to Australia's longstanding fidelity to the Western Alliance. Through the ANZUS security alliance, Australia has been a staunch, if distant, formal member. Always ready to support Western democratic values and interests throughout the period of the cold war, Australian defense planners have had to make allowances to maintain capabilities which were deployable for out-of-area contingencies, if politically dictated. Nonetheless, since the early 1970s, this capability has not been a prime element in the ADF's force structure calculus. To be sure, since almost all of the ADF's weapon systems and platforms are either procured in the West or built in Australia under license, and given the ADF's objective of maintaining state-of-the-art capabilities, force projection assets have been maintained in the ADF's inventory. However, due to financial constraints and Australia-specific force development concepts,
certain combat forces have been maintained, only at a low level of priority, e.g., the Australian Army's armored forces and antiarmor capabilities.

If one accepts the proposition that the post-cold war could very well be unstable and the current Iraqi crisis is merely a harbinger of future conflicts in the Third World, Australian defense planning may have to accept a new consideration in its force development policy. Assaults on world order and challenges to Western interests will surely elicit Australian participation. While some of the strike elements of the RAN and RAAF have already been publicly identified by the Hawke government as constituting forces suitable for these types of missions, future Western requirements could necessitate other forces, such as ground units. It is instructive to note that in the case of the Iraqi crisis, the deployment of allied air and sea forces, politically and logistically the simplest forces to deploy, has generally not been matched with ground forces. When one considers the innumerable possible conflict points around the world over territorial issues and the reality that the sanctity of borders can only be secured with ground forces, it is clear why the creation of airmobile ground forces, supported by heavy armored elements, is a growing force development trend in Western military doctrine.

It is also interesting to note that one of the prime lessons learned from Kangaroo 89 was that the Australian Army suffers from poor tactical mobility. If the Australian Army were to follow Western trends, and this capability would be directly relevant to the defense of the Australian north and regional contingencies, it would necessitate the purchase of sufficient fixed-wing air-lift and battlefield helicopters to enable the
Army to become airmobile, as opposed to being currently airportable. The August 1990 decision to place back into service half of the RAAF's CH-47 Chinook helicopter fleet is a step in the right direction, albeit many more such reforms are needed. The point here is that capabilities considered nonessential in the past could well become important shortly, and thereby add an additional strain on financial resources.

In the final analysis, if the ADF is to be in a position to support stated Australian foreign policy objectives, there is a need for a shift in emphasis in its force development policy and the allocation of scarce resources. The current force structure review announced in May 1990 and the reassessment by the Australian defense bureaucracy of Australia's strategic planning requirements could provide the needed policy and budgetary framework to align better Australia's diplomatic aspirations and defense capabilities. That the force structure review is being coordinated by the office of the Chief of the Defence Force, as opposed to the individual Services, presages a more balanced and joint ADF in the future. Clearly, the problem to date for Australian defense planning has been ambitious (and ill-coordinated) objectives, and limited, if not shrinking, resources with which to work. Probably the most important move to take is simply to recognize what many in the Australian defense community already admit (albeit in private); i.e., Australia does not have the domestic political will to provide sufficient resources to provide for its own defense.

Starting with this proposition, one can then question the need to focus unnecessary attention to northern security. Simply stated, it does not make sound strategy to sacrifice limited resources for capabilities and missions
that are not flexible for other national stated requirements. This is not a popular argument to make because no government is willing to admit that it is unable to provide for the country's physical defense. While obviously not an easy task for a government that has made "self-reliance" a centerpiece of its defense policy, the uncertainties of Australia's future regional security and the recognized deficiencies of the ADF now dictate it.
Endnotes


6. Ibid., p. ix.


12. This point is well developed in Robert O'Neill, "The Development of Operational Doctrines for the Australian Defence Force," in *The


15. See, Kim Beazley, Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, June 12, 1986, who describes the argumentation of the Strategic Basis Paper, which unfortunately, remains classified.


17. See, Australia, Department of Defence, Resources and Financial Programs Division, The Defence Budget Brief, 1990-91, Canberra, August 1990.


29. See, The Sydney Morning Herald, August 2, 1990. Kangaroo 89 was the largest field joint exercise the ADF has held since the Second World War. Begun in the mid-1970s, the biennial Kangaroo field exercise
series has been the primary exercise to test operational concepts and doctrines to be used in the defense of Australia. For background on the first exercises see, *The Australian* (Canberra), October 14, 1976, and reports of major communications problems during the 1977 Kangaroo exercise in *Pacific Defence Reporter* Volume 13 (4) (August 1986), p. 23.


31. This threat scenario is strongly reflected in Dibb, pp. 52-56.


35. This region is defined as constituting, "Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South Pacific." See, *Defence of Australia 1987*, p. 2.


49. For recent Australian perceptions on India's defense program and the region's reaction see, The Canberra Times, March 5 and March 28, 1990; and, The Australian (Canberra), March 27, 1990.


51. See Gubb, op. cit.


58. See ibid., passim.

59. Iraq being an excellent example of this phenomenon. See, Stephen C. Pelletiere et al., Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East,


65. "...the advent of these very large [defence] projects means that up to 90 percent of capital funds will now be tied up for a number of years." Tom Muir, "Winners and Losers in Project Squeeze," Australian Business, November 29, 1989.


69. See, The Age (Melbourne), May 9, 1990.

70. See, The Australian (Canberra), August 8, 1990.