THREATS TO PANAMA'S DEMOCRACY AND U.S. INTERESTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

BY

Colonel Dana Dillon, AR
Senior Service College Fellow
The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
Tufts University

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THREATS TO PANAMA'S DEMOCRACY AND US INTERESTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

by
Colonel Dana Dillon, USA

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Professor Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

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A. Introduction and Purpose

The purpose of this study is to develop a framework for analysis of the threats confronting the newly established Panamanian government, as well as US personnel and facilities in Panama. Although political change may occur through democratic and non-democratic means, this study seeks to develop a model for assessing the likelihood that non-democratic means of change will threaten Panama. To that end, economic, political, and social determinants must first be analyzed to isolate the conditions under which these threats are likely to emerge. The framework can then be applied to formulate strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence requirements to guide collection efforts and intelligence analysis.

Although the United States seeks to ensure that political change in Panama occurs through democratic processes such as elections, legislative actions, and judicial review, the Panamanian government may also be faced with groups that seek non-democratic change. Non-democratic change can be achieved through violent means, such as coups, revolutions, or terrorism, or through non-violent means, such as bribery, strikes or exclusionary politics. Non-violent actions can provide a direct stimulus for change, or they can lead to violent actions which cause a change. A vicious cycle between the two often results, in which a peaceful strike leads to a violent demonstration, which itself provokes further non-violent acts as popular support increases.
Both democratic and non-democratic changes can affect the structure, the personalities or the policies of a government. A revolution is an example of a structural change which alters the nature of the regime. Personality changes can result from coups or assassinations, which replace the people in government, but do not transform the regime. Policy changes occur when a government's action policy shifts, sometimes in concert with its declaratory position. These changes may occur independently of each other or simultaneously.

Therefore, to assess the threat posed to the Panamanian government and US interests in Panama, the analyst must determine which type of change is most likely, how it will be achieved, and the political objective of the change.

B. DETERMINANTS OF INSTABILITY: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL

The first step in intelligence collection and analysis is to assess the prospects for political change and instability determined by the economic, political, and social conditions of the country. Perceived inequities in any of these areas can lead to an environment that fosters and facilitates non-democratic change.

This section offers a framework for the collection and analysis of information necessary to analyze the economic, political, and social determinants of instability. It is not complete; experience will indicate which requirements should be added or eliminated, and collection requirements may differ for various levels of analysis. It is also not static; the environment changes constantly, and these changes must be continuously monitored to determine their effect on
the current situation and the possible events resulting from these changes.

1. ECONOMIC

Economic conditions may reflect the potential for threats ranging from revolutionary insurgency or a coup d'etat to narcotrafficking. Revolution is often most likely when a wide discrepancy develops between societal expectations and achievements, as when long periods of economic prosperity—for society as a whole or for only certain groups—are followed by a sharp period of decline. Or, conversely, the same result may occur when society's expectations about economic improvement after long periods of decline are left unfulfilled. Opposition groups can easily exploit such discontent and perceived deprivation.

Some of the economic indicators of political instability include:

---Are society's economic expectations satisfied?
---Did a sharp decline follow a period of relative prosperity?
---What is the level of unemployment and which groups are most affected?
---Are there opportunities for advancement open to all groups?
---What is the inflation rate?
---Does a small elite own most of the property?
---Can the government fulfill the basic economic needs of society?
---Are there viable alternatives available to those who grow illicit crops?
---Is the economy dependent on the drug industry?
What is the level and pace of modernization and development? Are some groups left behind?

2. POLITICAL

Political conditions also shape the potential for non-democratic change. For example, political violence can erupt when the existing political structure does not accommodate the interests of newly developed political groups. In these cases the process of social and economic change often outpaces political modernization and development. The political legitimacy of the target government is often attacked, and revolutionary insurgency may be regarded as a form of political competition. Exclusionary politics, government rule by oligarchy that leads to disenfranchisement of particular classes, minorities, or any other group, is itself a threat to democracy and can also fuel political frustration. Finally, terrorism may also become more likely under political conditions that allow terrorist groups to undermine citizens' faith in government and morale, thereby hastening the political collapse of society. A terrorist may also seek to provoke the government into overreacting, thus creating an authoritarian police state.

Key political indicators of political instability include:

--Legitimacy

Do certain groups challenge the legitimacy of the ruling power?

Are specific individuals and policies, or the regime itself, criticized?

--Openness of the political process

Can the system adapt to accommodate the interests of emerging political groups?

Is the system open to the participation of every interest group, or is the process manipulated by a
powerful few?

Do structural obstacles, such as voting laws, exclude certain groups?

Are fair elections conducted on a regular basis, according to law?

Are the major branches of government fairly represented by a cross section of the population, or does one group seem to dominate?

--Government Competence and Integrity

Are elected officials noted for nepotism and political favoritism?

Are conflicts of interest prevalent?

Is bribery commonplace? If so, is it practiced for personal gain or political influence?

Does the government tolerate illegal activities, such as narcotrafficking?

Can the government's intelligence service and police forces penetrate terrorist and subversive organizations, foil attacks, and mount successful counterterrorist operations without the perception of overreacting, thus alienating the public?

--Political Culture

Are coups and revolutions prevalent in the society's history and political culture?

3. SOCIAL

Prevailing social conditions comprise the final category of variables that affect political instability. Conditions such as class structure, cultural norms, and popular discontent influence the degree and nature of political violence. The role of public perception is particularly important. Even in the absence of any real societal grievances, the public perception of such difficulties often independently provokes hostility against the government, which may be exploited by the opposition.
Social conditions which may incite political instability include:

-- Are there real or perceived political or economic "causes" which terrorist and other subversive movements may exploit?

-- What is the class structure of the society? Does one class resent another for any reason?

-- Do the local cultural and religious norms legitimize violence as a means of political change?

-- Which social institutions--such as family, the church, etc.--shape society's political attitudes?

-- Is politics driven more by personal appeal or ideological preference?

-- What is the level of government repression?

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS

When applied to a specific case, the economic, political, and social determinants of political instability described above should not be analyzed independently of each other and must be evaluated in terms of the local political culture. Depending on local conditions, some indicators will become more important than others, and some may not apply at all. For example, some degree of corruption probably plagues every government. In some cases, it might even be an accepted norm. To assess whether such a practice poses a threat to the political stability of a country, the analyst must determine how this behavior is perceived by the public and whether it interferes with the functioning of government.

5. PRELIMINARY JUDGMENTS: THE DETERMINANTS APPLIED TO PANAMA

At this point we believe that low-level terrorism poses the most probable threat to the new government in Panama. Little organization or training is necessary to attack unprotected targets
of opportunity. Terrorists may wish to exploit public discontent with the slow pace of rebuilding the economy and create the impression of the government's inability to respond. Both American and Panamanian unprotected targets probably will remain at risk.

The risk of other threats to the government of Panama—including more serious forms of political violence—probably will remain low in the near term. The disorganization and defeat of pro-Noriega forces in the wake of Operation Just Cause is likely to continue to paralyze the opposition. If the economic situation does not improve, the opposition is likely to exploit growing public frustration and blame the new government, as these forces attempt to reorganize and rebuild themselves.

Any threat to Panama's political stability must be analyzed in terms of the country's history and political culture. The history of coups and exclusionary politics in Panama suggests that non-democratic means of change are readily available should the democratic government fail. The appeal of nationalism for building a political consensus is also historically prevalent and may be exploited by groups which pose a threat to the government.

Once these economic, political, and social determinants are believed to exist in Panama, the analyst may then apply the following model to assess the threat and help to predict and explain events.

C. THE MODEL

Once the above economic, political, and social determinants of instability indicate conditions that foster non-democratic actions
against the legitimate government, disaffected members of the population are likely to seek out or form organizations that support their personal objectives. These groups may use violent or non-violent means, or both, to achieve their organizational goals. The purpose of this model is to assess, predict, and explain these threats to democratic government.

Threats to democratic government are rational acts that can be predicted through the use of proper intelligence techniques. Discontented with the current political situation, organizations may seek to change the structure, personalities, or policies of a government through non-democratic means. The actions taken by the organization will usually be consistent with the group’s ultimate political objectives.

The following cyclical model is based in part on this rationale.** Non-democratic actions, either violent or non-violent, can be divided into four distinct phases: Organizational, Pre-Incident, Incident, and Post-Incident.

**This model was adapted in part from the terrorist incident model in the unpublished manuscript, "Winning the Violent Peace: Special Operations Short of War," by Colonel Peter J. Shoomaker, USA, Research Associate, National Defense University, June 1989.
Within each of the phases, specific actions are taken; however, the actions may or may not occur sequentially within each phase, and every action may not apply to every threat scenario.

1. THE ORGANIZATIONAL PHASE

The organizational phase refers to the formation of a group of persons who share common political objectives. The group or organization is the vehicle used to achieve common goals. It will remain active as long as it can recruit members who share the same political beliefs or until all of its objectives have been achieved. When the organization chooses to pursue its goals through non-democratic means, the group becomes a threat to freely elected governments.

The organizational stage also applies to the formation of select cells within the organization to carry out specific acts—either violent or non-violent—against the government. The actions of this cell almost always support the group's objectives, and the recruitment of persons for the cell will generally come from within the parent organization. A select cell can be organized to accomplish a specific task—staging a one-time work stoppage—or to perform a permanent function—preparing all propaganda for the organization.

The analysis of information in the organizational phase is essentially the determination of the order of battle. The techniques for collecting this information, however, differ markedly from those used to assess the capabilities of a conventional enemy. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is by far the most useful method. Since clandestine subversive organizations do not extensively use
electronic communications, and do not move obtrusively large types of equipment, signals and photographic intelligence are of limited value.

The threat of the organization is determined not only by the size of its membership, but also by the social, religious, professional, and kinship relationships of the organization's active membership. The active members' circle of friends, family, and work associates will determine the potential size and capability of the organization. For example, a three man organization may pose little military threat. However, the three members may represent the view of hundreds of people who, though unwilling to provide the group active support, will not report it to governmental authorities. The group then would have the freedom to recruit and persuade others to join its cause. Left unattended because the initial analysis indicate no military threat, the organization can grow in size and capability to challenge legitimate government's authority.

As a new group matures, and its size grows, the organizational focus may shift from mobilizing internal support to consolidating its membership. While in the embryonic stages, the group may be very small and loosely organized without a strong leadership. As the size of the group increases, however, the organization may become more structured as the leadership attempts to increase its control over the membership. The group may also choose to unite with other organizations that share similar goals to form a coalition. Such an umbrella organization is often able to exert more pressure on the government, but is also more vulnerable to factionalism.

2. PRE-INCIDENT PHASE
Once an organization has been formed and a political objective has been chosen, the group then determines the means it will use to pursue its goals. Whether the means chosen are violent or non-violent, the organization is likely to follow a general sequence of preparation:

1. Select potential targets/events.
2. Develop the logistical network and infrastructure to support operations.
3. Plan, train, and rehearse the event.
4. Pre-position operatives and equipment.
5. Move to the target/event location.

a. Selecting a Target or Event

An organization will choose a target or event based on the group's capabilities. Newly formed groups, for example, with little training, experience and materiel, are likely to attack unprotected targets using relatively unsophisticated methods—such as throwing hand grenades. Established organizations may select higher profile, protected targets that require sophisticated casing and assessing, and more complex techniques, such as the use of remotely detonated devices.

The group will also select targets which support the organization's strategic and tactical objectives. The tactical goal of many groups, especially those in the early stages of development, is to attract public attention to its cause and to gain popular support. The strategic objective of the organization will vary
according to the political objectives. The targets, however, will be consistent with these objectives.

Finally, the target will also be chosen in an attempt to influence a particular audience that is often different than and broader than the immediate object of the action.

b. Developing the Logistical Infrastructure to Support Operations

The activities of the organization's logistical support network, which depend on the sophistication of the planned operation, make the group vulnerable to detection during this phase. The procurement of arms, explosives, vehicles, and safehouses, for example, requires contacts with non-group members, thus increasing the number of persons who have some knowledge of the operation, which heightens the risk of detection.

c. Planning, Training, and Rehearsing

During this stage of planning, training, and rehearsing, organizations are generally most vulnerable to compromise. While the level of this preparation depends on the complexity of the operation, in this phase most participants will be informed of the plan and the roles they are to play. Thus, at this point, the greatest number of persons, from both within and outside the group, will have at least some knowledge of the operation.

d. Pre-Positioning of Personnel and Equipment

As in the previous stages, the level of activity during this phase depends on the complexity of the planned event. For violent,
low-level actions against unprotected targets, such as throwing a hand grenade into a crowded restaurant, or non-violent actions, such as strikes and demonstrations, this phase is likely to be brief, and possibly spontaneous. In more sophisticated operations, however, such as attacking a well protected embassy, leaders may be required to move participants and equipment from various training sites and safehouses, which again increases the risk of detection.

e. Movement to Target

During this phase, participants are often required to commit illegal acts which endanger the group members and puts the operation at risk. Participants are forced to leave their safehouses and safehouses to move to the area of operations. At this point they also must frequently break the law by possessing illegal firearms, false documents, or stolen vehicles, for example. Participants in non-violent acts, though still required to enter the area of operations and thus expose themselves to surveillance and questioning, generally do not, at this point, commit illegal acts.

3. INCIDENT PHASE

In the incident phase, the group actually executes its plan, the success of which is the ultimate measure of the group's capabilities. To accomplish its objective, the group must gain access to the target, takeover the target, and then terminate the action on grounds favorable to the organization. Obviously, during this critical phase, several imponderables may intervene to jeopardize the operation. Security forces should be alert and prepared to exploit these opportunities.
4. POST-INCIDENT PHASE

During this phase the group must focus on escaping the area of operations and returning to its safehaven, which again makes the group vulnerable to detection. After a low-level attack on an unprotected target, an escape is usually relatively easy to accomplish. Return to the safehavens after non-violent acts is also relatively uncomplicated, especially when illegal acts were not committed. In the case of a sophisticated operation against a protected target, a return to the safehaven becomes more difficult and may depend on outside assistance from a state sponsor or negotiations with the target government.

D. COLLECTION PLAN AND GUIDE TO ANALYSIS

The following collection plan and analysis guide seek to both predict and explain threats to the stability of the Panamanian government and US interests in Panama. Phases one and two, the organizational and pre-incident stages, are predictive, as the analyst develops a list of possible threats, and then a more detailed assessment of the most probable of these. This portion of the guide is also explanatory, for the analyst can use the model to assess incidents that have already occurred.

Phases three and four, the incident and post-incident stages, illustrate the cyclical nature of the model—what is essentially an explanation of a past incident may serve as input for predicting events in the future. These final two phases assist the analyst in assessing an event after it has occurred. This analysis, however, then itself becomes valuable information that can be rechanneled into
the organizational and incident phases to help predict future threats.

1. Organizational Phase

PIR: What groups or organizations pose a threat to the Panamanian government or US interests in Panama?

a. What organizations are known to exist?

b. What are the objectives of these organizations?
   strategic vs. tactical objectives
   stated vs. real objectives

c. What are the capabilities of these organizations?
   funding
   equipment
   training
   outside support from states or organizations
   popular support

d. Who are the members of the organizations that pose a threat?
   known leaders and members
   kinship, religious, PDF, social ties
   ties to foreign governments

e. What links exist among groups and group members?
   common objectives
   covert/overt ties

Organizational Phase Analysis

The first step in determining which organizations pose a threat to the Panamanian government or to U.S. interests in Panama is to identify all possible clandestine and overt political organizations. The analyst must list every possibility, and then eliminate those that do not pose a threat, which is determined by assessing the capabilities and intentions of the organizations. Since stated objectives may differ from actual objectives, the analyst must compare organizational actions with organizational objectives to discover the true goals of the group.
Capabilities of an organization include access to resources, such as funds and materiel, as well as less tangible resources, such as popular support and experienced planners. If the goals of an organization do not support non-democratic change and it has extremely limited capabilities, then it probably poses little threat. Conversely, organizations with objectives explicitly advocating violent or other non-democratic acts against the government of Panama or U.S. interests pose a real threat, and significant capabilities only enhance that threat. The stated objectives of an organization should not be disregarded because the group apparently lacks the capability to conduct operations in pursuit of its goals.

After assessing the objectives and the capabilities of these organizations, the result should be a prioritized list of possible threats. Next, the analyst must attempt to identify the known members of each organization, especially the organizational leaders. The search for group members should include kinship, religious, and social ties. The extended family is common in Panamanian culture, and often includes distant relatives and godchildren. Ties to the PDF are also important, and the tendency for PDF officers to associate with graduates of the same military academy, for example, could lead to further connections. Identification of known members can help in focusing surveillance and discovering safehouse locations, training and staging areas, and possibly even targets.

The last step is to identify links among groups. Dual membership in threatening and non-threatening organizations can indicate hidden ties. Groups may pursue a united front strategy to attract members from different groups with various political agendas.
to gain widespread support and the aura of legitimacy. Evaluation of these linkages might also lead to the discovery of additional capabilities that increase the threat posed by an organization.

This portion of the analysis narrows the number of organizations to those that have non-democratic objectives and some capability to support actions to pursue their goals, and in this sense, is predictive. The model can be explanatory as well, as the analyst examines a previously committed act and tries to explain it in terms of organizational objectives and capabilities. Each event provides input that requires objectives and capabilities to be reevaluated and perhaps the threat list to be reordered.

2. PRE-INCIDENT PHASE

Target Selection

PIR: What are the most likely audiences, targets, and tactics?

a. What audiences can be influenced to achieve the group's objectives?

b. What are the tactical, short-term goals of the group?
   - media attention for the "cause"
   - mobilization of popular support

c. What kinds of acts are likely to achieve the objectives and influence the audience?
   - violent vs. non-violent
   - capabilities of the group

d. What targets can influence the audience?

e. How secure is the target?
   - protected vs. unprotected

Target Selection Analysis

The determination of the target audience is a critical step in predicting and analyzing target selection. Often the immediate target of an event is different than the target audience the group
seeks to influence. For example, US military personnel stationed abroad may become the targets of political violence in an attempt to force the United States to withdraw from that country. In this case, the immediate victims are the US personnel attacked, but the target audience the group seeks to influence is US public opinion and US government policy.

This analysis also applies to the conditions in Panama. If the objective of an organization is to force the withdrawal of US troops, then the analyst must identify the audience capable of influencing events to achieve this goal. Knowing the pressure that public opinion exerts on American politics, groups may select targets in Panama that will influence public or political opinion in the United States. Thus, the analyst must examine the goals of the organization, decide which audience can best achieve these goals, and then identify targets that can influence this audience.

In addition to their strategic objectives, groups may pursue short-term, tactical goals that may directly or indirectly support their broader political aims. Propaganda and demonstrations may be used to gain popular support for a cause, rather than to effect a direct change in policy. Terrorist acts may also be committed to publicize the group's cause, to instill disorder in society, or to provoke a government into taking repressive countermeasures. Some groups may even wish to claim attacks it did not commit in order to create the perception of enhanced capabilities and to attract popular support. Such changes in the societal environment may create a situation more conducive to achieving the group's goals. Finally, some organizations, especially those in the embryonic stages, may
commit acts merely to demonstrate that they possess the capability, in order to attract support from other organizations or state sponsors.

An analysis of the group's objectives and capabilities will also enable the analyst to better predict and assess the types of acts that may be committed. The effect of the act on the target audience must be considered in conjunction with the goals of the group. Violent acts may alienate the general population which the group is seeking to influence, or strengthen the resolve of the audience not to succumb to the group's demands. Conversely, non-violent acts may be viewed as ineffective and weak, or as an indication that the group is incapable of committing violence. Embryonic groups with little capability are most likely to seek the publicity of a high-profile, violent attack against an unprotected target using relatively unsophisticated tactics. Depending on their political objectives and the audience they seek to influence, groups with more sophisticated capabilities are more likely to attack protected targets.

Logistical Support

PIR: What indications suggest that an act or event is being planned?

a. What actions indicate increased procurement of money, arms, explosives and other supplies?
   - bank transfer activity
   - discovery of arms caches
   - property/equipment rentals
   - any evidence of illegal activity to obtain this material
   - transport capability

b. Has there been increased activity at safehouses or other areas where the group is known to be present?
   - increased number of persons entering and exiting
communications via telephone or other means
travel to safehavens provided by state sponsors

c. Have there been incidents of lost, stolen, or
counterfeit documents?
  passports
  visas
  identification cards

Logistical Support Analysis

Information on activities conducted to provide logistical
support can offer clues to the group's intended tactics and serve as
an early warning device as well. Increased procurement of arms,
explosives or other supplies could indicate that a group is gathering
the tools necessary to take action. The equipment being procured
should indicate the type of act or event that is being planned.
Printing presses or mimeograph machines, for example, would be useful
in a propaganda campaign. Criminal activity is an especially
significant indicator when it involves contraband, money or strictly
controlled items.

Additional transport capability acquired by a group could
indicate several possibilities. Perhaps the group is larger than
originally estimated to be, or has recently added new members,
resulting in increased capability. It could also signal that an
operation is being planned, indicating a high level of sophistication
for violent acts that require coordination among many persons.

Incidents involving falsified or stolen documents may also
reveal information regarding the group's capabilities and intentions.
Acquisition of such documents may indicate ties to another country if
entry or unrestricted travel in Panama is of concern to the group.
They may also signal activities related to narcotrafficking, which
relies on Panama for transshipment and money laundering. Knowledge
of specific documents involved may also assist in tracking organizational personnel and predicting a probable staging area for the event.

Training

a. What suitable sites exist for training?
   sympathetic or at least tacitly approving inhabitants
   rural, remote, secure
   level of training offered commensurate with group's suspected capabilities

b. Have gunfire, explosions or other unusual activity been reported?

c. Have leaders within/among groups increased communications/meetings?

Training Analysis

Training locations depend on the type of skills that are taught and the level of popular support near the training site. Training of large groups and instruction in easily detected operations such as explosives are most likely to occur in rural or remote areas. Popular support is also an important factor to consider. Densely settled urban areas can provide secure training areas when the local population sympathizes with the group's objectives. Popular support in rural areas decreases the chance that the local inhabitants will report the group's activities, thus impeding detection and collection efforts.

As training progresses and the projected date of the event draws near, the increased pace of activity may lead to errors that expose the operation or its personnel. Operational rehearsals generally require dissemination of specific information to the lower
levels of the group, thus increasing the risk of compromising the operation.

Discovery of surveillance and training activities may indicate that an act is being rehearsed, and may also reveal the type of action that is being planned. New leaders may be identified, and estimates of the group's capabilities--including the size of the membership and the skills they possess--may be revised.

Staging

a. What staging areas are close to/within potential target operational areas?

b. Has unusual activity been observed in/around possible staging bases?

Movement to Target

a. Has the group been observed departing the staging area?

b. Has the group been observed entering the operational area?

Staging and Movement to Target Analysis

Once the indicators for target selection, logistical support, and training are detected, the analyst can then narrow the search for probable staging areas and movement to target. Locations close to the probable target's operational area can be surveilled for unusual activity.

After such activity becomes apparent, possibilities for active and passive countermeasures may be initiated--to include threat warnings, increased security in the target area, and proactive operations.
3. INCIDENT PHASE

a. How did the group gain access to the target? independently or inside connections sophisticated surveillance techniques

b. How was the act or event conducted? who, what when, where, why

c. What was the final resolution? escape route used punishment or interdiction popular support gained objectives achieved

Incident Phase Analysis

In addition to explaining the event after it has transpired, the analysis of this phase is an important source of new information for predicting future events.

The method used to gain access to the target depends on how well the target is protected. Penetrating well protected targets usually requires sophisticated techniques and careful planning. The analyst should determine whether inside help was needed, or if the group was able to operate independently. Recommendations to improve security in the future can then be formulated to deter future such attacks, or force groups to switch targets and tactics.

The target and tactics also reflect the group's objectives and audience. The analyst should evaluate the target of the event, the audience to be influenced, and the tactics used to determine how well they supported the group's objectives. Since the stated goals and actual goals of the group may differ, an evaluation of the target and tactics may assist the analyst in determining the organization's true intentions.
Finally, the analyst must examine the resolution of the event to further evaluate the group's capabilities and intentions. The weapons or explosives used, for example, obviously indicate the group's capabilities, but may also reveal ties to outside states or other organizations based on the origin and type of material used.

The analyst should also pay close attention to how the event was resolved. If arrests occurred during a demonstration, for example, it is important to note who was bailed out first and by whom. Such information may indicate the leaders of the group, as well as any ties to other organizations. Group characteristics may also be revealed during this phase. Extremist group members, for example, may be willing to martyr themselves or serve long prison terms in support of their cause.

Finally, the analyst must consider the impact of the event on the likelihood of future acts. Were the group's tactical or strategic objectives achieved? Were any group members arrested? Was the security of the organization compromised? Did the group gain popular support? Did the government security forces fail to detect and foil the plan? Such factors indicate the probability of future events and should be evaluated in this phase of analysis.

4. POST-INCIDENT PHASE ANALYSIS

The post-incident phase comprises the link between the predictive and analytical functions of the model. After an event has occurred, the analyst compares what actually occurred with what was predicted to happen. Resulting disparities must be resolved by reassessing previous assumptions, searching for further information, or adjusting the model. For example, if a certain act does not seem
to support a group's objectives, the analyst must decide whether the objectives have changed or were just evaluated incorrectly. The group may have a new leader, or have acquired new capabilities. If disparities have led the analyst to modify the model, then all previous judgments concerning the group's objectives and capabilities must be reformulated in terms of the adjusted framework. Once any discrepancies have been resolved, the information is then rechanneled through the model.

The cycle continues as all available information is reassimilated, beginning with the organizational phase. Any missing information should then drive new collection requirements to fill in the gaps. When all available information has been collected and analyzed, the model can then be used to explain what has happened and why, in terms of the group's objectives and capabilities, and serve as a basis for predicting future threats.

Finally, most acts or events will also affect the economic, political, and social determinants of instability previously discussed, thus modifying the environment in which intelligence is collected and analyzed. Therefore, these determinants must also be reevaluated in light of changing conditions and new information. This step completes the cycle and enables the analyst to formulate new collection requirements, analyze new information, and develop logical assessments of the threat posed to the Panamanian government and US interests in Panama.