

AD-A230 905

The Dynamic Structure of Navy Research and Development Budgets: A Time-Series Analysis

Edward S. Cavin
William W. Davis

DTIC
ELECTE
JAN 10 1991
S E D



A Division of Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

Work conducted under contract N00014-87-C-0001.

This Research Memorandum represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue.
It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OPM No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Office of Management and Budget, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 1990	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Dynamic Structure of Navy Research and Development Budgets: A Time-Series Analysis			5. FUNDING NUMBERS C - N00014-87-C-0001 PE - 65154N PR - R0148	
6. AUTHOR(S) Edward S. Cavin, William W. Davis				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Center for Naval Analyses 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER CRM 89-128	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Cleared for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This paper investigates the dynamic nature of the Navy's R&D budget by examining the Navy's budget in the aggregate and by functional activity (i.e., manpower, operation and maintenance, procurement, and research and development). Qualitative conclusions about trends in each functional area are made using constant-dollar plots for the period 1955-88. The percentage of the aggregate DON budget that is allotted to R&D has been remarkably constant at 10 percent over the last 30 years. A forecast for the R&D budget percentage is made for the next 5 years using statistical techniques. Thus, independent forecasts of the aggregate DON budget can be used to generate alternative R&D budget forecasts.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Economic models, Forecasting, Naval budgets, Naval planning, Naval research, Planning programming budgeting, Research management, Statistical models, Technology forecasting, Time series analysis			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 24	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT CPR	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE CPR	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT CPR	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	



CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

A Division of Hudson Institute 4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268 • (703) 824-2000

7 August 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: CNA Research Memorandum 89-128

Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 89-128, *The Dynamic Structure of Navy Research and Development Budgets: A Time-Series Analysis*, by Edward S. Gavin and William W. Davis, Jun 1990

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.

2. This paper investigates the dynamic nature of the Navy's R&D budget by examining the Navy's budget in the aggregate and by functional activity (i.e., manpower, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research and development). Qualitative conclusions about trends in each functional area are made using constant-dollar plots for the period 1955-88. The percentage of the aggregate DON budget that is allotted to R&D has been remarkably constant at 10 percent over the last 30 years. A forecast for the R&D budget percentage is made for the next 5 years using statistical techniques. Thus, independent forecasts of the aggregate DON budget can be used to generate alternative R&D budget forecasts.

R. Kenneth Lobb

R. Kenneth Lobb
Director
Advanced Systems Division

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	



Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 89-128

Distribution List

SNDL		OPNAV
21A1	CINCLANTFLT	OP-00
21A2	CINCPACFLT	OP-00K
21A3	CINCUSNAVEUR	OP-02
24G1	COMSUBLANT	OP-03
24G2	COMSUBPAC	OP-05
28A1	COMCARGRU 4	OP-06
	Attn: RAdm R. MacKee	OP-07
A1	ASSTSECNAV RDA	OP-08
	Attn: Mr. R. Rumpf	OP-092
	Attn: Mr. J. Volpe	OP-094
A1	SECNAV	OP-094H
A1	UNSECNAV	OP-098
A2A	CNR	OP-22
A6	HQMC INTEL	OP-35
A6	HQMC PP&O	OP-50
A6	HQMC RD	OP-65
C4K	JPM-3	OP-70
E3A	NRL	OP-76
	Attn: Mr. P. Wilhelm	OP-940
	Attn: Mr. L. Hammerstrom	OP-943
FE1	COMNAVSECGRUCOM	OP-943E
FF44	NAVWARCOL	OP-987
FKA1B	COMSPAWARSSYSCOM	
	Attn: RAdm. D. Brooks	
	Attn: RAdm. T. Betterton	
	Attn: Capt. F. Carey	
FKQ6C	NAVOCEANSYSCEN	
FKQ6F	NAVSWC DAHLGREN	
FKQ6G	NUSC	
FN1	COMNAVSPACECOM	
	Attn: RAdm. D. Frost	
	Attn: Dr. J. Springer	

The Dynamic Structure of Navy Research and Development Budgets: A Time-Series Analysis

Edward S. Cavin
William W. Davis

Advanced Systems Division



A Division of Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

4471 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the dynamic nature of the Navy's R&D budget by examining the Navy's budget in the aggregate and by functional activity (i.e., manpower, operation and maintenance, procurement, and research and development). Qualitative conclusions about trends in each functional area are made using constant-dollar plots for the period 1955-88. The percentage of the aggregate DON budget that is allotted to R&D has been remarkably constant at 10 percent over the last 30 years. A forecast for the R&D budget percentage is made for the next 5 years using statistical techniques. Thus, independent forecasts of the aggregate DON budget can be used to generate alternative R&D budget forecasts.

CONTENTS

	Page
Illustrations	vii
Introduction	1
Graphical Analysis of Navy Budgets by Function	3
Time-Series Models of Navy Budgets	9
Results of Time-Series Analysis	11
Conclusions	16
References	17
Appendix: Data Used in Analysis	A-1-A-3

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
1 Total DON Budget, 1955-1988	4
2 DON Manpower Budget, 1955-1988	4
3 DON Operations and Maintenance Budget, 1955-1988	5
4 DON Procurement Budget, 1955-1988	6
5 DON Research Development Budget, 1955-1988	6
6 Functional Composition of DON Budget, 1955-1988	7
7 R&D Share of DON Budget	13
8 Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions	13
9 Out-Sample Forecast of R&D Budget Share	14

INTRODUCTION

In response to tasking from OP-98, CNA recently reviewed technology initiatives that will support the development of Navy systems¹ into the middle of the 21st century. The ultimate goal of this effort, Quo Vadis (Phase II), was to present OP-98 with an investment strategy that minimizes unevenness in Navy research and development expenditures over time and is consistent with projections of future R&D funding.

Any meaningful investment strategy must respond to the requirement of affordability. It obviously is not very helpful to the Navy for Quo Vadis to propose future R&D investments that have no relation to available funds. Therefore, the success of the Quo Vadis effort depends to some extent on projecting research and development budgets into the relatively distant future. Given that any such projection inevitably will be inaccurate to some degree, and that forecast errors generally increase with the length of the forecast period, it becomes important to understand as well as possible the dynamic pattern of budget growth over time.

This paper represents a preliminary attempt to investigate the dynamic behavior of the Navy R&D budget by examining it in the aggregate and by functional activity (i.e., manpower, operation and maintenance, procurement, and research and development). The goal of this analysis is to determine how sophisticated an acceptable model of R&D expenditures must be in order to be useful. While there is always a tendency to opt for the simplest possible model, such models should be used only when the available data suggest that more sophisticated models are not required. At a first order of approximation the candidate models are, in order of sophistication²:

- Straight-line extrapolation of most recent year (in constant dollars)
- Constant rate of growth
- Time-series models of budget series
- Structural models of budget series.

Because time-series models are the simplest of the statistical models among these alternatives, they are an especially useful tool for discerning the time structure of DON budgets. Therefore, this paper is based primarily on a preliminary

1. Throughout this paper, the term "Navy" will be understood to mean the Department of the Navy, i.e., the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, including both active-duty and reserve forces.

2. Assuming that the entire R&D budget request always will be funded is taken to be inadmissible as a model.

ime-series analysis of Navy R&D budgets. The first section graphically presents recent U. S. Navy budget data to provide background for subsequent discussion. Second, some basic elements of economic time-series modelling are presented, and their implications for the specification of forecasting models are discussed. Third, a forecast is given for the R&D budget series.

GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF NAVY BUDGETS BY FUNCTION

Each functional component of the Navy budget has grown significantly in constant dollar terms since the 1950s. Figure 1 shows the Navy's aggregate budget for the period 1955-1988, in constant dollars.¹ (Data for all figures are included in the appendix.) Qualitatively, two trends are evident from figure 1: a temporary increase in real expenditures during the Vietnam period (1966-1972), and a dramatic increase in real expenditures after 1981.

However, these trends do not necessarily represent movements in each of the functional budgets. Figure 2 shows Navy manpower budgets over this period. Probably the most significant event during this period was the dramatic increase in real cost per active-duty member during the early 1980s. Between 1981 and 1988, the Navy manpower budget increased by approximately 80 percent, from \$5.1 billion to \$9.7 billion. During this same period, endstrength increased by only about 20 percent.²

Navy operation and maintenance (O&M) budgets, on the other hand, display a somewhat different pattern, shown in figure 3. O&M certainly increased during the Vietnam era, and also after 1981. But additionally, O&M expenditures jumped considerably during the mid-1970s, probably reflecting fuel price increases. Finally, there is some suggestion from figure 3 that O&M budgets exhibit some cyclic behavior over time.

Figure 4 shows that procurement expenditures historically have exhibited pronounced peaks and troughs over time. The large peak in the early 1960s represents construction of the first large strategic submarine fleet. Another peak occurs during the Vietnam period, and primarily comprises replacement aircraft. Procurement went into a significant decline through the mid-1970s, rebounding slightly at the end of the decade. Finally, procurement increased dramatically after 1981.

The Navy RDT&E budget, which is of greatest importance for this study, is presented in figure 5. As one might expect, the Navy RDT&E budget appears

1. Constant dollars are expressed in terms of 1972 dollars, which is the midpoint of the date range covered by the data. Use of beginning or ending years as a base has the undesirable feature of artificially increasing or decreasing the apparent amplitude of the time series.

2. The remaining 60 percent of this increase is primarily accounted for by two factors: (1) increasing seniority among active-duty personnel, as a result of the success of various retention measures undertaken in the late 1970s, and (2) the FY 1984 change in military retirement funding




Figure 1. Total DON budget, 1955-1988




Figure 2. DON manpower budget, 1955-1988




Figure 3. DON operations and maintenance budget, 1955-1988




Figure 4. DON procurement budget, 1955-1988




Figure 5. DON research and development budget, 1955-1988

much less sensitive to external events than the other functional budgets. In constant dollars, RDT&E has increased over time at a fairly constant rate of 5 percent per year since the mid-1960s. The Reagan administration jump in DON budgets seems not to have translated into a jump in the research and development budget until after 1984.

Despite these trends in the component budgets, however, the total budget shares of each function have remained remarkably constant over time. Figure 6 shows the functional composition of the total DON budget. Procurement has remained more or less a constant share of the budget, with manpower and O&M each occasionally gaining or losing a bit at the other's expense. However, since the early 1960s, R&D has absorbed a steady 10 percent of the overall DON budget. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Navy has long had a "10 percent" programming policy for research and development.




Figure 6. Functional composition of DON budget, 1955-1988

What are the implications of these figures? Recognizing that more formal statistical analysis is required to investigate the structure of these time series, it is still possible to make the following qualitative points:

- The research and development budget is not particularly sensitive to major external events.

- The procurement budget seems to be most sensitive to transitory events (e.g., wars and changes of administration) and also to major systems developments (e.g., construction of submarines).
- The O&M budget appears to grow at a fairly constant, rate except when interrupted by major external events (e.g., wars, oil price increases).
- The manpower budget tends to reflect force levels.

The following section proposes a statistical model for investigating these qualitative impressions further with respect to the R&D budget.

TIME-SERIES MODELS OF NAVY BUDGETS

There essentially are two kinds of economic models that can be specified for budget profiles: time-series models and structural models. Time-series models are simpler in that only the behavior of the budget (or other economic) variable over time need be specified, while in structural models, the behavior of the budget variable is considered a function of a number of other variables. Economic analysis of time profiles typically is based in the first instance on simple time-series models. Various kinds of diagnostic information from these models then can suggest whether more sophisticated models should be developed (see, for example, [1]).

Economic time-series analysis usually is based on the so-called ARMA (autoregressive moving average) model.¹ The autoregressive part of the model specifies the value of a variable y at time t as a function of its past values, with some random error:

$$y_t = a_1 y_{t-1} + a_2 y_{t-2} + \dots + a_p y_{t-p} + \epsilon_t \quad (1)$$

where the errors ϵ are considered to be independent and identically distributed (iid), with zero mean and standard deviation σ . An autoregressive model of order (i.e., maximum lag) p is written AR(p).

The moving-average part of the model specifies the variable at time t as the outcome of random effects over time:

$$y_t = \epsilon_t + b_1 \epsilon_{t-1} + \dots + b_q \epsilon_{t-q} \quad (2)$$

where the ϵ variables are specified as above. A moving average model of order q is written MA(q). The full ARMA model expresses the variable at each time t as the sum of the autoregressive and moving-average parts of the model, so that:

$$y_t = a_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + a_p y_{t-p} + \epsilon_t + b_1 \epsilon_{t-1} + \dots + b_q \epsilon_{t-q} \quad (3)$$

1. Most of the following discussion follows Chow [1]. Other good references are Box and Jenkins [2] and Amemiya [3]. It is assumed throughout that the time series y_t is stationary, i. e., has a constant mean and variance.

An ARMA model of autoregressive order p and moving average order q is written ARMA(p, q). Many common macroeconomic time series, such as the gross national product, are frequently modelled as AR(1) or AR(2).¹

In general, the dynamic properties of the time series y_t are determined by some joint probability distribution of all of the y_t . However, for practical purposes, the first two moments of this distribution contain all of the useful information for analyzing its properties. The first two moments are represented by the autocovariance matrix of the series, defined as:

$$[\gamma_{ij}] = E(y_t - \mu)(y_j - \mu) \quad . \quad (4)$$

It turns out that this matrix can be expressed iteratively as the solution to a difference equation of order p . Therefore, the dynamic properties of the time series in general are determined by the eigenvalues of the autocovariance matrix and are cyclic because of the cosine representation of complex conjugate roots. (Readers interested in additional details are referred to [1] or [2].)

The important point for this analysis is that the structure (if any) of a stationary time series can be discerned by examining the autocovariance matrix (or, more conveniently, the autocorrelation matrix) of the time series. After appropriately transforming the series to eliminate pure time trends, the autocorrelations between lagged values of different lengths will determine the degree of the ARMA(p, q) model.² In identifying time series models, both the autocorrelations and the so-called *partial autocorrelations* generally are used. (The partial autocorrelation is the standardized regression coefficient of y_{t-p} in the regression of y_t on $y_{t-1} \dots y_{t-p}$.) If the partial autocorrelation abruptly becomes insignificant after p periods, an AR(p) model is probably reasonable. If, on the other hand, the simple autocorrelations terminate abruptly after q periods, an MA(q) model may be required. Finally, it may be the case that no ARMA(p, q) structure seems to represent the series very well, and a different kind of statistical model must be specified.

1. The order of the model obviously is sensitive to the time units measured. Most economic time series are annual in their order of autoregressivity, so that they are AR(1), AR(4), or AR(12), depending on whether time is measured in years, quarters, or months.

2. Another time series technique that imposes less formal structure is spectral density analysis. This method is based on the Fourier analysis of the autocorrelations of the time series, and can help identify cycles of different lengths. Unfortunately, this so-called time-domain analysis requires large numbers of observations, which are not available in this case.

RESULTS OF TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

As remarked above, the basic approach used in this analysis was to compute the autocorrelations among elements of the R&D time series by lag length, and examine the pattern of the autocorrelations for evidence of internal structure. All of the budget time series are strongly nonstationary: they exhibit pure time trends upward that contaminate the autocorrelations among lags of various lengths. Therefore, prior to analysis the R&D and total DON series were differenced once to remove these effects and to leave the differenced series approximately covariance-stationary (i.e., with no pure time trend).¹

However, it was apparent that even after this first-differencing, both the total DON budget and the R&D budget series remained nonstationary (i.e., had some pure time dependence). Therefore, additional preliminary analysis was required before the formal time-series analysis could be undertaken. First, there is a strong suggestion from figure 6 that the R&D budget series may be closely bound to the total DON budget, yet that the R&D *share* of the total budget may be substantially independent of external events. Therefore, it was important to examine the R&D budget series as the composition of an R&D share series and the total DON budget series:

$$RD_t = \frac{RD_t}{DON_t} DON_t \quad (5)$$

Second, it is obvious from the graphical analysis in the last section that major institutional changes occurred over the period, in which the series shifted upwards more or less discontinuously to a higher level. Therefore, it was necessary to identify relatively "steady-state" time periods over which the time series of interest could be considered stationary.²

Finally, for forecasting purposes, it must be assumed that the total DON budget will remain a key policy variable in the DOD and overall federal budgets, and therefore that the internal structure of the historical DON budget series (if any) is of only limited use in forecasting future budgets.

1. First-differencing a series is a common technique for removing nonstationarity. One could also regress each series on a time variable and use the residuals in the autocorrelation analysis [1, p. 204].

2. This not to suggest that recent history is somehow uninteresting or less important than the preceding 25 years, but only that statistically it generally is not possible to discern the internal structure of a series when such jumps are included in the data.

For all of these reasons, the time-series analysis of Navy R&D budgets was based on the share of the total DON budget accounted for by R&D. As figure 7 shows, the (first-differenced) R&D budget varies about 10 after the "takeoff" years 1955-1959. Thus, a stationary model is analyzed using the data from 1960 to the present.

Figure 8 presents the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions for the R&D budget share series. The gradual decay of the autocorrelation function and the abrupt termination of the partial autocorrelation function after one period strongly suggest an AR(1) model.

Using Box-Jenkins notation, this AR(1) model can be parameterized as:

$$(1 - \phi L)\left(\frac{RD}{DON}\right)_t - \alpha = \epsilon_t \quad , \quad (6)$$

where ϕ is an autoregression parameter, L is the lag operator, α is the mean of $\frac{RD}{DON}$, and ϵ_t is iid as $N(0, \sigma^2)$. An alternative parametrization is:

$$(1 - \phi L)\left(\frac{RD}{DON}\right)_t - \alpha - \beta t = \epsilon_t \quad , \quad (7)$$

where βt is a pure time trend in the R&D budget share. Table 1 compares maximum-likelihood estimates from equations 6 and 7. The mean R&D budget share is 10.1 percent, with an autoregression parameter of 0.82. There is no evidence of a pure time trend. Figure 9 presents an out-sample forecast of the R&D budget share based on these parameters with the upper and lower 95-percent confidence limits.




Figure 7. R&D share of DON budget




Figure 8. Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions




Figure 9. Out-sample forecast of R&D budget share

Table 1. Estimates of parameters

Variable	Equation 6 parameters ^a	Equation 7 parameters ^a
Mean (α)	0.101 (17.71)	0.057 (1.63)
Slope (β)		0.001 (1.29)
Autoregression (ϕ)	0.816 (7.95)	0.772 (6.33)
Standard error (σ)	0.007	0.007

a. T-statistics are in parentheses.

CONCLUSIONS

What, then, is the interpretation of the results presented in the fourth section, Results of Time Series Analysis?

First, R&D budgets probably can be forecast fairly reliably as a constant share of the total DON budget. The advantage is that independent forecasts of the aggregate DON budget can be used to generate alternative R&D budget forecasts. It may well be unwise in any case to divorce forecasts of the R&D budget from forecasts of the aggregate DON budget, particularly in the current climate of budget austerity. Probably the safest assumption to make is that the R&D budget share will remain constant at about 10 percent of the DON total.

Second, one probably should be cautious in using recent budgetary history as a guide to future DON budget *levels*. Another surge in spending such as that witnessed in the early 1980s can hardly occur again in the current macroeconomic climate of large deficits. On the other hand, the *composition* of the DON budget by functional activity seems to have been unaffected by recent events. Therefore, data from the 1980s probably can be used in analyses based on budget shares without much concern.

REFERENCES

- [1] G. C. Chow. *Econometrics*. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983
- [2] G. Box and J. M. Jenkins. *Time-Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control*. Holden-Day, 1970
- [3] T. Amemiya. *Advanced Econometrics*. Harvard University Press, 1985

APPENDIX
DATA USED IN ANALYSIS

APPENDIX DATA USED IN ANALYSIS

Table A-1. DON budget data (millions of current-year dollars)

Fiscal year	Aggregate DON budget	DON manpower budget	DON O&M budget	DON	
				Procure- ment budget	DON R&D budget
55	10,323.3	3,243.1	3,540.3	3,674.7	60.2
56	9,496.4	3,910.8	2,394.8	3,756.7	433.9
57	9,359.0	3,145.2	2,447.9	3,316.0	430.0
58	9,943.6	3,218.8	2,730.1	3,494.8	499.9
59	10,284.7	3,085.9	2,670.2	3,923.2	600.3
60	11,441.3	3,263.3	2,752.1	4,504.0	922.0
61	11,532.4	3,295.9	2,775.3	4,435.0	1,026.1
62	11,948.6	3,359.6	2,767.9	4,572.0	1,249.1
63	13,735.6	3,519.7	3,186.0	5,651.2	1,379.6
64	15,842.3	3,553.4	3,142.2	6,849.1	1,499.8
65	14,686.5	3,904.6	3,294.9	5,948.8	1,458.2
66	14,559.1	4,040.6	3,408.9	5,714.8	1,394.7
67	16,851.6	4,821.1	4,140.4	6,324.8	1,565.4
68	19,968.1	5,591.3	5,063.0	7,477.3	1,839.8
69	22,161.0	5,913.9	5,913.0	8,204.3	2,129.8
70	22,503.1	6,246.0	5,788.8	8,313.3	2,150.0
71	20,547.1	6,065.9	5,212.4	7,103.8	2,165.0
72	20,892.0	5,829.0	5,306.0	7,497.0	2,260.0
73	22,121.8	6,785.5	5,460.9	7,422.6	2,442.8
74	23,539.6	7,062.5	5,950.8	7,967.0	2,559.4
75	25,817.1	7,741.1	7,360.0	7,713.4	3,002.6
76	27,603.5	7,882.2	8,764.9	7,707.5	3,248.9
77	31,605.1	8,177.5	9,702.7	9,718.1	4,006.8
78	34,192.0	8,396.4	11,370.2	10,433.1	3,992.1
79	36,019.4	8,638.4	12,619.3	10,578.2	4,183.6
80	38,158.7	9,149.4	13,154.9	11,440.3	4,414.1
81	44,015.9	10,030.4	16,099.8	13,232.3	4,653.3
82	55,171.4	12,393.0	20,333.6	16,872.4	5,572.3
83	64,713.3	14,529.0	23,185.7	21,055.9	5,947.7
84	73,275.3	15,596.4	24,613.7	25,921.0	7,139.2
85	85,807.5	21,949.2	26,514.0	28,724.9	8,619.4
86	92,491.9	23,860.4	27,749.3	30,873.0	10,001.7
87	88,809.9	24,427.1	27,332.9	28,473.6	8,568.8
88	92,655.5	25,330.8	26,639.8	31,108.9	9,523.4

Table A-2. DON budget data (millions of 1972 dollars)

Fiscal year	DON				
	Aggregate DON budget	DON manpower budget	DON O&M budget	Procure- ment budget	DON R&D budget
55	16.968	5.010	5,819	6,040	99
56	15,124	4,636	3,814	5,983	691
57	14,414	4,844	3,770	5,107	693
58	15,057	4,874	4,134	5,292	757
59	15,214	4,565	3,950	5,811	888
60	16,654	4,750	4,006	6,556	1,342
61	16,634	4,754	4,003	6,397	1,480
62	16,922	4,758	3,920	6,475	1,769
63	19,165	4,911	4,444	7,885	1,925
64	20,671	4,883	4,318	9,412	2,061
65	19,643	5,251	4,431	8,000	1,961
66	18,967	5,264	4,441	7,445	1,817
67	21,315	6,098	5,237	8,000	1,980
68	24,192	6,774	6,140	9,059	2,229
69	25,534	6,814	6,813	9,453	2,454
70	24,607	6,830	6,330	9,096	2,351
71	21,401	6,318	5,429	7,399	2,255
72	20,892	5,829	5,306	7,497	2,260
73	20,919	6,426	5,164	7,019	2,310
74	20,455	6,137	5,171	6,923	2,224
75	20,524	6,154	5,851	6,132	2,387
76	20,858	5,956	6,623	5,824	2,455
77	22,567	5,839	6,928	6,939	2,861
78	22,731	5,582	7,559	6,936	2,654
79	22,041	5,286	7,722	6,473	2,560
80	21,387	5,128	7,373	6,412	2,474
81	22,503	5,128	8,231	6,765	2,379
82	26,604	5,976	9,805	8,136	2,687
83	30,054	6,747	10,767	9,778	2,762
84	32,803	6,982	11,021	11,604	3,196
85	35,978	9,203	11,117	12,044	3,614
86	37,721	9,731	11,317	12,593	4,079
87	35,270	9,701	10,855	11,310	3,403
88	35,473	9,717	10,199	11,910	3,646

Table A-3. DON budget data (millions of 1980 dollars)

Fiscal year	Aggregate DON budget	DON manpower budget	DON O&M budget	DON	
				Procurement budget	DON R&D budget
55	5,786.0	1,708.4	1,984.2	2,059.6	33.76
56	5,322.5	1,631.5	1,342.2	2,105.6	243.18
57	5,245.5	1,762.8	1,372.0	1,858.5	252.19
58	5,573.2	1,804.1	1,530.1	1,958.8	280.19
59	5,764.3	1,729.6	1,496.6	2,201.7	336.45
60	6,412.6	1,829.0	1,542.5	2,524.4	516.73
61	6,463.6	1,847.3	1,555.5	2,485.7	575.09
62	6,696.9	1,883.0	1,551.3	2,562.5	700.08
63	7,698.4	1,972.7	1,785.1	3,167.3	773.26
64	8,430.8	1,991.5	1,761.1	3,838.8	840.60
65	8,186.6	2,188.5	1,846.7	3,334.2	817.28
66	8,160.0	2,264.7	1,910.6	3,203.0	781.71
67	9,444.9	2,702.1	2,320.6	3,544.9	877.36
68	11,191.6	3,133.8	2,840.5	4,190.8	1,031.17
69	12,420.7	3,314.6	3,314.1	4,598.3	1,193.72
70	12,612.4	3,500.7	3,244.5	4,662.2	1,205.02
71	11,516.1	3,399.8	2,921.4	3,981.5	1,213.44
72	11,709.4	3,267.0	2,973.9	4,201.9	1,266.67
73	12,398.7	3,808.7	3,060.7	4,160.2	1,369.14
74	13,193.4	3,958.3	3,335.3	4,465.3	1,434.47
75	14,469.9	4,338.7	4,125.1	4,323.2	1,682.89
76	15,471.1	4,417.8	4,912.5	4,319.9	1,820.95
77	17,713.9	4,583.3	5,438.1	5,446.7	2,245.73
78	19,163.8	4,706.0	6,372.7	5,847.5	2,237.50
79	20,188.0	4,841.6	7,072.8	5,928.8	2,344.78
80	21,387.0	5,128.0	7,373.0	6,412.0	2,474.00
81	24,669.8	5,621.8	9,023.6	7,416.4	2,608.07
82	30,922.2	6,946.0	11,396.5	9,456.6	3,123.14
83	36,273.0	8,143.1	12,995.0	11,801.3	3,333.53
84	41,069.0	8,741.4	13,798.2	14,528.1	4,001.36
85	48,093.0	12,302.0	14,860.5	16,099.6	4,830.96
86	51,839.4	13,373.2	15,552.8	17,306.4	5,605.71
87	49,775.7	13,690.8	15,319.4	15,961.5	4,802.57
88	51,931.1	14,225.3	14,930.9	17,435.8	5,337.60