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
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE

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AIR WAR COLLEGE

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THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Bruce Moreland

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Democratization of Eastern Europe. AUTHOR:  
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There are many experts who claimed that the democratization process in Eastern Europe was inevitable and that the events of the past forty years were a prelude to events as they unfolded in 1989.

This study focuses on the development of Communism throughout Eastern Europe, the development of the Warsaw Pact as the buffer zone of the Soviet Union, the challenges to Communist control of the Warsaw Pact nations and their struggles for freedom during the past 40 years, how the democratization process occurred and the reasons why and assesses the future ramifications of Eastern Europe without Communism. *specifically Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, & Albania.*



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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Backman enlisted in the Air Force in April 1969. He received his commission from Officer Training School in 1971 and earned a master's degree from Pepperdine University in 1978. Colonel Backman completed Undergraduate Navigator Training in 1971 and Navigator Bombardier Training (NBT) in 1972. He served as a B-52 combat crew instructor and standardization evaluation navigator and radar navigator. He also served as an instructor, flight commander and executive officer at the NBT squadron at Mather AFB, Ca. and as the chief flight examiner of NBT stan eval. He then served as the commander of the 3708th Basic Military Training Squadron at Lackland AFB, Tx and as the commander of the 3569th USAF Recruiting Squadron in Los Angeles, Ca. Colonel Backman is a graduate of Squadron Officers School, the Air Command and Staff College, and the Air War College, class of 1990.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| DISCLAIMER.....   | 1   |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....  | ii  |
| BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.....  | iii |
| Chapter   |     |
| I. INTRODUCTION.....  | 1   |
| II. THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE.....  | 3   |
| Poland .....  | 3   |
| Hungary .....   | 7   |
| Czechoslovakia.....   | 12  |
| East Germany.....   | 14  |
| Romania.....  | 18  |
| Bulgaria.....   | 22  |
| Albania.....  | 25  |
| III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT.....                        | 29  |
| IV. CHALLENGES TO COMMUNIST CONTROL OF THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS..... | 34  |
| Polish October-1956.....  | 34  |
| Hungarian Revolution-1956.....                                      | 36  |
| Albania-1961.....   | 39  |
| Prague Spring-1968.....   | 40  |
| Hungary's New Economic Mechanism-1968.....                          | 43  |
| Romanian Strikes-1977-1982.....                                     | 45  |
| Poland and the Rise of Solidarity-1980-81.....                      | 46  |
| V. THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS--1989.....                           | 49  |
| VI. ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE.....                                  | 60  |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY.....   | 71  |

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In October 1989, The United States stood open mouthed as the East German government of Egon Krenz announced that effective November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall access to West Germany would for now, and evermore, be opened to regular travel between East and West, effectively signalling the demise of Communist controlled East Germany. This, of course, followed closely on the heels of two other very significant changes in European politics; the loosening of the Communist strangle hold and democratization of both Poland and Hungary.

Needless to say, the other Warsaw Pact nations began tumbling one by one; Bulgaria on November 9, 1989; Czechoslovakia in December, 1989; and Romania on December 21, 1989. Seemingly, no one in the West was prepared for these significant changes nor were they even predicted. The Russian's hold on these nations was deemed so strong that events such as these would not ever be likely to occur.

But these changes were, in fact, inspired by Mikhail Gorbachev and the USSR. Why? Why now? What significance will the changes have on East / West relationships in the future?

The purpose of this Defense Analytical Study will be to trace the growth and development of Communism in Eastern Europe, discuss the reasons for the development of the Warsaw Pact as the Russian buffer zone, look at the types of governments that, until recent times, were in place, their military and political relationships with the USSR and the West, and look at the way political problems and unrest were dealt with in the past.

The study will then look at the dramatic changes as they have developed throughout 1989 in each of the Pact nations as they moved from Communism to democratic forms of government, assess future political relationships between the Pact nations and the USSR and the West and, finally, try to draw some conclusions on where this will all lead.

## CHAPTER II

### THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

#### POLAND

The Polish conflict is unique in that for the past 200 years, security has been a real dilemma because of her position between Germany and Russia. Poland always felt that the best way to improve this adverse position was to secure external allies. (3:1-2)

Foreign policy has always been a fundamental issue in Polish politics. And, indeed, political movements traditionally have formed and split, not over domestic issues, but foreign policy. There had always been two schools of thought on how to best conduct the affairs of State: the idealists vs. the realists. (3:2)

The realists believed that they should just make the best of the situation and that there should be no struggle against the existing political order for reasons of

principle. They felt that to do so would only serve to weaken the nation. Their avowed goal was to protect the nation from future blows and to secure for it as much opportunity for normal internal development as possible. In other words, they praised prudence. (3:3)

The idealists, on the other hand, took a rigid, moralistic stance. They believed that to deprive Poland of its place in the international sphere was an unjust act and their "mission" was to restore Poland to her rightful place. Until this was achieved, they pledged to carry on a relentless battle to overthrow the existing political order counting on assistance from nations sharing their ideals; The goal--Poland's freedom. The leaders espoused heroism as the highest national virtue. (3:3)

Poland began developing ties with the Bolshevik's in the early 1900s, and a small marxist ideological group was established. During this time, the Polish Socialist Party was in control of Polish politics. During the Revolution of 1905-06, Polish leaders tried to rid Poland of Russian rule by armed insurrection backed by outside military assistance. The revolt failed when they failed to secure this needed help. Ultimately, the Party split. The left wing forged ties with the other communist based groups and eventually merged into the Communist Party of Poland in 1918. (3:22-24)

Poland found itself in dire straights as WW I approached. Again, her position between Russia and Germany was quite discomforting. Initially, Poland aligned with Austria to help against Russia. However, Poland could see that Austria was aligning with Germany. This left them with several perils. First, they knew they couldn't get their provinces back from Germany and second, it cast a shadow over the prospect of restoring a Polish state even in Poland's Russian provinces. Indeed, in view of Germany's aim to expand to the East, it was doubtful that Germany would tolerate a truly independent Polish state on their eastern border after they defeated Russia. (5:28)

In 1917 with Russia defeated, Poland withdrew from the war in hopes of a favorable settlement at its conclusion. The Treaty of Versailles restored an independent Polish state. Neither Russia nor Germany was pleased with the terms.

Meanwhile, the Communist party was experiencing several fiascos. The Party never gave any consideration to Polish nationalistic sentiments when they attempted to influence politics and alienated much of the population. In addition, Russia invaded Poland in 1920. Polish communists pinned their hopes on victory. The Poles looked at the Russians as an invading force and rose up in arms and pushed the Russians out of Poland. Since they had now lost the

sympathy of any of the Polish people, the Communist party remained an outcast in Polish politics and was eventually disbanded in 1938. (3:56)

During the inter-war period, Poland continued in a precarious position. The economy was not satisfactory for the purposes of national defense. Industrialization was very slow. Initially there was no armament industry although a small one was developed later. The net result was that, as Russia and Germany grew stronger, Poland did not. (3:34) Polish soldiers attacked tanks with horse cavalry soldiers.

This was especially evident as WW II started. Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and defeated them in several weeks. Russia invaded on September 17, 1939 from the east and between the two powers they partitioned Poland. Eventually, the Germans pushed the Russians out of Poland in 1941 after which, the Poles reestablished relations with the USSR again to hopefully restore the Polish state on favorable terms. (3:46)

Toward the end of the war, two governments in exile grew; one, a hard line group that realized the West would not help much and wanted all or nothing--the moralistic stance. The other group, with a push from the West, sought to normalize relations with Russia to try and salvage their

eastern provinces. Unfortunately, this didn't happen. Instead, Poland pushed for generous compensation from Germany in the form of territory in the west. (3:49)

Poland also agreed to Churchill's 50-50 plan for joint influence. The Polish government would be composed of 50% Communists and their followers and 50% Polish democratic leaders. The Polish Peasant Party began open political struggles against the communists. They expected political assistance from the West which didn't happen. In 1947, the Communists forged the general elections and wound up in power. They then defeated the wartime underground and suppressed the Polish Peasant Party thus effectively eliminating any resistance to Communism. (3:50)

#### HUNGARY

During the last half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungary remained a feudal aristocracy ruled by magnates and gentry. Industry was weak, the country was economically underdeveloped, illiteracy was rampant and the administration was corrupt. National minorities, who constituted more than half the population were deprived of all rights. This proved to be the principle cause of the decline of the empire. (38:3)

With the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy in 1918, the minorities were emancipated. Hungary became a republic. The new government had a difficult time establishing peace and carrying out agricultural reforms. This led to general unrest and deprivation. (38:3)

Under these conditions, Communism gained a following in the industrialized areas. It had been brought back to Hungary by returning POWs from Russia. The WW I armistice of 1919 called for Hungary to give up additional lands to neighboring countries. The government refused and as a result, was disbanded. This was also the end of Hungarian democracy. (38:3)

In the hopes of saving Saint Stephen's Kingdom from the Entente forces who were backing Czech and Rumanian claims to the area, the new government aligned itself with Lenin. The government lasted 133 days until the Rumanians marched on Budapest. (38:3)

The National Assembly named Horthy as Regent and this authoritarian remained in power for the next 25 years. He restored the traditional values, institutions and authorities that existed during the feudal period. Belief in God, sanctity of family ties and private property ownership were placed above everything. (38:3)

As WW II approached, Hungary aligned itself with Germany in order to regain lost territories. The government tried to surrender to the allies but was forced to fight on to the end. As the Russians laid siege to Budapest in 1944, Hungarian Communists, most of whom lived in the USSR, established a provisional government and gained control of the coalition. (38:4)

At the end of the war, Hungary was still a semi-feudal agrarian economy with a rigid class structure and had little or no industrial development. Land reform and industrialization became the two main objectives. (38:4)

The primary task of the Communists was to build support across the country. The strategy was to apply pressure from the top by pressure from communist dominated units and the introduction of legislation and the bottom by agitating the masses.

The 1945 land reform program distributed one-third of all agricultural lands to 640,000 new farmers. Private enterprise was encouraged within certain bounds.

During the first postwar elections in October, 1945, the Smallholder's Party, which represented the small farmers, the clergy and others, got 51% of the vote. In the November general election, they got 57%. Their principal

aim was to prevent the Sovietization of Hungary. Of course, the Communist goal was to break the Smallholders. (38:5)

The Communist plan called for the opposition to create a number of competing parties. This, ultimately, allowed the Communists to gain a two-to-one advantage. The only group that remained a threat was the Social Democratic Party and they finally merged with the Hungarian Communist Party to form the Hungarian Working Peoples Party (HWPP). (38:6)

Now firmly in place, the next task was to prepare the country and society for Socialism. All elements of society were altered: social norms were legislated, all enterprises with 10 or more workers were nationalized, workers had to pay for damage to State property, absenteeism and changing jobs were frowned upon, as were anti-State acts. The national bank gradually assumed control of industry, foreign trade and savings and loans. By the end of March, 1948, 74% of the industrial workers were employed by the State. (38:11)

The initial production and economic results were pretty good. This was followed by huge increases in expectations. The government had introduced centralized planning as one of its reform initiatives. Hungary also needed to import raw materials. As a result, the volume of industrial and power production fell behind. The demand

also increased for imported goods. This led to an unfavorable balance of trade. (38:11)

The economic problems were a result of political mistakes that affected every aspect of life. This totalitarian style, copied from the Soviets, remained in effect until 1962. (3:12)

By 1953, the government had nationalized the main means of production and established the basic institutions to regulate Hungarian political, social and cultural life. But the policies were not working and Imre Nagy was brought in to solve the crisis. He ended forced collectivization, stopped some major industrial projects and increased wages. He also criticized, unsuccessfully, the terror tactics of the Party. Industrial output did actually increase a little by 1955. (38:13)

The impact of these changes was that a principally agrarian society was changed into a semi industrial state. This was achieved at great expense of human rights and welfare. During the time the Nagy government was in power, the people had tasted a more moderate and humanistic approach to problem solving. Nagy was replaced in 1956. Again the repressiveness of communism and a return to the old policies were put into effect. This led directly to the spontaneous revolt in November, 1956. (38:14)

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia was established as an independent state in 1918 after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The ingredients were always there; they had a national identity and awareness was present in the historic lands of Bohemia and Moravia-Selesia before the 14th century. (21:140)

The first 20 years of existence were under liberal and democratic roots and were influenced by Western political concepts. (21:140) During WW II, Germany dominated the country. The government went into exile and sought reestablishment after the war.

After the war concluded, the government reflected some Communist influence as they were liberated principally by Soviet forces. In addition, the Communist party was legal. In the postwar 1946 election, the Communists won 38% of the vote. The government in exile had little choice but to form a coalition. (21:140)

In June, 1947, Czechoslovakia was invited to join the conference on the Marshall Plan. They accepted at first; but, after a state visit to Moscow, the Czech government declined. The Soviets had promised to furnish the necessary aid to rebuild the country. (2:20)

In 1947, Stalin urged the Czechs to consolidate power in Communist's hands. By February, 1948, the purge began in earnest. A coup d'etat resulted in total control by the Communists. All non-communists were expelled. Shortly thereafter, the Parliament was changed to a collective political body. Military officers were replaced and the judiciary removed. (2:36)

Economically, the Czechs were in pretty good shape. Their living standard was much ahead of other Eastern European countries and the USSR. Their industrial production was also good. (2:41)

Even after the war, the country kept producing. A drought in 1947 hurt agricultural production and led to importing of food. But the country was still ok. After the coup, all industry was nationalized except small private enterprises which accounted for only 15.9% of the industrial production. (2:41)

The first five year plan set very unrealistic goals. The Czechs had to get raw materials from outside. Inflation resulted from the shortages of raw materials and consumer goods. Forced collectivization caused poor agricultural production as it was not popular and did little to spur investment. (2:43)

From 1948-1953, the country went through revolutionary purges and transformations and wound up with a government that was almost an exact copy of that in the USSR. (2:44)

### EAST GERMANY

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is in many respects an anomaly. It is largely a product of the collapse of the Third Reich and the division of Europe. (30:xi)

The present GDR is a composition of four sets of influences. The people are Germans. Their culture and politics are set from historical German precedents. East Germany lies within the Soviet sphere of influence and faces severe restraints in both foreign and domestic policies. It is also frequently the object and victim of East-West confrontations. The GDR has a Socialist economy oriented toward skilled labor and technology. It's deficient in raw materials and energy and must import. This makes them highly dependent on foreign trade thus making central planning difficult. The GDR has created an advanced urban-industrial society. This social transformation has spawned serious problems in pollution, crime, weak family structures, etc. (30:vii)

East Germans are in a unique position wherein they buy consumer goods from West Germany, watch West German T.V., denounce capitalism and envy the prestige and material successes of their neighbors.

They buy raw materials from the Soviet Union, belittle Russian culture, struggle to make socialism work and regard Soviet power with a mixture of fear and admiration. The biggest problem for the East Germans is the search for a national identity. (30:1)

The GDR was originally created during the allied Conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. It was formally dedicated on October 7, 1949.

The government laid claim to its Communist roots through the thoughts of Marx and Engels. The Communist Party (KPD) was formally founded in 1918. It was originally sponsored by scattered workers councils and its main function was to stir some uprisings. After receiving 6.3% of the vote in the 1925 presidential vote, the Party steered for closer cooperation with the Soviet Communist Party. This resulted in some expanded recruitment in Germany. (30:5)

The efforts of the KPD paralleled those of the developing socialists and facilitated the rise of Hitler to power. The KPD was one of the first victims of Fascism. The Party fell into disarray during WW II. It was

reconstituted in June, 1945 and started a four year transition toward gaining control. (30:6)

It did not appear that Moscow's policy toward Germany was initially formulated as part of a scheme to create an East European bloc. Rather, it was a separate issue. The Russians were determined to collect reparations and end Germany's threat as a military power. (30:7)

Initially there were many problems with how to resolve some major problems. Foremost, and the most visible among the allies, was the exchange of goods between Western and Soviet zones. Also, the French opposed a British-US plan to facilitate the economic development of their zones. (30:7)

The Soviets objected and blockaded all land and river accesses to the western sectors of Berlin. The US airlift for 11 months charted West Berlin's future as well as Germany's enduring division. (30:7)

The Soviets and US also disagreed over the reconstruction of Germany. The US envisioned political life on a democratic basis while the Soviets viewed the destruction of capitalism and gradual introduction of Socialist democracy as a necessity. (30:7)

Each zone was to have the indigenous group's preference. In the Soviet sector, the Russians took outright control. They pushed for total denazification and confiscation of property. Citizen resistance grew as did anti-Soviet resentment. The situation was further exacerbated by Russia's historical adversarial relationship with Germany and the German feeling that the Russians were culturally inferior. (30:7)

These sentiments were reinforced by the stringency of the Soviet occupation and the extraction of war reparations--up to 25% of the GDR national income. The Communist Party kept pointing out that the Soviets saved the Germans by destroying the nazis so they owed a special debt. (30:8)

The first few years of the GDR's existence was consistent with a parliamentary road to Socialism. Agricultural land reform and nationalization of much of the industrial sector produced short range public benefit and popular support. Four parties were created as was the groundwork for a parliamentary system.

In 1946, the Communist Party merged with the Social Democrat Party to become the Socialist Unity Party--the present day SED. The tense times during the Berlin Airlift coincided with Stalin trying to undermine Tito in Yugoslavia

and encouragement for the other Eastern Europeans to purge "Titoists" from their ranks. Waves of purges followed. By June, 1949, the SED had been fully reconstructed according to the pattern of the Communist Party and had a political system according to the Soviet model. (30:10)

The East Germans were still searching for a national identity. From the first days of occupation, German communists were highly visible. They had always openly stated their purposes and publicly recruited support. There was never a design to take over the government since the Party and government were built simultaneously and in tandem. (30:38)

#### ROMANIA

Romania received its formal independence in 1878 as a result of the Treaty of Berlin. It would become a Kingdom under King Carol I who remained in power until WW I. Under his leadership, Romania made substantial economic progress, built industries, established a national system of railroads and established modern economic systems. (17:11)

Romania emerged from WW I with almost twice the territory and population it had started with including nationality groups as opposed to Romanian rule as it had been to Hungary's rule previously. The formal basis for

rule was a royal parliamentarism based on universal suffrage and participation of opposing parties. (39:51)

The Romanian Communist Party (PCR) was formed in 1921 and outlawed in 1924. It was reorganized in 1944 as an organization at the service of invading Russian forces. The party lacked mass appeal and wound up alienating the minority groups. (17:14)

Romania continued on an even keel until King Carol II assumed power in 1930. The domestic situation was beginning to deteriorate as many crises were happening. This led to a rise in the fascist and pro-German movement called the Iron Guard. Romania sided with the Germans in WW II as a means of getting back the territory taken away by the German-Russian Non Aggression Treaty. (39:51)

The war years hastened the disintegration of Romania. The consequence of Soviet liberation was the imposition of a Marxist/Leninist regime with Stalinist controls. The official Soviet policy from 1944-47 was one of cooperation with the allies and the assertion that a popular front, representing all major democratic forces in the country would rule. (17:29-30)

The transition toward democratic rule ended in 1947 with the declaration that Romania was now a "People's Republic." In addition, the great socialist socio economic

transformation of the State began including basic land reforms, collectivization, nationalizing the means of production and centralized planning. (17:11)

A full-fledged Stalinist political and economic system developed through the late 1940s and early 50s under the leadership of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The balance of power shifted, however, from pro-Russian to Romanian Nationalism. Gheorghiu-Dej established his orthodox Communist credibility to secure his position. When Stalin died, he moved toward greater autonomy keeping Stalinist controls on internal economic and political policies. (17:59)

Gheorghiu-Dej was committed to establishing an independent socialist state by 1957. He implemented policies to accelerate the development of economic autonomy. He chose to maximize the value of economic nationalism and commitment to the industrialization of Romania rather than what the Warsaw Bloc needed Romania to produce. He also ended the joint ventures with the Soviets and diversified external trade. (17:59)

Last, and most important, he managed to get the Russians to withdraw their troops in 1958. At the same time, he purged all pro Soviet groups and positions of influence in Romania, thus removing his opposition. (17:60)

Ceausescu followed Gheorghiu-Dej into office after his death in 1965. Initially he followed a course of relaxation of internal controls. It made some observers believe that changes would be forthcoming. By 1968, new, tighter internal controls were established. For the Russians, there was a tradeoff to be made. As long as Romania followed a commitment to Marxist/Leninist orthodoxy and Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe as defined by the USSR, they would tolerate Romania's nationalistic rhetoric designed to create an illusion of national autonomy. (17:61)

This tradeoff did little to change the fundamental reality of Romanian economic dependence on the USSR. This was even clearer with the economic and energy crises of the early 1970s. (17:61)

Over the years, Romania was been a thorn in the side of the Soviets. They always ran as independent a policy as could be expected. They openly opposed many Soviet policies such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, trade with the West, relations and policy in the Middle East and the non-allowance of Soviet or Warsaw Pact troops to maneuver or be stationed in Romania, among others. Ceausescu assumed that as long as he appeared more Stalinist than Breshnev, he and his family would be secure. (25:10)

## BULGARIA

Bulgaria is an extremely old country that can trace its roots to 681 A.D. Modern Bulgaria was created as a result of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Through the years, the government was traditionally run by elections with a political system that did not encompass any particular point of view.

In 1878, a monarchy was established which was extremely liberal for its time. It established a military and primary and secondary schools. Literacy was at 75% by 1912 and culture abounded. (15:84)

After WW I, Bulgaria lost the area of Thrace and its access to the Aegean Sea. It also suffered tremendous problems as a result of severe war reparations. There was also an intense power struggle after the war as a result of deteriorating living conditions in the cities. The Communists fed on this discontent and initiated the Great Transport Strike in 1919-20. Martial law was declared and all available forces, including the army, were used to end the strike. (15:84)

A coup in 1923 overthrew the monarchy and installed a democratic alliance that initiated generous land reforms and improvements, established an eight hour working day,

increased wages, ended censorship, and allowed full participation in government. Moscow was upset that the Communists did not participate in the coup and ordered a change in policy but were ultimately defeated. The Communist Party tried to instigate terrorist activities that only led to anti-Communist sentiment and retaliation. The Party was ultimately banned in 1924. (15:100)

The democratic alliance basically remained in power until the early 30s when they were deposed by a military coup that placed Bulgaria under a dictatorial regime. They dissolved the constitution, abolished all political parties and organizations, and barred various publications and political meetings. (43:293)

The USSR entered Bulgaria in September, 1944 to liberate the country. September 9, 1944 is the birth date of modern Bulgarian history. The country was reorganized in order to help reestablish itself. Coop farms, where the peasants retained ownership, were established. The military, however, was put under the Soviet High Command to fight the Nazis and they remained in the country until 1957. (14:34)

The 1946 elections resulted in the Worker's Party (the communists) receiving over 50% of the vote. A new constitution was drafted in 1947 that made racial discrimination illegal, guaranteed the rights of minorities

to be taught in their own language and had the government garner control of the banks and foreign trade. (14:37)

In 1948, the Worker's Party became the Bulgarian Communist Party and began to rebuild the country's infrastructure--the ship yards and railroads. At the same time, the country did not lose the technical means to get the job done. Engineers, doctors, teachers and technicians remained to accomplish the tasks. (14:37) However, the creation of Communist power involved the elimination of all effective political opposition, the destruction of the social power of the bourgeoisie and the isolation of Bulgaria from hostile foreign influences. (15:145)

After 1944, the Bulgarians maintained the closest relations with the USSR of any of the other Eastern European nations. They copied all changes, both internal and in foreign policy. At the same time, Bulgaria suffered exploitation by the Soviets. They were charged extremely high prices for goods they purchased while the Soviets devalued many Bulgarian products. Joint projects between the two countries were abandoned in 1954-55. (43:296)

Zhivkov came to power in 1954 and he continued the efforts to ultimately eliminate the private farmer which was accomplished by 1958. The Bulgarian Communist Party declared that it was the first state after the USSR to reach full

collectivization. By 1963, all experiments with economic decentralization were abandoned. (15:182)

The Bulgarians had mixed successes and failures with central planning. Agriculture remained its weakest point, where it had previously been fairly successful, because of a failure to properly invest in mechanization and modernization. (39-226-7)

Problems with the Soviets arose as Krushchev sought to improve relations with Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia, traditionally an adversary of Bulgaria. Bulgaria was concerned that it would lose its major trading partner, the USSR, to which by 1974, accounted for almost 47% of Bulgaria's export business. (43:298)

## ALBANIA

The modern Albanian state was declared independent from the Turks in 1912 by Ismail Bey. They were recognized by the great powers of Europe in 1913. Albanians are a fiercely independent people who live largely free of control by a central government. Early historical waves of conquests made them extremely sensitive to the slightest threat to their independence. In fact, that they have survived as a distinct ethnic group in the face of overwhelming odds is amazing. (27:8)

Communist underground activities began in the early 1930s but had little or no following. During Zog's rule, political power was vested in the hands of the chieftains, a few merchants, and some landowners. They also held the balance of power in the country. Zog fled when Italy invaded in 1939. A leadership vacuum created an internal power struggle. For three years the struggle remained a war of word between the various competing factions. (27:10)

Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in June, 1941 caused great indignation among the Albanian Communists. It gave them a compelling reason to organize into a single political force rather than remain eight separate and competing factions. The Albanian Communist Party (ACP) was founded in 1941. (27:10)

The Party had two major tasks: to liberate the country from the fascist occupiers and the destruction of the feudal bourgeois social order. Once accomplished, this would then be followed by the establishment of a democratic government of the people. (27:11)

The means to accomplish the goal was through guerrilla warfare which was highly suited to the terrain of Albania. The struggle was fought on three fronts; political, diplomatic and military. The goal was to create effective propaganda to popularize the struggle, to achieve

recognition by the allied powers and to develop an effective military force. (27:11)

The Partisans and Nationalists fought the Italians well together but could not resolve their political differences. The two sides met in August, 1943 and agreed to form a common resistance front, create an ethnic Albanian state and have free post-war elections to determine the country's form of government. This lasted one week until Enver Hoxha, leader of the Partisans, stated that the Nationalists would grab power at the end of the war. The matter was eventually settled through civil war with the Partisans taking control. Hoxha took over the leadership of Albania and steered the course of development toward the strictest Marxist/Leninist orthodox interpretation in Eastern Europe. (27:17)

For the next two decades, the Communists concentrated on constructing the economic roots of socialism and solving the associated socio economic issues. Industry was nationalized and collectivization of agriculture implemented. The overall goal of the government was to stamp out bourgeois and revisionist ideas and create the "new Communist man." (27:30)

Albania was unique among the Eastern European nations with its interpretation of communism. They were, without a

doubt, the most orthodox in their interpretation of Marxist/Leninist ideology. They resisted all efforts to decentralize and liberalize policies after Stalin's death. They were the only Moslem country to adopt communism and later, the only country to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Another striking fact is that Albania was the only communist movement to seize power without the help of the Soviet army. (27:23)

The Albanian-USSR problems in 1960-61 were mostly related to ideological differences and is discussed in greater detail later. But they had only two choices at that point: turn East or West. The Chinese were having similar ideological problems with the Soviets so they had a mutual advantageous situation and received the economic and technical support they needed from the Chinese. (27:80)

After 1961, Albania, for all intents and purposes, was no longer a factor in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact and eventually withdrew in 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

## CHAPTER III

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Pact was established May 14, 1955. The official reasons given for its creation was that in the previous year, the Western powers had refused to accept Soviet proposals for a European security system involving the neutralization and permanent division of Germany; Instead, the Western powers had invited the Federal German Republic to join the Western European Union and were in the process of admitting her to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) under the terms of the Paris Agreements. NATO ratified Germany's entrance on May 5, 1955. The treaty had a duration of 20 years with automatic prolongation unless one year's notice of withdrawal was given. (23:1)

There had been some speculation of other reasons for the Pact's development. Surely the Soviet Union objected to West German remilitarization. But, under an alliance, at least Germany would be subjected to institutional constraints. Outside an alliance, there would have been no

restrictions at all. This led to two additional questions of why the Soviets did not establish their alliance with the establishment of NATO in 1949 and when the decision was really made to allow Germany to rearm? (6:8)

Perhaps the Soviets did not consider NATO an aggressive alliance until West Germany joined at which time NATO took on an offensive flavor. This may be somewhat implausible thinking to some but would appeal to several of the Eastern European nations still paranoid over German power. (6:8)

A good case can be made that by the mid-50's, the Treaty made some sense as a military alliance. At least half the signatories perceived it as strengthening their own security, vis-a-vis Germany and NATO, although this was not proven to be a major factor. (6:9)

For Khrushchev, the importance of the Warsaw Pact was a reflection of his drive toward detente with the West. It was intended to gain another asset in the cold war. For Molotov, the Warsaw Treaty was a vehicle for Socialist consolidation, military preparedness and defense. This ambiguity in the views of the Russian leaders was consistent in Soviet history. It was also indicative of the struggle for power at the time. (29:26-27)

There were good political and military reasons for the establishment of some kind of organization in Eastern Europe through which the new Soviet leaders, Krushchev and Bulganin, could adapt their own ideas and system of controls over the area. Stalin had used his autocratic, awe-inspiring character to hold things together. As he got older, he became more resistant to change which, ultimately, led to stagnation at home and isolation abroad. (23:1)

Eastern Europe was a political, economic and military wasting asset. The Soviet leaders needed to get the area moving again. Some degree of coordination and direction of foreign policy and political affairs was immediately required. (23:1)

Stalin had four major objectives that provided the motivation for aiding and abetting the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe. First, he wanted to deny the region to countries hostile to Moscow and who could threaten its security. Second, he wanted to insure that the domestic political system in the area remained under the control of elements friendly to the USSR. Third, he wanted to utilize the regions resources to aid the post-war economic recovery and development. And fourth, he wanted to be able to use Eastern Europe as a potential jumping off point for a possible offensive against the West. (6:5)

The Warsaw Pact filled the need of having a political organization through which the Soviets could continue to transmit directives to their allies and organize Eastern European support for Soviet policies. It also gave the appearance of being a forum for Eastern European views. This helped reduce visible signs of Soviet domination. The Pact also prohibited members from joining other coalitions or alliances thus enhancing Soviet security. (23:2)

The Pact also filled a military need. Stalin's policies had been primitive and wasteful on the Eastern European countries. Stalin imposed Soviet Army regulations down to the most trivial detail on all the other countries. He also sent Soviet officers to hold key appointments and insisted they be given special rights and privileges. Needless to say, this was regarded as rather humiliating. He distrusted the national officer corps and frequently had them purged. (23:2)

Stalin's policies were wasteful in that he was obsessed with the number of formations and the number of men under arms. He was also reluctant to equip these forces with anything but obsolete arms. In addition, there was no evidence of any attempt to coordinate any training. This left the military basically allocated to internal security duties. (23:2)

After Stalin's death, the Soviet defense policy had been redefined in the face of nuclear weapons, postwar improvements in the means of delivery, transport, and speed of ground forces. New doctrine required Soviet and East European forces to play a part in the defense of the Soviet Union's western frontier by manning the "buffer zone," by maintaining internal security for the orthodox Communist Parties in power and, in the event of war, by advancing rapidly westward to destroy and then occupy NATO forces and territory. (23:2)

In order to accomplish these changes in doctrine, Soviet leaders recognized the need to have modernized weapons. Also, in order to be of real value, they had to reorganize, reequip, cut troop strength to a realistic size, and provide the means of mobility to their allies. Above all, their activity, training and tasks had to be efficiently coordinated under Soviet direction. The formation of the Soviet-Eastern European High Command was the logical step to fix this problem. (23:2)

## CHAPTER IV

### CHALLENGES TO COMMUNIST CONTROL OF THE WARSAW PACT

#### POLISH OCTOBER--1956

It wasn't long before the seeds of discontent within the pact began to germinate. Problems within Poland and Hungary began surfacing quickly.

The evolution of the problem began with the introduction of Poland's New Course which was to be limited to economic experimentation and liberalization. However, it soon began to take on political overtones as well. Party leadership continued to permit the relaxing of Party control throughout 1955 and into 1956. Power within the Party was beginning to move toward the moderates. This shift in policy began around the same time as Krushchev's destalinization speech in February, 1956. (39:81)

On June 28, 1956, a worker's strike in Poznan flared into an uprising. After two days, the military was ordered

to fire on the workers. This order was refused and, in fact, some of the military joined with the strikers. Eventually the strike was put down by Polish security forces. (29:5)

Soviet leadership interpreted the strike as the beginning of the threat to the Socialist system. They advised the Polish leadership that separate roads to Socialist doctrine had limitations and nationalism would not be tolerated. (39:82)

However, nationalism was still growing. The popular Polish leader, Gomulka, who had been considered rehabilitated by the Soviets, and was released from house arrest in the spring. He became the voice of the Polish Central Committee and, indeed, was elected to it after the escalation of tensions had led to the committee's reshuffling. The Soviets called for harsh punishments but, eventually, the regime delayed actions and ultimately released or acquitted the striking workers. (39:82)

Soviet control over political events was slipping. Despite the presence of Soviet military officers in key positions within the Polish forces and government, the military remained fiercely loyal to the country. The Russians realized they could not count on their support and would have to use their own troops to regain control. (29:31)

On October 19, 1956, the Soviet leadership arrived unannounced in Warsaw to discuss the situation. Soviet troops, stationed in Poland under the postwar agreements, began moving toward the capital. During negotiations, it was apparent that only Gomulka could control the nationalistic feelings but only if there was no Soviet intervention. Krushchev had no choice but to capitulate. (39:83)

Poland succeeded in attaining a leadership that was both nationalistic and communist. Lands were given back to the peasants but the government still planned to follow Communist industrial practices. Poland also established cordial ties with the Catholic church but still followed Marxist ideology. (39:83) The strict discipline of maintaining the party line was cracking a little.

#### HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION--1956

By early 1956, the old Rakosi government was back in power. The totalitarian and repressive policies that marked his previous regime were again instituted. This was at a time when Krushchev was calling for destalinization. Organizations critical of his methods began to form and join the revolutionary freedom fighters in their call for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops, an end to Stalinist terror

tactics and the reactivation of a pluralistic political system. It should also be noted that at no time was there a call for the elimination of socialism. (38:14) By July, he was replaced by Gero.

By mid October the call for change was getting louder. It was occurring at the same time changes are being called for and granted in Poland. A peaceful demonstration of students in support for the Poles became inflamed by declarations broadcast by Gero that the demonstrators were enemies of the working class and whose criticism of Soviet military presence and exploitive trade practices contained no truth. (20:115)

The students tried to take over the radio station and shots were fired into the crowd by the guards. The army refused to take part and remained passive or, in some cases, joined the rebels. The next day more shots were fired and the battle began. The situation became so bad that the Hungarian Worker's Peoples Party collapsed and Imne Nagy, a moderate, was returned to power. (20:115)

The revolutionary council sent their demands to the capital. Nagy got the Russians to grant as many as possible within the framework of maintaining Communist power. The Russians also agreed to discuss economic and military grievances with other Pact members. Nagy also announced

that Hungary was going to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. (20:116)

In a declaration on October 30, Moscow admitted mistakes and agreed to renegotiate its military arrangements within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The slogan, "many roads to socialism," was revived to stress the importance of specific historical conditions. It also showed Soviet vulnerability to ideological control in that it was ok to admit diversity before power was consolidated, but not tolerable once the Communists had consolidated power. (29:37)

On November 1, there were numerous troop movements and a large influx of Soviet troops began. The Hungarian leaders went to negotiate with the Russians at the Soviet military headquarters outside Budapest and all are arrested. At the same time, the Russians began simultaneous attacks on all points of resistance. (20:118)

With the Hungarian leadership gone and the military hopelessly outgunned, the revolution failed. It lasted only 13 days. Krushchev made it very clear to the Warsaw pact members that unilateral withdrawal from the Pact would not be tolerated under circumstances that Moscow could not control. It also underlined the indispensability of the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union and her readiness to use force to keep an orthodox Communist party in power. (33:4)

## ALBANIA--1961

From the very beginning of the Warsaw Pact, the Albanians had disagreements over the interpretation of the Pact's political role. This was different from the other Pact members in that Albania still had a Stalinist government in power. They also, quite naturally, opposed Krushchev's destalinization program. (23:9)

By the early 60's, the Albanian's had formed a relationship with China. They send a plea to Moscow in hopes of gaining a moderated Soviet attitude toward China. At the same time, the Soviets sent a secret letter to the Albanians asking them to form an anti-China pact. (29:49)

The situation started to worsen. In August, 1961, the Albanians did not attend the meeting of the Warsaw Pact First Secretaries. This was the first time a member did not attend. At the meeting's conclusion, an official communique on the German problem was released. Albania also released a statement that was much longer, more anti-American and more concerned with advancing the cause of socialism. This was the only separate statement ever issued on a joint Warsaw Pact discussion topic. (29:50)

Albania was excluded thereafter from all other meetings. The Albanians went so far as to take control of

the submarine base at Valona. After 1961, Albania played no further role. They withdrew officially from the Warsaw Pact in 1968, after the Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia. (23:9)

#### PRAGUE SPRING--1968

Up until January, 1968, Czechoslovakia had suffered under a series of repressionist governments. The country was stagnating. When Dubcek took over he was committed to making reforms.

Throughout the spring, he began a program of liberalization that had three main aims: the political liberalization of the Stalinist model, economic reform that would result in an efficient and decentralized economy and federalization of the national system giving greater equality to the Slovak minority. (39:91)

The reform movement was caused by tensions between outmoded doctrine and modern political and economic practices. This was characterized in the fact that during the 50s, the Czech's followed strict dogmatic adherence to Communist ideology and, as a result, wound up with a political and economic system that produced less and less. Their industrial base, once the best, experienced actual decline. (39:90)

Changes were necessary. Many were made including freeing the economy from central planning, making managers responsible at the local level, incentives were encouraged as opposed to production penalties and Slovaks were given full autonomy. (39:91)

This program of liberalization caused anxiety among other Warsaw Pact members as they could see events getting out of hand. The main danger as far as the Soviet Union was concerned was the loss of orthodox Communist Party control. The Soviets attempted to regain control through political discussions, propaganda and offensive troop movements. (23:11)

The Czech and Russian Politburos held a series of meetings and it appeared that the Soviets would allow the Czechs to proceed with liberal reforms. By July, it was apparent that events were still moving too quickly. (23:12) On July 15, the "Warsaw Letter," signed by all Pact members except Rumania and Albania, warned Dubcek to heed Soviet communist leadership's advice and slow down. (6:56) This, in effect, was an ultimatum that outlined the justification for an invasion. (29:102)

The situation continued to deteriorate throughout the summer. Supposed disagreements over military exercises in and around Czechoslovakia became a bone of contention.

Dubcek kept assuring Moscow that he was committed to maintaining socialism in Czechoslovakia. Pravda, at one point, described Czechoslovakia as slipping over the edge of counterrevolution. (29:105)

Numerous editorials in Pravda addressed Czechoslovakia's "bad attitude" toward the Pact. Pravda stated that it would be impossible to tolerate a break in the organization as it would contradict the vital interests of all the other members. (29:106)

Moscow had drawn the line, but Dubcek ignored the advice. The Soviets had no choice but to invade with a combined Warsaw Pact force. Interestingly enough, the numerous exercises throughout the spring and summer were a cover for the logistics buildup to carry out the invasion. In addition, The Warsaw Pact High Command was not involved in either planning the exercises or the invasion. (23:13-15)

Militarily, the plan was flawless. The Czech forces put up no resistance. Politically it was a fiasco in that the government they sought to remove never left office. The October Treaty specified harsh terms. In return for the gradual withdrawal of Soviet and Eastern European troops occupying the country, the Dubcek regime legalized stationing an unspecified number of Soviet troops for an unspecified period of time. Also, there would be no

compensation for any of the damage caused during the invasion. (29:108)

The invasion was really the first demonstration of what became labeled as the "Brezhnev Doctrine" where he explained that there were limitations to sovereignty for Communist bloc countries. Brezhnev stated that the right to self determination was acceptable as long as it did not jeopardize the interests of Communism in their own countries or in any other state of the socialist commonwealth. It also enunciated the right of the Soviet government to interfere internally in Warsaw Pact nations if it was necessary. (6:57)

#### HUNGARY'S NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM

Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was introduced in 1968 by Janos Kadar. It was an economic and social reform movement with far ranging implications. Its attempt was to liberalize internal life from Communist politics allowing the people to remove politics from their daily lives. At the same time, however, the government would remain staunchly pro-Moscow in its foreign policy. (39:97)

Most issues were permitted to be discussed on their own merits. The Communist Party only insisted on

maintaining control over politics vs economic and social issues. (39:97)

The reasons for the changes were the result of the many disastrous decisions made in the preceding years. In 1959, 70% of all arable land was in the private sector and steady economic growth had been achieved. That year, the decision was made for massive collectivization which resulted in a disaster. Over the years, many people left the farms for the industrial sector where wages were higher. However, that sector ultimately slumped and fell short of its expectations. (20:156)

The fundamental mechanisms of this program were the reintroduction of a market mechanism, prices that would be gradually adjusted to conform to the world economy, the stressing of profit motives and incentives and private business given a freer hand to operate. (39:97)

The NEM called for a three tiered pricing system. One level of fixed prices for raw materials, food and certain products. A second had maximum rates for other specified products. A third allowed a free price system for the rest of the products. This system allowed for a closer relationship between wages and profits, for investment by the State in only major projects and more independence for collectives in their investments. (29:159)

Hungary had managed to move as far away from the Soviet model as was thought permissible. It did, in fact, challenge communist authority. But since it did not affect the political arena, it was condoned by Moscow. Although there were many problems, the reforms did lift the economic stagnation.

#### ROMANIAN STRIKES--1977-1982

On four separate occasions 1977, 1980, 1981 and 1982, Rumanian workers staged a series of strikes. These were staged at several mines and oil fields. On two occasions, the strikers even seized the officials who came to provide calm. (39:97)

At first, the strikes seemed to be mere economic dysfunctions. The workers primary aims were for better allocation of food, meat in the stores and a simpler way to resolve local grievances. (39:97)

All four times the government gave in but nothing changed. Higher work quotas were demanded, the workers remained exploited and scarcity of everything remained.

Ceausescu, and his dictatorial band had systematically mismanaged the political, social and economic

life of Romania. The only thing that kept the government operating was terror.

## POLAND AND THE RISE OF SOLIDARITY

A precursor to the events of 1989 had its roots in the unrest that prevailed during the 1970s and early 80s. The Gierek government's economic and political policies had failed to solve some of the fundamental problems, just as previous regimes had failed. (39:94)

The mass demonstrations in 1970 had been as a result of increased prices for food and fuel and had to be put down by the army and police units. As food became scarce in 1976, riots again broke out. The police were ordered to fire on workers who set fire to the Communist Party headquarters. The army was called in but were ordered by Gen Jaruzelski, their commander, not to fire. (39:94)

New strikes broke out again in mid 1980 when meat prices doubled. The government was beginning to lose control. From August, 1980 until December, 1981, a new trade union, Solidarity, formed under the leadership of Lech Walesa. (39:94)

Solidarity's major demand was for greater economic and political rights. They became a real force and

initiated many changes. They were granted the right to form a free trade union, were granted relative freedom of the press, assembly and speech and liberal passport laws were enacted allowing for greater movement. (39:94)

The body hardest hit was the Communist party. The leadership was fearful of losing their positions so they tried to sabotage the changes. The Party was forced on the defensive. They had to recognize the workers right to strike, to have free Saturdays, form a free trade union, and the right of workers councils to have a say in the hiring and firing of managers. (39:95)

The Party was becoming weaker and would not implement the changes. Solidarity was becoming more radical and demanded a referendum to determine what form of government would be created. (39:95)

General Jaruzelski put an end to the reforms. He used selected army units and security forces to organize a coup and established a military junta. Martial law was established. Since the army acted on its own to crush Solidarity, it also served to make the party less relevant. (39:95)

The prime mover behind the whole operation was still the Soviet Union. Their troops were ready to lend assistance if needed. Jaruzelski did not implement any of

the reforms. He figured that the people would prefer a dictatorship that provided food to a democracy and anarchy that didn't. He never solved the problem but only exacerbated the social and political tensions that would end with the real reforms in 1989. (39:96)

## CHAPTER V

### THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

History may one day show that 1989 was the most amazing years for political change ever. Essentially in six months, the face of Eastern Europe has changed 180 degrees. Communism is dead! has cried many newspaper and magazine articles. How could this radical change happen? It's fairly obvious that all of the elements were present to make it so; political repression, economic decay and social unrest. In the following pages, the situation in each country will be explored for its unique circumstances.

The situation in Poland had been fertile for many years. Ever since the Polish October of 1956 through the rise of Solidarity and martial law in the early 80s, Poland was ready to lead the change. Unable to take on the government directly, the Polish underground used its imagination to help keep the resistance movement alive. They had a network of over 500 publication operations turning out newspapers, bulletins and books. (24:23)

At the same time, all efforts on the part of the Jaruzelski government to introduce economic reforms were disastrous. Largely because they consisted of half-measures that had no popular support. The only way to stave off a popular revolt was to strike a deal with Solidarity, the union the government had vowed to crush in 1981, refused to negotiate with as recently as November, 1988 and then finally legalized in April, 1989. (42:17)

At the time Solidarity was legalized, the government also allowed them to participate in a partly free election, gambling that the government would hold its own. Solidarity won 99 of 100 seats in the Senate and all 161 seats in the ruling lower house, the Sejm. (42:17)

Although the Communists still retained a working majority, they were losing control of the political situation. Even the Communist deputies were getting out of control. In August, 1989, the Sejm voted to condemn the Soviet Bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. (42:18)

Lech Walesa offered to form a broad coalition government which had essentially been described as a coup d'etat. On August 24, 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was confirmed as the first non-Communist prime minister of Eastern Europe since 1948. (1:9)

Why did the Soviets allow this to happen? Mikhail Gorbachev feared the greater danger of a revolt in Poland. Such a turn of events with the inevitable repression would have amounted to the death of perestroika. Gorbachev's credibility, both at home and abroad would have been destroyed. And, since perestroika depends heavily on increased Western loans, trade and technology transfers, a crackdown or invasion would have had serious ramifications. (24:23)

The bigger problem for Gorbachev was the example that Poland was setting for the rest of Eastern Europe. It was quite clear in the past that challenges to Communist rule would not be tolerated nor would any talk of leaving the Warsaw Pact be tolerated. Walesa's reassurances that Poland would not leave the Pact helped matters some, but may not hold in the future. (24:23)

The major problem and challenge confronting Poland is how to fix an economy that is in shambles after 40 years of neglect. The government is determined to change from a centrally planned to a market economy. They have introduced a number of emergency measures and have applied for, and received, tremendous amounts of aid from the International Monetary Fund, the US, West Germany, France and especially Japan.

Observing the happenings in Poland, reformers in Hungary pushed to achieve the same ends--the demise of Communism. The revolution, launched by reforms within the Communist Party, had expected to exchange free elections for selecting the country's new head of state. (1:9) Not only did this not happen but in early October, 1989, the Communist Party disbanded itself. The government also disbanded the "cells" within the factories and the Worker's Guard, the Party's private army.

The major political reforms enacted by the new government included transforming the Communist government into a western-style Socialist Party committed to pluralism, constitutional rule and a free market economic system. The country changed its name back to the Republic of Hungary, legalized opposition political parties and banned Party organizing in the work place. (32:49) Also, travel restrictions from East Germany were removed ultimately becoming one of the major factors in their democratization process.

Economic reform will present the real challenge to the new government. They hope to introduce more market pricing, cut subsidies for inefficient State industries, scrap restrictions on private ownership and encourage entrepreneurship. (40:10) The government must also eliminate the old Communist bureaucracy, which will take some doing.

In addition, Hungary is struggling to pay the interest on the 22 billion it owes to Western governments and financial institutions. This accounts for nearly half of the country's hard currency earnings. (35:19) Inflation, currently in 1989-90 averaging about 20%, will more than likely continue to grow.

There are many dangers associated with these tremendous changes. Social problems of unprecedented proportion will definitely result. How the Hungarian people accept inflation and unemployment will determine how long these changes remain in effect.

Militarily, Hungary has stopped short of questioning its membership in the Warsaw Pact, so far. However, Party leader Rezső Nyers has stated that Hungary's continued active role would depend on what internal reforms take place within the system. (36:49) Negotiations are also under way for Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary.

Probably the most significant surprise in Eastern Europe was the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. The Wall, that since 1961, had stood as a constant reminder of the division between East and West, is now open. In just six weeks, the people had driven the Communists from power and secured a promise of reform--all by peaceful

means. This was more of a civil rights movement than a revolution. (41:31)

As East Germany's neighbors, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, opened their borders to allow East Germans to escape to the West, thousands chose to leave. In fact, over 200,000 left in 1989. This exodus caused severe employment problems and, together with the resultant "brain drain," is having a devastating economic impact on the country.

Also, peaceful demonstrations in East Germany have had a great effect. In major cities such as Dresden and Leipzig, as many as 500,000 demonstrators gathered in the streets to call for reforms, adding to the tremendous pressure on the government.

Mikhail Gorbachev, as much as anyone, helped effect and accelerate the changes. After Gorbachev's visit to East Germany to celebrate their 48th anniversary, Erich Honecker, the leader for the past 18 years was relieved of his post. His protege, Egon Krenz, assumed the leadership. Although considered a Communist hard-liner and not really trusted by the reformists, he did initiate some changes in travel restrictions and let young people perform non-military work instead of national service. (14:55) He also promised numerous other reforms such as free and secret elections.

Much of this effort resulted after the trip Krenz made to Moscow.

At the end of November, 1989, in an unprecedented move, the entire Politburo and Parliament resigned. Numerous incidents involving the Stasi, the secret police, have also materialized. The people have forced their way into the Stasi headquarters to insure that the massive evidence of intrusion into their lives was not lost or destroyed. As Dr. Jerry Collester stated during an Air War College lecture..."this was a typical German revolution: It happened only on nights and weekends to be sure that the people were able to go to work during the day."

Demonstrations in Bulgaria led to the abrupt resignation of Todor Zhivkov, the senior leader in the Communist bloc for the past 35 years. He was replaced by Peter Mladenov who stated that there was no alternative to reform only it had to be done within the framework of Socialism. As many as 50,000 demonstrators called for swift democratic changes.

Zhivkov probably caused his own downfall when he chose in May, 1989 to encourage the mass exodus of ethnic Turks. Some 310,000 left before Turkey could close the border. This also caused some severe internal employment and

economic problems with so many people departing so quickly. (12:56)

Mladenov sought to oust Zhivkov after he promoted his incompetent son, Vladimir, to run the Central Committee Department for Culture. He forged an alliance with other leaders and, with the tacit approval of Moscow, forced a vote for Zhivkov's resignation in a Politburo meeting on November 9, 1989. (12:57)

As this change occurred, it appeared that the new government would seek economic reforms and some amount of glasnost, but would stop short of giving up Communist rule. In early 1990, the Communists agreed to give up power, again supporting the lesson that economic change does not stick unless it is preceded by political change. (12:57)

For the first time since 1969, the year after the Prague Spring, thousands of demonstrators openly marched in Prague and called for democratic changes. The people could see how events in Poland and Hungary were producing changes. Much of the impetus for change resulted from the brutal response by the police to the November 17, 1989 peaceful rally. The violence prompted protests and forced the Communists to negotiate. Previously in Czechoslovakia, Milos Jakes, the country's long-time leader, did little in the way of change. Jakes also knew that the church and labor unions

were intimidated and would do little to threaten the government. (37:32)

But pressure to reform was being felt, even within the Politburo. In November, 1989, Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec told Parliament that economic reform could not work without political reform. (37:32) Although Czechoslovakia was relatively well-off compared to other Eastern European countries, production had stagnated and the quality of textiles had deteriorated. In addition, air pollution is among the worst in the world. (37:33)

In December, 1989, a new Cabinet was formed under Premier Marian Calfa that consisted of 11 non Communists and 10 Communists. Article 6 of the constitution that banned political opposition was struck down and Parliament voted overwhelmingly to support a program of Western style parliamentary democracy and a market economic system. Elections were scheduled for late December and Vaclav Havel, the country's first non Communist President since 1948, was overwhelmingly elected. (7:A-3)

Another major development was discussions with the Soviets over troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia. Currently, 80,000 Soviet troops are on Czech soil. No official date for final withdrawal was determined but it could happen soon. In addition, Alexander Dubcek, the former

Communist Party leader who was ousted during the Prague Spring, was named head of Parliament. (26:A-1)

The last of the Eastern European nations to succumb to the democratization process was Romania on December 21, 1989. It was also the only country that experienced any real bloodshed along the way. Romania had been ruled mostly as a dictatorship since 1965 by Nicolae Ceausescu and his immediate family.

Many economic and social problems led to the overthrow and eventual killing of Ceausescu in December, 1989. Shortages of heat and food were widespread. Repression was commonplace.

In Timisoara, factory workers rebelled because of a lack of food despite having the largest pork processing plants in Europe and factories that baked fresh bread for export. Eventually the police were ordered to shoot the protestors creating chaos and disorder. In Bucharest, the police had also fired on rebel crowds during a peaceful demonstration killing many people.

It took longer for Romania to change because Ceausescu was the power within the country. He and his family ran the country as their own personal kingdom and everyone was kept under control by his personal security forces. Even after Ceausescu fled the country on December 21

and eventually was executed on December 26, his security forces kept fighting on.

The government was put under the control of the National Salvation Front that will serve by decree until elections are held in May, 1990.

## ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE

There is no question that Mikhail Gorbachev has been the catalyst behind the democratization process in Eastern Europe. His program of perestroika has set the tone, not only for Russia, but for all of Eastern Europe. It would have been difficult for Gorbachev to say change was necessary within the Soviet Union and then use his troops to force his allies to remain unchanged. His credibility was at stake.

The Soviets set the tone for democratization through a basically open election process in early 1989. This attempt to build a law-based state in the Soviet Union made no sense if they kept an empire in Eastern Europe. (11:A1)

Change also became necessary because of the severe economic crisis and challenges being experienced by the Russians. The costs associated with maintaining the empire was estimated by the Rand Corporation to be about 37 billion a year in subsidies between 1980 and 1983 with 50% going to

Eastern Europe. With the decline of hard currency from oil revenues, this became a more difficult task. (11:A22)

The final political and moral choice occurred after the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square in China. This situation caused the Russian leaders to anticipate how they would react in similar circumstances. The situation in China only served to strengthen Gorbachev's belief that a modern society cannot be built by relying on tanks and bayonets. (11:A22)

According to Dr. John Stoessinger, Professor of International Affairs at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, there were three reasons why the changes have happened now. The first was that the Russian economy is a total disaster. They, like the US, have spent tremendous amounts of money building military power. They already have enough hardware to take care of themselves. Rather than put more into the military, Gorbachev has to put more into economic and technological development thus causing economic necessities to dictate military and political policy. (36:11)

The second reason was that the leaders of the US and USSR have begun to develop a relationship. Presidents Regan and Gorbachev met five times and gradually Mr. Regan stopped using the term "evil empire" to describe the Russians. President Bush has perpetuated the friendship and now the

chances of a nuclear confrontation appear to be very remote. (36:11)

The last reason is that Gorbachev has many problems of his own to worry about without having to concern himself with Eastern Europe. Problems in the Baltic Republics to nationality issues in Azerbaijan, to major economic problems keep him busy full time and have forced this measure of accommodation. (36:11)

In assessing what could possibly happen in Eastern Europe in the years to come, one must look at the major problems that need to be addressed. The two major problems are the synthesis and final resolution of the political systems that will evolve throughout Eastern Europe and the economic system changes necessary to revive the economies that, according to many experts, are on the verge of total collapse.

Other significant issues are the resultant social problems such as unemployment, homelessness and environmental problems that will result as each country tries to heal the economic and political chaos that has existed for the past 40 years. Probably the key potentially destabilizing problems are nationalistic and ethnic problems within the Eastern Bloc countries rather than any real threat from outside the Bloc.

One must ask whether the democratization process was inevitable all along? The December 2, 1989 Economist concurs that the democratization process was simply a consequence of the things Gorbachev has done and said. (15:11) The Los Angeles Times, in its end of year, 1989 assessment of the events of Eastern Europe saw the resultant changes as a natural consequence of economic failure and long suppressed popular yearnings for freedom and national self determination. Changes could have been delayed and effected differently if the Soviet leaders had elected to keep their eyes closed to historical trends. (11:A22)

The basic lesson learned is that the violence of transition in each country was inversely proportional to the foresight shown by the Communist leaders in their effort to share power. In countries where they willingly did so, the transition of power was peaceful. In Romania, where Ceausescu refused to capitulate, the change was bloody. (11:A22) Without the go-ahead from the Soviets, however, none of the changes would have been possible or bloodless.

The transition from the Brezhnev Doctrine, which would have fought to keep Socialist countries in line, to the Sinatra Doctrine, that allows each of the Eastern European nations to "do it their way," certainly smoothed the path of change. Gorbachev realized that reform-minded

governments or even non-Communist governments could guarantee Soviet security better than the old, unpopular Communist governments. (33:22)

Gorbachev could also be gambling that troop reductions in NATO and the Warsaw Pact would speed the construction of his "common European dream house." (33:22) The bigger Soviet fear was, and has proved to be, an increase in civil unrest within the Soviet Union.

Economically, most of Eastern Europe is facing problems of immense proportions. In the short term, just surviving the first winter of 1989-1990 will be a significant challenge. Shortages of fuel for heating and food will be significant. This could possibly create tremendous unrest among the very people who want the changes to happen--now--but see no change from the past. Currently, these nations do not possess the political infrastructures to diffuse public dissatisfaction. (9:A19)

The experts agree that changing from a central planning system to a market economy will be difficult. (9:A19) In fact, no one has ever done it before where a bureaucracy was already in place. The reconstruction of the economic systems after WW II was fairly simple in that the infrastructures of the defeated nations were decimated and had to be rebuilt from scratch. The problem is

that the current systems are so terribly inefficient that they may be beyond repair. (9:A19) Billions of dollars are being raised through the United States, West Germany, France and the World Bank to try to assist each of these Eastern European nations get a start on revamping their crumbling systems.

For the future, each of these nations is looking toward EC 92 and developing trade relations with Western Europe now. If they don't build the relationships now, they could be at a severe disadvantage after 1992. (34:5)

Throughout the past 40 years, the Russians consistently discouraged trade between the Warsaw Pact nations and basically restricted their relations to dealing only with the Soviet Union. The Soviets have also realized that they need to do everything possible to encourage trade with the West in order to gain hard currency and the technology necessary to produce quality manufactured goods that can compete internationally. (34:7)

The future, economically, for the Soviets and Eastern Europe is linked to EC 92. The prospect of a single European market of 320 million people has a major impact. (34:7) In addition, for the Soviets to maintain super power status into the next century, they must be careful to insure that their economic link to the US and Japan is secure. Even Gorbachev realizes that the international standing of any

country is determined by the performance of its economy, not its colonial possessions. (28:3)

Social issues will cause numerous stresses on all of the Eastern European nations, including the Soviet Union, as they struggle to change political and economic systems. For the past 40 years, basically all of the people have received cradle to grave treatment from the government. Everyone had a job whether any work was performed or not. Likewise, medical treatment and housing were also provided.

As the system changes, so does the problem. Changing to a market economy forces people to work and work for a profit. Those that don't perform go out of business or lose their jobs. No longer will the right to have a job be a guarantee of the state.

Some of the worst environmental problems exist throughout Eastern Europe. Air and water pollution in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Russia is absolutely severe and must be dealt with immediately.

Probably the most destabilizing influences for the future are the ethnic and nationality issues. Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing in Foreign Affairs, has addressed these issues directly. He believes that we have ignored the issue for too long. He points out that Eastern Europe has only two ethnically homogeneous states, Poland and Hungary. All of

the other states have diverse societies of one sort or another. (4:3) Each has potential problems with one or more neighbors.

Poland has territorial grievances with Czechoslovakia and East Germany as well as the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia and Hungary still have resentments over the treatment of respective national minorities within the other's borders. Even more acute is the potentially explosive dispute between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania. And the disputes go on and on. (4:4) The problem is that each of the nations will basically be out from the watchful eye of the Soviets. As troops are pulled back to the USSR, old enmities could erupt quickly.

Of even greater consequence is the situation in the Soviet Union which has been fueled by the democratization efforts throughout Eastern Europe. This is likely to lead to demands for greater self-determination by the Russian republics themselves.

This nationalistic issue has become the central dilemma of Soviet political life even overshadowing the economic crisis. (4:10) It can be seen in the Baltics as they look to devolute power from Moscow, peacefully. It also explodes in the other republics periodically as can be seen in Armenia and Azerbaijan. As many as 350,000 have been made

homeless by national strife. (4:11) What are the chances that Gorbachev will allow the same sharing of power with the Communists in the Soviet Union? An after the fact addendum has seen this very event beginning to unfold. Simply amazing!

Other issues that must be addressed for the future are the necessity to maintain NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. How many troops can be withdrawn by both sides and insure stability and peace in the future? Conventional Force Reduction and START talks balance the two alliances.

Will Gorbachev survive to continue leading the reform movement throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? Where will the power be in the European Theater? A reunited Germany? The European Community? France? Great Britain?

I think the Europe of the year 2000 will certainly be dominated by the countries that will make up the new European community. I also think that despite their generally chauvinistic attitude, Europeans will be forced by necessity to form a close trading alliance with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe while maintaining close relations with the US and Japan.

There is every reason to believe that the reduced military threat throughout the European theater will cause tremendous numbers of troops to be withdrawn on both sides.

Russia will pull out all troops stationed in Warsaw Pact nations. This will happen because of the reduced threat from the pullout of the US offensive missiles in Germany. Without a direct threat, forward positioning will not be required. The US will pull out a significant number of troops but certainly not all. The remainder will serve as a counter balance to Soviet troops stationed along the Western USSR borders.

The driving force for these changes, besides the reduced threat, is dollars. Both the US and USSR have major deficits that must be brought under control. One way to divert the huge investment in the military-industrial complex of both nations is to reduce the force structure to the level necessary to counter the current and projected threat. Money can then be diverted for other more necessary programs.

It is truly difficult to forecast 10 years ahead considering that six months ago, no one could predict that any of the events in Eastern Europe would occur. Although some experts suggested that the changes were inevitable, nearly all missed the mark completely. To guess what might happen in the future is, at best, foolhardy. We can all hope that the countries of Eastern Europe remember the lessons of the past and that the stronger help the weaker get healthy.

A continent where all countries flourish will be a much better place to live.

The last six months of 1989 were some of the most exciting times the world has ever experienced in political change. Witnessing the changes leads me to believe that anything is possible. The relatively peaceful transition of *Communism* to democracy has proven that the will of man can make anything happen.

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