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IDA PAPER P-2348

THE DEBATE ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND FORCES

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January 1990

Prepared for
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE January, 1990		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 12/88 to 12/89	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Debate about Soviet Military Doctrine and Forces				5. FUNDING NUMBERS C-MDA 903 89C 0003 TA-T-K6-670	
6. AUTHOR(S) Kent D. Lee; Susan L. Clark; Robbin F. Laird					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER IDA Paper P-2348	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) The Pentagon, Room 1D469 Washington, DC 20301				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This paper first describes the principal sources available in the Soviet literature to researchers of security issues. It then identifies seven elements of military affairs that are currently the subject of debate within the Soviet Union. These topics are: Soviet grand strategy; strategic nuclear policy; theater conventional policy; the preferred organizational principle for the Soviet military; reform within the military and factors influencing this reform; economic considerations in defense policy, especially defense conversion efforts; and the ability of glasnost' to penetrate military affairs. It is clear that the Soviet security debate is designed not merely for Western consumption and for the purposes of influencing the West, but rather is integrally interconnected with the process of reform in the Soviet Union itself.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Soviet military doctrine; reasonable sufficiency; strategic nuclear policy; theater conventional policy; military reform; nationalities problems; civilian role in security debate; Soviet political reform; defense conversion; glasnost'; Soviet national security policy; parity; minimum deterrence; defensive doctrine; organizational principle of armed forces; defense budget.				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 83	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Same as report	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		

PREFACE

This study was performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy. Its primary focus was on the changes taking place in Soviet thinking about its military doctrine and security policy. These changes, in turn, clearly have significant implications for the future Soviet force structure. This study sought to identify the emerging trends in these areas in order to contribute to a better Western understanding of these changes and of their implications for both U.S. and NATO policy.

This study was conducted under contract MDA 903 89C 0003; task order number T-K6-670, The Evolution of Soviet Thinking About Military Doctrine: Implications for NATO.

The authors would particularly like to thank the reviewers for this final report, Dr. Stephen Blank and Dr. Christopher Jones, as well as the many participants in the working group sessions held at IDA over the past year.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following an overview of the principal sources in the Soviet literature available to researchers of military issues, this paper outlines seven areas of current debate in Soviet military affairs: grand strategy, strategic nuclear policy, theater conventional policy, the future organization of the Soviet armed forces, internal military restructuring, economic considerations, and glasnost'. In each area the assessment focuses explicitly on East-West relations in the traditional sense, i.e., on the European arena, so as to best determine the various implications for U.S. interests in particular and the NATO Alliance more broadly.

The discussion of Soviet grand strategy analyzes the issues, players, and important trends in the debate. Considerable attention is being focused on how much defense is sufficient, with serious implications for the future structure and duties of the Soviet armed forces. This section also identifies the central elements of Soviet national security policy. Although there is widespread agreement that the Soviet economy can no longer support its military strategy, agreement on what changes are necessary has not yet been reached.

The section on strategic nuclear policy looks first at the relationship between parity and reasonable sufficiency. The new concept of parity now under discussion is admittedly confusing to Soviets and Westerners alike. The focus then shifts to the recent minimum deterrence debate, much of which is similar to earlier debates in the United States. This subject, in particular, highlights a split between civilian and military analysts.

In the realm of theater conventional policy, military analysts continue to dominate. The section on this debate discusses defensive doctrine; strategy and operations, as shaped by the defensive doctrine debate; and tactics and force structure, including the difficulties of implementing a defensive orientation in Soviet military training.

The discussion about the Soviet military's future organizational principle is driven by the question: What kind of military should the USSR have? Namely, should it maintain its current system, wherein most servicemen and non-commissioned officers are conscripts and the officers are volunteers, or should it adopt one of the three alternatives now being actively discussed? The ideas of national formations, territorial-militia formations, and a professional (volunteer) force are each examined in turn and the key proponents and opponents of each identified.

The section on reform within the military covers three perspectives. First, it analyzes the effects of Soviet political reform, as stipulated by the Nineteenth Party Conference, on the Soviet military. Next, it identifies the nationalities problems within the armed forces, focusing mainly on interethnic tensions and the inability of a growing number of conscripts to speak Russian. Finally, this section looks at the effects of legal reform on the military, including how the officer corps actually will be reduced, in accordance with President Gorbachev's pledge at the United Nations in 1988.

In terms of economic issues, the main area of interest in the military field is that of conversion. Particularly since Gorbachev's speech, a great deal of attention has been directed to converting defense industries to civilian uses. This section examines the expectations, progress, and difficulties involved in this effort.

In conclusion, this paper assesses the ability of glasnost' to penetrate military affairs. The effects of the 19th Party Conference are especially relevant in this respect. The Soviets have begun to produce and release data and information on some of their weapons systems, the defense budget, and even military history. Admittedly, much remains to be accomplished, but it is a step in the right direction. One of the key difficulties will be trying to overcome the conservative backlash, particularly among certain segments of the military.

THE DEBATE ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND FORCES

The growing turbulence in Soviet military affairs today reflects to a great degree the growing turbulence in Soviet society generally. Indeed, the changes taking place provide a new and far more complex context for assessing the current state of the USSR's Armed Forces and the debates about their future. As a basis for making such assessments, it is critical to consider the abysmal and worsening state of the Soviet economy; the profound political and legal reforms that are still evolving; the growing social crises, encompassing ethnic turmoil, nationalist movements, and ecological catastrophes; and the equally profound events in Eastern Europe.

As a consequence of these trends and events, the Soviet Union is changing fundamentally and probably irrevocably. Today the country is being forced to channel its energies into its domestic ills. And as many Western analysts have begun to argue, so fundamental are the USSR's domestic troubles that this shift inward almost certainly will not be a transient one, with a new, invigorated, "leaner and meaner" superpower reemerging after only a few years. Indications are that this *peredyshka* (breathing space) will last much longer. Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that when the new Soviet structures emerge, they will do so in a fundamentally altered European political landscape no longer easily conceptualized as East versus West, NATO versus Warsaw Pact.

This does not mean that a USSR preoccupied with reform will soon drop out of world politics. It does mean, however, that the country's foreign policy and military strategy will be designed as never before to serve the goal of domestic reconstruction, a reconstruction necessary for the very survival of the USSR as a federated political entity and as a world power (if not a superpower). Thus, economic, social, and domestic political considerations are driving Soviet security policy.

Many of the changes and their significance have become clear only in the past year or even few months. And if these events have been a perception-changing experience for Western analysts of the Soviet Union, their effect on the Soviets has been even more telling. Certain high-ranking officials talk openly about their own psychological and perceptual changes in recent times. Marshal Sergei Akhromeev offers a vivid example, noting in an interview: "If I consider the way I was thinking in 1985, and the way I think

now, in 1989, then I must say that while my world view has not changed fundamentally it has become modified to a significant degree." Subsequently, when asked if he thought the United States would launch a war against the USSR, Akhromeev responded: "My personal opinion is no. Today they have no such intention. By the way, this is the result of the hard work of the past four years. In 1984 I would not have answered this question in this way."¹

For U.S. analysts and policymakers, these trends and changes are of profound significance. First, the traditional bipolar world is being replaced by an increasingly multipolar one, a fact which will affect Soviet behavior and policies in the international arena. Second, to the extent that the Soviets are still rethinking various security and doctrinal concepts, Western opportunities to help shape this thinking should be exploited as much as possible, particularly in the context of face-to-face meetings. And third, the West must broaden the way in which it analyzes Soviet security policy in order to understand the dynamics of change in the Soviet Union and to participate effectively in building a new European security order.

A. SOVIET SOURCES

As with other elements of Soviet life, some notable changes have taken place in the quality and orientation of Soviet press publications during the period of glasnost'. A review of this literature is both necessary and useful when assessing the diversity of opinions now being expressed in the Soviet Union. The periodicals and other sources discussed in this paper include those that concentrate solely on military issues as well as those that focus on a broader range of topics. This list is not meant to be comprehensive; rather, it is designed to highlight those sources that have generally proved the most useful and informative.

1. Journals

On security issues, two journals have long produced the best analysis and commentary: *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], or ZVO,² and *Voennaya Mysl'* [Military Thought], both of which fall under the purview of the USSR

¹ Interview with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev, Budapest television, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter FBIS-SOV)-89-125, June 30, 1989, pp. 72, 73. A similar statement can also be found in his article "Memory of War and Duty to Peace," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 9, 1989, pp. 1-2, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-089, May 10, 1989, p. 100.

² Before 1973, it was known as *Voennyi zarubezhnik*.

Ministry of Defense and have been issued monthly by the Military Publishing House, *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star],³ since 1921 and 1918, respectively. Unfortunately, however, both journals have been difficult to obtain at times. *ZVO* focuses on military-political and military-technical questions in capitalist countries and some Third World states, with the primary emphasis on NATO countries. Each issue is generally broken down into the following sections: an editorial usually dealing with Soviet forces or military thinking; general problems in the armed forces; individual sections on the Army, Navy, Air Force; the military economy and infrastructure; and miscellaneous weapons and personnel facts. For understanding Soviet perspectives on a given country, articles examining that country's military infrastructure often provide some of the best information. Frequently such articles include a map of the nation's key military facilities, which provides a good sense of the targeting priorities Soviet military planners would have in the event of war. As a general rule, *ZVO* does not seem to have been penetrated by glasnost' to the same extent as many other journals and has tended to adhere to a more conservative viewpoint.

One of the problems with *ZVO* has been its limited availability. It became available for Western subscription only in 1978, and in 1986 this right was suspended. It is, in fact, widely rumored that the Soviets decided to forbid the export of this journal because Western analysts were obtaining too much good information from it. One credible test of how much the Soviets have changed would be whether they will allow Western subscriptions to this journal to resume.

In contrast to *ZVO*, *Voennaya Mysl'* is becoming more available to Western researchers. Until 1989, each issue carried the caveat "only for officers," which naturally restricted its availability. Consequently, it was frequently difficult for U.S. analysts to access this journal. Many U.S. Sovietologists specializing in military affairs have viewed *Voennaya Mysl'* as the most authoritative for Soviet thinking about their military-political and military-technical questions. Many of the articles focus on strategy, operational art, military science, or tactical issues within the Soviet armed forces; each issue also usually contains an article devoted to a fraternal army and sometimes to developments in foreign armies. While the journal certainly merits the respect and attention of Western analysts, the information it offers has not necessarily differed from that found in the open-source materials. Moreover, there is some concern now that, since the journal is no longer restricted, the quality of the articles has begun to decline. Beginning in January 1990, *Voennaya Mysl'* became available for Western subscription.

³ *Krasnaya zvezda* is also the name of the Ministry of Defense's daily newspaper. It is examined below.

A third military journal, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* [Communist of the Armed Forces], has been issued twice a month since 1920 and is the "military-political magazine of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy." It is designed to address problems and issues within the Soviet military and contains such sections as the Marxist-Leninist training of officers; training and education; ideological work; personnel issues; perestroika in the military; and the military's role and duties. Of perhaps greater interest to most Western analysts are other articles, frequently found under a section on current affairs which address such topics as strategic stability, parity, security, the Middle East, East-West relations, and nuclear weapons. Along with *ZVO* and *Voennaya Mysl'*, *KVS* belongs on the list of the more conservative journals.

Finally, two other military journals have experienced some change under glasnost': *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* [Military History Journal], or *VIZh*, and *Voennyi vestnik* [Military Herald]. Both fall under the purview of the USSR Ministry of Defense and are published by *Krasnaya zvezda*, the former since 1939, the latter since 1921. Of late, *VIZh* has become an important forum for Soviet analysts in reviewing and revising Soviet military history. Thus, while it was previously useful mainly for analysts of World War II and for occasional references to the applicability of past experience to the present day, *VIZh* now plays a key role in the rapidly changing field of military history, helping to fill in the numerous "blank spots," especially those related to World War II. The general format is of a more military-technical nature, frequently examining the successes and failures of past military operations and the like. Thus, frequently the largest number of articles are devoted to analyzing Soviet military art; other topics include the war economy and the rear, party-political work, and local wars. In general, *VIZh* pays very little attention to other countries' militaries (other than in the context of examining previous wars).

For its part, *Voennyi vestnik* has devoted considerable attention to the importance of defense and defensive operations (mainly at the tactical level), a trend also evident in the closed press of *Voennaya Mysl'*. It is interesting to note that the open literature has been more frank in revealing the difficulties currently being experienced in trying to prepare and conduct defensive operations during troop training and exercises. Broadly speaking, the set-up and categories found in this journal have not changed significantly over the years, but the content has. A new addition has been a section on "perestroika: from word to deed." Other categories have generally remained the same, encompassing the following: the theory and practice of combined-arms battles; troop training and education; specialized troop sections for missiles and artillery, engineer troops, chemical troops, etc.; and military affairs abroad (almost entirely Warsaw Pact and NATO countries). But the specific topics

addressed in each of these sections and the ways in which they are assessed have seen some change. World War II and now Afghanistan are also frequent themes on the pages of this periodical.

In addition, there are periodicals that are dedicated to individual branches of the armed forces or to other specialized areas. Among the former are *Morskoi sbornik* [Naval Digest] and *Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony* [Air Defense Herald], while *Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika* [Air and Space] numbers among the latter. Articles devoted to policy and strategy tend to be less prevalent in such journals, with emphasis placed instead on more technical issues specific to that particular field; *Morskoi sbornik* provides the occasional exception to this rule. Thus, for research focusing on one service or speciality, these journals can be quite useful. Analysts of the broader issues of military affairs, however, will generally find these periodicals of only peripheral interest.

There are other journals that do not specialize solely in military affairs, but which also merit careful reading for analyses of Soviet security affairs. These would include *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [World Economy and International Relations], or *MEMO*; *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* [USA: economics, politics, ideology], or *SShA; Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*; and *Kommunist*. The latter is published eighteen times per year, while the others are issued on a monthly basis.

First published in 1957, the journal *MEMO* is the product of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, or IMEMO. The journal and the institute have been widely respected both within the Soviet Union and in the West for the quality of analysis. As the name suggests, the articles frequently focus on economic issues, and perestroika has certainly provided impetus to this subject. But this is not to say that the sole orientation of the journal is purely economic. East-West, West-West, and Third World relations are frequently addressed, with attention paid to the political, and security, as well as economic, dimensions.⁴ *MEMO* is uniformly one of the highest quality journals produced in the Soviet Union.

A periodical that has undergone some of the greatest changes over the past several years is *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, also published in an English-language version entitled *International Affairs*. Founded in 1954, this journal has for many years frequently been dismissed by the majority of Western analysts, who argued that its contents were of low

⁴ The other socialist economies are not analyzed in this journal. A separate institute--the Institute of Economies of the World Socialist System under Oleg Bogomolov--and its periodical address these countries.

quality and designed primarily for Western consumption. As *International Affairs* has changed under glasnost', so too have Western assessments about it; its reputation has been enhanced dramatically. It has emerged as a vital forum for civilians writing about military affairs and for discussions about the errors of previous Soviet foreign policy, the changing international environment, and the like. The journal also now includes articles written by foreign analysts, primarily Americans, West Europeans, and Japanese. Recognizing the controversial stands many of the articles take, the editorial board has inserted the following disclaimer after the table of contents: "Material published in this journal does not necessarily reflect the views of the Editorial Board." This was the first Soviet journal to contain such a disclaimer.⁵

A newer periodical on the scene, and perhaps one of the best known to American analysts, is *SShA*. Founded in 1970, it is produced by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada. As the name suggests, the journal's primary emphasis is on the United States (with an occasional article about Canada). While some articles simply address U.S. politics and politicians or profile different U.S. states, others cover issues such as arms control, nuclear weapons, and even the lessons of Afghanistan. Thus, East-West issues are frequently examined and the security dimension is a prominent one in these discussions.

Kommunist is the theoretical journal of the CPSU Central Committee. Long known for its tedious and boring articles, *Kommunist* has begun to alter its content and reputation in recent years. Many articles do still fit the old profile; however, about half of the issues now contain at least one noteworthy article. These articles are primarily of a military orientation and encompass such topics as arms control, defense reform, military doctrine, East-West relations, and the economics of defense and security, although the broader changes in Eastern Europe have also been the subject of considerable attention. Perhaps the most frequently cited of the *Kommunist* articles appeared in the first issue of 1988; it was entitled "Challenges of Security: Old and New," co-authored by Vitalii Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov. Thus, glasnost' certainly has had its effect on *Kommunist* as it now includes articles which can be labeled liberal and controversial.⁶

⁵ Beginning with the October 1989 issue of *SShA*, a similar editorial disclaimer was added to its table of contents.

⁶ The use of terms such as "liberal" and "conservative" in this paper must be understood in a Soviet context, not as these terms would be defined and used in the West.

2. Newspapers

Among the daily national newspapers, three are of particular use to analysts of Soviet military affairs: the Party newspaper, *Pravda*, the government newspaper, *Izvestiya*, and the Ministry of Defense's newspaper, *Krasnaya zvezda*. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* are important for their coverage of important domestic events, assessments of the international environment, and notable articles specifically devoted to military issues. Of course *Krasnaya zvezda* contains many more of the latter, particularly articles detailing the daily life and problems of military service, combat readiness and training, perestroika in the military, etc. While *Krasnaya zvezda* has shown some innovation in addressing problems previously ignored, it still tends to speak with a more conservative voice, thereby following the trend of military publications remaining more conservative.

There are also several weekly newspapers that have played important roles in some of the debates about military issues. *Novoe vremya*, which is also published in English as *New Times*, has been one of the leading publications involved in discussions about defensive doctrine and, most recently, about minimum deterrence. In contrast to the military publications, this weekly is noted for its liberal outlook. The same can be said for another weekly, *Moskovskie novosti*, also published in English as *Moscow News*. In both cases, it is easy for Western analysts to obtain the newspapers through subscriptions. In contrast, it is much more difficult for Soviet citizens to find them now that their more liberal, pro-reform stances have made them extremely popular with the public. The last weekly that deserves at least a brief mention is *Literaturnaya gazeta*, which is known as the main periodical for Soviet intellectuals. While this newspaper seldom contains articles devoted to security issues, it has occasionally provided a forum for airing both sides of a debate, such as the desirability of conscripting Soviet university students into the armed forces.

3. Books

The monograph literature is another rich source of information for the analyst of Soviet military affairs. The Military Publishing House, Voenizdat, certainly has no rival for military-technical subjects. But other publishers such as Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya and Nauka frequently offer high-quality analysis of broader issues, including the military-political dimension. Still, given the lengthy process involved in publishing a book (which is compounded by the Soviet requirement that each book pass through the censors), it is not surprising that the writings found in books have lagged considerably behind those in

periodicals in reflecting the effects of glasnost'. All Soviet books scheduled for publication are listed in a weekly magazine called *Novye knigi* [New Books]. This publication, as well as all journals and newspapers, is available for subscription through Kamkin's bookstore and advanced orders for books can be placed there as well.

4. Translations

Such are the main sources used in researching Soviet views of military affairs. Nevertheless, there will always be an occasional noteworthy article in an obscure publication. In such cases, U.S. translation services are particularly useful. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) produce several important periodicals. The FBIS issues a daily report (Monday through Friday) for eight regions of the world, including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The materials contained in these reports are primarily translations (or reprints) of articles from major and minor newspapers and of radio and television broadcasts in the respective countries. The JPRS publishes its reports more sporadically, but it provides translations of articles from many of the important journals, including *MEMO*, *SShA*, *International Affairs*, *ZVO*, and *VIZh*. For researchers who do not read Russian, these translation services are obviously invaluable, although the lag time in translating journal articles is considerable (usually about six months).

Having examined the variety of sources available, it is clear that the civilian and institute publications have taken the lead in promoting reform and change. What is sometimes less clear is the extent to which certain articles might be considered to be "authoritative" statements and others not. The notion of free-wheeling debates in the press is obviously a new one for the Soviet people, a notion that has certainly complicated Western attempts to understand what is now happening in the Soviet Union. The following sections of this paper define some of the changes and debates gleaned from current readings and publications.

B. IDENTIFYING THE CENTRAL DEBATES

During the past two years, a variety of important debates within the USSR have emerged concerning the fate of the Soviet military. With few exceptions, these debates are all interlinked, representing several different levels of analysis. What is fundamentally new is the fact that there is now a debate about the role of the military in Soviet society and about

the role of security policy within Soviet domestic priorities. For purposes of this paper, looking at these issues from a NATO geostrategic perspective, the following seven areas are identified:

- **Grand strategy.** This subject area encompasses Soviet security policy as a whole, in its military, political, and economic dimensions. Included are commentaries on the Soviet defense burden, threat assessments, and nuclear and conventional strategy in general. In short, this category encompasses the concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "parity" in their broadest senses.
- **Strategic nuclear policy.** Most conspicuous of late in this realm have been the running discussions over minimum deterrence, including potential desirable force postures.
- **Theater conventional policy.** Not surprisingly, discussion of Soviet strategy toward Western Europe dominates this literature, although some attention is being focused on Soviet strategy in the Far East, namely toward Japan and China. This literature contains most of the analysis on the practical implications of "defensive doctrine" and is where the professional military is most strongly engaged.
- **Shape of the future Soviet army.** This category encompasses discussions about the organizational principle of the Soviet armed forces. Should the traditional mixed professional cadre/conscription system be continued or should a new system, such as a territorial militia or national formations, be established? Demographic factors, the nationalities question, economic constraints, and Soviet theater conventional strategy are all factors that must be considered when making such a decision.
- **Internal military restructuring.** Largely an intra-military debate (but with important contributions from civilians), discussions in this realm revolve around the central themes of "democratization" in the armed forces and the effects of Gorbachev's unilateral reductions.
- **Economic considerations below the level of grand strategy.** The central themes in this literature include the problem of the conversion of Soviet defense industry to civilian production, economic efficiency within the Soviet military, and the impact of foreign economic involvement on the military.
- **Glasnost' in military affairs.** Despite impressive inroads, a growing number of commentators are recognizing that thorough assessments of all of the above issues remain greatly fettered by the military bureaucracy's penchant for secrecy, both in current issues and in historically relevant ones.

C. SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY

1. The Issues

How much defense is sufficient? That is the question Alexei Arbatov poses in the most provocative Soviet essay on military affairs in years.⁷ No one had previously woven the separate strands of threat assessment, resource constraints, and profound criticism into concrete recommendations for the future structure and duties of the Soviet Armed Forces in providing security to the Soviet state.

In fact, looking at Soviet security policy from the systemic "level of analysis,"⁸ the paucity of serious, critical attention (in the open literature, at least) given to this subject is striking. "Grand strategy at the systemic level" is meant to encompass discourses on the interrelationship and nature of the USSR's political system, economy, foreign policy, and military strategy in pursuit of national security. While the statements and writings of various Soviet leaders and high officials--from Lenin to Gorbachev--have often addressed this subject, rarely have they incorporated sufficient candor and detail. Moreover, since this paper is interested in detail, change and alternative views in this realm, more must be considered than the musings of Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Yakovlev, and the like. Although such statements are critically important, for the purposes of this paper they essentially provide a baseline against which other debates may be measured.

To date, six central elements of Soviet national security policy can be identified. First, Soviet security policy has been too fixated upon military solutions. Consequently, the military has become too large organizationally; it must be scaled back to a level of reasonable sufficiency. No one yet agrees on a definition for this concept (the lack of agreement provides fodder for many of the current debates). Still, certain elements have been determined, such as: war must be prevented; if war should be forced on the USSR, it should optimally remain conventional; military doctrine must be defensive; troop quality and readiness must improve but with fewer resources; parity must be reconceptualized;

⁷ Alexei Arbatov, "Skol'ko oborony dostatochno?" [How Much Defense is Sufficient?], *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* [hereafter *MZh*], No. 3 (March), 1989, pp. 33-47.

⁸ The essence of the level-of-analysis question in (mainly American) international relations theory concerns the choice of the most appropriate and insightful vantage point for studying the various phenomena of international relations, for example war between states: at the level of the international system as a whole; organizations within states; or decision-making by individuals.

external threats must be subject to critical assessment; and any military strategy must be economically sustainable.

Second, the "security dilemma" is now better appreciated. Steps (primarily military ones) taken by one country to increase its security tend to lead to similar steps by other countries, resulting in a vicious circle and an erosion of security. A third and related element of Soviet national security policy focuses on the fact that security based on nuclear deterrence is not likely to last forever. Some non-military alternative must be found. In effect, these two factors have combined to increase pressure to develop a policy aimed at forestalling hostile coalitions and reducing sources of tension and confrontation at the conventional and nuclear levels.

Fourth, the role of ideology in international relations must be reexamined. "Class values" are now said to be subordinate to values that are common to all of humanity, foremost the value of preventing war. Thus, security must ultimately be a global phenomenon. This notion is often referred to as the "de-ideologization of international relations," although one should not infer that ideology will no longer be important to the USSR. On the contrary, ideology remains critical to understanding Soviet policy in all realms and underlies why the USSR is still perceived as a fundamentally different actor in the international arena. Without some kind of intellectually persuasive ideology, the Soviet Union must relinquish its role as the other superpower; without ideology, it becomes just another "great" power, at best. Thus, "de-ideologization" for the Soviet Union lies somewhere between anticipatory thinking and grasping at straws.

A fifth area of vital concern is the state of the Soviet economy. There is no question that the economy is in critical condition in all areas, and national security demands that it be improved. Economic problems are inextricably linked with the Soviet defense burden.

Finally, the Soviet political and legal system must become more representative, pluralistic, and permissive, with the Supreme Soviet assuming the leading role in this effort. Because these issues are inextricably linked with economic problems, failure in this realm means failure everywhere--on the order of a systemic catastrophe or collapse with unpredictable but probably profound consequences for international relations. By the same token, ultimate success in this realm will likely pose equally profound consequences for the rest of the world.

2. The Players

Having identified the issues under discussion, it is also important to identify who is saying what in the Soviet literature about grand strategy. The vast majority of writers on security-related issues generally confine themselves to small, manageable topics. Because the big picture is so overwhelming, and because such analysis implies the need to criticize the political-cultural system, only a few writers are smart enough, brave enough, or pompous enough to attempt the task. Of those that do, they and their arguments may be divided into six categories. The categories must obviously be generalized, so there are certainly exceptions to them, but they do at least provide a useful framework for analyzing the debate.

The first group might be called the "Captain Kirks." They boldly go where no man (and they are all men) has gone before. This group is by far the smallest, and at times seems to comprise only Alexei Arbatov of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). However, this group might also include *Izvestiya* correspondents Stanislav Kondrashev and Aleksandr Bovin, as well as Vyacheslav Dashichev, Vitalii Shlykov, and Aleksandr Konovalov. They are pathbreakers, and their criticisms have systemic implications. By and large they are the only ones making concrete recommendations, but in doing so they have made powerful enemies. If there is a systemic catastrophe (i.e., a military or right-wing/conservative coup), the Captain Kirks (as well as the Young Turks, see below) will be among those to suffer second-wave persecution. (Victims of the first wave will be those opponents with real or symbolic political power such as Boris Yeltsin and some of the nationalist leaders.) On the other hand, if systemic catastrophe is avoided, the Captain Kirks might well find themselves in powerful positions in the future.

Another set of writers resemble "Barking Dogs." Members of this group complain and criticize but are more likely to stop short of any concrete recommendations. They include the vast majority of civilian analysts/whiz kids and are often lumped together with the Captain Kirks. Among the older generation of members are Radomir Bogdanov, Vitalii Zhurkin, Lev Semeiko, and Daniil Proektor, while the younger generation includes Andrei Kortunov, Sergei Karaganov, and Igor Malashenko. As long as these "dogs" remain in the USSR Academy of Sciences' institutes, they have the potential to become Captain Kirks; but as soon as they move to a Central Committee department or the Foreign Ministry, they appear to forsake this possibility, and sometimes cease barking altogether.

A third contingent might be known as the "Owls." For the most part, they have the same agenda as the Captain Kirks, but the Owls take extraordinary care to couch their proposals in forms palatable to the current leadership, especially the military leadership. Like the birds for which they are named, these men watch events from above and are wise and calculating. Thus, they have chosen to operate as they do (slowly, deliberately, circuitously) because they know the system well. By preserving their ties with everyone, no matter what happens in the future, they will (if relatively young) likely rise to very powerful positions. In fact, they are often already quite influential. The most obvious Owls are deputy director of the Institute for the USA and Canada (ISKAN) Andrei Kokoshin and retired Maj.-Gen. Valentin Larionov, formerly of the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff. Others who might be included are the senior Arbatov (Georgii) and Oleg Bogomolov.

The fourth category of writers is the "Top Military," which comprises the current and most recently retired top-echelon military and defense-industry officials. Key characteristics of this group are the high degree of organization and coherence, the absence of public in-fighting (except over arcane micro-issues of military science), and the readiness to descend en masse on the Captain Kirks who are seen to be too bold. The members are highly conservative, sometimes even reactionary. This group includes several civilians, such as Aleksei Podberezkin, formerly of IMEMO, now with the Military-Diplomatic Academy. Although quite intelligent, these writers appear to be unwilling to countenance self-reform, at least reform in which the institutniki would dominate the process. Perhaps one explanation for the military's resentment of the civilian institutniki's role in formulating strategy--and reform more generally--is that many members of the military apparatus have been striving to implement in-house reform, but now find themselves losing control of this process to outsiders. As a result, criticism of these civilian outsiders has been particularly rigorous and negative. Indeed, some of the "Top Military" even appear to be developing a kind of siege mentality.

Next are those who might be labeled the "Young Turks." This interesting group comprises a diverse and apparently disorganized coterie of young officers (mostly Lieutenant-Colonels) of both Russian and non-Russian background who have gained prominence by debating the organizational principle of the Soviet armed forces. Although they have not addressed matters of grand strategy,⁹ this group is worth mentioning here

⁹ Cols. V. Strebkov and Nikolai F. Karasev may be two exceptions, even though they have largely been published by the mainstream military press, in contrast to the other Young Turks. Strebkov has contributed some noteworthy essays on parity (including "Military Parity Yesterday and Today,"

because it illustrates independent thinking within the Soviet military about major issues of national security. However, this group appears to have been silenced for the time being.

Finally, there are the "Party Hacks." These commentators are mostly senior academicians and journalists who invariably take their cues from the latest Gorbachev, Yakovlev, or Shevardnadze speech. Viewed in isolation, their writings might easily be mistaken for inspired intellectual originality; but, in fact, a careful search would produce a prior leadership speech legitimizing the line of argument in question. Most prominent in this group are people like Georgii Shakhnazarov, Georgii Mirskii, and Yurii Krasin, and their most prominent vehicles are *Pravda* and *Kommunist*.

3. The Trends

What is perhaps of greatest interest is the direction these discussions about Soviet grand strategy are taking. Considering the diversity of players involved, the paths are equally diverse. At least three trends are worthy of further exploration: the writings of and responses to Alexei Arbatov; the contributions of Kokoshin and Larionov; and an overview of the Supreme Soviet's actions thus far in this area.

Returning to the above-mentioned March 1989 article by Alexei Arbatov, who heads the Department on Disarmament and Security Affairs at IMEMO, several points merit highlighting. First, Arbatov acknowledges the stark fact that Soviet resources are insufficient to maintain anything approximating its traditional military strategy. On a bloc-to-bloc comparison, the East lags several-fold in GNP, considerably in productivity, and by 200 million in population. Regarding burdensharing within each bloc, the United States bears 50-60 percent of total costs in NATO, while the USSR has shouldered more than 90 percent in the Warsaw Pact.¹⁰ Such numbers imply an enormous defense burden for the USSR if it is to maintain "parity" with the West and any other enemies. The logical alternative to this increasingly futile attempt to maintain parity is to make tough strategic

Krasnaya zvezda [hereafter *KZ*], January 3, 1989), while Karasev has done the same in the area of economic reform and the Soviet military ("*Ekonomicheskaya strategiya perestroiki: oboronnye aspekty*" [The Economic Strategy of Perestroika: Defense Aspects], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 1 (January), 1989, pp. 3-11). The latter is also the subject of a puzzling and unusual biographical article that portrays him as a struggler against the establishment. See Maj. Samial Temirbiev, "Vybor" [Selection], *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* [hereafter *KVS*], no. 6 (March), 1989, pp. 44-48.

¹⁰ The political commentator Stanislav Kondrashov was one of the first to openly raise this line of reasoning in public. See his "Paritet v dvukh izmereniyakh" [Parity in Two Measurements], *Izvestiya*, February 4, 1982, p. 5, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-024, February 7, 1989, pp. 1-3.

decisions, including replacing parity with reasonable sufficiency. But as Arbatov is aware, the rejection of parity causes disquiet, to say the least, among many Soviet military officers.

In the first of what may be called his grand strategy writings, Arbatov took the unprecedented, un-Soviet step of making concrete recommendations of the highest order.¹¹ His recommendations, the sum total of which envisions a 40- to 50-percent reduction in the annual Soviet defense budget, proceed from a reinterpretation of Soviet strategic beliefs, goals, and interests. Some of this reinterpretation (such as a recognition that military power is increasingly irrelevant and indeed counterproductive to Soviet diplomacy, and that damage limitation in a nuclear war is impossible) has been heard from the highest podiums even since the Brezhnev days, but other suggestions are newer. In any event, Arbatov is the first to operationalize these beliefs in a concrete way. Accordingly, he advocates the following:

- developing strategic offensive forces that comprise one land-mobile SICBM system and smaller SSBNs with less-MIRVed missiles, while eliminating all penetrating bombers and settling for ALCMs to be fired from stand-off positions.
- scrapping all strategic defenses, especially strategic air defenses and the Moscow ABM system.
- almost completely demobilizing all Soviet ground forces not directed at NATO, and reducing existing Warsaw Pact forces by 50 percent.
- limiting the Soviet navy to coastal defense and SSBN protection only, with no attempt at SLOC interdiction or open-ocean ASW operations.
- completely restructuring the defense industry and weapons development process.

Since March, Arbatov has embellished and emboldened his original recommendations (he would now abolish the *Protivovozdushnaya oborona* [Air Defense], or PVO, as an independent service, for example). Moreover, the work in his department has to some extent elaborated his suggestions.¹² However, as is discussed in Appendix A to this

¹¹ See Arbatov, *MZh*, no. 3, 1989, pp. 33-47; "'Neposvyashchennym' postoronit'sya?" [To Exclude the 'Uninitiated?'], *Novoe vremya*, no. 39 (September 22), 1989, pp. 16-17; also several recent unpublished works.

¹² For example, in late winter 1989 his department will publish a collection of prescriptive articles on Soviet naval strategy and force posture, most of which call for unilateral actions by the USSR and explicitly move away from the official prevailing position that naval issues should be dealt with in an arms control framework.

paper, the (largely civilian) expertise he is trying to create faces enormous challenges not often considered by Western analysts.

Arbatov's recent actions have incurred the wrath of high-level Soviet military and political conservatives. Frequently referred to by his military critics as "incompetent,"¹³ Arbatov has been simultaneously attacked by military writers on multiple fronts. Bearing the sign of an organized campaign, articles appeared in September 1989 in two major military journals, *Voennaya Mysl'* and *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* [hereafter *KVS*]. (Two other articles by military officers, on the naval and ground forces aspects of Arbatov's article, were submitted to the journals *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* and *Novoe vremya* at the same time, but have not yet been published.) The *Voennaya Mysl'* article, written by two colonels from the Academy of PVO Troops, browbeats Arbatov for his "lack of serious analysis" and his "tendentiously and incompetently" proposed models. Most of the article is then devoted to the U.S. strategic threat, which legitimizes the existence of a strong PVO and concludes with a call to structure the PVO along the lines of "reasonable sufficiency for anti-air defense."¹⁴ The *KVS* essay is even more vituperative and mocking. Although addressing some of Arbatov's arguments head on, it generally tends to attack Arbatov personally, charging a lack of "objectiveness, competency, and qualification."¹⁵

While the debate continues, one result is already evident: the Soviet military clearly wants to discredit and discourage any further radical civilian contributions to Soviet military

¹³ The term "incompetent," now frequently encountered throughout the military literature, was initially applied by Defense Minister Yazov and others of similar rank primarily to journalists writing in such free-thinking periodicals as *Ogonek*, *Argumenty i fakty*, *Moscow News*, and *Vek XX i mir*, to name a few. From the military's perspective, these journalists, generalists at best, had no professional expertise in military matters; therefore, they were "incompetent." Quickly, however, this term began to be applied to any person who dared voice any ideas that were displeasing to the military, including outspoken civilian specialists like Arbatov, who are anything but "incompetent." In fact, the frequency, pattern, and consistency with which this term is used implies a concerted campaign by the top military leadership against anyone with serious alternative ideas about the military.

¹⁴ Cols. A. P. Vasil'ev and V. K. Rudyuk, "Dostatochna li protivovozdushnaya oborona" [Is Air Defense Sufficient], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 9 (September), 1989, pp. 59-68.

¹⁵ Maj.-Gen. Yu. Lyubimov, "O dostatochnosti oborony i nedostatke kompetentnosti" [On Defense Sufficiency and Lack of Competence], *KVS*, no. 19 (September), 1989, pp. 21-26. In an introduction to this essay the *KVS* editors note that the article's author originally proposed a debate in the pages of *MZh* but was rebuffed by editors there. However, responses to Arbatov's article (one civilian and one low-ranking active military officer in favor, and one senior officer opposed) were printed. See "O state Al. Arbatova 'Skol'ko oborony dostatochno?'" [On A. Arbatov's Article 'How Much Defense is Sufficient?'], *MZh*, no. 7 (July), 1989, pp. 155-159.

science, an area in which it has traditionally enjoyed a near-total hegemony, protected by massive secrecy and sole control over the language of communication.¹⁶

Soviet grand strategy has also been addressed by Andrei A. Kokoshin and retired Maj.-Gen. Valentin V. Larionov, although these analysts take a fundamentally different approach.¹⁷ At root, their goals are no less revolutionary than Arbatov's: radical reduction of the size of the USSR's armed forces, a truly defensive and economically sustainable strategy, political means for guaranteeing security, and so on. However, their means for doing so are much more circuitous, and indeed, much more Soviet. Their approach probably reflects a greater maturity, patience, experience, and understanding of what is possible when trying to change the Soviet military establishment. Moreover, their backgrounds and connections also play a key role. Kokoshin, in addition to being next in line to head the Institute of the USA and Canada, also serves in a variety of high-level advisory positions. The most recent addition to his portfolio is the chairmanship of the "Social Committee for Verifying the Unilateral Reductions of the USSR Armed Forces," a position that puts him in regular contact with the highest Soviet military leaders. Larionov, for his part, has retired from active duty and now serves as a consultant at ISKAN (where he worked for a time in the 1960s and early 1970s). Previously he taught for 20 years at the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff, where he was a professor in the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art. In the latter position, he personally taught a large percentage of the current senior officers in the Soviet Armed Forces.

In contrast to Arbatov, who uses Western strategic thought to make his case, Kokoshin and Larionov have been careful to give their arguments historical legitimacy, as seen in their intellectual rehabilitation of Gen. A. A. Svechin, a former Russian imperial

¹⁶ On the importance of military science to the Soviet military as a means of framing and answering relevant questions in the current debates, see Kent D. Lee, "Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role of Soviet Military Science," in Willard Frank and Phillip Gillette (eds.), *Soviet Military Doctrine in an Era of Change* (forthcoming).

¹⁷ In this realm most indicative are their writings that invoke the former Russian imperial officer Gen. Aleksandr A. Svechin. See their joint articles "Kurskaya bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitel'noi doktriny" [The Battle of Kursk in Light of Today's Defensive Doctrine], *MEMO*, no. 8 (August), 1987, esp. pp. 37-38; "Protivostoyaniye sil obshchego naznacheniya v kontekste obespecheniya strategicheskoi stabil'nosti" [Opposition of General Purpose Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability], *MEMO*, no. 6 (June), 1988, esp. pp. 24-25; with A. A. Kononov and V. A. Mazing, *Voprosy obespecheniya stabil'nosti pri radikal'nykh sokrashcheniyakh vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzhenii v Evrope* [Questions of Ensuring Stability given Radical Reductions of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms in Europe] (Moscow: APN, 1989), p. 9. See also Kokoshin's solo articles "Razvitiye voennogo dela i sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzhenii" [The Development of Military Affairs and the Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms], *MEMO*, no. 1 (January), 1988, pp. 20-32, passim; and "A. A. Svechin. O voine i politike" [A. A. Svechin. On War and Politics], *MZh*, no. 10 (October), 1988, pp. 133-142.

officer.¹⁸ Such an approach involves frequent references to Lenin, Marx, and Engels on social and political matters and to Frunze, Tukhachevskii, and others in the military realm. Kokoshin and Larionov thereby place their critique of Soviet legacies in a Russian context. Essentially they argue that once the historical correctness of Svechin is accepted (implying the repudiation of the legacy of Frunze,¹⁹ and especially Tukhachevskii), a chain of profound events might be set in motion. For example, a Svechin-centered trend in Soviet military thinking would imply the following:

- the intellectual respectability of a defensive military strategy, dictated first and foremost by Soviet economic capabilities, objective analysis of the potential security threats on its borders, and the nature of a contemporary war.
- as a corollary, the tailoring of military strategy to the economy, not the economy to military strategy, as has been the case since the first five-year plan.
- the legitimacy of pluralism or factions of strategic thinking within the Soviet military.
- unprecedented candor about Soviet military history, especially during World War II and the interwar period.

Although much of this analysis admittedly remains speculative, there is evidence that the Gospel of Svechin according to Kokoshin and Larionov is being increasingly well-received: an unprecedented reprint of a Svechin article in *Voennaya Mysl'* last year,²⁰ a favorable essay by Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff Army Gen. Lobov,²¹ plans for the military publishing house, Voenizdat, to issue a set of Svechin's collected works,²² and an upcoming article on Svechin's strategic thinking, to be co-authored by Kokoshin and Chief of the General Staff Moiseev.

¹⁸ The issue of Svechin is taken up in greater detail in Lee, in Gillette and Frank (eds.), *Soviet Military Doctrine in an Era of Change*.

¹⁹ On the significance of Frunze, see William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

²⁰ See A. A. Svechin, "Voennaya igra" [War Game], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 10 (October), 1988, pp. 54-57.

²¹ Col.-Gen. Vladimir N. Lobov, "Aktual'nye voprosy razvitiya teorii sovetskoi voennoi strategii 20-x srediny 30-x godov" [Urgent Issues in the Development of the Theory of Soviet Military Strategy of the 1920s-mid 1930s], *VIZh*, no. 2 (February), 1989, pp. 41-50. Lobov has since been promoted to his current rank.

²² Up to six volumes may be published. At a minimum this will include Svechin's classic *Strategiya* [Strategy] (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927, second edition); *Evolutsiya voennogo iskusstva* [The Evolution of Military Art] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1927, 1928, two volumes); and a volume of his collected articles.

To be sure, there are other Soviet writings about grand strategy, although few seem to compare to those of Arbatov, Kokoshin, and Larionov in terms of candor, incisiveness, or influence. Nevertheless, among military writers Col. Nikolai F. Karasev merits at least a brief mention. Karasev argues that everything, including military policy, is subordinate to Soviet economic policy, and that economic success depends foremost on political reform.²³ Karasev apparently has not published extensively, making it difficult to make a more detailed assessment. Still, although his *Voennaya Mysl'* article has not yet attracted much attention, this essay is the clearest to date among military writers about how the exigencies of economic reform play an enormous role in determining strategy, from a conventional strategy incapable of conducting offensive operations, to a nuclear strategy that must reject the "mirror interpretation" of parity. In the latter case, such a concept of parity only plays into the hands of U.S. designs to exhaust the USSR economically in an arms race.

Among the "barking dogs" some certainly do bark more loudly than others, and thus deserve some attention. IMEMO's Daniil Proektor, a military historian by training whose experience somewhat parallels Larionov's,²⁴ has made an intellectually convincing argument for the need for greater morality and openness in the USSR's conduct of both domestic and foreign policy.²⁵ Igor Malashenko, formerly of ISKAN and now working in a Central Committee department, may have the potential to become a Captain Kirk, although his writings apparently have not been so provocative as to get him in trouble with the powers that be. Malashenko has, nevertheless, boldly called for a total overhaul of the USSR's approach to threat assessment (as have others, such as Dashichev, Zhurkin, Kortunov, and Karaganov); for decades this approach has been warped by an oversimplified world view, the result of Soviet ideology.²⁶ Consequently, the USSR has grossly ignored "the viability and internal unity of Western civilization," all the while laboring under the "siege mentality" engendered by Stalin. Finally, another interesting barking dog is Radomir Bogdanov, first deputy chairman of the newly-invigorated Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. Bogdanov has openly stated that the preservation of

²³ See Karasev, *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 1, 1989.

²⁴ For example, Proektor once held a high position in the Frunze Military Academy where, like Larionov, he taught the history of wars and military art.

²⁵ See Daniil Proektor, "Balans sil: avtoritet ili ego utrata?" [Balance of Power: Authority or its Loss?], *Liternaturnaya gazeta*, November 9, 1988, p. 14; also his book *Politika i bezopasnost'* [Politics and Security] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).

²⁶ Igor E. Malashenko, "Bezopasnost' i zatratnyi podkhod" [Security and a Wasted Approach], *Kommunist*, no. 18 (December), 1988, pp. 115-119; and "Non-Military Aspects of Security," *International Affairs*, no. 1 (January), 1989, pp. 40-45.

U.S. troops in Europe and French nuclear weapons ought to be encouraged because they "deter the FRG's nuclear ambitions." He has also addressed the USSR's economic inferiority unflinchingly: "We do not simply lag behind them, we are becoming two different civilizations. The technological gap is so great that when a genuine interaction of the two systems reaches the agenda, it will simply be impossible to implement."²⁷

Barking Dogs, Captain Kirks, Owls, and even "the Military" all agree that the USSR's economy can no longer support its military strategy. Indeed, it is important to note here that several high-ranking Soviet military officials were at the forefront in recognizing this fact, most significantly Dmitrii Ustinov.²⁸ More generally, much of the reform impetus in military issues was launched by Ustinov and Nikolai Ogarkov beginning more than a decade ago. Spearheading this effort, they were motivated by a variety of factors, including changes in Soviet thinking about nuclear war (reflected in Brezhnev's 1977 Tula speech), the ongoing scientific-technological revolution, and changes in the American force posture and NATO strategy (such as Air/Land Battle, FOFA, SDI, and INF deployment). Thus, the military has not been opposed to reform per se; indeed it has supported Gorbachev's efforts, although the problems involved in their implementation have admittedly tempered much of the military's initial support. Perhaps most important to note is the fact that "the military" does not speak with one voice on this or many other issues. Just as there is dissension among civilian analysts, so too are there differing points of view among military officers. In the final analysis, all concerned are still faced with fundamental, unresolved questions, including: how does the USSR transition to a different strategy (unilaterally or through negotiations)? what is the extent of the threat (or is there a threat at all)? and how deep should the reductions be?

D. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY

Under the rubric of strategic nuclear policy a number of debates and discussions have taken place over the past year, all of which seem to have culminated in the current discussion about minimum deterrence. The relationship between parity and reasonable sufficiency has been evolving. In 1988, Marshal Kulikov saw essentially no difference between the two concepts,²⁹ whereas in 1989 it was argued that parity must be based not

²⁷ Radomir G. Bogdanov, "Glavnyi protivnik--inertsia gonki vooruzhenii" [The Main Opponent--The Inertia of the Arms Race], *SShA*, no. 10 (October), 1988, pp. 61-65.

²⁸ See, for example, Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, *The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 117-173.

²⁹ Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, "O voenno-strategicheskome paritete i dostatochnosti dlya oborony" [On Military-Strategic Parity and Defense Sufficiency], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 5 (May), 1988, pp. 3-11.

solely on the other side's capabilities, but also on its interests.³⁰ Clearly, an impetus for rethinking parity at the strategic nuclear level came from the imperative of the 19th Party Conference to construct the Soviet military according to "qualitative parameters." The most important qualitative measurement is the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. But how is this to be measured? As described below in the minimum deterrence debate, it is the absence of an answer to this question that prevents the formation of a consensus.

The rejection of the traditional quantitative parameters of parity (which cost too much and did not guarantee stability or security in any event) has made it possible to argue that the USSR no longer needs the same number of strategic weapons as the United States. Not surprisingly, the military tends to argue against this line of reasoning: most of them see opportunities for "blackmail" if there should ever be a serious imbalance in the number of strategic nuclear weapons, even if there were parity in capabilities to inflict unacceptable damage. This argument underlines where the mainstream Soviet military diverge from their opposition, namely most civilian analysts: the threat assessment of the United States. These military men believe that U.S. leaders have used nuclear blackmail in the past and that they would use it again if they had the chance, a chance which could arise only in the absence of parity, as conceived by that segment of the Soviet military. Moreover, they realize that it took 30 years to develop a Soviet triad that was capable of threatening the continental United States (CONUS).

In fact, it appears that the Soviet military's thinking about a new concept of parity is confused and contradictory, again reflecting the fact that the military has more than one point of review. One of the best examples of this confusion can be seen in an article by Lt.-Col. Andreev published in 1989 in *Voennaya Mysl'*.³¹ Although Andreev professes that parity is not just a numerical issue, his argument that parity must encompass an "equal capability for destruction" is a numerically based notion of parity, since it is tied to the U.S. capability for destruction, however this would be measured.

Soviet military officials have also built an "insurance policy" into their arguments about parity, so that even if they should lose the argument on military-technical grounds

³⁰ Within the Soviet military one of the better spokesmen for this view is Col. V. Strebkov. See his "Military Parity Yesterday and Today," *KZ*, January 3, 1989, p. 3, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-002, pp. 1-3.

³¹ Lt. Col. V. F. Andreev, in "Voенно-strategicheskii paritet: ob"ektivnyi faktor sderzhivaniya agressivnykh sil" [Military-Strategic Parity: The Objective Factor of Detering Aggressive Forces], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 2 (February), 1989, p. 45.

(e.g., that unacceptable damage could be guaranteed with some kind of smaller force posture), they are prepared to shift the focus of the debate to the "social aspect" of parity. Andreev's argument on this score has been the most explicit so far. Essentially it is this: the weapons themselves do not matter; the West is bad because it is imperialist, and only imperialists start wars or use nuclear weapons for political blackmail. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has nuclear weapons only to prevent war and frustrate Western attempts at blackmail; it has never threatened anybody, either before parity was established or after. Only because of parity did the imperialists come to their senses, thus making possible real peace and security. Therefore, we cannot retreat from the current situation of parity, because the imperialists would revert to their old ways.³²

As mentioned above, threat assessment is the point where many Soviet analysts of military affairs part company. For the civilians that have embraced the concept of minimum deterrence, their first and most important assumption (although one not always explicitly made) is that the West presents no real threat of war as an aggressor; rather the vast arsenals of weapons increase the likelihood that war may happen by accident. Therefore the first step in seeking greater stability and security is to reduce the force posture drastically--to a minimum deterrent posture.

The minimum deterrence discussion seems to capture the essence of many earlier, related debates. It tries to answer questions about the nature of deterrence; the relationship between parity and reasonable sufficiency; the goal(s) in the START negotiations (or if negotiations are indeed desirable); and the feasibility of Gorbachev's abolitionist goal. Yet this discussion (and essentially all others relating to the role of nuclear weapons) suffers from several fatal shortcomings that will prevent further progress in any of these debates. First, massive secrecy in this realm still reigns. Second, the Soviets are averse to open and detailed discussions about such matters as targeting civilian populations, and whether this is credible, lest they appear like the "bourgeois heathens" they have always criticized.³³ And third, they have not studied the past: few have any clear idea of the essentially identical debates that occurred in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.

The current debate over minimum deterrence was opened in June 1989 with a *Moscow News* article by Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov (the latter is a section

³² Ibid., pp. 50-53.

³³ This aversion is particularly acute among the military, but is also strong even among the most Westernized civilian analysts.

chief at ISKAN).³⁴ To some extent it was foreshadowed by Alexei Arbatov's above-mentioned *International Affairs* article, in which he asserted that Soviet nuclear targeting strategy should be purely countervalue, not counterforce. Bogdanov and Kortunov argue that the USSR should unilaterally adopt a minimum deterrent posture: 500 warheads deployed on SS-25 mobile SICBMs and Delta-4 submarines. The first step, they contend, is to unilaterally implement the proposed 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons. The goal is to retain a force posture capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the United States, which the authors ultimately think can be done with as few as five large warheads detonated over the East or West coast.

Their article, a synopsis of a much longer piece published one month later in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*,³⁵ is interesting not only for what it says, but also for what it reveals about a subject that has never been discussed extensively in the open Soviet literature: what should be, and has been, Soviet nuclear targeting policy? This, in turn, begs another question: what, for the Soviet military and political leadership, is unacceptable damage, and what is the difference between it and assured destruction?

According to Bogdanov and Kortunov, the dynamics of the nuclear arms race and the failure to develop "new rules of the game" between the USSR and the United States after World War II are explained by the fact that the leaders of both sides sought to use nuclear weapons for purposes of political coercion, not just for deterring an attack on themselves or their allies. The pursuit of a political coercion capability was deemed important enough to justify the cost and burden of an arms race. For this very reason, the idea of minimum deterrence was rejected from the start. With time, other reasons prevented minimum deterrence from taking hold: the political significance and inertia of the arms race; the nature of arms control negotiations, which engender a "position of strength" mentality; the evolution of alliances and the resulting issue of providing extended deterrence; and finally, the difficulty of defining unacceptable damage.

Unfortunately, the authors fail to take up this latter point adequately in either of their articles, a fact which both their critics and supporters recognize in various response articles.³⁶ Until they do so, they tend to fall into the category of barking dogs, despite their

³⁴ Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, "Minimum Deterrent: Utopia or a Real Prospect?," *Moscow News*, no. 23 (June 11), 1989, p. 6.

³⁵ Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, "O balanse sil" [On the Balance of Power], *MZh*, no. 7 (July), 1989, pp. 3-15.

³⁶ In order of appearance they are: Cols. Vladimir Dvorkin and Valery Torbin, "On Real Sufficiency of Defense," *Moscow News*, no. 26 (June 25), 1989, p. 6; Nikita Moiseev, "Both Calculation and Common Sense," *Moscow News*, no. 28 (July 9), 1989, p. 7; Igor Malashenko, "Parity Yesterday

bold calls for unilateral action. If they were to address this subject frankly, they would probably have to argue along the following lines: First, assuming that unacceptable damage is a valid criterion for determining sufficiency (and many argue that it is not³⁷), there is no reason to think that it would be the same for both societies.³⁸ Even Soviet military writers have recently stated that 60 percent of industrial capacity and 30-plus percent of population destroyed would be unacceptable, although it is not certain that they are talking about the USSR.³⁹

The following line of reasoning might be considered. The U.S. economy, being much more developed, is also more fragile and thus more easily damaged than the Soviet economy. Moreover, it can be argued that the United States has never really suffered, particularly as compared to the USSR. For the Soviet military mind, these are important, if tacit, realities. Perhaps as a result of projecting its own strategic culture on U.S. leaders, it is impossible for the Soviet military to imagine that only five penetrating nuclear weapons would cause unacceptable damage to the United States. The effect would certainly be horrible, but not necessarily unacceptable. Determining whether the result were unacceptable would be a relative matter, depending on how the other side is faring. Thus

and Today," *Moscow News*, no. 31 (August 6), 1989, p. 6; and Andrei Nuiken, "Warheads, Kindness, and Professionalism," *Moscow News*, no. 31 (August 6), 1989, p. 6.

³⁷ The contribution to the debate by Nikita Moiseev, the eminent mathematician and computer modeling specialist, explicitly argues that discussions of unacceptable damage and defense sufficiency inevitably proceed from a narrow military point of view and thus are condemned never to be resolved. In fact, one must also consider ecological (nuclear winter), economic, and social perspectives. Consequently, civilian experts (mathematicians, ecologists, economists) have more to offer than military experts, since they can overcome stereotypical thinking.

³⁸ In their own circuitous and perhaps unconscious way, Soviet military and even civilian commentators appear to admit this point. For example, the journal *MZh* has run a two-part series on "the secret plans of the Pentagon," a discussion of U.S. war plans from the 1950s, to show how U.S. leaders thought that only a few Soviet bombers penetrating with nuclear weapons would wreak unacceptable damage upon the United States. (Obviously, this buttresses the Bogdanov-Kortunov assertion that even five nuclear weapons would cause unacceptable damage to the United States.) On the other hand, the military journal *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [hereafter *ZVO*] also cites secret U.S. warplans from the 1950s to show that the United States has had a predilection for warfighting/preventative war notions against the USSR, especially when it possessed strategic superiority. As the military critics of Bogdanov and Kortunov point out, these warplans concluded that 200 atomic bombs dropped on the USSR could not lead to a decisive defeat of the USSR. "One should not forget such conclusions," write the critics, "when determining the number of warheads needed for delivering a strike to inflict 'unacceptable damage.'" See "Sekretnye plany Pentagona" [The Pentagon's Secret Plans], *MZh*, nos. 3 and 4 (March and April), 1989, pp. 96-107 and pp. 142-152; also Lt.-Gen. I. Perov, "Pentagon: stavka na pobedu v yadernoi voine" [The Pentagon: Gambling on Victory in a Nuclear War], *ZVO*, nos. 5 and 6 (May and June), 1989, pp. 7-12 and pp. 7-11.

³⁹ Col. Strebkov appears to have been the first to state these numbers in the current debate. He also observed that this damage could be inflicted with "less than 10 percent" of current arsenals. Similar numbers are cited by Andreev, *Voennaya Myst'*, no. 2, 1989, p. 45.

in a test of wills (the essence of "deterrence by punishment"), the "winning" side is the side that is not assuredly destroyed.

Such is the essence of the unacceptable damage/assured destruction dichotomy: for the Soviet military, they are one and the same. Assured destruction--that is, the total destruction of the USSR, particularly the destruction of all counterforce targets--is unacceptable. Anything less than total destruction *may* be acceptable, again depending on the status of the other side. For assured destruction (assuming the Soviet military does not believe in nuclear winter or other climatic catastrophes), thousands of survivable warheads are required. Thus, current force levels could be maintained or a 50 percent reduction in these forces could be tolerated, but probably no deeper cuts would be permitted. This line of reasoning raises the macabre philosophical question: What is the Soviet (military) leadership's value of human life?⁴⁰ This then leads to the question: Why is the loss of Moscow and a few other major Soviet cities not unacceptable under some circumstances? The Soviet military may project this logic when assessing U.S. perceptions of this issue.

Notwithstanding philosophical differences over what constitutes unacceptable damage and the force posture required to inflict it, a minimum deterrent posture would be unacceptable to the Soviet military on a unilateral basis because such a posture would, in their view, provide no credible guarantee against "nuclear blackmail" by the United States. In fact, Cols. Dvorkin and Korbin make precisely this argument. What they fail to say, but would logically believe, is that to counter "blackmail" one needs flexible (credible) options, and such options are generally found only in a large and diverse strategic nuclear posture, which by definition bears no resemblance to a minimum deterrent posture. For their part, civilian analysts like Malashenko counter the nuclear blackmail argument by saying that the value of nuclear weapons lies in statesmen's perceptions about the role and benefits of nuclear weapons. Thus "militarily meaningless weapons are significant politically only if political leaders believe them to be important."⁴¹

Many of the discussions on these subjects recall similar debates among U.S. analysts (mainly civilian) in the 1960s and 1970s. Would-be Soviet nuclear strategists, especially the civilian analysts, probably could save themselves much time and effort were

⁴⁰ Apparently there is active research underway on this question by at least one Western scholar, Professor Ammon Sella of the Jerusalem Institute of International Affairs. Interestingly, the problem of the value of human life has also been addressed by the Soviets themselves, at least tangentially, in an essay by Col. E. I. Rybkin, who seeks to explain the high Soviet casualty rates in World War II. See his article "Mirovozzrenie i voennaya istoriya" [The World View and Military History], *Voennno-istoricheskii zhurnal* [hereafter *VIZh*], no. 3 (March), 1989, p. 54.

⁴¹ Igor Malashenko, "Hard Parting," *New Times*, no. 13 (March-April), 1989, pp. 18-20.

they to read the classics of U.S. nuclear strategy by the likes of Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, and Herman Kahn. Following the current course, it seems inevitable that discussions about targeting, about what actually deters, and so on, must be addressed. However, not only have such discussions never taken place in the open Soviet literature, there is no indication that more than a few of the most advanced Soviet strategic analysts (a small cohort already) are even remotely familiar with Western writings on these topics.⁴² Moreover, even if such discussions were possible, it is still unclear whether the Soviets, especially the leadership, would discuss their nuclear policy in detail. Thus, it would appear that Soviet discussions about minimum deterrence are destined to chase shadows for the foreseeable future. In fairness, even Western leaders, who theoretically have the freedom, prefer to avoid detailed discussions of nuclear policy. Such discussions are certainly disquieting to large sectors of their publics, who by and large would prefer not to think about such issues at all.

Substance aside, the minimum deterrence debate also highlights some of the structural dynamics between the organized military apparatus and their civilian challengers. This is seen most clearly in the Dvorkin-Torbin essay, which brands Bogdanov and Kortunov as "incompetent" and "irresponsible" for making their proposals. In fact, the former argue that such essays should not be published, especially since readers are not prepared "to assess such complex problems." The civilian respondents, particularly Malashenko and Nuiken, lambast the Soviet military in general for its suffocating secrecy, and Dvorkin-Torbin in particular for hypocritically citing U.S. war plans when Soviet plans have never been made public. They propose opening Soviet archives so that the substance behind Khrushchev's and Malinovskii's threats in the late 1950s and early 1960s can be examined.

Perhaps the most radical and innovative idea advanced in the minimum deterrence debate thus far is the notion that arms control might best be scrapped altogether. As Bogdanov and Kortunov point out, it is not the negotiations themselves, but presumably improved security that is the goal. With unilateral Soviet initiatives still a viable possibility, an article exploring the futility of the arms control process could make a useful contribution.

⁴² For example, one senior civilian analyst who has written widely on strategic nuclear deterrence, stability, and arms control, when given a copy of Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence*, not only remarked that he had never heard of the book, but that he had never even heard of Schelling.

E. THEATER CONVENTIONAL POLICY

Debates in the sphere of theater conventional policy--doctrine, strategy, operations, tactics, and force posture--have continued to expand. Not surprisingly, in contrast to the area of nuclear weapons and strategy, the uniformed military continues to dominate theater conventional discussions. The exceptions are, most notably, Alexei Arbatov's analysts in IMEMO and a slightly smaller group of researchers at the Institute of the USA and Canada.⁴³ Nevertheless, because military researchers hold a virtual, if eroding, monopoly on expertise and information relevant to conventional warfighting, such as analytic modeling and military history (and because they outnumber their civilian counterparts by several orders of magnitude), the future evolution and development of Soviet military strategy still will be determined overwhelmingly by the Soviet military organization. Civilian experts can hope for more influence in the area of threat assessment and political analysis, where they might win over Soviet political leaders and thereby affect the amount and quality of resources allocated to the military.⁴⁴ But because some kind of armed forces will remain, the military--foremost experts working in the General Staff--ultimately will mold strategy and force posture.

I. Defensive Doctrine

During 1989, the volume of analysis in Soviet periodicals devoted to military doctrine *per se* diminished considerably.⁴⁵ Instead, attention shifted to different levels of analysis; now under study are such issues as the strategy, operations, tactics, and force posture required to implement the broad principles of a "purely defensive military doctrine." And attention is also being focused on completely different areas, such as how deterrence of war is understood and best assured.

⁴³ In Arbatov's group there are roughly a dozen analysts working this subject. Two of his department's strongest contributions in this area include the annual *Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost'* [Disarmament and Security], published in both Russian and English, which contains numerous substantive essays on conventional military issues; and the recent formation of a new section, headed by Gennadii K. Lednev, on conventional modeling.

⁴⁴ For an exceptional essay along these lines, see Aleksandr G. Savel'ev, "Predotvrashchenie voyny i sderzhivanie: podkhody OVD i NATO" [The Prevention of War and Deterrence: Warsaw Pact and NATO Approached], *MEMO*, no. 6 (June), 1989, pp. 19-29, especially the conclusions on p. 29.

⁴⁵ The tediousness of and frustration with this topic has been readily apparent in various semi-official attempts to hold "doctrinal comparison seminars" over the past six months. Two of the more serious attempts--both held in Ebenhausen, FRG, in April and June 1989--saw essentially no progress, with participants completely speaking past one another.

Still, it is worthwhile to review briefly the evolution of Soviet doctrinal discussions. A major cornerstone of this thinking is the notion of war prevention, which as one authoritative article noted "is included in the definition of our military doctrine for the first time...and has become the main, definitive task."⁴⁶ Another cornerstone of doctrinal change (already discussed above) concerns the quest for an economically viable strategy. Both of these imperatives combine to form the basic foundation for constructing a new, defensive strategy. In the process of formulating strategy, Soviet military planners are also confronted with several external factors. Prominent among these factors are the perceived military-political threat, especially from the West; the continuing advances of military technology; the material means for fighting a modern war; and the nature of such a war.

Army Gen. G. I. Salmanov, commandant of the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff, attempts to reckon with these factors and their implications for formulating Soviet strategy and force posture.⁴⁷ Arguing not only that NATO is as threatening as ever, but also that its military strategy and technology increase the credibility of its invasion capability, Salmanov stresses that the USSR must prepare for "the most serious kind" of war: "a protracted world war."⁴⁸ Not surprisingly, the central issue is the enormous importance of high technology. For Salmanov, five basic points are vital in planning for a future war in the context of a defensive doctrine:

- Aggression must be repulsed in the initial period of war in both a nuclear and conventional environment.
- Surprise attack must be prevented (therefore real-time reconnaissance capabilities are critical).
- Warsaw Pact forces must possess a forward defense capability (which implies ceding little territory and relying for a time on in-place forces).
- The offensive potential of second-echelon NATO forces must be sharply attrited even before they begin attacking (which requires the Pact to have its own FOFA/AirLand Battle strategy).

⁴⁶ Unattributed, "Oboronitel'nyi kharakter sovetской voennoy doktriny i podgotovka voisk (sil)" [The Defensive Character of Soviet Military Doctrine and the Training of the Troops (Forces)], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 1 (January), 1988, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Army Gen. G. I. Salmanov, "Sovetskaya voennaya doktrina i nekotorye vzglyady na kharakter voiny v zashchite sotsializma" [Soviet Military Doctrine and Certain Views on the Nature of War in Defending Socialism], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 12 (December), 1988, pp. 3-13.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

- Warsaw Pact second-echelon and rear units must be secure from NATO attack.⁴⁹

A final theme related to military doctrine is the notion of national military doctrines for the various Warsaw Pact states. The May 1987 Berlin communique raised the possibility, at least in theory, that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries had their own military doctrines. Previously, no differentiation was recognized by Moscow. But in light of the unilateral Soviet military reductions begun in December 1988, the various political upheavals throughout Eastern Europe, and the prospect of success at the CFE talks, the notion of national military doctrines has become much more interesting. Some statements already have appeared on the pages of *Voennaya Mysl'*,⁵⁰ in Soviet press discussions with top NSWP leaders since the December troop reduction announcement, and in various Warsaw Pact meetings in 1989.⁵¹ Moreover, as new elites emerge within the East European countries, greater emphasis will likely be placed on a broader representation of national interests. As new partnerships are formed, these countries may experience many of the problems that have long plagued NATO. For instance, the increasing assertiveness of the West European countries to prevent their soil from becoming a nuclear battlefield may well be mirrored in Eastern Europe.

2. Strategy and Operations

Recent Soviet writings on military strategy and operations have continued to suggest the presence of deep ferment in Soviet military thinking. Attention to strategic defense and defensive military actions is quite serious and differs qualitatively from that of any prior period. Most striking is the marked decrease in articles promoting an offensive orientation and the proliferation of articles arguing for a defensive orientation. Even in

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵⁰ Col. Yu. Kachmarek (a prolific theorist in the Polish General Staff Academy), "Nekotorye voprosy teorii oboronosposobnosti sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva" [Certain Questions of the Theory of the Defense Capability of the Socialist State], *Voennaya mysl'*, no. 7 (July), 1988, pp. 68-71; Gen. Josef Uzhitski (Chief of the General Staff of Polish Forces), "Oboronitel'naya doktrina Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki" [The Defensive Doctrine of the People's Republic of Poland], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 11 (November), 1988, pp. 72-80; and Col.-Gen. Fritz Schtreletsii, "Voенно-doktrinal'nye vzglyady GDR na voprosy sokhraneniya mira i zashchity sotsializma" [Military-Doctrinal Views of the GDR on Questions of Preserving Peace and Defending Socialism], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 8 (August), 1989, pp. 58-66.

⁵¹ The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Conference held in Bucharest from July 7-8, 1989, may prove particularly important. Pounding yet another nail in the Brezhnev Doctrine's coffin, both the Statement and Communique adopted in Bucharest contained provisions affirming the right of all states to develop independently and without outside interference. See *Pravda*, July 9, 1989, pp. 1-2, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-130, 10 July 1989, pp. 7-15.

writings that continue to emphasize offensive forms of battle, particularly in the monograph literature, this focus appears to be on the wane. The shift in the periodical literature is unmistakable and unprecedented; for the first 9 months of 1989, the journal *Voennaya Mysl'* contained no articles dealing with offensive ground forces actions at the strategic or operational level. Moreover, conversations with knowledgeable senior Soviet military officers suggest that this shift parallels the attention being given to defense in the military academies.

Indicative of the intellectual ferment on the subject of defense are a number of recent formal debates and informal discussions. They include a debate over the role of surprise, begun by Army Gen. (then Col.-Gen.) V. N. Lobov in March 1988 in *Voennaya Mysl'*.⁵² From the outset this debate has focused on the necessity of creating surprise under the USSR's new defensive doctrine, when at the basis of preparing its armed forces "lies the principle of retaliatory actions."⁵³

Another discussion with potentially far-ranging implications concerns the goals and nature of counterstrikes and counteroffensives. At root is the search for a new concept of "victory" in war. This debate has been manifested in a series of articles in *Voennaya Mysl'* and the journal *Novoe vremya* [New Times] since late 1988. Victory, the obvious objective of war, was traditionally secured by seizing the enemy's territory and subjugating him. Historically this made sense, but increasingly victory in modern warfare seems harder to define and is, in fact, meaningless in a strategic (and possibly theater) nuclear war. Driven by this historical notion of victory, and buoyed by the experience of the later years of World War II, postwar Soviet military art at the operational level enshrined the offensive. Over time the criteria for success in such operations became dogmatic: no margin of superiority could be too large; high force densities must be achieved on attack axes; means for exploiting success must be developed (operational maneuver groups, air assault groups, raiding units); and so on. Thus, a critical factor in dismantling offensive

⁵² Col.-Gen. V. N. Lobov, "K voprosu o vnezapnosti i neozhidannosti" [Toward the Question of Surprise and Unexpectedness], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 3 (March), 1988, pp. 3-8. Besides Lobov's initial article, other contributions in *Voennaya Mysl'* include: Lt.-Col. V. N. Danilov, "Obshchemetodologicheskie aspekty problemy vnezapnosti" [General Methodological Aspects of the Problem of Surprise], no. 5 (May), 1988, pp. 22-27; V. G. Reznichenko, V. D. Ryabchuk, V. V. Krysanov, S. D. Leonenko, and O. A. Orekhov, "K voprosu vnezapnosti i neozhidannosti" [Toward the Question of Surprise and Unexpectedness], no. 8 (August), 1988, pp. 25-36; V. R. Volobuev, V. S. Chvirov, and V. M. Evlakhov, no. 11 (November), 1988, pp. 11-20; A. A. Kokoshin, "K voprosu o vnezapnosti" [Toward the Question of Surprise], no. 1 (January), 1989, pp. 62-68; and K. V. Lazar', A. Yu. Yashin, A. P. Aristov, and N. M. Vinokur, "K voprosu o vnezapnosti i neozhidannosti" [Toward the Question of Surprise and Unexpectedness], no. 3 (March), 1989, pp. 22-30.

⁵³ Lobov, *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 3, 1988, p. 4.

capabilities lies not only in hardware, but also in concepts and the minds of military planners.

Civilian military expert Kokoshin is concerned with focusing attention on the level of operational art (as opposed to strategy or tactics) in order to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, to determine what forces are necessary for defense, and to construct a theory of victory for using armed force.⁵⁴ Alexei Arbatov, for his part, criticizes Soviet military hardliners who reason that defensive actions alone cannot win a war, and argues that neither can an offensive or counteroffensive, since a war in contemporary Europe is fundamentally not winnable.⁵⁵ His interlocutor, Lt.-Gen. Serebryannikov, does not completely disagree and implicitly acknowledges the need for a new theory of victory: the traditional Soviet objective of "routing the enemy in his own territory. . . may have deadly consequences for all life on Earth."⁵⁶ One of the interesting results so far is the notion of a "pause" before shifting over to the offensive.⁵⁷ Still, few concrete ideas about how to create such a pause have yet been developed, and as other military writers acknowledge, there are inherent contradictions in separating defense from the counteroffensive, since the weapons and capabilities critical for defense's success are indistinguishable from those that make offense possible.⁵⁸

One noteworthy exception is an article by Col.-Gen. F. F. Gaivoronskii, which argues the current relevancy of the August 1939 battle of Khalkhin-Gol, where Soviet forces defeated the Japanese in a major land battle, but consciously chose not to develop the counteroffensive into a full offensive.⁵⁹ Khalkhin-Gol, stresses Gaivoronskii, shows how "the problem of destroying an invading enemy was successfully resolved without shifting

54 Andrei A. Kokoshin, "Defense is Best for Stability," *New Times*, no. 33 (August), 1988, pp. 18-19; see also Kokoshin and Maj.-Gen. Valentin V. Larionov, "Shifting the Emphasis to Defense," *New Times*, no. 10 (March), 1989, pp. 19-21.

55 Alexei G. Arbatov, "Defense Dilemmas," *New Times*, no. 6 (February), 1989, pp. 19-21.

56 Lt.-Gen. Vladimir Serebryannikov, "More on the Defense Doctrine Dilemma," *New Times*, no. 12 (March), 1989, pp. 16-17.

57 Maj.-Gen. I. N. Manzhurin, "Nekotorye voprosy podgotovki i naneseniya kontrudarov v oboronitel'nikh operatsiyakh" [Certain Issues in Preparing and Conducting Counterstrikes in Defensive Operations], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 1 (January), 1989, p. 13.

58 See *ibid.*, pp. 12-17; also Lt.-Gen. A. G. Khor'kov, "Kontrnastuplenie: opyt podgotovki i vedeniya" [The Counteroffensive: Experience of Preparing and Conducting], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 10 (October), 1988, pp. 12-17; and Col. V. N. Andrienko, "Ot oborony k kontrnastupleniyu (istoriya i sovremennost')" [From Defense to the Counteroffensive (Past and Present)], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 12 (December), 1988, pp. 23-32.

59 This contrasts with the more often-cited 1943 Battle of Kursk, where the Soviet counteroffensive was developed into a full offensive.

combat actions beyond the limits of the territory being defended."⁶⁰ Indeed, the Khalkhin-Gol battle served as the primary example for the "variant three" model of offense-defense interaction as outlined by Kokoshin and Larionov in their June 1988 *MEMO* article.⁶¹ In tracing the intellectual development of ideas, it should be noted that Gaivoronskii and Larionov have worked together for many years in the Voroshilov Academy's Department of the History of Wars and Military Art. While one article does not a revolution in military strategy make, a pattern in Soviet military thinking is beginning to emerge, the sum total of which is to make defense more intellectually respectable and perhaps gradually erode the offensive orientation that the Soviet military establishment has long sought to instill.

Finally, another discussion prevalent throughout the Soviet military press involves the role of maneuver and activeness in defense. It is repeatedly asserted that defense must not be conceived of in static terms, but rather must be highly active to be successful. Activeness in defense, in turn, implies a significant role for maneuver, which is provided especially by aircraft, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and real-time reconnaissance capability--forces and capabilities which many military men believe would suffer in unilateral or negotiated reductions.⁶² Soviet analysts place ever greater stress on the need for real-time reconnaissance-strike systems since under all scenarios (including defense), they are vital in countering surprise and long-distance fire strikes from both conventional and nuclear platforms far from the homeland and the front.

3. Tactics and Force Structures

Several issues related to the growing Soviet attention to defense in practice, at the level of tactics and troop training, warrant brief examination. First, there have been changes in what Soviet officers are being taught, whereby "radical changes" in the approach to tactics is underway. Moiseev has stated that all major textbooks in this area are being rewritten.⁶³ Maj.-Gen. Vorob'ev, a widely-published expert on military tactics, has

⁶⁰ Col.-Gen. (ret.) F. F. Gaivoronskii, "Pouchitel'naya stranitsa istorii" [An Instructive Page of History], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 8 (August), 1989, p. 37.

⁶¹ Kokoshin and Larionov, *MEMO*, no. 6, 1988, pp. 27-28.

⁶² See especially N. K. Shishkin, "Manevr v sovremenom oboronitel'nom boiyu" [Maneuver in Modern Defensive Battle], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 8 (August), 1988, pp. 45-53; Maj.-Gen. S. L. Lushchan and Maj.-Gen. A. V. Zlobin, "Manevr v oboronitel'noi operatsii" [Maneuver in the Defensive Operation], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 1 (January), 1989, pp. 18-29; Col. P. Popovskikh, "Razvedka nablyudeniem v oboronitel'nom boiyu" [Reconnaissance by Observation in a Defensive Battle], *Voennyi vestnik*, no. 12 (December), 1988, pp. 33-38.

⁶³ Col.-Gen. M. A. Moiseev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], *KZ*, February 23, 1989, p. 2. Even the famous Reznichenko book *Taktika* [Tactics] has apparently been

made similar statements, repeatedly calling for greater attention to defensive forms of battle.⁶⁴ He is not alone in recommending that officers reexamine the debates of the 1920s, primarily for their unfettered quality and willingness to address all the burning issues. Vorob'ev argues that the entire operational-tactical discipline in officer education has been degraded by dogmatism and stagnation in military thought. Until this is overcome--and there are emerging signs that it will be--defensive doctrine will not be truly implemented.⁶⁵

Outside the classroom, changes have not been so smooth. Soviet armed forces' training during 1988 demonstrated a number of problems in the attitude of officers and troops toward defensive combat, and training during 1989 indicated that major problems persisted. As numerous Soviet assessments have shown, the exhortation to act "defensively" frequently is not taken seriously. Army Gen. B. Snetkov, commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), referring to officers' attitude toward defensive battle, notes that "we must overcome the well-known psychological barrier: certain commanders, as before, underestimate the significance of these problems."⁶⁶ During the annual "Druzhba" exercise in the GDR in March 1989, Snetkov lamented that the defensive preparations of one division "were not for battle, but for show." Furthermore, in a debriefing following the exercises, one commander "simply fell apart" once it became apparent that his superiors knew his smooth description of the exercise was a charade.⁶⁷ Thus it would seem that an assessment of nearly three years ago still holds: "Some officers think that it is uninteresting to conduct lessons on a defensive theme."⁶⁸ Quite simply, defense pales in comparison to offense and to attempts to seize decisive objectives.

revised for the third time since its original publication in 1966. These three editions were issued in 1984, 1987, and apparently again in 1989.

⁶⁴ See Maj.-Gen. I. N. Vorob'ev, "O tvorchestve i novatorstve v taktike" [On Creativity and Innovation in Tactics], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 3 (March), 1988, pp. 43-51; Vorob'ev, "Takticheskaya oborona (istoriya i sovremennost')" [Tactical Defense (Past and Present)], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 1 (January), 1989, pp. 38-46; and Vorob'ev, "Iz plena zauchennykh skhem" [From the Captivity of Classroom Models], *KZ*, February 2, 1989, p. 2.

⁶⁵ Vorob'ev, *KZ*, February 2, 1989, p. 2. It appears that Soviet experiences in Afghanistan have also been an important stimulus to this process.

⁶⁶ See the interview with Army Gen. B. Snetkov, "V usloviyakh sokrashcheniya" [In the Conditions of the Reduction], *KZ*, March 23, 1989, p. 2.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Also compare the interview with Lt.-Gen. M. Kalinin, deputy commander of the GSFG, given during the "Druzhba-89" exercise, which is much more upbeat. See "Druzhba-89" [Friendship-89], *KZ*, March 19, 1989, p. 2, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-055, January 23, 1989, pp. 5-6.

⁶⁸ A. Voskobovich and A. Mitrofanov, "Tankovyi vzvod v oborone" [The Tank Platoon in Defense], *Voennyi vestnik*, no. 1 (January), 1987, p. 41.

F. ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

In 1988, a widespread debate began to unfold concerning the most desirable organizational principle for the Soviet military. Currently, these forces are organized according to the "mixed, regular-cadre" principle; that is, most servicemen and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are conscripts, while most professional officers are volunteers. Three basic alternative organizational principles are currently being advanced: national formations, territorial-militia formations, and a professional army. The first two often are lumped together, although the idea of national formations is more radical. In contrast to territorial-militia formations, national formations would be much more ethnically homogeneous and more independent of Moscow. Essentially national formations would become the individual armies of the various union republics. Not surprisingly, such proposals are most popular in the Baltic republics, headed by Latvia and Lithuania, but there is growing interest in this concept in the Caucasus region as well.

The debate over alternative organizational principles differs markedly from the other debates examined above. First, it has remained essentially an intra-military debate, where a united group of top Soviet military leaders (with some exceptions) has strongly opposed changes to the current system and a disparate and disorganized group of field-grade military officers (and a few civilian commentators) has supported reform. Given the paucity of military debate since the purges of the 1930s, this debate over the best way to organize the Soviet military has guaranteed itself a place in Soviet history regardless of the outcome. Second, the debate participants appear to be more reflective of the USSR's constituency than the traditional Moscow intellectuals (who are often despised by much of the rest of the country). For example, besides Russians, participants include Lithuanians, Latvians, and Muslims, and hail from Vilnius to Rostov-on-Don. Third, since some of the proposals overlap with the nationalities question, there is a good chance that some commentators have a broader agenda. Clearly, some nationalists would like to have their own armies to advance their secessionist goals.

Several hints earlier in 1988, including the rumor that the draft would be abolished, suggested that this subject would attract much discussion, but a full-fledged debate did not materialize until the November publication in *Moscow News* of an article by Lt.-Col.

Aleksandr Savinkin.⁶⁹ For Savinkin, military reform means a transition to a "professional-militia army"--one that is relatively small, well-equipped, professionally trained, mostly volunteer (although conscription would continue), and supported by a "broad network of local militia formations." He believes reform is necessary for three reasons: the current system is too large and expensive; it is too threatening to other countries; and the prestige of the USSR's armed forces within the country is unacceptably low (due to Afghanistan, various negative phenomena within the military, and excessive secrecy). Above all, he argues, such reform is possible due to "the absence of any immediate threat of aggression."

The mainstream, official military responded promptly, almost all of them with sharp criticism of Savinkin's plan.⁷⁰ Initially, the primary knee-jerk response was that reform was out of the question because the Western threat was actually just as strong as ever. Subsequent arguments have gradually become more sophisticated, although the caveat that any change be tied to the level of the perceived Western threat remains primary.

The Savinkin article served as the precursor to several alternative notions for organizing the army. Of these alternatives, perhaps most disconcerting for Moscow have been the calls for the formation of national armies, especially by Baltic nationalists. In this connection, the campaigns for positions in the Congress of People's Deputies provided a forum for discussing changes in the Soviet army. Although alternative organizational principles were proposed throughout the USSR during the campaign, candidates from the Baltic republics were by far the most active proponents of altering the current system. Coverage of these developments in the military press, particularly in *Krasnaya zvezda*, was predictably negative, but unusually extensive.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Lt.-Col. Aleksandr Savinkin, "What Kind of Armed Forces do We Need?," *Moscow News*, no. 45 (November 13-20), 1988, p. 6.

⁷⁰ Responses included: letters to editor regarding Savinkin's article, *Moscow News*, no. 2 (January 8-15), 1989, p. 4, and no. 4 (January 29-February 5), 1989, p. 4; Capt. O. Boltunov, "Bezotvetsvennye prizvyvy" [Irresponsible Appeals], *KVS*, no. 1 (January), 1989, p. 22; and letters to editor regarding Savinkin's article, "Poka sushchestvuet opasnost' agressii" [The Threat of Aggression Still Exists], *KVS*, no. 2 (January), 1989, pp. 18-26.

⁷¹ A good example is *Krasnaya zvezda's* ridiculing but detailed coverage of the military platform of People's Deputy candidate A. K. Chepanis, deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers. Chepanis would like to reduce the term of mandatory service to one year (largely by eliminating the non-military labor often performed by servicemen), create national military formations, and eventually shift to a professional army. Capt. Third Rank V. Verbitskii, "Voennye voprosy v programme kandidata" [Military Issues in a Candidate's Program], *KZ*, February 26, 1989, p. 2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-040, March 2, 1989, pp. 47-48.

Another featured military candidate, Maj.-Gen. Nekroshus, chief of staff of Lithuania's civil defense, would bring back troop formations named after the region in which they are located. This, he argues, would help raise the prestige of the armed forces. Such a proposal, although not quite the same as national formations (since it would merely involve changing the names of existing divisions)

A proposal by Lt.-Col. Zigmas Vichis, who argues that the Baltic republics should regain their right to create territorial military organizations--a right recognized by previous Soviet constitutions--has received considerable attention. Such formations would save money by keeping troops near their homes; morale would improve for the same reason; and interethnic rivalry would decrease. A less ambitious option would allow soldiers to serve in home units after they have "proven themselves" during the initial part of their service.⁷²

Lt.-Col. Alimurzaev makes another proposal advocating territorial-militia formations.⁷³ Like Savinkin, Alimurzaev couches his argument in historical terms, citing Soviet experience with territorial-militia formations after the civil war and arguing that they were the preferred organizational principle of Lenin and Frunze. Pushing the argument one step further, he suggests a close link between the offense-defense dichotomy in military doctrine and the organizational principle of the army: a territorial-militia system of military construction is much more compatible with a defensively oriented military doctrine.

One reason that this unusual debate has been tolerated thus far is undoubtedly the top military leadership's palpable displeasure with the current system. In his article in *Voennaya Mysl'* in December 1988, Voroshilov Academy commandant Gen. G. A. Salmanov, referring to the modern technological battlefield, appears to question the prudence of the USSR's continued reliance on a conscripted army: "Inadequately prepared servicemen are incapable of making effective use of new weapons or military technology. Moreover, as a result of inadequate skill they may be quickly eliminated from battle. *All of this forces us to search for new means of recruiting [komplektovanie] the Armed Forces and preparing the reserves.*"⁷⁴ [emphasis in original]

Some mainstream senior officers at least allow that a territorial-militia army might be desirable in the future, should arms control proceed and both sides adopt such a

nonetheless is probably a foot in the door for more radical proposals. See interview with Maj.-Gen. S. Nekroshus, "My v otvete za vsyu stranu" [We Answer for the Whole Country], *KZ*, March 8, 1989, p. 2.

⁷² Lt.-Col. Z. Vichis, "Should There be National Army Formations?" *Sovetskaya Litva*, January 13, 1989, p. 4, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-019, January 31, 1989, pp. 55-56. For a direct and critical response, see Col. V. Kul'pinski, "Zachem lomit'sya v nezapertuyu dver'?" [Why Force an Unlocked Door?], *KZ*, May 4, 1989, p. 2.

⁷³ Lt.-Col. Grigorii N. Alimurzaev, "Shield or Sword? Toward a History of Soviet Military Doctrine," *MZh*, no. 4 (April), 1989, pp. 112-122. His name indicates a Muslim, perhaps Tartar heritage.

⁷⁴ Salmanov, *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 12, 1988, p. 12.

principle.⁷⁵ Interestingly, the same sentiments were voiced almost 30 years ago in the wake of Khrushchev's unilateral troop cuts.⁷⁶

Soon after the initial wave of alternative proposals, the Soviet high command began to comment on them. Chief of the General Staff M. A. Moiseev noted that many proposals were quite worthy of attention and were being studied carefully.⁷⁷ Indeed, some concessions have been made to the Baltic states for basing their men in their own republics. Unfortunately, the reason why senior military officers are impelled to reexamine the current system remains unknown. It may be for the same reasons advanced by Savinkin, or because of other factors such as demographic trends (whereby the percentage of non-Russian recruits in the Soviet army are continually increasing, with significant implications for combat capability). Nevertheless, open press writings by the senior military indicate that they are not seriously entertaining any of the more radical proposals. The most important justification for adhering to the current regular-cadre principle is that the system has worked in the past. Thus, MPA chief Army Gen. Lizichev stresses that the Red Army's cadre system withstood the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars.⁷⁸ Other reasons include the important socializing role the Red Army plays: in Soviet parlance, it is a "school of internationalism." National and territorial-militia formations would be a step away from heterogeneity and political federalism and, therefore, must be avoided.

Many civilians involved in the debate have tended to favor a professional army (like that of the United States), in contrast to numerous official statements opposing such an

⁷⁵ See Lt.-Gen. of Aviation V. Serebryannikov, "Armiya: Kakoi ee byt'?" [The Army: What Should it Be Like?], *KZ*, February 12, 1989, p. 2.

⁷⁶ In a January 14, 1960, statement in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev suggested that the territorial-militia principle might be worth investigating in the event that general and complete disarmament became a reality. Whether it was for this reason or as a consequence of the unilateral reductions he implemented, a number of articles examining the historical roots of such a system began to appear soon after. In contrast to the current debate, however, none of them advocated the system. See, for example: "Militsionno-territorial'naya sistema stroitel'stva vooruzhennykh sil" [A Militia-Territorial System of Construction for the Armed Forces], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 6 (June), 1960, pp. 92-95; "K istorii territorial'no-militsionnogo stroitel'stva v Krasnoi Armii" [On the History of the Territorial-Militia Construction in the Red Army], *VIZh*, no. 11 (November), 1960, pp. 87-97; I. Verkhin, "O territorial'no-militsionnom stroitel'stve v Sovetskoi Armii" [On a Territorial-Militia Construction in the Soviet Army], *VIZh*, no. 12 (December), 1960, pp. 3-20; and Col. of the reserves A. Goryachev, "K voprosu o territorial'no-militsionnoi sisteme stroitel'stva Vooruzhennykh Sil" [On the Question of a Territorial-Militia System of Construction in the Armed Forces], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 2 (February), 1961, pp. 81-86.

⁷⁷ Army Gen. M. A. Moiseev, "Guarding Peace and Socialism," *KZ*, February 23, 1989, p. 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-035, February 23, 1989, pp. 101-104.

⁷⁸ Army Gen. Aleksei D. Lizichev, "Armiya: razgovor o nasushchnom" [The Army: Talk about what is Vital], *Kommunist*, no. 3 (February), 1989, pp. 14-23; also Lizichev, "V tsentre perestroika:

idea. Chief of the General Staff Moiseev has objected more strongly than anyone in this respect. The enormous cost of a professional army forms the cornerstone of his argument: a "6-8 fold increase" in personnel costs for officers, and "several-hundred fold" for servicemen, who now make about 7 rubles per month.⁷⁹ Other arguments are also cited: because a professional army would be small, it could not reliably defend the USSR's enormous geographic expanse; similarly, it would imply much smaller reserves, rendering the Soviet army "incapable of conducting protracted military operations, particularly in defense of extensive territories"; and it would be morally unjustified, since not all citizens would share in the country's defense. Also morally repugnant is the degree to which the Soviets perceive morale in a professional army to depend on material incentives such as good pay.⁸⁰

In the latter half of 1989, new contributions to this debate appeared to have slowed, with the notable exception of more calls for national troop formations in the Baltics, especially Lithuania, as its relations with Moscow deteriorated. In October 1989 *The New York Times* reported a strong movement to prevent Lithuanian youths from being drafted for service outside their republic, in response to reports of increased hazing incidents against Baltic recruits in the Soviet army. In Lithuania's case, Moscow must consider that granting the republic the right to effectively have its own army could be a significant step toward Lithuania's secession. Based on historical experience--when partisan activities were used against the Soviet army for several years after World War II--it is reasonable to assume that the Lithuanians would exploit such an opportunity.

Taking these factors into consideration, the prospects for adopting a new organizational principle that involves any devolution of Moscow's centralized control, as would be the case with a territorial militia or national formations, appears extremely unlikely in the present context. Put in other terms, the adoption of new organizational principles of the Soviet armed forces is inextricably intertwined with the evolution of the Soviet federal system itself.

chelovek" [In the Center of Perestroika: Man], *KZ*, February 3, 1989, pp. 1-2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-024, February 7, 1989, pp. 51-55.

⁷⁹ The cost argument has been strongly disputed by several civilian commentators. One of the more eloquent is Albert Plut'nik, "Uroki voennogo dela" [Lessons of Military Affairs], *Izvestiya*, March 20, 1989, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Moiseev, *KZ*, February 23, 1989, p. 2; and Army Gen. Dmitrii T. Yazov, "Byt' na ostrie perestroiki" [To Be on the Edge of Perestroika], *KZ*, March 7, 1989, p. 2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-043, March 7, 1989, pp. 102-105.

G. INTRA-MILITARY REFORM

Within the Soviet Armed Forces, the notion of "reform" encompasses a range of issues such as the restructuring of existing organizations (for instance changes within the General Staff and Defense Ministry bureaucracies); the effect of an increasingly powerful Supreme Soviet on civil-military relations; the nationalities question as it affects the military; the need for legal reform; and the creation of completely new organizations and procedures.

1. Political Reform and the Soviet Military

To understand the effect of the current political situation on the Soviet armed forces, it is necessary to examine the legacies which the 19th Party Conference left for the military. First, legal reform, the central theme of the Conference, has accelerated the so-called "democratization" of the armed forces (examined below). Second, there emerged the notion that the Soviet military should be based on "qualitative parameters" in its construction and strategy. Third, the Conference laid the basis for reforming the Supreme Soviet, a prospect which holds profound implications for the military.

Several other noteworthy events have occurred since the Party Conference in the summer of 1988. In mid-to-late-December 1988, local district party conferences were held in all Soviet military districts, fleets, and groups of forces. Press coverage of the various meetings revealed a common theme: stagnation abounded, discipline was not improving, and training and exercises were of low quality with no sign of improvement. Perhaps most interesting was the account of the General Staff party conference in Moscow. Certain officers, such as then-deputy chief of the General Staff Maj.-Gen. Lobov and Deputy Minister of Defense Shabanov, complained that "attempts are being made to present barely changed old techniques as a model of work 'in the new fashion.'" These same officers and others then roundly criticized senior military officials, including Col.-Gen. M. A. Gareev, for foot-dragging.⁸¹

Also noteworthy were the elections for the Congress of People's Deputies. In these elections, two broad issues had relevance for the Soviet armed forces: military issues in the campaigns and military men in the campaigns. With respect to the former, the most

⁸¹ Col. A. Vasilets and Lt.-Col. I. Kosenko, "Perestroika trebuet dela" [Perestroika Demands Deeds], *KZ*, December 25, 1988, p. 2; also translated in FBIS-SOV-88-248, December 27, 1988, pp. 71-74. It appears that following the Moscow conference Gareev was relieved of his duties as First Deputy

discussed topic was that of military reform in general. As noted above, an alternative organizational principle for the Soviet army headed the agenda for many Baltic (and other) candidates. Other issues included widespread calls (including by military men themselves) to publish the USSR's actual defense budget as soon as possible⁸² and to establish reliable civilian oversight of military budgeting and decisionmaking.⁸³ Along these lines, an amendment to the USSR's constitution, which would make the Defense Council subordinate to the Supreme Soviet, is apparently still pending. The suggestion was even voiced that the Minister of Defense should be made a civilian position, as it is in the United States, an idea which the current Minister of Defense, Dmitrii Yazov, has since discussed.

As for military candidates in the elections, those coming from the senior command invariably pledged themselves to the platform of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), with no real surprises. Most claimed to be concerned about the interests of their local constituents, civilian and military. Invariably such concern involved promises to improve the housing situation, but other issues, such as local pollution and environmental problems, often figured prominently as well. Surprisingly, in the races where senior military officers faced serious challenges, in general the Soviet press was relatively fair in reporting events and issues, even Col. Ochirov's race with Gen. Snetkov in the GSFG.⁸⁴

One unexpected but potentially important consequence of the People's Deputies campaigns and elections was the politicization of both the military officers who ran for positions and the broad masses of the Soviet people. Although the West seems to have centered on the former, the latter may well present more complex issues for Moscow. For example, many future Soviet conscripts and officers will have been politically active or will

Chief of the General Staff. He still holds some position of power, however, although it is not clear exactly what.

⁸² No doubt pressure here prompted Gorbachev to reveal the 77.3 billion ruble figure in his May 30 Report to the Congress of People's Deputies earlier than he otherwise probably would have. The conventional wisdom was that such a budget statement was at least another six months to one year away, since leaders had wanted to make some progress on price reform first.

⁸³ Rather surprisingly, an eminent group of senior and retired military men, in particular Marshals Kulikov and Silat'ev, has strongly favored a civilian commission in the Supreme Soviet that would be responsible for military decisions. They argue that it should be responsible for all aspects of military policy: the kind of army, its size, the kind of industry to support it, and the use of force. The latter is most important since the military tends to be blamed, even when it did not make the decision to use force. The decision to invade Afghanistan is the classic example, as Kulikov observes. See the roundtable discussion, "Veterany i perestroika" [Veterans and Perestroika], *KZ*, March 4, 1989, p. 2; see also Vladislav A. Drobkov, "Po venskomu mandatu" [According to the Vienna Mandate], *Kommunist*, no. 6 (April), 1989, pp. 124-125.

have been previously exposed to such people. What, then, is to be expected when the sons of Baltic politicians or striking coal miners and railroad workers enter into military service? The events of 1989 certainly demonstrated that many Soviet people from various backgrounds are no longer afraid to speak out.⁸⁵

2. The Nationalities Question and the Soviet Military

The nationalities question as it pertains to the Soviet military can be divided into two main themes: problems relating to the growing clamor for Baltic autonomy, and more general issues. The debate over Baltic autonomy has received a great deal of attention in the military press, particularly in *Krasnaya zvezda*, whose coverage has probably been the most extensive (if not objective) of that in any central periodical. Soviet military leaders find two major issues raised by these movements particularly troubling: the future of Soviet military bases located in the republics, particularly in Latvia, and the future willingness of Baltic citizens to be conscripted into the Soviet armed forces as they are currently organized.

The program of the Peoples' Front of Latvia (PFL), the main political opposition, openly calls for establishing a Latvian national army and abolishing preliminary military training, and argues for a return of the first Latvian SSR constitution, which would permit this.⁸⁶ Other more radical groups within the republic call for the removal of Soviet "occupation troops" of the Baltic Military District from Latvia and the establishment of United Nations peacekeeping observers.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ For a profile of Col. V. Ochirov, General Snetkov's challenger in the GSFG, see: Col. A. Vasilets, "Polkovnik byl ubeditel'nei..." [The Colonel was Persuasive], *KZ*, March 21, 1989, p. 1.

⁸⁵ Some in the military, particularly MPA officials, have already recognized this change. Lizichev criticizes party organs for not responding quickly enough to the rapid politicization of the people and of Army and Navy personnel: "the fact that a new person has entered the Army today [has not] been taken into account. New in the sense that he has already passed through a real school of democratization and become less fettered and more socially active." Army Gen. A. D. Lizichev, "Mastering Political Methods of Leadership," *KZ*, July 22, 1989, p. 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-141, p. 104.

⁸⁶ Lt.-Col. M. Ziemin'sh, "Esli otreshit'sya ot emotsii" [If Emotion is Renounced], *KZ*, November 27, 1988, p. 2.

⁸⁷ Latvian protesters began to intensify their picketing of the Baltic military district's Riga headquarters in early February, charging that Soviet troops have been occupying the republic since 1940. For coverage in the central military press, see: "Shou dlya parlamentaiev," *KZ*, February 12, 1989, p. 4, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-030, February 15, 1989, pp. 55-57; "Legko li byt' 'migrantom'?" [Is it Easy to be a 'Migrant?'], *KZ*, February 15, 1989, p. 4, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-031, February 16, 1989, pp. 61-63; and "Ultimatum' to the Commander, or Who in Latvia is Fueling

The parameters of the debate are essentially the same in Lithuania, where appeals are led by the "Sajudis" group, the PFL's analogue. Thus, the Sajudis would welcome a revival of national military units, a national officer corps, a reduction in the length of mandatory service, alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors, and an end to military training in schools and military educational institutions (VUZs).⁸⁸

Beyond problems in the Baltics, other more general but equally serious issues of interethnic relations in the armed forces have also received prominent attention in the military press. The numerous incidents of national unrest, as well as preparation for the CPSU Central Committee plenum on nationalities held in September 1989, helped keep attention focused on this topic. Distinct issues include ethnic rivalry in the Soviet army, the lack of Russian-language capability among an increasing proportion of new recruits, the uneven ethnic composition of the officer corps compared with that of the soldiers, and the recent establishment of interethnic commissions throughout the armed forces.

As a rule, the Soviets no longer hide the fact that ethnic rivalry exists in the armed forces, and do not discuss it quite openly, including in *Krasnaya zvezda*. This rivalry often is linked with the problem of "hazing" among recruits and their immediate superiors, although much evidence suggests that hazing incidents are rooted in rank, not ethnic differences.⁸⁹ Not surprisingly, however, Soviet writings have failed to examine the role that the Soviet armed forces might play domestically, namely as related to quelling ethnic unrest or even a possible coup.

Another serious problem for the Soviet military is the inability of growing numbers of recruits, mostly from Central Asia, to speak Russian. One author notes that this affects fully 50 percent of the troops.⁹⁰ Attempts to rectify the language problem after recruits are inducted are largely useless, providing too little too late. Moreover, remedial Russian

Passions around the Army," *KZ*, March 16, 1989, p. 6, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-052, March 20, 1989, pp. 60-62.

⁸⁸ Maj. Yu. Rubtsov, "The Movement is Convinced: What is behind Certain 'Sajudis' Proposals on Military Questions," *KZ*, December 21, 1988, p. 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-88-246, December 22, 1988, pp. 72-75.

⁸⁹ See Maj.-Gen. A. Ivanov, "Stat' shkoloji internatsionalizma" [To Become a School of Internationalism], *KZ*, December 20, 1988, p. 2. Another author (a former airborne regiment commander in Afghanistan) argues that essentially no problems of interethnic rivalry existed during the war in Afghanistan. While this may be true, it does not resolve the problem of eliminating ethnic tensions in daily military life. See the interview with Lt.-Col. Aleksandr I. Skachkov, "Odnopolchanc" [Brother-Soldiers], *KZ*, December 31, 1989, p. 2.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

language training detracts from combat training, resulting in decreased proficiency in handling modern weapons and reduced readiness. Military prep schools cannot be expected to improve the situation significantly either, since the problem goes much deeper. Local schools, especially in the Central Asian republics, are "almost feudal" in their primitiveness; instruction in Russian language (and often the native language as well) is largely nonexistent.⁹¹

As a direct consequence of the language problem, propaganda-patriotic education is becoming increasingly difficult to instill in new recruits since most such lessons have been designed for conscripts well versed in Russian. Maintaining morale thus becomes a serious problem. Moreover, to the extent that discipline is not instilled in troops during their military service, they tend to return home disaffected and are more prone to engage in street protests and demonstrations. For instance, the Alma-Ata riots of December 1986 were led largely by recently discharged troops.⁹² Clearly, this problem will worsen as more politicized conscripts enter army service and are faced with continuing language and educational problems.

Yet another consequence of language illiteracy is the concomitant cultural illiteracy. The Slavs do not understand the customs of the non-Slavs, the non-Slavs do not understand the Slavs, and the non-Slavs often do not understand each other's heritage. Tension and confusion are therefore rife, both among conscripts and between officers and conscripts.⁹³

It is also important to consider the enormous distortion between the ethnic composition of soldiers on the one hand and the officers corps on the other. A rare detailed profile of a motorized rifle regiment reveals some noteworthy statistics: Of the 546 men in the regiment, only one-third are of Slavic origin (Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian), while more than 40 percent are from Central Asia. The percentage of those of Muslim background would undoubtedly rise if the numbers of soldiers from the "Volga region" (which includes many Tartars) and the Caucasus and Transcaucasus regions (many

⁹¹ Maj. S. Babaev, "Govorim na raznykh yazykakh" [We Speak Different Languages], KZ, March 11, 1989, p. 2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-050, March 16, 1989, pp. 82-84.

⁹² Interview with G. B. Kolbin, "Ot razobshchennosti k ob"edineniyu usilii" [From Disconnectedness to a Unification of Efforts], KZ, April 1, 1989, pp. 1-2. Kolbin is the first secretary of Kazakhstan's Communist Party.

⁹³ For example, a recent poll taken in one GFSG garrison revealed that the majority of officers could not answer correctly even one simple question about the national life of any minority nationality. Col. N. Buyanov, "Uprochenie splava" [Strengthening Fusion], KZ, January 10, 1989, p. 2.

Azerbaijanis) were disaggregated. Among officers these numbers are reversed: 91 percent are Slav, and the rest are Caucasians, with "no one from Central Asia."⁹⁴

In an attempt to counter these problems, in early January 1989 the "Interethnic Relations Commission" was formally established. It is run by the Main Political Administration (MPA) and chaired by Adm. Sorokin, the head of the MPA. Subsequently, smaller interethnic relations groups at the local level were created throughout the Soviet Armed Forces. Evidence so far suggests that these groups face Herculean challenges.⁹⁵ They seem primarily concerned with organizing propaganda lecture series for recruits in their own languages, compiling and distributing phrasebooks among servicemen, and the like.

3. Legal and Institutional Reform in the Military

The central theme of "democratization in the USSR Armed Forces" has encompassed a host of complex issues associated with social justice and everyday life in the military: housing and living problems (especially for officers and their families); the hazing problem; promotion obstacles; service regulations; and interethnic relations. The December 1988 unilateral troop reductions further highlighted issues relevant to the Soviet officer corps, and clearly have been an impetus for further institutional changes, including within the General Staff.

Notably boosted by the 19th Party Conference, legal reform throughout Soviet society is now manifesting itself in the military. A roundtable held in February 1989 suggested that memories are still strong among the Soviet military about Stalin's repressions of the officer corps in the 1930s, a repression made possible by the Soviet legal system.⁹⁶ Codification of current laws must prevent such a recurrence. There is also considerable interest in rewriting the general service regulations. Initially, changes in these regulations were deliberated behind closed doors in the upper echelons of the Soviet military, causing resentment in some quarters.⁹⁷ However, pressure generated during the

⁹⁴ Babaev, *KZ*, March 11, 1989, p. 2.

⁹⁵ Interview with Maj.-Gen. N. Plyaskin, "Komissii po mezhnatsional'nym otnosheniyam" [Commissions on Interethnic Relations], *KZ*, March 15, 1989, p. 2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-052, March 20, 1989, p. 72. Plyaskin is first deputy chief of the Urals Military District political directorate.

⁹⁶ Roundtable, "Vooruzhennyye Sily v sovetskom pravovom gosudarstve" [The Armed Forces in the Soviet Legal State], *KVS*, no. 3 (February), 1989, pp. 18-38.

⁹⁷ Army Gen. E. Ivanovskii, "What the New Regulations Will be Like," *KZ*, December 21, 1988, p. 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-88-248, December 27, 1988.

first session of the Supreme Soviet forced the military to publish the draft regulations for general discussion in the middle of July.⁹⁸ Of major concern to all is how the new regulations will concretely improve the often miserable lot of the average Soviet soldier, and in particular, how the problem of hazing [*dedovshchina*] will be addressed. One change sought by some is the right to make collective complaints, which are currently prohibited.⁹⁹ Of related concern is how to improve the military court/tribunal system, an institution with a particularly brutal history.¹⁰⁰ Efforts in this realm will no doubt coincide with changes in the civilian court system. Finally, some--particularly middle-level, conservative officers--are worried that legal reform, to the extent that it raises the rights of soldiers and lower-level officers, will contradict and weaken one-man command [*edinonachalie*] and the military tradition of giving and implementing orders without question. They fear a return to the commissar system, or worse, the democratic system of the early Soviet state, when subordinates elected and fired their officers. However, senior commentators such as Yazov dismiss these fears out of hand.¹⁰¹

Aside from legal reform, the effect of the December 1988 unilateral reductions has been to focus primary attention on the fate of the 100,000 Soviet officers to be cut (including 1400 generals and 11,000 colonels), although attention has also been paid to the roughly one million officers who will remain. A conference held in the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Cadres in early February 1989, attended by Yazov, Army Gen. Sukhorukov (Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadre Issues), and other responsible officials, was particularly important for resolving pertinent questions.¹⁰² According to Yazov and others the "primary category" of officers to be discharged include, first, those who have served the prescribed time and have pension rights and housing and, second, those who were drafted for active military service for 2 to 3 years. The officer corps will

⁹⁸ See TASS interview with Army Gen. Valentin Varenikov, July 3, 1989, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-128, July 6, 1989, pp. 87-89; also "Otkrytost', glasnost'" [Openness, Glasnost'], *Pravda*, July 4, 1989, p. 2.

⁹⁹ See Maj. Viktor Semashko, "Army Must be Law-Governed," *Moscow News*, no. 16 (April 23), 1989, p. 12.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Maj.-Gen. of Justice A. Muranov, "Pravda o tribunale" [The Truth about Tribunals], *Izvestiya*, May 3, 1989, p. 3, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-090, May 11, 1989, pp. 87-90; see also Muranov, "Na strazhe zakonnosti" [Guarding Lawfulness], *KZ*, December 9, 1988, p. 2. Muranov is chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals.

¹⁰¹ Army Gen. Dmitrii T. Yazov, "Demokratizatsiya i Vooruzhennyye Sily," *KZ*, November 18, 1988, pp. 1-2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-88-224, November 21, 1988, pp. 68-76.

¹⁰² Lt.-Col. S. Levitskii, "O rabote s kadrami" [About Work with Cadres], *KZ*, February 11, 1989, p. 1.

be further reduced via a partial (and later a complete) renunciation of calling up reserve officers for 2 years.¹⁰³

The certification [*attestovanie*] process will be a key determinant in deciding who stays and who is discharged early. Normally a quadrennial event, certification has been moved up one year, and rumors are circulating that it will no longer be a pro forma event, causing many officers to worry about the security of their positions. Historically, this process has been seriously flawed, often used by senior officers to promote their relatives and other sycophants.¹⁰⁴

Several categories of officers will apparently remain untouched. They include most young officers (especially pilots), military scientists, academy instructors, medical and legal officers, those who served in Afghanistan, and officers of families that suffered in the Armenian earthquake. As for the effect on cadets and other future officers, there are tentative plans to close a number of military schools effective summer 1990.

The associated social problems are enormous. Above all, no one wants to repeat the bitter experience of the Khrushchev unilateral reductions, when discharged officers often were denied their military pensions and thrust into dire straits. The political leadership's desire to ease the transition of discharged officers must be enormous; if this unilateral reduction is not properly implemented, the military will certainly fight tooth and nail to oppose any similar moves in the future. Accordingly, some steps already have been taken. On March 21 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued a decree ordering local soviets and labor collectives "to take the necessary measures for employing and guaranteeing housing" for the discharged officers. The Defense Ministry is also drafting relevant measures and will assist in providing housing, by far the most contentious issue.

As for the officers who remain in the military, one new organization that may affect their lives is the "Officers' Meeting" [*Ofiterskoe sobranie*]. Its stated purpose is to improve relations between officers "in conditions of democratization and glasnost'." It is modeled after a similar officer organization that originally existed in the Russian army

¹⁰³ A strong rumor in Moscow in July 1989 among young post-graduates (many of whom have a perfunctory status as low-level reserve officers) was that the military was calling up an unusually large number of them to active duty with the intention of cutting them several months later as "officers discharged due to the unilateral reduction." Thus, they would be part of the 100,000 officers reduced, and "real" career officers would be spared. When senior officials familiar with the reduction process were asked, however, they resolutely denied any such plans.

¹⁰⁴ See Army Gen. D. S. Sukhorukov, "Ofiterskie kadry na novom etape perestroiki" [The Officer Cadres in the New Stage of Perestroika], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 6 (June), 1988, p. 10; and Sukhorukov, "Smotr ofiterskikh kadrov" [A Review of Officer Cadres], *KZ*, January 14, 1989, p. 2.

(which causes ideological consternation for some) and that was tried briefly during World War II, from 1944-45.¹⁰⁵ In early 1989, a draft charter was circulated among the troops, and although it apparently has not yet been published in the open press,¹⁰⁶ numerous responses to it have been. Commentary to date has been varied, and it is obvious that no firm consensus about its exact purpose yet exists.¹⁰⁷ It currently appears that the "Officers' Meeting" is a kind of budding competitor to the primary party organization. Indeed, in the longer term--depending on how pluralistic the USSR actually becomes--it may become an "insurance policy" for the Main Political Administration should the CPSU relinquish its "leading role." For the nearer term, officers now confront numerous problems with daily living that clearly need to be addressed more effectively; this new organization might reasonably be expected to help solve some of these problems.

It is vitally important to consider these numerous problems and challenges facing the Soviet military. Glasnost' has compelled the officer corps to become politicized in order to answer the military's critics and relegitimize the patriotic values the corps perceives to be threatened by the current reform process. In addition to the military's politicization as well as its morale problems, the grave ethnic and socio-economic challenges it faces have inevitably called into question the success and, indeed, very utility of the Main Political Administration. Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, to cite but one example, attest to the fact that this traditional system may be breaking down in the face of politicization, ethnic antagonisms, and the decline of the party and the army's prestige and legitimacy. The question becomes: what will be the primary agency for political control and socialization of the military? Might the "Officer's Meeting" be called upon to fill this void, and if so, would it be able to?

As for institutional reforms, in February 1989 Chief of the General Staff Moiseev revealed that the General Staff (and Defense Ministry) would undergo a partial structural reorganization. Numerous "unnecessary organs" and duplicative efforts were to be eliminated, and the "leading directorates and trends" elevated and strengthened. Moiseev criticized the continued "formalism," extreme centralization, and excess paperwork in many

¹⁰⁵ Lt-Gen. Aleksei K. Mironov, "Ofiterskoe Sobranie: kakim emu byt'?" [The Officers' Meeting: What Should It Be Like?], *KZ*, January 19, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ Col. A. Chaika, "Ofiterskoe sobranie postanovilo..." [Officers' Meeting Established], *Voennyi vestnik*, no. 2 (February), 1989, pp. 10-13.

¹⁰⁷ Various letters under the rubric "Ofiterskoe sobranie: kakim emu byt'?" [Officers' Meeting: What Should It Be Like?], *KZ*, March 28, 1989, p. 2; April 4, 1989, p. 2; April 14, 1989, p. 2; May 3, 1989, p. 3; and May 17, 1989, p. 3.

directorates, and observed that many junior officers often are afraid to express their opinions.¹⁰⁸

Finally, Soviet military education is also the subject of reform. In a speech given at the January 24-25, 1989, conference of VUZ leaders in Moscow, Defense Minister Yazov identified some of the main directions for restructuring the military education system. The main problem is said to be the steadily declining competency of Soviet officers, especially in combat performance, technological literacy, and grasp of command skills.¹⁰⁹

H. ECONOMIC ISSUES

Conceptually distinct from the broader issue of the USSR's defense burden are several other areas where economic policy meets defense policy: conversion; reform of the defense industry; and greater economic efficiency within the Soviet military itself. Ongoing discussions in all of these areas, especially conversion, further indicate the extensiveness of the USSR's economic reasons for changing its traditional military notions of security.

Prior to Gorbachev's December 1988 United Nations' speech, the Soviet press paid little attention to the question of converting military production to civilian production. True, articles did begin to appear a bit more frequently once implementation of the INF Treaty began; the Votkinsk factory's production of baby carriages in place of SS-20 and SS-23 missiles is the best known case in point. But serious discussion of Soviet defense conversion has long been rendered impossible (and is still seriously hindered) by the traditional pervasive secrecy of the defense sector, especially the defense industry.

Since Gorbachev's speech, the subject has become quite topical. As often seems to be the case, the General Secretary caught the experts off guard. Thus, during the first few months most of the articles about conversion were written by journalists with essentially no expertise in the subject.¹¹⁰ Now this discussion has been raised to a higher level through

¹⁰⁸ Army Gen. M. A. Moiseev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], *KZ*, February 23, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ Army Gen. D. T. Yazov, "Military School: A New Quality," *KZ*, January 27, 1989, p. 1, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-020, February 1, 1989, pp. 86-89.

¹¹⁰ In a sense it is no surprise that conversion should be such a popular issue among nonexperts, in contrast to the often tiresome discussions of the complexities of implementing defensive doctrine. The public at large may derive tangible benefits (i.e., more and better consumer goods) if conversion succeeds.

conferences,¹¹¹ the planned creation of a high-level "Commission on Conversion," and publication of numerous informative articles and interviews in the Soviet press. Moreover, Western attention to the issue of defense conversion is also increasing.¹¹² Indeed, the topic represents a legitimate and growing area of research for the future in the security field.

After a brief and optimistic period, the overwhelming consensus now is that conversion is a vastly complex and expensive proposition with almost no quick fixes. Indeed, conversion costs may be greater (at least initially) than the savings accrued from military cuts. The current situation differs from that of the early 1960s, when men and resources made available from unilateral cuts could be immediately transferred to such capital- and labor-extensive projects as Siberian and Far East development and the Virgin Lands campaign. Now development must be intensive, therefore requiring significant retraining in many cases, costing both time and money.¹¹³ Moreover, experience to date has underlined how futile and even wasteful the entire venture may be if it is carried out without radically changing the USSR's entire economic system.¹¹⁴

On the topic of conversion, Gorbachev's United Nations' speech committed the USSR to the following: to draw up and make public its plans for conversion; to formulate conversion plans in 1989 for two or three defense plants; to report its experience in employing defense specialists and using defense equipment for civilian purposes; and to encourage the major powers to draft and submit their own conversion plans to the United Nations.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ The most substantive conference to date appears to be one held at the Defense Ministry's V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy in June 1989. See Col. V. Martynenko and Maj. I. Ivanyuk, "Oborona. Konversiya. Khozaschet" [Defense. Conversion. Accountability], *KZ*, June 29, 1989, p. 2.

¹¹² A joint conference between the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Cologne-based Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien held in November 1989, addressed this issue in some detail. Perhaps the most extensive research to date on this topic has been that by Hans-Henning Schröder. See his recent work, *Versorgungskrise. Rüstungsabbau und Konversion in der UdSSR, Teil I: Versorgungskrise und Rüstungslastdebatte* (Cologne, FRG: BOST, 1989).

¹¹³ Aleksei Kireev, "Cost Accounting for Disarmament Economics," *New Times*, no. 4 (January), 1989, pp. 14-17.

¹¹⁴ The failures are many, including the waste of skilled labor in defense factories converted to produce civilian goods that have nothing in common with the previously produced military goods; the use of T-54 tanks to plow fields when those using them do not have sufficient access to the required spare parts, high-octane fuel, and expertise; and the use of military transport aircraft to ferry tomatoes and watermelons from Azerbaïdzhan to Murmansk.

¹¹⁵ As might have been predicted, after Gorbachev's speech, each Warsaw Pact member made a concomitant pledge to convert military production in their statements on the unilateral reduction of military production and spending.

A central dilemma is how to implement Gorbachev's promise to formulate a national conversion plan. Many experts feel that such plans should be drawn up at the local level (factories and regions), and then at the national level based on local capabilities. To do otherwise would squander the accumulated experience of individual enterprises. Others (conservatives and Gosplan officials) argue for a central plan at the national level which would dictate requirements to specific enterprises. Judging by a new wave of press reports beginning in June and July 1989, which detail conversion efforts at specific plants, the central planners appear to have won the debate.¹¹⁶ Further evidence is provided in comments by Abel Aganbegyan.¹¹⁷ When asked what mechanism would provide for the allocation of resources to convert military industry to civilian uses, he replied that this would have to be decided upstairs. In other words, for conversion to be successful, the government will have to provide the impetus.

A key question, then, is the role of the military in the conversion process. There is abundant evidence that the military and the Ministry of Defense are dragging their feet; arguments against excessive reliance on the military thus appear to have a certain validity. Paradoxically, there are compelling reasons for the military to assume a leading role in these efforts. First, because the USSR's military economy system has made it possible for the military to have unequalled production capability and access to materiel, the military can make a strong initial showing in conversion efforts, which can then be cited as proof of its "good faith" in these efforts. Second, there are numerous signs of pressure for the military industrial sector to embrace foreign economic trade, again because of its privileged resource and manpower status as well as its higher technology level. To the extent that the military can emerge as a competitive factor on the world market and obtain both scarce hard currency and technologies, it might be able to retain a monopolistic position in the Soviet economy while also remaining prepared for future military eventualities.

Given the worsening food situation in the USSR, tremendous hopes have understandably been focused on the conversion procedure's potential to resuscitate the food processing industry. Consequently, the February 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum on agriculture resolved to abolish the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and to transfer responsibility for producing food-processing equipment to some 200 design bureaus and 250 defense plants over the next 8 years. Besides the Ministry of

¹¹⁶ For example, it is otherwise difficult to explain the recent decision of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (responsible for nuclear power and weapons) to produce toothpaste and cottage-cheese processors at a uranium-separation complex.

¹¹⁷ See notes in Sol Sanders' article, *Strategic Review*, Spring 1989.

Medium Machine Building, other central ministries playing a large part in food processing include those of Aviation, Shipbuilding, and Communications.

A central assumption underlying the hopes for conversion--both in the case of a wholesale transfer of a civilian ministry to the defense sector, and in the case of the conversion of entire weapons plants--is the superior efficiency of the defense industry sector. Some analysts question this logic, however, and in fact charge that efficiency in Soviet defense industry is a fallacy. This apparent higher efficiency has been due to three factors: privileged supply, larger salaries and incentives for workers, and stricter quality control. All these advantages will disappear once military factories are converted to civilian use: guaranteed supplies will disappear, high quality will immediately plummet as quality control ceases to exist, and former defense workers will begin to work like their civilian counterparts. The only rational solution is to separate former military production facilities from the defense industry complex and to sell them to private, cooperative, or joint ventures.

Conversion thus far involves three basic areas: skilled labor (demobilized officers and defense industry workers), demobilized weaponry, and a certain portion of Soviet defense industry's capacity. In 1989, two or three defense enterprises were to have been converted to civilian production on an experimental basis and their experiences published. One particularly interesting aspect of the experiment is the effect on skilled labor, especially how engineers and workers who formerly did only military work fared. One problem is that defense industry workers have long been accustomed to the workstyle of "results at any price." Thus, the advantage of their specialized skills may be negated by wasteful habits, resulting in the production of civilian goods too expensive for consumers to afford.

The conversion potential for much of the idled weaponry remains in question. Although some ships have been sold as scrap metal abroad for hard currency,¹¹⁸ and a number of tanks have been melted down at home, other equipment may be less useful. For example, although some 500 million rubles worth of military surplus has been turned over to Gosstab for sale to the Soviet public, cooperatives, and other organizations through its territorial organs, many pieces of equipment are inappropriate for these consumers. Organizations that could make better use of the surplus equipment, such as state enterprises, are prevented by regulations from buying the equipment (the apparent rationale

¹¹⁸ Destroyers, cruisers, mine sweepers, patrol boats, and submarines have been auctioned off to a Norwegian company with ties to Pepsico. See interview with Adm. V. V. Sidorov, "Unusual Deal," KZ, May 20, 1989, p. 5, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-101, May 26, 1989, p. 59.

being that Gosstab can charge cooperatives about three times the wholesale price it charges to state enterprises).¹¹⁹ Moreover, among those organizations that have purchased military surplus, doubts are being raised about the cost-effectiveness of this decision. Spare parts shortages affect military equipment even more than civilian equipment; many military vehicles are not fuel-efficient or they use high-performance fuel that is extremely difficult to obtain in the countryside; and so on. Finally, the use of excess military aircraft is absurd from the standpoint of economic efficiency. For instance, one of the major uses has been to transport fresh fruit and vegetables to the extreme north, Siberia, and the Far East.¹²⁰

While the outlook for conversion is hardly rosy, it will take place as the USSR scales back on its defense burden. And while tangible short-term benefits are likely to be few, one such benefit should be a reduction in the pathological secrecy of the Soviet defense industry. Such a development would help lay the foundation for future defense spin-offs to the civilian sector and other profitable forms of diffusing technology, as has been the case in essentially all capitalist countries but never in the USSR. Moreover, greater availability of information would help promote discussions of how to reform the remaining defense industry.¹²¹

I. GLASNOST'

Throughout 1989, glasnost' began to penetrate military affairs, both past and present, in numerous tangible ways. Clearly, this has enriched debates in the East and West. But although the easing of restrictions is impressive by historical standards, the level of official secrecy still remains extraordinarily high and has prevented various debates and events from developing fully.

Nevertheless, some of the positive aspects should be highlighted. Like much of the progress in other areas outlined above, the incremental improvements in military glasnost' appear to be related to the 19th Party Conference and the implementation of its decisions.

¹¹⁹ V. Ogurtsov, "North Caucasus Military District Hardware on Sale," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 20, 1989, p. 4, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-120, June 23, 1989, pp. 73-74.

¹²⁰ About 60 transport aircraft (including the AN-124 Ruslan, the largest plane in world) of the Soviet Air Forces' Military-Transport Aviation (VTA) are being transferred to Aeroflot. See V. Belikov, "Voennye samolety pomogayut Aeroflotu" [Military Aircraft Help Aeroflot], *Izvestiya*, April 18, 1989, p. 1; also interview with USSR Defense Minister D. T. Yazov, "Vtoraya professiya voennoi aviatsii" [Second Profession for Military Aviation], *Pravda*, April 15, 1989, p. 2.

¹²¹ Several commentators believe that it is time to address this subject. See, for example: E. Shashkov, "Skol'ko stoit bezopasnost'?" [How Much Does Security Cost?], *Kommunist*, no. 4 (March), 1989, pp. 110-117; also Aleksandr S. Isaev, "Perestroiki i oboronnye otrasli" [Perestroikas and Defense Fields], *Kommunist*, no. 5 (March), 1989, pp. 24-30.

Thus, Army Gen. Sorokin of the MPA refers to a September 1988 decision that partly lifted the embargo on "certain military information" about the Soviet armed forces.¹²² One concrete consequence (useful for Western and Eastern researchers alike¹²³) springing from this decision is the "declassification" of the General Staff journal *Voennaya Mysl'*, as well as the open availability of apparently all military district, fleet, and Group of Soviet Forces newspapers.¹²⁴

One of the most impressive signs of glasnost' was the January 1989 publication of the Warsaw Pact "Statement" on the East-West correlation of conventional forces, the first time that the Pact ever published relatively disaggregated data about its own forces.¹²⁵ Of equal import was Gorbachev's revelation of the military budget--in a slightly disaggregated form--although doubts still exist as to its completeness, accuracy, and utility in the absence of a rational pricing system.¹²⁶ Glasnost' has even made possible unprecedented descriptions of several Soviet weapons systems, including the MiG-29 fighter, Su-27 fighter-interceptor, Su-25 close-air-support aircraft, Mi-28 combat helicopter, and Tu-160 long-range bomber.¹²⁷ Open coverage of several military disasters and accidents (such as the MiG-29 crash at the Paris Air Show and the sinking of the Komsomolets submarine) also resulted in the dissemination of previously unknown technical and operational information. Future hearings by Lapygin's committee in the Supreme Soviet promise to

¹²² Army Gen. Mikhail Sorokin, "Restructuring in the USSR Armed Forces," *Bratislava Pravda*, February 23, 1989, p. 6, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-040, March 2, 1989, pp. 84-85.

¹²³ For example, the first open-publication Soviet article to cite recent *Voennaya Mysl'* articles is scheduled for publication in 1989 in the journal *Znamya*. Written by Aleksandr Konovalov of ISKAN, it includes a critique of the December 1988 *Voennaya Mysl'* article by Army Gen. G. A. Salmanov.

¹²⁴ As for *Voennaya Mysl'*, subscriptions (including for foreigners) have been accepted for delivery beginning January 1990. General access to previous issues remains problematic, although there are now reports that older articles can be obtained via inter-library loan, from the Lenin Library in Moscow.

¹²⁵ "Zayavlenie" [Statement], *Pravda*, January 30, 1989, p. 5, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-018, January 30, 1989, pp. 1-8. The decision to publish it was made at the mid-December 1988 Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee meeting in Sofia.

¹²⁶ The 77.3 billion ruble budget is said to be broken down as follows:

- R32.6 billion procurement of weapons and equipment
- R15.3 billion R&D
- R20.2 billion upkeep of armed forces (the "official budget" of past times)
- R4.6 billion military construction
- R2.3 billion military pensions
- R2.3 billion "other expenses"

¹²⁷ *Izvestiya* led the way with articles about the MiG-29 (March 3, 1989, p. 1) and Su-27 (March 25, 1989, p. 3). *Krasnaya zvezda* then responded by creating a regular feature under the rubric "Our Defense Arsenal," beginning in April.

further glasnost' efforts, although so far the committee has concentrated on events such as Defense Minister Yazov's confirmation hearings.

Notwithstanding these indicators of increasing openness, the Soviet military is still not routinely open about its military weaponry and strategy with its own people. Perhaps the newly created "Social Committee for Verifying the Unilateral Reductions," chaired by Andrei Kokoshin, will help change this fact. The committee is to have access to all military facilities affected by the reduction and will issue at least one major summary of its findings.

Finally, glasnost' has arguably made even greater inroads in the realm of Soviet military (and general) history, where numerous official¹²⁸ and unofficial efforts are underway to fill in the numerous "blank spots" of pre-Gorbachevian history. In probably no other country is the past so relevant to the country's present and future. Perhaps the most acute example is how interpretations of the origins of World War II and Soviet actions in the Baltic states provide the foundation for arguments both for and against Baltic autonomy. But even in the comparatively narrower realm of military history, glasnost' promises to affect dramatically current military strategy and thinking, as well as other relevant areas. The initial period of the war with Germany, for example (not yet fully examined due to poor Soviet performance), should reveal a great deal about notions of a defensive military strategy as well as give insights into the development of postwar Soviet strategy.¹²⁹ The increasing attention to the formative years of Soviet military thinking, as seen in Kokoshin and Larionov's work, portends changes in the very way that debates on strategic issues are conducted in the Soviet military.¹³⁰ Finally, the equally controversial topic of historical Soviet civil-military relations has been broached, particularly as it concerned Marshal Zhukov's relationship with Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Most noteworthy are the (re)writing of a 10-volume history of the Great Patriotic War; Col.-Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov's forthcoming biography of Stalin, *Triumf i tragediya* [Triumph and Tragedy]; and the Central Committee's Commission on Problems of International Politics, a body set up after the 19th party conference and chaired by Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, which has to date largely concerned itself with matters of the inter-war years, especially the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

¹²⁹ See especially in this regard Vitalii V. Shlykov, "I tanki nashi bystry" [And Our Tanks Are Fast], *MZh*, no. 9 (September), 1988, pp. 117-129. Shlykov, "Bronya krepka" [The Armor is Strong], *MZh*, no. 11 (November), 1988, pp. 39-52. Interesting as well is the re-publication in serial form of a suppressed 1961 book by Col.-Gen. L. M. Sandalov, which paints a critical picture of the Soviet leadership, especially Stalin, in the initial period of war. Col.-Gen. L. M. Sandalov, "Stoyali nasmert'" [They Stood to the Death], *VIZh*, nos. 10, 11, 12 (October, November, December), 1988, and nos. 2, 6 (February, June), 1989, pp. 3-13, 3-10, 14-22, 32-40, and 8-15, respectively.

¹³⁰ See especially Lobov, *VIZh*, no. 2, 1989, pp. 41-50.

¹³¹ See Lt.-Gen. (ret.) N. G. Pavlenko, "Razmyshleniya o sud'be polkovodtsa" [Thoughts about the Fate of the General], *VIZh*, nos. 10, 11, 12 (October, November, December), 1988, pp. 14-20, 19-27, 29-38; V. Komolov, "Eto--chestnaya kniga!" [This is an Honest Book!], *KZ*, January 12, 1989, p. 4.

Despite these positive developments, it is clear that military glasnost' has much further to go. Ambassador Viktor Karpov has noted that the USSR, "unlike a whole series of countries," has practically no glasnost' in the realm of military issues: creating, maintaining, and financing the armed forces.¹³² Although the Warsaw Pact Statement was a step forward, the total numerical strength of the Soviet military, much less a disaggregation by region, remains unknown. In a similar vein, finely disaggregated budgetary information is completely nonexistent, especially for Soviet weapons costs and research and development expenditures.

But the grounds for dissatisfaction or pessimism about military glasnost' are not limited to its inadequacies. More alarming than the lack of glasnost' is the conservative backlash (by military and civilians) to the writings of analysts and commentators (also military and civilian) that the former feel have exceeded the range of the permissible. Although this theme has been addressed throughout this paper, several more examples are instructive because they suggest that a kind of bunker or siege mentality is settling over many senior members of the Soviet military.

Defense Minister Yazov's statements at the "All-Army Conference of Leaders of the Military Press" in March 1989 are indicative of this mindset.¹³³ That he devoted nearly half his speech before such a group to attacking those who favor a new organizational principle for the Soviet armed forces suggests that he and others expect the military press to do more to shape the public debate along official lines. Concerning glasnost' in the press more generally, Yazov seems to threaten military journalists not to push too far: "the journalist cannot escape responsibility for the careful selection of facts and arguments." "Journalistic frivolity," he says, will not be tolerated. The tone of Yazov's sentiments is in marked contrast to the more tolerant, even encouraging, tone of Gorbachev's March 29 speech, also made before a meeting of media representatives.¹³⁴

Marina G. Zhukova, "Korotko o Staline" [Briefly on Stalin], *Pravda*, January 20, 1989, p. 3; and most recently, Capt. First Rank S. Bystrov, "V oktyabre 1957-go" [In October 1957], *KZ*, May 19, 20, and 21, 1989, p. 4.

¹³² Viktor P. Karpov, "V XXI vek: bez oruzhiya" [Into the 21st Century: Without Weapons], *Pravda*, January 15, 1989, p. 4, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-010, January 17, 1989, pp. 3-5.

¹³³ Army Gen. Dmitrii T. Yazov, "Byt' na ostrie perestroiki" [To be on the Cutting Edge of Perestroika], *KZ*, March 7, 1989, p. 2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-043, March 7, 1989, pp. 102-105.

¹³⁴ Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Na perelomnom etape perestroiki," *Pravda*, March 31, 1989, pp. 1-2.

Another example of the conservative backlash is evident in a March 1989 article by Col. E. Rybkin, long considered a reactionary conservative.¹³⁵ His essay is striking in its intolerance and occasionally mocking tone toward all who would disagree with him. For example, referring to Lt.-Col. Savinkin's article, Rybkin chafes: "You feel ashamed for an author capable of such an irresponsible statement. Isn't it time to more carefully and competently review the articles being published by some of our newspapers and journals on military and military-historical themes, and indeed not to permit in their pages such cheap and dubious sensations?"¹³⁶

It appears that many conservatives were in agreement with Rybkin's assessment, for in late April 1989 the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution based on a memorandum [*zapiska*] co-signed by the Central Committee's Ideology and State-Legal Departments and the Soviet military's Main Political Administration. The memorandum strongly criticized the publication of essays deemed offensive to the Soviet armed forces.¹³⁷ A number of journals and newspapers were singled out for criticism,¹³⁸ and the signatories suggested that pro-military watchdog journalists be installed in the offending periodicals' editorial offices. The CPSU Secretariat "approvingly" recommended this suggestion and published it in the June 1989 issue of the new journal *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*. This memo was then republished in *Krasnaya zvezda* one month later on July 6, immediately following Yazov's difficult Supreme Soviet confirmation hearings. As such, the Memorandum represents the most powerful official criticism yet, much more serious than the Leningrad chemistry teacher's impassioned defense of Stalin in March 1988.¹³⁹ Moreover, there are signs that the Memorandum already has been partially implemented; shortly after the memo was adopted by the Central Committee Secretariat (but before it was published), First Deputy Chief of the MPA Adm. Sorokin remarked that "our ties with the mass media are expanding." He cited the recent establishment of a military

¹³⁵ Col. E. I. Rybkin, "Mirovozzrenie i voennaya istoriya" [World-view and Military History], *VIZh*, no. 3 (March), 1989, pp. 48-57.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53. The phrase "not to permit for publication" was also contained in the assessment by military men Dvorkin and Torbin of the Bogdanov-Kortunov proposal for unilaterally moving to a minimum deterrent posture.

¹³⁷ Postanovleniya Sekretariata TsK KPSS, "Ob osveshchenii v tsentral'noi pechati zhizni i deyatel'nosti Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [On the Coverage in the Central Press of the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces], *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, no. 6 (June), 1989, pp. 11-14.

¹³⁸ They included *Izvestiya*, *Moscow News*, *Ogonek*, and almost every other centrally published periodical, with the obvious exceptions of *Pravda* and *Krasnaya zvezda*, newspapers that have been very tightly controlled.

¹³⁹ Nina Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupat'sya printsipami" [I Cannot Forsake Principles], *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 13, 1988, p. 2.

editorial and consulting department in Gostelradio, a military-political desk in Novosti Press Agency, an MPA-sponsored military-artistic "writers' workshop," and special departments to cover the life and activity in the army and navy in "a number of central newspapers."¹⁴⁰

Undoubtedly, the progressive, reformist writers will not acquiesce easily; more radical essays are sure to appear. While no academic journals or writers specializing in military issues were mentioned specifically, they cannot have failed to take notice.¹⁴¹ Indeed, there already has been reaction to the Memorandum by Aleksandr Pankin, the deputy editor-in-chief of *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, a journal replete with glasnost' on military affairs.¹⁴²

All of the above seems to suggest an increasingly suspicious segment within the military. Perhaps it is in the tradition of their Bolshevik predecessors to see things like a "campaign aimed at belittling the prestige of the Army and military men," as Marshal Akhromeev has stated.¹⁴³ But their suspicions do perhaps become more understandable if two factors are taken into consideration. First, the Soviet military has no experience in dealing with straightforward, serious, and systemic criticism. Thus, collectively the military probably feels dazed by the unexpected and unprecedented criticism leveled against it over the past year or so. Finding itself the object of (critical) public discussion as a result of glasnost', the military has sought to develop more active means of influencing opinion, as seen in the above-mentioned memorandum as well as in certain journal articles.¹⁴⁴

Second, the Soviet military now must define a specific threat which it must counter; it is no longer enough to point to a vague "imperialist threat" in order to justify heavy Soviet defense expenditures. A recent article in *Voennaya Mysl'* calls the phenomenon "defense consciousness"--the need to convince the people of a state that an external threat

¹⁴⁰ Fleet Adm. A. I. Sorokin, "Byt' v avangarde perestroiki" [To Be on the Vanguard of Perestroika], *KZ*, May 16, 1989, p. 2, also translated in FBIS-SOV-89-096, May 19, 1989, pp. 116-119.

¹⁴¹ For writings by figures such as Alexei Arbatov, who mostly write in the specialist academic press and cannot be deterred by threats aimed at the mass media, the military takes a different tack: simultaneous attack on multiple axes in the main military journals.

¹⁴² Alexei Pankin, "Army for the People or for the Generals?," *Moscow News*, no. 30 (July 30), 1989, p. 13.

¹⁴³ Marshal Sergei K. Akhromeev, July 2, 1989.

¹⁴⁴ See, for example, the articles by Karem Rash published in *VIZh* and *Morskoi sbornik* in 1989. They represented full-fledged attacks on Gorbachev's policies combined with support for traditional chauvinistic, patriotic, even Stalinist, values.

does exist and that it must be countered.¹⁴⁵ Many of those who infuriate the Soviet military with their proposals obviously hold opinions about an external threat distinctly different from those of the Soviet military. The Soviet military leadership must now perceive that increasing numbers of Soviet citizens are beginning either to discount the existence of an external threat or at least to compare its magnitude with the magnitude of the internal situation. For while the extent of the external threat is difficult to assess, the gravity of domestic problems is readily apparent. In sum, if a wide strata of the Soviet population comes to believe that "we have met the enemy, and he is us," then much of what the Soviet military does today will lose its legitimacy. Many Soviet military leaders genuinely seem to believe that the West is an economic, political, and ideological threat. But more important, the conservative backlash is probably due to the bureaucratic instinct for self-survival above all else.

J. CONCLUSIONS

When this project assessing the debate about Soviet doctrine began, we shared the skepticism that many in the West felt about the debate's apparently limited nature. Much of the debate seemed to be for Western consumption and designed to influence the Western debate. Indeed, the attempt to affect the evolution of Western defense policy certainly remains a primary and fundamental motive of Soviet doctrinal discussions and restructuring arguments. In this effort, the Soviets are using new agents of influence--members of the academic institutes, or *institutniki*--in seeking to influence the scope and nature of Western discussions about the possibilities of establishing a cooperative security regime in the West.

Yet it would be erroneous to view the Soviet doctrinal debate only as it relates to Western policy. Over the past few months, the importance of this debate as it relates to general discussions of reform in the Soviet Union has increased. Moreover, as the Warsaw Pact changes fundamentally under the pressures for democratization and reform in Eastern Europe, the debate about the nature of Soviet security policy becomes more urgent.

The Soviet doctrinal debate is further complicated by the fact that the Soviets themselves are not certain of the specific nature of some of the concepts they are introducing. The General Staff is apparently entrusted with trying to determine what the West will accept under the rubric of the new debate. If, for example, the Soviets seem somewhat unclear about the exact scope and nature of defensive deterrence, they can

¹⁴⁵ Lt.-Col. A. A. Kokorin, "Oboronnoe soznanie: real'nost' i neobkhodimost'" [Defense Consciousness: Reality and Necessity], *Voennaya Mysl'*, no. 6 (June), 1989, pp. 39-48.

engage in an interactive process with the West, as a means of elaborating the concept in ways useful to themselves.

Soviet military leaders certainly see the West Europeans as critical interlocutors in this process of working out a new security order in Europe. The Americans cannot assume that the good old days of superpower condominium will shape the concrete dimensions of the new security agenda. Recognizing the shift away from the bipolar world, the Soviets are seeking more extensive and frequent interactions between their military officials and writers and the West European governments and their elites.

President Gorbachev underscored the importance of these contacts in his key speech on European developments which he delivered in Strasbourg to the Council of Europe in July 1989. In this speech he embraced the minimum nuclear deterrent concept and called for the establishment of a network of Eastern and Western specialists that would focus their efforts on determining the meaning of this concept.

As this report has made clear, the Soviet security debate is not just for Western consumption and for the purposes of influencing the West, but rather is integrally interconnected with the process of reform in the Soviet Union itself. At its most fundamental level, the debate about doctrine and strategy has forced the Soviet military to justify its policy stance and its priority within the Soviet state system. This is unprecedented. Notably, the debate about the organizational principles of the Soviet army have become intertwined with the debate about the future of the Soviet federal system. In turn, this issue has become enmeshed in the debate about the role of nationalism and subnationalism in the structure of armed forces, both East and West.

The close interconnection between debates and changes in Soviet security policy and the military, on the one hand, and the process of reform, on the other, fundamentally alters how analysis of Soviet security policy needs to be conducted in the West. In the past, assessments of Soviet military policy have been conducted in a relatively narrow way, focusing primarily on how the Soviet military defined its needs. Such an approach is no longer adequate. The kind of broad-scale approach suggested in this report has become essential if Western analysts are to understand the dynamics of change in the Soviet Union today.

We would argue that the evolution of the Warsaw Pact will necessitate a significant effort to redefine Soviet doctrine and strategy. As Eastern Europe changes, and with it the meaning of membership in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets are seeking to reshape this organization. Certainly one alternative for the Soviet leaders would be to try to make the

Warsaw Pact a more political than military organization. This process of transformation will be linked fundamentally to a shift in Soviet doctrine and strategy.

The agenda for future research in the field of Soviet doctrine and strategy ought to focus on three critical issues. First, how will the Soviets seek to influence (organizationally and conceptually) their Western interlocutors in reshaping the security order in East-West relations? Second, what issues should the United States place on the agenda as a means of shaping Soviet thinking and policy in the overall effort to reconfigure the East-West security system? And third, how will the Soviets approach the reshaping of the European security order and how will that effort be reflected in their attempts to redefine Soviet doctrine and strategy?

Appendix A

SOVIET CIVILIANS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

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SOVIET CIVILIANS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

The role of civilians in the unfolding debates about various aspects of Soviet military affairs merits closer examination. In keeping with the thrust of the report, the emphasis in this appendix is primarily on civilian intellectuals, academics, and other commentators in the area of Soviet defense policy as opposed to the Party-military dynamic, which is frequently examined in the framework of civil-military relations.¹

First, civilian intellectuals--with a few exceptions during the first decade of Soviet power--never have really played a major role in Soviet defense policymaking until relatively recently. The subject has exceeded their purview for numerous reasons. In addition to the structural barriers discussed below, which work to frustrate the development of civilian expertise in the first place, the Soviet military has severely restricted the availability of basic information about Soviet force posture, strategy, and military spending. The party leadership has not only tolerated such efforts by the military, but has even facilitated them. For example, during the SALT I negotiations Marshal Ogarkov chastised American negotiators for discussing the "details" of Soviet strategic force structure (such as the number of Soviet ICBMs) in the presence of Soviet civilian negotiators.

The limited scale of civilian involvement in Soviet military affairs may explain why this phenomenon has, with a few significant exceptions,² received little attention in the West. It is more common for Western treatments to be superficial and oversimplified. In fact, the very way that the question of civilian participation in military affairs is often raised (as pure propaganda instruments of the state, at one extreme, or in terms of "the civilians vs. the military," at the other) tends to obscure a deeper and more complex issue: the notion of *intellectual pluralism* and its relationship to innovation in Soviet military affairs. It is not self-evident that the addition of civilian military expertise *per se* necessarily leads to the emergence of a more defensive doctrine or military strategy, as some are now suggesting. Moreover, as the first section of this report argued, events of the past year

¹ A recent example of Party-military tensions can be found in Soviet press accounts about who was responsible for the decision to invade Afghanistan. A number of Soviet military men, including the now-retired Marshal V. G. Kulikov, have emphasized that the military was only following the politicians' orders in carrying out the invasion.

² See especially the volume of essays edited by Jiri Valenta and William Potter, *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), as well as Rose Gottemoeller's work in general.

reveal a variety of schools of thought which, when duly considered, suggest that almost no clean cuts can be made according to institutional (civilian vs. military), national (Russian vs. non-Russian), or dispositional (conservative vs. liberal) lines.

Accordingly, the role of civilians in Soviet military affairs might best be examined within this overall framework of intellectual pluralism, not only as it is currently developing but also in light of its further development. Such a framework allows for a better assessment of the real question: is the vigorous participation of civilians in Soviet military policymaking a necessary and sufficient condition for effecting significant and lasting changes in Soviet military strategy, force posture, spending, and so on? If it is not, then what needs to be done to effect the kinds of changes the West would like to see?

Evidence suggests that genuine self-reform by the military (toward more defense-oriented strategic concepts, for example) may well be a futile endeavor. An entire postwar era of devotion to the offensive cannot be shrugged off lightly. So the institutional framework itself (an all-powerful defense ministry and general staff populated only by military officers) may make genuine reform impossible. The experience of trying to reform the Soviet economy provides an analogy: as long as the basic institutional framework exists (in this case, a centrally planned and controlled economy built on the foundation of a one-party political system), robust economic development is precluded. Therefore, some critical impulse from without is needed to change the basic framework. In the economy's case, the critical impulse probably needs to be a revolutionary one: the abolition of Article Six and private ownership of the means of production. In the military's case, this critical impulse is sometimes flatly asserted to be an increased role for civilian participation in military policymaking.

One of the clearest examples of such an assertion lies in a recent jointly authored Soviet-American article by Jack Snyder of Columbia University and Andrei Kortunov of the Institute of the USA and Canada.³ The article compares the experience of French civil-military relations of the 1890s with those of the Soviet Union today, basically arguing that civilians are an inherently good influence. In the case of military strategy, for example, civilian influence counters the military's natural tendency to embrace offensive strategies, with all the resulting consequences for force posture, foreign and domestic policy, and defense burden.

³ Jack Snyder and Andrei Kortunov, "French Syndrome on Soviet Soil," *New Times*, no. 44 (October), 1989, pp. 18-20.

Although much of the article is well-argued, the authors' central assumption about the benevolence of civilian influence and the malignance of the military's is open to dispute. One problem is gross errors of omission. Most important, the authors ignore the fact that there did exist a strong tradition of defensive military-strategic thinking in the 1920s and early 1930s in the USSR. Led by the former Russian Imperial officer Aleksandr A. Svechin, this school of thought was ultimately discredited and destroyed for political purposes by those (foremost Tukhachevskii) who advocated the offensive "deep-operations" strategy. But regardless of the historical fate of the "Svechin school," its very existence (and its large following) destroys the argument that military men are inherently offensive-minded, capable of advocating only offensive military strategies. In fact, over the last year or so a number of both civilian and military commentators have drawn attention to Svechin so as to show the legitimacy of defensive thinking by military men in the area of strategy.

A second objection to the Snyder-Kortunov line of reasoning is that it suffers from ethnocentricity. Specifically, the notion of an inherently good role for civilians in military affairs seems peculiar to the American experience. (In this respect it may be no accident that this ethnocentricity is reflected in certain analyses by Soviets who have long focused on American military policy, in part as a surrogate for Soviet military policy, which until recently could not be studied openly.) This ethnocentricity is revealed if one takes a broader perspective and examines the role of civilians in military policymaking in a number of West European countries, such as Great Britain, West Germany, and indeed in France, the authors' chosen example. Here, civilian participation in the formulation or critique of military strategy has been comparatively minimal. Yet this has not inexorably and consistently led to the emergence of offensive military strategies.

In addition, the authors' assertions about the inherent advantages of civilian participation in strategy formulation appear too simplistic. Civilian participation should not automatically be assumed to be synonymous with intellectual pluralism in strategy formulation. There is no guarantee that civilian input would be better or more sensible. Indeed, many eloquent essays have been written about the "illogic of American nuclear strategy," a strategy that is essentially the creation of civilian think tanks established after World War II. Moreover, Soviet civilians may themselves come to advocate offensive military strategies; their non-military status hardly guarantees that they will not be highly

conservative, and therefore opposed to doctrinal innovation along defensive lines.⁴ Finally, appeals essentially to create organized civilian elites in order to rationalize military strategy, based on assumptions of inherent civilian advantages, threaten to ignore the complex and developing cross-fertilization of ad hoc and decentralized interaction between military and civilian intellectuals.⁵

A final objection to this article lies in its presentation: the authors have darkly depicted an already-paranoid Soviet military, ignored all of the foregoing criticisms, and failed to present an intellectually watertight argument. It is not difficult to envisage how a member of the official military establishment will react to an article that essentially reduces to "civilian good, military bad." Clearly, the authors could have advanced their cause much further by presenting a more sophisticated argument.

Ultimately, their proposals for more civilian expertise represent only a superficial solution. Much more is required because the explanation for how Soviet strategy has developed can hardly be reduced to a lack of civilian input. More likely is the absence of competing input (pluralism) in general: civilian, military, or otherwise. That is why the destruction of the Svechin school was so important. For whatever reasons, there is tremendous inertia in Soviet society and, apparently, tremendous intolerance for a diversity of opinion. Consequently, the issue becomes one of how to guarantee the institutionalization of intellectual pluralism. Even then, this may not be enough; there may be cultural impediments to pluralism and tolerance. Thus, even with inputs from Soviet civilian military strategists, the result may be intolerance and coercion.

To recapitulate, the problem might not be so much that excessive military influence has generated an offensive military strategy, but rather that such a strategy is the product of a coercive intellectual environment whereby stagnation and the status quo reign, and in which freedom of discussion, information, and innovation are eroded. In this case, the offensive nature of Soviet strategy in the interwar period is best explained by the fact that intolerant totalitarianism enshrined the offensiveness of early communist ideology and destroyed the defensive-minded theorists who argued differently. And in the postwar

⁴ Good examples are the writings of Aleksei Podberezkin, now of the Diplomatic Academy, and those of author Karem Rash, which have recently been featured in the journal *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* as a series of essays entitled "The Army and Culture."

⁵ Examples have already been cited; foremost is the work of ISKAN Deputy Director Andrei Kokoshin, Maj. Gen. (formerly of the General Staff Academy and now retired) Valentin Larionov, and Army Gen. Vladimir Lobov, who is Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact.

period, the successful offensive operations of 1943-1945 which won the war became immutable dogma enshrined by the same traditions of intolerance.

THE STATE OF SOVIET CIVILIAN MILITARY EXPERTS TODAY

Thus the argument that increased civilian participation is a necessary and sufficient ingredient to effecting lasting changes in Soviet military affairs is not completely convincing. But even if it were, there are many reasons to believe that the civilians could not rise to the occasion.

First is the problem of quantity. Quite simply, the number of civilian analysts conversant in matters of military strategy is extremely limited. Moreover, those few who have mastered the field often find themselves hopelessly overburdened; there are not enough of them to allow for specialization in all the different facets of military policy and national security, even in such basic categories as military doctrine, nuclear strategy, conventional arms control, and conversion. In the case of subspecializations (such as mathematical modeling of various types of warfare), the situation is even worse: fewer than six Soviet civilians work fulltime in modeling nuclear and conventional warfare issues. This bleak quantitative picture becomes even more dire in light of the fact that there are virtually no emerging future experts.⁶

Yet another problem relates to the qualitative preparation of most Soviet civilian specialists on military affairs. With only a few exceptions (probably fewer than 10 or 12), Soviet civilians are quite underprepared from a methodological point of view to analyze military affairs. And even the best analysts are not necessarily on a par with their counterparts in the West.

What reasons lie behind this lack of civilian influence? A number of fundamental structural factors can be cited which help explain why civilian influence has never flourished and what preconditions must exist before such influence can take root. (At the same time, it must be kept in mind that the expansion of civilian influence does not necessarily guarantee either intellectual pluralism or favorable doctrinal innovation.)

⁶ For example, in attempting to organize the Columbia University-ISKAN Arms Control Simulation Project, it became clear that there were not enough qualified Soviet graduate-level students in Moscow to run a nuclear arms control simulation with 14 players on each side. And there are none outside of Moscow.

The first factor to be considered is the nature of the political system. Since the Soviet system has been a one-party system, there exists essentially one "set" of civilian experts associated with it, and all the mechanisms for generating these experts are tailored to this one-party system. Thus it is not structurally possible, as it is in multi-party systems, for civilian experts associated with the other party (or parties) currently out of office to migrate temporarily to universities, business, or think tanks, for example. Because there is no need for redundancy, other civilian experts do not exist, and the consequently opportunities for intellectual challenges, debates, and innovation are considerably fewer under this system. Instead, the structure tends to foster stagnation and dogmatism in thinking.

A second reason lies in the nature of the economic system. Being state-owned and party-administered, the system does not offer opportunities for various cottage industries employing civilian military specialists. The lack of a capitalist system also rules out philanthropy in the USSR. Similarly nonexistent are for-profit research institutes that sell their intellectual services. Thus, there has been no equivalent of the Ford Motor Company in the Soviet Union. Here in the United States, Ford has used some of its profits to create the philanthropic Ford Foundation, which has donated millions of dollars to non-profit research institutes and universities, which has in turn helped train and employ hundreds if not thousands of civilians with military expertise, whose work to some degree affects the development of U.S. military policy. Philanthropy aside, Ford has also invested some of its automobile profits in Ford Aerospace, which has, for example, acquired the for-profit research organization Pacific-Sierra. This has, in turn, created more job and training opportunities for civilian expertise, institutionalizing intellectual pluralism even further.

There are other reasons for the lack of civilian influence in the USSR as well. Many basic political institutions that the West often takes for granted do not exist. Recent developments regarding the Supreme Soviet notwithstanding, the organization does not match the U.S. Congress' elaborate infrastructure of civilian expertise in military and other affairs: a bicameral system with multiple committees and subcommittees, each with their relevant staffs; hundreds of Congressmen and Congresswomen, each with their own military experts; scores of lobbyists; a Congressional Research Service; the Library of Congress; the General Accounting Office, etcetera.

The overcentralization of the Soviet system is another serious impediment to the generation of civilian military expertise. Since there is no need for such expertise elsewhere, all of it remains in Moscow. A small, semi-aristocratic order is formed, which

over time becomes increasingly cliquish and incestuous. Often it becomes somewhat arrogant as well, and consequently tends to incur the animosity of anyone (especially the military establishment) when it gives them advice in a rather snide way.⁷

In addition the Soviet educational system presents enormous structural barriers to the creation of civilian military expertise and intellectual pluralism. At present, the best and brightest experts almost never teach; rather, they migrate to the Academy of Sciences' institutes and enjoy a comfortable existence of pure research. Thus, various eminent professors in the Soviet Union do not have the loyal followings of graduate students that their counterparts in the West do. The Academy of Sciences system is hopelessly bloated and overcentralized, and consequently suffers from the same problems as does Moscow vis-a-vis the rest of the USSR. Finally, basic realms of academic inquiry, such as political science, do not exist for ideological reasons. Instead, students waste enormous amounts of time studying "scientific communism" and "historical materialism"; consequently, they fail to acquire much basic knowledge and to fully develop critical analytical skills.⁸

The proliferation of cooperatives also erodes the potential for creating and sustaining effective civilian military expertise. In a number of cases, research institutes have effectively been "raided" for the language expertise of their researchers, who quickly discover that fluency in English and other languages can earn them, as translators and interpreters for Western businesses, five or even ten times as much money in one-fourth

⁷ Conversely, the decentralization of Moscow's political influence has created a budding cadre of civilians outside of Moscow with at least some military expertise, as seen in the military platforms of various nationalist politicians, particularly those in the Baltic republics.

⁸ The Soviets themselves acknowledge this situation, as seen in the following joke: Three medical students--an Englishman, an American, and a Soviet--are to demonstrate their respective knowledge before an international panel of experts. Two skeletons are arranged on a stage. The British student is first, and says: "Skeleton number one is a male, age mid-40s. Cause of death was a heart attack. The second skeleton is that of a female, early thirties, and cause of death was apparently AIDS." The experts verify this, and politely applaud. The American enters: "The first skeleton is that of a male, age 46, who died of a heart attack after a long history of angina. The heart attack was the result of the stressful life he lived, having had to work long hours and provide for his family since a very young age. The second is that of a woman age 32. Cause of death is AIDS. The AIDS was contracted by her abuse of intravenous drugs, which began early in life as a consequence of having grown up in a broken home." The experts, with great astonishment, verify all this from the medical records and burst into loud applause. Then the Soviet student enters. "Well," he hesitates, "there are two skeletons. One is a bit taller, and one is a bit shorter." The experts are aghast. "What do you mean to tell us!?" cries one. "Is this all you learned after five years of medical school?!" The Soviet student is silent, then suddenly exclaims, "Wait a minute. You're not telling me that these are the skeletons of Marx and Engels?"

the time. The prestige of working for the Academy of Sciences thus pales in comparison with vastly improved purchasing power and increased leisure time.

The increased opportunities for emigration are yet another complicating factor. Just as in the 1920s, when a huge portion of the Soviet Union's intelligentsia left the country, recent events suggest that a repetition is not out of the question. Already this is the case with the smaller ethnic minorities (in particular Jews and Armenians) who have traditionally constituted a disproportionate percentage of the intellectual elite, and whose absence will therefore be more noticeable. Another brain drain cannot help but have an effect on intellectual pluralism in the Soviet Union.

Clearly, the military is still resisting any opportunity for expanded civilian influence. The sentiment that this is not the purview of civilians pervades the culture of military thinking, as can be seen from many recent writings. This is reinforced by the absence of a historical tradition, and therefore legitimacy, of civilian intellectual input in military affairs. Again, the U.S. experience stands in stark contrast. Civilian military input received an enormous boost from World War II: their involvement in operations research, the strategic bombing survey, and weapons development paved the way for the establishment of a number of think tanks and university-based studies programs. The advent of nuclear weapons heightened this trend as it created an intellectual base for those involved in their further development and for those dedicated to opposing them. Indeed, nuclear strategy became the ideal civilian strategy since nuclear weapons are inherently militarily unusable. Of related significance was the institutionalization of direct scientific advice to the president in the 1950s as well as the anti-ballistic missile experience of 1960s. In the latter case, civilian advice to the U.S. Congress on questions of military strategy led to the decision to vote down the weapon system, the first time the Congress had ever done so.

Finally, as outlined in the last section of the paper, two additional Soviet cultural impediments to greater intellectual pluralism and the creation of civilian military expertise should be mentioned: the continuing lack of *glasnost*' and freedom of the press, on the one hand, and the absence of civility in the debates that have unfolded to date, on the other.

Appendix B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CONUS	Continental United States
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
FBIS-SOV	Foreign Broadcast Information Service, <i>Daily Report: Soviet Union</i>
FOFA	Follow-on Forces Attack
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
Gosplan	Gosudarstvennyi planovyi komitet [State Planning Committee]
Gossnab	Gosudarstvennyi komitet Soveta Ministrov SSSR po material'no-tekhnicheskomu snabzheniyu [State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Material-Technical Supplies]
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IMEMO	Institut mirovoi ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii [Institute of the World Economy and International Relations]
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ISKAN	Institut SShA i Kanady [Institute of the USA and Canada]
<i>Izvestiya TsK KPSS</i>	<i>Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz</i> a [News of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]
JPRS	Joint Publications Research Service
<i>KVS</i>	<i>Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil</i> [Communist of the Armed Forces]
<i>MEMO</i>	<i>Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya</i> [World Economy and International Relations]
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle

MPA	Main Political Administration
MZh	<i>Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'</i> [International Affairs]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
PFL	Peoples' Front of Latvia
PVO	Protivovozdushnaya oborona [Air Defense]
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SICBM	Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SSBN	Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
VIZh	<i>Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal</i> [Military-Historical Journal]
VUZ	Voенно-uchebnoe zavedenie [Military educational institution]
ZVO	<i>Zarubezhnoe voенnoe obozrenie</i> [Foreign Military Review]

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