

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE AUG 90	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
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TITLE AND SUBTITLE Air National Guard Fighters in Europe Readiness through Training and Mission	5. FUNDING NUMBERS (1)
AUTHOR(S) LT COL ROY A KEYT	

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AUCADRE/PT Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER AU-ARI-89-8
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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE "A"
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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

DTIC
ELECTE
OCT. 11 1990
S B D

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES 124
	16. PRICE CODE No charge

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLAS	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLAS	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLAS	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
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NSN 7540-01-280-5500

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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


Air National Guard Fighters in Europe

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Research Report No. AU-ARI-89-8

Air National Guard Fighters in Europe

Readiness through Training and Mission

by

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Research Fellow
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Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

August 1990

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
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Foreword

Because the majority of Air National Guard (ANG) fighter and reconnaissance units would support our NATO allies in the event of mobilization, we must ensure that these units can integrate rapidly into the European theater. Toward that end, the ANG continues to seek improvements in readiness training as well as in areas that support the active Air Force during peacetime.

This study begins with a review of the reasons behind the Guard's success, thus providing a basis for examining how its fighter units train for contingency operations in Europe and how these units have supported Air Force missions overseas. Colonel Keyt's conclusions deserve our attention, and his recommendations—although they are certainly open for debate—represent a logical approach to future ANG programs because they keep in mind the Guard's past achievements.



DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF
Director
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About the Author

Raised on a farm in Illinois, Lt Col Roy Keyt completed a BA degree from Luther College in Decorah, Iowa, in 1967 and later that year married Sonja Anderson. In 1968 he earned an MS degree from the University of Illinois and began a short but successful teaching career as the director of instrumental music at Gibson City, Illinois. His high school program won the Illinois Sweepstakes Award, and his junior high bands won consecutive first place finishes at district and state contests.

Beginning his military career in 1970, Colonel Keyt earned a commission through officer training school and his pilot wings at Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia, in 1971. He was assigned to the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at McChord AFB, Washington, as an F-106 pilot and served as the unit nuclear safety officer after attending the Air Force weapons safety school at Lowry AFB, Colorado.

In 1974 Colonel Keyt joined the Michigan Air National Guard. During the same year, his new unit—the 191st Fighter Interceptor Group—changed to the F-106. The 191st converted to the F-4 in 1978, and Colonel Keyt completed upgrade training and, later, air combat training for instructors at Luke AFB, Arizona. In 1982 he became a full-time air technician with his unit. He has been the 191st's training officer, weapons and tactics officer, and standards and evaluation officer as well as an instructor pilot and flight examiner in all phases of the F-4 air defense mission.

In the summer of 1985, Colonel Keyt was selected to join the initial planning team for Creek Klaxon, a project that called for the Air National Guard to perform the air defense mission of the 86th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ramstein Air Base (AB), West Germany, while that unit was converting to the F-16. Later, as the operations officer for the detachment created to implement the program, he managed the academic training, alert certification, and flying activities for over 100 temporary duty (TDY) aircrew personnel during the unit's one-year existence.

Colonel Keyt returned to the 191st in 1987 and managed the current-operations section, responsible for the aircrew training, scheduling, and flight management branches. In the summer of 1988, he began his assignment as a student at the Air War College and as an ANG-sponsored research fellow to the Airpower Research Institute of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Turning his musical background into an avocation, he has been active in various community bands and choirs. He directed his church choir in Michigan and the 1989 Air War College choir. He was also the tubist for the Capital City Brassworks—a professional brass quintet in the

Montgomery area. He claims to be the only fighter pilot and semiprofessional tuba player in the total Air Force. He and his wife Sonja have three daughters—Ellen, Laura, and Maren.

Acknowledgments

This year has been a tremendously satisfying time, both personally and professionally. My military career began as the total force policy was being implemented in the early 1970s. When I arrived at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1988 for my tour as a command-sponsored research fellow, I knew from experience that the Air National Guard was a highly successful part of the Air Force, having witnessed many exercises and deployments (William Tell, Red Flag, Creek Klaxon, etc.) in which Guard units proved themselves worthy partners in the total Air Force. This project allowed me to focus on the reasons for the Guard's success and to gain insight into what can be done to continue it. For this opportunity I am grateful to the many people of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, especially Dr Stephen Blank, my advisor, for keeping me on track; Dr Marvin Bassett, my editor, for converting what came out of my word processor into English; and Lt Col Manfred Koczur, my boss, for his support when I needed it.

I would also like to acknowledge the support I have received from my home unit, the National Guard Bureau, and many people throughout the Air National Guard: Brig Gen David T. Arendts, my wing commander, for allowing me to participate in both Creek Klaxon and this research project; Col Gregory Maciolek, my group commander, for his continued help and friendship; the people who work for Lt Col Dave Cherry in the Operations Exercise Branch of the Air National Guard Support Center at Andrews AFB, Maryland; Lt Col Dave Cobb, my commander during Creek Klaxon, who had faith in me and taught me how to run a successful air operation in the demanding environment of central Europe; and Col Deb Ward, also with Creek Klaxon, who shared his insights and caused me to think about the reasons for the Guard's success. Most important, I would like to thank the members of my family—Sonja, Ellen, Laura, and Maren—for their continued love and support. Finally, I need to thank my parents for being the only people in the world—besides, of course, my dad's cousin W.C.—who believe I will be a general officer someday.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Our plans for military manpower mobilization are based upon the Total Force Policy, established in the early 1970s, which places increased responsibilities on the reserve component of U.S. forces.

Their priority for manning, training, and equipment mobilization is based on time-phasing of their use in operational plans. In many cases, the sequence of deployment would place reserve component units side by side with, and sometimes ahead of, the active duty forces.

—*National Security Strategy
of the United States*

A significant number of US tactical fighter and reconnaissance units earmarked for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the event of mobilization are in the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Force Reserve (AFRES). Except for an additional 24 hours allowed for unit activation, these units must be just as ready for deployment to overseas locations as their active duty counterparts.¹ ANG fighter units with contingency tasking to Europe must, therefore, be trained and equipped for immediate integration into the NATO force structure. This study seeks to identify the types of training and specific missions for the ANG in the European theater that would best prepare these units to fulfill their obligations within the context of the total force policy.

Because ANG activities should conform to the tenets of the total force policy, this study first examines that policy and the changes in the role of American military reserves that led to its implementation. As the United States was completing its withdrawal from the war in Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration introduced the total force policy in response to general dissatisfaction with the previous administration's use of the draft rather than mobilization of reserves to support the war effort. Just as important, however, was the opportunity to cut defense expenditures by shifting more responsibility to the reserve forces.² The historical survey in chapter 2 is useful in providing a background against which one may evaluate training deployments and proposed missions for the Air National Guard.

Further, because the total force policy increases the possibility of the Guard's being needed during situations other than national emergencies, one needs to assess the effect of additional demands on ANG personnel. Although guardsmen agree to pursue military careers simultaneously with their civilian careers by volunteering to serve in the Air National Guard, it is important to them that their military duties not interfere with their civilian

occupations, unless there are good reasons. Guardsmen have always been willing to volunteer when their services are needed, but if military demands disrupt their civilian careers too often during peacetime, the ANG may have difficulty recruiting and maintaining an adequate number of personnel. Chapter 3, therefore, discusses the responsibilities of reserve forces during mobilization or activation for a national emergency, as defined under Title 10 of the United States Code (USC). The discussion reviews in detail the circumstances under which ANG units could be called into active service—both voluntary and involuntary—and speculates about the probability of their occurrence. Because activation of the reserves sends a powerful message to both friends and enemies of the United States, our national leaders have historically been reluctant to take such action. This reluctance, coupled with the nation's increased reliance on the reserve forces, provides impetus to explore ways of using the reserves in peacetime without resorting to activation.

Supporting NATO has been a concern of the United States for the past 40 years. Current discussions between the public, Congress, our allies, and the Soviet Union about burden sharing and troop reductions in Europe present new challenges. Consequently, training activities that prepare ANG fighter units for action in the European theater remain a high priority with Guard leaders. Chapter 4 evaluates this theater as an environment for training by examining what has been done and conjecturing about what might be done. Presently, Checkered Flag is the only ongoing deployment program for ANG unit mobilization training. However, during July and August of 1988, three A-7 units supported a six-week deployment called Creek Corsair that was designed to augment Checkered Flag. Begun in the late 1970s, Checkered Flag deploys units for two weeks of field training in possible wartime areas or operating locations at three- to four-year intervals. Creek Corsair involved deploying three A-7 units to Spangdahlem Air Base (AB), West Germany—each unit deploying for two weeks—and was unique in that the units shared the same supplies and aircraft for the duration of the program. The discussion uses evidence from Operation Plans, end-of-deployment reports, interviews, and questionnaires to help determine whether these training activities adequately prepare units for immediate integration into their contingency missions upon mobilization.

Just as the ANG seeks worthwhile training experiences for its forces, so it should—when it is able to do so—perform peacetime missions that would enhance this mobilization training.³ Chapter 5 explores ways that the ANG has supported such peacetime missions in overseas theaters, and, as in chapter 4, evaluates two overseas programs—Coronet Cove and Creek Klaxon. An ongoing mission deployment to Panama since 1978, Coronet Cove uses A-7 units on a 30-day rotational basis to share the responsibility of providing air support to US Army units defending the Panama Canal. Despite being outside the European theater, Coronet Cove merits attention because it is a mission deployment to an overseas area that has been supported by the ANG on a continuing basis. Creek Klaxon was a one-year

deployment of air defense F-4 units to Ramstein AB, West Germany, designed to perform strip alert while the 86th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) converted to the F-16. The program was unique in that it required guardsmen to volunteer for 45 to 135 days and consisted of a composite detachment supported primarily by eight different ANG units. Since Coronet Cove and Creek Jaxon are so different, they offer distinct choices to the people who must make decisions about future activities for the ANG in Europe.

In chapters 4 and 5, the study uses evidence from questionnaires to supplement discussion of the four deployments. The questionnaires were tailored for each deployment and sought three types of data: (1) general information (e.g., age of respondent and number of years service), (2) information on the respondent's willingness to volunteer for active duty tours of various lengths in the European theater, and (3) information on the respondent's views about various aspects of the deployments. Although direct comparisons could not be made since no respondent had participated in all four deployments, these instruments helped answer several questions pertinent to this study. Specifically, the questionnaires were designed to seek suggestions for improving the deployments, to determine whether units reached a point of diminishing returns after repeating a deployment, to ascertain whether performing actual missions contributed to the training value of deployments, and to gauge the effect of a composite deployment (i.e., Creek Klaxon) on the quality of training. The questionnaires, data elicited, and accompanying commentary are found in the appendices.

Chapter 6 evaluates the adequacy of ANG training and overseas mission deployments. First, it considers factors relative to the basic question of whether current training deployments prepare ANG fighter units for their wartime roles. Second, it examines whether these units are capable of supporting future peacetime missions in the European theater and whether supporting such missions would contribute to their mobilization readiness.

The study concludes, in chapter 7, by discussing possible future programs that would allow the ANG fighter community to gain vital experience in Europe while providing valuable services to the active Air Force. These recommendations represent both logical application of the precepts of the total force policy and appropriate peacetime use of ANG resources. Most important, they have the common goal of facilitating the rapid integration of ANG fighter units into the European theater for contingency air operations, as required by the total force policy.

Notes

1. Capt Greg Garner, "Mobilization of the Air National Guard." National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet, 14 February 1986.

2. Charles Joseph Gross, *Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 167.

3. AFR 45 1, *Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, 2 January 1987, 2.

Chapter 2

Total Force Policy

Total Force planning is not new for the United States; planning to make the reserve components a useful part of the total force is as old as the Republic.

—DOD, *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*

One must understand the purpose of the Air National Guard within the context of the Department of Defense's (DOD) total force policy guidance in order to determine appropriate peacetime missions and training deployments for the ANG. This chapter defines the total force policy, traces its development, discusses basic tenets responsible for its success, and describes its effect on the current general requirements, capabilities, and limitations of the ANG.

Total Force Defined

The total force policy requires that both active and reserve elements be considered part of a single US military resource and that the policy's guidance "be part of all planning, programming, staffing, equipping, and employing of Active and Reserve components."¹ This policy has been in force since 1970, when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said in a memorandum to the services that "Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserve will be prepared to be the initial and primary source of augmentation of the Active Forces."² Secretary Laird issued this directive because of the unpopularity of the draft and the cost of maintaining an adequate military force.

Both Congress and the general public had been dissatisfied with the Johnson administration's reliance on the draft rather than mobilization of the Guard and Reserve for the Vietnam buildup.³ Historically, this country's reserve forces have served as the primary and, if possible, the only supplement for its active forces. Of course, the United States will institute some form of conscription when it feels threatened by an enemy. The colonists, for example, demanded that all able-bodied men turn out to counter threats from the Indians, and Congress has periodically passed legislation to draft men into service when they were needed. When the threat is over, however, the American taxpayer has always demanded a return to an all-volunteer military and to the economy offered by a small, active force augmented by reserve forces during emergencies.⁴ Even the

peacetime draft from 1948 to 1973 did not alter this approach to meeting the military's manpower needs. Both the active and reserve forces continued to recruit volunteers and used the draft only to meet any manning deficits.⁵

Reserve components may well be the only practical source of additional manpower and equipment for the Air Force during emergencies. The highly technical nature of air power requires a much longer training period than the 12-week minimum established by Congress for recruits entering combat. Allowing 30 days for the Selective Service System to begin supplying inductees, the Army could be receiving a steady supply of infantry replacements in about four months.⁶ At least twice this amount of time, however, would be necessary to train a basic Air Force mechanic, and about one and one-half years for a mission-ready pilot.⁷ Replacement aircraft would take even longer. Therefore, because reserve forces constitute the only viable source of augmentation for all but very prolonged contingencies, they must be fully trained, equipped, and ready in sufficient numbers to reinforce the active Air Force.

Historical Development

The Air Force has not always favored this relationship between its active and reserve elements, as was the case toward the end of World War II, when the Army Air Forces (AAF) was making plans for its postwar force structure. Because the AAF felt that air power had made victory possible and because of advances in technology (e.g., long-range bombers, jet aircraft, and atomic weapons), it envisioned a large, standing air force built around strategic bombardment. AAF planners tended to ignore reserve forces, convinced that future conflicts would be quickly decided by strategic bombing. Consequently, the ANG was not warmly received by the AAF, which at this time was struggling to become an independent service, using the above rationale, and doubted the value of a reserve air component, especially one that answered to state governments. Nevertheless, driven by austere peacetime budgets, postwar military plans of the Department of Defense (which replaced the War Department) called for a relatively small, active air service supplemented by reserves.⁸

The newly independent Air Force remained unconvinced that it needed a well-trained, well-equipped reserve component that it did not fully control:

Regular Air Force officers could see no compelling military justification for these state-controlled organizations whose missions were entirely national. Moreover, they could point to the fact that, although Washington paid ninety-seven percent of the Air Guard's bills, it could not tell it how or when to train. Operational readiness tests conducted by the Air Force during 1949 concluded that, on the average, it would take Air Guard fighter units 86.6 days after mobilization to become fully prepared to carry out their primary operational mission.⁹

The mobilization experience of the Guard during the Korean War bore out these estimates in that most units required about three months to reorganize and train before entering combat. Units that had to reequip took even longer.¹⁰

Despite these problems, Korea was the turning point in the Air Force's attitude toward the reserves. The Air Guard's inefficient mobilization was the result of poor planning, substandard equipment, and general neglect by Air Force officials. Once its units were adequately trained and—in many cases—reequipped, the ANG compiled an enviable combat record and augmented the active forces throughout the world. More experienced than their active counterparts, guardsmen made significant contributions, both in combat and in various support functions. As a result, civilian and military leadership of the Air Force began to see value in properly managing the reserves.¹¹

Two Air Force study groups—one chaired by Brig Gen Robert J. Smith (the Smith committee, 1951) and the Reserve Program Review Board chaired by Lt Gen Leon W. Johnson, commander of the Continental Air Command (the Johnson board, 1953)—were given the responsibility of long-range planning for the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. In addition to reaffirming the Guard's post-World War II mandate of providing combat-ready units, these two commissions for the first time recommended that reserve missions and force structure be incorporated into Air Force contingency planning. They further advised that flying units—equipped with first-line aircraft—should be given specific missions and should be slated for activation into predetermined air commands.¹² These recommendations reflected a genuine change in the Air Force's attitude since they originated within the Department of the Air Force rather than being directed from DOD or higher authority, as was the case after World War II. General Johnson reported in a September 1953 speech to the US Air Force Association convention on what the board had accomplished: "I believe we are going to come out of the woods and get a reserve which we have to have, because as the regular establishment goes down, the reserve must go up and the country must depend on it more and more."¹³

During the post-Korean period, the ANG made considerable progress. By 1960 it had grown to 71,000 members and 92 flying squadrons. Its missions, which had been mostly air defense and light bombardment, now included other tactical fighter operations, reconnaissance, airlift, and medical evacuation. All fighter units were equipped with jet aircraft, including Century Series F-100s and F-104s.¹⁴

The Eisenhower administration, determined to lower military expenditures, relied on a nuclear umbrella provided by the Air Force's strategic capability and gave the reserves increased responsibilities.¹⁵ This support of the ANG and the growing cooperation between it and the Air Force improved the Guard's ability to provide combat-ready units in an emergency. However, during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Kennedy administration was hampered by Eisenhower's emphasis on nuclear deterrence at the

expense of conventional forces—a policy that left few options other than negotiation or nuclear war. Attempting to bolster US forces within Europe as well as expand conventional capability, President Kennedy activated almost 150,000 guardsmen and reservists in 1961, including over 21,000 air guardsmen. Eight tactical fighter squadrons deployed to Europe in late October, followed by three F-104 squadrons a month later. All fighter squadrons were in place within 30 days of initial mobilization—about one-third of the time required during the Korean conflict.¹⁶

In spite of this dramatic improvement, the Berlin crisis—like Korea—revealed shortcomings in the performance of mobilized units. Although the Air Force had implemented the concept of the gaining command in 1960,¹⁷ the Guard's manning and equipment were not compatible with that of regular units. Further, because deployed ANG units were authorized only 70 percent of the support equipment required for full-scale operations prior to mobilization and only 80 percent of the manpower, they had difficulty meeting acceptable operational ready rates and combat sortie-generation rates that were required during European exercises. Because most of the Guard's aircraft were no longer used by United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) units, spare parts were hard to come by. It was apparent that planners had anticipated a longer period between mobilization and deployment in order to correct these deficiencies.¹⁸ Despite the fact that the ANG performed significantly better than it had during the Korean mobilization, the Berlin crisis once again revealed major shortcomings in planning, funding, and equipping ANG flying units.

In order to solve these problems, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) asked that gaining command (defined below) prepare Guard manning documents that were similar to those for active units and that Guard units be included in contingency plans for situations short of global war. Generally, planners emphasized increased readiness and more integration with the active Air Force following the Berlin demobilization.¹⁹ In 1963 a portion of AFR 45-60, *Programming, Equipping, and Maintaining the Capability of the Air Force Ready Reserve Forces*, was changed to read as follows: "The objective of the Air Reserve Forces program is to provide operationally ready units and trained individuals that are immediately available to augment the active duty establishment in the event of war or national emergency or during periods of increased world tensions."²⁰ Clearly, the Air Force intended to use its reserves as had been envisioned following World War II. However, as the United States became more involved in Southeast Asia, the resources necessary to solve the Guard's problems in funding, personnel, and equipment diminished accordingly.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara solved these difficulties for a small number of Air Guard units in 1965 when he created the Selected Reserve Force. Nine tactical fighter and four tactical reconnaissance groups of the Air Guard were selected as strategic reserves—units manned and equipped to wartime levels and allowed increased training resources. Three years later, this program unintentionally provided a test of the future total

force policy. Mobilized for the USS *Pueblo* incident, eight of these fighter groups demonstrated that, given adequate equipment and proper planning, Air Guard units could mobilize and deploy for combat without additional training. All of the fighter groups were rated combat ready upon activation. Ultimately, four fighter squadrons from this force joined the Seventh Air Force at Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam. Eighty-five percent of the personnel in a fifth unit, the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), were guardsmen, most of them volunteers. Gen George S. Brown, Air Force commander in South Vietnam, stated that he had "five F-100 Air National Guard squadrons. . . . Those were the five best F-100 squadrons in the field. The aircrews were a little older, but they were more experienced, and the maintenance people were also more experienced than the regular units."²¹

Tenets of Total Force

With the Selected Reserve, the Air Force had finally established—albeit on a limited basis—the requisites for a total force policy. When the policy became official in 1970, the Air Force and the ANG stood ready to implement it because they had pioneered the concept, beginning with their experiences during the Korean War. The Air Force had realized that Congress would not fund an active force large enough to meet all contingencies and that the reserves were the only augmentation it could expect in all but protracted conflicts. Hence, the Air Force had recognized the need to view the ANG, AFRES, and active Air Force as elements of a total air force long before that policy was formalized by the secretary of defense.²²

Traditionally, reserve units have operated during peacetime at a fraction of the cost of active units with the same wartime missions. This situation was especially prevalent before the advent of technology associated with modern warfare. The Air Force could equip reserve units with obsolete or low-technology weapon systems and train people to use them at relatively little expense. The Air Force experimented with this approach between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, when it gave reserves surplus equipment and limited funding for training. The outcome was predictable: units needed three months of postmobilization training to be ready for combat.

As previously mentioned, the total force policy currently demands that units of the ANG and AFRES be prepared to deploy to the combat arena and enter combat operations within 72 hours of the order to mobilize. Except for the first 24 hours, which are allowed for mobilization of the reserves, the readiness requirements are the same as those for active units. Obviously, the costs of maintaining reserves at an enhanced level of readiness increase proportionally. According to studies by the Rand Corporation, an Air Guard fighter squadron of the 1960s could be operated with about 50 percent fewer tax dollars than an active squadron, but by the

late 1970s the cost had risen by 20 percent.²³ Several factors account for this increase.

First, the total force policy requires that weapon systems of reserve components be determined by their wartime mission and their sequencing into combat. Since Operation Plans call for reserve units to deploy simultaneously with active units and, in some cases, ahead of them,²⁴ they must have first-rate equipment, which, of course, is expensive. The Air Force, with congressional support, has demonstrated a commitment to supporting the Air Guard with such equipment.²⁵ During the 1970s, some Guard units were equipped with A-7s and A-10s delivered directly from the manufacturer's assembly lines. Currently, most ANG fighter squadrons are trading their F-106s and F-4s for F-15s and F-16s.²⁶ Consequently, equipping Guard units according to requirements of the total force policy is not a source of great savings.

Second, the total force policy requires that reservists maintain the same level of readiness as active duty personnel, since they may be entering combat beside or ahead of their active duty counterparts. Obviously, continuation training (the training required to maintain a given level of readiness) cannot be sacrificed in the interest of economy. However, the Guard has been able to maintain effectiveness with less training because of generally higher levels of experience and much lower personnel turnover rates than are found in active units. Traditionally, Guard units' high levels of experience are due to two factors. First, the Guard has attracted people with prior military service by allowing them to continue their military careers in a part-time status.²⁷ Second, once they are members, most guardsmen will remain so through retirement, usually within the same unit. Consequently, the Air National Guard has been able to maintain levels of experience and stability that are not usually found in the active service. General Brown's comment about the guardsmen who served under him in Southeast Asia is germane: "They had done the same work on the same weapon system for years, and they had stability [of personnel] that a regular unit doesn't have."²⁸ The cost of continuation training for guardsmen, then, does offer savings over the cost of maintaining regular Air Force personnel at a comparable state of readiness, though not as much as was realized before the total force policy came into being. However, as General Brown points out, this savings depends on the stability of personnel in ANG units.

Third, personnel costs have traditionally been much lower for an Air Guard flying unit than for a similarly equipped active unit. Although the total number of personnel required is essentially the same for both units, the savings derive from the fact that most guardsmen work on a part-time basis. Only 25 percent of the Air Guard are full-time employees;²⁹ they are responsible for unit administration, supervision, and training as well as maintaining equipment between scheduled unit activities. Although there is no savings in personnel costs for these guardsmen, their stability and experience have historically yielded high productivity, particularly in the area of aircraft maintenance.³⁰ The remaining 75 percent of the personnel

in each unit train on a part-time basis. They volunteer to attend 48 four-hour training periods and perform two weeks of active duty field training each year. Because this amount of training is not adequate for aircrews to operate high-performance fighters safely and to maintain the high proficiency levels required by the total force policy, they are authorized an additional 48 flying-training periods.³¹ Since part-time guardsmen are paid only for the amount of time they are in training, personnel costs continue to be a major source of savings under the total force policy.

What assurance do we have that the ANG is the bargain that it appears to be? One assessment of Guard capability is provided by each unit's gaining command—a system instituted by the Air Force in 1960, requiring that Guard units be assigned to one of the major air commands upon mobilization.³² During peacetime, gaining commands have the general responsibility of defining missions, setting the standards required to satisfy those missions, and determining if those standards are being met. With minor exceptions, these standards are the same for active and Guard units with the same mission. Inspection teams from the gaining command judge how well Guard units meet these standards, using the same criteria they use to evaluate active units.³³ Historically, ANG units have performed well during these inspections. The Tactical Air Command (TAC), for example, conducted 15 operational readiness inspections (ORI) of Air National Guard tactical fighter units during fiscal year 1988, rating nine units "excellent" and six "satisfactory."³⁴

The concept of the gaining command has worked well because it has been accepted by both Air Force and Air Guard leaders. To be sure, Guard units are not assigned to the gaining command until after mobilization and, therefore, are not under its chain of command during peacetime. Rather, the state governors—through their adjutants general—provide the command structure that plans and administers unit training programs. However, the Air Guard leadership recognizes that meeting the standards set by the gaining commands enhances the worth of its units and, consequently, is necessary for continued Air Force support in terms of adequate funding and equipment modernization.³⁵

In addition to charging the ANG with the responsibility of providing combat-ready units, the total force policy also requires that the ANG "perform such peacetime missions as are compatible with Guard and Reserve training requirements and the maintenance of mobilization readiness."³⁶ This requirement seems reasonable enough. If a Guard unit operates more economically than an active unit, flies capable equipment, and maintains the same readiness as an active unit, it should be able to perform peacetime missions—especially when those missions are compatible with the training required for mobilization readiness. In fact, the Air Guard has been doing just that for years: interceptor squadrons have provided aircraft and crews for continental air defense since 1953; Air Guard A-7 units have provided tactical air support to United States Air Force South (SOUTHAF) in Panama since 1978; RF-4 units regularly

support the Peacetime Area Reconnaissance Program; F-4 units provided air defense for a unit in West Germany that was converting to F-16s in 1986 and 1987; and tanker, transport, and special operations units support even more peacetime missions.³⁷

Performing peacetime missions, however, does incur increased costs because ANG personnel must be compensated for the time they spend performing them. Additional flying associated with peacetime missions would also increase costs. Consequently, the greater the demands of the peacetime mission, the closer the Guard unit's operating cost approaches that of an active unit performing the same mission. This increase in operating tempo can cause the Guard unit's costs to reach a point of diminishing returns, after which it is no longer cost-effective to assign a particular mission to the ANG.³⁸

AFR 45-1, *Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, addresses this matter of cost-effectiveness: "In determining the most advantageous mix of forces to ensure our national security, all elements of these forces are considered concurrently in terms of their contribution to national security versus the cost to equip and maintain them."³⁹ Presumably, "the most advantageous mix" implies the most "economical" mix of reserve and active forces. That is, in determining whether a reserve unit should be assigned a particular mission, planners should compare the unit's capabilities and operating expenses to those of an active unit that performs the same mission. Today, this method of assigning missions to reserve units is an integral part of the Air Force Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) implemented by the Air Force Board with the cooperation of representatives from both the ANG and AFRES.⁴⁰ However, cost-effectiveness is not the only consideration in determining missions for reserve forces.

The 1988 national security strategy published by the government's executive branch cautions against burdening reserve units with peacetime missions: "While there are specific mission areas in which the role for reserve components can be expanded, we need to exercise care to avoid fundamentally altering the nature of service in the reserves."⁴¹ That is, we cannot expect guardsmen to devote so much time to performing these peacetime missions that they jeopardize their civilian careers or otherwise disrupt their lives to the point that they choose not to participate in the ANG. There are limits to the amount of extra time that guardsmen can be expected to devote to peacetime missions.

So far the discussion has focused on the needs of the Air National Guard. However, the active Air Force also has requirements concerning "the most advantageous mix of forces." First, the Air Force rotates personnel in all specialty codes with their counterparts overseas so that no one must spend an inordinate amount of time in a forward deployed unit. Presently, the approximate mix of tactical forces is 40 percent with active stateside units,

30 percent deployed to forward areas, and the remaining 30 percent with the reserve components.⁴² Planners who wish to assign additional tactical missions and resources to reserve units must consider the consequences of altering the balance of rotational forces. Second, in order to give the national leadership more flexibility, planners should attempt to maintain sufficient strength within the active Air Force so that it could respond to peacetime contingencies without relying on mobilized reserves. An excellent example comes from the 1987-88 Persian Gulf operations. Navy planners were no doubt surprised and embarrassed to discover that the active Navy had almost no capability to conduct minesweeping during peacetime because 18 of the nation's 21 ship-based minesweepers had been assigned to the Naval Reserve.⁴³ Further, this matter of keeping the active force up to strength is especially important because presidents have been reluctant to resort to activation, for reasons discussed in the next chapter.

In sum, the total force policy has guided military force planning since the early 1970s, when the United States was trying to extricate itself from the war in Vietnam. It came about because the public had not been satisfied with reliance on the draft to supply manpower for the war effort and demanded that defense spending be reduced. The basic tenet of the policy is that reserve forces be trained, equipped, and ready to be the "initial and primary" source of augmentation for the active forces during contingencies or national emergencies. By adequately supporting its reserves, the nation saves money and maintains force structure without compromising its overall military strength. When the policy was instituted, the Air Force was ready because it had pursued the concept actively since the Korean War when its leaders realized that, with proper planning, the ANG and AFRES could provide valuable, timely reinforcement. Probably the most important factor in the success of the total force policy has been the concept of the gaining command, which ensures the readiness of the Guard by requiring that its units meet the same standards as active units.

On the other hand, the total force policy does introduce certain limiting factors. Because the policy demands the same degree of readiness from reserve units as from active units, expenditures for equipping and training the reserves cannot be a major source of savings. The ANG's higher levels of experience, made possible by low turnover rates for personnel and a significant number of members with prior military service, have allowed guardsmen to maintain the readiness standards dictated by the total force policy even though they train on a part-time basis. The savings realized from the part-time status of most reserve personnel can be significantly offset by expenses generated from performing peacetime missions that are labor-intensive. Further, planners must anticipate the effect that adding missions and transferring assets to reserve units will have on the balance of rotational forces and must consider maintaining enough active forces to preclude the mobilization of reserves to meet most peacetime contingencies. In short, when planners think about possible missions for the Air National Guard, they should take into consideration both the strengths and limita-

tions of the Guard within the confines of the total force policy, remembering that the purpose of the Guard is to augment rather than to substitute for the active Air Force.

Notes

1. AFR 45 1, *Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, 2 January 1987, 1-2.
2. Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Expanded Role for the Reserves and National Guard*, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986, 2.
3. Charles Joseph Gross, *Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 167.
4. Bennie J. Wilson III, ed., *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), 12-20.
5. *Ibid.*, 23.
6. *Ibid.*, 101.
7. Maj Dan Bristol, chief, Rated Management Division, Directorate of Operations, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, telephone interview with author, 7 July 1989.
8. Gross, 9-10, 20-21.
9. *Ibid.*, 23.
10. *Ibid.*, 76-84.
11. *Ibid.*, 69-73.
12. *Ibid.*, 76-84.
13. C. V. Glines, "Prelude to Total Force," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1988, 102.
14. Gross, 91-92.
15. *Ibid.*, 99-100.
16. *Ibid.*, 128.
17. *Ibid.*, 125.
18. *Ibid.*, 132-38.
19. *Ibid.*, 140-41.
20. *Ibid.*, 147; AFR 45 60, *Programming, Equipping, and Maintaining the Capability of the Air Force Ready Reserve Forces*, 13 February 1963, 1.
21. Quoted in Gross, 143-44, 156-60.
22. *Ibid.*, 167-68.
23. *Ibid.*, 170.
24. Office of the President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1988), 22.
25. Senate, *Expanded Role*, 3.
26. Lee E. Sharff, *National Guard Almanac* (Falls Church, Va.: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 1989), 70-71.
27. Department of the Air Force, *Air Force 2000: Air Power Entering the 21st Century* (U) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, 11 June 1982), 362. (SECRET) Information extracted is unclassified.
28. Quoted in Gross, 169.
29. Departments of the Army and the Air Force, *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau*, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: National Guard Bureau, 1987), 56-57.
30. Gross, 169.
31. ANG Regulation (ANGR) 50 01, *Active and Inactive Duty for Training Management within the Air National Guard*, 13 July 1988, 11-14.
32. Gross, 165.
33. AFR 45 1, 2, 4-5.

34. Col Lawrence J. Burda, chief, Safety, Security and Inspection Division, to chief, National Guard Bureau, letter, subject: 1988 Inspection Summary, 19 January 1989.
35. Gross, 165.
36. AFR 45-1, 3.
37. Capt Greg Garner, "Utilization of the Air National Guard in a Nonmobilized Status," National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet, 14 February 1986.
38. "General Larry D. Welch Speaks Out," *National Guard*, February 1988, 55.
39. AFR 45-1, 2.
40. Ibid.
41. *National Security Strategy*, 22.
42. *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 24-29.
43. Comdr Bruce Bower, legislative liaison, Office of the Director, Naval Reserve, telephone interview with author, 11 July 1989.

Chapter 3

Service in the Air National Guard

As pointed out in the previous chapter, the president's national security strategy advises that the "nature of service in the reserves" not be fundamentally altered when reserve forces assume new missions. In order to define the phrase *nature of service* more precisely with respect to the Air National Guard, this chapter explores the legal basis of the ANG's federal responsibilities by examining Title 10 of the United States Code, reviews the requirements of serving in the ANG with respect to peacetime commitments and contingency obligations, and surveys the ways in which Guard units and personnel may be mobilized or activated for federal service in response to a foreign threat. Further, it examines the probability of the ANG's being called into federal service, determines the most likely way that the role of the Guard could expand without altering its fundamental nature, and discusses how the Air National Guard could increase its contribution to national defense.

Purpose of Reserve Forces

Title 10 USC section 262 states that the purpose of the reserve forces "is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires."¹ Further, the code identifies several categories of reserve forces: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Within the Ready Reserve is a Selected Reserve, of which the entire National Guard is part, as are all reserve units and reserve individual mobilization augmentees (IMA). All members of the Selected Reserve train with their respective units and are compensated for their participation.² The Selected Reserve provides the initial augmentation of the active forces³ and is required to mobilize and deploy to a forward area within a prescribed amount of time.

Reservists' Commitments

People enlisting in the Air National Guard make the same basic contractual agreements as do their active duty counterparts and take the same

oath of office.⁴ The most significant difference is that, rather than making a full-time commitment, guardsmen agree to maintain combat readiness through part-time service by participating in scheduled unit training activities and being available when matters of national security require full-time service.

The code specifies that a member of the Selected Reserve must participate in "at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods and serve on active duty for training for not less than 14 days (exclusive of travel time) during each year."⁵ To assure that aircrews maintain proficiency and safety, the ANG authorizes additional training periods. Aircrews must use this time to meet training requirements established by the gaining commands. To be sure, under the total force policy, many guardsmen exceed these minimum requirements in order to achieve the increased-readiness standards required by the policy and to perform peacetime active duty missions when their units—like those discussed in chapter 5—support Air Force commitments. However, except for the additional training required of aircrews, guardsmen who perform peacetime missions or train more than the minimum period of time do so as volunteers, not because their enlistment requires them to do so.

Mobilization and Activation

The code specifies several types of federal activation to which the Guard is subject. For example, under Title 10 USC 672a, if Congress declares war or a state of national emergency, the entire Ready Reserve may be mobilized and, if needed, even the Inactive Reserve and the Retired Reserve for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months. Although only Congress may authorize a complete mobilization, the president, under Title 10 USC 673a, can declare a national emergency and order up to 1 million members of the Ready Reserve to active duty for up to 24 months.⁶ When ANG units are mobilized under either of these authorities, command—including operational control (OPCON) and administrative control—is transferred to their Air Force gaining commands until demobilization.⁷

Prior to 1976, the reserves could be involuntarily called into federal service only by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, or special legislation of Congress. Recognizing that the total force policy's dependence on reserve forces could limit the president's constitutional authority to commit and deploy military forces in the national interest, in 1976 Congress passed Public Law 94-286, described in Title 10 USC 673b: the president can authorize the call to active duty of up to 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not more than 90 days "when he determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission."⁸ This number was changed to 100,000 in 1980 and to 200,000 (200K call-up) in 1986. Also in 1986, Congress gave the president the authority to extend the active duty of selected reservists who had been activated under this

authority for an additional 90-day period—180 days total. However, within 24 hours he must provide Congress with his reasons for doing this.

A final authority under Title 10 USC 672b, whereby reservists may be called into involuntary federal service, allows service secretaries to activate an unspecified number of selected reservists for 15 days per member per year. In the case of the National Guard, state governors must give their consent,⁹ presumably to ensure that guardsmen could be retained for a state emergency should one occur during the proposed activation. According to a National Guard Bureau background paper, National Guard leadership has traditionally advised against the preplanned use of this provision due to the “volunteer nature of the citizen soldier force.”¹⁰ Indeed, because of the time constraint, the provision seems to have little operational value unless a service secretary used it to get an early start on an anticipated mobilization or activation under one of the other provisions. Further, there is evidently no Air Force directive that addresses transfer of command and control of reserve forces when they are called to active duty under this provision.

Unlike both its allies and potential adversaries, who do not place so much responsibility upon their reserves, the United States—by virtue of its total force policy—is likely to need its reserves in situations short of a national emergency. Unfortunately, mobilization of US reserve forces is likely to send a message to both friends and enemies that is different from the one intended. On the one hand, some countries may believe that such a move indicates that the situation is much more serious than it actually is. On the other hand, some nations may interpret it as a sign of weakness—that US active forces are insufficient to meet even minor peacetime contingencies. Clearly, national leaders must be careful that they convey to friends and adversaries the message desired.

Historically, Congress and the president have seldom used their authority to mobilize the reserves. Choosing not to designate the actions in either Korea or Vietnam as wars, Congress last declared war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, resulting, of course, in a total mobilization. As discussed in chapter 2, partial mobilizations occurred for the Korean conflict, the Berlin crisis of 1962, and the “war” in Vietnam (the latter as a result of the USS *Pueblo* incident as well as the Tet offensive).¹¹

Furthermore, presidents have never chosen to authorize any portion of a 200K call-up for operational missions. For example, recent operations in Grenada and Libya did not employ reservists under this provision although members of the ANG supported both military actions.¹² Likewise, when the presence of US forces was required during March of 1988 in response to attacks by Nicaragua on Contra base camps located in Honduras, the ANG provided airlift support with volunteer aircrews.¹³ For the recent operations in the Persian Gulf 322 Navy reservists volunteered—90 percent of them for tours of at least six months.¹⁴ Although members of reserve components supported these operations, this support was not mandated by a presidential call-up. The secrecy required for the operation in Grenada and the raid

on Libya is sufficient to explain why this option was not invoked in those instances. However, since demonstration of military presence to confirm national commitment was central to both the Persian Gulf operation and the deployment to Honduras, secrecy was obviously not an issue. The decision becomes all the more significant, considering the fact that the active force needed a minesweeping capability in the Persian Gulf and an airlift and resupply capability in Honduras. Rather than attempting to ascertain the reasons why presidents have not resorted to a 200K call-up, one may conclude that our chief executives will continue to be very reluctant to use this authority in responding to incidents that do not threaten the vital interests of the United States.

That mobilization of the reserves is not taken lightly by the authorities is fortunate for reservists, since frequent call-ups could easily "alter the nature of service in the reserves." Repeatedly interrupting the lives and civilian careers of reservists would discourage recruitment and retention of personnel, thereby jeopardizing the reserves' manpower stability—perhaps their greatest asset. For example, in *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, John K. Mahon points out that "partial mobilization for the Berlin crisis as for Korea worked hardship on many Guardsmen." He goes on to say that both the Army and Air Guards had difficulty rebuilding after their retention rates dropped to a low of 54.6 percent in 1964.¹⁵

Voluntary Active Duty

Although the reserves' acquisition of more responsibility under the total force policy increases the possibility that they might be needed to augment the active forces, the prospects for an involuntary call-up are remote (fig. 1). Therefore, the further to the right on the spectrum the reserves can operate without requiring activation, the more valuable they become. In light of the tendency of the national leadership to avoid involuntary call-ups, peacetime missions will have to be manned by volunteers, specifically those authorized under Title 10 USC 672d: "At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may order a member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty, or retain him on active duty, with the consent of that member."¹⁶ Further, calling guardsmen to active duty—with their consent and for mutually agreed-upon time periods—would not change the nature of service in the reserves. That is, if guardsmen felt that going on active duty at a particular time would interfere with their lives or careers, they simply would not volunteer.

Historically, our leaders have asked reservists to volunteer during conflicts, national emergencies, or periods of increased tension before resorting to mobilization. Furthermore, under the volunteer provision of the code, the ANG supplied tanker support for the Libyan raid and airlift support for the Grenadan and Honduran operations while the Naval Reserve provided 25 percent of the minesweeping effort in the Persian Gulf. We have every

reason to suspect that this trend will continue in the future, even for small-scale conflicts. Indeed, *Air Force 2000*—a study that projects air power at the start of the next century—observes that “relying on voluntary service by ANG unit members” is a viable option for meeting our needs in limited conflicts.¹⁷




Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict.

Certainly, the Air National Guard should not forgo its responsibility of preparing units for mobilization, but it should be prepared to supply volunteers when asked and thereby increase its worth to the national security. If the demand for augmentation is not extreme, a sufficient number of volunteers could come from units assigned to the First Air Force, whose air defense mission is performed stateside—often at home locations—and requires only a small portion of a unit’s resources. Furthermore, units assigned the tanker or airlift missions can support limited operations in overseas locations fairly easily with volunteers. Their aircraft are large enough to carry the required support equipment and personnel and can fly long distances without refueling.

Tactical fighter units, however, would have difficulty augmenting peacetime missions overseas, since they need support from both tanker and airlift aircraft. Consequently, active duty periods limited to a few days per individual—common among air defense, tanker, and airlift units—are not as practical for fighter units because of the costs of deployment and transportation. Further, there is no assurance that volunteer maintenance and support personnel will have the mix of skills necessary to support a fighter operation. Nevertheless, as we will see, Coronet Cove and Creek

Klaxon demonstrate that it is possible for the tactical fighter community to perform Air Force commitments in overseas areas during peacetime. Since about 25 percent of tactical forces and 50 percent of tactical reconnaissance are supplied by the ANG,¹⁸ the national security would certainly benefit from an Air Guard capable of deploying tactical fighters to forward locations by relying on volunteers.

Notes

1. *United States Code Annotated, Title 10: Armed Forces* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1983), 90 (hereafter, *United States Code*).
2. *Ibid.*, 98-99.
3. Bennie J. Wilson III, ed., *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), 97.
4. *United States Code*, 138-39.
5. *Ibid.*, 104.
6. *Ibid.*, 265, 270.
7. AFR 45 1, *Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, 2 January 1987, 2.
8. *United States Code*, 300-301.
9. *Ibid.*, 265-66.
10. Capt Greg Garner, "Mobilization of the Air National Guard," National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet, 14 February 1986.
11. Maj Thomas R. Brown and Maj Ivan B. Kelly, *U.S. Air Reserve Forces Handbook*, ACSC Report 86-0370 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1986), 1-4 through 1-6.
12. Lt Col James Ragan, chief, Media Relations, National Guard Bureau, telephone interview with author, 7 July 1989.
13. Headquarters Military Airlift Command News Service release, 25 March 1988.
14. Comdr Bruce Bower, legislative liaison, Office of the Director, Naval Reserve, telephone interview with author, 11 July 1989.
15. John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983), 229.
16. *United States Code*, 266.
17. Department of the Air Force, *Air Force 2000: Air Power Entering the 21st Century* (U) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, 11 June 1982), 262-63. (SECRFT) Information extracted is unclassified.
18. Lee E. Sharff, *National Guard Almanac* (Falls Church, Va.: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 1989), 145.

Chapter 4

Mobilization Training

The primary mission of the Air National Guard is to support wartime requirements of the Air Force. ANG fighter units help fulfill this commitment by training and providing combat flying units and qualified personnel for active duty through programs such as the two discussed here—Checked Flag and Creek Corsair.

Checked Flag

Tactical Air Command established Checked Flag to give its units and TAC-gained forces the training and experience necessary to conduct operations from forward deployed locations.¹ The program reflects TAC's general peacetime mission of keeping its units ready to deploy to forward areas quickly to begin operations in support of the theater commander's war plans. In the broadest sense, any activity that contributes to a unit's ability to mobilize, deploy to its assigned location, and conduct effective operations there could be considered Checked Flag training. Because units can be assigned a variety of training sites, missions, employment concepts, procedures, and host-nation support facilities, TAC cannot standardize readiness training requirements for each unit. This situation may be further complicated by host nations who, for political reasons, may refuse permission to train in particular areas.² Consequently, TAC expects commanders to tailor Checked Flag programs to suit their units' particular circumstances. These programs are validated through unit effectiveness inspections (UEI).³ As established in chapter 2, inspections of ANG units are the responsibility of the gaining command (TAC, in this case), and Guard units must meet the same standards as active ones.

Each unit must develop its Checked Flag program within the framework established by Headquarters TAC and must include certain elements: commander visitations, home-station training, and deployments to the unit's Checked Flag training site.⁴ Although this discussion considers general aspects of commander visitations and home-station training, it is primarily concerned with Checked Flag deployments of ANG fighter units to Europe.

Visitation gives commanders and supervisors the firsthand knowledge they need to customize their units' Checked Flag training programs so that they address mission requirements. That is, visitation allows them to

survey Checkered Flag locations and discuss matters face-to-face with US Air Force and host nation sponsoring units.⁵ Each team, led by the unit commander, visits Europe at 18- to 24 month intervals, making stops at "HQ USAFE, the appropriate NATO tasking HQ, and the designated USAFE Sponsor Unit(s) prior to proceeding to their Checkered Flag training location(s). The HQ USAFE visit will include briefings on European airpower, chemical defense, command and control, and the COB [collocated operating base] program."⁶ The overall intent of the visitation program is to clarify for commanders and their staffs the wartime role of their units. Thus, they will have the background necessary to plan and manage training programs that adequately prepare their units for combat.

A fundamental part of home-station training is the readiness briefing, which acquaints unit members with their mobilization responsibilities. The briefing must be given to aircrews within three months of their becoming mission ready, to support personnel within six months of their arrival on station, and annually thereafter to all unit personnel. Generally, this training acquaints unit members with what to expect should the unit be mobilized. Thus, the briefing covers the various aspects of mobilization from individual notification and in-processing; through unit deployment preparations, aircraft generation, and actual routing to the deployment location; to the details of operating in the assigned theater of operations.⁷

Aircrew members, however, are held to a higher standard of knowledge than are support personnel. Within 90 days of becoming mission ready at their home stations, they must meet and pass a verification board. This board consists of unit supervisors in functional areas (e.g., plans, intelligence, weapons, and tactics) and is chaired by the squadron commander or operations officer. During this session, an aircrew member must demonstrate an understanding of all aspects of the unit's mission by giving a briefing that covers the basic elements of the unit readiness briefing, with emphasis on tactics and employment in the intended theater of operations. The examinee then answers questions from the unit "experts" in the various functional areas. After passing an initial verification board, crew members maintain their status by participating in a unit readiness briefing or another examinee's verification board at least annually.⁸

Units demonstrate their proficiency in mobilization by passing operational readiness inspections (ORI) conducted by the gaining command. ORIs generally include unit recall, mobilization processing, aircraft generation, baggage and equipment palletizing, deployment (actual or simulated), and a demonstration of the unit's ability to operate using only equipment identified for mobility and spare parts drawn from the unit war readiness spares kit (WRSK). Although units need not leave their home stations during these inspections, many actually deploy to another location—usually a field training site.⁹

Presently Checkered Flag, under TAC's tactical deployments program, is the only source of regular theater training for ANG fighter units. Each year TAC convenes a conference to develop the tactical deployment schedule and

to publish its air tasking order, which is distributed to all participants. Units then begin planning so they can comply with this order and the supported command's (USAFE, for European deployments) exercise Operation Plan (OPlan).¹⁰ Normally, ANG units support six to eight such deployments to Europe per year—or about one every three years for an individual unit. However, recent budget cuts could reduce this number to about one every four years.¹¹

To prepare for tactical deployments, selected unit supervisors from operations and the support areas of munitions, services, and logistics conduct a site survey three to six months prior to deployment.¹² Accompanied by a representative from the Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC) staff,¹³ the survey team visits the Checkered Flag training site and inspects the facilities to determine whether the site is capable of supporting the planned exercise. If necessary, the team recommends changes in the sizing of the deployment or in support requirements to USAFE and the appropriate agency of Headquarters TAC.¹⁴

The tactical deployment itself brings together all aspects of the Checkered Flag program by allowing the unit to practice the elements it would expect to be tasked to perform if it were mobilized during a crisis—from unit recall to deploying to a forward area and conducting air operations. TAC policy requires that as many people as possible participate.¹⁵ An average Checkered Flag deployment lasts two weeks and consists of approximately 250 to 270 people, 12 aircraft, about 25 pilots, and a variety of supporting equipment.¹⁶ Through participation in theater exercises, the ANG accomplishes this training while supporting the overall Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise objectives.¹⁷ These programs integrate Guard units into the theater command and control system and allow them to work with the NATO sector operations centers (SOC) and allied tactical operations centers (ATOC), which would have tasking authority for the unit during wartime.¹⁸ Normally, units are exercised in all aspects of their intended wartime missions, including surge operations and simulated chemical warfare (CW).¹⁹

The Checkered Flag questionnaire (appendix A) had several goals: (1) to determine how the respondents valued the training they received on Checkered Flag deployments, (2) to solicit respondents' feelings on the effectiveness of individual units in planning and managing these deployments, (3) to judge whether units reach a point of diminishing returns after completing several Checkered Flags, and (4) to gauge respondents' feelings concerning longer deployments. One should bear in mind that because the respondents come from several ANG units, their responses are based on many different deployments.

Generally, respondents were very experienced at unit deployments, in that each person had participated in three deployments on the average—two of which were Checkered Flag exercises. When asked to compare the training value of Checkered Flag to that of other exercises, over 62 percent of the respondents listed it first, about 79 percent rated it either first or

second, and about 11 percent placed it last. Virtually all respondents who gave Checkered Flag a top rating did so because wartime mission training took place in the environment where they would be assigned should an actual mobilization occur. The most common complaint of the few people who put Checkered Flag in last place was that the program was not well organized.

Similarly, questions 12, 13, 14, and 15 were designed to determine whether the respondents found their experience valuable. They overwhelmingly agreed that the exercise was challenging and that they would volunteer for future Checkered Flag deployments. Further, their responses indicated that this deployment gave them a sense of accomplishment and that the training was superior to that received at home. Because the respondents ranked these deployments higher than others and other types of training and indicated a willingness to support the program, they evidently hold Checkered Flag in high esteem.

However, respondents were not so complimentary about their unit's ability to adequately plan and execute a Checkered Flag deployment. Although most people indicated that their unit ran a "smooth operation" during the deployment (question 17), over 46 percent of them felt otherwise. Indeed, when asked whether their units had major problems during a Checkered Flag (question 18), just over 50 percent of the respondents indicated that such was the case. Further, the most often-stated need for improvement in response to question 22 was that the deployment needed better planning and organization. Evidently, then, although most respondents valued their Checkered Flag experience, a significant number felt that their unit's handling of the exercise could stand improvement.

Question 19, which asked whether successive Checkered Flag deployments became easier to conduct, was intended to determine whether a unit reached a point of diminishing returns after completing several deployments. Although 57 percent of the respondents felt that their unit improved with each deployment, 43 percent either disagreed or were uncertain. This proportion of negative responses, together with the number of respondents who felt that their unit's performance needed improvement (see above), suggests that units have not reached a point of diminishing returns. For that reason, authorities should reconsider their proposal to reduce the frequency of Checkered Flag deployments to one every four years.

Last, over 31 percent of the respondents felt that Checkered Flag deployments would have been more valuable had they been longer, while about 53 percent felt that no increase was necessary. The average length suggested by respondents who felt that the deployment should have been longer was about five weeks.

Respondents were also asked to suggest changes that would make Checkered Flag deployments more valuable (question 22). As mentioned earlier, most people recommended better general planning and organization. Further, aircrew personnel mentioned problems integrating into the European theater, feeling that they needed more flying training that would

familiarize them with the theater rather than including events that could be practiced at their home station. Other respondents cited problems with the NATO command and control structure and the need for better coordination with NATO tasking agencies.

Incidentally, although members of the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing of Hancock Field, New York, were not among the respondents to the questionnaire, the unit apparently encountered problems similar to those mentioned above. For example, the after-action report of Coronet Rocket, the unit's 1987 Checkered Flag deployment to West Germany, cites a need for orientation flights followed by a gradual buildup into the exercise scenario because the number of sorties required by the exercise failed to satisfy the unit's training requirements. The unit had only marginal success at solving this problem through unit-tasked training sorties because of the exercise's airspace restrictions. The report also mentions problems in coordination and command and control with the NATO tasking agency—specifically, with airspace management and trying to control too many aircraft on a single frequency in a communications-jamming environment. The report concludes that "the overall result of this entire process was a low confidence in the ATOC's ability to properly task and control CAS [close air support] assets in a wartime environment."²⁰

In summary, Checkered Flag is an all-inclusive program implemented by TAC to ensure that its units maintain the readiness and capabilities necessary for all phases of their wartime role—from deploying at mobilization through employing in support of existing war plans upon arrival in theater. Questionnaire results indicate that ANG members think highly of Checkered Flag in comparison to other deployments and other types of training. The problems they found in the program should probably not be considered shortcomings but areas needing more emphasis. For example, a problem in coordination between a deployed unit and a tasking agency does not necessarily indicate that Checkered Flag is fundamentally flawed or that there is something wrong with either the unit or the tasking agency. Rather, the unit and agency more than likely just need more practice and better understanding in this area—something that probably cannot be accomplished by a two-week deployment every three or four years. Likewise, many respondents' complaint that their unit had difficulty planning and conducting a smooth Checkered Flag program also indicates a need for more frequent deployments.

Creek Corsair

Unlike Checkered Flag, administered by TAC, Creek Corsair was an ANG-sponsored deployment. It was supported by three A-7 aircraft units: the 121st Tactical Fighter Wing, the 185th Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), and the 150th TFG. The 52d TFW of Spangdahlem AB, West Germany, hosted the six-week deployment, which took place in July and August of

1988. Each unit deployed for two weeks and was responsible for operational scheduling and maintenance support during this time. In an effort to keep transportation costs to a minimum, units shared aircraft and larger support equipment by turning these items over to the replacement unit on each rotation.²¹

The planners of Creek Corsair sought to provide the participating units with training in the European environment and acquaint them with NATO and USAFE procedures.²² Accordingly, their plan called for the A-7s to fly mission-integrated sorties with the host unit's F-4Gs and F-16Cs. In turn, Creek Corsair allowed NATO tasking agencies and planners to become familiar with A-7 capabilities, since none of these aircraft are permanently assigned to the theater. From the onset, planners wanted Creek Corsair to complement rather than replace unit Checkered Flag training. For that reason, the project emphasized operations and maintenance support instead of training guardsmen in all phases of unit activity, as does Checkered Flag. By restricting the number of personnel involved and thereby reducing the cost of the deployment, the planning team hoped to lay the groundwork and acquire the expertise for future Creek Corsair exercises.²³

A temporary unit—Detachment (Det) 7, Air National Guard Support Center—was activated for the planning and execution of Creek Corsair. Det 7 was manned by six people assigned for the course of the deployment: commander, operations officer, intelligence officer, maintenance chief, first sergeant, and supply monitor.²⁴ They provided continuity for the deployment and support of the approximately 225 people in the three A-7 units.²⁵ Although the two projects are not entirely comparable, the ANGSC staff estimated that the total cost of Creek Corsair was less than a Checkered Flag deployment for one unit. In addition to the cost-cutting measures mentioned earlier, planners avoided much of the expense of transporting personnel to the theater on military airlift or commercial flights; instead, they used ANG KC-135 tanker aircraft on navigational training sorties. Further, personnel costs were met by using annual field training funds normally earmarked for guardsmen's two weeks of annual training.²⁶

The maintenance and support plan called for each unit to supply two A-7D aircraft. The 185th TFG also supplied an A-7K—a two-cockpit A-7—bringing the total to seven aircraft. Furthermore, this unit furnished larger, A-7-unique support and test equipment as well as a scaled-down war readiness spares kit—actually a mission support kit (MSK)—and supply personnel to manage it for the course of the deployment. The 52d TFW provided common support equipment, facilities, and the usual administrative and support services of a host unit. ANG assisted by allocating two C-141s for deployment of the support equipment and two for the redeployment, in addition to scheduling the KC-135 used to transport personnel. Last, each unit deployed 35 maintenance personnel and 15 support people from a variety of functional areas.²⁷

In the area of operations, each unit deployed with 12 pilots supported by six people—two from life support, two from intelligence, and two from

operations administration.²⁸ Each pilot received a local-area briefing and a supervised first flight to acquaint him with the flying area before proceeding with more demanding sorties. They then began a seven-sortie program that had been developed with the help of the ANG Fighter Weapons School in Tucson, Arizona. In fact, an instructor from the school served as the weapons officer throughout the deployment.²⁹ Mission events consisted of low-level flying; interdiction with Wild Weasel (F-4G) support on the USAFE electronic warfare ranges; minimum-risk departures and recoveries; air combat training (ACT) against F-16s, F-4s, and F-15s; and integrated hunter/killer missions with the host unit.³⁰

On Wednesday and Thursday of the second week, the A-7s practiced combined operations with other NATO players in a locally generated graduation exercise. After a mass briefing, pilots assumed alert status in the aircraft shelters, awaiting tasking orders by telephone or radio, just as they would during wartime.³¹ The 150th TFG performed this exercise under simulated chemical warfare conditions, using appropriate clothing and equipment.³²

Responses to the Creek Corsair questionnaire indicate that the quality of the training was very high and that participants felt the experience was valuable to them. For the pilots, this attitude is probably due to three factors. First, the ANG pilots understood the need to be familiar with the European environment. Aside from the fact that they would be fighting there after mobilization, these pilots needed to be able to operate in the congested area created by the large number of NATO aircraft operating daily in the theater. In their Operation Order (OpOrd), Creek Corsair planners noted the inherent training opportunities provided by this situation: "Air threats will be provided by any NATO and USAFE aircraft while flying in the low flying area. This threat is always present and uncontrolled."³³ Second, fighter units like the 52d TFW, which operate continuously in the theater, tend to develop workable procedures. By operating with this unit in the NATO structure, ANG pilots learned valuable techniques. Third, the seven-ride program developed in conjunction with the ANG Fighter Weapons School stressed the most effective ways of using the A-7's capabilities in Europe during wartime. The program allowed pilots to practice mission elements in sorties of increasing difficulty. Maj Hugh Sloan of the Det 7 staff commented on this concept of training:

Creek Corsair provides a real world framework into which the Air Force and Air Guard fit the considerable planning, flying and support training. That investment is realized in a series of basic, building block missions which are assembled over a two week period of increasingly challenging flights into the final composite exercises. This experience transforms every flying hour into a geographic and coordinated mission experience we can't achieve in less realistic settings.³⁴

Lt Col Walter Wick, commander of Creek Corsair, insisted that the deployment planning provide for as much interoperability with NATO agencies and USAFE units as possible. The planning group discovered that

the allied tactical operations centers of both the 2d and 4th allied tactical air forces were unfamiliar with the current wartime capabilities of the A-7 and its potential for tasking. Consequently, the Det 7 weapons officer gave briefings to the appropriate staffers at these agencies as well as those at USAFE headquarters.³⁵

Integration of Det 7 intelligence with host-unit intelligence was also built into the plan. The 52d TFW intelligence officer gave Det 7's counterpart a comprehensive briefing on theater threat and current intelligence, which prepared the latter to train his staff and provide theater orientation for the incoming units. Throughout the deployment, Det 7 intelligence personnel participated in the host unit's intelligence training. The Det 7 intelligence officer reciprocated by presenting a training session on ANG-unit intelligence operations, so that the host-unit intelligence officer could better understand the ANG. Furthermore, an A-7 pilot briefed the 52d TFW intelligence officer on A-7 capabilities, thereby improving the host's ability to assist in the planning of integrated missions.³⁶

Of course, the real test of interoperability took place in the air. By attending briefings and flying integrated sorties, Det 7 pilots were able to understand and experience host-unit tactics and pilot operations in a demanding training environment. Conversely, the 52d TFW aircrews and NATO tasking agencies were better able to understand the ANG A-7's capabilities and its tactical possibilities for wartime.³⁷ According to Maj Mike Rice, Det 7 operations officer, "Train as you will fight and, if possible, with those you will fight alongside. Creek Corsair affords that opportunity to the Air National Guard, U.S. Forces in Europe and our Allies."³⁸ The project's after-action messages suggest that Creek Corsair did in fact meet its primary objective of providing ANG A-7 pilots with realistic training opportunities in the European environment. Productive maintenance efforts and unusually good weather allowed the three participating units to meet or exceed the planners' goals for numbers of sorties and flying hours, and all but one of the 36 deployed pilots completed the flying training program.³⁹

Responses to the Creek Corsair questionnaire (appendix B) show that the deployment was worthwhile. Over 70 percent of the respondents rated the project first or second among the exercises in which they had participated. This finding is particularly significant since over 76 percent of the respondents had also participated in Coronet Cove, and almost 60 percent had been on Checkered Flag deployments to USAFE bases. Further, an examination of the data from the perspective of the two major occupational specialties—pilots and maintenance support personnel—revealed that over 70 percent of the respondents in each group ranked Creek Corsair in either first or second place. And a direct comparison of Creek Corsair with unit Checkered Flag deployments showed that the respondents felt the two exercises were about equal in value.

The respondents' favorable attitude toward Creek Corsair indicates that the deployment planners achieved their primary objectives. That is, par-

Participants valued being able to do real-world training in the area where they would likely be deployed and considered the time spent integrating with NATO facilities and USAFE units worthwhile. Of the three respondents who judged Creek Corsair the least valuable of their training experiences, only one had a valid criticism, feeling that the full capability of the A-7 was not incorporated into the tactics of the host unit's mixed packages. Of course, the project planners had identified this problem and attempted to correct it. This weakness was also cited in response to question 22, which solicited suggestions about how the deployment might be improved. Questions 12-19 also sought general reactions to the deployment, suggestions for changes, opinions on supporting future Creek Corsairs with volunteers, and the value of the training. Although responses were favorable in all areas, more than half of the respondents felt that major changes needed to be made in future versions of the project.

Questions 20 and 21 were designed to gauge respondents' feelings about the length of the deployment. No general consensus was evident here—25 percent indicating they preferred a longer deployment, 40 percent believing that two weeks were sufficient, and the rest undecided. Among the respondents who wanted a longer deployment, the average suggested length was six weeks, although many preferred a four-week stay.

The following is a sampling of respondents' suggestions for improving Creek Corsair. They should probably be considered lessons learned rather than criticisms. (1) Although Creek Corsair took place in Europe, the number of maintenance people allotted for the deployment was more in line with the number required for a stateside deployment. In the continental United States (CONUS), aircraft usually operate from a maintenance ramp and are in close proximity to each other. Here, line chiefs riding around in trucks can adequately supervise flight-line workers, since they can see the entire operation. In Europe, however, aircraft operate out of hardened shelters and are often spread hundreds of feet apart. Most of the Creek Corsair maintenance people recognized that more of their number were needed in this environment to make the operation safe, especially during a chemical warfare exercise. (2) Creek Corsair's flying schedule proved difficult for the maintenance and support personnel, usually calling for three two-ship sorties to launch in the morning and three more in the afternoon. Furthermore, afternoon launches were often delayed to match those of the host unit, as specified in the training plan. Consequently, the single-shift maintenance day often exceeded 10 to 12 hours.⁴⁰ Many participants suggested that the flying schedule should be fixed and should permit no deviations. Others proposed that increasing the number of aircraft would allow maintenance to have aircraft ready for the next day without working those from the latest launch. Of course, additional aircraft would have increased deployment costs and violated a cardinal rule of the planners. (3) Despite the planners' efforts to the contrary, many pilots felt the need for better understanding of the A-7's capabilities by theater

command and control agencies and suggested possible solutions (see appendix B).

In sum, Creek Corsair proved to be a worthwhile and popular deployment. By focusing on operations and maintenance support rather than the entire unit, by recommending the sharing of aircraft and equipment, and by suggesting that ANG tankers on routine training missions be used to transport personnel, the project's planners were successful in providing quality training opportunities at minimum cost. Moreover, USAFE units and NATO allies were able to see firsthand how the survivability, accuracy, and range of the A-7 make it a valuable asset in the current tactical doctrine of attacking follow-on forces deep in enemy territory. In a letter to Maj Gen John B. Conaway, director of the Air National Guard, Gen William L. Kirk, commander of USAFE, said,

Last week I traveled to Spangdahlem AB, [West] Germany, to visit the Air National Guard Creek Corsair '88 deployment. My visit and subsequent bombing mission in the A-7K reinforced my belief that USAFE, AAFCE [Allied Air Forces Central Europe], and NATO will benefit tremendously as we continue to exercise these longer-range aircraft in theater. . . . Creek Corsair '88 has been a very successful deployment in every respect. Future ANG deployments to USAFE will continue to receive my strongest support.¹¹

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, Program for Checkered Flag Training (Langley AFB, Va.: Tactical Air Command, 1988), 2.
2. Ibid., 2-3.
3. Ibid., 4.
4. Ibid., 3-4.
5. Ibid., 5.
6. Ibid., C-2-2.
7. Ibid., A-3-A-1 through A-3-A-4.
8. Air National Guard Manual (ANGM) 51-50, vol. 1, *ANG/AFRES Aircrew Training—Fighter, FAC, and Reconnaissance*, 1 January 1986, 6-24 to 6-25.
9. Lt Col William Lynch, chief, Current Operations Branch, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, telephone interview with author, 10 July 1989.
10. *Program for Checkered Flag Training*, C-1-1.
11. Lt Col Dave Cherry, chief, Exercise and Deployments Branch for Directorate of Operations, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, interview with author, 28 June 1989.
12. *Program for Checkered Flag Training*, C-1-2.
13. Cherry interview.
14. *Program for Checkered Flag Training*, C-1-2.
15. Ibid., C-1-1.
16. Cherry interview.
17. Departments of the Army and the Air Force, *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: National Guard Bureau, 1988), 53.
18. Cherry interview.
19. Capt Darrell Shoults, "Missouri's 131st TFW Central Enterprise '88," *National Guard*, October 1988, 20.

20. Maj Philip Hofmann, "Coronet Rocket After Action Report" (Hancock Field, N.Y.: Headquarters 174th Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 November 1987), 8-9.
21. Operation Order (OpOrd) Creek Corsair, 1 May 1988, 1-2.
22. Ibid., 1.
23. Lt Col Walter T. Wick, "Creek Corsair '88," briefing (information taken from briefing slides).
24. Ibid.
25. OpOrd, 1.
26. Lt Col Walter T. Wick, commander, Creek Corsair, interview with author, 4 February 1989. Navigator crew members of KC-135 aircraft are required to practice their skills on long range, overwater sorties. ANG tanker units provided transportation for Creek Corsair during this training.
27. OpOrd, 1-2, D1-3 through D1-4, E1-1.
28. Ibid.
29. Wick interview.
30. OpOrd, C4-1.
31. Ibid.
32. Wick interview.
33. OpOrd, 1.
34. Lt Col Walter T. Wick, commander, Detachment 7, Air National Guard Support Center, to public relations personnel of units participating in Creek Corsair '88, letter, subject: Quotes from "Creek Corsair '88," September 1988.
35. Lt Col Walter T. Wick, commander, Detachment 7, Air National Guard Support Center, to commander, Air National Guard Fighter Weapons School (FWS), Tucson, Arizona, letter, subject: Participation of the FWS Support for Creek Corsair '88, 25 May 1988.
36. OpOrd, B-1 through B-3.
37. Wick interview.
38. Wick letter, September 1988.
39. Compiled from the following messages: 021600ZAUG88, Creek Corsair commander, to commander, 185th Tactical Fighter Group, 21 August 1988; 151322ZAUG88, Creek Corsair commander, to commander, 121st Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 August 1988; and 311030ZAUG88, Creek Corsair commander, to commander, 127th TFW, 31 August 1988.
40. Wick interview.
41. Gen William L. Kirk, commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, to Maj Gen John B. Conaway, director, Air National Guard, letter, subject: Creek Corsair '88, 15 August 1988.

Chapter 5

Overseas Missions in Peacetime

In addition to providing units capable of supporting the wartime requirements of the Air Force, the Air National Guard performs peacetime missions that are compatible with mobilization readiness, as required by the total force policy. This chapter discusses two examples of ANG fighter units supporting Air Force commitments in overseas areas during peacetime.

Coronet Cove

The Tactical Air Command is required to maintain a tactical fighter detachment at Howard AFB, Panama. Headquarters USAF has determined that this detachment should be supported by Air National Guard units that fly the A-7D aircraft.¹ Their mission, nicknamed Coronet Cove, is to continually provide the detachment with four aircraft, pilots, support personnel, and equipment. Responsibility for detachment support rotates among the 14 ANG A-7 units in the United States and Puerto Rico.²

The Air Force began using the A-7 for this program in 1973, when only active duty units were flying the aircraft. As these units converted to newer aircraft during the mid-1970s, ANG units began receiving the A-7s. On 1 October 1978, ANG assumed the Coronet Cove mission when the 132d Tactical Fighter Wing of Des Moines, Iowa, relieved the 355th TFW of Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The only break in this commitment came during February and March of 1985, when runway construction temporarily reduced the length of the Howard AFB runway. During this period, ANG A-10s, which require less runway length for takeoffs and landings, fulfilled the Coronet Cove mission.³

That mission is "to provide tactical fighter aircraft and combat ready aircrews to support US Air Force South commitments."⁴ An attack aircraft designed for close air support and interdiction, the A-7 is well suited to satisfy SOUTHAF's obligation to help the United States Army South (USARSO) defend the Panama Canal. While deployed, the A-7 units are controlled by the 830th Air Division of the Twelfth Air Force. During training missions, as during contingency operations, ANG pilots work closely with the 24th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), whose forward air controllers (FAC) are located either on the ground with the supported Army units or airborne

in their OA-37 aircraft. Thus, the mission allows ANG pilots to train in the environment where they would operate if contingency plans are implemented.⁵ At the same time, joint operations with the Army and the FACs of the 24th TASS offer training opportunities for all concerned.

Each unit supporting Coronet Cove provides its own aircraft and personnel. Weather, maintenance, and airlift permitting, unit tasking rotates every four weeks. Personnel are relieved on the second Saturday of each tour, thus allowing a maximum tour of 15 days-- except for some volunteers who deploy with their unit for the full four weeks.⁶ Airlift and tanker support is supplied almost exclusively by ANG assets. For example, ANG C-141s normally support the deployments and redeployments while ANG C-141s or C-130s provide transport for midrotations. This arrangement permits considerable savings since the ANG Support Center supplies man-day, temporary-duty, and other necessary funding rather than paying the going rates of the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Tanker support by ANG KC-135 aircraft is funded in the same manner. Not only does this system offer considerable savings, but also it gives ANG tanker and airlift units valuable real-world training.⁷

When the deployed forces arrive at Howard AFB, operational control transfers from the state adjutant general to SOUTHAF, although parent units retain administrative control.⁸ A fighter liaison officer, who is a qualified A-7 pilot, and a senior noncommissioned officer are permanently stationed at Howard AFB and operate a liaison office responsible for providing continuity between the supporting units, for developing operating procedures and directives, and for managing the Coronet Cove facilities and equipment.⁹ The 830th Air Division assumes operational control of the deployed unit through the fighter liaison officer, who functions as the assistant director for operations (ADO) for A-7 operations under the 24th Composite Wing Directorate of Operations (DO). As the A-7 ADO, the fighter liaison officer is responsible for the overall management of the A-7 flying program. With respect to A-7 employment within SOUTHAF's theater of operations, this officer is directly responsible to the wing commander. In administrative matters, the unit's senior deployed officer, who functions as the detachment commander, retains command and control of the deployed personnel.¹⁰ (Later in the study, this command arrangement and the one in Creek Klaxon are contrasted with the requirements of Title 10 USC and Air Force regulations to highlight the ramifications of the ANG's assuming an Air Force commitment overseas.)

Each unit deploys with the maintenance and support personnel that would normally be required to support four aircraft for a 30-day deployment. Units carry full organizational maintenance capacity but only limited intermediate-level maintenance capability.¹¹ Obviously, one cannot foresee all possible maintenance problems, so the decision to restrict maintenance capability—made in the interest of economy—allows the unit to keep the number of deployed support personnel within reasonable limits. About 40 maintenance and support personnel can meet the unit's needs. As extra

insurance against fulfilling the requirement of keeping four mission ready aircraft on station, some units choose to deploy with five aircraft. Spare parts for the aircraft are supported by a base-level self sufficiency spares authorization. Since spare parts and support equipment are permanently prepositioned, units supporting Coronet Cove need only deploy with maintenance personnel and their composite tool kits.¹²

The flying-training schedule calls for 24 sorties flown Monday through Thursday, with units having the option of adding four sorties on Fridays. Normally, this plan translates into a four-turn-two schedule; that is, four sorties are flown in the morning, with two of the aircraft turning for a second sortie. Most of the training sorties are a mixture of ordnance-delivery and dry CAS missions. However, routes are also available to the A-7s for low-level flying, as are training areas for air combat training.¹³ Consequently, pilots are able to maintain proficiency and currency in all mission events required by TAC training manuals, including night events.

Each unit deploys with at least one intelligence officer (or noncommissioned officer) for operations support and for liaison with the 24th Composite Wing Intelligence Office (24COMPW/IN). Prior to deployment, each unit's intelligence section presents a predeployment update briefing to the deploying personnel, based upon a review of available intelligence estimates of the current situation in the SOUTHAF theater of operations. Upon deployment, 24COMPW/IN trains the unit intelligence section in the implementation of SOUTHAF's contingency plans. Unit intelligence then passes this training on to the deployed pilots and unit supervisors and is prepared to brief and debrief pilots should employment become necessary under these plans.¹⁴ According to a SOUTHAF news release,

Since the ANG assumed the Coronet Cove mission in 1978, their performance has been outstanding. They have maintained an extremely high in-commission rate and have amply demonstrated their professionalism and dedication to the mission. The Coronet Cove operation is beneficial to both the active Air Force and the Air National Guard. Using rotational A-7D units is cheaper than stationing a full fighter squadron here permanently, considering the additional support facilities and personnel that would be required. At the same time, the ANG units have an opportunity to hone their flying skills in a real world environment, flying in a locale and supporting a mission different from the normal flying activities at their home units.¹⁵

The Coronet Cove questionnaire (appendix C) had several goals: (1) to determine whether respondents felt they received worthwhile training during the deployment, (2) to find out whether performing an important real-world mission affected the value of their experience, (3) to determine whether participants in several Coronet Coves reach a point of diminishing returns with respect to the value of the deployment, and (4) to gauge individuals' feelings about longer Coronet Cove deployments.

With regard to the training value of Coronet Cove, many guardsmen, though divided in their opinions, expressed views contrary to those of the Southern Air Division. Although about 40 percent of the respondents ranked Coronet Cove either first or second among several deployments,

almost one-third ranked the mission last. Agreement with questions 14, 16, and 18 would have indicated that respondents valued their Coronet Cove experience. Although over 60 percent agreed that the deployment was challenging (question 14), more than one-third either disagreed or strongly disagreed. Similarly, responses to question 16 were inconclusive: about 48 percent of the respondents felt that they learned more at Coronet Cove than they did from training at their home unit; the rest, however, felt otherwise or were uncertain. The answers to question 18 were only slightly more decisive, in that over 61 percent of the respondents indicated that performing the Coronet Cove mission had been a valuable experience, while over 38 percent did not agree with this assessment. The respondents overwhelmingly agreed that they were adequately prepared for the Coronet Cove mission (question 17). But this attitude could indicate that the deployment was not particularly challenging. Responses to question 24, which solicited advice for making Coronet Cove more valuable, were almost entirely concerned with improving training. Evidently, although many participants believed they received valuable training from Coronet Cove, a significant number felt otherwise. In this respect, Coronet Cove is in sharp contrast to Creek Corsair, Creek Klaxon, and most Checkered Flag deployments.

Respondents were also divergent in their opinions on whether performing a real world mission affected the quality of training during Coronet Cove. Question 12 specifically asked whether carrying out a real mission enhanced the deployment. Although a majority of respondents felt that it did, almost 40 percent did not. Question 15 asked the same thing indirectly, by inquiring if the respondents felt a greater sense of accomplishment from Coronet Cove than from other deployments. Again the results were mixed: 46 percent agreed, and almost 39 percent disagreed. Responses to question 18, which asked whether performing the mission was a valuable experience, were similar in kind and in proportion to the results of question 12. Although guardsmen seemed to realize little benefit from the Coronet Cove mission, the fact that they defended the canal from would-be threats makes the deployment worthwhile. This conclusion is supported by the large percentage of respondents—almost 85—who indicated they would volunteer for future Coronet Cove operations.

Although no question specifically addressed the value of a unit's repeated participation in Coronet Cove, questions 19 and 21 shed some light on the subject. Responses to these questions indicate that Guard A-7 units can and do conduct Coronet Cove operations smoothly and experience no major problems in planning or execution. Further, none of the respondents suggested unit related improvements for the conduct or execution of the deployment. Instead, they recommended changes that they felt would create more valuable training opportunities. This evidence indicates that, after over 10 years of supporting the mission, the ANG A-7 units have indeed

reached a point of diminishing returns and probably have exhausted the benefits of participating in Coronet Cove.

Last, most of the respondents (almost 85 percent) rejected the suggestion that a longer tour would make the deployment more valuable. Only five respondents offered an opinion on the length of Coronet Cove deployments (question 23). Four of them thought that four weeks would be adequate; the other suggested eight weeks.

Respondents to the questionnaire were very generous in making suggestions that would improve the training during Coronet Cove. Most pilots felt that the flying missions could be changed to more closely simulate actual employment by including live ordnance delivery and more CAS missions (possibly with ground FACs using laser designators) and by upgrading the range to include electronic countermeasures (ECM). Moreover, they indicated that the training should be more varied and should avoid what several respondents termed *canned* missions (i.e., practicing mission elements in a predetermined sequence without tactical application). Two pilots suggested that minideployments or out-and-backs to friendly neighboring countries would help. And one unit operations officer, a lieutenant colonel, agreed that realistic training and range facilities should be improved. He went on to say that "the most valuable training in the times I participated in Coronet Cove was the overwater deployment. Mission-oriented training is inadequate and a waste of time and money for units to deploy."

Many maintenance personnel suggested that more flying time and training with live ordnance would be helpful. They also noted that since most component repairs are made stateside because of Howard AFB's limited shop facilities and repair equipment, it was difficult to keep many specialists busy and provide good training opportunities. Two supervisors felt that although their units adequately supported Coronet Cove, overall unit training suffered when part-time personnel, who have limited availability, participated in Coronet Cove rather than in deployments that provided more valuable training.

This discussion of Coronet Cove deployments leads to several conclusions. First, the quality of the training is evidently not as good as that in other deployments. Second, performing a real-world mission, in itself, probably has no effect on the training value of a deployment. Rather, the value of the mission depends on the opportunities for gaining practical experience. Nevertheless, performing a real-world mission during a deployment probably increases the likelihood of attracting volunteers. Third, if there were a point of diminishing returns in terms of benefits realized by A-7 units through participating in Coronet Cove, it has long since been passed. Most respondents felt that the mission presented their units few challenges. Finally, Coronet Cove's demanding manpower requirements exact a toll on Guard units. Approximately 80 to 90 maintenance and support personnel and 10 to 12 pilots from each unit must use 15 days of their availability each year to support the deployment. Since for many guardsmen, Coronet Cove is the only deployment they can support during

the year, units must judiciously select the personnel who participate. Units cannot afford to send guardsmen who could be more productively trained at a Checkered Flag or Red Flag deployment. Consequently, it benefits ANG planners to ensure that missions performed during peacetime provide the best training possible. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine the feasibility of the respondents' recommendations for changes to Coronet Cove. However, assuring that peacetime missions contribute to a unit's mobilization training is consistent with the guidance found in the total force policy.

Coronet Cove allows the ANG to prove its worth in guarding against the low intensity, high probability end of the spectrum of conflict. Although the ANG's formal obligation is to provide an in-place air force ready to defend free and unrestricted access to the Panama Canal, its real mission is to deter anyone who might threaten this link in the world's lines of commerce. Of course, the A-7 units fulfill this mission by making Coronet Cove rotations smooth, highly professional operations and by giving SOUTHAF and USARSO the support they need by maintaining high sortie-generation rates and flying effective training sorties. Hence, this mission could be enhanced only by making changes to Coronet Cove that would provide participants with realistic and challenging training. Thus, would-be aggressors in the SOUTHAF theater of operations would see close up the true capabilities of ANG tactical fighter units.

Creek Klaxon

The Creek Klaxon project provided an air defense alert detachment during the 86th Tactical Fighter Wing's conversion from the F-4E to the F-16C at Ramstein Air Base, West Germany. This unit was Detachment 11, Air National Guard Support Center,¹⁶ whose mission entailed supplying two armed F-4D aircraft and crews for 24-hour alert to assure the sovereignty of West German airspace.¹⁷ This deployment is unique among the ones included in this study in that Det 11 was a composite unit. Although the primary units tasked with supporting the detachment were the seven F-4 units of the First Air Force and the 154th Composite Group of the Hawaii Air National Guard of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), ultimately 22 ANG F-4 units supplied personnel in support of Creek Klaxon. All of the primary supporting units were also responsible for the air defense alert mission at their home stations, and most had alert detachments as well. These home commitments, like those at Ramstein AB, required the units to maintain two aircraft on continuous alert status for the duration of Creek Klaxon.¹⁸

Acting upon USAFE's request of 1984 that ANG study the cost and feasibility of performing the air defense mission at Ramstein, the NGB responded that ANG assets could sustain such a mission for up to one year. USAFE then sought approval for the project from Headquarters USAF, which consented in May 1985 and specified that ANG perform the mission

from April 1986 through March 1987.¹⁹ The commander of Det 11 was selected in June, and the project began the following month at ANGSC, Andrews AFB, Maryland, by assembling a planning team of temporary duty personnel representing operations, maintenance, supply, logistics, and other support areas. Since the guidance from the director of ANG called for minimal use of ANG assets, the planning team designed a flying program to acquaint the aircrews—most of whom had never flown in central Europe—with the mission and the local flying area prior to assuming alert duties. The program also provided for just enough continuation flying thereafter to maintain basic proficiency. This flying schedule required only a single-shift maintenance operation five days per week, thereby keeping the number of support personnel to a minimum.²⁰

The basic plan called for a cadre of 10 people, permanently assigned to the project, who were responsible for the command and administration of the unit. Eight of these people (the commander, operations officer, maintenance officer, first sergeant, and noncommissioned officers in charge of administration, operations, maintenance, and supply) were stationed at Ramstein AB, while the remaining project officer and noncommissioned officer assistant remained with ANGSC at Andrews AFB to coordinate and communicate with the supporting units.²¹

The maintenance plan divided the period of responsibility into three equal segments of approximately four months duration. The 119th Fighter Interceptor Group (FIG) from North Dakota, the 148th FIG from Minnesota, and the 144th Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIW) of California were selected as "core units," each responsible for organizing and supervising maintenance support during one of these periods. Each of these units provided Det 11 with three aircraft and, in turn, received F-4Ds from another ANG unit that was in the process of converting to F-4Es. These backfill aircraft enabled the core units to have sufficient aircraft at their home stations to support normal commitments. (The original plan specified only eight aircraft, but this number proved insufficient and a ninth was added in July 1986.)²² The single-shift maintenance plan and the 24-hour alert commitment required 72 maintenance and support personnel. Because maintenance core units could not provide all of the manpower during their period of responsibility and maintain normal operations at their home stations, all participating units supplied support personnel. Temporary duty (TDY) tour lengths for these people ranged from 35 to 135 days, with preference given to individuals who volunteered for longer tours, in order to conserve transportation costs. Major rotations of personnel occurred approximately every 45 days, with a five-day overlapping period to facilitate continuity. At each major rotation, 30 to 50 percent of the personnel changed over. Consequently, indoctrination training during these changeover periods was intense, ranging from driver training (for the US Armed Forces in Europe driver's license) to Det 11 standards for maintaining and launching aircraft.²³

Since the detachment's F-4Ds were the only ones in theater, it faced the formidable problem of establishing a supply line several thousand miles long. This dilemma was solved by locating an extra F-4D war readiness spares kit and maintaining it at the detachment as a maintenance spares kit. The unit also benefitted from equipment such as tires, drag chutes, and other items common to F-4Ds and F-4Es already in base supply, as the 86th TFW phased out its F-4Es.

For operations, each of the eight primary supporting units supplied a pilot and a weapons system operator. These crews rotated at 90-day intervals, including a three-week overlap for a theater checkout. Although all aircrews were mission ready as a prerequisite for volunteering, they received a minimum of four indoctrination flights and 13 days of ground school to acquaint them with flying in the area and learning the peculiarities of the NATO air defense mission. This training culminated with a practice scramble launch and an alert verification board in which each aircrew member gave a briefing on mission requirements and responded to rigorous questioning. After qualifying, each crew member was assigned to a formed two-ship element for alert and flying activities.²⁴ These TDY personnel performed all the supervisory duties of a normal flying operation and did most of the ground-school and flight instruction during each checkout.²⁵

Although cadre personnel were in place January 1986 to make final preparations, the arrival of the MSK and the first maintenance rotation during the last week of February marked the beginning of the operation.²⁶ Aircrews and aircraft that were assembled at Andrews AFB deployed to Ramstein AB the first day of March and during that month prepared for a USAFE alert force readiness inspection (AFRI). All first-rotation aircrews completed their theater checkout and, together with maintenance personnel, refined techniques to launch alert aircraft safely and consistently in less than five minutes. The unit passed the USAFE AFRI the first week in April and assumed the alert commitment on 4 April.²⁷

During the year that Det 11 performed its mission, the unit enjoyed the lowest average time in the theater for scrambles. It flew a total of 142 practice and active air scrambles and 1,069 total sorties while maintaining a perfect safety record in a high-density traffic area.²⁸ Even more remarkable, Det 11 alert aircraft were never off status for maintenance during the course of the deployment.

The issue of command and control of Det 11 was never formally resolved by USAFE and the NGB. USAFE/XP (plans division) completed a draft programming plan (PPlan) and forwarded it to the NGB for coordination. The NGB responded with recommended changes, but the final USAFE PPlan (4935-85, Creek Klaxon) was completed without resolving significant NGB comments. As a result, the NGB did not sign the proposed host-tenant support agreement. Further coordination "resulted in completing the program in an environment of implied understanding as opposed to a formal agreement."²⁹

The agreement proposed by USAFE required that the host unit (the 316th Air Division, to which the 86th TFW is assigned) would "exercise command of the Tenant through the 86 TFW Commander [and] exercise operational control through the Director for Operations, 86 TFW."³⁰ The NGB position was that, while operational control of the alert aircraft and aircrews should come under the authority of the appropriate theater agencies, command of the unit and operational control of flying-training activities should remain with ANG.³¹ Complying with appropriate USAFE regulations governing flying and the general supervision of the 86th TFW supervisor of flying (SOF) were not issues—these items were agreed upon by USAFE and NGB operations representatives to the first planning conference in July of 1985.³² But the ANG maintained that USAFE should submit its regulations to the National Guard Bureau for approval and inclusion in the appropriate Air National Guard regulation. According to Lt Col David Cobb, commander of Det 11,

Basic problems of operational control existed, defining in what level and who directly was responsible for the aircrew training and flying program. With a unique training program that qualified aircrews in one third the time of the relieved active duty unit, it is essential to define who is responsible for its success or failure.³³

His view was that since he and the other Det 11 officers would be held accountable for the program's success or failure, they ought to maintain command and control of nonalert assets.³⁴

The Creek Klaxon questionnaire (appendix D) had several objectives: (1) to determine whether the project was worthwhile, (2) to investigate the suitability of employing a composite unit, (3) to determine the value of performing an Air Force mission during deployment, and (4) to survey participants' attitudes toward volunteering for such a deployment for more than 15 days. The responses to question 2, asking participants to rate Creek Klaxon against other exercises, indicate that the project was indeed worthwhile, in that almost 94 percent of the respondents ranked Creek Klaxon first among the deployments in which they had participated. Further, the answers to questions 16 and 18—and to a lesser extent, questions 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21—support this conclusion. Questions 12, 19, and 22 asked the respondents to assess the effectiveness of training with people from other units. The responses show that 81, 91, and 88 percent of the participants, respectively, agreed with statements in those questions suggesting that training in a composite unit was a valuable experience. Answers to question 23 affirmed this attitude. Soliciting suggestions about ways to improve training in Creek Klaxon, the question prompted some guardsmen to praise the composite environment (e.g., "I feel it was the sharing of ideas that enhanced our jobs"). Questions 13, 17, and 21 elicited reactions about the Air Force mission that was part of the Creek Klaxon project. Ninety-four percent of the responses to questions 13 and 17 and 99 percent of the responses to question 21 indicated that participants thought their involvement in the mission was beneficial to them. As mentioned earlier, all support personnel volunteered for at least

35 days (60 being the average) and aircrews for 90 days, in order to reduce transportation costs and training time. Question 14 was designed to determine whether respondents felt that a shorter tour (e.g., two weeks) would have sufficed. Ninety-nine percent of the respondents said that reducing the length of their tour with Creek Klaxon would have detracted from the quality of the training.

The open-ended nature of question 23 produced suggestions for improvement of the project. Although most respondents thought that no changes were needed to increase the training value of Creek Klaxon, some crew members expressed their desire for more flying. Unfortunately, the need to perform the mission using minimum assets (aircraft, equipment, and personnel) constrained the amount of time spent in the air. In fact, planners used the same rationale in selecting air defense units to support Creek Klaxon rather than general purpose F-4 units. Some people might argue that general purpose F-4 units should have been used because many of these aircraft would be committed to central Europe in the event of mobilization, and participation in Creek Klaxon would give their pilots a working knowledge of the theater. Further, although general purpose F-4 aircrews might be unfamiliar with the real-time air defense mission, they could have been checked out during Creek Klaxon's theater indoctrination flights prior to mission verification. However, to maintain mission-ready status throughout their 90-day tours, they would need practice in air-to-ground weapons delivery, which would require additional weapons personnel, aircraft, and sorties. Again, the overriding requirement of performing Creek Klaxon with minimum resources eliminated this option.

A common complaint from senior maintenance personnel was that inexperienced people were allowed to participate in the project. Certainly, if such a deployment is to be supported by a minimum number of people, they should be proficient and expected to pull their own weight. However, from the perspective of management and overall training, one should maintain a balance between levels of experience and give novice personnel the opportunity to practice their specialties. Furthermore, statistics from Det 11 and from the questionnaires indicate that both experienced, higher-ranking personnel and less experienced, lower-ranking personnel tend to volunteer for longer deployments than do people of middle rank and experience. For example, twice the percentage of chief master sergeants and 33 percent more airmen first class participated in Creek Klaxon's composite unit than are representative of the average ANG population.

The results of the Creek Klaxon questionnaire, then, indicate that people who participated in this project overwhelmingly felt that performing the air defense mission had indeed contributed to their training for supporting their wartime mission. There is good reason for this attitude. The proximity to the borders of Eastern bloc countries, the presence of a real-world threat 15 minutes away, and the requirements of the NATO air defense mission caused Det 11 to maintain a higher degree of readiness than most supporting units were accustomed to. Unlike stateside units, which are required

to load alert aircraft only with AIM 7 Sparrow missiles, Det 11 aircraft carried four Sparrow and four Sidewinder missiles as well as an SU-23 gun pod and ALE-40 chaff and flare dispensers. The detachment modified its aircraft in the last half of the deployment and became the first and only F-4 unit ever to perform alert with the newer AIM-9M Sidewinder, a capability that significantly enhanced combat potential. Approximately 100 aircrews were certified in the USAFE air defense mission, which included thorough indoctrination into NATO war plans, and almost 650 ANG personnel served TDY tours with Det 11 and contributed to its success.³⁵ These people, trained in the handling and employment of this additional equipment, returned to their home units with knowledge and hands-on experience they would not have otherwise acquired.

The praise that most participants gave the composite unit concept is probably surprising to some readers because it seems somewhat contradictory to the idea, discussed in chapter 2, that ANG's stability is one of its greatest assets. Further, having many different units operate together to perform a mission in an unfamiliar theater would seem to be a formidable task. In fact, this was the case as the unit was preparing for the AFRI that would qualify it for alert. However, Det 11's ways of doing things were perfected during the first few weeks and later passed on to replacement personnel. In both the operations and the maintenance areas, these Det 11 standards continued to evolve and be passed on through the life of the project. In fact, TDY aircrews performed most of the ground and air training for replacement aircrews to prepare them for alert duties. This proved to be "a constant source of reinforcement and review as accumulated knowledge was passed from one rotation to the next."³⁶

Last Creek Klaxon is the only deployment in this study that involves guardsmen volunteering for extended periods of time (longer than 15 days). It is significant that participants were virtually unanimous in their opinion that these longer tours had contributed to their being able to work and operate effectively in the European environment. In fact, many aircrews expressed the feeling that they were just becoming comfortable when, after 90 days, they had to leave.

In conclusion, then, it is obvious that the participants in Creek Klaxon felt that fulfilling this peacetime Air Force commitment did indeed contribute to their mobilization training. As Gen Charles A. Gabriel, former Air Force chief of staff, stated at the ceremony marking Det 11's assumption of the NATO air defense mission, "This is an example of the Total Force Policy as a way of life and not just a concept."³⁷

Notes

1. Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC) Operation Order (OpOrd) 54-89, Coronet Cove, 15 October 1988, 1.

2. United States Air Force (USAF) Fact Sheet, "Coronet Cove, the A-7D Potation," Headquarters USAF Southern Air Division (FAC), Office of Public Affairs, Howard AFB, Panama, February 1987.
3. Ibid.
4. ANGSC OpOrd 54-89, 1.
5. USAF Fact Sheet.
6. ANGSC OpOrd 54-89, 1-2.
7. Lt Col Dave Cherry, chief, Exercise and Deployments Branch of the Directorate of Operations, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, interview with author, 28 June 1989.
8. ANGSC OpOrd 54-89, iv.
9. USAF Fact Sheet.
10. ANGSC OpOrd 54-89, 3.
11. Ibid., D-1.
12. Ibid., D-1 through D-7-1.
13. Ibid., C-1 through C-3.
14. Ibid., B-1 through B-2.
15. USAF Fact Sheet.
16. After Action Report, "Project Creek Klaxon," June 1987, 3.
17. Lt Col Ron Wilbanks, "Creek Klaxon RECAP," National Guard Bureau Point Paper, 9 October 1987.
18. After Action Report, 5. The First Air Force units and the Hawaiian unit performed the air sovereignty commitments for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and PACAF, respectively.
19. Wilbanks point paper.
20. After Action Report, 3.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Wilbanks point paper.
24. Creek Klaxon air crew orientation briefing, April 1986.
25. After Action Report, 9.
26. Ibid., 3.
27. Ibid., 3-4.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 5.
30. Draft USAF host tenant support agreement between 316th Air Division and Det 11, ANGSC, December 1985.
31. After Action Report, 7.
32. Minutes of the USAFE Air National Guard Alert Project Task Force (PROTAF) 1 Conference conducted at Headquarters USAFE, Ramstein AB, West Germany, 30 July-1 August 1985.
33. After Action Report, 7.
34. According to AFR 45-1, *Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, operational control (OPCON) transfers to the gaining command under sections 672a and 673b of Title 10 USC - the basis for mobilization. Permanent activities in USAFE during peacetime, however, would involve people who volunteered under 672d, a statute not addressed by Air Force regulation regarding transfer of operational control. If the peacetime mission of a permanent unit assigned to USAFE is to train or be ready to carry out the theater commander's war plans, the ANG should retain OPCON of the unit until those plans are likely to be implemented. Therefore, the ANG and USAFE would have to agree at some point in the transition to wartime operations for transfer of OPCON to occur. As soon as competent authority declared that that point had been reached, the theater commander would assume OPCON of ANG assets.

Although the ANG could agree to transfer OICON during peacetime-- as was done in Panama-- it would not relinquish control of the training process. Because the ANG best understands the needs of its members, it should be responsible for planning and implementing training programs to meet the standards set by the gaining command. This is the relationship that should prevail between USAFE and any permanent ANG unit in its theater.

More than likely, only a gentlemen's agreement between Col David Cobb and Col Clifford Krieger, 86th TFW commander, early in the program averted disaster. Under this agreement, the 86th TFW did not interfere with or try to control the detachment's training programs but provided support when the detachment requested it. Thanks to the understanding of Colonel Krieger, the relationship between Det 11 and the 86th TFW was-- in practice though not on paper-- similar to that between the unit and gaining command described in chapter 2. That is, the 86th TFW set the standards and determined whether Det 11 was in compliance by participating in aircrew verification boards and conducting several alert force readiness inspections-- at Colonel Cobb's request. Det 11, on the other hand, managed and controlled its own training programs in order to meet those standards.

One incident is worth mentioning. As fate would have it, Good Friday occurred the week prior to Det 11's USAFE alert force readiness inspection. Although this was the only opportunity many support personnel had to take the leave they had acquired during their 45 day tours, the 86th insisted on exercising OICON by requiring them to practice for the AFRI over this weekend. The wing eventually relented, but this matter could have had serious repercussions. Specifically, had these people not been allowed to take leave, their morale would have plummeted, and-- worse-- they would have told members of their home units and prospective volunteers that USAFE refused to reward their hard work with even so much as a weekend to do a little sight seeing. Since Creek Klaxon relied entirely on volunteers, this type of disgruntlement could have killed the program.

35. Data taken from the computer data base of Det 11's roster maintained by the detachment's administration section.

36. After Action Report, 9.

37. "The Air National Guard Stands Zulu Alert in Europe," *National Guard*, September 1986, 17.

Chapter 6

Effectiveness of Training and Missions

This chapter evaluates the adequacy of current training deployments for preparing Air National Guard fighter units for their wartime task of immediately and effectively integrating into the European theater. Further, it considers whether these units are capable of performing peacetime missions there that would contribute to their mobilization readiness, as required by Air Force regulation. Certainly, the overseas deployments under the Checkered Flag program allow units to practice all phases of their expected wartime roles, from mobilization processing through actual employment in the European theater. However, at issue is not whether these deployments provide appropriate and high-quality training experiences, but whether deployments that occur only once every three to four years can effectively prepare units for employment upon arrival at their wartime location. The planners of Creek Corsair would say that unit Checkered Flag deployments are not enough—at least not for pilots and maintenance support personnel from A-7 units. Indeed, Creek Corsair was specifically designed to augment Checkered Flag; yet many participants felt even this program wasn't entirely successful in providing the necessary training for rapid integration into the NATO arena. To gauge the worth of these training programs, we must determine more precisely what aircrews need to operate effectively in Europe.

Personnel experienced in European flight operations know that the weather, concentration of aircraft, language differences, and a very compressed and complicated airspace structure can intimidate a novice, even during peacetime. Foremost, ANG pilots, flight leaders, unit supervisors, and commanders need to experience the diversity of conditions in Europe in order to master them. Only then can they conduct effective air operations during the initial stages of war. As Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, *Tactical Air Operations*, points out,

The pace of modern high intensity war will not allow time to polish skills, develop new procedures, new techniques, and new organizational structures as the crisis develops or after hostilities begin. Hence, training for aircrews, training for the battle staffs, and training for our maintenance people must be as realistic as possible.¹

Central European weather has many of the features normally associated with that of coastal regions.² That is, throughout much of the year, weather patterns consist of rapidly moving frontal systems accompanied by

precipitation and low ceilings, making forecasting a very inexact art.³ According to a 1973 Rand report, "The most exercised files of Rand's weather data base are those of Central Europe. Weather there does not permit a casual approach to air operations." The study goes on to say that the worst weather occurs during 70 percent of December and January when ceilings are less than 3,000 feet and visibilities less than three miles—worse even than the weather aircrews flew in over Hanoi during the monsoon season.⁴ Historically, weather has played a major role in military air operations in the European arena. Perhaps the best example is the German offensive through the Ardennes (the Battle of the Bulge) in December 1944. Hitler thought that he could change the outcome of the war in the west if he could have 10 days of weather bad enough to keep Allied air power grounded. When the weather finally lifted after seven days, however, Allied air support quickly crushed the last major enemy offensive in the western front. General Eisenhower said afterward, "As long as the weather kept our planes on the ground, it would be an ally of the enemy worth many divisions."⁵ Although European weather obviously has the potential for being a major contributor to the "fog and friction of war," most Checkered Flag and Creek Corsair deployments are scheduled for the months of best weather in order to increase flying training. This decision, though reasonable, effectively deprives aircrews and unit supervisors of valuable training under adverse conditions.

More fighter aircraft are located in the NATO central region than in any other location in the free world. During peacetime, approximately 1,000 fighters are based in West Germany alone.⁶ Furthermore, after mobilization and reinforcement, these forces would be significantly augmented—all this in an area roughly the size of the state of Minnesota. Because of this large number of fighters, the military air traffic control (ATC) facilities in the NATO central region are simply unable to provide separation and handling during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) in the same manner that stateside pilots are accustomed to. Therefore, minimum separation approach procedures for aircraft surge launch and recovery (ASLAR)—requiring members of a formation to be responsible for in-flight separation after the formation is split up for landing—are often necessary during IMC. Under these circumstances, pilots must often compensate for likely ATC delays by terminating training sorties early and landing with additional fuel reserves.⁷

Differences in language also present a problem to inexperienced aircrews. Military aircraft are controlled by several nationalities in the central region, and although English is the universal language of the air, variations in accent and inflection make radio communications difficult for the uninitiated. In fact, a recent Checkered Flag deployment cited this problem as a major hindrance to flight safety.⁸

For reasons of tactical training and because of the ATC problems mentioned earlier, aircrews fly by visual flight rules (VFR) whenever possible. Knowledge of no-flying areas such as airfield control zones, population

centers, the buffer zone, and other restricted areas becomes very important during peacetime, just as an awareness of free fire areas and similar airspace divisions is crucial during wartime. Interestingly, the VFR structure of the central region is a rough equivalent to the wartime structure. For example, the buffer zone—near the inner German/Czechoslovakian border—and the controlled airspace above 10,000 feet could be thought of as missile engagement zones. Similarly, the control zones around airfields and airports equate to airfield defense zones, and restricted areas surrounding artillery ranges or nuclear power plants are similar to free-fire areas. Flying into these no-fly zones carries the risk of an ATC violation, since the radar coverage in the theater is often good enough to track offenders to their home airfield.⁹ Certainly this consequence is not as dire as being shot down—a possibility that faces violators of wartime airspace management procedures—but it is ever present, nevertheless, and contributes to the realism that training in the central region offers.

Another feature of the aircrew training environment in the central region that enhances its realism is the target of opportunity program, adopted by USAFE in conjunction with our allies. This program allows fighters to intercept and simulate attacks on any other military aircraft that are operating in uncontrolled airspace.¹⁰ Pilots are thus able to practice visual lookout and take appropriate defensive or offensive measures—tactics that become vital skills in the wartime environment. Given the number of fighter aircraft in the theater, pilots have ample opportunity to benefit from this program.

Unit supervisors must have an understanding of the air environment while unit flying is in progress. The closeness of the air bases to each other, the large numbers of aircraft that are likely to be airborne, and the possibility of rapidly deteriorating weather conditions invite disaster if poor decisions are made. Recognizing that there is no substitute for experience, USAFE requires a pilot, regardless of rank or other qualification, to have been mission ready in the theater for at least three months before he can be certified as a supervisor of flying (SOF).¹¹ In contrast, ANG has no such requirement for a stateside SOF; the only requirements are that he be highly qualified, experienced, and current in the unit aircraft.¹²

It should be apparent that conducting safe and effective flying in the NATO central region is a very demanding proposition, even in peacetime. Mastering the total spectrum of this challenging environment is a prerequisite for a successful transition of ANG aircrew and unit supervisors from peacetime operations in the states to contingency or wartime operations in theater. Under the circumstances, two weeks of theater training every three to four years seem woefully inadequate, even when supplemented by excellent programs such as Creek Corsair. This reservation is borne out by the experience of active duty units. Normally, a pilot who is newly assigned to a central region fighter unit and fully trained in his aircraft requires about two months to be certified by his unit¹³ and an additional 90 days to be a flight leader or supervisor of flying.¹⁴

The planners of both Creek Corsair and Creek Klaxon developed relatively short training programs for aircrews—two weeks and three weeks, respectively. Creek Klaxon's program was longer because it included provisions for mission verification and allowed for disruptions caused by bad weather. However, the significant difference in the programs was that participants in Creek Corsair completed their training and then returned home to their civilian jobs and normal unit flying activities, while Creek Klaxon participants could operate in the theater for the balance of their 90-day tours of duty. As discussed in the previous chapter, these aircrews performed the normal flying related duties and provided most of the ground-school and flight instruction for newly arrived replacement crews. This routine proved to be a constant source of reinforcement of what they had learned about flight operations in the region. The Creek Corsair participants, though, must wait until their next deployment for any such reinforcement.

I can vouch for the value of this additional time from personal observation and experience. I noticed that aircrews with prior active duty assignments to USAFE felt comfortable in the European environment and quickly assumed leadership roles in unit flying-related activities. Furthermore, early in Creek Klaxon, I accompanied Lt Col Dave Cobb, the Det 11 commander, on his fourth sortie. He had flown F 105s 20 years earlier while assigned on an active duty tour to Spangdahlem AB, only about 50 miles from Ramstein AB, but had not flown in Europe since. We climbed through the overcast and spent several minutes flying in bright sunshine with the clouds below us—but no land for reference. I was busy "navigating" by cross-referencing instruments and maps when we were jumped by other fighters taking advantage of the target of opportunity program. We spent the next several minutes in and out of several air-to-air engagements, at the end of which Colonel Cobb seemed to know instinctively where he was, while I spent several additional minutes verifying that my boss had been accurate within a couple of miles. In less than four sorties, Colonel Cobb had relearned the theater situational awareness that he had acquired 20 years earlier—something that I, having no previous European experience, didn't acquire until later. While this type of awareness may do nothing more than keep a pilot from receiving an ATC violation during peacetime, it is a necessary attribute for operating effectively and staying alive during wartime.

Even though NATO controlling agencies had operational control over Creek Klaxon alert aircrews and the unit trained under them daily, no respondents to the Creek Klaxon questionnaire mentioned the kinds of problems in integration and coordination that were typical of Checkered Flag and Creek Corsair. As the Det 11 operations officer, I must admit that the first part of the program was not completely trouble free. However, by the time the unit assumed alert responsibility, these NATO agencies and Det 11 had developed a close working relationship and mutual understanding that continued through the life of the program. Establishing this


kind of relationship is probably not possible in two-week unit deployments—especially when they occur only every three or four years and when NATO and USAFE personnel manning these agencies rotate at similar intervals.

Furthermore, as we have seen, when a unit is permanently assigned to a theater, it develops “standards”—ways of operating that work in a particular environment. Hence, Creek Corsair planners insisted on working closely with the 52d Tactical Fighter Wing and flying integrated sorties. Creek Klaxon also took advantage of the accumulated experience of the 86th TFW aircrews by adopting their standards and scheduling integrated missions early in the program—before the 86th phased out all F-4 flying. The important point is that those standards continued to evolve and were passed down through the life of Creek Klaxon—again, something that cannot be accomplished in two-week unit deployments.

It appears, then, that ANG fighter aircrews and supervisors could benefit a great deal from programs that would allow them to gain experience in theater over extended periods of time. Unfortunately, unit deployments like Checkered Flag and Creek Corsair cannot be made longer, for, by law (Title 10 US Code), the maximum length of time guardsmen can be expected to deploy for training is 15 days. Certainly, many individuals would volunteer for a longer deployment, but there would be no way to guarantee the proper mix of skills required to support a unit flying operation. Therefore, unit deployments are not the answer.

The solution lies in programs designed to give *individuals* more theater experience. Although it is impossible to expect all aircrews in an ANG unit to participate in extended overseas training programs, it is probably also unnecessary. More importantly, we need *some* aircrews and unit supervisors with theater experience who would be the leaders during the early stages of combat. Although they are valuable deployments, Checkered Flag and Creek Corsair cannot develop theater-experienced aircrews since, as unit deployments, they cannot be made longer.

By this time the reader is probably thinking, “What about the high level of experience in ANG units that I keep hearing about? Isn’t this and the stability of its units one of the strengths of the ANG? Aren’t most ANG flying units made up of aircrews with prior service, many of whom must have been assigned to forward deployed units in Europe?” I was surprised to learn from the questionnaires (see appendix E) that the trend in ANG units is toward fewer aircrews with prior service. Of approximately 80 crew members who answered the questionnaire, none under 30 years of age had any prior service at all, and less than 20 percent of those 35 and under had prior service. About 70 percent of these individuals over 35, however, reported prior service—over 30 percent of them with combat experience. The ANG Support Center at Andrews AFB, Maryland, verified that the results of the survey are close to official ANG figures (fig. 2). The reason for this trend toward ANG aircrews having less prior service is complicated and is related to the current problem of pilot retention in the active force.



Source: Maj Dan Bristol, chief, Rated Management Division of the Directorate of Operations, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, 3 February 1989.

Figure 2. Pilot Model: Air National Guard Trained versus Prior Service.

During the last few years, the mandatory service commitment for pilots has increased steadily. It was increased from four to five years in 1970 and remained at five years through 1979. However, in 1987 it was raised to six years, then seven years, and to the present eight years in 1988.¹⁵ Currently, active pilots must remain on active duty for at least nine to 10 years—counting pilot training—before they are able to leave. Another factor is airline scheduling practices since the airlines were deregulated a few years ago. Because of the competition, commercial pilots must work at or near the maximum number of hours that federal law allows, leaving them less time to pursue a career in the ANG. Consequently, when active pilots separate from the active service, they are less likely to join an ANG unit. In fact, less than 30 percent of the pilots who left active duty in 1987 and were ineligible to retire actually joined the ANG or the Air Force Reserve.¹⁶ For this reason, the ANG has found it necessary to increase recruiting efforts rather than rely on a dwindling pool of experienced pilots.¹⁷

It is possible that when the Checkered Flag overseas training deployment began in the late 1970s, a two-week deployment to the expected wartime theater of operations was adequate because ANG flying units were manned by a much higher percentage of aircrews with prior service. Many, no doubt, had flying experience in Europe and, as we have seen from the questionnaire, about half had been in combat. However, because of the trend toward fewer aircrews with prior service and the complex nature of flying in the

European theater, a unit Checkered Flag program every third or fourth year is no longer sufficient.

This is not to say that Checkered Flag and Creek Corsair deployments should be cancelled. Both offer valuable training opportunities and need to be continued. Checkered Flag allows units to practice all aspects of mobilization and is their only means of gaining expertise in their likely wartime theater of operation. Creek Corsair contributes to this training, at considerably less cost, by concentrating on the training needs of pilots and maintenance support personnel. However, neither program lasts long enough to allow aircrews to become sufficiently familiar with the European environment to operate effectively during the early stages of conflict.

This study showed that if there are missions in the European theater that the ANG is capable of performing, they would contribute to the Guard's mobilization readiness. Creek Klaxon supports this position: participants agreed that performing this mission was a valuable training experience, even though most came from units that would not be assigned to Europe during a conflict. Because of the challenges of conducting peacetime air operations and the similarities between the peacetime and the wartime environments, it seems obvious that any Air Force commitments the ANG fighter community might perform in Europe would definitely contribute to mobilization readiness. However, any future program along these lines should, like Creek Klaxon, require ANG aircrews to spend enough time in the theater to master the environment. If a significant number of aircrews could become proficient in European operations, the ANG would, in a sense, have regained some of the experience that it has lost over the past few years.

It remains to be seen, though, whether the ANG fighter community can support peacetime missions in the European theater. Chapter 3 showed that only volunteers under Title 10 USC 672d could support such a mission since guardsmen cannot be ordered to active duty for more than 15 days per year without their consent. One of the goals of the questionnaire was to gauge respondents' feelings about volunteering for such missions in the European theater. The results (see appendix E) indicate that many people would volunteer for more than the standard 15 days per year. More than 37 percent of the respondents said they would volunteer for at least 45 days per year while almost 63 percent indicated they would be willing to volunteer for 30 days or longer. These figures are consistent with a survey done by the General Accounting Office (GAO) for a Senate subcommittee in 1987, indicating that 43 percent of the respondents would likely volunteer for at least a 45-day tour of duty.¹⁸ Perhaps the most startling statistic revealed by the questionnaire is that over 40 percent of the respondents said they would likely volunteer for a three-year active duty tour to USAFE. Evidently, a significant number of guardsmen would be willing to support a real-world mission in Europe.

Of the two programs reviewed in this study as concept models for ANG mission support—Coronet Cove and Creek Klaxon (see chapter 5)—the

latter seems to be the program of choice. Whereas Coronet Cove personnel were limited to two weeks of duty, Creek Klaxon volunteers served tours ranging from 35 to 135 days. In short, although Checkered Flag and Creek Corsair, too, are good programs, neither is capable of producing theater-experienced aircrews. Only the composite unit concept employed by Creek Klaxon seems capable of using to best advantage the large number of guardsmen willing to volunteer for extended tours of duty.

Notes

1. TAC Manual (TACM) 2-1, *Tactical Air Operations*, 15 April 1978, 10-2.
2. Thomas A. Blair, *Climatology* (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1942), 394.
3. Operation Order (OpOrd) Creek Corsair, 1 May 1988, C7-3.
4. R. E. Huschke, *Tactical Airpower in NATO Contingencies--Modeling Weather Constraints on Air Operations: Weather and Warplanes IV*, Rand Report R-1195-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, September 1973), 31.
5. Charles C. Bates and John F. Fuller, *America's Weather Warriors* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 101.
6. *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 67.
7. OpOrd, C7-1 through C7-4.
8. Maj Philip Hofmann, "Coronet Rocket After Action Report" (Hancock Field, N.Y.: Headquarters 174th Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 November 1987), 4.
9. Creek Klaxon aircrew orientation briefing, April 1986.
10. USAFE Regulation (USAFER) 55-79, *Aircrew/Weapons Controller Procedures for Air Operations*, 22 June 1988, 3.
11. USAFE Manual (USAFEM) 51-50, vol. 1, *Tactical Fighter/Reconnaissance Aircrew Training*, 17 May 1988, 108.
12. ANG Regulation (ANGR) 60-3, *Supervisor of Flying (SOF) Program*, 15 February 1989, 2.
13. After Action Report, "Project Creek Klaxon," June 1987, 7.
14. USAFEM 51-50, 107-8.
15. AFR 36-51, *Active Duty Service Commitments (ADSC)*, 15 March 1989, 7, 12.
16. From a table produced by Col Jerry Ball, Analysis Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters US Air Force, which charts the number of pilots with nonretirement dates of separation during fiscal year 1987.
17. Maj Dan Bristol, chief, Rated Management Division of the Directorate of Operations, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, telephone interview with author, 7 July 1989.
18. Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Expanded Role for the Reserves and National Guard*, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 1986, 170.

Chapter 7

Possibilities for the Future

Although the Air National Guard's problem of maintaining a high level of experience among its pilots is serious, it is not insurmountable. This chapter suggests that the ANG can improve this situation by having both inexperienced and supervisory-level pilots (e.g., flight commanders, training officers, weapons and tactics officers, etc.) perform extended tours of duty in Europe and by establishing a permanent ANG unit there. These proposals can be implemented in such a way that they are both economical and consistent with the total force policy. Furthermore, they would increase the combat potential of ANG personnel by giving them substantial operational experience.

Ideally, new ANG pilots would serve a three-year tour with an active duty unit near their home unit's probable wartime location. If possible, this tour should include experience in the aircraft flown by the home unit, but active duty overseas tours of three years or longer are in line with current rotation cycles and would be long enough to justify changes in aircraft type. Similarly, the mission need not be identical with that of the home unit since the principal objective—from the ANG point of view—would be to gain experience in theater.

Such a program would thoroughly indoctrinate young aircrew members in theater operations. In fact, a three-year tour would be long enough for a pilot to become a fully qualified—by current USAFE standards—flight leader and supervisor of flying. Moreover, the additional experience would augment current stateside training. Presently, new pilots return to their units after completing a tour of approximately one and one-half years. This includes pilot training, upgrading into their units' aircraft while assigned to a replacement training unit (RTU), and completing the water survival and basic survival schools. At this point, however, they have no operational experience. Recognizing the need for a checkout in local operations and familiarity with the unit's missions, the National Guard Bureau authorizes home-station training—an additional 90 days of active duty—for all new pilots upon rejoining their units. But many units feel that 90 days is not enough—especially in units flying single-cockpit aircraft. They maintain that while 90 days allows for a local checkout, mission readiness, and even mission verification, it is insufficient to give pilots a base of knowledge and experience that can be sustained throughout their part-time careers. Consequently, the NGB has budgeted 260 days of active duty for each new pilot returning to a general-purpose fighter unit, beginning in fiscal year

1990. This allotment, together with unit training assemblies (monthly drills) and additional flying training periods (AFTP), will allow new pilots to remain essentially full-time for one year.¹

Further, if the number of former active duty pilots who enter the ANG continues to decline, ANG units will be forced (in fact, are currently being forced) to plan unit training activities designed to develop experience rather than sustain it. In each case, the approach to training is tailored to the appropriate level of experience. On the one hand, a program that is designed to develop experience will become progressively more challenging—like the building-block program developed for Creek Corsair. On the other hand, programs designed to sustain the more advanced pilots will challenge them only at higher levels of experience. Although the ANG has proven itself adept at maintaining the proficiency of established pilots, it is faced with the prospect of sacrificing this capability for the sake of developing novice pilots—something that is difficult to do on a part-time basis.

However, a program that allowed these young officers to spend three years in Europe (or whichever theater their units would be assigned to after mobilization) would eliminate the need for 90 days or more of home-station training because they would return to their units as experienced pilots. At that point, they would need only a local environmental checkout prior to being certified as mission ready—something they could do during their 15 days of annual training. Moreover, the returning pilots would be the current experts on their unit's proposed wartime theater of operations and would have the latest ideas on conducting combat operations there. Thus, their unit could concentrate on maintaining pilot readiness rather than developing it.

Such a program, of course, would require that the unit fill the temporary vacancies created during the pilot's extended tour. Although some units might have difficulty finding replacements, many units could hire prior-service personnel who are currently unable to join the ANG. Furthermore, hiring these people would also have the effect of increasing the overall experience of the affected units.

Although the program might well be mandatory, pilots would probably be willing to volunteer for a number of reasons. First, assuming they entered pilot training soon after college graduation, they would be only 27 or 28 years old after completing their training, RTU, and a three-year active tour. Historically, this age group is most attractive to commercial airlines. Certainly, they would have an advantage over the active duty pilots who must fulfill their eight-year commitment after pilot training and would be in their thirties by the time they could separate from the active service and search for an airline position. Second, employers other than airlines would likely view a short, active duty career as an asset rather than a liability: at 27 or 28 years of age, pilots are young enough to compete with recent college graduates but are more mature because of their Air Force experience. Third, the additional three years of active duty would accrue about the same number of points toward retirement as a guardsman could earn in nine to

10 years in a part-time capacity. Last, many young ANG pilots would welcome an opportunity to gain three years of experience overseas, preferring to return to their units as experienced "old heads" with much to give rather than novices with much to learn.

A mandatory program would have its advantages too. Prospective pilots would be fully aware of their commitment before signing enlistment papers, so there would be no surprises. Further, instead of spending time developing new pilots, ANG fighter units could concentrate on what they do best—maintaining the high level of expertise that pilots would bring to their units after returning from overseas.

A similar program designed for senior captains and field-grade pilots could be instrumental in solving the problems of developing theater-qualified SOFs and of coordinating and interfacing with the theater tasking agencies mentioned previously. A program allowing pilots in middle-management positions to volunteer for active duty assignments in rated staff positions at NATO sector operations centers and allied tactical operations centers, and at the group or wing level of USAFE fighter units has a certain appeal. It would enhance these volunteers' ability to supervise and manage their units' combat operations, would increase the ANG's understanding of NATO and of mobilization tasking, and would improve NATO's understanding of ANG capabilities. Obviously, these pilots would return home well qualified to plan and administer their units' Checkered Flag training programs.

Just as fighter pilots would likely volunteer for the first program, volunteers would probably be forthcoming for this one—and in such a way that the "nature of service" in the Guard would not be compromised. For instance, guardsmen could participate only with the consent of their state (see chapter 3). The procedure, already established for guardsmen volunteering for service schools or other ANG-related active duty, is to request permission from the adjutant general by an in-turn letter routed through the guardsman's chain of command. Consequently, if the unit felt that an active duty tour would not be in its best interests, it would not have to release the individual. A full-time unit employee—technician or active Guard/Reserve (AGR)—leaving for the active assignment would have to be temporarily replaced by one of the unit's part-time members. The effect would be that two unit members would be gaining experience from such a program—the volunteer for the overseas assignment and the part-timer hired as a replacement. Often, perhaps because of the increasing mobility of present-day society, a part-timer could be between jobs, able to take a leave of absence, or otherwise willing to temporarily work full-time. In any case, the unit does not have to release a guardsman, and the guardsman is not obligated to volunteer.

Like the extended duty proposed for young pilots, tour lengths for middle-level pilots should be consistent with current Air Force policy, offering the same cost-effectiveness in terms of moving family and household goods and, if necessary, upgrading to a different aircraft. Under

both programs, theater commanders should have operational command and control over the participants, but home units would retain administrative control under the terms of Title 10 USC 672d. Further, although these volunteers would occupy positions normally filled by active duty personnel, they would not compete with them for promotion, since this would be controlled through normal ANG channels. Similarly, the fact that no more than about 130 pilots could be in both programs at any given time suggests that there would be minimal infringement on the opportunities of active duty pilots.² This number is insignificant, especially when considered in light of the current shortage of Air Force pilots.

These programs would benefit the active Air Force as well as the ANG. For example, pilot retention is critically low because of the losses to commercial airlines; consequently, as of 1988 the Air Force has fewer pilots than positions. Indeed, prior to increasing the financial incentives to pilots to remain in service, the Air Force projected a pilot deficit of over 2,500 positions by 1993,³ and current incentives are not expected to bring this shortage to less than 1,000 by 1994.⁴ Although full enactment of both proposed programs would not solve this dilemma, it would make the problem less critical. From the Air Force perspective, these additional pilots could be had for only the normal pay and allowances; there would be no costly bonuses. Moreover, guardsmen in both programs would fill overseas billets and reduce the amount of time active aircrews must spend overseas during their careers. That is, the programs would have a positive effect on the rotational base that must be maintained by the active service (see chapter 2).

In addition to the proposed programs for new fighter pilots and pilots who have reached supervisory positions, the ANG should consider locating a permanent ANG unit in the European theater. Either of two types of units would be useful: a full-time squadron with USAFE as the gaining command or a detachment modeled after the Creek Klaxon detachment.

Responses to the questionnaires indicated that establishing a full-time ANG squadron in USAFE is certainly feasible. In fact, the pilots for such a squadron could come from the 20 (out of 80) respondents who said they would volunteer for a three-year active duty tour to USAFE, a figure representing well under 10 percent of the total number of ANG fighter pilots. Even higher percentages of support personnel were willing to volunteer (see appendix E).

Moreover, a full-time squadron in USAFE could offer savings by allowing assets from *two* active fighter squadrons to be transferred to the ANG—assets from the USAFE unit that the ANG would replace and assets from the stateside unit that supported the rotational base. Certainly, replacing the USAFE squadron would not be a source of savings since the ANG USAFE unit would also be full-time and have about the same operating tempo as the active squadron. However, assets from a stateside active fighter unit could be absorbed by the ANG (e.g., by increasing four ANG units from 18 to 24 aircraft each). Since the Air Force maintains about the same number

of units stateside as it does overseas (see chapter 2) to support its rotational base, this base would be left intact by the ANG's absorbing the USAFE unit and the assets of one stateside squadron. To be practical, however, current discussions about troop reductions and having allies share the burden of defense in Europe suggest that such a proposal has little chance of approval. That is, it makes no sense to convert a unit from active status to the ANG when the number of forward bases will likely decline. Nevertheless, such a unit is feasible, economical, and consistent with the total force policy, given the current levels of forward basing.

An ANG detachment permanently located in the NATO central region would depend on supporting units for aircraft and TDY volunteers who would augment a small, permanent staff designed to provide continuity and training. The unit could be assigned to USAFE, have a wartime or contingency role as a NATO asset, and prove valuable to the ANG in terms of mobilization training. Specifically, Creek Klaxon kept eight pilots current and fully trained in the mission at all times. After being certified, they spent the rest of their time practicing what they had learned and training replacements. This process constantly reinforced the pilots' knowledge of theater operations. Assuming a 90-day rotational tour with a three-week overlap, as in Creek Klaxon, about 50 pilots—the equivalent of one and one-half to two squadrons—could be indoctrinated in the NATO mission each year. Further, this program would return pilots to their home units much sooner than the proposed three-year program. Although ANG and Air Force planners and programmers might have difficulty justifying the expenses associated with this proposal—especially if they intend to continue established programs like Checkered Flag—certain factors may favor permanent detachments in Europe. These factors include expected budget cuts across the board, public and congressional demands that NATO allies assume their share of the burden for defense, the West Germans' insistence on reducing the number of US troops in their country, and President George Bush's suggestion that the superpowers limit themselves to 275,000 troops in Europe. If any combination of these factors led to reductions in forward-deployed fighter units in Europe, establishing ANG—perhaps even Air Force—detachments could prove to be an attractive alternative to forward basing.

If units are in fact pulled out of the theater, some provision must be made for their rapid reintroduction should this become necessary. Because airfields, aircraft shelters, weapons storage areas, barracks, and other necessary facilities for conducting air operations are expensive and time-consuming to build, they should remain intact. Similarly, spare parts, bombs, ammunition, missiles, general weaponry, support equipment, and other materials should be kept in place, since reintroduction of these items would place extraordinary demands on US airlift/sealift—capabilities that many people feel are inadequate even at today's level of forward basing. In other words, the bulk of the Air Force's share of any drawdown in Europe should be confined to aircraft and the personnel who fly and maintain

them—assets that can be quickly reintroduced—rather than personnel and equipment for logistical support. The reintroduction of fighters to Europe could be exercised periodically through such programs as Checkered Flag for TAC and TAC-gained units. In fact, these deployments would be easier than current ones because equipment would be located in the forward areas.

Under these circumstances, the ANG might establish a permanent detachment in Europe as follows. Since most ANG fighter units are manned and equipped for 18 aircraft rather than the 24 aircraft typical of most active duty units, aircraft from an inactivated forward deployed unit could be absorbed by existing ANG fighter units with only small increases in manpower. That is, four ANG units could receive six aircraft from the inactivated unit, bringing each of the four to a total of 24 aircraft. One of the ANG units could then supply the aircraft and support equipment for the proposed detachment and be assigned the detachment location as its wartime operating base, making mobilization relatively easy since part of its aircraft and equipment would be prepositioned.

The larger the number of units participating in the program, the easier it would be for the ANG to give the program permanent support. In the foreseeable future, F-16 units—totaling 11 by the end of fiscal year 1990, not counting air defense units—will comprise the largest of the ANG communities.⁵ An F-16 detachment about the size of Creek Klaxon's would require 70–75 people (i.e., no more than seven or eight people deployed from any one of the 11 units at a given time), allowing supporting units to continue their normal schedules and support their usual commitments.

Aircraft communities smaller than the F-16 community could gain theater experience by planning similar composite detachments but running them on a part-time basis. These detachments could be at sites other than the permanent F-16 location; however, incorporating them into the F-16 detachment would be more economical since the permanent detachment could provide theater training as well as other types of support at no additional expense. On the other hand, if the active Air Force adopted this concept of training as an alternative to forward basing, smaller aircraft communities of the ANG could easily participate by cooperating with the Air Force in the development of jointly supported detachments.

This chapter has recommended several ways that ANG fighter aircrews could train in the European theater of operations. These proposals are economical, consistent with the total force policy, and—most important to national security—conducive to increasing the combat potential of the Air National Guard. The proposals involving new pilots and the middle-management-level pilots could be implemented quickly and easily. Although these programs would require the support of the active service, they should be attractive options for the Air Force since they would help alleviate its problems with pilot retention. Further, the proposal for a full-time training detachment in USAFE is designed as an alternative to the two other programs in the event of an expected troop drawdown in Europe. Such

detachments would be attractive to both the ANG and the Air Force since they can produce theater-qualified pilots without undue expenditures for manpower, equipment, and flying time. The ANG, therefore, should give serious consideration to these proposals since, taken together, they provide for the continuance of a strong US presence in the European theater.

Notes

1. Lt Col Mac Fairchild, National Guard Bureau, Plans and Operations Division, Washington, D.C., interview with author, 28 June 1989.

2. The number of ANG pilots who would participate depends on many variables, making speculation on the actual number difficult. This figure, which probably represents a reasonable maximum, simply assumes about two new pilots from each of the ANG fighter units and a midlevel pilot from half of these units.

3. Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Issues Book*, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 1-7.

4. Col Robert H. Fogelson, "AF Mapping Long-Term Strategy to Improve Its Retention of Pilots," *Air Force Times*, 19 June 1989, 24.

5. Maj Dan Bristol, chief, Rated Management Division, Directorate of Operations, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland, interview with author, 3 February 1989.

APPENDIX A

Results of the Checkered Flag Questionnaire

The rank, average length of service, and average age for both officer and enlisted respondents who participated in Checkered Flag deployments are as follows:

<i>Officer</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Number</i>
O2	2	E2	2
O3	3	E3	2
O4	7	E4	2
O5	12	E5	19
O6	1	E6	30
		E7	16
		E8	4
		E9	5
Total	25		80

	<i>Average Years in ANG</i>	<i>AverageYears Prior Service</i>	<i>AverageYears Total Service</i>	<i>Average Age</i>
Officer	12	5	17	41
Enlisted	12	2	15	35
Combined	12	3	15	36

The Questionnaire

(The numbers and percentages included below did not appear in the original questionnaire. The author's commentary is enclosed in square brackets.)

If you have had prior service out of CONUS, please list each occurrence by location, year, and total months.

[Almost 30 percent (29.6%) of the respondents had active service out of CONUS. The average length was 27 months. About 20 percent (19.4%) reported experience in Southeast Asia (SEA).]

Total number of out-of-CONUS deployments with the Guard:

[Average number per respondent was about three deployments.]

Total number of Checkered Flag deployments to USAFE:

[Average number per respondent was about two, with a high of four.]

Type of work you do in your unit:

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
a. Maintenance	65	60.2
b. Logistics	3	2.8
c. Administration	7	6.5
d. Aircrew	19	17.6
e. Other	14	12.9

1. Which exercises have you participated in?

	<i>Percentage of respondents who participated in each</i>
a. Checkered Flag	100.0
b. Red/Green Flag	46.3
c. Copper Flag	—
d. Combat Archer	19.9
e. Gun Smoke	19.4
f. William Tell	—
g. Annual field training (off home station)	74.1
h. Other	35.2
i. Creek Klaxon	—
j. Creek Corsair	2.7
k. Coronet Cove	35.2

[The average person had at least three (3.4) deployments with which to compare Checkered Flag.]

Respondents who had participated only in Checkered Flag were asked to skip to question five.]

2. How do the exercises you circled compare? Please list them—from most to least valuable—according to what you think their value has been to you as a guardsman. Include all the deployments you circled above.

[More than 60 percent (62.8%) of the respondents listed Checkered Flag as the most valuable, and over 15 percent (15.7%) listed it second. Almost 11 percent (10.9%) listed Checkered Flag as the least valuable deployment.]

3. Why was the exercise listed first valuable to you?

[Thirty-six respondents chose to answer this question. All indicated that training for their wartime mission in the environment where they would be assigned made Checkered Flag deployments most valuable.]

4. Why was the exercise listed last not as valuable to you?

[Four respondents said the deployments were poorly organized and offered little training; two indicated that the exercise was so intense that they could only react to situations rather than learn from them; and one felt that poor food and quarters made the deployment unpleasant.]

5. What is your present status in your unit?

- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| a. Part-time | 26.4% |
| b. Full-time | 73.6% |

[Full-time respondents—air technicians and active Guard/Reserve—were asked to skip to question 8.]

6. What best describes your civilian status?

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| a. I have full-time employment. | 67.9% |
| b. I have part-time employment. | 10.7% |
| c. I am self-employed. | 7.1% |
| d. I am a student. | 3.6% |
| e. I am a homemaker. | 7.1% |
| f. I am unemployed. | 0.0% |
| g. Other. | 3.6% |

7. What is your civilian job?

[Responses were divided into six categories. The “traditional” category included several occupations, but all appeared to be nonseasonal jobs requiring eight-hour days, five days per week.

Airline	42.8%
Teaching	4.8%
Government	14.3%
Professional	23.8%
Sales	4.8%
Traditional	9.5%]

8. In your present situation, what is the maximum length of a tour that you could volunteer for deployment to USAFE?

[Technicians and AGRs were told to assume no limitation imposed by their unit.]

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. 15 days	67.9%	15.4%
b. 30 days	10.7%	33.3%
c. 45 days	7.1%	2.6%
d. 60 days	3.6%	7.7%
e. 90 days	7.1%	9.0%
f. 135 days	—	1.3%
g. More	3.6%	30.7%

9. How often could you deploy for this length of time?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Every 6 months	10.7%	21.8%
b. Every year	67.9%	47.4%
c. Every 2 years	17.9%	17.9%
d. Every 3 years	3.5%	12.9%

10. When are you available for deployment?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Spring	—	2.6%
b. Summer	14.3%	2.6%
c. Fall	—	—
d. Winter	—	—
e. Anytime	85.7%	94.8%

11. If one were available, would you volunteer for a three-year active duty (Title 10) tour to USAFE? (Assume that it would be accompanied and that you could return to your home unit in your present status afterward.) (Select one)

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Yes (certain or almost certain).	28.6%	47.4%
b. Very likely (better than 50/50).	7.1%	16.7%
c. About 50/50 that I would volunteer.	3.6%	10.3%
d. Not very likely (less than 50/50).	10.7%	11.5%
e. No (certain or almost certain).	50.0%	14.1%

11a. I would be more likely to volunteer for a three-year active duty tour to USAFE if _____.

[The largest number of respondents (23) indicated that the location of an active duty tour would have the greatest bearing on whether or not they would volunteer. Nine said they would volunteer if they were assured of promotion, and five said that they would volunteer if pay were equal to or greater than their present pay. Five respondents said that they would volunteer if they could be accompanied. Of course, this was a premise of the question.]

Items 12-20 are statements about Checkered Flag deployments. Circle the answer that corresponds to how you feel about your experiences. Please be honest. If you want to explain your answer, use the back of this page.

12. I would volunteer for Checkered Flag again.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 41.7% |
| b. Agree | 43.5% |
| c. Uncertain | 10.2% |
| d. Disagree | 3.7% |
| e. Strongly disagree | .9% |

13. Checkered Flag was a very challenging experience.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 25.2% |
| b. Agree | 57.0% |
| c. Uncertain | 7.5% |
| d. Disagree | 9.4% |
| e. Strongly disagree | .9% |

14. After Checkered Flag, I had a greater sense of accomplishment than I do after most deployments.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 27.1% |
| b. Agree | 39.3% |
| c. Uncertain | 19.6% |
| d. Disagree | 13.1% |
| e. Strongly disagree | .9% |

15. I learned more from Checkered Flag than from the training I get at home, say at drill or during summer camp.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 29.0% |
| b. Agree | 41.1% |
| c. Uncertain | 10.3% |
| d. Disagree | 18.7% |
| e. Strongly disagree | .9% |

16. I feel I was adequately prepared for Checkered Flag.

a. Strongly agree	23.6%
b. Agree	58.6%
c. Uncertain	6.6%
d. Disagree	9.4%
e. Strongly disagree	1.8%

17. Checkered Flag (the last one, if you have been on more than one) was a smooth operation.

a. Strongly agree	15.4%
b. Agree	38.5%
c. Uncertain	20.1%
d. Disagree	23.1%
e. Strongly disagree	2.9%

18. My unit has no major problems in planning and executing a Checkered Flag deployment.

a. Strongly agree	15.4%
b. Agree	35.6%
c. Uncertain	20.0%
d. Disagree	21.3%
e. Strongly disagree	7.7%

19. Each time my unit performs a Checkered Flag deployment, it becomes easier.

a. Strongly agree	11.2%
b. Agree	45.8%
c. Uncertain	25.2%
d. Disagree	15.9%
e. Strongly disagree	1.9%

20. Checkered Flag would have been more valuable to me if I could have stayed longer.

a. Strongly agree	9.3%
b. Agree	22.4%
c. Uncertain	15.0%
d. Disagree	48.6%
e. Strongly disagree	4.7%

21. If you agree with no. 20, how long?

[Over 30 percent (31.4%) of the total number of respondents answered this question. Although one pilot suggested that 18 months would have been the right amount of time, the average response was five weeks.]

22. What changes could be made in Checkered Flag to make it more valuable to you?

[Fifteen respondents felt that the Checkered Flag deployments should have been better planned and organized. Ten indicated that the areas of mobility and transportation needed improvement. Eleven individuals felt that quarters and meals could be better. Eight of the pilots felt that they needed more environmental flying. (Some indicated that they should have concentrated on learning the flying area rather than doing range work and practicing tactics.) Several people commented on problems with integration into the NATO system: nine said they needed more opportunity to practice tactics in the environment, and four recommended better coordination with NATO tasking agencies. Four respondents felt that too many people were included on the deployments, making them more expensive than they should have been.]

23. Checkered Flag was _____.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------|
| a. one heck of a deal | 32.7% |
| b. not too bad of a deal | 53.8% |
| c. not too good of a deal | 13.5% |
| d. not a good deal | — |

APPENDIX B

Results of the Creek Corsair Questionnaire

Eighty-one of the 215 participants in Creek Corsair (37.7%) responded to the questionnaire. The rank, average length of service, and average age for both officer and enlisted respondents are as follows:

<i>Officer</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Number</i>
O1	1	E2	1
O2	5	E3	5
O3	8	E4	3
O4	7	E5	14
O5	6	E6	14
O6	1	E7	11
		E8	2
		E9	3
Total		28	53

	<i>Average Years in ANG</i>	<i>Average Years Prior Service</i>	<i>Average Years Total Service</i>	<i>Average Age</i>
Officer	11	2	14	36
Enlisted	14	2	16	36
Combined	13	2	15	36

The Questionnaire

(The numbers and percentages included below did not appear in the original questionnaire. The author's commentary is enclosed in square brackets.)

If you have had prior service out of CONUS, please list each occurrence by location, year, and total months.

[Well over one-third (37.0%) of the respondents had active service out of CONUS. The average length was 17 months. Almost one-fourth (23.5%) reported experience in Southeast Asia.]

Total number of out-of-CONUS deployments with the Guard:

[Average number per respondent was about four (4.2) deployments.]

Type of work you did with Creek Corsair:

	Number	Percentage
a. Maintenance	49	60.5
b. Logistics	0	0.0
c. Administration	2	2.5
d. Pilots	24	29.6
e. Other	6	7.4

1. Which exercises have you participated in?

	<i>Percentage of respondents who participated in each</i>
a. Checkered Flag	59.3
b. Red/Green Flag	71.6
c. Annual field training (off home station)	75.3
d. Gun Smoke	27.2
e. Coronet Cove	76.5
f. Combat Archer	11.1
g. None	3.7
h. Other	23.1

[The average person had at least four deployments with which to compare Creek Corsair.]

2. How do the exercises you circled compare? Please list them—from most to least valuable—according to what you think their value has been to you as a guardsman. Include Creek Corsair and all deployments you circled above.

[Twenty-four of the 59 respondents (40.6%) who answered the question listed Creek Corsair first, and another 19 (32.2%) listed it second. Approximately the same percentages held true for pilots only and maintenance personnel only. Of the respondents who participated in a Checkered Flag, approximately the same percentage ranked that deployment first or second as did those who ranked Creek Corsair first or second. Three people (5.1%) listed Creek Corsair last.]

3. Why was the exercise listed first valuable to you?

[[Only respondents who ranked Creek Corsair first are included.] Ten respondents thought that integrating with NATO and USAFE made the exercise valuable. Ten valued the real-world training opportunities. Three pilots thought the tactics they practiced contributed to the value of Creek Corsair. One person commented that the pressure of the exercise made it beneficial.]

4. Why was the exercise listed last not as valuable to you?

[Of the three people who listed Creek Corsair last, one was a pilot who wanted better integration of A-7 capability into mixed packages with the host unit; one, from maintenance, had only one other exercise with which to compare Creek Corsair, but thought Creek Corsair was valuable; one maintenance person simply said he did not accomplish anything.]

5. What is your present status in your unit?

- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| a. Part-time | 35.8% |
| b. Full-time | 64.2% |

[Full-time respondents—air technicians and active Guard/Reserve—were asked to skip to question 8.]

6. What best describes your civilian status?

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| a. I have full-time employment. | 62.1% |
| b. I have part-time employment. | — |
| c. I am self-employed. | 10.3% |
| d. I am a student. | 27.6% |
| e. I am a homemaker. | — |
| f. I am unemployed. | — |
| g. Other (explain). | — |

7. What is your civilian job?

[Responses were divided into six categories. The "professional" and "skilled-labor" categories included several occupations, but all appeared to be nonseasonal, for eight hours a day, five days per week.

- | | |
|---------------|------|
| Airline | 35% |
| Teaching | 5% |
| Sales | 10% |
| Government | 5% |
| Professional | 35% |
| Skilled Labor | 10%] |

8. In your present situation, what is the maximum length of a tour that you could volunteer for deployment to USAFE?

[Technicians and AGRs were told to assume no limitation imposed by their unit.]

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. 15 days	34.6%	19.6%
b. 30 days	44.8%	45.1%
c. 45 days	—	2.0%
d. 60 days	10.3%	13.7%
e. 90 days	—	11.8%
f. 135 days	—	—
g. More	10.3%	7.8%

9. How often could you deploy for this length of time?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Every 6 months	21.4%	27.5%
b. Every year	67.9%	43.0%
c. Every 2 years	7.1%	27.5%
d. Every 3 years	3.6%	2.0%

10. When are you available for deployment?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Spring	3.5%	1.9%
b. Summer	31.0%	1.9%
c. Fall	—	—
d. Winter	—	1.9%
e. Anytime	65.5%	94.3%

11. If one were available, would you volunteer for a three-year, active duty (Title 10) tour to USAFE? (Assume that it would be accompanied and that you could return to your home unit in your present status afterward.) (Select one)

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Yes (certain or almost certain).	20.7%	20.0%
b. Very likely (better than 50/50).	3.5%	14.0%
c. About 50/50 that I would volunteer.	20.7%	18.0%
d. Not very likely (less than 50/50).	24.1%	26.0%
e. No (certain or almost certain).	31.0%	22.0%

Items 12-20 are statements about Creek Corsair. Circle the answer that corresponds to how you feel about your experiences in West Germany. Please be honest. If you want to explain your answer, use the back of this page.

12. I would volunteer for Creek Corsair again.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 66.7% |
| b. Agree | 25.9% |
| c. Uncertain | 6.2% |
| d. Disagree | 1.2% |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

13. Creek Corsair was a very challenging experience.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 34.6% |
| b. Agree | 48.1% |
| c. Uncertain | 11.1% |
| d. Disagree | 6.2% |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

14. After leaving [West] Germany, I had a greater sense of accomplishment than I do after most deployments.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 28.8% |
| b. Agree | 41.2% |
| c. Uncertain | 12.5% |
| d. Disagree | 16.2% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 1.3% |

15. I learned more from Creek Corsair than from the training I get at home, say at drill or during summer camp.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 40.8% |
| b. Agree | 25.9% |
| c. Uncertain | 16.0% |
| d. Disagree | 14.8% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 2.5% |

16. I feel I was adequately prepared for Creek Corsair.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 30.9% |
| b. Agree | 59.3% |
| c. Uncertain | 6.1% |
| d. Disagree | 3.7% |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

17. Creek Corsair was a smooth operation.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 22.3% |
| b. Agree | 50.6% |
| c. Uncertain | 11.1% |
| d. Disagree | 14.8% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 1.2% |

18. My unit had no major problems in planning and executing the Creek Corsair deployment.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 30.9% |
| b. Agree | 40.7% |
| c. Uncertain | 13.6% |
| d. Disagree | 13.6% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 1.2% |

19. There are several major changes that should be made if we do another Creek Corsair.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 18.5% |
| b. Agree | 33.3% |
| c. Uncertain | 23.5% |
| d. Disagree | 24.7% |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

20. Creek Corsair would have been more valuable to me if I could have stayed longer.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 9.9% |
| b. Agree | 14.9% |
| c. Uncertain | 33.3% |
| d. Disagree | 40.7% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 1.2% |

21. If you agree with no. 20, how long?

[Of the 24.8 percent who agreed or strongly agreed, over half recommended four weeks; however, the average length was six weeks.]

22. What changes could be made in Creek Corsair to make it more valuable to you?

[The respondents made many suggestions for improving Creek Corsair, arranged below in general groupings. The author's comments are in parentheses.

Twenty maintenance people felt that there were not enough of them to perform safely in a chemical warfare environment and produce the number of sorties required. (Main-

tenance is spread among aircraft shelters and is quite different than operating from a flight line. The Creek Corsair operation needs a minimum of two people per shelter to perform maintenance or launch aircraft.)

Nine people thought that the flying schedule should not have been spread over a 12-hour work shift. They felt that the detachment should not have deviated from its schedule to accommodate the host unit's schedule. (The schedule was shifted to match the host unit's in order to fly integrated sorties. Solutions included adding more people and more aircraft, or working out an agreement with the host unit indicating that its schedulers know and understand the detachment's limitations. Creek Klaxon had the same problem until a full-time scheduler was added.)

Eleven pilots thought that more integrated packages, dissimilar air combat training (DACT), or bomb competition with USAFE units would have improved the training.

Five pilots indicated that USAFE needed to better understand A-7 capabilities so they could utilize these aircraft more realistically. (Pilots recognized the need to educate USAFE on A-7 capabilities, as had the Creek Corsair planners.)

Five people thought that host-unit procedures and local-area procedures needed to be more thoroughly briefed.

Five people thought that too many nonproductive Air Force specialty codes (AFSC) were included in manning. (A minimal number of support AFSCs were included in the deployment packages—e.g., one medic, one food service, one security, etc.—even though they did not contribute directly to operations or maintenance functions. The planners intended for these people to gain experience from the operation. In retrospect, however, the commander felt that these positions should have been replaced with flight-line personnel.)

Four people felt that more aircraft were needed in order to shorten the maintenance day. (See the above suggestions for shortening the workday.)

Three people indicated that more per diem was needed to compensate for missed meals at the messing facility due to the work schedule. (A per diem of twelve dollars for enlisted people did not cover surcharge and meals.)

Three people wanted more coordination between deploying units, including some overlap to inform succeeding units of lessons learned. (Twice as many rooms would have been needed to accommodate an overlap. Because billeting was very limited, this was not possible. The staff probably provided enough continuity in operations, but overlap was probably desirable for maintenance.)

Two people thought that each unit should take its own aircraft. (Obviously, the intent of the deployment was to save money by not deploying each unit's aircraft.)]

23. Creek Corsair was _____.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------|
| a. one heck of a deal | 54.3% |
| b. not too bad of a deal | 37.1% |
| c. not too good of a deal | 7.4% |
| d. not a good deal | 1.2% |

APPENDIX C

Results of the Coronet Cove Questionnaire

The rank, average length of service, and average age for both officer and enlisted respondents who participated in Coronet Cove deployments are as follows:

<i>Officer</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Number</i>
O1	1	E2	0
O2	0	E3	2
O3	1	E4	2
O4	10	E5	7
O5	6	E6	11
		E7	3
		E8	0
		E9	1
Total	18		26

	<i>Average Years in ANG</i>	<i>Average Years Prior Service</i>	<i>Average Years Total Service</i>	<i>Average Age</i>
Officer	13	3	17	38
Enlisted	12	1	13	35
Combined	12	2	15	37

The Questionnaire

(The numbers and percentages included below did not appear in the original questionnaire. The author's commentary is enclosed in square brackets.)

If you have had prior service out of CONUS, please list each occurrence by location, year, and total months.

[Over 27 percent (27.3%) of the respondents had active service out of CONUS. The average length was 21 months. Furthermore, 13.6 percent reported experience in Southeast Asia.]

Total number of out-of-CONUS deployments with the Guard:

[Average number per respondent was about four (4.3) deployments.]

Total number of Checkered Flag deployments to USAFE:

[Average number of Checkered Flag deployments was just over one (1.05) per respondent.]

Type of work you do in your unit:

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
a. Maintenance	24	54.5
b. Logistics	—	—
c. Administration	2	4.5
d. Aircrew	14	31.8
e. Other	4	9.2

1. Which exercises have you participated in?

	<i>Percentage of respondents who participated in each</i>
a. Checkered Flag	77.3
b. Red/Green Flag	50.0
c. Annual field training (off home station)	93.2
d. Creek Corsair	—
e. Gun Smoke	15.9
f. Combat Archer	—
g. None	—
h. Other	50.0

[The average person had at least three deployments with which to compare Coronet Cove, and none of the respondents answered "g," indicating that Coronet Cove was their only deployment.]

2. How do the exercises you circled compare? Please list them—from most to least valuable—according to what you think their value has been to you as a guardsman. Include all the deployments you circled above.

[More than 20 percent (21.1%) of the respondents listed Coronet Cove first, and another 20 percent listed it second. Checkered Flag deployments were the most popular, with almost 65 percent (64.7%) of those who indicated that they had participated in a Checkered Flag deployment listing it first or second. Almost one-third (32.4%) of the respondents listed Coronet Cove as the least valuable deployment.]

3. Why was the exercise listed first valuable to you?

[Five respondents thought that working in a different environment was valuable, and another five felt that performing the mission made the experience valuable.]

4. Why was the exercise listed last not as valuable to you?

[Of the people who thought Coronet Cove was the least valuable deployment, six felt that the training was not realistic and did not facilitate training for the wartime mission; three felt that the deployment did not provide enough flying experience.]

5. What is your present status in your unit?

- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| a. Part-time | 56.8% |
| b. Full-time | 43.2% |

[Full-time respondents—air technicians and active Guard/Reserve—were asked to skip to question 8.]

6. What best describes your civilian status?

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| a. I have full-time employment. | 81.0% |
| b. I have part-time employment. | 3.8% |
| c. I am self-employed. | 7.6% |
| d. I am a student. | 3.8% |
| e. I am a homemaker. | — |
| f. I am unemployed. | — |
| g. Other. | 3.8% |

7. What is your civilian job?

[Responses were divided into eight categories. The “traditional” category included several occupations, but all appeared to be nonseasonal jobs requiring eight-hour days, five days per week. The “irregular” category included full-time positions requiring nonspecific hours.

- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| Airline | 19.3% |
| Teaching | 7.7% |
| Government | 3.8% |
| Professional | 30.7% |
| Sales | 7.7% |
| Traditional | 15.4% |
| Skilled | 7.7% |
| Irregular | 7.7%] |

8. In your present situation, what is the maximum length of a tour that you could volunteer for deployment to USAFE?

[Technicians and AGRs were told to assume no limitation imposed by their unit.]

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. 15 days	44.0%	5.6%
b. 30 days	32.0%	44.4%
c. 45 days	4.0%	5.6%
d. 60 days	4.0%	—
e. 90 days	—	5.6%
f. 135 days	—	—
g. More	16.0%	38.8%

9. How often could you deploy for this length of time?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Every 6 months	28.0%	33.3%
b. Every year	64.0%	38.9%
c. Every 2 years	4.0%	11.1%
d. Every 3 years	4.0%	16.7%

10. When are you available for deployment?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Spring	4.0%	—
b. Summer	8.0%	—
c. Fall	—	5.6%
d. Winter	8.0%	5.6%
e. Anytime	80.0%	88.8%

11. If one were available, would you volunteer for a three-year active duty (Title 10) tour to USAFE? (Assume that it would be accompanied and that you could return to your home unit in your present status afterward.) (Select one)

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Yes (certain or almost certain).	24.0%	40.4%
b. Very likely (better than 50/50).	8.0%	17.5%
c. About 50/50 that I would volunteer.	16.0%	15.8%
d. Not very likely (less than 50/50).	24.0%	15.8%
e. No (certain or almost certain).	28.0%	10.5%

11a. I would be more likely to volunteer for a three-year active duty tour to USAFE if

[Guarantee of promotion ranked first, with five people saying they would volunteer in exchange for a promotion. Four respondents indicated they would volunteer if they could return to their civilian jobs, and two pilots said they would volunteer if they could fly F-15s or F-16s.]

Items 12-22 are statements about Coronet Cove. Circle the answer that corresponds to how you feel about your experiences in Panama. Please be honest. If you want to explain your answer, use the back of this page.

12. Knowing that Coronet Cove had a real mission made it more important to me than a deployment like those listed in question one.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 23.3% |
| b. Agree | 37.2% |
| c. Uncertain | 11.6% |
| d. Disagree | 25.6% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 2.3% |

13. I would volunteer for Coronet Cove again.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 47.7% |
| b. Agree | 36.4% |
| c. Uncertain | 9.1% |
| d. Disagree | 6.8% |
| e. Strongly disagree | -- |

14. Coronet Cove was a very challenging experience.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 15.8% |
| b. Agree | 45.6% |
| c. Uncertain | 2.3% |
| d. Disagree | 25.0% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 11.3% |

15. After leaving Panama, I had a greater sense of accomplishment than I do after most deployments.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 11.4% |
| b. Agree | 34.1% |
| c. Uncertain | 15.9% |
| d. Disagree | 25.0% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 13.6% |

16. I learned more from Coronet Cove than from the training I get at home, say at drill or during summer camp.

a. Strongly agree	13.6%
b. Agree	34.1%
c. Uncertain	20.5%
d. Disagree	18.2%
e. Strongly disagree	13.6%

17. I feel that I was adequately prepared for the Coronet Cove mission.

a. Strongly agree	50.0%
b. Agree	45.4%
c. Uncertain	2.3%
d. Disagree	2.3%
e. Strongly disagree	—

18. Training for and actually helping to perform the Coronet Cove mission was a valuable experience.

a. Strongly agree	25.0%
b. Agree	36.4%
c. Uncertain	18.2%
d. Disagree	15.9%
e. Strongly disagree	4.5%

19. Coronet Cove (the last one, if you have been on more than one) was a smooth operation.

a. Strongly agree	40.9%
b. Agree	52.2%
c. Uncertain	2.3%
d. Disagree	2.3%
e. Strongly disagree	2.3%

20. My unit has no major problems in planning and executing a Coronet Cove deployment.

a. Strongly agree	56.9%
b. Agree	40.9%
c. Uncertain	—
d. Disagree	—
e. Strongly disagree	2.2%

21. Each time my unit performs a Coronet Cove deployment, it becomes easier.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 27.3% |
| b. Agree | 56.8% |
| c. Uncertain | 9.1% |
| d. Disagree | 6.8% |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

22. Coronet Cove would have been more valuable to me if I could have stayed longer.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 13.6% |
| b. Agree | 2.3% |
| c. Uncertain | 40.9% |
| d. Disagree | 34.1% |
| e. Strongly disagree | 9.1% |

23. If you agree with no. 22, how long?

[Of the people who responded to this question, the average recommended length of stay was almost five (4.8) weeks, with four weeks being most common and eight weeks being the longest.]

24. What changes could be made in Coronet Cove to make it more valuable to you?

[Eleven pilots felt that Coronet Cove needed more realistic training. Several suggestions included upgrading a range to have electronic countermeasures, live ordnance delivery, more close air support missions (possibly with ground forward air controllers using laser designators), more variation in planned missions, and possibly redeployments or out-and-backs to friendly countries in the region. Several maintenance personnel felt that the flying schedule should be increased to make their jobs more challenging. Two supervisors indicated that they felt overall unit training suffered because part-time guardsmen who supported the Coronet Cove deployment were not available to participate in more valuable deployments because of job-related constraints.]

25. Coronet Cove was _____.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------|
| a. one heck of a deal | 54.5% |
| b. not too bad of a deal | 36.4% |
| c. not too good of a deal | 9.1% |
| d. not a good deal | — |

APPENDIX D

Results of the Creek Klaxon Questionnaire

A number of senior personnel who participated in Creek Klaxon have retired and were not available for the survey. Further, many part-time junior personnel have since become full-time technicians or active members of the Guard/Reserve. Many of the units that participated in the project are now in the process of or are soon to be converting to single-seat F-15s and F-16s, a change that eliminates the position of weapon systems officer (WSO). Because WSOs would probably indicate a preference for longer and more frequent overseas exercises, data concerning frequency and length of tour do not include WSO statistics.

The rank, average length of service, and average age for both officer and enlisted respondents who participated in Creek Klaxon are as follows:

	<i>Officer</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Number</i>
	O2	1	E3	2
	O3	10	E4	4
	O4	11	E5	41
	O5	3	E6	48
	O6	1	E7	29
			E8	8
			E9	2
	Total	26		134
	<i>Average</i>	<i>Average Years</i>	<i>Average Years</i>	<i>Average</i>
	<i>Years in ANG</i>	<i>Prior Service</i>	<i>Total Service</i>	<i>Age</i>
Officer	12	3	16	37
Enlisted	13	3	17	38
Combined	13	3	17	38

The average age and length of service are higher than those of the general ANG population because of the time that has elapsed since the conclusion of Creek Klaxon.

The 26 officers who responded represent 26 percent of the 100 officers who participated in Creek Klaxon; about the same percentage of enlisted personnel responded. Personal names, unit designations, AFSC, and skill levels were not used in this analysis.

The Questionnaire

(The numbers and percentages included below did not appear in the original questionnaire. The author's commentary is enclosed in square brackets.)

If you have had prior service out of CONUS, please list each occurrence by location, year, and total months.

[Over 37 percent (37.3%) of the respondents had active service out of CONUS. The average length was 21 months. Over 10 percent (11.2%) reported experience in Southeast Asia.]

Total number of out-of-CONUS deployments with the Guard:

[Average number per respondent was 1.5 deployments.]

Type of work you did with Creek Klaxon:

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
a. Maintenance	122	76.5
b. Logistics	4	2.5
c. Administration	7	4.3
d. Aircrew	21	13.0
e. Other	6	3.7

1. Which exercises have you participated in?

	<i>Percentage of respondents who participated in each</i>
a. Checkered Flag	26.1
b. Red/Green Flag	40.4
c. Copper Flag	62.7
d. Annual field training (off home station)	59.0
e. Air-to-Air Weapons Systems Evaluation Program (WSEP) or Combat Archer	55.9
f. William Tell	37.2
g. None	9.3
h. Other	14.3
i. Amalgam Chief	18.7
j. Amalgam Warrior	28.6

[The average person had at least three deployments with which to compare Creek Klaxon.]

2. How does Creek Klaxon compare with the exercises you circled? Please list them—from most to least valuable—according to what you think their value has been to you as a guardsman. Include Creek Klaxon and all deployments you circled above.

[Almost 94 percent (93.8%) of the respondents listed Creek Klaxon as the most valuable exercise. Seven listed it second among at least four exercises, and one listed it fourth among eight exercises.]

3. Why was the exercise listed first valuable to you?

[(Only respondents who ranked Creek Klaxon first are included.) Fifty-nine respondents indicated that the project's real-world mission made it valuable. Thirty-two respondents valued working with people from other units and learning how they operated. Twenty-four respondents thought that performing a mission in close proximity to a threat contributed to the value of Creek Klaxon. Six respondents said that because they were given more responsibility, Creek Klaxon gave them a sense of accomplishment.]

4. Why was the exercise listed last not as valuable to you?

[Creek Klaxon was not listed last on any questionnaire.]

5. What was your status in your unit prior to Creek Klaxon?

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| a. Part-time | 25.6% |
| b. Full-time (AGR or technician) | 65.6% |
| c. Full-time alert (aircrew only) | 8.8% |

5a. What is your present status in your unit?

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| a. Part-time | 22.5% |
| b. Full-time | 72.6% |
| c. Full-time alert (aircrew only) | 4.9% |

[Almost 7 percent (6.8%) of the respondents changed from part-time or full-time alert to full-time Guard employees. Persons answering b or c to 5a were instructed to skip to question 8.]

6. What best describes your civilian status?

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| a. I have full-time employment. | 50.0% |
| b. I have part-time employment. | 4.5% |
| c. I am self-employed. | 9.1% |
| d. I am a student. | 15.9% |
| e. I am a homemaker. | 2.3% |
| f. I am unemployed. | 6.8% |
| g. Other. | 11.4% |

7. What is your civilian job?

[Responses were divided into six categories. The "traditional" category included several occupations, but all appeared to be nonseasonal jobs, requiring eight-hour days, five days per week.

Airline	14%
Teaching	7%
Farming	7%
Sales	7%
Government	17%
Traditional	48%]

8. In your present situation, what is the maximum length of a tour that you could volunteer for deployment to USAFE? (Circle one) (Technicians and AGRs: assume no limitation imposed by your unit).

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Alert</i>
a. 15 days	9.4%	2.6%	—
b. 30 days	25.0%	6.2%	—
c. 45 days	12.5%	15.8%	25%
d. 60 days	15.6%	15.8%	25%
e. 90 days	28.1%	28.9%	50%
f. 35 days	3.1%	4.4%	—
g. More	6.3%	26.3%	—

9. How often could you deploy for this length of time?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Alert</i>
a. Every 6 months	16.1%	13.2%	50%
b. Every year	41.9%	48.2%	25%
c. Every 2 years	29.0%	29.8%	25%
d. Every 3 years	13.0%	8.8%	—

10. When are you available for deployment?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Alert</i>
a. Spring	9.4%	5.2%	—
b. Summer	15.6%	8.7%	—
c. Fall	—	.9%	—
d. Winter	9.4%	6.1%	—
e. Anytime	65.6%	79.1%	100%

11. If one were available, would you volunteer for a three-year, active duty (Title 10) tour to USAFE? (Assume that it would be accompanied and that you could return to your home unit in your present status afterward.) (Select one)

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Alert</i>
a. Yes (certain or almost certain).	18.8%	37.4%	100%
b. Very likely (better than 50/50).	15.6%	14.8%	—
c. About 50/50 that I would volunteer.	18.8%	20.0%	—
d. Not very likely (less than 50/50).	12.4%	16.5%	—
e. No (certain or almost certain).	34.4%	11.3%	—

11a. I would be more likely to volunteer for a three-year active duty tour to USAFE if _____.

[Almost all respondents who answered this question said they would be more inclined to volunteer if their families could accompany them. Of course, this would be the case if the tour were accompanied. Most respondents who answered "no" to question 11 said that nothing would make them more likely to volunteer.]

Items 12–22 are statements about Creek Klaxon. Circle the answer that corresponds to how you feel about your experiences at Det 11. Please be honest. If you want to explain your answer, use the back of this page.

12. While at Det 11, I picked up some new ideas from people in other units about how to better perform my military job.

a. Strongly agree	25.5%
b. Agree	55.4%
c. Uncertain	11.0%
d. Disagree	7.5%
e. Strongly disagree	.6%

13. The alert mission made Creek Klaxon more valuable to me than deployments like those listed in question one.

a. Strongly agree	61.3%
b. Agree	32.5%
c. Uncertain	2.5%
d. Disagree	3.7%
e. Strongly disagree	—

14. I would have gotten just as much out of Creek Klaxon had I been there only two weeks.

a. Strongly agree	.6%
b. Agree	4.4%
c. Uncertain	6.3%
d. Disagree	43.1%
e. Strongly disagree	45.6%

15. I would volunteer for Creek Klaxon again.

a. Strongly agree	83.1%
b. Agree	13.8%
c. Uncertain	3.1%
d. Disagree	—
e. Strongly disagree	—

16. Creek Klaxon was a very challenging experience.

a. Strongly agree	58.8%
b. Agree	39.4%
c. Uncertain	1.2%
d. Disagree	.6%
e. Strongly disagree	—

17. After leaving Ramstein, I had a greater sense of accomplishment than I do after most deployments.

a. Strongly agree	61.9%
b. Agree	31.9%
c. Uncertain	3.8%
d. Disagree	2.4%
e. Strongly disagree	—

18. I learned more from Creek Klaxon than from the training I get at home, say at drill or during summer camp.

a. Strongly agree	38.7%
b. Agree	41.3%
c. Uncertain	10.0%
d. Disagree	9.4%
e. Strongly disagree	.6%

19. My experiences working closely with people from other Guard units have benefited me since leaving Det 11.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 31.3% |
| b. Agree | 60.0% |
| c. Uncertain | 7.5% |
| d. Disagree | 1.2% |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

20. I was adequately prepared for the Det 11 mission.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 31.3% |
| b. Agree | 56.3% |
| c. Uncertain | 6.2% |
| d. Disagree | 5.6% |
| e. Strongly disagree | .6% |

21. Training for and actually helping to perform the Creek Klaxon mission was a valuable experience.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 61.3% |
| b. Agree | 38.1% |
| c. Uncertain | .6% |
| d. Disagree | — |
| e. Strongly disagree | — |

22. Even though people came from many units, Creek Klaxon was a smooth operation.

- | | |
|----------------------|-------|
| a. Strongly agree | 31.3% |
| b. Agree | 56.3% |
| c. Uncertain | 10.0% |
| d. Disagree | 1.9% |
| e. Strongly disagree | .6% |

23. What changes could have been made in Creek Klaxon to have made it of more training value to you?

[The overwhelming majority of the respondents felt that no changes were necessary. Several aircrews said that more flying training should have been available. But this would have required more aircraft and maintenance personnel and thus would have violated the requirement of performing Creek Klaxon with minimum resources.]

24. Creek Klaxon was _____.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------|
| a. one heck of a deal | 93.0% |
| b. not too bad of a deal | 7.0% |
| c. not too good of a deal | — |
| d. not a good deal | — |

APPENDIX E

Questionnaire Totals

The rank, average length of service, and average age for both officer and enlisted respondents who participated in the four deployments are as follows:

<i>Officer</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Number</i>
O1	2	E2	4
O2	8	E3	13
O3	22	E4	14
O4	36	E5	92
O5	26	E6	111
O6	3	E7	61
		E8	14
		E9	11
Total	97		320

	<i>Average Years in ANG</i>	<i>Average Years Prior Service</i>	<i>Average Years Total Service</i>	<i>Average Age</i>
Officer	12	3	16	38
Enlisted	12	2	15	36
Combined	12	2	15	37

Personal names, unit designations, Air Force specialty codes, and skill levels were not used in this analysis.

The Questionnaire

(The numbers and percentages included below did not appear in the original questionnaire. The author's commentary is enclosed in square brackets.)

If you have had prior service out of CONUS, please list each occurrence by location, year, and total months.

[Over 35 percent (35.1%) of the respondents had active service out of CONUS. The average length was 22 months. Over 15 percent (15.3%) reported experience in Southeast Asia.

There were no pilots under 30 years of age with prior service, and exactly 20 percent of the pilots 35 and under had prior service. Of the pilots over 35, over 70 percent (71.1%) had prior service, and almost one-third (31.1%) had SEA experience.

Nonpilot respondents in all age groups had considerably more prior experience than did pilots. For example, almost 60 percent (58.4%) of all nonpilot respondents had prior

service, and almost 40 percent (38.2%) of those 30 years of age and under had prior service.]

Total number of out-of-CONUS deployments with the Guard:

[Average number per respondent was about three deployments.]

Type of work you do in your unit:

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
a. Maintenance	270	64.4
b. Logistics	8	1.9
c. Administration	25	6.0
d. Aircrew	78	18.6
e. Other	38	9.1

5. What is your present status in your unit?

a. Part-time	33.7%
b. Full-time	66.3%

[Full-time respondents—air technicians and active Guard/Reserve—were asked to skip to question 8.]

6. What best describes your civilian status?

a. I have full-time employment.	66.7%
b. I have part-time employment.	3.5%
c. I am self-employed.	7.8%
d. I am a student.	14.2%
e. I am a homemaker.	.7%
f. I am unemployed.	2.1%
g. Other.	5.0%

7. What is your civilian job?

[Responses were divided into the following categories:

Pilot	19.8%
Teacher	6.6%
Government worker	9.4%
Professional	18.9%
Sales person	8.4%
Manager	3.8%

Farmer	1.9%
Skilled worker	25.5%
Unskilled worker	5.7%]

8. In your present situation, what is the maximum length of a tour that you could volunteer for deployment to USAFE?

[Technicians and AGRs were told to assume no limitation imposed by their unit.]

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. 15 days	38.6%	10.2%
b. 30 days	24.8%	23.3%
c. 45 days	6.6%	8.4%
d. 60 days	8.0%	12.0%
e. 90 days	7.3%	18.5%
f. 135 days	1.5%	2.5%
g. More	13.2%	25.1%

9. How often could you deploy for this length of time?

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Every 6 months	20.0%	21.7%
b. Every year	60.7%	46.0%
c. Every 2 years	13.3%	23.5%
d. Every 3 years	6.0%	8.8%

[The data from questions 8 and 9 were used to find the average number of days that the respondents could deploy each year by totaling the number of days per year that each person was willing to deploy and dividing that total by the number of respondents. The results for several categories of respondents are listed below:

<i>Respondent Category</i>	<i>Days per Year</i>
Total	70.7
Part-time	53.6
Full-time	79.4
Part-time pilots	42.0
Full-time pilots	64.5

Because the ratio of part-time to full-time personnel in the ANG population differs from that in the questionnaire sampling, the above total is skewed in favor of full-time guardsmen. Since this ratio in the ANG population is approximately 75 percent to 25 percent, it is possible to weight the averages accordingly. The results are listed below.

<i>Respondent Category</i>	<i>Days per Year</i>
Total (weighted)	60.1
Pilot (weighted)	47.7

Another method of analyzing the same data is to consider the percentage of respondents who could deploy for a given number of days:

<i>Respondent Category</i>	<i>Can Deploy 45 Days or Longer</i>	<i>Can Deploy 30 Days or Longer</i>
Part-time	30.4%	57.1%
Full-time	57.2%	79.3%
Total (weighted)	37.1%	62.6%
Pilot (weighted)	23.4%	56.7%]

10. When are you available for deployment? (Circle one)

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>
a. Spring	3.6%	3.3%
b. Summer	16.9%	4.7%
c. Fall	—	.7%
d. Winter	3.6%	4.3%
e. Anytime	75.9%	87.0%

11. If one were available, would you volunteer for a three-year active duty (Title 10) tour to USAFE? (Assume that it would be accompanied and that you could return to your home unit in your present status afterward.) (Select one)

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Weighted</i>
a. Yes (certain or almost certain).	26.8%	37.8%	29.6%
b. Very likely (better than 50/50).	8.0%	16.4%	10.1%
c. About 50/50 that I would volunteer.	12.3%	16.4%	13.3%
d. Not very likely (less than 50/50).	18.1%	16.4%	17.7%
e. No (certain or almost certain).	34.8%	13.0%	29.3%

[The following results are taken only from pilot respondents to question 11:

	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Weighted</i>
a. Yes (certain or almost certain).	24.4%	33.3%	26.6%
b. Very likely (better than 50/50).	—	7.6%	1.9%
c. About 50/50 that I would volunteer.	9.8%	18.5%	12.0%
d. Not very likely (less than 50/50).	29.3%	18.5%	26.6%
e. No (certain or almost certain).	36.5%	22.1%	32.9%

11a. I would be more likely to volunteer for a three-year active duty tour to USAFE if

[By far, the largest number of respondents indicated that location of the active duty tour would have the greatest bearing on whether or not they would volunteer. Many said they would volunteer if they were assured of promotion or some other pay benefit. Many respondents also said that they would volunteer if they could be accompanied. Of course, this was a premise of the question.]

Glossary

AAF	Army Air Forces
AAFCE	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AB	air base
ACT	air combat training
ADO	assistant director for operations
AFB	Air Force base
AFR	Air Force regulation
AFRES	Air Force Reserve
AFRI	alert force readiness inspection
AFSC	Air Force specialty code
AFTP	additional flying training periods
AGR	active Guard/Reserve
ANG	Air National Guard
ANGM	Air National Guard manual
ANGR	Air National Guard regulation
ANGSC	Air National Guard Support Center
ASLAR	aircraft surge launch and recovery
ATAF	allied tactical air force
ATC	air traffic control
ATOC	allied tactical operations center
CAS	close air support
COB	collocated operating base
CONUS	continental United States
CW	chemical warfare
DACT	dissimilar air combat training
Det	detachment
DO	Directorate of Operations

DOD	Department of Defense
ECM	electronic countermeasures
FAC	forward air controller
FIG	fighter interceptor group
FIW	fighter interceptor wing
FWS	Fighter Weapons School
GAO	General Accounting Office
IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
IMC	instrument meteorological condition
IN	intelligence
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MSK	mission support kit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OPCON	operational control
OPlan	Operation Plan
OpOrd	Operation Order
ORI	operational readiness inspection
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PPlan	programming plan
RTU	replacement training unit
SEA	Southeast Asia
SOC	sector operations center
SOF	supervisor of flying
SOUTHAF	United States Air Force South
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACM	Tactical Air Command manual
TASS	tactical air support squadron
TDY	temporary duty

TFG	tactical fighter group
TFS	tactical fighter squadron
TFW	tactical fighter wing
UEI	unit effectiveness inspection
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAFEM	United States Air Forces in Europe manual
USAFER	United States Air Forces in Europe regulation
USARSO	United States Army South
USC	United States Code
VFR	visual flight rules
WRSK	war readiness spares kit
WSEP	Weapons Systems Evaluation Program
WSO	weapon systems officer