GEORGE C. MARSHALL, EMERGENCE OF A POLITICIAN
1 SEPTEMBER 1939 TO 6 DECEMBER 1941

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

HOWARD A. OLSEN, MAJOR, USA
B.S., WEBER STATE COLLEGE, 1977

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1990

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited.
**Title**: General George C. Marshall, Emergence of a Politician, 1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941

**Author**: Major Howard A. Olsen

**Performing Organization**: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

**Perfomning Organization Report Number**: ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

**Sponsor's Name**: none

**Sponsor's Report Number**: none

**Distribution/Availability Statement**: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**Abstract**: General George C. Marshall--Emergence of a Politician--1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941. This study is a historical analysis of the political growth, development, and influence of a former Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall during the period 1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941. These first two years of General Marshall's tenure as Chief of Staff were critical in rebuilding and modernizing the Army and the Nation's defense establishment prior to the start of World War II. During this period General Marshall's primary efforts centered on securing appropriations for equipment, personnel, and training. These efforts were political in nature, because they involved close association with the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. This thesis depicts how General Marshall's early career prepared him for the Capital's political environment. It capitalizes on three distinct legislative acts to illustrate the growth of General Marshall's political skill and influence during the period: The Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940; the Lend-Lease Act of 1941; and the 1941 legislation which extended the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Finally, the study develops the premise that General Marshall by the start of World War II had mastered the politician's craft and used that capacity to enact legislation which accommodated the Army's transformation from a poorly prepared peacetime organization to wartime giant.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL, EMERGENCE OF A POLITICIAN
1 SEPTEMBER 1939 TO 6 DECEMBER 1941

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

HOWARD A. OLSEN, MAJOR, USA
B.S., WEBER STATE COLLEGE, 1977

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1990

Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited.
Name of candidate: Major Howard A. Olsen

Title of thesis: General George C. Marshall, Emergence of a Politician--1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941.

Approved by:

Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chairman
Dr. Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Stephen D. Coats, M.A., Member, Graduate Faculty
Major Stephen D. Coats, M.A.

Gilbert A. Bernabe, Ph.D., Member, Graduate Faculty
Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert A. Bernabe, Ph.D.

Accepted this 1st day of June 1990 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

General George C. Marshall, Emergence of a Politician, 1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941. A historical analysis of General George C. Marshall's political role during the two years prior to the start of World War II, by Major Howard A. Olsen, USA, 143 pages.

This study is a historical analysis of the political growth, development, and influence of a former Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, during the period 1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941. These first two years of General Marshall's tenure as Chief of Staff were critical in rebuilding and modernizing the Army and the Nation's defense establishment prior to the start of World War II. During this period General Marshall's primary efforts centered on securing appropriations for equipment, personnel, and training. These efforts were political in nature because they involved close association with the executive and legislative branches of government.

This thesis depicts how General Marshall's early career prepared him for the Capital's political environment. It capitalizes on three distinct legislative acts to illustrate the growth of General Marshall's political skill and influence during the period: The Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940; the Lend-Lease Act of 1941; and the 1941 legislation which extended the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Finally, the study develops the premise that General Marshall by the start of World War II had mastered the politician's craft and used that capacity to enact legislation which accommodated the Army's transformation from poorly prepared peacetime organization to wartime goliath.
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of General George C. Marshall who proved Politics and Integrity are compatible.

A special thanks to my wife and my committee who waded through so many drafts and provided so much helpful direction.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1. Introduction
   - Page 1
2. George C. Marshall--Roots of a Politician
   - Page 9
3. Burke-Wadsworth--Schooling of a Politician
   - Page 37
4. Lend-Lease--Emergence of a Politician
   - Page 61
5. Extending the Draft--Workmanship of a Politician
   - Page 91
6. Conclusion
   - Page 117
7. Selected Bibliography
   - Page 128
8. Distribution
   - Page 143
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a historical analysis of the political growth, development, and influence of a former Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, during the period 1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941. These first two years of General Marshall's tenure as the Army's Chief of Staff were critical in rebuilding and modernizing the Army and the Nation's defense establishment prior to the start of World War II. During this period General Marshall's primary efforts centered on securing appropriations for equipment, personnel, and training. These efforts were political in nature because they involved close association with the executive and legislative branches of government. It establishes his evolution from unwilling political participant to one of the most powerful political players in the nation's capital.¹

The thesis draws upon General Marshall's early life and military career to establish how he gained an appreciation for and insight into the country's political system. The thesis describes Marshall's assignment as General John J. Pershing's, Army Chief of Staff, Aide-de-Camp and delineates how this relationship provided Marshall the opportunity to learn first hand Washington's political enterprise, and to observe the Army's Chief of Staff's working relationship with the President, Congress, and members of the Executive Branch. It examines how assignments with the National Guard, Army Reserve, Civilian Conservation Corps, and as post commander enabled him to form close associations with political

¹ Raymond Clapper, "The Ten Most Powerful People in Washington," Look, January 1941. Also, see The Reader's Digest, May 1941, p 45-48. Those listed as the ten most powerful, in order, are: FDR; John L. Lewis, labor leader; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff; William S. Knudsen, overseer American's military-industrial complex; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of Treasury; Harry Hopkins, presidential advisor; Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; Thurman Arnold; Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce, and Eleanor Roosevelt.
leaders, political organizations, and influential civilians throughout the country. It reveals how these experiences gave him an opportunity to develop an understanding and appreciation for the unique and necessary relationship between the military and the American political process.

The thesis uses three distinct legislative acts to illustrate the growth of General Marshall's political skill and influence during the period: The Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940; the Lend-Lease Act of 1941; and the 1941 legislation which extended the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Each of these legislative acts had great impact on Marshall's program for rebuilding the Army prior to the start of World War II. The Burke-Wadsworth Act \(^2\) instituted the nation's first peace-time draft. It is significant because it shows how Marshall opposed the legislation and sought to derail its passage even though the measure guaranteed the Army the manpower it desperately needed to fill its ranks.

The second statute, 1941 Lend-Lease Act was passed nearly two years after President Roosevelt began clandestine maneuvering to provide war-aid to the European Allies. It is significant because it reveals that while Marshall publicly supported the President's efforts, he privately opposed them since Roosevelt's undertaking gave priority to the allies at the Army's expense. Lend-Lease also demonstrated Marshall's growing political influence, and President Roosevelt using Marshall's influence to ensure the act's passage.

The last noteworthy statute of the period was the extension of the Burke-Wadsworth Act in the summer of 1941. The extension of the draft coupled with the continued federalization of the National Guard, just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, displays Marshall's metamorphosis from military leader to military-politician.

Each of these laws fueled the highly emotional debate surrounding America's involvement in the growing war in Europe. They provide an excellent medium through which to observe and

---

\(^2\) The Burke-Wadsworth Act legislation enacted the first peace-time selective service law. See J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986.) (Hereafter referred to as Clifford and Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft*.)
analyze Marshall’s political growth and emergence during his first two years as Army Chief of Staff and transformation from military leader to political protagonist.

Many of the Marshall biographies address the two-year period under study in this thesis and also discuss the three legislative acts being analyzed. However, none do so in great depth; neither do they assert Marshall’s personal motivation and involvement in each statute’s passage. Many have not specifically treated Marshall’s political roots and political activities during the period nor given them historical significance. Many have simply characterized Marshall, at this time, as a very smart and honest man who, through his intelligence and integrity, was able to influence presidential and congressional decision merely by his forceful example rather than by direct political activity. Evidence suggests there is much more to Marshall’s political success than mere character virtue.4

3 Foremost in any study of Marshall are Forrest Pogue’s four volumes on the life of General Marshall. Each volume details a particular period in General Marshall’s life, providing vivid analysis of his activities. Pogue is unique among Marshall biographers because he was able to conduct in depth personal interviews, with General Marshall in 1956 and 1957. These interviews coupled with awesome research, make the Pogue volumes the definitive work on General Marshall: life and career. Recent works on Marshall by Professor Mark Stoler, George C. Marshall—Soldier—Statesman of the American Century, and Thomas Parrish’s, Roosevelt and Marshall, provide reviews of Marshall’s political side, but neither focus specifically on this period nor on the legislation which was so much a part of the period. Other works on Marshall such as William Frye’s Marshall: Citizen Soldier and Leonard Mosley’s Marshall: Hero for Our Time cover traditional aspects of Marshall’s life and career but only briefly touch upon the period and its significance. Mrs. Marshall’s work, Together—Annals of an Army Wife, also provides some insight on the period.

4 Marshall, by his second year in office, was aware of his political power and began to use it to shape political decisions and legislative action. Early in his tenure as Chief of Staff, Marshall poured over the congressional testimony of his predecessors and painstakingly charted the strengths and weaknesses of their statements, identifying areas where the content and method of presentation could have been improved and made more effective. See Time Magazine, 3 January 1944, p 17. Also, see speech given to the Army Ordnance Association on 11 October 1939, in Washington, D.C., Larry J. Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 2 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p 83-84. (Hereafter referred to as Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, if referring to Dr. Bland’s commentary. If referring to actual document contained in the book, then the reference will be Marshall Papers, Vol. 2.) He sought to avoid their pitfalls of vague and jargon-filled
The author researched in reverse order. That is, he first reviewed the major secondary works on General Marshall before going to primary sources. The secondary sources were mainly the Pogue volumes, Professor Stoler's work, Parrish's recent monograph on Marshall and Roosevelt, and Mrs. Marshall's book. Only superficial review was given to Frye's and Mosley's works. After reviewing these secondary sources, the author then reviewed Dr. Larry Bland's marvelous two volume collection of General Marshall's personal papers. These two volumes provided a wealth of information, background, and insight into Marshall's thinking at the time events were occurring. Without the benefit and insight of personal diary or autobiography, Bland's efforts provided the best fountainhead for primary source information. The Marshall Papers, along with selected portions of the Marshall Interviews, provided the author an insight into General Marshall's thoughts and justifications for particular actions during the time under study and the legislative measures reviewed. While reviewing the Marshall Papers and Marshall Interviews, the author also reviewed Marshall's testimony before Congressional Committees during the period, paying particular attention to his testimony relating to the draft and lend-lease. Congressional Committee testimony, coupled with floor debate contained in the Congressional Record, provided valuable briefings. He also carefully forged relationships with key officials and presidential advisors who could assist him in dealing with the President. See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries: Part IV. The Story Behind Lend-Lease." Collier's, p 17. (Hereafter referred to as Morgenthau. Morgenthau Diaries.) Also, see Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), p 65. (Hereafter referred to as Stoler, George C. Marshall.)

5 The Marshall Interviews were read with the understanding that they were conducted sixteen to seventeen years after the period in question. During that gap, General Marshall had been through the most riveting period of American and world history and had played a major role in nearly every key military and political event of the period. With that in mind and given his age and health, the author feels the interviews must be carefully considered and review in conjunction with other available evidence.

6 The author was unable to obtain Marshall's testimony before the Senate and House Foreign Relation Committee other than references to his testimony from the daily newspapers and Congressional Record.
information regarding Marshall's thoughts, powerful oratorical skills, and influence over Congressional action.

The author reviewed a number of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals from the period to obtain a historical frame of reference for the period. He also reviewed a number of secondary sources related to the period, principal players, or specific events. These proved invaluable in gaining other viewpoints on Marshall's actions in light of the events of the day. In sum, the author first sought a broad perspective of the period and Marshall the man; then, he investigated specific portions of the time, people, and events in question.

Armed with this research, the author framed the thesis to be a combination of historical review and analysis. The thesis provides the reader with a context in which to understand the events under study. It also attempts to analyze Marshall's political conduct, always trying to answer the question: Why did Marshall pursue a particular political course of action?

A discussion concerning crucial terms used in this study is necessary. The word "politician" is important to the thesis' basic question. Many consider a "politician" in a negative connotation.

---

7 Primary among newspapers, magazines, etc. are *The New York Times*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Colliers*, *Life*, *Reader's Digest*, and *Saturday Evening Post*.

8 Examples of the main sources used are: Langer and Gleason's *The Undeclared War*, an excellent book covering the period and focusing on pre-Lend-Lease efforts as well as lend-lease itself. It also provided commentary on the efforts to institute selective service and extend .. one year later. Clifford and Spencer's *The First Peacetime Draft* was an excellent source of information concerning the history behind the effort to launch a peacetime draft in this country. Of all the books on the subject, it provided a clear and unbiased picture of General Marshall's role on selective service. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, gave not only a view of Hopkins relationship to Marshall, but also an excellent view of the period and Roosevelt's position and efforts regarding selective service and lend-lease. McJimsey's latter work *Harry Hopkins*, was useful but provided little that was not covered in Sherwood's work. Watson's *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparation* was an excellent source of information on the period and the War Department's perspective concerning selective service and lend-lease. Blum's *Years of Urgency*, from the Morgenthau Diaries and Stimson and Bundy's *On Active Service in Peace and War* also provided key perspectives from two of the crucial players of the period. A recent work by Richard M. Ketchum, *The Borrowed Years*, provides an excellent view of major events in the period.
Even in this thesis the word suggests manipulation by someone or some group to bring about a private objective. The term "military-politician" is defined by the author to mean one who understands the United State's political system and uses that knowledge to effect decisions in the executive and legislative branches of government. However, "politician" will retain its unsavory reference, if a person uses political skills to bring about personal goals or ambitions.

Another term which may be confusing is the word "draft." A "draft" is the process by which a country's population is involuntarily selected into military service for a determined time period. In this case, it refers to those men drafted into service during the period 1 September 1940 and beyond. The phrases "Burke-Wadsworth Act," "Selective Service Act," "conscription," or just "selective service" are interchangeable with "draft." A "draftee" is someone drafted into the Army. A "guardsman" is a member of the National Guard and part of the group federalized in 1940. "Federalization" means calling the National Guard and Reserve Officer Corps into federal service and placing them under the control of the President and Regular Army.

Related to the draft is the term "extension." In the summer of 1941, the question of extending the provisions of the Burke-Wadsworth Act and continuing the National Guard's and Reserve Officer Corps' federalized status was an important political question. In the thesis, the terms "extend" and "extension" refer to the effort to continue those groups on active duty for an indefinite period of time.

The words "congressmen," "senator," and "representative" refer to those men and women who serve in the legislative branch of government. A "representative" is a member of the House of Representatives, a "senator" is a member of the United States Senate, and the term "congressmen" refers to both groups.

The term "Lend-Lease" is another expression which may be confusing or unknown to the reader. Lend-Lease was a phrase coined after FDR gave his famous "Arsenal of Democracy" Speech on 27 December 1940. It characterizes the "transfer of goods and services," generally war-goods, "to an ally to aid in a common cause with payment being made by a return of the original items or their
use in the common cause..." In this thesis, "Lend-Lease" is used to describe the legislative act passed in March 1941 which approved the transfer of war-goods to American allies fighting Germany and Japan. The term "allies" refers mainly to Great Britain and also includes any country aligning itself with the United States during World War II.

The goal of the thesis is to clearly depict General Marshall as a politician in the sense that he willingly and knowingly participated in political activities to protect and further his efforts to rearm, rebuild, and modernize the Army. It attempts to determine if his political activities were a natural extension of his personality and background or if they resulted from the requirements of the period. The thesis does not suggest General Marshall's political activities were undertaken to enhance his own stature or seek personal political ambitions. On the contrary, it shows that the typical definition for a politician does not apply in Marshall's case. However, it proves he was not above using traditional political activities to secure his goals and accomplish army objectives.

The relevance for the thesis is its examination of the political activities of one of the most significant American military leaders of the period. It shows how those activities increased Marshall's effectiveness as Army Chief of Staff and enabled him to prepare the Army for the Second World War. Analyzing why Marshall became a political Chief of Staff, despite his personal inclinations to the contrary, suggests that using the political system to realize meaningful and proper strategic objectives is not incongruent with traditional military leadership values or roles. It also demonstrates that such activity is necessary if military leaders are to influence properly and professionally the formulation and execution of national military policy. Accordingly, it supports the author's belief that political acumen is a desirable skill for military officers in or

---

10 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines a politician as someone who is "primarily interested in political offices from selfish or other narrow short-run interests." (Springfield, Mass.: G&C Merriam Company, 1973).
progressing to the highest levels of army leadership. Failure to acquire such skill may well result in professional frustration and an inability to bring about political action which will positively impact military policy affecting national strategic interests.

"George C. Marshall, Emergence of a Politician, 1 September 1930 to 6 December 1941" is an attempt to illuminate one minor aspect of General Marshall's career. Truly historic individuals never dim with the passage of time; but rather, they become more significant as the complexity of their personality is revealed, and the magnitude of their achievements is manifested. Hopefully, this thesis will add to the overwhelming evidence that General George C. Marshall is truly an historic figure.
CHAPTER 2

GEORGE C. MARSHALL—ROOTS OF A POLITICIAN

On 1 September 1939 Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ward, was shaken from a sound sleep. As he looked at his bed-side clock he could barely make out the time as 3:50 a.m. Drowsily, Ward listened as General George C. Marshall, acting Army Chief of Staff and his boss, told him Germany had invaded Poland. As he hung up the phone, Ward scrambled out of bed, hurriedly dressed, and made his way to the Chief of Staff's office to begin work on what would certainly be a busy day. The crisis in Poland, coupled with General Marshall's official swearing-in as Army Chief of Staff, would keep Colonel Ward, his military assistant, fully engaged throughout the day.

Two years earlier, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler told a small group of confidants that he planned to "settle the Czec and Austrian

---

1 Colonel Ward was later promoted to general and given command of the 1st Armored Division. The 1st Armored Division fought in America's first significant battle against Germany at Kasserine Pass. American efforts at Kasserine were anything but successful. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower—Soldier General of the Army, President-Elect: 1890-1952* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p 228-229.

2 Russell A. Gugeler, "George Marshall and Orlando Ward, 1939-1941," *Parameters. Journal of the U.S. Army War College*, Volume XIII, March 1983, p 28. This article suggests Ward played a larger role in developing and instituting programs and policies during Marshall's first two years in office than is the case. Interestingly, in his forward to Mark S. Watson's book, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, Orlando Ward, then serving as Chief of the Army's Historical Division, says concerning the purpose of Watson's book, "More specifically, it tells of the contributions to national security that were made during the prewar period by the Chief of Staff and his immediate assistants." It is doubtful that Watson was terribly interested in the contributions of Marshall's assistants. Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1951) p X. (Hereafter referred to as Watson, *Chief of Staff*) Also, see *Marshall, Vol. 2*, p 47. General Marshall in a letter to G. Edward MacGirvin, said the following concerning his first day in office, "My day of induction into office was momentous, with the starting of what appears to be a World War."
question..."3 Those listening warned Hitler that such an invasion would start a European war. Hitler dismissed their counsel and three months later invaded Austria. He, not his advisors, was correct; France and England did nothing. Without opposition, he carefully proceeded to extend German boundaries, first by threat of force, and then by actual invasion. In little more than four years, the face of Europe had changed; the balance of power shifted; and the emergence of the United States as a global superpower had begun.

France and England no longer were world powers. America, now the hope of the free world, clung to its innocence. For four years it desperately tried to find a way to help its former mentors while at the same time retain its independence and forsake superpower responsibility.

Unfortunately, its military forces were anything but world-class. While Hitler had used his time to create a war machine, the likes of which the world had never seen, the United States had carefully sliced and diced its military, turning it into a third-rate force.4

General Marshall had been Acting Chief of Staff for nearly four months filling in for General Craig since 1 May 1939. Marshall had served as Deputy Chief of Staff, for nearly a year, prior to assuming Craig's day to day responsibilities while he was on terminal leave.5 The Army's Chief of Staff's office was not new to General Marshall. Eighteen years earlier he had been at General Pershing's side, as his Aide-de-Camp, when Pershing was sworn-in as Army Chief of Staff. Perhaps, Marshall, even then, fancied the thought of someday becoming the Army's Chief of Staff.

Marshall's rise to prominence in the Army was anything but normal. He decided not to try and attend the Army's premier officer training school, West Point because he felt his father's political

---

4 Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 69. America's army ranked 19th in the world.
5 The Deputy Chief of Staff was the equivalent of today's Vice Chief of Staff.
standing as a Democrat in a very Republican district offered him little chance of selection. Even at this early age, Marshall was not blind to politics. Rather, he decided to pursue a first-class education at a school in the foothills of Virginia, Virginia Military Institute (VMI).  

Marshall, following his older brother Stuart's example, enrolled at the VMI. VMI, in its picturesque setting of Lexington, was ideally suited for Marshall. Having never previously excelled academically, VMI provided him the opportunity to improve basic academic skills while at the same time master the essentials of military leadership, which would prove to be his greatest skill. So gifted was he at the art of military science, he was selected to be Cadet First Captain his senior year. Though clearly without peer in military skills, he only graduated in the middle of his class. Ironically, later in life, he would be renowned for his supreme intellect.

Marshall completed his studies at VMI in 1903 and graduated as the Corps of Cadets' First Captain. A designation given to the student who exemplified preeminent military leadership. Marshall characterized his selection saying, "I tried very hard...I was very exacting and very exact in all my military duties..." Notwithstanding his status as First Captain, a commission in the Regular Army was not automatic. In fact, only those graduating from the Military Academy at West Point were tenured commissions, all others were

---

6 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall—Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963) p 41. (Hereafter referred to as Pogue, Education of a General.) In 1890 only 10 officers on active duty were graduates of VMI. VMI was the school which produced the likes of Stonewall Jackson, and the boy soldiers who fought at the Battle of Hay Market during the Civil War.


8 Ibid., p 10. Also, see Pogue, Education of a General, p 39- 57.

9 Pogue, Education of a General, p 53-54.
forced to compete for a handful of commissions opened to all who qualified. Once again Marshall was exposed to the political world because one had to be nominated by one's state congressional delegation in order to take the competitive exam. This time, however, his desire to become a Regular Army officer overcame his fear of failing, and he resolved to do whatever was necessary to obtain the right to compete.

Following the Spanish-American War, Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer from New York City, was named Secretary of War. Although he possessed no formal background in military matters, Root set about to reorganize the War Department and the Army's General Staff. Late in 1900 Root asked Congress to increase the size of the Army. The proposed bill also started the reformation of the General Staff by limiting the term of service for officers who would serve on the General Staff in the future. In 1903 Congress passed Root's bill which instituted massive restructuring of the General Staff by abolishing the position of Commanding General of the Army and replacing it with the position of Chief of Staff.10 Later that year he also introduced the Militia Act of 1903, legislation which formally established the Army's officer education system. Marshall benefited throughout his career from all of Root's sweeping changes, especially from the 1901 bill which increased the Army's officer ranks by nearly 837 lieutenants.11 With this increase in the size of the Army's officer corps, Marshall now could realize the fulfillment of his dream of becoming an Army officer. First, however, he would have to win the right to compete for one of the 142 slots open,12 and to do that he needed a political nomination.

10 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 56. General Nelson A. Miles, the serving Chief of Staff was so opposed to the reforms that the bill was postponed for one year during which time he retired. Also, see Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1939), p 248-258.
12 Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 10-11. 837 officer slots were available. West Point graduates and men from within the ranks had 1st and 2nd priority. They filled 695 slots. Competition for the remaining 142 slots was fierce: over
The selection process consisted of being nominated and successfully passing the exam. As had been the case four years earlier, the Pennsylvania delegation was solid Republican. This time, however, Marshall and his father knew exactly what to do to overcome this political dilemma. Though his parents were initially opposed to the idea of young George going into the Army,\(^{13}\) they decided to fully sustain his strong desire to embark on an Army career.

Marshall's father first wrote to General Shipp, VMI's Superintendent, seeking assurances that George possessed the skills needed to be a successful candidate. After all, he surely did not want to risk his political influence on a failed cause. In a letter, 21 January 1901, to Shipp, George Sr. asked, "Now my object in writing is to ask of you a letter simply giving me your opinion as to George's fitness. Whether he possesses those qualifications, so essential to the making of an officer that would be a credit to the Institute..."\(^{14}\) Shipp said that young Marshall was, "as well qualified for officer of infantry as any man who has been turned out here." Continuing he asserted "with complete confidence that if commissioned in the Army, (George Jr.) will in all respects, soon take his stand much above the average West Point graduate."\(^{15}\) With such strong assurances, Marshall's father set about to vigorously campaign for the support of every influential person he knew.\(^{16}\)

Marshall's father asked several people to write letters of recommendation on behalf of his son. Mr. John Wise, a VMI graduate

---

10,000 men applied for the 142 slots. All applicants except West Point graduates had to take the competitive exam.

13 Pogue, *Education of a General*, p 63. At this time the army was thought to be the place where only those without other career options served. Having been a very successful businessman, Marshall's father undoubtedly had higher aspirations for his youngest son.


16 Letter George C. Marshall, Sr. to Brigadier General Scott Shipp, 21 January 1901, *Marshall Papers, Vol. I*, p 10. In the same letter to Shipp said, "I have many warm and influential friends of the Administration and quite close ones at that. They will do for me all that it is possible to do. Even so far as making it a personal demand. On that score I am fully satisfied and assured..."
who fought at the famous battle of Hay Market and helped President McKinley win the nomination in 1886, was one of those who Marshall's father entreated to personally write the President. In his letter, he cited Marshall's ancestry which included the famous John Marshall. General Shipp was also "buttonholed" to send a letter to President McKinley, which he did on 14 February 1901.

George Sr. intended to take young Marshall to Washington, along with the letters of endorsement, and personally present them to the President. However, fate had young Marshall making the trip by himself. In April 1901 Marshall made his way to the nation's capital to engage in his first personal lobbying effort. As he would learn some 40 years later, this personal touch proved very effective in gaining his way. He first met with the recently appointed attorney general, Philander C. Knox, a friend of his fathers. Next he talked his way into a house party being hosted by John A. Hull, Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee. Marshall convinced Mrs. Hull that it was absolutely necessary that he meet with her husband that night. Convinced, she escorted young Marshall to her husband's study to meet with the Congressman. The next day he used similar bravado to gain an audience with President William McKinley.

Concerning the incident, Marshall later said,

I had no appointment of any kind. The office was on the second floor. I think the President's bedroom, as I knew it in Mr. [Franklin] Roosevelt's day, must have been Mr. McKinley's office. The old colored man (the head usher) asked me if I had an appointment and I told him I didn't. He said I would never get in, that there wasn't any possibility. I sat there and watched people, some ten or fifteen, go in by appointment, stay ten minutes, and be excused. Finally a man and his daughter went in with this old colored man escorting them. I attached myself to the tail of the procession and gained the President's

---

17 Ibid., see note 1, p 11.
18 Ibid., see note 2, p 11. In his letter to the President, General Shipp said, "Marshall is fully the equal of the best."
19 Pogue. Education of a General, p 64.
office. The old colored man frowned at me on his way out, but I stood pat. After the people had met the President, they also went out, leaving me standing there. Mr. McKinley in a very nice manner asked what I wanted and I stated my case. I don't recall what he said, but from that I think flowed my appointment or rather my authority to appear for examination.21

Little did George Marshall realize that his first meeting at the White House would be but one of many in years to come. Whether Marshall's lobbying efforts resulted in his nomination is a topic of debate among his biographers. Pogue, principal among them, feels it had little to do with the end result. He believes Marshall's father's efforts with Senator Quay were far more persuasive.22 Marshall, himself, felt his meetings with the President and others in Washington, resulted in his appointment.23 Regardless, the totality of the experience was not lost on Marshall. He had had a valuable insight into the Nation's political system and learned first hand the power of political influence and personal lobbying.24 Marshall drew upon this experience later as Army Chief of Staff. On 17 June 1901, his name was among those on the list of nominees to take the examination. On 23 September 1901, he took the examination and attained an average of 76 percent on the five basic subjects. On 8 October 1901, the examining board at Governors Island, New York in a memorandum to the War Department said, "...the board considers him as having passed, and as well qualified for the position of a

21 Ibid., p 64-65. In September 1901 President McKinley was assassinated. Thereafter, security arrangements for the President were substantially increased. Marshall's timing again proved fortuitous, for had the events been a mere six months later he would not have been able to see the President.

22 Ibid., p 65.

23 Ibid.

24 Interestingly, Marshall's experience was not shared by West Point graduates. With Regular Army appointments virtually assured each cadet upon graduation, contacts with politicians were limited to their experience in securing their original appointment to the Academy. Marshall with this experience laid a foundation of political sensitivity which the average West Point Cadet would not have the opportunity to gain.
commissioned officer in the United States Army. Eight months later, on 3 February 1902, Marshall obtained his goal and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Army.

Elihu Root's sweeping reforms continued to impact Marshall's early career when he was selected to attend one of the formal officer training schools established by the 1903 Dick Act. In 1906 Marshall was selected to attend the Army's School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While there, his academic prowess was unleashed. Being one of the junior officers in the course, he was determined to resolve the difference in rank by surpassing more senior officers academically, which he did by being one of the select few designated to attend the more advanced course the following year.

The second year of instruction greatly benefited Marshall's career. Beyond the obvious intellectual opportunities, Marshall received a number of advantages from his prominent class standing. General Bell, the Army's Chief of Staff and former commandant of the college, took notice of Marshall's superb academic performance and recommended he spend the summer, between school terms,

25 Memorandum from Examining Board to War Department, 8 October 1901. See Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 18. On two subjective areas, physique and moral character antecedents, he scored 100 percent. Because Marshall had not yet turned 21 years of age, the board recommend his commissioning be delayed until after 31 December 1901.

26 The Dick Bill or Dick Militia Act adopted in 1903 created a formal education system. See Watson, Chief of Staff, p 57. Also, see Pogue. Education of a General, p 62 and 94. Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 36, and Jessup, Elihu Root, p 258-70. Marshall was stationed at Fort Reno at the time he was selected for the college at Fort Leavenworth. To be selected, he had competed with two other officers assigned to Fort Reno; each year he had finished first in the competition but fail to be detailed to the college because he was junior in grade. Finally, the third year he was selected because no one else signed up to attend the college. The army's education system was not considered a necessity for advancement by the officers of the day. Had General Bell, the Army's Chief of Staff not been the former commandant, this aspect of Marshall's career would have been far less remarkable.

27 Those selected for the second year of instruction were taken from the upper 50 percent of those attending the basic course. Marshall finished the first year ranked first in the class with a 96.78 percentage. On his class standing report he was cited as being well suited for several positions none of which included commander. See Pogue. Education of a General, p 99, and Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 37.
instructing the Pennsylvania National Guard. At the time Marshall was less than enthusiastic about the assignment. In a 7 July 1907, letter to the Army's Adjutant General he asked that, "the order directing me to attend the encampment of the 2d Brigade, National Guard of this state...be revoked...."28 Fortunately for Marshall and the Army his request was denied and he began what was to be a long and extremely profitable relationship with the citizen-army which imbeded in him a firm belief in the nation's civilian-soldier system of defense. His initial impressions of the Guard were favorable. In his report to the senior instructor at the Guard's summer camp, Captain Charles Rhodes, he wrote, "My criticisms and suggestions were solicited and followed out to a flattering degree...My tour of duty with the 3d Brigade...was made as pleasant and enjoyable as work can be...I was treated with every possible consideration and kindness by the Brigade Commander...and his officers."29 The Pennsylvania National Guard was equally impressed with Marshall's instruction, word of which reached General Bell, thus vindicating Marshall's selection.30

Marshall's success with the Guard, coupled with his academic standing during his second year at Leavenworth, earned him a position on the school's faculty.31 During his tenure at Fort Leavenworth, Marshall continued to instruct the National Guard each summer. The National Guard's Commanding General specifically asked for Marshall. Marshall responded to these assignments positively because he saw the guardsmen as eager students and the

---

30 Marshall's association with General Bell was to last a number of years. He served with him in 1916, again working with civilians serving in the Plattsburg officer training camps in the Western United States. In 1917 Marshall was Bell's Aide-de-Camp.
31 Pogue, Education of a General, p 102-103. Marshall was an unanimous choice of the academic board. Also, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 47. Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 23.
Guard itself as a valuable component of the Nation's defense. In a 27 July 1907, letter to the Secretary of War, Colonel F. W. Stillwell wrote

We wish also to particularly express our appreciation for the zeal, the energy, the intelligence, and the many helpful suggestions of Lieutenant George C. Marshall...who was detailed to this regiment, and whose presence and faithful work with and among us was very beneficial to every officer and enlisted man of this command; so much so that if it be possible and in accord with your and his circumstances at the time, we would respectfully request that he be detailed to this regiment again at our next annual encampment.32

There are also indications that during his association with the Guard, Marshall developed a web of relationships with Guard members who would soon be influential in business and government. One such example was M. W. Clement who later became president of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Clement said of Marshall and his fellow instructors, "A new world in military affairs opened itself to the minds of the militia men."33 Along with these new found friends in the Guard, Marshall, while at Leavenworth, also became friends or acquainted with a number of students who would play prominent roles in the Army over the next twenty years.34

Over the next six years, Marshall's outstanding service with the Guard played in his future assignments. In 1911 Governor Draper of Massachusetts asked Secretary of War Henry Stimson to assign Marshall to instruct Massachusetts' National Guard. Naturally, Marshall preferred remaining with the Regular Army; however, he accepted the detail and again excelled in this unique training

33 Pogue, Education of a General, p 102-103.
34 Officers such as McAuley Palmer, LTC Hunter Liggett, and Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur.
environment. In 1916, while serving on General Bell's staff in California, Marshall again was asked to train civilians in military art.

In 1915, after Germany sunk the Lusitania, a group of wealthy and prominent young men, all members of the Harvard Club in New York City, petitioned the White House swearing to "support the government in any measures, however serious, to secure reparations and guarantees" for the Lusitania. Anxious to gain some action and all being old enough to serve in the military, they came upon the idea of training themselves for military service. Naturally, they believed, given their education and background, they were ideally suited for some kind of officer training. With the backing and encouragement of General Leonard Wood, commander of the Army's Eastern Department, they set up an officer's training site at Plattsburg, New York, to train hundreds of young businessmen in officership. Soon, under the auspices of the Military Training Camps Association, MTCA, the Plattsburg Movement was copied at locations throughout the country. While serving as Bell's aide, Marshall was asked to oversee several civilian training camps for wealthy and well educated volunteers at sites throughout the Western United States. In describing one such experiences Marshall said, "They were all the hot血液 of San Francisco. I saw more Rolls Royces and other fine cars around there than I had ever seen collected..." Ironically, Marshall, in his first year as Chief of Staff, was confronted by the MTCA's founders with a proposal for the country's first peacetime draft, and a year later an initiative to reestablish the Plattsburg Camp.

35 Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. I, p 57. Also, see 15 May 1911 letter from Major General Charles B. Dougherty, Commanding General, Pennsylvania National Guard, to Captain Charles D. Rhodes, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. In this letter General Dougherty asks that Marshall's assignment be changed so that he can serve instead with the Pennsylvania Guard.
36 Clifford and Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft, p 15.
37 Ibid., p 15.
38 Ibid., p 15.
39 Pogue, Education of a General, p 136.
40 Forrest C. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope: 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), p 103. (Hereafter referred to as Pogue, Ordeal and Hope.) Also, see Clifford and Spencer, The First Peace Time Draft, p 117-118.
Marshall's last formal association with citizen-soldiers came in 1933 when then Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur selected him to be the senior instructor of the Illinois National Guard. Colonel Robert McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, had been most critical of the Illinois National Guard's training program. The Illinois Guard Commander, Major General Keehn, an active Democrat and attorney for the Hearst publishing empire, asked General MacArthur to assign an officer who could significantly improve the Guard's readiness.

Marshall was the officer hand-picked by MacArthur to fix things in Illinois. According to the Army's Adjutant General, the Chief of Staff personally picked Marshall for the billet. Responding to General Keehn's request, MacArthur wrote, "Suggest Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall. He has no superior among Infantry Colonels." Although he personally queried the Chief of Staff seeking to change the assignment, the request was disapproved.

On 13 November 1933, he wrote General Pershing, concerning what he thought was a most fateful time in his career saying, "General MacArthur wrote me in a very sympathetic manner, but it was 'back to staff duty' for me. I seem fated." Disappointed professionally by the assignment, Marshall felt his last chance for promotion to general and assignment as Army Chief of Staff was now gone with this, still another, assignment away from troops. For the first few months Marshall could not shake the depression he felt for being assigned to a back-water billet. Mrs. Marshall, commenting on her husband's initial response to the assignment said "Those first

---

41 From 1915 until 1933 Marshall served in a number of assignments overseas in Europe and China. He also commanded a number of stateside garrisons.
43 Ibid., see note 3, p 399. Some believe MacArthur picked Marshall for the Chicago assignment with the sole motive of taking him out of contention for general officer. With MacArthur being a "March man" and Marshall tied to General Pershing, there seemed understandable differences between the two men. However, MacArthur denied such a motive. See Pogue, Education of a General, p 401, note 34.
months in Chicago I shall never forget. George had a grey, drawn look which I had never seen before, and have seldom seen since. By Christmas, however, his enthusiasm had returned..."45 As Marshall warmed to the assignment he gained valuable insight into a section of the country which became a hotbed of isolationism in the 1930's. Colonel McCormick's newspaper was an outspoken critic of the Roosevelt Administration's New Deal; and it would play a very important role, later in the decade, in the debates concerning America's participation in the war in Europe.46

Marshall's extensive time with the Illinois National Guard proved crucial in his training to be a political Chief of Staff. While the rest of the Army's Officer Corps was serving the majority of their career with troops or in key staff positions, Marshall was learning how Guardsmen felt about the Regular Army. This insight proved priceless in two ways. It helped him to appreciate guardsmen's attitudes for military service; which was valuable in 1940 when the National Guard's federalization became one of the major public debates facing Marshall as Chief of Staff. It also gave him the opportunity to meet and befriend many key business and political leaders. For example, in Chicago he reestablished relationship with Charles G. Dawes, whom he had met while serving as General Pershing's Aide-de-Camp in Washington. Dawes, a prominent Illinois banker, introduced Marshall to several of the area's business and professional leaders. These contacts became friends and associates who provided key support to Marshall after he became Chief of Staff.47


46 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peace Time Draft, p 66 & 144. Also, see Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 69.

47 Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 60.
Marshall's relationship with civilians was not limited to the National Guard. While assigned as post commander at Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Screven, Georgia, and Vancouver Barracks, Washington he sought out civilian officials from surrounding communities in an effort to befriend them and gain their support for programs affecting their cities. One example presents Marshall's sensitivity to and appreciation for such relationships. On the first Sunday after taking command at Fort Screven, an old post about seventeen miles southeast of Savannah, Georgia, Colonel and Mrs. Marshall drove to town to attend the Episcopal services. The Mayor, who happened to be a member of the Episcopal Church, was taken back by the unexpected visit. Marshall was the first in a long line of commanders who had taken the time to visit the city. Recalling the event, Mrs. Marshall said

The rector seemed pleased that the new C.O. had come from such a distance to attend the service...and insisted that we have Sunday mid-day dinner with them...We accepted the invitation...and on that day a friendship was born which has lasted through the years...Shortly after our arrival, my husband was asked to speak before the Chamber of Commerce; the Mayor called to deliver the invitation...When George was made a full colonel, a year later, and ordered to Fort Moultrie, near Charleston, he carried with him a baton with an inscribed plate 'To the Marshall of Savannah'.

Later Marshall hosted the city's officials to view a variety of demonstrations, have dinner with the troops, and enjoy a prize fight. A number of the visitors told Marshall it was the first time they had been on the post in many years. Throughout his career at posts both in the United States and abroad, Marshall encouraged and fostered strong relationships with local community leaders, a pattern

---

49 Letter Colonel Marshall to Major General Edward L. King, 9 March 1933. See Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 388-389. Marshall said of the occasion, "I feel we did some good, and I know we staged a very clever and interesting show despite the small size of the Command and no music."
so atypical of most senior Army officers of the period. Perhaps the continued funding cuts prompted most Army officers to blame local civilians for Congressional actions.50

Marshall's exposure with civilians continued through his association with the Civilian Conservation Corps (C.C.C.). Shortly after taking office in 1933, Roosevelt organized the Emergency Conservation Work, better known as the C.C.C., Civilian Conservation Corps, to be used in forestry, flood control, and anti-erosion projects. The program was designed to employ and train young males, a segment of the population especially hard hit by the Depression. The Army was given the responsibility to house, feed, clothe, and entertain over 250,000 C.C.C. volunteers. Marshall, as post commander at Fort Screven and Fort Moultrie, supervised 21 camps and nearly 4,000 men enrolled in C.C.C. As one assistant put it, "Marshall ate, breathed, and digested the many C.C.C. problems."51

Unlike many officers, Marshall thrived on his association with the C.C.C. camps. Colonel Lawrence Halstead, acting Chief of Infantry, reflecting the view of many officers, wrote, "This work is onerous and probably distasteful to the Army..."52 Marshall, building on his extensive service with the National Guard and civilians in general, saw nothing but potential in the C.C.C. camps. He saw the Army learning how to train and care for a large mobilized force. He saw money formerly cut, being retained so the Army could accomplish their new C.C.C. mission.53 He saw nothing but opportunity and took full advantage of it. Throughout the summer of 1933, Marshall's

50 In 1932, President Hoover signed the Omnibus Economy Bill which stipulated that all military officers were required to take unpaid furloughs totaling thirty days, all leaves were prohibited, and salary increases associated with promotions or length of service were prohibited. See Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 390 note 2; and Memorandum Colonel Marshall to General Hammon, 13 April 1934, p 425-428.
53 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 76. Also, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, 393.
letters where full of details concerning the C.C.C. camps. As was the case with the National Guard, the C.C.C. association enabled Marshall to add to his list of influential contacts. One such association was with Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina. Byrnes would play a significant role in Marshall's legislative battles during his first two years as Army Chief of Staff. The C.C.C. association stayed with Marshall throughout his career and gave him a unique sensitivity to the thoughts and opinions of the common American. Few of his peers in the Army ever developed such an appreciation for those that they protected. On the battlefields of Europe it probably did not matter; however, in the hallways of Congress, such an insight was invaluable.

Marshall continued his association with the C.C.C. after he was promoted and placed in command of the Seventh Infantry Regiment and Vancouver Barracks. Undoubtedly his support and success with C.C.C. camps caught the eye of Harry Hopkins, head of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in Washington, which had overall responsibility for the C.C.C. program. Mr. Hopkins later proved pivotal in Marshall's selection to be Chief of Staff.

Another person, who had a profound influence on Marshall's career and eventual selection as Chief of Staff, was his mentor General John J. Pershing. Though the relationship between these two men eventually neared that of father-son, their first meeting was anything but cordial. They met in World War I; after a rocky


57 On 3 October 1917, General Pershing visited the 1st Infantry Division headquarters at Condorecourt, France. On this occasion, after listening to General Sibert, Division Commander, and another junior officer critique a
introduction, Pershing selected Marshall to serve on his A.E.F. staff where Marshall’s planning and administrative brilliance became apparent. After distinguishing himself in planning the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, Pershing asked him to become one of his Aides-de-Camp.

demonstration, Marshall recalled the experience years later, “He just gave everybody hell, and he was very severe with General Sibert...in front of all the officers. Among other things, he said that we didn’t show any signs of much training; we had not justified the time we had had here;...and generally he just sacrificed us. He didn’t give General Sibert a chance to talk at all...So I decided it was about time for me to make my sacrifice play...I went up and started to talk to General Pershing, who dismissed the Division’s chief of staff rather contemptuously and was off...he shrugged his shoulders and turned away from me, and I put my hand on his arm and practically forced him to talk.” (The other officers in the room where startled at such a display. But as one of Marshall’s assistants later said about Marshall temper, "his eyes flashed and he talked so rapidly and vehemently no one else could get in a word. He overwhelmed his opponent by a torrent of facts.") Holding Pershing’s arm Marshall said, "There’s something to be said here, and I think I should say it because I’ve been here longest.” When Marshall recounted the episode to his bibliographer, Dr. Pogue, he could not recall exactly what he said to Pershing, but others said he told Pershing that since he had been there the longest, he should have been asked the questions. Whatever he said, it obviously had a modifying effect because Pershing responded by saying, “You must appreciate the troubles we have.” Marshall, as he later said, “I thought I had gotten in it up to my neck; I might as well not try to float but to splash a little bit.” He responded by telling Pershing, "Yes, General, but we have them every day and many a day, and we have to solve every one of them by night.” Pershing, without further comment, left the headquarters. Most, including General Sibert, who witnessed this display of emotions, believed Marshall’s career was finished. But rather than hurt, it caught the eye of the most popular and powerful general in the Army. Then after, whenever Pershing visited the division, “he would get me off away from the others and talk to me about the conditions of affairs.” See Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 121-122. Also, see Pogue, Education of a General, p 151-153, and Frank E. Vandiver, Black Jack---The Life and Times of John J. Pershing (College Station and London: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), p 797-798.

58 After the A.E.F. Chief of Staff, Hugh Drum, gave Marshall the assignment to plan the offensive, Marshall realizing the complexity of the task, said, "This appalling proposition rather disturbed my equilibrium. The next few hours were the most trying mental ordeal." Knowing his reputation and future depended on the success of his plan, he prepared what he later called "...my best contribution to the war.” Marshall planned the movement of "eleven French and Italian divisions with two corps headquarters from the front and replaced them with fifteen U.S. divisions and three corps headquarters, a movement of 220,000 troops out of the line and 600,000 into it (400,000 from Saint Mihiel) with 3,000 guns and 900,000 tons of supplies and ammunition...Marshall’s planning was a logistical feat of unprecedented
For the next five years (1920-1924), Marshall served as General Pershing’s Aide-de-Camp both during the post war period and more importantly during the period 1921 to 1924 when he served as Pershing’s senior Aide while Pershing was Army Chief of Staff. Of all his pre-chief of staff positions, none prepared him better for the political arena than his service with Pershing.

Marshall’s first exposure with Congressional Committees came when Pershing was called to testify about the appropriate size for the peace-time Army. Pershing was in the precarious position of being General of the Armies with a permanent four star rank yet subordinate to the Chief of Staff, General March, who held only temporary four star rank. Pershing and his staff supported a small peacetime Army, yet large enough to deal with any emergency and large enough to train the civilian militia, the National Guard. General March, Pershing’s arch rival, maintained it was improper to place such faith in a civilian militia. He proposed a standing Army of nearly 500,000. Pershing was called to testify before the House Military Affairs Committee. The combination of Pershing’s influence and the nation’s strong desire to decrease the Army’s size, resulted in Congress passing the 1920 National Defense Act which established an Army built around a Regular Army core and augmented by the National Guard in the event of a national emergency. The measure, along with setting the Army’s strength, established the General Staff configuration which Marshall would inherit in 1939. This proportions, and it succeeded brilliantly.” See Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 40. Also, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 160, and Vandiver, Black Jack, p 944-945.

Ibid., page 207-208. Prior to departing for Washington, D.C., and becoming Chief of Staff, March, the A.E.F. Artillery Training Camp Commander at Valdahon, visited Pershing. After March left, one of Pershing’s assistants said, “That man is going to cause you trouble.” “I know that,” Pershing remarked, “but he is a capable officer.” “Hostilities between the two generals broke out almost as soon as March took over as Army Chief of Staff on May 24, 1918, and began issuing orders to the A.E.F. Commander...” Also, see Donald Smythe, “The Pershing-March Conflict in World War I,” Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Volume XI, number 4. December 1981, p 53.

Marshall, when asked about the Pershing-March feud said, “I had rather not go into the Pershing-March feud. They had it out, and I’m not an umpire on such things. I leave that to the columnists.” Marshall Interviews, 11 April 1957, p 225-226.
experience provided Marshall his first taste of Congressional Committee.60

In 1921, Pershing became the Army's Chief of Staff, and for the next three years Marshall saw first hand how the Army Chief of Staff of the Army worked with the Secretary of War, the Congress, and the President. Marshall, perhaps with an eye to one day being Chief of Staff, scrutinized Pershing's every action eager to learn the nuances of the position. He watched Pershing interact with the powerful and influential in Washington. He observed and learned how Pershing made and use friendships with important people.61 Marshall began to develop his own network of powerful partners, men such as Charles Dawes62 and Bernard Baruch, who later on, during his early years as Chief of Staff, provided council and helped the new Chief of Staff influence legislative action.63 In 1923, while Pershing was on a six month visit to Europe, Marshall was responsible for preparing the Chief of Staff's annual report to the Secretary of War, which asked for small, but necessary, increases to the regular Army force structure and funding for large-scale National Guard maneuvers.64 Though the request was denied, it provided Marshall a unique opportunity to prepare and testify before Congress and to see the Army's post-war struggle for resources.65

---

60 Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 47. Also, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 194.
63 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 24. Also, see Bernard M. Baruch, BARUCH: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962.), p 277-278. Baruch said of his association with Marshall, "I had known him since the time when he was General Pershing's aide...Several times, Marshall asked my help in his efforts to win Congressional support for his plans."
64 Vandiver, Black Jack, p 1064. While Pershing made a six-month tour of France in 1923, "George Marshall held the chief of staff's office together...Marshall knew the chief's mind, and everyone in the office accepted his decisions."
65 Pogue, Education of a General, p 221-222.
His entire period as Pershing's Aide-de-Camp was a significant preparatory experience for Marshall. Dr. Pogue said of this period in Marshall's career,

Marshall's five years with Pershing inevitably involved him in a miscellany of activities which in retrospect was difficult to assign any coherent pattern. From the point of view of his career, these years were most fruitful in terms of exposure to politics and to personalities of politics and business, not only in Washington but in the course of his frequent travels through the country with his chief. He sat in on a number of informal talks between Pershing and President Harding...became acquainted with Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover...developed a close relationship during Dawes' year in Washington as Director of the Budget...while on a trip through Louisiana...joined with the state's Governor John Parker and Bernard Baruch for duck hunting...” In sum Dr. Pogue said, “It was to be training not only in the political art of the possible but in the temper of democracy.66

The years as Aide to the Army Chief of Staff were the best possible training for the political world he would face as Chief of Staff. Perhaps it was the combination of Marshall's brilliance in France; the execution of his aide duties, which were far more involved than today;67 and the close personal relationship which emerged at this time that convinced Pershing that Marshall should one day become Chief of Staff.68

67 "Marshall, equally close to ‘the chief’, found himself increasingly deluged with draft letters, reports, memoranda. Knowing the keen intelligence of Marshall, his thoroughly professional view, Pershing seldom acted without the younger man's opinion.” Vandiver, Black Jack, p 1058 and 1064.
68 From a number of sources the author has reached the conclusion that Pershing had, since Marshall’s tenure as his aide, pushed and furthered Marshall’s career. Throughout his care he was known as a "Pershing Man" which contributed to his being prevented from general officer rank for many years. General MacArthur, a "March Man" and the Chief of Staff, did little to help Marshall. Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 200. In 1935, General Pershing
Ironically, in 1939 it was two former Pershing subordinates, Major General Hugh Drum and Brigadier General George C. Marshall, who were the prime challengers to succeed General Malin Craig as the Army Chief of Staff. Drum, the leading candidate and highly talented officer had been Pershing's A.E.F. Chief of Staff. Marshall, although well known within the Army, was thought to be a dark-horse candidate by the public. In 1938, Marshall was assigned to be Chief, War Plans Division, Army General Staff, the equivalent of today's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Three months later, he was named Craig's Deputy Chief of Staff. Little did Drum realize that these rapid assignments were part of Pershing's maneuvers to place Marshall in strong contention to replace Craig in 1939.

Another key Marshall supporter was Harry Hopkins, one of Roosevelt's closest advisors. Hopkins met with Marshall in an effort to broaden his own background in military affairs. This was all part of the President's effort to have Hopkins run for president in 1932. Personally asked President Roosevelt to promote Marshall, but nothing came of the request, even though the President personally petitioned General MacArthur. "General Pershing asks very strongly that Colonel George C. Marshall (Infantry) be promoted to Brigadier. Can we put him on the list of next promotions?" See memorandum President Roosevelt to Secretary of War, 24 May 1935. Marshall Papers, Vol. I, p 468. Baruch said the following about the day Pershing told him he had recommended Marshall for the Chief's job. "I have just done a great thing for our country. I have recommended to F.D.R that he appoint Marshall as Chief of Staff." See Baruch, BARUCH, p 278. Pershing knew each of the top officers in the Army personally. He had seen them perform in the World War. The one man he favored over all others to be Chief of Staff was Marshall. Also, see Vandiver, Black Jack, p 1091.

Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 13. Also, see Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 77-78.


Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 11.
Hopkins was immediately taken by Marshall's superb intellect and command of the subject. He quickly saw Marshall as someone who was able to support Roosevelt's program and bring much needed order to the War Department.

While General Drum, on the other hand, had a much broader support base, both in and outside the Army, he lacked the confidence of the President. Often Drum exacerbated his standing with the President by overtly campaigning or encouraging others to campaign in his behalf. On one occasion the President remarked, "Drum, Drum, I wish he would stop beating his own drum..." In fact Drum was so confident that one rumor had him visiting General Craig's quarters at Fort Myer to inspect the house slated for the Chief of Staff the same Sunday Roosevelt offered the job to Marshall.

After months of speculation the President called General Marshall to his office on 23 April 1939 and asked him to become the next Army Chief of Staff. Exactly how Marshall came from behind and beat out Drum and others for the job has been a matter much speculated on. However, the influence of Marshall's mentor and close

---

73 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 25-26, and Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 92-93.
75 Pogue, Education of a General, p 329.
76 Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 66.
77 Russell A. Gugeler, "George Marshall and Orlando Ward, 1939-1941," Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Volume XIII, March 1983, p 29 and 42. According to Orlando Ward's diary entry on 7 January 1941, "Drum left Washington thinking he would be C/S. Since that time he has been trying to supplant Marshall in every way or at least get some kind of good job."
78 Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 97. Also, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 712-713. Larrabee, Commander In Chief, p 109. "Marshall was called to the White House on Sunday, April 23, arriving at 3:33 p.m. and staying for forty minutes in the President's study. Roosevelt had informed no one else, not even the Secretary of War. 'It was an interesting interview,' Marshall said later; it must have been. He told Roosevelt that he would want to speak his mind without hesitation and that this might not always be pleasing. 'Is that all right?' Marshall asked. The President naturally said 'yes' and so Marshall added: 'you said yes pleasantly but it may be unpleasant.'"
friend, General Pershing along with the backing of Harry Hopkins, seemed to have made the difference in President Roosevelt's mind.\textsuperscript{79}

In 1939, George C. Marshall took charge of the Army General Staff, which had not changed in make-up or character since the National Defense Act in 1920. The Army Chief of Staff, according to the Act was, "...the immediate advisor to the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program." In 1936, the Chief of Staff was given the added responsibility of Commanding General of the Field Forces in time of peace. That responsibility continued until Congress declared war and the President named a Commanding General of the Field Forces.\textsuperscript{80} The Chief of Staff was also, by custom, chief military advisor to congressional committees responsible for military matters and principal spokesman in conferences with the various branches of government.\textsuperscript{81} The Chief of Staff reported directly to the Secretary of War, who in turn represented and reported to the President; however, under Marshall the line between the Chief and the

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p 11, 92-93, 97. Also, see Pogue, \textit{Education of a General}, p 323-330. Pogue, \textit{Ordeal and Hope}, p 23-25. Larrabee, \textit{Commander In Chief}, p 106-109. "Why did Roosevelt pick him?" Larrabee in his book suggests there were several reasons but that the choice was not as unobvious as some might suggest. First, when seniority is reviewed although Marshall was number 35 on the list he was not as junior as one may think at first look. A proviso prevented anyone from serving as CSA who could not complete a full four year term before retirement. This eliminated all but four of the 34 ahead of Marshall. (Roosevelt did ask for names of possible junior nominees.) The four ahead of Marshall were Hugh Drum, John Dewitt, Frank Rowell, and Walter Krueger; of these, DeWitt was overly identified with logistics, Rowell had no energetic supporters, Krueger was handicapped by his German birth, which left Drum...It would not be fair to say (as some of his partisan critics have said) that Marshall was a New Deal general, but it is true that he had a better understanding than most Army officers of the conditions which the Roosevelt administrations were trying to cope...He had personally experienced the New Deal in the form of the Civilian Conservation Corps...Marshall was one of the few officers who threw himself into the task of running the C.C.C.'s with some sense of the Army's stake...It was an exercise in triangulation of the kind that politics regularly gives...Marshall fell within the angles of favorable judgment by all three, and the fact that he was endorsed by both Harry Hopkins and John J. Pershing said something about him that could not be said of any other candidate, surely not of Hugh Drum."  

\textsuperscript{80} Watson, \textit{Chief of Staff}, p 64.  

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p 66.  

31
President was opened and often used. In July 1939, while Marshall was acting Chief of Staff, President Roosevelt issued an executive order which provided for immediate contact between the White House and the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Naval operations.

Marshall came to the Chief's chair with two pressing problems. The first one was how to deal with the personal feud between Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring and his Deputy Under Secretary of War Louis Johnson. The second concerned how to rebuild an Army dismantled by twenty years of congressional cutbacks and prepare it for war. His only recourse concerning the Woodring-Johnson dispute was to walk a narrow path between the two. However, concerning the second problem he had prepared his entire career for just such a challenge.

Mrs. Craig, wife of the serving Chief of Staff Malin Craig, told Mrs. Marshall at their first meeting, "I shall never forgive Washington; they have crucified my husband." Mrs. Marshall realized that the "they" Mrs. Craig was referring to was the Secretary of War, Harry Woodring and his Deputy Assistant Secretary, Louis Johnson. These two men had been at each other's throats since Mr. Johnson was named by Roosevelt to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War in 1938.

The friction between the two men hurt the Army's ability to present a united front to a Congress still wary, despite the growing

---

82 Marshall, Together, p 44.
83 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 20. Roosevelt named Mr. Woodring, a former governor of Kansas Assistant Secretary of War in 1933. When Secretary of War George H. Dern died in 1936, Woodring became Acting Secretary of War. Roosevelt never intended to retain Woodring, but in 1936 the Democrats carried Kansas and the President named Woodring Secretary of War. Roosevelt later named Mr. Johnson, a corporate lawyer from West Virginia and former national commander of the American Legion Assistant Secretary of War. The two men were opposites in every way. Woodring was a strong isolationist who fought the President's efforts to aid the allies and rearm the nation. Johnson was a strong interventionist who believed America's best defense rested in aiding the allies and building a strong military. Woodring was a questionable administration. Johnson was extremely talented. Roosevelt had promised Johnson Woodring's job. Despite urgings from his advisors, Roosevelt refused to fire Woodring and move Johnson into the position. The two men fought over every issue. The War Department came to a virtual stop in the late 1930s.
tensions in Europe, of providing more resources to the Army. Therefore, one of Marshall's first and most pressing responsibilities was to become the Army's front man to the Congress. Normally, the Secretary of War was the main link with Congress; however, in the case of Secretary Woodring, members of both parties thought him to be incapable if not down-right incompetent. In the case of Mr. Johnson, because of his interventionist views and other outspoken political positions, many Republican members of Congress did not trust him. Marshall quickly realized he would have to carry the Army's case to the Congress.84

Fortunately, for Marshall, unlike his predecessor General Craig, both Woodring and Johnson viewed him as an ally; both had supported Marshall in becoming Chief of Staff. This standing enabled Marshall to be an effective agent in presenting the Army's strategy to the President and Congress. As time passed and Marshall's influence with the Congress grew, the infighting between the two civilian leaders of the Army became more of an embarrassment than a hindrance to the General and his efforts to reshape the Army.85 In fact, this situation enabled Marshall to build a relationship with legislators which may not have been possible with a strong Secretary of War.

The Army Marshall inherited in 1939 was meager to say the least. From the end of the First World War until the wars in Spain and China, the Army suffered from both neglect and decreasing funding.86 In 1933, the Army stood seventeenth among the armies of the world. Personnel stayed at levels below the 1920 Defense Acts ceiling, 136,000 vs. 280,000, while equipment readiness

84 Ibid.
85 One can only postulate why General Craig had been paralyzed by the Woodring-Johnson conflict. This author believes it points to Craig's lack of experience with working in the civilian and political realm before becoming Chief of Staff; a short-coming General Marshall would not have. It also points to the value of the March-Pershing conflict had on Marshall. He saw how crippling such a conflict could be and how to work within such an environment. In defense of Craig, however, the world situation was not so critical and the economic conditions at home played a more dominate role during his tenure than they would during Marshall's.
suffered from continuing congressional neglect. Unfortunately, the structure of the Army did not change with the reduction in manpower; therefore, the term 'skeleton force' became fashionable.87

By 1939, "The U.S. Army...was a threat to nobody; it stood nineteenth in the world, with a meager total of 174,000 men, ahead of Bulgaria but just behind Portugal. Its 'divisions' were half under strength and dispersed in scattered posts, with virtually no opportunity to train as units; joint maneuvers were held only every forth year and lasted two weeks at the outside...Equipment, 'modern' by 1919 standards at the least, was hopelessly obsolete and inadequate."88 One article written in 1940 characterized the task of rebuilding the Army to be like the, "reconstruction of a dinosaur around an ulan and three vertebrae."89

Marshall was not surprised by the lack of preparedness nor the country's seeming indifference to it. He had seen the effects of unpreparedness first hand during the First World War, and the tremendous price America paid for the country's unwillingness to prepare.90 In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 19 June, 1940, he related what General Pershing experienced in 1924 concerning efforts to scale down the Army, "I find on my return here that the War Department seems to be up against the real thing. The budget officer insists on reducing our estimates; so that, we shall not be able to have over 110,000 men. What this means I cannot understand. I do not know what is going to be done about it, but to my mind it is very discouraging."91 Pershing, ever the soldier and never the politician, was somewhat bewildered by the Nation's quick reaction to the call for a smaller and less costly Army. Marshall was

87 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 25. Ranking was based on size of army in terms of personnel and equipment. Then Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur's mentions only 12 modern tanks in his 1933 Annual Report. However, in defense of congressional funding restrictions, the country lacked a creditable threat; while at the same time, it had been through and was still suffering from the most severe economical crisis in its history. So naturally, without a threat, the army was expected to suffer along with the rest of the country.
88 Larrabee, Commander In Chief, p 114.
90 Pogue, Education of a General, p 147.

34
never so naive. In a May 14, 1939 article in *The New York Times Magazine*, Marshall observed the following concerning America's mood,

...the problem of the United States is a simple one. Potentially we are the strongest military power on earth. Geographically isolated behind a barrier of oceans so far as first-class military powers are concerned, ours is a tremendous advantage....We are very apt to misread the European situation because of failure to appreciate the contrast in distances. Call the Hudson the Rhine, then Rochester becomes Paris, and Buffalo represents London, so far as the flight of a bomber is concerned. Naturally, a man in Buffalo would experience a strong reaction to thousands of hostile planes just across the Hudson. The American today has no such reaction because the Atlantic Ocean lies between him and Europe.92

As Colonel Ward made the final preparations for the very private swearing-in ceremony, little did he appreciate General Marshall's years of preparation for his tenure as the Army's Chief of Staff. From Marshall's first attempts to gain a commission, he had dealt with the country's political forces. He had been one of the first Regular Army officers detailed to train and evaluate the Nation's civilian-soldiers, and throughout his career he returned to these units to update their readiness and his understanding of their unique problems. While others tried avoiding the touch of civilians, he sought them out. He understood the special tie between the military and their civilian hosts had to be strengthened not broken if the Country's security was to be safeguarded. As aide to the Army's highest ranking officer, he came in contact with political forces and saw first hand their importance in shaping the Army. Colonel Ward was not aware of the fateful crafting of General Marshall's career; but in all fairness to him, no one else, including Marshall himself, appreciated his roots as a politician.

General Marshall was sworn in at 12:00 noon. He did not review the troops as is customary at a military change of command. Rather, he quickly traveled to the White House to meet with the nation's political leaders.
During the next nine months General Marshall reluctantly worked with politicians to garner resources for the Army. He approached the congress with great care; asking for far less than was actually needed, Marshall was fearful congress would veto any large request. In retrospect he said, "If I had ignored public opinion, if I had ignored the reaction of congress, we would literally have gotten nowhere...They were unwilling to go ahead. They were unwilling to give it support." However personnel and not appropriations became Marshall's greatest struggle during this period. Ironically, he would become the unwilling conservative force; the one unwilling to go ahead. Political powers forced him to accept a peacetime draft, thus destroying his well conceived plan to rebuild the Army. Though his extensive service as Pershing's Aide prepared him to work in Washington, it did not endow him with the political forte needed to effectively operate in the Capital. Now, he learned from others the power of political skill and influence. The passage of the Burke-Wadsworth Act painfully taught him the politician's craft.

In the 1939-41 period did you have the feeling that you were seeing 1915-1916 all over again?" General Marshall, responding some sixteen years later said, "I saw

---

1 Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941, 76th Congress, 3rd session, 4 June 1940, p 64-65. Despite warnings, congress had continued to act with near hostility to the military. On the 27-30 November, 1939, Marshall asked for supplemental funding to the FY 1940 appropriations bill to pay for increasing the strength of the Regular Army and National Guard, increasing motor transportation, and improving training programs, especially large scale maneuvers. Of the $120,000,000 requested, only $109,416,689 was appropriated. Still, later in April, the House cut the overall armed forces appropriation by 10 percent. Also, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 286.

very much reflections of the things of '15-'16 all over again. In fact, in some ways very little-occurred that didn’t seem to me was a repetition, but what disturbed me most of all was to find the Army, the War Department, and the country in the same shape again—in the same shape again.3

Germany stormed Poland on 1 September 1939. France and England quickly declared war on Germany. Shortly after Germany's invasion, congress relaxed several Neutrality Act restrictions, but little else was done. On 1 September 1939, Roosevelt, responded to the invasion by pledging to make every effort to keep the nation out of war.4 Despite world-wide indignation, no country came to Poland's aid. Soon, Germany completed its conquest and wisely consolidated its position. Lack of further military action during the winter and early spring of 1940 became known as the "Sitzkrieg" or "Phony War."5

In the United States, during this period, the public hoped Hitler was pacified and stability returned to the continent. If not, they were confident, the Maginot-Line, coupled with the mighty French and Britain armies would stop German aggression.6 Regardless, Americans knew they were shielded by the Atlantic Ocean.7 Then suddenly, just after midnight on 9 April 1940, "Sitzkrieg" again became "Blitzkrieg" as the German war-machine rolled into Norway. On 10 May the Germans moved into the European Low Countries. By the end of June, the French Army had been routed; the British Army

---

3 Marshall Interviews. 5 April 1957, p 183.
4 The New York Times. 2 September 1939, p 1, 8.
5 Clifford and Spencer. The First Peace Time Draft. p 8-9. Also, see Watson. Chief of Staff. p 104.
6 Sherwood. Roosevelt and Hopkins. p 136-137. Also, see Ketchum. The Borrowed Years. p 323.
7 In a December 1939 speech to the American Historical Association, Marshall characterized this Country's reaction by saying "The possibility of conflicting interests between nations diminishes as the distance between them increases...and if the Atlantic Ocean has not guaranteed complete immunity from wars with European Powers, it has made such wars so difficult...and sudden attack on us seems unlikely. See General George C. Marshall, Speech to the American Historical Association, Washington D.C., 28 December 1939. See Marshal Papers Vol. 2. p 123-126.
driven across the channel; and the Maginot-Line was little more than a tourist sight. Germany was now the master of Europe. Concerning these momentous events, Marshall said, "The German advance completely upset the equilibrium of the European continent. France was eliminated as a world power and the British Army lost most of its heavy equipment. To many the invasion of Great Britain appeared imminent." Truly, Marshall's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on 23 February 1940 had been prophetic. He had warned, "...if Europe blazes in the late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere." As the flames of war grew higher and the threat of military action on this continent became a real possibility, public awareness and opinion altered. Describing the change in public opinion Marshall said,

The precariousness of the situation and its threat to the security of the United States became suddenly apparent to our people, and the pendulum of public opinion reversed itself, swinging violently to the other extreme, in an urgent demand for enormous and immediate increases. Just as Marshall had predicted, Europe was again at war. America was not anxious to rush to their aid. A national taken in April showed 96 percent of the nation opposed going to war against Germany. See The Gallup Poll--Public Opinion--1935-1971 (New York: Random House [1972] ). p 220.


Ibid.

Ibid., twenty-three years earlier America sent Dough Boys to Europe to save their fore-fathers' homeland from Germany. After the war, America tried to influence the terms at Versailles only to be rebuffed by the Europeans. They isolated themselves from the continent warning the British and French that imposing harsh and repressive measures on the Germans would result in another war.
Europe was at war. Now the question became not if America would become involved, but how, when, and where.\textsuperscript{12}

As the public's attitude changed, so did the congress's. For the first time since the end of World War I, Marshall sensed congressional emphasis changing from saving as much money as possible to spending as much money as possible.\textsuperscript{13} In the spring of 1940 Marshall was deeply involved with increasing appropriations needed for improving the training, and providing much needed equipment. On 1 April 1940 he wrote,

I have been under terrific pressure since my return... with presentations before the Appropriations Committee... to protect our appropriations in the Senate against heavy economic slashes... I feel that if I can keep the Army training program going, then my most important business is to see that the money is forthcoming to provide adequate preparedness.\textsuperscript{14}

On 16 April 1940 in a letter to his sister, Marshall said

\textsuperscript{12} This shift in popular support did not surprise Marshall. Earlier in the year he said, "I think it's apparent that much of this misfortune in the life of our democracy could have been avoided by the influence of a better-informed public on the decisions of the Congress." See General George C. Marshall, Speech to the American Historical Association, Washington D.C., 28 December 1939; \textit{Marshall Papers}, Vol. 2, p 123-126. Also, see General George C. Marshall, Speech to the Committee on Community Chest, Washington, D.C., 16 November 1939; \textit{Marshall Papers}, Vol. 2, p 103; also, see Pogue, \textit{Ordeal and Hope}, p 18.

\textsuperscript{13} Watson, \textit{Chief of Staff}, p 166. Also, see Bland, \textit{Marshall Papers}, Vol. 2, p 210. Ironically, after the invasion, many isolationists in congress attempted to distance themselves from their former positions. On 17 May 1940 Senator Hayden of Arizona, made an elaborate entry into the Subcommittee on Appropriation's record to show that the Committee "was anxious and willing to undertake what the War Department wanted, regardless of very recent events." See Congress, Senate, Committee or Appropriations, \textit{Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1941}, 76th Congress, 3rd session, 17 May 1940, p 403. Also, see Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigation of the National Defense Program, \textit{A Resolution authorizing and directing an investigation of the National Defense Program}, 77th Congress, 1st session, 15 April 1941, p 164,168, 171, and 177. As Senator Brewster pointed out to General Marshall, "You come at a very fortunate time. I don't want to reflect on your predecessors, but Mr. Hitler helped you out."

I am getting ready to appear before the Senate on the Appropriations Bill, which was badly cut in the House. Incidentally, last night I had a very successful talk with Senator Tyding...and he volunteered to take the lead in defending my point of view in the Senate.\footnote{Letter CSA to Mrs. John J. Singer, 16 April 1940. *Marshall Papers, Vol. 2*, p 199-200. Note how Marshall here is asking senators to do his bidding. Within a year he himself would champion his causes no longer needing others to 'politic' for him.}

Meeting for the first time with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, on 15 May 1940, Marshall outlined the Army's forecasted financial needs. Morgenthau and Marshall agreed that it was essential for Congress not be stampeded by a myriad of army demands, but rather that a detailed program, outlining the Army's course of action and associated needs, be presented to avoid confusing them.\footnote{Pogue, *Ordal and Hope*, p 29.} Unfortunately, little known to Marshall, as he attempted to gain funding to complete his master force restructuring plan, a small group of New York businessmen were discussing the prospects for the Nation's first peacetime draft. This group's initiative would completely destroy Marshall's blueprint, but at the same time provide him a political education well worth the destruction.

The nation's conversion to defense, was limited to building defense at home, not sending American soldiers to fight against Germany. The public and the politicians were neither anxious nor willing to send another World War I style A.E.F. to Europe.\footnote{Anti-FDR groups were perplexed by these changing political tides. They were unsure which side of the debate to support. With 1940 being a presidential election year, the President, one third of the Senate, and all the House were running for reelection. Before the invasion of Belgium and France, Roosevelt was undecided whether he would seek an unprecedented third term. After the invasion, however, he felt that if there was to be a war, no one was better suited to lead America through it than he. An election year placed added pressures on the elected politicians to cautiously approach support for American rearmament and the call to arms of its youth. FDR, now concerned about the upcoming election, pushed for increased military war-supplies to Britain, and increased funding for the military. Anti-Roosevelt forces were in a contrary. How could they oppose FDR and a middle of the road position. If they opposed aid to Britain, given the immediate threat of German}
the idea of another A.E.F. was hardly acceptable, one prominent group believed the nation should prepare for war by instituting a peacetime draft; something never before accomplished in American history. In October 1939, an officer at the Army War College asked General Hugh S. Johnson, the man who had helped run the selective service in World War I, about the possibility for peacetime conscription. Johnson said

If you are asking for my opinion as a mechanical question, I would say 'yes'...If you are asking my opinion as a political question as to whether you could get it through without being chewed up, I would say 'by all means, no.' Get it ready but keep it in the dark.18

Marshall knew a draft would one day be needed if the Army was to increase to a full-scale war-time structure. However, as General Johnson said, the political prospects for a draft were, in Marshall's opinion, remote.19

The draft movement grew out of an innocent dinner sponsored by an obscure organization called the Military Training Camps
Association (MTCA). The executive committee of the MTCA gathered on 8 May 1940 to plan the 25th anniversary of the Plattsburg training camps\(^{20}\). During the meeting one man, Glenville Clark, a prominent Wall Street lawyer, expressed concern for the growing crisis in Europe and the need for a peacetime draft to prepare the nation for war. He felt the MTCA's efforts should be focused on urging a draft initiative.\(^{21}\) Through Clark's prodding a larger forum, including Henry L. Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, and retired army General John M. Palmer, met again on 22 May 1940 to further discuss Clark's idea.\(^{22}\) At this second meeting, the group agreed to mount an intensive campaign to have Congress enact a peacetime draft.\(^{23}\)

On 25 May 1940, the MTCA sent General Palmer, author of the 1920 National Defense Act and personal friend of Marshall, to meet with the Chief of Staff with the hope of securing Marshall's support for their plan. Marshall listened to his old associate, and then explained how a draft, at this time would be disastrous to his program to rebuild the Army and have it ready to fulfill its hemispheric mission. A key aspect of this preparation, Marshall explained was a gradual expansion of the Army.\(^{24}\) Recalling the visit years later, Marshall said "I was opposed to the inception of the draft

\(^{20}\) In 1915 Major General Leonard Wood, Army Chief of Staff, organized a summer camp at Plattsburg, New York. The private contributions paid for military training for business and professional men. "The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized camps on the Plattsburg model, and upon that authorization the War Department conducted sixteen Officers' Training Camps from May 15 to August 11, 1917...About 30,000 civilians and 7,957 Reserve Corps officers were admitted, of whom 27,341 were commissioned for active duty at the close of the course.". See Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p 342-444 and 373.

\(^{21}\) Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 23-24, 26-27. Also, see Kreidberg & Henry, History of Military Mobilization, p 577-578.

\(^{22}\) A month later, Roosevelt nominated Stimson to replace Woodring as Secretary of War and in July 1940, Patterson replaced Assistant Secretary of War Johnson.

\(^{23}\) Blum, Years of Urgency, p 345-346.

\(^{24}\) Watson, Chief of Staff, p 190.
as early as it went into effect—violently in favor of it—but I wanted the thing to be approached in a little better ordered way."25

Marshall suggested General Palmer discuss his proposal with Major Lewis B. Hershey, a member of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. Hershey advised General Palmer that the Services were working on their own draft proposal. However, he pointed out that they saw the draft being implemented after the start of hostilities, not before.26

Following his session with Hershey, Palmer asked Marshall if Hershey could come to New York and meet with the MTCA leaders. Marshall agreed. However, despite his willingness to let Hershey talk to the MTCA, his instructions to Hershey indicate how much he opposed the idea of a draft, now and worried about any political backlash such a proposal might cause. Marshall said

"Talk to these people...answer their questions...explain the draft system we would hope to operate if war should come. But, do nothing that would constitute endorsement of their plans by the Army. If any adverse publicity comes out of these meetings, I will disavow you."

After meeting with Hershey, Palmer told Grenville Clark and the other MTCA leaders that Marshall was unwilling to support any draft legislation at this time. Determined to gain Marshall's support, Clark and Julius Adler, one of the owners of the New York Times, traveled to Washington on 31 May to meet face to face with the Army Chief of Staff. This first meeting between Marshall and the "Plattsburg Men" was short, to the point, and heated.28

During the meeting, Marshall repeated the concerns he had voiced to General Palmer that he would not "break up existing units to provide instructors for thousands of raw recruits." He explained that politically he thought the passage of a peacetime draft was

26 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 190-191.
impossible. He told them that the Country's military strategy centered on a hemispheric defense, not on sending troops to Europe. Clark called Marshall's position foolhardy. He said events in Europe were far more important than those in South America and that Marshall should be planning for war in Europe and not the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Marshall explained, as politely as possible, that the President would not support such an initiative, and Marshall would not circumvent the President. Marshall, never one to be lectured, ended the meeting.

Marshall did not need Clark proclaiming the Army's manpower needs. As his program of modernization progressed Marshall grasped the demand for personnel would increase. On 1 May 1940, in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Marshall asked for 15,000 more soldiers to bring another Corps into service. The Army had the structure but needed 15,000 more men to fill it. On 17 May before the Senate Committee, Marshall told Senator Lodge,

I had in mind: First, voluntary recruiting of the Regular Army...we can secure the men, until the authorized limit of 280,000 is reached. If then the situation is as serious as it is now, and surely if it is more serious, recruitment of the Regular Army on a volunteer basis should continue, possibly to 400,000 men as a temporary measure, not as a permanent increase.

---

29 Unknown to Marshall, Clark, who had known FDR since their days as law clerks, sent the President a telegram informing him of the MTCA's idea. In his reply, FDR voiced support for the group's patriotism but expressed his opposition to the concept. FDR maintained that public and political support for compulsory training in a period of relative peace would be difficult to muster. Also, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 157; and Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 26.

30 Marshall Interviews. 5 April 1937, p 181. Also, see Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 51; Parish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 150; and Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 56-59.

31 Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment Appropriations Bill 1941, 76th Congress, 3rd session, 1 May 1940, p 61.

32 Ibid., p 412.
Marshall expected the increase to 400,000 to meet the Army's training needs and capabilities without mobilizing the National Guard. The Army believed that the National Guard was not proficient enough to train new soldiers. He told the House Appropriations Committee on 29 May 1940,

Personnel at the present moment is our most serious deficiency...I have struggled in the past to hold the personnel requirements down because the materiel is a permanent asset, good for 20 to 25 years...But now the situation has changed and personnel is the only thing, in a large measure that can produce immediate results...

With such an apparent and urgent need for personnel, one may well ask why did Marshall not indorse Clark and the Plattsburg group's efforts for a draft. Primarily, Marshall believed a rapid influx of soldiers would put the Army in a situation where it had neither the equipment nor manpower to train large numbers of new soldiers. He believed a draft would significantly disrupt the Army's restructuring program.

Marshall's strategy for rebuilding the Army was centered on a concept of giving "thorough training to a small one (army) which could thereafter serve as leaven to a larger mass. From that mass, later, would be extracted newly trained elements which could then be mingled with a still larger mass, and thus provide the next stage of a step-by-step development." The small force, however, would be strained by requirements to: respond to attacks in the hemisphere, staff army outposts, and train and upgrade the National Guard. Marshall's options were limited because the Army lacked sufficient trainers. As he later said, "I was opposed to the inception of the draft as early as it went into effect...I wanted the thing to be

---

33 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 188.  
35 Hemisphere defense was also a consideration, however, it played a much larger part in the Lend-Lease debate. For a detailed discussion on the ramifications of hemispheric defense see Chapter Three of this thesis.  
36 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 186.
approached in a little better ordered way...The trouble with that was
we didn't have instructors."

Marshall did not want to risk the
advances that he had already made. 38

Political considerations were also a factor in Marshall's not
supporting Clark. He was convinced in the spring of 1940 that
congress would not pass and the nation would not support a
peacetime draft. Since historically the Nation had never resorted to
peacetime conscription, he did not want the Army to be portrayed as
warmongers by calling for a draft. He even predicted the death of
such legislation if the War Department proposed it.39 Marshall was
not yet the "towering" figure on Capitol Hill, and was not yet

37 Marshall Interview, 5 April 1957, p 179-180. As an example, Marshall
gave the following illustration, "I remember finding the now head of the
Federal Reserve Board and then president of the Stock Exchange, who had
been drafted in one of these earliest drafts, and I found him being instructed
by a corporal who had only been a corporal a month...That was our trouble all
around." Also, see Marshall, Biennial Report, p 5.

38 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 51. Throughout the
winter Marshall had worked with various people to improve the Army's
congressional support for appropriation. One such example was Marshall's use
of Bernard Baruch. Marshall first met Baruch while serving as Pershing's aide.
On 3 April 1940 Marshall wrote to Baruch requesting his support in
getting more money for an air base in Alaska, money which the Senate had
eliminated from the original request. He asked Baruch if an "opportunity"
presented itself, to address the matter with the President. On 5 April Baruch
sent such a recommendation to the President. On 9 April Marshall
acknowledged Baruch's efforts in setting up a meeting between Marshall and
key Senators. At that meeting, which was one of the watershed events in
changing his relationship with the Senate, Marshall, after Baruch had opened
the discussion, said, "My job as Chief of Staff is to convince you of our needs
and I have utterly failed...I don't know what to do. To which Senator Alva
Adams, a long time critic of preparedness and Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, said, "Yes, you do. "You come before the committee without even a
piece of paper and you'll get every goddamned thing you want." Parrish said of
Marshall's use of VIP's in pursuit of Army needs, "If a man like Baruch had
influence, Marshall would make full political use of it." Also, see Bland,
Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 188-9, 194, 204, 253; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 27-28;
Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 140; and Baruch, BARUCH, p 278.

39 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 52. Only after the
outbreak of hostilities in Europe did congress debate and finally pass draft
legislation. During the draft debate, one Senator asserted that the Selective
Service Legislation was "one of the most stupid and outrageous things that the
generals' had ever perpetrated on the Congress." even though the Army
actually had nothing to do with its introduction. Also, see Marshall Interview,
22 January, 179-180; Marshall Interview, 5 April 1957 1957, p 279; and
Kreidberg and Henry, History of Mobilization, p 577.
confident in his ability to influence congress. As Marshall became more assured in his ability to gauge congressional action, people said he "had the sense of statesmanship that enabled (him) to consider the political as well as purely military aspects of the...situation." He often caution the Army staff to delay proposing legislation until, as he said, "world events forced congress to act differently tomorrow than they would today." Finally, Marshall considered the President's opposition to a draft a major political roadblock. Roosevelt's opposition to a draft was not ideological in nature. He supported the concept of universal service; however, he was convinced his policy of supplying war materials to the allies was more acceptable politically, than the idea of a peacetime draft. With 1940 being an election year, Roosevelt saw the issue of selective service creating a perception that he was moving towards an offensive strategy. Fearful of the strong isolationist lobbies, he was sure such a perception would have a very negative impact on any hope for an unprecedented third term. Selling war goods to

---

40 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 164. Sherwood said of Marshall, "Marshall gained confidence by his quiet assurance, mastery of facts and exceptional courtesy, although he was suspect when he talked in terms of armored divisions and long-range bombers for this seemed to suggest that he might have in mind taking the offensive, instead of concentrating on the work of building and manning coastal defense fortifications...." Another consideration was the perception that a peacetime draft would be a dramatic "...in the Country's foreign policy; from strict neutrality to possible intervention. Such a change, Marshall was sure, congress would never support. Certainly, it was not his or the Army's place to suggest such a change to national policy. See Watson, Chief of Staff, p 194-6. Also, see Kreidberg and Henry, History of Mobilization, p 577.

41 Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina said, "...To get a peacetime draft bill through, congress would be difficult enough but without the President's backing, it would not stand "a Chinaman's chance." Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 84.

42 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, page 53.

43 See James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.), p 3-6; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War--1940-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p 202-209; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 174-175. Many of the President's decisions that spring and summer were based on his desire for a third term. Selecting Stimson and Knox in June, the decision to circumvent the congress on the B-17 sell, and his tardy support for the draft are three examples of Roosevelt's election concerns being manifested.)
England and France seemed the safest course of action to take politically.\footnote{Surprisingly, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, Marshall disagreed with Roosevelt's allied aid strategy.}

Marshall, at this time, did not feel he had Roosevelt's complete confidence. He said, "I didn't have the confidence of the President. I don't mean I lacked his entire confidence, but he didn't know me."\footnote{Marshall Interviews, 5 April 1957, p 181.} Accordingly, he resolved to support Roosevelt's policies.\footnote{Early in his tenure as Chief of Staff, Marshall, having witnessed the paralyzing effects of the rift between Craig, Woodring, Johnson and the Roosevelt Administration, refused to take any action which he knew the President opposed. He said, "I thought it was far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member of the team, and try to do my convincing with that team, rather than to take action publicly contrary to the desires of the President..." See Parrish, \textit{Roosevelt and Marshall}, p 125. Also, see Bland, \textit{Marshall Papers Vol. 2}, p 206 (See note 3, page 207.) Marshall resolved to quit rather than publicly take issue with Roosevelt's military strategy. Also, see Larrabee, \textit{Commander in Chief}, p 141-145. Also, see Pogue, \textit{Ordeal and Hope}, p 22-23. It is important to understand the relationship between General Marshall and the President. During Marshall's first year as Chief of Staff neither he or the President were particularly close. The two men had different personalities. Marshall was very proper and reserved. FDR was very outgoing and good-humored. The key point to remember is that they had frequent disagreements on issues in private but never showed public disunity. Nonetheless, overtime they developed a great appreciation and respect for each other.}

Marshall's strong sense of loyalty, respect for Roosevelt's political instincts, and knowledge of Roosevelt's strong support outside Washington convinced him that it was better to side with the President than go against him.\footnote{Bland, \textit{Marshall Papers Vol. 1}, p 561; In 1937 Roosevelt visited Marshall's command at Vancouver Barracks and the surrounding area. During that visit Marshall talked to Governor Martin, an old friend, about the President's visit in Portland early in the trip. Writing to Pershing later about Martin's impressions, Marshall said, "Quite apparently the Governor suffered a change of mind regarding the diminution of the President's hold on the people." Also, see and Parrish, \textit{Roosevelt and Marshall}, p 75.}

The final possible consideration was Marshall's pride. As Marshall saw it, here was a group of World War I veterans, from New York, trying to tell him, the Army's Chief of Staff, how he should do his job. Most in the administration and congress saw him, after his first months in office, as an emerging competent voice of
Clark’s indictment, in all likelihood, did not set well with the Chief of Staff. As he later said, "No one had to tell me how much it was needed--I knew that years before--but the great question was how to get it."49

Perhaps Marshall felt threatened by Clark’s group. More probably, he was offended by Clark’s assertion that he was not moving quickly enough. He had been Chief of Staff for seven months and believed he had pushed the President and congress just as far and as fast as possible. He also knew that the changing winds of public opinion and political support required a prudent, long term approach to rearmament.

Having observed Pershing many years earlier in like situations, he knew that timing was everything, and that even the wisest course of action taken at the wrong time could prove destructive. Knowing that only 50 percent of the public favored conscription, though 65 percent of them believed that Germany would attack America if Britain and France relinquished, Marshall acted cautiously.50 He was concerned that Clark and his group, though full of good intentions, might disappear once the fight in congress started.51 He did not want the Army as the sole voice supporting a draft. Over the long

48 Morgenthau, after his first few meetings with Marshall recommended to the President that General Marshall alone make all the War Department’s presentations to the congress. See Bland, Marshall Papers. Vol. 2, p 214. In his 15 May 1940 memorandum, Morgenthau said “In view of my experience with the Army during the last couple of days, I am taking the liberty of making a suggestion. Let General Marshall, and only General Marshall, do all the testifying in connection with the bill which you are about to send up for additional appropriations for the Army.” Later Morgenthau told Marshall he had written to the President. He told Marshall that if he had any trouble from either Woodring or Johnson in this regard, to let him know and he would advise the President. Also, see Blum, Years of Urgency, p 138-144. Marshall’s relationship to Morgenthau grew through the years as Morgenthau became a trusted confidant and useful conduit for Marshall to pass information to the President. Keep in mind that as impressive as all this sounds, Morgenthau and other key Roosevelt advisors, had little respect for the War Department’s current civilian leadership.

49 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 56-59.

50 Time Magazine, 17 June 1940, p 17.

51 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 84. Regarding both the MTCA’s staying power and public and political receptiveness to a peacetime draft, Marshall was wrong.
run such a situation could jeopardize Marshall's program for the Army by alienating congress support.\textsuperscript{52} Undaunted by Marshall's rejection and lacking War Department support,\textsuperscript{53} Clark's group took another approach to winning the War Department's backing.

While drafting the actual legislation, Clark decided the best way to get War Department support was by convincing the President to replace Secretary Woodring with someone sympathetic to their cause. Clark was very aware of the on-going controversy between Secretary Woodring and Assistant Secretary Johnson. He also knew the President was disenchanted with both men. The word in Washington was that "Chaos ruled the War Department."\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, Clark, with the aid of Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, convinced Roosevelt to replace Secretary Woodring with Henry Stimson, a member of the Plattsburg group.\textsuperscript{55}

Mr. Stimson, a seventy-two year old former Secretary of War in the Taft Administration, was a strong supporter of a draft. Although a prominent Republican, his interventionist views were closely alined with those of the President. Justice Frankfurter knew that Stimson's appointment would offset Secretary Woodring's Midwest political influence by depriving the Republicans of one of its

\textsuperscript{53} Parrish in his work, \textit{Roosevelt and Marshall}, maintains that Marshall had wanted a draft all along but did not want the Army to take the onus for leading the movement and was merely using Clark's group, a notion Marshall, himself, gave credence to during the Pogue interviews in 1957. Parrish tries to draw some comparison between this and Roosevelt's technique of playing one group against another. However, given Marshall's personal dislike for Roosevelt's management style and Marshall's own limited power at the time, it is doubtful that he was intentionally playing both ends against the middle. This author feels that Marshall knew that a draft was needed, but if instituted at this time would be a fatal setback to his well conceived plan for preparedness. See Parrish, \textit{Roosevelt and Marshall}, p 149-150.
\textsuperscript{54} Clifford and Spencer, \textit{The First Peacetime Draft}, p 58.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p 60, "Clark's connection with the Supreme Court Justice formed one thread of the intertwined relationship that shaped the events to follow. There were others: Frankfurter's link to Stimson and the President's connections with Stimson. Each of these strands, winding back to the early year of the century, contributed to the final product." See pages 56-69 for a detailed description of the relationships and events leading to the Stimson nomination.

51
most senior and respected statesmen; Roosevelt, ever the politician, surely agreed. Another Stimson strong point was the fact he was a very astute, experienced, and highly respected administrator.

On 20 June 1940 the same day the conscription bill was introduced in congress, Roosevelt announced Henry Stimson's nomination to be Secretary of War. Marshall and Stimson had known each other for over twenty years, having met in 1918. Nearly ten years later, Stimson asked Marshall to go with him to the Philippines to be his aide, but Marshall gracefully declined.\textsuperscript{56} Though not personally close, both men held the highest regard for each others' professional competence.

While Clark was securing Stimson's nomination, the MTCA was vigorously campaigning for conscription in the press and on Capitol Hill. Using the newspapers at their disposal and every political contact they could buttonhole, Clark's group sought to convince the public and congress that a draft was absolutely necessary and a prudent means to prepare for a possible war. This campaign was not without expense. The MTCA, now called the National Emergency Committee (NEC), established a budget and received donations of nearly $285,000 to help produce support for conscription; while the combined anti-draft forces raised and spent only $5,000 in their fight against the selective service.\textsuperscript{57}

On 11 June 1940 Clark gave a copy of the proposed conscription legislation to General Marshall. The MTCA found legislative sponsors on 18 June 1940. Congressman James W. Burke,

\textsuperscript{56} Letter Lieutenant Colonel Marshall to Henry L. Stimson, 22 December 1927. See Marshall Papers, Vol. 1, p 322. Marshall responded to Stimson's offer by saying "I am deeply grateful to you for honoring me with this opportunity and I am concerned that you should know just what governed my decision...Now if I became an aide for the fourth time I fear, in fact I feel sure, that to the Army at large I would be convicted of being only an aide and never a commander. With your familiarity with the service, I feel sure you will understand this point of view..." Also, see Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service--In Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p 330-331; Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 251; and Marshall Interviews, 5 April 1957, p 180.

\textsuperscript{57} Clifford and Spencer. The First Peacetime Draft, p 72. Also, see Time Magazine, 17 June 1940, p 17. Because the efforts to pass draft legislation only lasted three vs. the expected six months, only half of the amount was used.
a Republican and vocal defender of preparedness, agreed to sponsor the legislation in the House. Senator Edward R. Burke of Nebraska, a Democrat and long time opponent of Roosevelt’s New Deal, was asked to guide it through the Senate. With the legislation drafted and the sponsors picked on 20 June 1940, the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, as it became known, was formally introduced.

From the 31 May meeting with Grenville Clark until the bill was submitted on 20 June, General Marshall maintained his opposition to conscription. On 1 June, in a press release regarding calling-up the National Guard, Marshall said

The War Department is opposed to ordering the National Guard out for active duty, and is hopeful that by quickly building up, on the foundation of scattered organizations of the Regular Army still available...we can avoid the necessity of utilizing the National Guard at this time.\(^{58}\)

In a 3 June letter to Major General William N. Hakell, Commanding General of the New York National Guard, he wrote, "All our plans are to get such quick increases of volunteers enlisted for duration, as we can manage in order to avoid the necessity of calling for elements of the National Guard."\(^{59}\) On the eve of the bill’s introduction, in a speech to the annual encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Marshall said

Let me strongly emphasize the fact that we must not become involved by impatience or ignorance in an ill-considered, over-night expansion, which would smother well-considered methods and leave us in a dilemma of confused results, half-baked and fatally unbalanced. If I may leave a message with you, let it be this: The War Department knows what is needed...\(^{60}\)

\(^{58}\) Public Relations Branch Press Release, Subject: Statement by Chief of Staff on use of National Guard, 1 June 1940, see Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 233.

\(^{59}\) Letter CSA to General William N. Haskell, 3 June 1940, see Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 234.

\(^{60}\) George C. Marshall speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 19 June 1940, Akron, Ohio; See Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 249.
Without mentioning names, one can recognize Clark and the MTCA's efforts in Marshall's warning. One must ask why then, only a week later, did Marshall change his position and support the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, and what does this shift in position say about his political growth.

The first, and the most significant factor, in Marshall's decision was Henry Stimson's nomination to be Secretary Of War. Stimson's nomination put the fox in the hen house. Being an MTCA member he helped devise the strategy to enact the draft. Clark asked him to accept a presidential call to serve as Secretary of War for the specific purpose of supporting conscription. Now, having been selected and nominated by the President, Stimson was in a position to dictate that the War Department's position on the proposed draft legislation.

For Marshall, Stimson's nomination meant, for the first time since his becoming as Chief of Staff, that a capable, experienced, and respected man would be his immediate superior. To successfully fulfill his duties as Chief of Staff, and more importantly complete his plans for the Army, Marshall understood he would have to work with Stimson. He could have merely continued working directly with the President, effectively by-passing Stimson much as he had done with Secretary Woodring; however, Roosevelt could not allow such a relationship. Having assured Stimson of autonomy in running the Department, Roosevelt realized Stimson may well resign if he believed Marshall, and not he, was in charge of the War Department. Since Roosevelt could not afford to lose Stimson until after the fall election, he could not permit Marshall to ignore the new Secretary of War.

Stimson, not waiting for confirmation, summoned Marshall to his New York home to discuss War Department matters, specifically

61 Stimson and Bundy. On Active Service, p 323.
62 Ibid., p 324. In his interview with Roosevelt, Stimson had told the President he "was in favor of general compulsory military service." Roosevelt said he knew that and "he was in sympathy with me." Roosevelt told Stimson he was to be "undisputed head of his own department."
63 If Marshall even contemplated such action, no evidence suggests he did so.

54
the Burke-Wadsworth Act. On 27 June 1940 Marshall flew to New York to meet with Stimson.64 At the meeting Stimson made it clear to Marshall that he supported the Burke-Wadsworth Bill. Undoubtedly, Marshall tried to convince Mr. Stimson of his and the General Staff's skepticism concerning a draft, but Stimson would not be swayed from his position. However, even after this frank exchange, Marshall and the General Staff still did not totally "form ranks behind Stimson and the Burke-Wadsworth Bill."65

On 7 July one of the Plattsburg group received word that the War Department was going to submit a new draft recommendation to congress offering "a far-better measure prepared by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee" to replace the Burke-Wadsworth Bill. Quickly, Clark notified Stimson of the Army's last minute ploy to significantly alter the bill.66 Stimson assured him that he would, "iron things out."67 On 8 July 1940 Stimson asked General Marshall to meet with him in Washington. There Stimson had all the interested parties meet together to resolve their differences. On the 9 July Clark and his associates met with Marshall and the members of the General Staff. Stimson did most of the talking and quickly established the War Department's priorities. Marshall, "realizing they were in Dutch with the Secretary of War," tried to stress the Army's balanced needs, but without success. As one member of the General Staff recalled later, "We were given our marching orders."68

Marshall was left with the choice of supporting Stimson or taking action to highlight their differences either publicly or directly to the President. Either way, Marshall could not win. If he openly

64 Before the meeting, Marshall wrote and asked General Frank R. McCoy, a mutual friend, "Will you give me a tip on Mr. Stimson, what you may happen to know of his special ideas and what advice you would give me in my approach to him." See Letter CSA to General Frank R. McCoy, 26 June 1940, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 252. Also, see Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 97; Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 147.
65 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 93.
66 Ibid., p 108.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
opposed Stimson, he would lose his across-the-board support in the congress. If he went to the President for a decision, the President may well have sided with Stimson, thus stunting Marshall's growing influence. Remembering General Craig's ineffectiveness due to his split with Secretary Woodring and Johnson, Marshall decided to maintain his philosophy of public support and private dissent. Had Marshall not changed his position and chosen to fight against Stimson and the draft, he would have destroyed his standing and relationship with Stimson, jeopardized his partnership with the President, and fractured the bi-partisan support he was building in the congress. Clearly, siding with Stimson was the precisely the correct political decision.

Another factor which impacted on Marshall's decision to support the draft was the war in Europe. Though he had warned of Europe's blazing in the spring, it is doubtful that even he expected the French and British could be beaten so quickly and decisively. The allies' collapse tempered Marshall's thinking, and suggested events there, were moving much quicker than he had anticipated. Marshall now realized his time-line for rebuilding the Army had been significantly compressed. Not only did he see the wisdom in a draft proposal, he recognized the need to implement it as quickly as possible.

Marshall justified his earlier concern over inadequate training by having the President ask congress to federalize the National Guard. Given the emergency in Europe, congress would surely support such a request. With the National Guard on active duty, Marshall now could fulfill hemispheric responsibilities while at the same time increasing training base support for new draftees. On 12 July 1940, the President activated the first four National Guard Divisions.

---

69 Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p 163. "Stimson...indicated his acceptance under certain stringent conditions, the chief of which was that all traces of the warring factions in the War Department be eliminated...Roosevelt agreed.

70 Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p 192-194.

71 *The New York Times*, 13 July 1940, p 1. "The decision was announced soon after General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, told the Senate..."
The events in Europe not only surprized Marshall, they also jolted the public and congress. Suddenly, a measure which had little or no chance of being passed by congress, was rapidly gaining support. In October 1939 the public had been against a draft by 61 percent. By 1 June 1940, they were split 50-50 on the idea of conscription. On 11 June over 68 percent of the public supported a draft. Marshall's concern that congress and the public would not support a draft had fallen with France.

Finally, Marshall's last concern—the President, was also grasping the change in the political winds. Draft was no longer a five letter word to someone running for election in the fall. With the nomination of Stimson, Roosevelt had given his tacit approved to the Burke-Wadsworth Bill. Once Roosevelt was sure the bill would pass in congress, he put aside his election year fears and publicly supported the bill on 2 August.

Having justified his earlier concerns, Marshall now put his full support behind the draft initiative. In only a few short weeks, Marshall had fought hard to protect his program to rebuild the Army by opposing draft legislation sponsored by a group he vigorously disagreed with. Then, after coming to grip with the political realities of the situation, he completely reversed his position and wholeheartedly embraced the MTCA's draft legislation—the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Though he may have justified this change based on events in Europe, the changing political situation was the real force

Military Affairs Committee that he deemed it 'essential' to call up the entire National Guard for a minimum training of a year 'right now.'
72 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p 197.
73 *Time Magazine*, 17 June 1940, 17. Also, see Clifford and Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft*, p 13, 139.
74 Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p 157. "...the intimation that Roosevelt would support the bill when he felt that the time was right for him to do so. Indeed, Roosevelt by then had already decided on the appointments of Stimson and Patterson, two of the foremost champions of Selective Service."
75 Ibid., p 174. The fact that Wendell Willkie, his likely Republican opponent in fall, came out in favor of the bill also helped Roosevelt to support the Act. Three days later the Senate Military Affairs Committee favorably reported the bill out of committee.
which compelled him to alter his course. Marshall was becoming a politician in the classic sense. He was beginning his transition from military leader to military-politician.

On 24 June 1940 two days after the French signed the Armistice with Germany, Marshall and Stark met with the President and supplied him a "Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning the National Defense" containing nine basic decisions which they felt the President needed to make immediately. The ninth proposal was an "immediate enactment of a Selective Service Act along the lines of existing plans..." Although the details of this proposal were quite different from those of the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, the fact was, Marshall now supported a draft.

In July Marshall testified twice before congress in favor of the bill. Each time he enthusiastically supported it, never displaying or calling attention to his former concerns or misgivings. With each presentation, Marshall skillfully added to his growing relationship with the congress. His testimony was always brief and to the point. His opening statements, usually not more than five or six paragraphs, supplied a brief outline of his major thoughts, he then asked for questions. His answers were detailed and yet brief. He displayed a unique skill to cover complex questions in a very brief and informative way.

Marshall later say of this change, "I was much criticized because I didn't take the lead in the Selective Service legislation. I very pointedly did not take the lead. I wanted it to come from others...Then I could take the floor and do all the urging that was required. But, if I had led off with this urging, I would have defeated myself before I started." See Marshall Interviews, 22 January 1957, p 276.

According to Watson, Marshall never voiced support for the legislation for any political reasons, but solely based his plans to revitalize the Army. Given his original opposition to the legislation, this flexibility was to serve him well in the coming months when his behind the scenes opposition to the President's efforts to provide more and more military materiel to the British would be offset by his public support of the President's actions.

Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Compulsory Military Training and Service. 76th Congress, 3rd session, July 10, 1940, p 1, 100-111. Also, see Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Compulsory Military Training and Service. 76th Congress, 3rd session, July 12, 1940, p 327-349; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 60-61; and Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime
He was not opposed to charming congress by heaping praise upon them. On one occasion he said, "I would like to say, gentleman that the War Department has met the most generous response from the congress in the matter of funds for materiel and for personnel, for the regular establishment over and above the approved budget program." Then in stark candor he would say, "but, however generous you are in the way of funds for materiel that will be ineffective unless we have the trained personnel to handle that materiel."79 Stimson in a rare complaint about General Marshall said he was often too diplomatic. Another staff officer who observed him daily said, "He stuck to his job and did the best he could playing politics with the rest of them, and ultimately proved himself as good as the best..."80

The Burke-Wadsworth Act passed the Senate on 30 August 1940. The House acted on the bill during the first two weeks of September and passed it on 14 September 1940. President Roosevelt signed the legislation on 16 September. In the end, what was originally thought to be a very controversial piece of legislation was rapidly ratified signally a shift in public and congressional opinion.

"Stimson saw this act as one of the two or three most important accomplishments of the American people in the whole period before the outbreak of active war...And as an unprecedented departure from American peacetime traditions, it demonstrated clearly the

Draft, p 186. An example of Marshall's honesty is shown in how he treated a very embarrassing event which surfaced during the heat of the Senate debate. In what he categorized as a "colossal bone," a subordinate staff officer in the Adjutant General's Office suppressed a portion of an Army publication, Recruiting News, in the which Marshall had prepared a message commending the recent recruiting efforts. The staff officer felt that the message would send the wrong signal to congress so he removed the pages from the publication. When Senator Wheeler, a leading opponent of the Bill, "unearthed" the event he thought he had discovered a "real piece of skulduggery." Many in congress, appalled by the Army's actions were outraged. Only through personal involvement and his reputation for candor was the Senate convinced that the event was nothing more than one officer's overt act of zeal and that the recruiting, though progressing well, was not sufficient to meet the Army's demands.

79 Ibid., p 330.
80 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 120.
readiness of the American people to pay the cost of defense in terms more significant than dollars."  

The battle over Burke-Wadsworth was Marshall's first real foray into the political arena. Under Pershing he had observed politics but never practiced its craft. In his early months as Chief of Staff he had played the traditional role as the Army's primary spokesman on appropriation issues. However, he had never been placed in a situation where he had to compromise his goals in order to retain and enhance his political influence; Burke-Wadsworth changed all that. It forced him to choose between the traditional role as the Army's ranking spokesman, or the unexplored role as the Army's politician leader. He choose to break new ground as the Army's political leader.

Burke-Wadsworth provided Marshall an invaluable political schooling. From it, he learned that carefully coordinated action brought about desired results. He learned that public and congressional opinion is fluid and dependent on external forces; forces which can be manipulated to bring about political goals. Though he resented the MTCA's tactics, he learned how successful such tactics could be. He also learned the power of his own philosophy-support in public and dissent in private. As he practiced it, his influence with the President and key advisors, like Hopkins and Morgenthau, grew. Finally, he learned the power of a nonpolitical appearance. As Chief of Staff he could use his newly formed political skills within the context of his office without threatening those that held political office. Burke-Wadsworth had been a tremendous teacher. The debate over Lend-lease would provide Marshall the opportunity to exercise his know-how.

---

81 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p 347.
"Do you believe that Britain and Russia could have held out without Lend-Lease?" General Marshall was asked after his retirement from public life. He responded by saying,

I don't know what the result would have been if we had not had Lend-Lease as to the British and Russians surviving. I think it would have been exceedingly difficult for Great Britain; maybe not quite so difficult for Russia, though they were seriously lacking many, many things. I took the position that any measure then to prevent the complete collapse of Great Britain was of importance to the United States, because it would put the war on a different front, very threatening to us...

Though he supported Lend-Lease much later in his life, he privately voiced strong opposition to the initial concept. Marshall's struggle with Lend-Lease, as he continued his effort to rearm and modernize the Army, provide an excellent study of his political activities during the period between the passage of the Burke-Wadsworth Act and the debate to extend it in the summer of 1941. This period marks his transition from military general to military-politician, and depicts his growing political influence in Washington.

The debate concerning aid to the allies at first involved only a hand-full of presidential advisors and civilian and military leaders. Roosevelt strongly believed that America's first line of defense was

---

2 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries, Part IV The Story Behind Lend-Lease." Collier's (18 October 1947): p 16. Advisors involved with aid to the allies included Harry Hopkins, Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Woodring and other assistants. The Treasury Department was the agency with primary responsibility. One of the primary Army officers involved in early discussions was Major General Hap Arnold.

61
Britain and France; helping them, he believed, was the only way to prevent direct American involvement in the growing crisis in Europe. Without resources, the allies would be seriously hampered in their efforts against the Germans. Often the President stood alone in his conviction to strengthen the allies.

The need for a program capable of supplying the allies with large amounts of aircraft and other war equipment became evident during the German advances into Western Europe. Lend-Lease was a system whereby the United States loaned war equipment to the allies with the understanding that after the war they would either return the items to the United States or pay for them. The concept for Lend-Lease did not develop in 1938 but nearly two years passed before the actual program took shape and became the program which contributed significantly to the allies' success during the war.

At first, although war goods were indeed scarce, availability was not the most difficult part of the President's efforts to assist the allies. Laws forbidding transactions with the warring parties were the President's major obstacle. Strict neutrality laws passed by congress during the 1930's were designed specifically to prevent American participation in European affairs. The two most significant laws were the 1934 Debt Default Act or Johnson Act which prevented the U.S. from either extending loans to or buying bonds from nations who defaulted on World War I loans, and the 1935 Neutrality Law which forbade arms sales to belligerents and forbade use of U.S. shipping in trade of war materials. With the fall of Poland in 1939 and England and France's declaration of war on Germany, congress agreed to amend many restrictive measures of the 1934 and 1935 laws. These amendments allowed the administration to sell the British war goods on a 'cash and carry' basis as long as the transportation restrictions of the 1935 Act were adhered to. With this opening, Roosevelt moved to sell as much materiel to the allies as possible, often using

third party companies to overcome the shipping problems imposed by the 1935 Neutrality Law. With the passage of the 'cash and carry' amendment, the allies, especially the British, began to purchase all the war supplies that the U.S. would sell. From November 1939 until the spring of 1940 over $50 million dollars worth of arms alone were sold. Items included: 75-mm field guns, 3-inch Stokes trench mortars, 40mm and 37 mm anti-tank guns, 303 Enfield rifles, Browning automatic rifles, and cartridges and shells for the weapons. Aircraft such as the P-36's and B-17's were certainly the most urgent and controversial items sold.4

While Roosevelt encouraged the sale of war goods to the allies, Marshall formulated his plan to rebuild the Army into a credible military force. Since the efforts of both men involved the use of scarce resources, a natural and extended struggle began over who would have priority for those resources. Ironically, both men saw their efforts as America's best way to avoid direct involvement in the European war.

Marshall was not alone in his opposition to the sale of valued materiel to the allies; Secretary of War Woodring was also opposed to such assistance but for entirely different reasons. Woodring's opposition came not so much from his concern for Marshall's rebuilding efforts but rather his belief that supporting the allies would end in U.S. intervention. General Marshall's foot-dragging was far more pragmatic and void of any political misgivings. He simply wanted to have the resources needed to properly train and rearm the Army. In February 1940, while meeting with State Department officials, he said "...that much of the materiel needed to equip completely...even the first force (the Initial Protective Force) was still

lacking...and that most of the equipment, even the most antiquated, on the surplus list was of value for training purposes if not for actual replacement..."5 On another occasion Marshall told Morgenthau, when opposing the sale of Enfields and B-17's, "It is a military consideration to us that the allies succeed in stopping this flood, on the other hand," Marshall continued, "we have to weigh the hazards...in this hemisphere..."6 In an 18 June 1940 memorandum to the Secretary of War, Marshall recommendation against selling B-17's to the British, "It is the unanimous opinion of the War Department officers concerned, that it would be seriously prejudicial to our own defensive situation to release any of these ships."7 Four days later in a joint memorandum presented to the President, he and Admiral Stark voiced concern over the flow of war-supplies to the allies by saying "to release to Great Britain additional war material now in the hands of the armed forces ...will seriously weaken our present state of defense."8 Marshall's sense of historic accountability perhaps justified his position for not giving the allies everything possible. To officials in the State Department he said, "His position would be untenable if... we should later be drawn into a conflict and would not have a sufficient number on hand."9

To analyze Marshall's resistance to allied aid, one must appreciate the fact that the national strategy he had been given to implement had little to do with safeguarding Europe; rather it was centered on the defense of the western hemisphere and U.S. protectorates, such as the Philippines and the Hawaii Islands. As far

5 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 303. The Initial Protective Force (IPF) was "to be the emergency defensive force only." The concept was developed during General Pershing's tenure as Chief of Staff. It provided for the IPF to grow from the initial 280,900 Regular Army personnel to 730,00 Regular Army and National Guard soldiers, see Watson, Chief of Staff, p 30.


7 Memorandum CSA to Secretary of War, Subject: Transfer to British of 12 Flying Fortress type planes (B-17). 18 June 1940; see Marshall Papers, Vol 2. p 246-247.

8 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 111. Also, see pages 299-300, 303, 305, and 306. and Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford Press, 1979). p 252.

9 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 303.
back as Roosevelt's first inaugural address in 1933, the U.S. committed to improving relations with South and Central American nations. After the passage, in 1934, of the Platt Amendment and up through 1940, a number of actions were taken to improve relations with the nation's hemispheric neighbors. For example, Cuba was released from restrictions which made it a near protectorate of the U.S. Panama obtained treaty rights which improved its standing with America, while providing the U.S. additional basing sites needed to protect the canal; which was key to the overall defense of the hemisphere. Latin America was advised that armed intervention by the U.S. would be restricted and the whole region would be part of and benefit from a "Good Neighbor" policy. In 1938 the United States assured Canada they would respond to any threats against its safety. The Philippines had been guaranteed the right to become fully independent by 1945. All of these actions were pursued by the Roosevelt Administration with an eye towards reversing the historically bad image of the United States in the area and developing a strong alliance within the hemisphere.  

Naturally, Marshall was quite concerned about the prospects of defending the Western Hemisphere against a possible German invasion or organized subversive activities orchestrated by the Germans against the colonies of countries they had invaded. In October 1940 Roosevelt met with a number of visiting defense ministers from the region and assured them that the inter-American defense program was "one for all and all for one." On 22 May 1940, Marshall provided the Secretary of War and the President a Memorandum, Subject: National Strategic Decisions, which reviewed the Army's perception of national strategic objectives. Marshall's

10 Basing rights in Panama and other countries in the region continued to be a problem through 1941. See Soward, Twenty-Five Troubled Years, p 137-140. Also, see, Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 147-174, for a complete discussion of Americans foreign policy considerations with other Western Hemispheric nations at the time.

11 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 148. This trip was in reciprocation for a visit Marshall made to the region in May of 1939. The purpose of the mission was to ascertain the defense status in the region, see Pogue, Education of a General, p 337-342.
purpose in writing this memo was to gain assurances from the President that the strategic concepts the Army was operating under accurately reflected those of the Administration. The memorandum listed the objectives in order of their priority:

Nazi-inspired revolution in Brazil, widespread disorders with attacks on U.S. citizens in Mexico and raids along our southern border, Japanese hostilities against the United States in the Far East, and Decisive Allied defeat, followed by German aggression in the Western Hemisphere as the imminently probable complications of to-day's situation.

In paragraph six of the Memorandum Marshall said,

'It would appear that conditions now developing limit us for at least a year, more or less, to the conduct of offensive-defensive operations in South America in defense of the Western Hemisphere...'

Both the Secretary of War and the President approved the Memorandum.

Obviously, with such strategic objectives, it was critical for Marshall, as Army Chief of Staff, in fulfilling his responsibilities to develop operational programs which aligned themselves with the stated National security objectives. He could not ignore them without ignoring his primary responsibility as Chief of Staff; hence, Marshall's

---

12 Memorandum, from CSA to not addressed, Subject: National Strategic Decisions, 22 May 1940; see George C. Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 218-219; also, see note 1 on page 219: Marshall gave copies of memo to President and Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells. Also, see Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 144-45.

13 Memorandum from CSA to War Plans Division, 23 May 1940, see Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 220: In the memo Marshall says, "I found the President in general agreement, also Admiral Stark, and specifically, Mr. Welles...They all felt that we must not become involved with Japan, that we must concern ourselves beyond the 180 meridian, and that we must concentrate on the South American Situation." However, FDR, although he approved the memo, still believed the European situation was far more important, long term, to the safety of the Nation than the immediate defense of the Western Hemisphere.
reluctance to give so much of the Nation's war production capacity and materiels to the European allies.

On 22 June 1940 a "Joint Estimate" presented to the President outlining decisive national defense decisions which the President's key military advisors believed he should make, in his role as Commander-in-Chief, for the army and navy to proceed with strategic planning. The paper made nine recommendations to the President. Six of the nine recommendations concerned hemispheric defense issues; all of which, with minor variations, Roosevelt approved. The other three recommendations involved continuing arm sales to Britain, increased arms production at home, and manpower procurement. Regarding further arms to the British, the military chiefs recommended, "...the United States make no further commitments of this sort. They also recommended against commercial producers' acceptance of any munitions orders which would retard the American forces procurement." Roosevelt, according to Marshall's notes, said

In general, yes, but in extending his remarks he made material qualifications. The Army and Navy "would continue to search over its material to see if there was something" to release; the "decision...would have to depend on the situation;"if "a little help" seemed likely to carry Britain through the year..." "we might find it desirable from the point of view of our defense to turn over other materiel..." Commercial orders would be accepted as long as materiel could be employed to block Germany and "without seriously retarding" Army and Navy procurement.  

---

14 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 111. The nine "Basis for immediate Decisions concerning the National Defense, " were, "First, the location of the U.S. Fleet, then based at Pearl Harbor...Second, the continuing question of arms to Britain...Third, the defense of the Western Hemisphere...Fourth, and also with regard to hemisphere defense, the occupation of other strategic positions in the Caribbean and in Latin America...Fifth, American support of existing governments...Sixth, arms for Latin America...Seventh, economic adjustments with Latin American which would recognize that losses were a proper charge to national defense...Eighth, a speed-up of arms production at home...Ninth, speed-up also of manpower..."  
15 Ibid.
The "Phony-War" reduced some allied demand for resources as well as provide American industry time to catch-up. However, during this period congressional concern for foreign military sales increased, resulting in the Senate calling for special hearings concerning the effectiveness of the rearmament program and the effect arms sales were having on the military build-up.

Senate Resolution 244, asked, "Whether the purchase of arms, ammunition, and implements of war...by foreign governments...has delayed or threatens in the future to delay the delivery of arms, ammunitions... including aircraft, to the United States Army..."16 While testifying, Marshall clearly advised senators that questions concerning foreign policy and sales of materiel were clearly not within his responsibility. Senators tried to lure him into taking sides on the issue, he responded by saying, "I do not know about that. You will have to answer that. I presume so. But that is a matter of Foreign Relations quite outside of my bailiwick...I am not championing the allies."17 One Senator asked if the sale of planes to the allies would offend certain governments causing the U.S. to "increase our own national defense as a result...because they feel resentment..." To which Marshall replied, "I must give my own personal view on that. I do not think so. I think the stronger we are...then the better off we are, regardless of other nations."18

Throughout his testimony Marshall strongly supported the President's program to sell war goods to the British. When asked by Senator Chandler of Kentucky, "General, is it your opinion that what we are doing under this policy is in no wise impairing our ability to defend the United States of America in case of emergency?" to which Marshall replied, "Yes sir; I would say and very emphatically, that it greatly bolsters up our strength..."19 One could assume Marshall was attempting to misled the Senate, however, he was merely supporting

16 Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Senate Resolution 244, 76th Congress, 3rd session, March 28 1940, p 1.
17 Ibid., p 14.
18 Ibid., p 15.
19 Ibid., p 16.
the President's policy. He was not sharing with the senate how the President's policy affected the army's efforts for improving hemisphere defense or the Army's urgent training needs.

Another prime concern to the special Senate Committee was the production and sale of aircraft to the allies. On 14 November 1938 General Marshall, then Deputy Chief of Staff to General Malin Craig, and other key advisors, met with the President concerning airplane production and sales to the allies.20 At the meeting the President outlined his plan to build ten thousand additional planes. Roosevelt saw air and sea power as the dominate factors in any future war and key to British and French defense efforts. Everyone at the meeting, but Marshall, agreed with the President's analysis. When asked by the President what he thought, Marshall countered that conventional forces and equipment, not air and sea power alone, would be the deciding factor in any future war. He told the President to ignore land components would prove foolhardy.21

As Roosevelt had pointed out at that meeting, air power was playing a major role in the European war. Now the British and French were desperately seeking greater numbers of aircraft to fight the Germans. At the same time Marshall's Army Air Corps was requesting larger numbers of planes to train an increasing numbers of pilots. Even though production had increased, thanks to the President's farsightedness, production capacity still lagged behind other major world powers. Priority for aircraft production became a key issue between the President and his Chief of Staff. Roosevelt wanted the aircraft to be used by the allies in combat; Marshall wanted them for the Army's pilot training program. Despite this difference, Marshall in his testimony to the Special Committee voiced strong support for the President's efforts. He agreed with Senator Reynolds that by selling aircraft to the allies they were "paying for

20 It was Marshall's first formal meeting with President Roosevelt. While commanding Vancouver Barracks, Marshall had hosted FDR on 28 September 1938.
the development of our national defense," by increasing overall capacity.22

Lacking War Department support for his unofficial program to aid the allies, Roosevelt turned overseer responsibility for reviewing and prioritizing their needs to an old and trusted advisor, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. Secretary Morgenthau processed and coordinated the allies requests for war goods and war-good production priority. The allies told Morgenthau's people what they needed, and the Treasury in turn coordinate the requests with the War Department, generally urging them to give up the items or production priority.

The President's decision to circumvent the War Department, in an area clearly within their purview, proved both a hindrance and blessing to Marshall. Marshall clearly saw that Morgenthau and his advisors' priorities reflected the wishes of the President and not necessarily the Army's defense priorities. It seemed the Treasury Department was oblivious to the Army's rebuilding efforts.23 However, having the Treasury Department oversee military aid required Marshall to deal with Morgenthau directly. From these meetings, Marshall was able to build a strong and lasting relationship with Morgenthau. Quickly, Morgenthau saw in Marshall a man of talent and integrity. Soon Marshall used the relationship as a means to gain presidential support for larger Army appropriations requests.

22 Ibid. Also, see Dobson, US Wartime Aid to Britain, p 20. Six weeks after his testimony before the committee, the "Phony-War" turned real with Hitler's invasion of Western Europe. During this period Britain, who was the major source for American war-goods turned down France's urgent requests for more tanks, guns, and ammunition. Ironically, the British's reason for denying the French would be the same argument later voiced by the Army General Staff in recommending against providing more aid to Britain. Why give aid to a lost cause. The American Ambassador to England, Joseph Kennedy was "reporting pessimistically to Washington (as the British knew full well because they had broken the State Department codes) about Britain's chances of survival and about her will to resist." He later resigned and became one of the President's most vocal critics. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 49-51.

23 Of course, Morgenthau may have had other reasons for listening to the President's urging other than mere loyalty. An out growth of the allies' desperate need for war-goods was the stimulus it provided the U.S. economy. FDR's New Deal had taken heavy criticism for the 1937 recession. The allies' production demands, did much to revive the sagging economy and make Morgenthau's job as Treasury Secretary much easier.
On 10 May 1940 the President met with Secretary Morgenthau, General Marshall, and several others to discuss the events in Europe. During the meeting the President asked General Marshall to "get all of this (needed appropriations) together" and meet with him the following Monday. On Monday, General Marshall stressed, quite forcefully, the Army's immediate and critical requirements in such a way that Roosevelt directed him to return on the 14th, the next day, with a detailed list of all Army's requirements. Ultimately, the President asked Congress for over one billion dollars. This meeting marked a turning point in Marshall's relationship with the President by building both Marshall's confidence in his ability to deal with Roosevelt and the President's confidence in his Chief of Staff's candor.

Marshall's association with Secretary Morgenthau demonstrated his willingness to deal with potential adversaries in a way that resulted in beneficial relationships; not animosity. Marshall was honest and professional in his relations with other members of the Executive branch. He rarely involved himself in battles over lines of responsibility, i.e., turf issues. He furnished those close to the President with carefully crafted information, assured it would be passed on to Roosevelt. As an example, unlike others in the War Department, he allowed Secretary Morgenthau and the Treasury Department to oversee the allied aid program; a program which rightfully belonged within the War Department's purview. He did so without interference or the usual inter-agency strife. Rather he demonstrated his willingness to cooperate by providing honest, prompt, and detailed information.

---

24 Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 209-211, also see, Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 29-32. Secretary Morgenthau was so impressed by Marshall's stand that he later wrote and advised the President on 15 May 1940 to, "Let General Marshall, and only General Marshall, do all the testifying in connection with the Bill..." see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 214.

25 After the 15 May 1940 meeting with Morgenthau, Marshall the next day overwhelmed the Treasury Secretary with the facts and figures he had requested. Having dealt with the likes of Woodring and Arnold in the past, Morgenthau saw in Marshall a man willing to support the President and positively contribute to the decision process. In his diary, Morgenthau makes a number of comments in reference to Woodring's and Arnold's lack of
political skill again and again to turn potentially dangerous situations into ones which enhanced his stature and ability to accomplish his long-term goals.

A significant amount of Marshall's requested budget increase was for B-17 bombers and other aircraft. On 17 May, Marshall met with Morgenthau and told him that it was important to keep enough planes to continue training approximately 200 pilots a month. Marshall said, "We are right at that moment of all these things being synchronized—we keep on receiving the pilots, but we have lost the training ships."26

On May 23 1940, in a memorandum to the War Plans Division, which ultimately found its way to the President, Marshall expressed his concerns over Britain's requests for more aircraft. He told Under Secretary of State, Sumner Wells, that releasing aircraft to the British would "jeopardize the completion of our augmentation of operating units, because it would give up planes being manufactured for the Army, and its training programs, to the British."27 Though Marshall had been instrumental in convincing the President of the Army's need for more aircraft, the events of the summer persuaded Roosevelt to ultimately sell most of those planes to the British. Marshall should not have been surprised by this decision for on 16 May 1940, Roosevelt told the congress not to inhibit his supply efforts to those nations which he felt needed them the most, he said

I ask the Congress not to take any action which would in any way hamper or delay the delivery of American-made planes to foreign nations which have ordered them or

support. "But Woodring and General Hap Arnold dragged their feet. To Woodring's isolationism Arnold added a resentment at Treasury 'interference'..." On another occasion he noted, "But there were other obstacles. A big one was Harry Woodring. See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries. Part IV. "The Story Behind Lend-Lease. Collier's (18 October 1947): p 17 and 71.

26 Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 223-4: see note 3 on page 224. Marshall told Morgenthau that the Army had 150 P-36's and if the British took shipment of 100 of these planes, the pilot training program would be set back nearly six months.

seek to purchase more planes. That, from the point of view of our own national defense, would be extremely short-sighted...

In the weeks prior to the fall of France and the British retreat at Dunkirk, British and French needs for war materials increased considerably. During this period, the British replaced Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain with Winston Churchill, a man accustomed to raising his voice in behalf of the British Empire. Immediately Churchill’s pleas for munitions, arms, tanks, destroyers, and all matter of war goods came to Roosevelt. However, congress, armed with the restraints of the neutrality regulations, was keeping an ever present eye on the sale of war materials to the allies in Europe; thus making it very difficult for Roosevelt to respond to Britain’s needs.

On 3 June 1940 Roosevelt, Morgenthau, Marshall, and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, in an effort to circumvent the intent of the neutrality acts, devised a scheme, whereby, items in the Army’s inventory could be sold to Britain if they were thought to be surplus to the needs of the Army. Though he opposed excessive sales to the British, Marshall nonetheless loyalty participated in exploring ways to accomplish the President’s wishes and at the same time remain within the letter of the law(s). On this occasion, the group decided the goods could be sold if they were acknowledged to be surplus by either the Army Chief of Staff, in the case of Army goods, or the Chief of Naval Operations in the case of Navy surplus, then sold to a domestic company which would turn around and sell the items to the allies. Admiral Stark had a particularly difficult time with this procedure in August when the British asked for destroyers. This procedure was subsequently legalized through an

28 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 138.
30 Secretary Morgenthau, in reassuring the British liaison officer, Arthur Purvis, of Marshall’s resourcefulness, told the story of how Marshall, while serving in China, had sold manure from the stables in exchange for instructors to teach Chinese to his soldiers. See Ibid., p 153-154.
31 According to Watson’s account, Marshall was the one who came up with this procedure. See Ibid., p 153-154.
Act of Congress but only after specific wording was added requiring the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations to certify the surplus status.\textsuperscript{32}

On 7 June, Roosevelt announced that an agreement had been reached "whereby the United States would sell obsolete or surplus military equipment to private firms which would immediately resell them to the allies."\textsuperscript{33} Soon, however, Marshall once again urged caution 11 June when he told his G-4 "No further 75mm guns should be declared surplus, obsolete...that would render them available for sale." Marshall was against the sale because the 75mm was the primary direct support gun of the infantry division, and the Army was already short 3,220 of them. Research showed Marshall that "it would take two years for production to catch up with requirements," thus approving the sale would mean placing the Army in a dangerous position of running short.\textsuperscript{34} A few days later Roosevelt, despite Marshall's urgings, approved the sale.\textsuperscript{35} On 17 June Roosevelt agreed to sell the British twenty old model B-17's. Just as promptly, Marshall in a memorandum to Secretary of War Woodring dated 18 June advised Woodring against the sale because the Army needed the planes in Hawaii, the Caribbean and the Canal Zone.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{32} Pogue, \textit{Ordeal and Hope}, p 51. Also, see Parrish, \textit{Roosevelt and Marshall}, p 146. On 28 June the Congress made the certificate of surplus law by passing the Walsh amendment. Sponsored by the Anti-British Senator from Massachusetts, David I. Walsh, the amendment prevented any materiel from being disposed of--in and manner--unless the "Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations certified that the material was not essential to the National Defense. Interestingly, General Marshall felt the Walsh provision was unconstitutional, even though it gave him a certain leverage over the President, because it gave him a subordinate to the Commander in Chief, authority to override the President's decisions. Also, see Bland, \textit{Marshall Papers, Vol. 2}, p 262, note 1.

\textsuperscript{33} Bland, \textit{Marshall Papers, Vol. 2}, p 237-238. The President's announcement was based on a suggested press release General Marshall had written on 7 June 1940. He stated the release was not used by the President; however, the information issued by the President closely reflected Marshall's recommendations.

\textsuperscript{34} Watson, \textit{Chief of Staff}, p 310-311.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Memorandum CSA to Secretary of War, 18 June 1940. In the memo Marshall said, "This is the only efficient bomber we now possess...Our secret bombsight is built into the plane...They must be held available for the defense of the Canal Zone and the Caribbeans areas...It is the unanimous opinion of the
Yielding to Marshall's pressure, Roosevelt, on 20 June rejected the sale.

Despite Marshall's resistance, Roosevelt continued his strong support for the British. The President believed any items the U.S. could sell would help the British "withstand the German assault...through...the first of the year..."37 The jostling between the two continued throughout the summer, with Roosevelt, naturally, prevailing. Marshall's opposition to the President came only in private, never in public or while testifying before congressional committees. He sometimes stretched the truth regarding the surplus certification process if the President felt a particular item should be sold to the allies. Regarding this hoodwinking, Marshall recalled later, "It was the only time that I recall that I did something that there was a certain amount of duplicity in it."38

In September the President again urged Marshall to allocate a larger share of plane production to the British, especially B-17 bombers. Roosevelt suggested Marshall find a creative way to circumvent the Walsn Amendment. Roosevelt recommended that the Army provide a small number of planes to the British under the guise of combat testing. Roosevelt reasoned that combat testing would be more valuable than simulating war-like conditions in a sterile environment. As Marshall later told General George H. Brett, new Chief of the Army's Air Corps, in an attempt to sell him on the

---

War Department...it would be seriously prejudicial to our defensive situation to release any of these ships, see Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 246-247: On 20 August 1940, FDR approved the sale of five B-17's to the British, see LTC Orlando Ward's Conference Notes, 20 August 1940, Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 292. Marshall had hoped to be able to send five to ten B-17's to the Hawaiian garrison as a means of reinforcing it against possible Japanese invasion. Writing to the President on 18 June 1940, Marshall explained, "We have recognized the urgent necessity for locating a few of these planes in Hawaii but have not done so because of the small number available. They must also be held available for the defense of the Canal Zone and the Caribbean areas.

37 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 111. Also, see Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 258, note 64.
38 Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 262, see note 1 to 12 July 1940 Certificate of Compliance. It should be understood that Marshall's interpretation of "only time" extended throughout the period prior to the formal passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941.
President's idea, "Battle tests are better than peace tests." Although "conscience stricken" at again having to skirt congressional guidance and faced with the perspectives of adding another six months to the Air Corps training time, Marshall agreed to the President's idea and released the planes.

With September came the passage of the Burke-Wadsworth Act, the first peacetime draft in the history of the country. Unfortunately, as Marshall pointed out to the bill's sponsors in the spring, more men in the Army meant more equipment was needed to train them, now even World War I surplus equipment became critical. Unfortunately, the plight of the allies worsened at the same time. Germany's endless bombing convinced the U.S. Army's General Staff that Britain would be unable to last the winter, despite Churchill's assurances. Marshall's advisors, convinced more than ever that the war supplies given to the British would soon be destroyed or fall into Nazi hands pressured Marshall to intensify his fight for resources.

Unfortunately, for Marshall he was quickly becoming the lone advocate for decreasing sales to the allies. With the departure of Secretary Woodring and the arrival of Harry Stimson in June 1940, the scales now clearly favored the President's commitment to the British. Stimson, unlike his predecessor, was a stanch supporter of the British and, as did Roosevelt, believed the country's best defense rested with supporting the British. But Stimson was not blind nor insensitive to Marshall's position either. He knew that the equipment being sold to the British was also needed by the Army to train new soldiers and units, as well as being sought by other South

39 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 307-308.
40 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 62-69.
41 Winston Churchill, "Great Britain Will Not Fall," Vital Speeches of the Day. (September 1940): p 692-696. Speech given by Winston Churchill on 20 August 1940. In the Speech, Churchill said, "Few would have believed we could survive; none would have believed that we should today not only feel stronger, but should actually be stronger, than we have ever been before." Also, see Charles Eade, The War Speeches of The RT Hon Winston S. Churchill, Volume 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953).
42 Stimson and Bundy, On Service in Peace and War, p 355-363.
and Central American nations to improve their defenses. Stimson saw the validity of both sides and tried to support Marshall in his efforts to meet everyone's needs.

Britain and France were not the only allies seeking American war-goods. Many South and Central American countries, along with the Philippines, pressed the State Department directly and Marshall indirectly, to strengthen their country's defenses by suppling more military aid. These countries, not restricted by the Neutrality Laws, expected the United States to give them the items they needed. Marshall, tied to the strategy of hemispheric defense, was one of the few advocates these countries had. For example, the Philippines throughout the summer of 1940 requested small arms ammunition, anti-aircraft materiel, mustard gas, aircraft and aircraft equipment, and assortment of other items. On 7 August, in a memorandum to Secretary Stimson, Marshall was able to persuade the Philippines' critical ammunition needs and have him approve diverting 50,000,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition from the British Purchasing Commission to the Philippines. Stimson agreed to only send 5,000,000 rounds to the British and the 45,000,000 to the Philippines. Later in December, however, Stimson was not so accommodating. He too held President Roosevelt's conviction that Britain and not South and Central America was America's best line of defense. On 23 December 1940 Stimson told the Chief of the American Republics Division in the State Department that "South America was not a theater of war. Therefore no planes could be sent there." Stimson went on to say he regretted this, "but if c... Latin American friends were unable to grasp the most rudimentary requirements of strategy, they mu... lack intelligence." Stimson was allowing Britain's situation to cloud his vision of hemispheric requirements. Marshall, until the strategy was clearly changed, could not do that.

During the late fall to early winter, 1940, Marshall found himself absorbed by events in Washington. The requirements to

---

44 Ibid.
testify before congressional committees increased with his growing reputation for honesty and forthrightness. To General Dawes he wrote, "With Congress in session, I have necessarily had to remain close to home to be available for committee meetings." Those who had marked his first year's performance as Chief of Staff noted his growth in the position. General Craig said in a 31 August letter, "...you have handled yourself and your problems very wonderfully. You have the confidence of Congress and altogether, you can not have many regrets." New Yorker magazine said of the Chief of Staff's Congressional skill at the end of his first year,

In the preliminary stages of preparing for war, a Chief's most valuable asset is a knack of getting along with legislators in order to secure appropriations. General Marshall has it to a degree which veteran Washington correspondents call unprecedented...he is fluid and genial in the best congressional manner...When a congressman asks him a question, he is likely to reply with an extemporaneous monograph that draws an awed response...Records of hearings at which he has appeared are studded with citations from admiring senators or representatives, who say, like Representative Snyder,

45 Hopkins' biographer said of Marshall's first year "Marshall gained (Congress's) confidence by his quiet assurance, mastery of facts and exceptional courtesy..." One must keep in mind that Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, had been selected at the same time. After the attack on Pearl Harbor Roosevelt replaced Stark with Admiral King. Marshall was not replaced. See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 164. Also, see Larrabee, Roosevelt and his Lieutenants, p 116-117 and Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 98. Senator James Byrnes regarding Marshall's efforts to secure passage of the Age-in-Grade bill said, "In Congress nothing just happens, somebody must make it happen." The Age-in-Grade Bill was designed to promote younger officers at a faster rate. It was this act which enabled Marshall to accelerate the likes of Eisenhower, Bradley and over 350 other younger officers. In the interest of the bill, Marshall even offered to resign so that Roosevelt could appoint a younger Chief of Staff. Later Hopkins told Marshall the President had laughed at the suggestion and said "No politician ever resigns a job; that's just talk."


47 Ibid., p 298; see note 1. Also, see 3 September 1940 letter CSA to General Craig in which Marshall replied, "This first year has been hectic...However, I will continue to follow your scheme of doing my damndest and to hell with the result." Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 298.
"General Marshall, I think I voice the sentiment of every member of the committee which I say you have made a most comprehensive, detailed, and elucidating statement."\textsuperscript{48}

Now, more confident with congress and the President, he pushed his program of rearmament and training forward at a vigorous pace. Marshall showed remarkable flexibility during his first year in office. He demonstrated the capacity to turn his defeat into victory. For example, though he did not prevail in his efforts to postpone selective service legislation, Burke-Wadsworth passed despite Marshall's initial efforts to stay it, he took advantage of its passage by securing National Guard federalization and increased appropriations for the Army.\textsuperscript{49} Most powerful men are more concerned with getting their way; Marshall was more interested in preparing the nation for war. Indeed, Marshall may have lost every major battle during his first year in office, but he was an overwhelming winner amongst the legislators in congress and the President and his key advisors. Lend-Lease was the last major political battle Marshall would lose, but once again he would emerge victorious out of defeat.

In the late fall of 1940, the British found they had another problem besides German bombing; they were running out of money to pay for war materials. On 23 November 1940, the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, upon returning from London, declared to reporters in Washington, "Well boys, Britain's broke; it's your money we want."\textsuperscript{50} This situation proved difficult for the President because


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p 323. Now he had the means to build the large scale Army which he knew the country would eventually need. During the last three months of 1940 over 182,000 new soldiers joined the Army. This was nearly equal to the total force Marshall headed on 1 September 1939.

now schemes to sell goods to the British were not enough. He needed to find the where-with-all to help them pay for the war goods also.

Fortunately, for Roosevelt, in early November he won the election despite having supported the Burke-Wadsworth Act, increasing aid to the British, and sought an unprecedented third term. With over 55% of the vote and a perceived mandate, Roosevelt no longer had to hide his belief that it was in the Nation's best interests to fully support Britain. Aid to Britain was absolutely necessary and the public needed to know that.

Like Roosevelt, General Marshall had had similar feelings concerning the need for forthrightness with the public concerning Lend Lease. He was concerned that congress was becoming increasingly hostile due to the perceived duplicity going on. Marshall was very concerned about damaging or even losing the creditability he had built over the past year. In a 20 November 1940 memorandum to the President's military aide, General Watson, he wrote

Every day we are being probed by the press and radio commentators regarding this matter. The question is, in my opinion, do we worry along until there is a leak with additional embarrassments, or can something be said at the present time in the way of a "lead-up" to a deeply interested public--and a critical Congress.51

Now, Marshall was cautioning Roosevelt, to be sensitive to the political ramifications of leaked secrets and hidden deals. Roosevelt told Marshall to inform the press that, twenty completely equipped B-17-C's, Flying Fortresses, were being sent to England in an effort to test them in wartime conditions. Not the complete truth, but as

much as Marshall thought the public and congress could bear.\textsuperscript{52} Marshall was not being noble, just politically realistic. He too could be critical of the public and press, and of the costly delay resulting from having to build consensus, as he was in a 9 November 1940 letter to Major General Keehn, Marshall said:

\begin{quote}
We are trying to organize an Army, and we are still struggling with political aspects...we are wasting our money and gravely risking the security of the United States...If every thing pertaining to the Army has to be put on a town meeting basis, we might as well quit before we start.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Despite these feelings, he was mindful that the press could destroy the efforts of a year, if they felt mistreated or even worse, misled. So Marshall continued to persuade the President to provide the public more details on the measures being taken by the Administration in behalf of Great Britain. Perhaps more than Roosevelt, Marshall realized that the public would support a sound and logical approach to assisting the allies. He recalled from earlier in his career how reaching out to civilian sponsors resulted in greater understanding and acceptance. Conversely, he also knew that deception and isolationism, regardless on what level, bred mistrust and confusion. Marshall believed the American public and congress had to be told what the President's intention were and how he was going to accomplish those objectives. The passage of the Burke-Wadsworth Act had shown him that the voices against greater American preparedness, though loud, were not representative of the

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p 353, see note 2.
\textsuperscript{53} Letter CSA to Major General Roy D. Keehn, 19 November 1940, see Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 351. Responding, General Keehn wrote and told Marshall "Frankly, George Marshall, I am a little worried about your nervousness and high tension. If you will permit a very fine friend and a older head to talk with you quietly, I would like to say--Get some rest and relaxation. You know I know you are the smartest man in the Army, but I believe some of these boys...have gotten under your hide, which you cannot afford to let happen."
majority of the population. When given the facts, the people and the
congress acted responsively.

In December under the guise of a post-election vacation,
Roosevelt set sail for a cruise aboard the USS Tuscaloosa. On the
voyage the President and long-time friend and confidant Harry
Hopkins considered the best method to assist the British.\textsuperscript{54} On
8 December Prime Minister Churchill sent a dispatch to the President
in which he confirmed the situation outlined by his ambassador and
suggested that perhaps the needed items could be sent to the British
as a "gift, loan or supply."\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} Harry Hopkins had been with Roosevelt since FDR's days as Governor of
New York. During that period he became FDR's most trusted advisor, see
Sherwood, \textit{Roosevelt and Hopkins}, p 1-122. Stimson often criticized Roosevelt for
"listing (too much) to his nonconstitutional advisors; however, in Hopkins' case Stimson said, "The more I think of it, the more I think it is a god send that
he should be at the White House (Because of his chronic ill health, Hopkins
lived with FDR at the White House), see Stimson and Bundy, \textit{On Active Service
in Peace & War}, p 333-334. Hopkins was also an important advisor to Marshall.
They had met in 1938 while Hopkins was being touted by FDR to run for
President in 1940. Hopkins had sought Marshall's advice on military matters,
see Pogue, \textit{Ordeal and Hope}, p 23-25. Marshall later said of Hopkins, "he was
having great influence on him (FDR)--he was in a very, very high position in
this country, and I think I did a very wise thing, but it was a very difficult
ting to do. I made his acquaintance, and I won him over...I won his respect.
He thought I knew what I was doing and after that he was advising the
President to follow my advice and he remained my supporter for many years."
See \textit{Marshall Interviews}, 5 April 1957, p 181-182. One of Hopkins biographers
said, "Perhaps Marshall felt indebted to Hopkins. Many years later he said that
he had always believed that Hopkins had been responsible for his appointment
as chief of staff." But Hopkins also had a profound respect for Marshall and
admired his "steadiness, self-control and devotion to duty." see McJimsey,

\textsuperscript{55} Letter/telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, C-43x, 7 December 1940, see
\textit{Churchill & Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence, I, Alliance Emerging
October 1933- November 1942}, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1985), p 106. The phase actually dealt with the disposition of fleet
protection, but in points/paragraphs 14-16 of the letter Churchill also brings
up aircraft and other munitions. Robert Sherwood, one of Harry Hopkins'
biographers, maintained that the idea for Lend-Lease came from a little known
law passed by Congress in 1892, during the Harrison Administration which had
authorized the Secretary of War to lease Army property "when in his
discretion it will be for the public good." Sherwood, \textit{Roosevelt and Hopkins},
p 51& 228.
Encouraged by Marshall, endorsed by Hopkins, and moved by Churchill, Roosevelt decided to go public with his thoughts on a formal comprehensive military aid program for the allies. On 17 December 1940, at a press conference in South Carolina, he told the press that he believed the best possible defense of the United States was the successful defense of Great Britain. He unveiled his idea to share war materiel production between the United States and its allies, based on military priority and not the ability to pay. Military priorities would determine the proper allocation of America's industrial production; payment would be settled after the emergency.

On 29 December 1940, Roosevelt, finally, outlined his vision for aiding the allies. The "Arsenal of Democracy" speech detailed to the world, for the first time, America's direction and commitment in its struggle against Germany. The speech did three things for the heretofore helter-skelter effort of supplying the British. It provided Britain the financing needed to continue to receive war goods. It gave the American government complete and badly needed authority over the whole field of military supplies, to include centralized distribution and procurement of weapons. And, finally, it clearly placed the allegiance of the nation on the side of the allies with what amounted to an economic declaration of war on Germany.56

Not surprising, especially to Marshall, the public strongly supported Roosevelt's. A Gallup poll, shortly after the speech, showed 61% of those asked supported President's idea, while only 21% opposed it.57 Here, it seems, the ability to gauge the public mood was becoming another weapon in General Marshall's political arsenal.

In his first Biennial Report, published 1 July 1941, Marshall characterized the Lend-Lease Bill as "a complete reversal of the

situation in 1917-1918 when our allies provided us with practically all of our munitions."\footnote{58} Indeed the concept of Lend-Lease was not novel but the scale was staggering. "At 12:21 p.m., on Friday, 10 January, Rep John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, House Majority Leader, dropped a sheaf of paper into the legislative hopper. A moment later H.R. 1776 was on its way to the Congressional Record."\footnote{59} Much like the Buke-Wadsworth Act, the War Department had little to do with formulating or writing the Lend-Lease legislation. The Treasury Department General Counsel drafted the bill and only 13 others reviewed the President’s plan for future war aid. Never before had such sweeping presidential powers been suggested. In the legislation the President was given power, when in his judgment it was in the interest of national defense, to have the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy, without consent of the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, "To manufacture...or procure, any defense article for the government of any country...To sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article..." All without congressional knowledge or approval. The congress, the public, the General Staff, and the allies were stunned. Truly, the President’s concept of an "Arsenal of Democracy" was far greater than anyone had conceived.\footnote{60} The vast Presidential powers included in the actual bill sparked fears of a American dictatorship, specially given Roosevelt's unprecedented third term.\footnote{61}

\footnote{58} Department of War, Office of the Chief of Staff, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941 To the Secretary of War (July 1941), By General George C. Marshall, p 9. 1 July 1941, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941. (Referred to hereafter as Marshall, Biennial Report.)


\footnote{60} Ibid. Also, see Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 254-255. Two Treasury legal advisors, Edward H. Foley and Oscar Cox, were responsible for drafting most of the legislation, and took the Pittman-Bloom Act of 1940 as the model for the Lend-Lease Act. Cox later became one of Hopkins most able assistants in administering the Lend-Lease Program. Also, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 228-229.

\footnote{61} See Time, 10 February 1941, p 17; Newsweek, 17 February 1941, p 17-19; Newsweek, 20 January 1941, p 15-17; The New Republic, 20 January 1941, p 69-
The bill was a double-edged sword. Stimson said that it "enabled the United States to exercise effective coordination and control over all production of defense articles in the United States..." and gave the allies, especially Britain, more time to prepare for the long anticipated German invasion. But, even as it gave the British more time, it robbed Marshall and the General Staff of the materiel they needed to build and train the Army.62

Much to the surprise of the Army General Staff, Marshall endorsed the concept of Lead-Lease. Although not a convert to Roosevelt, Morgenthau, or Stimson's affinity for the British, he did see in the President's proposal, at last, American gearing-up its industrial complex for mass production of war materials. No longer would there be a need to unevenly divide production between the British and America's requirements, which had been one of Marshall's main points of contention to the President's previous efforts. Now, he saw a program he could rely on and support; one which was orderly, long-term, and tied to strategic considerations.63

The battle lines for the debate over the Act were quickly drawn and unlike the battle over Burke-Wadsworth, those opposing the President's plan were well organized and financed. Led by the America First Committee, based in Chicago, the isolationists joined forces with those, mainly Republicans, who simply hated or distrusted Roosevelt and feared presenting him such enormous

70 and 10 February 1941, p 178. "Pass the Lease-Lend Bill," Senator Tom Connally, of Texas, delivered over the National Broadcasting Company, 17 February 1941; and "Let Us Keep our of Foreign Wars," Senator Arthur Capper, of Kansas, delivered over the Radio, 7 February 1941. See Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 March 1941, p 292 and p 295. The Congress and public were concerned with the vast Presidential powers included in the bill. The Army was concerned that the President had complete say over the type and amount of war materiels to be given to the allies. Though Marshall felt the Walsh Amendment was unconstitutional, it did at least give him an opportunity to review all aid proposals and recommend to the President what should and should not be given to the allies. Now, with Lend-Lease, no requirement for Service Chief approval was needed.

63 Letter CSA to Congressman Bloom, 29 January 1941, see Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 400. Also, see Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 55-71; and Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 254-255.
powers. Familiar names from the battle over the draft once again
came forth to oppose Lend-Lease; Charles Lindbergh, Senator Burton
Wheeler of Montana, who said passage of the Act would, "...plough
under every fourth American boy," Representative Hamilton Fish of
New York, and Alfred Landon of Kansas.64

Fortunately, for the Roosevelt Administration, it now presented
a united front. With Woodring and other malcontents gone, and
strong public figures like Stimson and Navy Secretary Knox solidly
behind the President, Lend-Lease supporters were confident of a
quick victory.65 However, the key to the Roosevelt victory came not
from any of these practicing politicians, but from the one man who
prided himself on never having voted, George C. Marshall.

In a memorandum to General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief War
Plans Division, Marshall told him he would be called to testify before
the Foreign Relations Committee on the issues of Lease-loan. He
asked Gerow to prepare possible replies to questions concerning the
size of the Army. Marshall was called to testify before the House
Committee on 27 and 28 January 1941.66 The day following his
appearance, he held a news conference where he stated that since
the first phase of the Army's expansion program was not complete,
he was, "not planning to spare any of our existing equipment to the
British because we have not yet filled out our own program."67
Obviously, even though Marshall supported the legislation, he did not
support immediate wholesale supplies to the British at the expense
of his rearming program. This slip caused Marshall some
embarrassment but he quickly took action to cover lost ground and

64 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 259.
65 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 228-229. Roosevelt also had twenty-seven million recent American votes which the Congress could not ignore. Ironically, one of the bill's major supporters was Wendell Willkie FDR's recent presidential opponent. He warned his party that if they blindly opposed the bill, they would, "never again gain control of the American Government."
66 Memorandum CSA to General Leonard T. Gerow, 21 January 1941, see
67 New York Times (New York), p 1 and 6, 29 January 1941. Also, see Bland,
Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, note 2, p 400-401. Marshall wrote to Congressman Bloom apologizing for discussing matters which had been addressed in a Executive
Session of the Committee debating Lend-Lease.
reiterate his support for the legislation. After only six days of House Committee hearings and floor debate, on 8 February 1941, the House of Representatives passed the bill, with amendments, by a vote of 260 to 165. Now it was the Senate's turn to act upon the legislation. Ironically, their decision would not be made on the Senate floor but behind closed doors.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings opened on 27 January 1941. Again the administration sent Morgenthau, Hull, Stimson, and Marshall to the Hill to testify in behalf of Lend-Lease. All restated their fears that Britain would not hold-out without Lend-Lease. Morgenthau even predicted that "Britain, China, and Greece would have to "stop fighting" unless H.R. 1776 was passed." Marshall reported before a secret session that 70,000 planes were poised for an "all-out attack on the British Isles this spring." On 17 February, after nearly a month of testimony, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent the bill to the Senate floor by a vote of 15-8. Unfortunately, the Senate was not as convinced about the merits of the legislation as the public. In a poll taken on 17 February 1941, 54% of America supported the bill and only 22% opposed it. Once the bill was sent to the floor the opposition made a last ditch effort to amend and talk it to death. The two major stumbling blocks were an amendment requiring congressional approval prior to materiel being shipped to Britain. The administration believed the amendment would, as Stimson said, "take the guts right out of the bill." The other obstacle was the Ellender amendment which restricted the use of U.S. forces outside the western hemisphere.

As the President's forces marshalled to combat these destructive

---

68 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 275. Among the amendments was a provision to terminate presidential powers at any time with a resolution from Congress. Also, a $1,300,000,000 ceiling was set for the value of military and naval equipment to be leased.
69 Later revised to 36,000 planes.
71 Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, page 172.
72 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p 281-282. The Administration eventually agreed to a innocuous substitute.
changes to the legislation, the President was sick in bed with influenza. Undaunted, Roosevelt directed them to gather those key senators who were uncommitted and convince them to vote for the original bill.73

On 4 March 1941 Secretary Stimson held a meeting in his office with Senators Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, Walter F. George of Georgia, and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Jimmy Byrnes of South Carolina. Other Cabinet members such as Morgenthau, Hull, and Knox were also in attendance. Stimson had prearranged for Marshall to "drop-in" after the meeting was in session. As planned, Marshall casually came by Stimson's office. Stimson invited him to share with the assembled group his thoughts on Lend-Lease. Then in his precise, logical, common sense manner, Marshall detailed the benefits of enacting the original bill. Stimson's subterfuge worked and on 11 March 1941, Lend-Lease became law. After the meeting, Secretary Stimson said of Marshall's presentation he "gave a ripping good speech on it... He made a great impression on the senators, who evidently don't know much about the whole situation." The only restrictions added to the bill were the right of appropriation and the requirement to submit regular reports.74

Though Marshall never supported the concept of aid to the allies and fought privately to lessen its impact on the Army even after Lend-Lease's passage in March, he did come to appreciate the benefits of the President's policy: increased industrial capacity, improved product development resulting from war-time testing, and improved cooperation and coordination with the allies. These benefits enabled him to publicly support the President's initial

73 Parish, Roosevelt and Marshall, page 172.

74 Blum, Years of Urgency, p 227. Also, see Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 65-71. Newsweek, p 17-19, 17 March 1941. Bland, Marshall Papers, Vol 2, 436-437. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace & War, p 360-363. Langer and Gleeson, The Undeclared War, p 285. Parish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 168-173. Parish said of Marshall's role in Lend-Lease's passage, "Although Morgenthau acted more or less as the administration's official shepherd for the...bill, the Roosevelt-Marshall partnership in which the President created and enunciated broad policies and the chief of staff carried them through the legislative committee, continued to evolve."
program for foreign sales and later the concept of Lend-Lease, over the objections of the Army's General Staff.

Marshall's response to Roosevelt's policy clearly separated him from other recent Chiefs of Staff and War Department leaders. His demonstrated willingness and ability to support, improve, and foster policies he disagreed with, impressed Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Morgenthau. In Marshall, they saw a Chief of Staff who could be trusted. One who could opposed the President in private, but would never publicly call attention to such opposition. His actions throughout the Lend-Lease debate advanced him into the President's inner circle of trusted advisors.

His stature not only increased at the White House, but also on Capitol Hill. Legislators were beginning to see Marshall as someone they could trust - someone willing and able to discuss candidly and in detail the pressing defense issues. The polarization between civilian and military seemed to diminish when Marshall testified. Here was a man of authority, honor, and conviction. And although he worked for the President, they felt he also answered to them.

In a 10 March 1941 letter to General Pershing, Marshall described the hectic days prior to the bill's passage and his involvement with the legislation.

The fact of the matter is, the past two weeks have been terrific here, due to a number of matters, particularly the preparations for the passage of the Lease-Loan Bill, as well as business in connection with its passage. My days have been spent in conferences with the State Department, at the White House, before Committees of Congress, and with the Advisory committee for National Defense, until I have had but an hour or two to devote to the Army, as such.75

Marshall clearly understood that the duties of the Chief of Staff had expanded into political areas which were unknown to

Pershing and his successors. Marshall spent most of his time contributing to the political process by coordinating political tactics, advising the President, testifying before congress, and lobbying individual senators or congressmen. Despite his stated distaste for such political activity, he knew it was his most important and demanding function.

Perhaps Marshall could have avoided politics, focusing solely on tradition Chief of Staff duties. To some degree he had done that the previous summer when Grenville Clark and the MTCA pushed the Burke-Wadsworth Amendment through congress. Then, Marshall waited for others to come forth, fearing that Army's involvement. He had been embarrassed by Clark's initiative, courage, and success. Marshall now realized that inaction resulted in others pressing legislation which did not fit into his overall plan. He now realized he could shape and influence legislation which would serve his and the Army's goals. Never again would he stand on the sidelines and merely reacting to others political activity. In just a few months Marshall demonstrated his political prowess by being the political force responsible for the extension of the Burke-Wadsworth Act.

---

76 Letter CSA to Senator Wadsworth, 21 February 1941, see Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 426-427. Also, see Letter CSA to Senator Lodge, 4 March 1941, Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 435-436. See notes 2 & 3. Lodge had initially opposed the Lend-Lease bill because he believed it would grant excessive powers to the President. Lodge later broke ranks with his Republicans colleagues on March 8, as the Senate voted sixty to thirty-one in favor of Lend-Lease...Lodge, quoting the chief of staff's letter, explained in a prepared statements that Marshall's beliefs accounted for his shift of position." See New York Times, 9 March 1941, p 21.
EXTENDING THE DRAFT--WORKMANSHIP OF A POLITICIAN

No sooner was Lend-Lease signed into law than Marshall was embroiled in another political debate--the fight to extend Burke-Wadsworth and National Guard federalization. This time, however, he would not wait for others to define the issues. Stepping from behind the President's shadow, Marshall moved to set the agenda, initiate the action, and carefully direct extension legislation through the conference rooms of the Capitol onto the floor of the congress. Marshall's efforts were not taken in reaction to events thrust upon him as was the case with the original Burke-Wadsworth Act; this time he knew what steps were needed to bring about the extension. Through these efforts, Marshall's transition from military leader to military-politician is realized.

The President signed the Lend-Lease Bill on 11 March 1941. With its enactment, however, the earlier problems of allocating war-goods were not readily resolved. Unfortunately for Marshall his support and participation in the bill's passage did not earn the army a greater share of materiels. Roosevelt, with his "popularity at an all-time peak of 72%, as compared with 55% on election day..." was confident the American public supported his efforts to strengthen the British even to the detriment of America's own preparation war effort.

1 *The New York Times*, 30 July 1941, editorial page, section C. "The most important debate in congress since the adoption of the Lease-Lend Act is scheduled to begin today, when the Senate takes up the proposal to extend the present period of training for selective service men and National Guardsmen."

2 Britain's immediate requirements coupled with the Army's training requirements continued to overwhelm American industrial. See Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p 318-322.

3 *Newsweek*, p 17, 24 March 1941.

4 See Bland, *Marshall Papers*, Vol. 2, p 439. FDR made Harry Hopkins his unofficial Lend-Lease coordinator. With this new responsibility, Hopkins flew to Britain to get a first hand look at what the British were facing and make an
As Marshall battled for more resources, he became very concerned over the looming end to the one-year service selectee training period. Selectee length of service had been one of the major issues of the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Originally, the bill’s sponsors, the MTCA, had asked for eight months. General Marshall and the Army General Staff had suggested 18 months. When asked how long the draftees term of service should be, he said:

Well, if we were allowed to set the figure, we would say 18 months. I am willing to compromise on 15 months, but it certainly must be at least a year. There is so much lost time in getting the men in and getting the men out that when you say a year, you only have them for about 11 months.

Marshall remarked a year later, in his testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs, that "I went from cold military reason to plain political expediency. I wanted the Selective Training and Service Act to pass and for that reason alone I was willing to compromise."7

Marshall was not the only one beginning to think about the upcoming deadline imposed by the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Selectees, guardsmen, parents, loved ones, and congress, especially the House of Representatives were all starting to ask if the promise to release the troops at the end of the year was going to be kept. Congress first

---

5 The National Guard federalization debate had also focused on the period of call-up. The National Guard’s Federalization Act, passed on 27 August 1940, stipulated a one-year period.


asked General Marshall that question on 5 March 1941 during his testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations. Representative Scurtes of Alabama asked "General Marshall, what is contemplated with reference to the National Guard troops? Do you contemplate keeping them in service longer than the year for which they are ordered?" Responding, General Marshall said "I would not use the word contemplate; we do not know yet. It depends entirely on the situation. If the Lord is good to us, they will be returned to their home." On 7 March 1941, the *Washington Post* reported the War Department was preparing to ask for a six to twelve month extension of both the National Guard and draftees. The War Department vigorously denied the report. Despite these politically motivated denials, Marshall and the Army General Staff had known from the time the Buck-Wadsworth Act was passed, that the service of both the draftees and the guardsmen would have to be extended. In fact, the General Staff's planning for deploying these groups was based on an infinite enlistment period. The problem faced by the General Staff was unique in American history. Never before had the War Department had to plan for the army's mobilization, demobilization, and mobilization all within a twelve month period.

Marshall, wanting to organize the army in the manner which made it most combat ready, integrated the Regular Army, National Guard, and draftees in a fashion which would draw upon each group's strengths. Accordingly, the National Guard Units had from

---

9 On 13 March 1941, in a memorandum CSA to General Richardson, Director, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, Marshall directed that efforts be taken to let the public know that the matter of extending the selectees and guardsmen had not yet been decided. This was in response to a *Washington Post* report that the decision had been made to ask for the extension. See Bland, *Marshall Papers, Vol. 2*, p 444, note 2. Also, see Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p 215.
30 to 50 percent of selectees in their ranks; all the National Guard Units had a certain number of reserve officers; and the Regular Army units had a portion of each group but National Guard, in their ranks. As Marshall later told the House Committee on Military Affairs, "...we have a veritable melange, a complete interweaving of all components in the Army..." Since each of the various components had different rules or law restricting their respective usage, Marshall remarked before the House Committee on Military Affairs that to keep track of all the laws governing how to utilize the soldiers in the army "I need a lawyer constantly at my side..." The army would have to be literally torn apart and put back together if the federalization of the National Guard and Selective Service Acts were not extended.

Since Marshall was responsible for the composition of the force, some argued that he intentionally created such a complex mixture, knowing full well how difficult it would be to dismantle a year later. Senator Reynolds of North Carolina, Chairman of the the Military Affairs Committee, said, "General Marshall's excuse for these resolutions is that the selectees are all mixed up with men of the Regular Army...I can't accept that argument; he knew what the law was when he mixed the men up that way. It's his problem, not ours." Senator Austin, of Vermont, asked General Marshall, "I have heard criticisms which conveyed the charge that selectees have been infiltrated into ordinary units and sent away to outlying possessions of the United States in order to force the hand of Congress...what would you say about that?" Whether Marshall's and the Army

---

11 Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, _Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service of Draftees_, 77th Congress, 1st session, July 22 1941, p 27.
12 Ibid., 22 July 1941. Also, see Marshall, _Biennial Report_ 1939-40, p 21. Another criticism of Marshall's integration plan was the deployment of selectees to overseas locations such as Hawaii and Alaska as a means of forcing congress to extend the Selective Service legislation.
General Staff's actions were politically motivated one cannot prove. Marshall in his testimony before the Senate maintained the configuration and assignment of selectees and National Guard units was based solely on training, availability, and deployment considerations. Nevertheless, the composition of the army and the effects nonextension would have on it, proved to be the most convincing argument congress had for passing the extension. If this was a calculated gamble on the part of Marshall, it was a stroke of sheer political brilliance.15

If political considerations did not play a part in Marshall's method of building the army, they certainly were a reason why the Administration hesitated, asking congress to extend the term of service for draftees and guardsmen. A leading voice for the isolationist movement, the Chicago Tribune, said shortly after the bill was passed Roosevelt would "renege on his promise to release the troops at the end of the year."16 Stimson discussed the prospects of such legislation with a number of Senators and Congressmen in March 1941, and they were nearly "unanimous in their assertion that it could never pass."17 The President, despite his unprecedented approval rating at the end of March, felt the public, although willing to lend military aid to the British, would not support keeping

15 Ibid., Marshall responded to Senator's Austin question by saying, "Senator Austin, exactly the opposite has been the case. I have been personally responsible for the assignments to foreign service. With the greatest reluctance, I was forced to the conclusion that in certain specific cases we must send units upon foreign service which were National Guard units or which had in their ranks selective men. In order to hold these categories to the absolute minimum, we almost destroyed the divisions of the Regular Army in order to provide the troops required." The author tends to believe it was both a matter of necessity and realization that the legislation would have to be extended. The Army had grown from 174,000 men on 1 July 1939 to 1,400,000 men on 1 July 1941. Such an expansion could have been accomplished either by component or melting the parts into a whole organization. Marshall knew an Army of component parts would be the easiest to dismantle in a year but would not be the one most combat ready. He built the Army for combat. Also, see p 6.
16 Pogue, Ordeal in the Day, p 146.
17 Stimson and Bundy, On Service in Peace and War, p 376-377
American boys in uniform.\(^{18}\) Marshall, in his testimony to the House discussed his frustration over this dichotomy saying, "I can get billions of dollars with comparative ease; but, when I get down to the practical proposition about personnel, then my real difficulties begin."\(^{19}\)

In a 16 May 1941 letter Marshall told General White, the Commanding General of the Forty-first National Guard Division, that the issue of returning guardsmen to their home states was a "matter of urgent importance," and asked him what the reaction would be if the President announced that he was contemplating asking for an extension. Marshall pointed out that the President's decision would probably be based on "political or public reactions" and not "on the details which concern us in the Army."\(^{20}\)

Marshall, sensitive to the public relations realities of the situation, attempted to mold its opinion. In a 11 March 1941 memorandum to one of his speech writers, Lieutenant Colonel A. Robert Ginsburgh, Marshall requested a speech be prepared which captured "the remarkable morale which has dominated these

---

\(^{18}\) Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p 281. For example, the isolationist raised "considerable ruckus" when the War Department had on one of their lists of textile requirements, an item called the "overseas cap". To the isolationist, the term "overseas" spelled A.E.F., and they would have no part of another A.E.F.

\(^{19}\) Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs. *Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service of Draftees*. 77th Congress, 1st session. 22 July 1941, p 27. Marshall told the House member: that "all of that effort, all of those billions are futile unless you provide the highly trained personnel."

\(^{20}\) Letter CSA to Major General George A. White. 16 May 1941, see *Marshall Papers, Vol. 2*, p 507-508. In his reply to General Marshall White said "I believe that a Presidential request on congress to extend the period of service of the civilian components will be accepted as the inevitable and only possible course." Also, see Letter CSA to Lieutenant General Drum, 26 April 1941; see *Marshall Papers, Vol. 2*, p 486. Marshall felt the opinions of the first draftees and guardsman who were enduring trying conditions which the millions that followed would not have to endure, might play an important part in the public debate over extension. In a 26 April 1941, letter to General Hugh Drum, Marshall said, "I think one of our most serious reactions in connection with the Selective Service Act, which may adversely affect its continuance, will be generated by the alert, well ordered minds of many selectees who have been assigned to National Guard divisions." Also, see 19 May 1941 memorandum CSA to General Richardson, *Marshall Papers, Vol. 2*, p 516.
(National Guard) units...contrasted to quibblings and bickerings...the long debates in Congress...which has produced so much confusion in the public mind..."21 Marshall knew the guardsmen and draftees simply wanted to get back home to their families and jobs and enjoy the nation's new-found prosperity. However, Marshall, on the other hand, also needed public support for his efforts to build a combat-ready army. As he told the twenty-ninth annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce,

...I feel sometimes that we are diverted from the main issue by so much of statistics about this or that, so much of argument about this delay or that delay, this opinion or that opinion. We have a great Army in the making...but it needs more than anything else the...support from every side and on every hand in this country.22

Given the worsening world situation, it was, in Marshall's opinion, vital to the nation's security to extend the draftees and guardsmen's term of service. He knew what needed to be done, but getting the President to submit the request to the congress would be another matter. On 7 March 1941, Roosevelt, when asked at a press conference if the National Guard was going to be given an additional six or twelve months training, said, "I don't know; what do you mean?" Probing further the reporter said, "There's a story out that...General Marshall thinks that is necessary and will ask for

21 Memorandum CSA to Lieutenant Colonel Ginsburgh, 11 March 1941. See Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 441-442. The speech was delivered over the N.B.C. radio network on 5 April 1941. At this time Marshall, under criticism from the media and was trying to develop a campaign to counteract growing sentiment against the Army. In a 22 March letter CSA to Mr. Westbrook Pegler, syndicated columnist, Marshall answers criticism that "high ranking army officers were more likely to go around posing as suburban taxpayers and leaders of the P.T.A. than to wear their uniforms." See Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 451-452.

22 Bland. Marshall Papers, Vol. 2, p 490. Marshall was receiving support and praise from numerous quarters in the press. The 5 May 1941, issue of Time, said of Marshall and the Army he was building, "...the Army is over the hump. It is far better off than was the U.S. Army of 1917. It will soon be the first Army-in-being ready to fight... The job has worn George Marshall, but it has not broken him." p 24.
legislation on the subject." To which the President replied, "That's a
new one on me; I'll ask about it." If he did ask, he did not do it
very quickly or with much enthusiasm. Roosevelt did not want to
raise the extension question. As Hopkins' biographer said, "He was
again afraid of fear itself." Perhaps the President believed that he
had made a pledge with the draftees and guardsmen and feared the
political fall-out from breaking such a promise. Possibly he was
convinced monetary aid to the allies alone would be sufficient to
slow the Germans. Whatever the reason, he refused to introduce a
request for extension to congress.  

On 17 June, after a great deal of prodding from Marshall, the
President announced that the Administration was studying a plan to
keep the National Guard on active duty for another year, but made
no mention of extending the Burke-Wadsworth Act. On 20 June
1941 Marshall sent the Secretary of War a memorandum outlining
reasons why the guardsmen should be retained, and why the
decision to retain must be made as quickly as possible. Marshall said
there were seven factors affecting the decision to extend: morale,
employment of guardsmen, state interest, staff planning, selective
services, construction, and base task forces. After receiving Marshall's
detailed memorandum, Stimson, the same day, sent Roosevelt a
memorandum urging him to issue a joint resolution to congress
asking for an extension of the guardsmen and draftees. On 26 June
1941 the President instructed Stimson to "go ahead and get
something started as soon as you can." The President's change of

---

23 Roosevelt Presidential Press Conferences, Number 724, 7 March 1941,
Volume 17:180.
24 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 367.
25 Farrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 175. Also, see Katherine T. Marshall,
Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 146.
26 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 217-218.
27 Memorandum CSA to Secretary of War, 20 June 1941, Marshall Papers,
Vol. 2, p 541-542. See notes 1 and 2 on page 542-543. Also, see Kreditberg and
Henry, History of Military Mobilization, p 593. There is no indication from
either Stimson's work on this period or Dr. Pogue's work on Marshall that the
President's statement resulted in Marshall submitting a biennial report to
congress. Watson's work suggests that the President remained relatively
heart was not precipitated by changes in the political climate but by world events. On 22 June 1941 Germany surprised the world by attacking her former ally the Soviet Union.28

Marshall could not understand the President’s reluctance. With world events unfolding at an incredible pace, Marshall knew the Burke-Wadsworth Act provided for an automatic extension of draftees’ term of service if the President declared a national emergency. Surely, Germany’s latest构成了 an emergency. Marshall knew it was only a matter of time before the Nazi’s, having completed their conquest the Soviet Union, would seek to invade England. Marshall could no longer wait for the President to study the matter, he would take the decisive action to protect the army from the disastrous break-up which would occur by allowing the guardsmen and draftees to go home.

Action was needed and needed quickly. Having seen the success of Grenville Clark a year earlier, Marshall decided to go directly to the congress with his case. While horseback riding General Marshall came upon the idea of using the Chief of Staff’s annual report as the vehicle to recommend to congress to extend the

dormant even after the German invasion into Russia. Watson suggest that because of the President’s lack of action, Marshall decided to publish an annual report; something he had felt unnecessary a year earlier, see Watson, Chief of Staff, p 219. In trying to justify Roosevelt’s seemingly nonchalant attitude about a crucial issue at a critical time, Parrish in his work on Marshall and Roosevelt maintains that the President was using Marshall as “his Stedgehammer” to take the tough, controversial military/war preparation issues before congress. According to Parrish, the President believed congress was more willing to do what a respected Chief of Staff wanted than a political president, see Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 160-178. If Parrish is correct in his thesis, then the question left unanswered is did Marshall know he was being used? The author does not believe Marshall knew he was another Roosevelt pawn. Rather, Marshall had a difficult time understanding how Roosevelt could be so cavalier in such pressing times. It was not until later in their relationship did Marshall gain a respect for Roosevelt’s unique leadership style.

28 Watson, Chief of Staff, p 218. Also, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 303. Just as this dramatic turn of events may have moved FDR to support the War Department’s extension effort, it also affected many of his critics. For example, the day following the invasion, the American Communist party replaced all its pro-Hitler slogans with pro-Britain and pro-Lend-Lease ones. For the first time in two years the group was pro-interventionist and pro-FDR.

99
Selective Service Act. A year earlier, he declined to submit the annual report. Now, however, he saw the report as a way to apprise the congress of the army's progress, underscore the growing threat to the country, and detail the peril the army faced if the draftees and guardsmen were not extended.

Such action by Marshall was totally out of character. Only a year earlier he was lectured by Clark on the responsibilities of the professional officer to give honest and forthright advice. Marshall sternly rejected the counsel saying, he did not consider it his obligation to volunteer recommendations when they were not requested. However, now buoyed by his growing influence with the congress, and convinced it would heed his counsel, Marshall ventured forth to solicit congressional action.

Marshall and his staff worked on the report for five days, submitting it to Secretary Stimson on 1 July 1941. The report, 41 pages in length, detailed the army's growth from 1 July 1939 until 30 June 1941, outlined the progress the army had made, pointed to the "grave dangers" the country faced, and sought the immediate extension of the National Guard and Selective Service term of service.

The Biennial Report is significant for several reasons, foremost, however, is the insight it provides into Marshall's political growth. The introduction underscores Marshall's desire to link the army's progress, or lack thereof, to world events, public opinion and associated political action. As an example, he said, "In a democracy such as ours the War Department is limited in its actions by the...

30 For years the Army Chief of Staff had submitted an annual report to the Secretary of War on the state of the Army. The report was forwarded to the President; then on to congress. As Aide-de-Camp, Marshall had been involved in preparing General Pershing's annual reports. These reports were usually "dull and replete with dreary tables of statistics" accordingly, Marshall had in his first year saw no reason to continue this tradition, see Pogue, Critical and Hope, p 146-147.
31 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peacetime Draft, p 51.
appropriations approved by the President and provided by the congress. These agencies are in turn motivated by the will of the people." Marshall was not going to leave any element of the democracy untouched; all had to bear responsibility for the current situation with which the army found itself. None could plead apathy nor lack of involvement. He called attention to 1940 when the war had stabilized after the fall of Poland and how congress, instead of taking advantage of the lull in fighting by improving the army's readiness, rejected the army's requests for increased appropriations as "mere warmongering." Even after his warning that Europe would once again "blaze", the House continued to cut the army's appropriations. Not until the situation became precarious with the collapse of France and the "appeared imminent" invasion of Great Britain, did the "pendulum of public opinion reverse itself, swinging violently to the other extreme, in an urgent demand for enormous and immediate increases..." Then congress passed a Selective Service Act which nearly overwhelmed the army's capacity to house, equip, and train. "What has happened is history." Marshall said, offering the branch of reconciliation, "Of grave concern today are the contingencies of the present and the future." Having set the stage, Marshall began to articulate clearly the action's needed by each political faction to lift the restrictions which tied his hands and hindered his efforts to rebuild the army.

First, the President needed to submit the legislation, gain the public's support, and finally, congress must enact it. Marshall then warned, "Events of the past few days are even more forcible indications of the suddenness with which armed conflict can spread to areas hitherto considered free from attack." Marshall's Biennial Report leaves little doubt that the Chief of Staff fully understood the political realities and the steps needed to achieve his stated goals. As he said in the Report's conclusion, "These proposals which the War Department recommends for actions by congress have but one

34 Ibid., p 4.
36 Ibid., p 10-11.
purpose: the security of the American people...Such a purpose does not admit delay."37

With the publication of the report, Marshall took another step onto the political stage and learned another lesson in politics. Within an hour of its release the Biennial Report "provoked a storm of discussion and precipitated a White House conference with congressional leaders."38 In his rush to submit the report, he and the General Staff, failed to inform the leaders in the House and Senate that he was going to ask for extension legislation.39 Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn was particularly upset at having been caught "flat-footed". He characterized Marshall's efforts as "a crude attempt to force his hand on a draft-extension measure."40 Marshall, besides

37 Ibid., p 13. Marshall's remarks in the "General Comments" section of the report, p 13, further point to his political growth. After carefully calling into accountability the public, congress, and press in the preceding twelve pages, on the last page he pours lavish praise on each of these groups for their support. For example he says "The dealings of the War Department with the...Committees of congress during the past year have been without precedent in the evident desire of the officials to lend every possible aid to the Department meeting the situation."


39 It appears Marshall failed to notify anyone of the Report's contents. Dr. Pogue characterizes this mistake as a gross blunder by an "amateur". See Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 147. The fact that a hasty White House meeting was called suggests that even the President and Stimson were caught off guard. However, given the sensitivity of the subject, the President was probably amused that Marshall, the self-stated non-politician, was the center of the controversy, see Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 175-178. This lesson of preparing the political battlefield was never again lost on Marshall. In 1943, when he issued his next report, he did so with great coordination and resulting success. As Secretary of State he used the lesson to develop a comprehensive campaign to sell the congress and Nation on the 'Marshall Plan', see Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 167.

40 Pogue, Ordeal Hope, p 148. Marshall, upon realizing that Rayburn had been offended, quickly worked to personally repair the damage." See The New York Times, 10 July 1941, p 13. And The New York Times, 12 July 1941, p 1 "Speaker Rayburn said after a meeting with Secretary Stimson and General Marshall that his view against the extension of the present selectees has not been changed." Later, Rayburn reversed his position and announced his support of the extension legislation and put his "full weight into the fight." Explaining his reversal he said, "I believe that on account of world conditions as they now exist and are developing it would be unfortunate to disorganize the Army in the fashion that it would be disorganized by discharging the 8,000,000 selectees, and I am now supporting the proposal to keep them in
failing to notify administration leaders in congress, also failed to provide the press throughout the country with advance copies of the report. Unfortunately, after finally producing a document which graphically showed the congress and nation what the army had done over the past two years and the urgent need for extending the guardsmen and draftees' terms of service, he had failed to provide advance warning to key legislators, as well as coordinated mass distribution to the public.41

Fortunately, Marshall's recommendation did reach the leading newspaper of the day, the *New York Times*. Its headline read, "Senate Isolationists Assail Plan." The paper said "General Marshall's report stirred the isolationist and political opponents of the administration..." Senator Sheridan Downey of California said "...he saw nothing in the present situation to warrant retention..."42 Fortunately for Marshall the opposition focused most of their attention on their old antagonist, FDR. Frederick J. Libby of the National Council for the Prevention of War said, "President Roosevelt through General Marshall has just asked congress for permission to send an American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) anywhere in the world."43 As Marshall later said, "There was a deep animosity on the part of the Republicans toward Mr. Roosevelt, and some few Democrats went along with the movement."44

---

41 Ibid., p 148. "The War Department press section managed to feed the General's arguments to friendly correspondents in Washington," thus enabling the information to be published nation-wide.
44 Marshall Interviews, 22 January 1957, p 281. Adding fuel to the isolationist fears were statements in *The New York Times* by British Army Generals Wavell and Auchinleck that American manpower would be needed to finish the fight. General Wavell said, "No, undoubtedly we shall need manpower if the war continues long enough, and I have no doubt it will." General Auchinleck added, "We certainly are going to need American manpower, just as we did in the last war." *The New York Times*, 7 July 1941, p 6. Also, see Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p 571, and *The New York Times*, 4 July 1941, p 1.

103
With the opposition focused on the President, Marshall displayed political skill in assuming responsibility for the extension legislation. By convincing legislators that it was he and not the President asking for the extension, anti-FDR forces in congress would be willing to vote in favor of the resolution. Marshall explained his strategy this way:

...if Republicans could assure their constituency that they were doing it on my suggestion and not on Mr. Roosevelt's suggestion, they could go ahead and back the thing. He (FDR) had such enemies that otherwise the members of congress didn't dare seem to line up with him. And that was the same of certain Democrats who were getting pretty bitter.

A 14 July 1941 *Time Magazine* article verified Marshall's strategy when it said, "General George Catlett Marshall, Chief of Staff and field commander of the army, last week made the plea that no politician had dared to make...It was high time somebody began to talk on the subject...General Marshall talked bluntly as a soldier should." On 28 July *Time* said "Unwilling to buck the line himself, he (FDR) sent in General Marshall...to carry the ball and get the lumps."

On the day the report was released, President Roosevelt, resting at Hyde Park, N.Y., refused to comment on General Marshall's recommendations. President Roosevelt did talk to the press about the *Biennial Report* four days later. At his presidential press conference on 8 July 1941, he explained why General Marshall had asked for the extension. He discussed the restrictive legislation, in the original Act, which forbade using selectees outside the western hemisphere. Finally, when asked if he was going to recommend...

---

45 See Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p 274. Also, see Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p 572. Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, p 149.
47 *Time*, 14 July 1941, p 32.
General Marshall's proposals to the congress, he said, "Oh, I think they understand pretty well what the problem is before them." Even though extremist groups quickly rallied against it, overall public reaction to Marshall's report was slow in forming. Most Americans saw Marshall's request as reasonable given Germany's invasion into Russia.

On 7 July 1941, the War Department formally asked congress to act on Marshall's proposals. On 10 July 1941 Senator Reynolds introduced a resolution which would give the President authority to keep selectees and guardsmen under arms until six months after the end of the emergency and permit their employment either "within or beyond the limits of the western hemisphere, as he (the President) shall deem necessary in the interests of defense." Marshall not only wanted to extend the length of service of the selectees and guardsmen, but he also wanted the ability to use them, as the President saw fit, anywhere in the world. Current restrictions, as he later explained to both houses of congress, forced him to strip units of Regular Army soldiers in order to fill units in locations outside the United States. This request was significant because not only did it address a military consideration, but it also suggested a change in the country's foreign policy. In the public's mind, Marshall's action was tantamount to calling for another A.E.F.

The President's adversaries in the congress were neither naive or blind to the changing world situation. Many realized the draft would have to be extended. However, few wanted to take the blame for passing such an extension. congress hoped that Roosevelt would

50 Roosevelt Presidential Press Conferences, number 753, 8 July 1941, Volume 18:17-19.
51 The New York Times, 6 July 1941, p 1. "What the national sentiment is at present time is still puzzling the capital."
simply use the loop hole they had provided which said the President could transfer selectees from the active service to the reserves and then recall them back to active duty. As one congressman told Mr. Stimson, "This is one of those finespun technical interpretations which possibly is legally correct...yet contrary to the intentions of the Congress...Yet that is just what these cowards in Congress are trying to do. They want to avoid the responsibility themselves...and throw it on the President..." Mr. Harness of Indiana asked General Marshall during his testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs on 22 July 1941 if the President had considered doing this. Marshall replied by saying even though the law provided for such action, if used, "soldiers would feel that (they) had been victimized by a maneuver, by sharp practice, under the cover of the law." He went on to say "I want to go right straight down the road... and do it frankly and without evasion." On 11 July 1941, Marshall began to campaign personally for the resolution's passage. He met with Representative May of Kentucky and several other House members to brief them on the importance of lifting the time-in-service ban and geographical restrictions. Mr. May, after the meeting, said General Marshall had "persuaded him that the legislation was urgently needed to safeguard the security of the United States. He also said, "Information furnished by General Marshall would be enough to knock the hats of Congress if it could be released." On 13 July 1941, Marshall met with the President and other congressional leaders. Those in attendance said that General Marshall gave "convincing reasons why all troops...should be held in service." Marshall, at the meeting, began to sense that opposition to the western hemisphere restriction was so intense it imperiled the extension effort. Since, to him, the extension legislation was the most

55 Stimson and Bundy, On Service in Peace and War, p 377-378.
56 Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Providing for the National Defense by Removing Restrictions on Numbers and Length of Service of Draftees, 77th Congress, 1st session, July 22 1941, p 33.
58 Ibid., 15 July 1941, p 11.
crucial part of the legislation, he proposed that the western hemisphere restriction not be retained in the Act. Politically, Marshall’s perceptions were accurate because the congressional leadership quickly agreed to the compromise. Later, in the House debate, the absence of this amendment proved to be critical to the bill's passage.59

As Marshall continued to lobby individual legislators for the bill, he started to guide the legislation through the most crucial part of the legislative process: committee hearings. Overtime, in congressional committee hearings, Marshall had become a master at convincing legislators to support his requests. As Marshall later said in explaining why he was so effective in congressional hearings, "In the first place they were certain I had no ulterior motives. In the next place they had begun to trust my judgment."60 Others were impressed by his "ability to convey, without referring to notes...a coherent and unconfused sense of the overall situation, and by his ability to recite exact figures...The General's delivery seemed effortless, but it had precision..."61 Others said that unlike his predecessors, he "neither barks at congressmen as if they were rookies...nor condescends to them too obviously."62 If Marshall had a place of battle, it was at the congressional hearing table; there his ability to duel was unmatched.

On 17 July 1941, Marshall began testifying before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Marshall, when challenged about the way selectees had been integrated into Regular Army units and moved overseas, said, "Senator...I have been personally responsible

60 Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 136.
62 New Yorker, 26 October 1940, p 26.
for the assignments to foreign service." Marshall made sure the senators knew who was in charge; then he carefully gave the logic for his actions. In the midst of the explanation, a senator interrupted him. Marshall, not wanting to yield, firmly said, "May I finish this particular example of normal routine business?" The senator tamely waited. Later, the senator attempting to trap Marshall on the question of breaking the "one year contract" with the selectees by asking "You feel you have complied with the law, as to the letter and spirit of the law?" To which Marshall said, "Yes sir." The senator then started to spring the trap and said, "Now, General, a while ago---" At which point General Marshall interrupted and said, "Just one moment, please. I would like to read from my own reply before the Senate Military Affairs Committee last summer..." He then proceeded to read from his testimony. After which the senator said, "General, you beat me to that."

When asked what the effects of releasing the selectees would be, Marshall said, "...I think failure to authorize the extension of those now in the service would be a fundamental and tragic error...would defeat the effectiveness of a large portion of the vast amounts of money that have been appropriated." Marshall reminded the senate committee that not only would it be bad for national security, but it would also mean billions of dollars appropriated by congress would have been for nothing.

Throughout his testimony, he stuck to his strategy to divert attention from the President and convince congress that it was he, as Chief of Staff, who was asking for the legislation. In painting himself

---

63 Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Retention of Reserve Components and Selectees in Military Service Beyond Twelve Months 77th Congress, 1st session, 17 July 1941, p 4.
64 Ibid., p 9.
65 Ibid., p 21. Also, see Newsweek, 28 July 1941, p 11-13. Concerning Marshall's testimony Newsweek said, "For three hours the nation's No. 1 soldier fired facts at committeemen, neatly parrying their occasional thrusts at his position. To the question why had he not foreseen all these things when the Selective Service...Acts were passed, he replied calmly he had; that the Army had not wanted a time limit..."
as the solicitor of the army's requirements, Marshall said "My statement was for the purpose, frankly, of discounting the idea that the President has, for example, been trying to greatly augment our military set up." A senator responded by saying, "That is a general proposition. You came down to a specific point." At which Marshall said, "May I continue because you have placed me in a delicate position. The idea I mean to convey was that the President has been very conservative. It has not been a case of my being overridden, it has been more a case of my accepting that conservative attitude...All I was trying to do was to counteract the feeling that some seem to have, that there is a desire on his part to greatly enlarge, greatly magnify the army. Quite the contrary, his attitude has been conservative, decidedly conservative."67

Regardless of the question or attack, Marshall responded with frankness, honesty, sincerity, and confidence. Congress was the expert in legislative affairs, but Marshall was the expert in military matters. As he told one senator, "...on questions of legislative strategy I am a layman, a novice. On the urgency of the situation, however, I do not regard myself as a layman nor as a novice, but rather as a highly responsible military agent of the Government."68 Those in the congress did not realize that over the past two years Marshall had evolved from "layman" to an astute student and was quickly becoming a master of their political trade. Five days later while testifying to a much more hostile House Committee on Military Affairs, he continued to exhibit the same polish and forensic form which had convinced the Senate to support his recommendation to extend the Burke-Wadsworth Act.69 Newsweek said of his House testimony, "Opposition to the service extension all but dissolved

67 Ibid., p 24-25.
68 Ibid., p 8.
when Gen. George C. Marshall testified secretly to the House Military Affairs Committee..."70

On 16 July, shortly after he testified to the Senate and before his testimony to the House Committee, Marshall convinced President Roosevelt to send a message to congress recommending they adopt his proposals. In a memorandum to the President, Marshall explained that he and key House and Senate leaders were concerned that the tide might be turning away from approving the extension of the draft. As Marshall said, "The consensus of opinion appears to be that a message from you as soon as possible would be highly desirable; in fact, they believe this will be necessary to a favorable consideration of the recommendations."71 At this time Marshall believed it was important for the President to support publicly extending draftees and retaining guardsmen on active duty. Marshall knew one of the House's main concerns was the upcoming off-year elections. As one newspaper put it, "Congressmen would like to be reassured that any action by them to keep all men in the army would not work to their disadvantage at the next election."72 On 21 July 1941, Roosevelt sent his message to the congress in a recorded nationwide radio broadcast.73 At the same time the President was delivering his remarks, the Senate began debating the extension resolution on the Senate floor.

70 Newsweek, 4 August 1941, p 14.
73 Ibid. Also, see "Time Counts," by Franklin D. Roosevelt Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. II, 1 August 1941, p 610-611. "This was a surprising innovation as heretofore only messages which the President has delivered in person at the Capitol have been broadcast, and it means that he considers this a message to the nation as well as to Congress." Also, see The New York Times, 22 July 1941, p 1, 6, 8. In his speech the President said the international situation is "far more grave than it was a year ago." He said that "Each elimination of a victim has brought the issue of Nazi domination closer to this hemisphere," and concluded by saying, "Time counts. Within two months, disintegration, which would follow congressional failure to take action, will commence in the Armies of the United States. Time counts. The responsibility rests solely with the Congress."
It was during the floor debates that the power and influence of Marshall's congressional committee testimony became apparent. Senators and Representatives alike, whether for or against extension legislation, referred to General Marshall's testimony at some time during their exchanges on the floor. One senator said of Marshall's testimony concerning the minimum period of enlistment, "Let me say to you that I believe that is a rather refreshing and candid admission, coming from the No. 1 soldier of the United States of America."74 A senator in rebuking a fellow legislator said, "If the senator from Illinois thinks he has a better plan than General Marshall, I regret to say that I would rather rely on General Marshall than I would on the senator from Illinois."75 Another congressman said, "When I hear the utterances of those who, knowing nothing, laymen like me, would substitute their opinion for the opinion of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall...we cannot repudiate his recommendations without full responsibility resting upon our shoulders."76 Even the legislation's distractors, when seeking support to defeat the measure, referred to General Marshall's testimony. The representative from Indiana said,

I have the highest regard for General Marshall. I think he is one of the ablest soldiers who has ever served as Chief of Staff...From General Marshall's viewpoint, and with this special knowledge of events immediately ahead, this position is sound. From our point of view, which must consider total national welfare, I cannot agree that these selectees should be held in service.77

74 Congress, House, Representative Dirksen of Illinois speaking for the extension of the Selective Service Act, 77th Congress, 1st session., Congressional Record (4 August 1941), p 1688.
75 Congress, Senate, Senator Chandler of Kentucky speaking in favor of the Joint Resolution on declaring the existence of a national emergency, and for other purposes, Senate Joint Resolution, 95. 77th Congress, 1st session., Congressional Record (4 August 1941), p 6671.
76 Congress, House, Representative McCormack of Massachusetts speaking for the extension of the Selective Service Act, 77th Congress, 1st session., Congressional Record (8 August 1941), p 6914.
77 Ibid., Representative Hare's of Indiana, p 6932.
Others accused him of being too political. Responding to General Marshall's response of why he agreed to a 12-month service period, one senator said "Mr. President, that reminds me of some distinguished politicians...This language did not greatly appeal to me." The majority, however, in Congress agreed with Senator Chandler when he said, "I sincerely believe that the safety of my country is endangered. I have reached that conclusion because of...the statements before the Military Affairs Committee of General Marshall." Marshall, however, felt somewhat differently when in response to a congratulatory note from an old friend, who was impressed by the Chief of Staff's testimony, said, "In contrast to your message, I am being called—a Benedict Arnold, a skunk, Hitler Marshall, a stooge, Traitor, etc, etc."

The press throughout the country had a different impression of Marshall's testimony. They were linking their support for extension to Marshall's attestations. The Washington Post said, "If General Marshall says so, that carries the greatest possible weight." Walter Lippmann, a leading columnist of the day said, "Once members of the Congress have studied General Marshall's testimony, there is little..."
doubt that they will not wish to repeat in this crisis the errors of
every other congress in every other crisis in our history."  
This favorable support by the press resulted in over 51 percent of
the public supporting Marshall's call for extension.

Marshall's strategy was vindicated on 7 August when the
Senate voted 45 to 30 in favor of the resolution extending the draft.
Through his testimony before the Military Affairs Committee, he was
able to successfully shift the focus of the debate from the President
to the Chief of Staff's request for extension. As a New York Times
editorial put it, "On the testimony of the Chief of Staff that the result
of failure to provide for a longer period of service would be "virtual
disbandment...of our trained enlisted strength...the Senate could
arrive at only one conclusion consistent with the needs of the
occasion." Marshall, having closely followed the House debate,
know the vote there would be much more perilous than the Senate's.

Just like a good field commander, Marshall decided to outflank
the opposition by overwhelming them with superior combat power:
in this case, Marshall himself was the weapon. Marshall asked an old
friend and the Burke-Wadsworth Act's original sponsored to invite
forty of his fellow House Republicans to an informal dinner, sponsor
by Marshall, at the Army and Navy Club. Marshall said of this
meeting, "I talked to, I don't know how many Republican
congressmen, enough to fill the private dining room of the Army and
Navy club...I talked to them from seven o'clock at night until two in
the morning, struggling with them." Marshall knew the
congressmen's concerns were twofold. Many of them disliked
Roosevelt, and all of them feared not being reelected. One
congressman suggested he had been convinced by General Marshall's

82 Walter Lippmann, "The Army In the Hands of Congress," The
Washington Post, 21 July 1941.
51 percent of the public favored extension. Also, see Langer and Gleason, The
Undeclared War, p 572. Also, see Parris, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 178. Times.
4 August 1941, p 15. A 4 August 1941, Fortune poll showed 76% in favor of
following FDR's foreign policy, even if it led to war.
argument, but he said, "I'll be damned if I am going to go along with Mr. Roosevelt." To which Marshall replied, "You're going to let plain hatred of the personality dictate to you to do something you realize is very harmful to the interests of the country." 86 Marshall told those gathered that he realized that if they voted for the measure it might result in their defeat. But, he promised each of them if they voted in favor of extension, that he "would personally do everything that he could in their campaign to support them...." 87 However, only a few of those in attendance changed their vote when the House, on 12 August 1941, voted by the narrowest of margins, 203 to 202, in favor of the bill. 88 Marshall's flanking movement proved the difference between victory and defeat. Marshall himself characterized the event best when he said, "You could say the army played politics, too, in this period. That is a crude expression. Actually, we have high regard for politics." 89 Marshall expressed it

86 Ibid., p 276-277.
87 Ibid., p 277. Marshall was so sincere in this pledge that as he said, "took notes of that, (the names of those in attendance) so that I could go on the platform and use their names and explain exactly what had happened." However, as Marshall explained it, "The war came along and then there was no necessity for that." Also, see Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 178-179; and Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 152-153.
88 The vote may not have been as close as most historians and biographers of Marshall maintain. Congressman Joe Martin, Minority Leader in the House at the time the extension issue was passed, said "I regarded it as one of those fights in which one comes out stronger if one loses than if one wins. Thus, while as leader I voted against it myself, I hoped that it would pass. When certain Republican members who were in doubt came to me for advice, I would tell them, 'If I were you and it doesn't make any difference, follow your own preference on this.' I did not knock myself out trying to get their votes." He goes on to describe the actual vote. "When the voting began, I was taken aback by the large number of Democrats who, under pressure from home, were lining up with Republicans against the bill. As we neared the end of the roll call, with sixty-five Democrats voting against Roosevelt, I had the sinking feeling that I might have made a fatal miscalculation. Contrary to my wishes, the bill might be defeated after all. Finally, by a hair's breadth, it was passed 203 to 202. If I had wished, I could have got that one vote; when a leader comes that close he can always obtain an extra vote. But that was not my strategy. We lost, but won." See Robert J. Donovan, Joe Martin—My First Fifty Years in Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), p 97-98. Pogue has a slightly different interpretation of this passage. See Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 152 and 464 note 19.
correctly when he said they (he) played politics. From now on, none would prove more adept at it than he.

A few days after the House passed the extension bill by one vote, a British radio commentator quoted a British man in the street as saying,

The Americans are curious people. I can't make them out. One day they're announcing they'll guarantee freedom and fair play for everybody everywhere in the world. The next day they're deciding by only one vote that they'll go on having an Army.90

The attack on Pearl Harbor caused people to reflect on how close the nation had come to destroying its Army by releasing the majority of its soldiers and officers. As one author put it,

But for a single vote the nation might have been left with an Army in dissolution, only a few months before the Pearl Harbor Attack...The shock to the Congress itself was severe, while the impression made on the country was profound and lasting.91

As Secretary of War Stimson put it, George Marshall "took the main burden of advocating and explaining the bill."92

Marshall's efforts were not taken in reaction to events thrust upon him as was the case with the original Burke-Wadsworth Act. This time he knew what political steps needed to be taken to bring about the extension which was critical to the army's very survival. With this knowledge, he thoughtfully and carefully planned the course of action needed to guarantee the Act's passage in both the House and the Senate. He tried to persuade the President to recommend to the congress that they act on a measure to extend the draftees and guardsmen. Failing, Marshall then used the Chief of

91 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p 574.
Staff's annual report to the Secretary of War as the vehicle to bring the issue to attention of the congress and the public.

Having successfully brought the matter to congress, he then carefully lobbied individual members of both chambers as well as provided powerful committee testimony to convince lawmakers that the nation's survival depended on passing the legislation. To do this, he diverted attention away from the President and focused the debate on the Chief of Staff's judgment that this course of action was best for the nation. One cannot help but contrast this series of political actions with those of a year earlier, when Marshall merely reacted to political events that overtook him. Then he had been but a reactionary in a performance produced and directed by others. Now, twelve months later, Marshall was the sole political choreographer of a masterful play which became critical to the nation's survival. "HOUSE FOR...BY ONE VOTE". Though today the closeness of the final vote may be of some question, then, the banner headline of the nation's leading newspaper left little question how perilously close the army had come to being dismantled. Many may have contributed to the final victory, but none as significantly as General Marshall. The event was a watershed in his public life. He was now a political force with which the President, the Senate, and the House had to contend. From then on, no one could or would ignore General George C. Marshall the politician.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Early in 1942, General Marshall was having lunch at his Fort Myer home with a prominent lawyer, James T. Williams, Jr., from another part of the country. The lawyer seemed unnecessarily nervous. Finally, after a noticeable period of embarrassing behavior the lawyer said,

General you must excuse my awkwardness. I'm all too well aware that I am lunching today with the man who has more influence in the federal city than any man except the President of the United States. That's why I'm ill at ease...1

The gentleman then described how he reached such a conclusion. He told General Marshall that at a recent dinner party, hosted by Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, the Speaker told him "...that of all the men whoever testified before any committee on which he served, there was no one who had the influence with the committees of the House than General Marshall." Rayburn explained that General Marshall's influence stemmed from his willingness to tell the "truth, as he sees it, about the problems he is discussing."2

By 1942 General Marshall was certainly not the political unknown the President had appointed Army Chief of Staff two years earlier. General Marshall had become a unique political power, in a city full of powerful people, by combining a career fatefuly guided with a two-year on-the-job political apprenticeship. He came to Washington in 1939 well aware of the city's political character. In 1921 as Aide-de-Camp to then Army Chief of Staff General Pershing,

1 Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 136-137. (Quoted from "Lunch at Fort Myer": James T. Williams, Jr. Reminiscences File, George C. Marshall Library.)
2 Ibid. Rayburn went on to say "...when he takes the witness stand, we forget whether we are Republicans or Democrats. We just remember that we are in the presence of a man who is telling the truth..."
he had scrutinized the Chief of Staff’s political role. He paid particular attention to his working relationships with the President and the congress. It was during this period that his awareness for political factors blossomed by handling activities that served to sharpen his political focus: preparing General Pershing to testify before House and Senate Committees, drafting the Chief of Staff’s annual report to the Secretary of War, and representing General Pershing, during his long summer absences from the Capital, at Administration and Congressional conferences.

As Aide-de-Camp, Marshall learned the positive and negative effect of relationships on the Chief of Staff’s political influence. General Pershing’s tremendous popularity gave him opportunities to forge relationships with powerful political forces that enabled him to influence legislation beneficial to the Army.\(^3\) However, Marshall also witnessed the effect of antagonistic relationships. The rift between General Pershing and General March, with political forces siding with one or the other general, left many Army legislative needs unanswered.

Marshall also experienced the fateful impact personal political ambition had on the Chief of Staff’s prestige and influence. General Pershing’s presidential aspirations forever jaded many lawmakers’ views of the World War I hero. They could no longer consider him an independent, unbiased source of advice and counsel. With political aspirations he became one of them, threatening their political well-being. Marshall never forgot the polarizing effect personal political ambition had on the Army Chief of Staff’s political power.\(^4\) Further complimenting Marshall’s tenure as Aide to the Army’s Chief of Staff was his extensive service with civilian-military organizations such as the National Guard, Reserves, C.C.C., and community leaders near the posts he commanded. Evolving from this close association with civilians was a deep appreciation for the nation’s unique

---

\(^3\) The Defense Act of 1920 is a classic example.

\(^4\) During his tenure as Chief of Staff, individuals and groups approached General Marshall about running for president. He flatly refused any such suggestion.
civilian-military partnership. Marshall always sought to use this understanding to build and develop relationships which worked towards the betterment of both the Army and the civilian-military organization. Unfortunately, few others in the Army cared to do the same.

In 1939, after an 18-year absence from Washington, General Marshall became the Army Chief of Staff and brought to the office a background ideally suited for working within Washington's civilian political realm. However, he lacked practical political experience which could only be acquired through daily political battles. During those first two years as Chief of Staff, three pieces of legislation—the Burke-Wadsworth Act, the Lend-Lease Act, and the Selective Service Extension—provided Marshall the practical experience needed to transform him from political unknown to significant political force.

---

5 Marshall’s work with the Civilian Conservation Corps (C.C.C.) provides an excellent example of his enthusiastic support for a civilian program, and how that support, in the end, gained civilian patronage. In a 18 January 1939 letter to Senator Rufus C. Holman, Marshall said "When I went there, (Vancouver Barracks) I found a garrison which had not had a new building provided by the Government for thirty-three years, and before I left, we had gotten an appropriation for sixteen non-commissioned officers' quarters and about three hundred thousand dollars in W.P.A. money. With the latter fund I reconditioned the post and got it in excellent shape, with many improvements to boost morale." See Letter General Marshall to Senator Holman, 18 January 1939, Marshall Papers. Vol. 1, p 685. Also, see Letter General Marshall to General James K. Parsons, 23 June 1938, Marshall Papers. Vol. 1. p 606. As he told General Grunert, his replacement at Vancouver Barracks, "I found the CCC the most instructive service I have ever had, and the most interesting. The results one could obtain were amazing and highly satisfying...." See Letter General Marshall to General Grunert, 5 December 1938, Marshall Papers. Vol. 1. p 657.

6 As Deputy Chief of Staff, Marshall asked the General Staff for a study on the money the Relief Program had contributed to the Army. The study showed the Army receiving $250 million spent by the W.P.A. and P.W.A. This sum was nearly equal to the annual War Department budget at the time. Seeing the amount, "Marshall deplored the extent to which the War Department had failed to take full advantage of these opportunities; but it seemed that some of the aging generals had been too afraid of the congressional criticism they might incur if they became involved in dealings with such a vulgar, and radical fellow as Hopkins. Marshall himself never had any such qualms." See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 76. As Dr. Pogue said, "Perhaps most important, his duties with the Civilian Conservations Corps and the national Guard gave him a knowledge of the future citizen-soldier that few other top commanders would possess. See Pogue, Education of a General, p 348.
Marshall's working political education started in 1940 with the Burke-Wadsworth Act. Hesitation, pride, and lack of practical experience affected Marshall's first unsuccessful foray into political combat. Marshall opposed a draft in 1940 because he believed it would disrupt his well-conceived plan for transforming the Army into a combat-ready force. He maintained that the lack of public and congressional support gave the legislation little chance of enactment. Finally, he believed the Army was incapable of training the large number of draftees. On the other hand, Grenville Clark and the Military Training Camp Association (MTCA) believed a draft presented the Army the best and quickest method to prepare for war. They also pursued a well organized, aggressive campaign to force congress to enact draft legislation.

Marshall rejected the MTCA's overtures for support. He was piqued by the idea a group outside the War Department believed they had a better way to prepare the Army for war. Marshall opposed the group's initiative until the President nominated a member of the MTCA and strong draft proponent, Henry Stimson, to be Secretary of War. This change in leadership, coupled with growing public and congressional support for the draft, converted Marshall. Marshall promptly became a leading proponent for the draft and provided effective testimony to the House and Senate Congressional Committees. The legislation successfully passed both Houses of Congress.

Marshall learned a great deal from his failure to postpone draft legislation. Never again would he stand idly by while others pressed legislation affecting his goals for the Army. In the future he never

7 Twelve months later he boldly pressed the extension for the draft when no one else was willing. Despite personal differences, in the future, he subjugated his ego for the sake of cooperation. On one occasion, he tactfully handled a difference of opinion between himself and Judge Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of War. Judge Patterson had proposed, and Secretary Stimson had signed, an order changing the basic organization of the Air Corps without consulting Marshall. Marshall took umbrage with Patterson for taking such action when it was outside his purview to do so. Marshall, rather than confront Judge Patterson, simply took the document and placed it in his desk drawer. Some six to twelve months later, when Marshall and Stimson were having a disagreement over an issue, Stimson said to Marshall, "I'd like you to stop and think that we have gone along with you on everything you've
allowed a bruised ego to affect his effectiveness in influencing legislation and congressional action. Finally, he learned that public, congressional, and Presidential opinion changed often during the course of political debate. Burke-Wadsworth provided the Chief of Staff his first brush with political fire; though slightly burned, he gained significant insight in how best to influence Washington's political maze for the Army's benefit and fend off initiatives which he believed could impede his efforts.

Armed with this sagacity, Marshall worked to minimize the effect President Roosevelt's military aid program to the allies had on the Army's rearming and training programs, and at the same time continued to build his relationship with the President. The early military-aid programs, and later Lend-Lease, enabled the President to sell and later give essential war goods to the European allies. Marshall's training and remodernization goals were affected by these programs because goods sold or given to the allies generally came from those used or ordered by the Army. Marshall realized public disagreement with the President would be politically fatal; thus he set upon a tactic of public support and private dissent. While working with key administration officials such as Hopkins and Morgenthau to slow the allocation of goods to the allies, he also worked with them to identify legal ways for the President to circumvent congressional restrictions. This support earned Marshall the President's respect and admiration. Marshall's loyalty convinced Hopkins and Morgenthau, among others, that he was someone who could be trusted to support the President even though he privately disagreed with the policy.

As the debate for allied aid firmed into the Lend-Lease legislation, Marshall's most powerful political skill became crucial.8

---

8 When the question of Lend-Lease for the Russians came before Congress, General Marshall was once again asked to testify. Again he proved crucial in having the Congress vote in favor of Soviet aid. One must keep in mind...
Throughout January and February 1941, he testified before the House and Senate Committees debating Lend-Lease's merits. He calmed legislators' fears concerning sharing scarce war goods with the allies at the expense of the nation's own rearmament efforts. If Marshall had not publicly supported and testified in favor of Lend-Lease, its historic impact may well have been delayed for two years.

Lend-Lease taught Marshall the power of controlled dissent. Though some on the Army's General Staff felt he had compromised his position, Marshall reasoned he had to bend on lesser issues to enhance his standing with the President on future issues of greater importance. He was correct. Though Lend-Lease caused the Army to suffer in the short term, it significantly increased the Chief of Staff's political influence, reaping substantial advantage in subsequent political considerations.

By the summer of 1941, Marshall had adjusted his modernization plans to meet the increasing number of draftees. Federalizing the National Guard and changing the mix of Regular Army units, eliminated General Marshall's earlier peacetime draft concerns. Ironically, as the one-year training deadline stipulated in the Burke-Wadsworth Act neared, Marshall found himself concerned over the draft's demise. Realizing Clark and the MTCA had been correct about the draft's positive impact on the Army's readiness, he feared the draft's abolishment and draftees' release would destroy the Army.

Now completely confident with his political skills, he did not wait for others to champion draft extension. Rather, Marshall initiated a vigorous campaign to have congress extend the Selective Service Act. Relying on his personal stature and influence, he used the Chief of Staff's annual "state of the Army" report to call for

---

mind that many saw the Soviet-German conflict as two evils fighting each other and were convinced that they should be allowed to destroy each other without American help. See McLimsey, Harry Hopkins, p 190-191; and Memorandum CSA to the Secretary of War. Subject: Ordnance and Air Corps Mechanics for Russia. 14 October 1941. Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 645.

retaining all draftees and guardsmen.\textsuperscript{10} Although he failed to coordinate the report's initial publication with the press and key congressional leaders,\textsuperscript{11} Marshall's use of the report showed resourcefulness similar to Clark's initiative a year earlier.

Having bypassed traditional avenues to legislative consideration, Marshall pressed the House and Senate to quickly deliberate the extension issue. Once in the House and Senate Committees, Marshall used his overwhelming persuasive powers to overcome all opposition. Unlike a year earlier, he left nothing to chance. Having witnessed public and congressional fickleness during Burke-Wadsworth, he vigorously campaigned individual House and Senate members to ensure the bill's passage.\textsuperscript{12} In August 1941,

\textsuperscript{10} Since the report covered two years, it was called the Biennial Report.

\textsuperscript{11} Never again would Marshall make another miscalculation with the press. Marshall's reputation and stature with the press grew throughout the War. Frederick C. Painton, a war correspondent, recalled an example of Marshall's prowess with the press during a briefing in Algiers. Painton recalled, "A door opened, a hush fell, General Marshall walked in. He looked around the room, his eyes calm, his face impassive. 'to save time,' he said, 'I'm going to ask each of you what questions you have in mind.' His eyes turned to the first correspondent. 'What's your question?' A penetrating query was put: General Marshall nodded and went on to the next man--and so around the room, until 60 correspondents had asked challenging questions ranging from major strategy to technical details of the war on a dozen fronts. General Marshall looked off into space for perhaps 30 seconds. Then he began. For nearly 40 minutes he spoke. His talk was smooth, connected, a brilliantly clear narrative that encompassed the war. And this narrative, smooth enough to be a chapter in a book, included a complete answer to every question we had asked. But what astounded us most was this: as he reached the point in his narrative which dwelt upon a specific question, he looked directly at the man who had asked the question! Afterward I heard many comments from the correspondents. Some said they had just encountered the greatest military mind in history...All agreed on one thing: 'That's the most brilliant interview I ever attended in my life.' See Readers Digest, January 1947, p 71.

\textsuperscript{12} Ironically, passing the draft extension did not assure the Army continued growth. Two months after the vote in the House, Walter Lippmann, a famous columnist, called for the President to decrease the size of the Army. Lippmann believed that a larger Army increased the likelihood of conflict. By this time, Russian's success against the Germans coupled with Britain's growing strength had convinced Lippmann and others that America's best hope to avoid war was to increase Lend-Lease to the Russians and British and build the nation's naval power. Marshall became so concerned about the move to reduce the Army's size that he met with the President on 22 September to discuss the issue. Marshall was fully prepared to defend the Army against any such reduction. However, the President dismissed any discussion of the issue and assured General Marshall that he had no intention of cutting the Army.

123
Marshall's yeomen efforts enabled the extension bill to successfully pass both Houses of Congress. Burke-Wadsworth, Lend-Lease, and the Selective Service extension climaxed a two-year training period in which Marshall's lifetime of experience and observation was combined with practical lessons transforming the Chief of Staff from political novice to master craftsman.

Ironically, Marshall was not present the day the House passed the draft extension. He was at sea with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Marshall's demonstrated loyalty and emerging political influence during his first two years as Chief of Staff were to have ramifications throughout the course of the War as he took an active role in forming National security policy. Indeed Marshall's first two years as Chief of Staff were a watershed in his public life. Throughout the war he grew closer to the President and became one of his closest and most trusted advisors.

Perhaps no future event better illustrates Marshall's importance to the President and his political significance in Washington than Roosevelt's decision to have General Eisenhower and not General Marshall command the allied invasion of Europe, operation Overlord. Every major biographical work on Marshall details the events and circumstances surrounding President Roosevelt's decision. Clearly, Marshall was Roosevelt's, and

See Bland, Marshall Papers Vol. 2, p 613-614; Watson, Chief of Staff, p 362-366; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 76-78.

13 Pogue, referencing Hopkin's impression of Marshall's role during the meeting in the Atlantic, says "he (Marshall) emerged as the dominating figure at the meeting." See Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 145. Also, see McJimsey, Harry Hopkins, p 177.

14 Roosevelt said he wanted Marshall to be the "Pershing of the Second World War." See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 760. Roosevelt even told Eisenhower during a visit to his headquarters in Cairo that he planned to name Marshall the Supreme Commander for the invasion forces. See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect--1890-1952 Vol 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1983), p 269. Eisenhower writing to Stimson said, "I have always agreed with you that General Marshall was the logical choice to do the Overlord job, but as long as it has been assigned to me you need have no fear but that I will do my best." See Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p 443.
Churchill's first choice. Marshall had built the force, selected the commanders, and guided the strategy which had been so successful. Both Roosevelt and Churchill believed that it was Marshall's well-earned right to command the Army during its greatest hour and have his rightful place in history. However, the very skills which enabled Marshall to accomplish so much proved his undoing in being named commander of Overlord.

As news leaked to the press that General Marshall was to be Overlord's commander, a ruckus over his perceived "demotion" from Chief of Staff to field commander resulted. This upheaval caused Roosevelt to rethink his decision. Though still strongly supported by the President and key advisors such as Stimson and Hopkins, many of Marshall's closest friends and colleagues pressed the President not to remove Marshall from Washington. Fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, King and Arnold, vigorously protested. Even Marshall's mentor, General Pershing, petitioned the President to keep Marshall in Washington.

---

15 Churchill's support came not only from his recognition that Marshall was a truly outstanding soldier, but as Robert Sherwood points out, "Marshall's selection was important because of his enormous prestige with the British Cabinet and the British people, who might have had reservations about Eisenhower or any less celebrated American general." See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 758.

16 From 1 September 1939 to the end of the War in 1945 Marshall's Army grew from 174,000 to 8,200,000 soldiers. Marshall "controlled a force...deployed in nine theaters around the globe." See Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 129; Larrabee, Commander in Chief, p 115-116; and Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p 1-4.

17 In April 1945 General Eisenhower wrote Marshall saying "I think you should make a visit here at the earliest possible moment while we are still conducting a general offensive. You would be proud of the Army you have produced...you could see, in visible form, the fruits of much of your work over the past five years." See Larrabee, Commander in Chief, p 116.

18 The Army and Navy Journal said "powerful influences would like to eliminate Marshall as Chief of Staff...this action would shock the Army, the Congress and the nation at large." See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 760.

19 "Stimson did later say that Roosevelt's decision to replace Marshall with Eisenhower was correct." See Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p 443.

20 See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p 760. King said "We have the winning combination here in Washington, Why break it up?"

21 Ibid., p 760. Pershing wrote stating his "deep conviction that he suggested transfer of General Marshall would be a fundamental and very grave error in our military policy."
In the end, however, it was the President who made the decision to recant his original choice and select General Eisenhower. Roosevelt told Marshall "I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country."\textsuperscript{22} The decision was made. Following the general counsel of those in the Capital and his own instinct, Roosevelt could not "break up a winning team." Marshall was so much a part of the political workings of Washington, that the President could not and would not risk, at this junction, the military's political fate; nor his own chance at a fourth term, to a political novice like Eisenhower. As \textit{Time Magazine} said in 1944, when it named Marshall its "Man of the Year"! "The American people do not, as a general rule, like or trust the military. But they like and trust George Marshall...."\textsuperscript{23} Roosevelt needed Marshall more for the political warfare of Washington than the battlefields of Europe.\textsuperscript{24}

Marshall was to be honored many other times over the next ten years for service in a wide range of public positions. He served as Secretary of State, under President Truman for nearly two years. While Secretary of State he became one of the chief architects of the Truman Doctrine which directed American foreign policy for the next two decades. Under his direction, the State Department proposed the

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p 803.  
\textsuperscript{23} In January 1944, \textit{Time Magazine} named General Marshall its "Man of the Year." In listing its reasons for the selection it said, "The Man who more than any other could be said to have armed the Republic was George Catlett Marshall, Chief of Staff....The American people do not, as a general rule, like or trust the military. But they like and trust George Marshall....The secret is that American democracy is the stuff Marshall is made of." See \textit{Time Magazine}. 3 January 1944.  
\textsuperscript{24} For a complete review of the decision concerning command of Overlord, see Sherwood, \textit{Roosevelt and Hopkins}, p 758-771, 787-803; Marshall, \textit{Together}, p 167-170; Larrabee, \textit{Commander In Chief}, p 146-152; Stimson and Bundy, \textit{On Active Service}, p 440-443; and Parish, \textit{Roosevelt and Marshall}, p 414-417. This author believes that Roosevelt though well intentioned, could not have let Marshall go to Europe. If he had done so, the President would have had to shoulder the substantial political responsibilities for military affairs. Given his health, the active anti-FDR forces in the capital, and his desire for a fourth term, the results would have been substantially less than those Marshall achieved. Had he allowed Marshall to become the Overlord commander, in all likelihood, he would have recalled him to Washington after the invasion's success had been assured. History has shown Roosevelt was correct in his decision.
plan to revitalize war-torn Europe, later called the "Marshall Plan", and for which he later received the Nobel Peace Prize.

In 1950 President Truman again called on this political giant to serve in his administration, this time as Secretary of Defense. Once again he played a pivotal role in the events which shaped the American stage for years to come. He presided over America's involvement in the Korean War. Once again he was called on to rebuild an Army which had been hollowed out following World War II. Finally, having participated in every major decision affecting the nation during the most dramatic time in its history, in 1951 he retired.

Truly George C. Marshall was a politician. He understood and worked within the national political system to prepare an Army for the greatest war in the world's history. Had he not been so gifted and skilled in the politician's craft, the outcome of that war may have been much different. What separated him from other politicians was his complete disregard for personal gain or advancement. He did what he did because he believed it to be right. He did what he did because he believed it was the best course of action for the Country. If there is a lesson in this paper, it is that General Marshall showed that politics is not pejorative. Rather politics is a means to accomplish what is best for a free people when it is practiced without personal motive and practiced for the overall good of the Nation and its people.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS


128


GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS


U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs. S.J. 89. A Joint Resolution to Assist the Governments of American Republics to Increase their Military and Naval Establishments and for Other Purposes. 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 March 1939.


U.S. Congress. Senate. SubCommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 9209. Military Establishment
Appropriation Bill for 1941. 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 17 May 1940.


Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs. Nomination of Henry L. Stimson to be Secretary of War. 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 2 July 1940.


Congressional Record. 9 May 1940 to 8 July 1940, Vol 86, reel 226; 9 July 1940 to 30 September 1940, Vol 86, reel 227; 1 October 1940 to 3 January 1941, Vol 86 reel 228; 30 September 1940 to 3 January 1941 Vol 86, reel 230, appendix; 4 January 1941 to 18 March 1941, Vol 87, reel 231; 19 March 1941 to 30 June 1941, Vol 87, reel 232; 3 July 1941 to 25 November 1941, Vol 87, reel 233; 3 July 1941 to 25 November 1941, Vol 87, reel 234, appendix. (Note: All debates concerning Burke-Wadsworth, Lend-Lease, and Selective Service extension were reviewed.)
PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES


"Backers of Lend-Lease Bill Win First Round in Congress." Newsweek, 10 February 1941, 11-15.


"Battle of '1776'--Heated Words Sear the Air as Bill Splits Party Lines." Newsweek, 27 February 1941, 14-15.


"British Aid Stockpile Shaped as Lend-Lease Oratory Rages." Newsweek, 10 March 1941, 15-17.


Clapper, Raymond, "The Ten Most Powerful People in Washington." Look, 28 January 1941, 22-24. (Also see reprint in Reader's Digest, May 1941.)


"Democracy's Arsenal Unlocked as Congress Hands Key to FDR." *Newsweek*, 17 March 1941, 17-20.


Liebling, A.J. "Profiles--Chief of Staff." *New Yorker*, 26 October 1940, 26-34.


"Nation Affairs--Press Support For President Roosevelt Since War Began." *Time*, 25 August 1941, 16-17.


"National Affairs--The Congress." *Time*, 17 February 1941, 16-17.


"National Affairs--Two Times Two." *Time*, 21 January 1941, 17.


Painton, Frederick C. "Vignettes of America's No. 1 Soldier." Reader's Digest, January 1944, 71.


"Senate Lend-Lease Advocates Tighten Lines to Speed Vote." Newsweek, 17 February 1941, 17-19.


INTERVIEWS


139
Dissertation


Speeches


**NEWSPAPERS**

New York Times. 1 September 1939.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3. Dr. Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.
   Combat Studies Institute
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

4. Major Stephen D. Coats, M.A.
   Combat Studies Institute
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

5. Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert A. Bernabee, Ph.D.
   9217 Byron Terrace
   Burke, Virginia 22015

6. George C. Marshall Library
   Drawer 1600
   ATTN: John N. Jacob, Archivist-Librarian
   Lexington, Virginia 24450-1600

7. Dr. Larry I. Bland
   George C. Marshall Foundation
   Drawer 1600
   Lexington, Virginia 24450-1600