The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

SWEDISH DEFENSE IN THE FUTURE

BY

COLONEL YNGVE A. JOHANSSON
( Swedish General Staff Corps )

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

25 February 1990

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
International relations are changing rapidly. Soviet perestroika has led to negotiations between the superpowers and to near revolutions in many non-Soviet WTO-countries. The European Common Market develops toward more integration and more members. New military relations and capabilities may substantially change the threat.

Sweden, for more than a century a non-aligned nation, has declared its intention of maintaining an armed neutrality in future conflicts. This
article describes the more significant international and domestic changes and their impact on Sweden's defense. The upcoming new Defense Decision in 1991 was intended to be an important choice between spending more resources or reducing missions for the Armed Forces. The uncertainties in the environment may lead to a "wait-and-see-solution."
SWEDISH DEFENSE IN THE FUTURE

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Colonel Yngve A. Johansson
Swedish General Staff Corps

Colonel(Ret.) Jay C. Mumford
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
25 February 1990

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Yngve A. Johansson, COL, Swedish Army
TITLE: Swedish Defense in the Future
FORMAT: Individual Study Project Intended for Publication
DATE: 25 February 1990

International relations are changing rapidly. Soviet perestroika has led to negotiations between the superpowers and to near revolutions in many non-Soviet WTO-countries. The European Common Market develops toward more integration and more members. New military relations and capabilities may substantially change the threat.

Sweden, for more than a century a non-aligned nation, has declared its intention of maintaining an armed neutrality in future conflicts. This article describes the more significant international and domestic changes and their impact on Sweden's defense. The upcoming new Defense Decision in 1991 was intended to be an important choice between spending more resources or reducing missions for the Armed Forces. The uncertainties in the environment may lead to a 'wait-and-see-solution.'
SWEDISH DEFENSE IN THE FUTURE

International relations are changing rapidly. The perception is that the threat of war is fading away. After perestroika and glasnost the superpowers are negotiating in many different areas. Europe is entering a new era. The European Common Market, EC, takes new, important steps toward economic integration in 1992. Political developments in Eastern Europe are accelerating, with communist parties in many countries stepping aside, or at least allowing the emergence of other political parties. New regimes, based on popular support, take the responsibilities of governing. The reunification of Germany is on the foreign policy agenda of both East and West. What was "impossible" yesterday, seems to be happening today. It may be accomplished fact tomorrow.

What influence will these national and international developments have on the Swedish defense arrangements? Will the strategic warning time be increased or decreased? Will there be new requirements placed on the military forces, in order to increase readiness and initial strength, or will it be possible to continue to meet the new challenges with the old system based on mobilization?

As the post-war stability in Europe shifts towards a multipolar environment, new conflicts can arise. The freedom of action for potential aggressors and the threat against Sweden may actu-
ally increase, at least for a period.

Even though Sweden's security and defense policy have remained virtually unchanged for a very long time, the economic resources dedicated to implementing that policy have decreased during the last twenty years. Modern combat units will soon have been reduced by fifty percent during the same period. The majority of the Swedish Armed Forces becomes available only after a rapid mobilization.

This article describes some of the more significant national and international changes and the impact they may have on Sweden's defense. The focus will be on the adequacy of the force structure in providing necessary readiness for a conventional war.

SWEDEN'S SECURITY POLICY

For more than 150 years, Swedish foreign and defense policy have been based on non-alignment in time of peace and war. Sweden intends to be neutral in conflicts in its part of the world. This policy of neutrality is not laid down in the Constitution or otherwise proclaimed as a permanent State doctrine. The policy is neither confirmed in, nor guaranteed by any international agreement. Thus Sweden has chosen this option and can change or amend it as best suits Swedish national interests. The decisive factors, which allowed Sweden to stay out of the two World Wars were its limited strategic value, the military-geographic situation and the strength of its armed forces.

The ultimate aim of the Swedish security policy is to pre-
serve the independence of the state. The foreign policy and the defense policy in coordination are the main parts of the security policy. The intention is to have a defense strong enough to deter a potential aggressor. This is possible only if a potential aggressor has to keep his guard against his main opponent, which will substantially reduce the forces available for an operation against Sweden. This "Doctrine of the Margin" is an important prerequisite for the success of Swedish policy and has been both realistic and successful thus far. As the strategic value of Swedish and surrounding territories and the threat change, Sweden has to adjust its defense policy, or at least its force structure.

The defense policy must command respect and confidence, both abroad and in Sweden. A total defense has been organized, with such structure, readiness and strength, that an aggressor will conclude that his sacrifices would be out of proportion to his gains. The total defense consists of the entire Swedish society, organized for war. The armed forces total about 850,000 men and women, which is ten percent of the population. Additionally almost two million people will have different functions in the civil defense area.

Sweden's geographical size is as large as the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium together. The total population in these countries, however, is about one hundred million as compared to the 8.5 million in Sweden. The only way to organize a sufficient number of units is to use conscription. The Army trains about 35,000 conscripts each year. They are organized as battalions and "stored" when the
basic training is completed. The soldiers are "at home" and the equipment in battalion-size mobilization depots. Every fourth year the forces are called to refreshment training in brigade units. The mobilization can be completed in two to four days. Some local units can be ready within one day. More than 125,000 men and women are organized into Home Guard units. They are ready to defend important installations in a few hours. 4

The Air Force and the Navy have most of their wartime units organized as standing forces, but need mobilization to ensure sustainability. The Coastal Artillery trains much like the Army, but within hours can man important artillery batteries or in peacetime deployed mine stations.

Sweden has a well developed military industry. It has been an essential part of the security policy to develop and manufacture its own equipment and "tailor" the systems to a "Swedish Profile". The per-unit costs have been reduced through export. For example many Swedish made anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems and oversnow vehicles are used in other armies.

The current security policy has been refined during two centuries. It has been successful. Sweden has stayed out of war. The only discussion about changing the principle of non-alignment was after the Second World War, when a defense alliance among the Nordic countries was an option. When Norway and Denmark decided to enter NATO, Sweden continued along the traditional lines of neutrality. 5

CURRENT MILITARY DEFENSE

The threat is the principal factor in determining if a
A neutral country has, by definition, no enemy, but must prepare its defense according to other countries' capabilities, not their stated intentions. The geographical location between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is important. Sweden covers a longer part of the "frontier" between these two alliances than the Central European nations. If Sweden were turned upside down, the northern part would reach to the middle of Italy. Finland is also a non-aligned country, even if it has a special Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Norway and Denmark have a "low profile" in NATO. They do not permit stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons during peace. The Nordic countries have developed a certain balance, or as Finland prefers to say, stability in the North European area.

During the last decades, the Northern Flank has become more important. The big Soviet military build-up on the Kola peninsula is one crucial factor. The Northern Fleet contains the main part of the SLBM-forces, and several naval combatants capable of attacking NATO sea lanes of communication. Air Force units can attack targets at least out to the GIN-gap (Greenland-Iceland-Norway) and into the United Kingdom. The U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategy intends, among other objectives, to establish sea control or to deny WTO-forces access to those vast sea-areas. Control of Northern Norway is vital in order to establish air superiority and control over maritime forces in the Barent's Sea.

The Baltic Approaches have always been considered a strategically important area by Sweden. Swedish defense planning has
for a long time been concerned mainly with the northernmost and the southernmost parts of the country. The area around the capital and the isle of Gotland have been stressed, while the rest of the country earlier has been seen mostly as a transit area for an enemy on his way to final strategic objectives in Norway. As the importance of the Norwegian Sea has increased, and technology has made cruise missiles available, Swedish airspace and territory have been of increasing interest. Sweden can also be seen as a well deployed, unsinkable aircraft carrier. Its strategic value has increased markedly.

During the "detente period" the assumed warning-time was measured in months. Thus, equipping of the force rather than its readiness was the most important task. Training was reduced in order to save money, since it could be completed after mobilization. The war, if it came, was supposed to take the form of a secondary invasion across the land frontiers or from the sea in connection with a full-scale war in Central Europe. Strong air and naval forces had to be destroyed, before the invasion forces could attack across the sea. The Army and the rest of the total defense had time enough for preparations. The Defense Decision (DD) 1972 was based on those assumptions, and was the start of a downward trend in the Swedish Defense capabilities.

In the DD 1982 and 1987, the threat has been given new dimensions. During the last ten years, the two superpowers have increased the economic resources allocated to their military defense forces. A large part of those resources has been used to improve the quality of conventional forces. The military-technical development has led to better agility, mobility and rapidity.
and less dependence on the weather. Chemical weapons and spetsnaz units have been more evident threats. Interest in the Nordic area has increased and it is more directly involved than earlier in the conflicting interests between the superpower blocs. 7 The well-known problems with visiting submarines are clear indications.

Strategic advantages can be gained in controlling the Nordic area. The courses of action likely to be used by the power-blocs to gain such control, mean that the Nordic area is at an increased risk of early involvement in crises as well as in actual military conflicts. That may result in a race to gain advantages in time and in strength by deployment of forces in the Nordic zone. 8

The recent view of a likely war has tended more towards a surprise attack. "Short military warning" is the term used by the Swedish Supreme Commander. 9 The term implies that even though there would be some political warning signals, the decision to mobilize could well come late. Capability to react with resources in the peace-time organization is important. The tasks for the Air and Naval forces are still the same in peace. The Army has increased its readiness, and can be used during the basic training phase for actions during crises or at the outbreak of a war. Units called to refresher-training are also used to strengthen the readiness. The Home Guard has new tasks, often to organize the first defense at the border, or at least to guard or destroy important "entry points" to Sweden, such as bridges, airports and harbors. 10
The Defense Decisions during the last fifteen years have led to reductions of Sweden's wartime forces. The Navy and the Air Force have lost about fifty percent of their combat units. The Army has not been able to modernize all its combat units. So far, eight older brigades are leaving the Army for financial reasons. It will be necessary in the near future to cut a part of the modern brigades and many other units.

FUTURE CHANGES IN EUROPE

Eastern Europe seems to be in a state of accelerating change. What started as a Soviet declaration of perestroika and glasnost in the USSR, has spread into other WTO-countries. The perception of what is going on influences at least Western Europe and the USA. Nobody can predict with certainty what Europe will look like in ten to fifteen years - the period for military long-range planning. A lot of rapid changes will certainly occur. The greatest risk is that the governments may lose control of developments. That could lead to a military take-over or an intervention from the Soviet Union. One possible extreme would thus be a bloc of powers with even more hard-lined communist governments than today. The other extreme would be free, democratic states in Eastern Europe acting in good cooperation with other European nations, including a united Germany. Neither of these extremes is probable in the near future. Risk-assessment must be based on capabilities, not only on declared intentions. A "worst-case scenario" has often been used in the past, but today no nation can afford it. It is necessary to study both the security risks
and the policy consequences associated with European developments.

**Eastern Europe**

The basic reasons for the new Soviet policy are economic difficulties, social problems and technological limitations. The East European countries have mainly the same problems. It is inevitable to change the economic system. Some political changes towards liberal democracy are helpful in the process, but excessive change may not be necessary, or even sound. The governing party can lose control, and that was certainly not their first intention. This has already happened in the East European countries, but not yet in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Military supports perestroika, which in the long run may well lead to a more capable defense. The way leads through technology towards a smaller force but with higher quality.

The effectiveness of Soviet military forces has been questioned after the war in Afghanistan. That has happened only rarely in the past and is a significant sign that changes are imminent.

Some of the most evident changes on the WTO-side are:

* The INF-treaty.

* The reduction and restructuring of the conventional forces in Europe.

* The political changes in the non-Soviet WTO-countries.

Those changes will have their direct impact on NATO, including the USA, but at least the side effects will be important to
Sweden. The critical factors for Sweden are:

* Will there be more Soviet freedom of action in the form of additional forces, which can be used against Sweden?
* Will the warning-time for Sweden be longer or shorter?
* Will the risk or probability for an attack on Sweden change?

The INF-treaty

In his Annual Report to the Congress 1990, Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, states:

"This historic treaty will completely eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapon delivery systems - in this case all ground-launched U.S. and USSR ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers." 14

In Soviet Military Power 1989, Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, writes:

"Thus one of their goals in signing the INF Treaty appears to have been the elimination of some nuclear weapons that, although designated for use in the European theater, could allow a battlefield nuclear exchange to spill over to the Soviet homeland." 15

He also claims:

"Even after INF and START Treaty reductions, the Soviets will likely be able to satisfy their critical tactical, theater and intercontinental targeting requirements as effectively as with their current arsenal due to the ongoing modernization of their strategic forces. The Soviets also recognize that the INF Treaty has caused some dissension within the NATO Alliance." 16

The statements seem to be formulated for different publics. It is possible to conclude that:

* The "historic treaty" has a very limited effect on the capability to deter with, or to use nuclear weapons against targets in Central Europe.
Ground-launched missiles are forbidden, but the new generation of cruise missiles, launched from the air or the sea are still permitted. Zones of delivery are not restricted to Central Europe. The Norwegian Sea, The Atlantic Ocean and the air over the Nordic countries may be better solutions. Sweden, more than earlier anticipated, could be an interesting area for attack and defense in a war between the superpowers.

The treaty has not reduced the possibility of a conventional war.

The last sentence in the quotation - Secretary Cheney mentioning "some dissension" - is an understatement. The impact on NATO is more a goal than a side effect.

Conventional Force Reductions in Europe (CFE)

The CFE-talks have not reached a final agreement, but have shown that a treaty is highly probable. In spite of a lot of problems with definitions and counting rules, there will probably be mutual limitations concerning tanks (20,000), artillery (16,500), armored troop carriers (28,000) and perhaps helicopters (1,900) and aircraft (6,700). The figures may be changed, but there will be asymmetric changes and the Soviet Union will give up substantially more. U.S. troops in Central Europe and Soviet troops stationed in foreign countries in the Atlantic to the Ural (ATTU) area may be reduced to 195,000 each.

Gorbachev declared in December 1988 that the Soviet Union will make unilateral troop reductions as early as 1991. Those reductions include six tank divisions from East Germany, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary (to be disbanded), and should in the ATTU-area include 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, 800 aircraft and 240,000 men. 19 A part of these reductions have already been made. There is great uncertainty about to the extent, and how, these reductions will continue. The ongoing restructuring of the Soviet forces adds to the uncertainty. Reorganization of some tank units actually leads to considerable additions in equipment and personnel, when tank regiments are substituted with motorized rifle regiments, etc. 20

To fulfill the originally expected U.S. part of CFE, the USA would have to cut manpower in Europe by about 30,000; a small figure compared to the declared Soviet unilateral reductions, or to the CFE-figures. The Soviet initiative and its side effects on the tax payers and the U.S. Congress, have already led to significantly higher U.S. reductions. 21 Other factors, such as the U.S. economy and domestic problems, will probably have an impact. The perception of the threat, combined with the budget deficit and people's needs may be more decisive than the real threat. A real action to diminish the threat can lead to much greater reductions for the opponent. A "force divisor", which can be effective even if the action is not fulfilled.

Military changes

The Soviet military forces are changing in quantity and quality. Nobody knows precisely what final levels they will reach, but some possibilities are:

* The unilateral reductions being fulfilled as stated.
* The current changes might stop tomorrow. (This may consti-
tute the maximum threat.)

* Reductions similar to the CFE talks might be agreed upon. (This is probable.)

* Much bigger reductions may be caused by economic pressures in the USSR and Eastern Europe. (This is also probable)

Each of these possible levels would have its own impact on the "real" Soviet threat. The side effects outside the USSR may be much greater. Other WTO-countries will follow, which decreases the total threat. On the other hand, it is more than likely that the West European states, within NATO or not, will reduce their own forces. The impact of Soviet military force reductions on public opinion is already so great that it is causing problems with military spending in Europe and in the USA.

The force balance in Europe has been much discussed. It is based among many other factors on forces from all services, including nuclear weapons of different sorts and on military geography. The geography is the only unchangeable factor and it is still important. Moving troops from the ATTU-area to the east is not the same as moving them across the Atlantic Ocean. To transport forces back by rail or road, is much easier, cheaper and less vulnerable than using sea- or airlift, a capacity which is already limited. A withdrawal of troops, especially "attack-forces" (as proposed) would increase the warning time. But by how much? If it is one week, most of the advantages are on the USSR side. If it is one month or more, it gives the West possibilities to mobilize and redeploy. 22
For a neutral nation, with its defense based on the Doctrine of the Margin, a balance of power is crucial. A Europe with fewer, but unbalanced forces is dangerous. In this situation, not only would the freedom of action of the USSR improve, but the forces which could be used against Sweden would increase.

Confidence-building measures have become an important part of the negotiations. The Helsinki and Stockholm conferences laid the groundwork. The more notable results so far are agreements to notify in advance about larger exercises, to invite observers etc. On-site inspections are already a reality, and more will come. In current negotiations there are many proposals that would lead toward a more "transparent" Europe. The USSR has introduced the "defensive defense", and the notion of thinning out the troops in areas close to the inter-German border. A zone free from nuclear delivery systems has also been proposed. The combination of force-reductions and stocking of equipment in supervised depots could result in more preparation time, before any major operations could start. 23

The "defensive defense" contains the ideas of "enough capability" and "reasonable security". The big cuts in Soviet and other East European troops may indicate a reduction to a level that still is enough for defensive actions, but not for an offense. But the capabilities depend more on the balance of forces than on the numbers. The official Soviet strategy has always been defensive, even if forward deployment in the satellites has been one of its foundation-pillars. Another may have been, that the war should be fought outside Soviet territory. The third has been, that only offensive actions can lead to decisive results.
The Soviet war-machine has been organized and equipped for offensive actions over great depths. 24

Future Soviet possibilities to launch an offensive in Central Europe depend on those factors. Forward deployed forces in East Germany and Poland, with all the lines of communications to the Soviet Union, give a good start for operations with the first strategic echelon. Fewer divisions do not necessarily mean less capability. If the enemy forces are reduced there may be even better chances to gain local superiority and achieve success. Mobile operations will facilitate initiative and momentum. What the Soviet forces in reality look like after the restructuring is completed will be a good indicator of the future Soviet concept for warfighting.

The restructuring of Soviet forces results in uncertainty for the West and some interesting beneficial possibilities for the Soviet forces. An analyst writes, that the military's support for force reductions and funding cuts is based upon a well calculated program of long-range payoffs intended to make a shift from quantity to quality possible. Going back in post-world-war II history, it is possible to show, that a "more defensive" army can be structured, meeting the Gorbachev unilateral proposals, and with the ability to expand rapidly to a force with attack capability. This can be achieved by a combination of cadre units and rapid redeployment of tank battalions from other areas. 25

The capability to fight a war in Central Europe is not lost. Besides, a new force structure, with fewer tank and more motorized rifle units, would be particularly well suited for opera-
tions in the broken, forested terrain typical for the Nordic area.

Political changes

The political changes, sometimes more like revolutions, in Eastern Europe differ in many respects from those in the USSR. In the Soviet Union Gorbachev has built a relatively steady platform for himself and for the Communist Party. In the non-Soviet WTO-countries popular uprisings have led to the fall of the old regimes, and in some cases even of the communist parties themselves. More or less democratic governments have been organized. In Poland the communists have kept the responsibility for the Department of Defense, and Warsaw has declared that its relations to the WTO have not changed. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have asked for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Other countries will follow. A moment of truth may come when East Germany or Poland decides to leave the Pact, and demand that Soviet troops and installations leave their countries. If accepted by Moscow that would lead to an entirely new concept for the defense of the Soviet Union. At least two of the foundation pillars would fall, and a lot of costs and work would follow for preparing a new defense posture on its own territory. It is not probable that this will occur in the near future. The risks are too high on both sides. Swedish security of course would improve if such a real change towards defensive defense were to occur.

Developments in the Baltic states can influence Soviet warfighting capability. These nations are part of the Baltic Military district, which has important troop formations and
missions. They can be seen as providers of a part of the second strategic echelon in a war in Central Europe, or as forces for use in attacks by sea across the Baltic. The Baltic fleet and many air defense and attack forces are stationed there. The Baltic republics have already secured a wider independence than other members of the Soviet Union. There is a limit to Moscow's tolerance. The "buffer-states", occupied shortly after the war, have been of great value, as one of the areas with access to the sea. This area will be even more important for the defense of the Soviet "Motherland", especially against cruise missiles towards the Leningrad area. It is improbable that the Baltic states will be able to secede. They are too vital for the defense of the Soviet Union.

Reunification of the two German states has become an issue during the last months. A new Germany would change the balance of power in Europe. If it were to be a part of NATO, the Soviet Union would lose its current strategically beneficial position. Even as a neutral power Germany could be seen as a threat, at least from the Soviet side. A rapid development toward reunification would entail such risk that the economic and political evolution in the East European countries could well come to a standstill or even be reversed. Gorbachev has, in his new thinking, recognized the importance of the military pacts for the stability of Europe. They tend to make total reunification difficult. Close cooperation in the economic field, but remaining presence of the superpowers may be a first step.

The political changes have been remarkably fast so far.
Forty years of socialist experiments have come to a halt. But even if those lost forty years are seen as a "parenthesis" in European history, they still will influence the future. They have formed the base for progress, but the base is not favorable. The road to parity with Western Europe will be long and cumbersome. The people want success immediately which is impossible. The longer it takes to achieve positive results, the more the risk that unforeseen and more dramatic changes will occur. The road to "better" may go through "worse"; in some cases even through catastrophe.

Some alternative futures for the Soviet Union are described in an article in Military Review. "Gorbachev's intent is to reform the Soviet system, not to abolish it." 28 Six alternative futures are described. Three of them are based on success of perestroika, but none of them leads with any certainty to a more secure world. The most favorable development "is not probable because, even in the face of Gorbachev's good will and serious efforts, the host of domestic and international problems that have to be resolved or managed are just too complex and difficult". 29 The most probable alternative mentioned, is "a collaborative arrangement with an independent, unified Germany..." The three alternatives, based on the failure of perestroika all lead to potential conflicts, instability and disintegration. "The Soviet domestic scene is more volatile than at any time since Stalin's death." 30

The Communist Party and the military will for a long period be the only organizations covering all the USSR. If Gorbachev should fail, it is probable that his successor would need to rely
more on the Soviet defense forces.

The risks inherent in the unstable future strongly suggest the wisdom of moving cautiously and trying to keep control over events. Sweden learned during the 1970's that it is easy to destroy a defense system but difficult, expensive and time-consuming to rebuild it.

The cohesion of the WTO-forces has been questioned, at least since Poland's political changes began. The balance of forces between the two pacts looks different if the non-Soviet forces are excluded. Reductions in those forces have been announced. Compared to the situation if the pact members do not take part at all, those reductions are marginal. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already proposed that the Soviet forces leave their countries. That may be possible from a strategic point of view; they have been there mainly as a political force and are not needed any more to control the countries. But if they are withdrawn, more countries would ask, and somewhere along the line it would be necessary to say no. Poland and East Germany must be kept under control unless Moscow is willing to adopt the alternative of defense of the Soviet Union on its own ground. A reunification of Germany may make at least Poland more willing to stay in the WTO.

The impact on NATO of the "peace-offensive" may lead to more freedom of action on the Northern flank for Soviet forces. The capability to launch an invasion in this area is either unaffected or even increased. Strategic warning time would tend to be longer, as long as Sweden keeps sufficient forces to meet the
initial stages of an attack. A lower guard leads to possibilities for a strategic coup. Although the probability of an attack is still limited, its consequences are very serious.

**NATO and Western Europe**

On the Western side there are at least three major changes, that can influence the strategic situation in Europe and Sweden. They are interrelated, but can be separated for analysis as:

* Force reductions and other changes as discussed above.
* The new European Community 1992 (EC), including its relations with former East Bloc countries.
* The development of a reunified Germany.

The force reductions, initiated by Gorbachev’s proposals, may lead to an imbalance of forces between the two alliances. The concept of "Vorneverteidigung" (forward defense inside Germany) may be even more difficult to realize.

The EC has decided to increase its integration after 1992. The long-range goal is similar to a federation, with open borders for movements of trade and people. A common currency has been discussed. Progress towards standardization has been made. However, some tensions and problems remain. Great Britain is working against a strong European influence over national governments and some countries try to protect their own products. The EC will be a superpower in the economic field. Its human resources are great and its military capacity could be equivalent to that of a superpower in all areas, except the strategic nuclear area.

Some countries have applied for membership in the EC, and EFTA (European Free Trade Association) is negotiating an agree-
ment for close cooperation. The official Swedish point of view is that full membership in the EC is not acceptable, since the EC decisions in the areas of foreign policy or defense could not be combined with its policy of neutrality. 31

Hungary, East Germany and some other former East Bloc countries are discussing their relations to the EC, which may opt to help by giving them access to the EC markets. The Soviet Union has expressed its interest in a similar solution. Such a development would, in the long run, lead to more cooperation and mutual dependency. That means increased security. The transition from an East Bloc country to a full member of a Western supranational federation may be too difficult for most of the countries, especially the Soviet Union. An agreement on free trade is more probable.

A European federation in control of foreign policy and with its own armed forces would be even more distant in time if East European countries were to enter the EC. Therefore, a close cooperation between the EC and new member countries would be favorable for Sweden. The greatest risk is that, in following the principles of neutrality, Sweden might be left virtually isolated in an increasingly integrated Europe. The "New EC" influence on the military threat in the Nordic area is relatively small, at least in the near future. "A common European home from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals", as envisioned by Gorbachev, is so far away, that it should not unduly influence today's planning for the near and mid-range future.

A reshaped Europe, if that were to occur, would bring many
nationality interests to the surface. Most of them are in the southern part of Europe. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania have tensions between different peoples. Greece and Turkey have unsolved territorial problems. The present German-Polish border is not the best to separate nationalities. The Baltic states have been russified to a great extent, but nationality is very important for the original peoples. Ethnic problems and separatism have arisen in the southern part of the Soviet Union. Some of these potential problems could lead to uprisings or even civil war, with the inherent risk of intervention from neighbors. Europe has been relatively free from low intensity conflicts, but in the future LIC will be a problem even for the USSR.

FUTURE CHANGES IN SWEDEN

The next Defense-Decision will be made 1991. Preparations have extended already over several years. The Supreme Commander has delivered his plans in different steps. The Government has issued directives. In the final plan which covers the next twenty years, the Supreme Commander summarizes:

In order to be able to fulfill the most important missions, the last 20 years ongoing reduction of combat units must be stopped. Shortfalls in the remaining organization must be dealt with during the 1990's.

The DD 1987 was intended to break the downward trend for the Swedish Defense Forces, but the economic resources were not in balance with the missions.

The superpower-blocs have improved their capabilities to use military resources against Scandinavia; at the same time we have reduced the number of our operative units.

A new period of detente between the superpowers has begun....When the impact of (force reductions) is discussed we must consider the following:

Differing from the situation concerning the Swedish defense, the force reductions start after a period which in Central Europe has been characterized by a long, powerful growth in armament. The reduction proposals are mainly tied
to units with missions on the central part of the continent. The possibilities for the superpower-blocs to act with military means in the Nordic area may not be reduced. The proposals so far do not concern offensive naval or air forces, nor amphibious or airborne units. The withdrawal of modern equipment from Central Europe may be used to modernize forces, possible to use in the Nordic area. 32

The Supreme Commander clearly states that the assigned missions and resources do not match. He proposes a level of expenditure above the highest level in the Government's directives. He also explains the consequences of operations at the levels given in the directives. The intention is to force the Government to make the necessary decisions on which missions to delete. The options are: 33

* Capability to protect Swedish territorial integrity in peace, in crises and in situations, when Sweden declares its neutrality.

* Capability to make an early, unified effort, mainly in its border and coastal areas, to prevent an aggressor from gaining a foothold on Swedish territory.

* Capability to counter threats from multiple directions and to maintain an effective, organized and sustainable resistance in every part of the nation; and, if possible, prevent an aggressor from reaching his operational goals. This option is based on delaying an aggressor for an unacceptable length of time.

The Supreme Commander is convinced that capability to implement all three options is necessary. The economic levels in the Government's directives are enough only for two. The plan describes at which level a choice must be made, and the options in detail. The required defense structure differs in each instance
but in most cases a large reduction of the number of brigades is necessary. Including an earlier decision to disband eight brigades with the older organizational structure, the Army will lose about 50% of the strength it had a few years ago. 34

It seems that the DD 1991 will not be based on recent development in Europe. Twenty years of continued mismatch between missions and resources has led to a hollow Army. The Secretary of Defense has already said that the extra money the Supreme Commander has asked for is "unreasonable". 35 In statements from the State Department the tone has been more "wait and see; we still need a strong defense". 36 So far a good guess about the final outcome has been a new DD based on the same, or a slightly better, economy as earlier. 37

During the 1980's the repeated submarine incursions into our territorial waters, have led to a public will to spend a little more on defense. The will to defend the country has been evident among the conscripts and the people. The rapid changes in Eastern Europe, and the development of the relations between the superpowers, have left many people indecisive. The perception is, for many, that the threat has faded away. At the same time, the Swedes know, that the Baltic states - their close neighbors - risk a Soviet intervention in their fight for freedom. The situation close to the Soviet Union, makes the Swedes a little more skeptical than many Americans. It might have been possible to convince people and politicians that more money is necessary, had there been a status quo in Eastern Europe. Now a status quo in the resources allocated for defense may be the best to hope
for.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Swedish defense policy and the Defense Forces have changed slowly, but significantly over the last twenty years. The threat, real or perceived, has played only a minor part. The domestic economy has dominated. During the détente period Sweden decreased both readiness and preparedness in order to save money for modernization. A lot of high-quality equipment was bought and is still available. The number of quality units started to fall. Training, and most of all the sense of combat-readiness 24 hours a day, decreased. A reaction started, substantially assisted by "visiting" submarines and a more widespread knowledge of spetsnaz units. Many measures have been taken to strengthen the ability to meet an attack with short notice. The DD 1987 outlined the conditions under which this could be accomplished while performing the most important task: that of defense against an invasion. The intended balance between current readiness and long-term modernization and training of combat forces for rapid mobilization could not be maintained. The defense plan was not properly funded.

In planning for the future the Supreme Commander has used the DD 87 as a base, and concluded that the mismatch between missions and resources is so great that more money or reduced missions are necessary in the next decision, DD 91. The plan was meant to be "the big choice" for the Government. But the rapid development in Europe seems to present new options. Has the threat changed, and if so, by how much? A more defensive doc-
trine, force reductions and redeployment can be arguments for a diminished threat; at least for a surprise attack. On the other hand there are still no reductions mentioned concerning air-assault-units, amphibious forces, airlift capability or air attack forces. If the superpowers reach balanced forces in Central Europe, there is an increased risk that the forces in the northern sector will be reinforced or modernized. If a true balance in Central Europe cannot be maintained on a lower level, the freedom of action for the WTO-forces may increase.

The risks must be calculated not only in terms of the probability for a conflict, but also regarding the damage it can cause. The probability for smaller armed conflicts may increase until a new pattern has been reached among the European states. Problems in the Soviet Union, or a withdrawal from the WTO by East Germany or Poland may lead to wider conflicts and war involving NATO-members.

Strategic warning time will probably increase. Thus allowing phased reductions in current readiness. Eventually long warning times may permit training or even organization of some units after a threat has been discovered. A type of cadre units could be used as a complement to the small, but high-quality forces, which can be kept immediately ready within the Swedish conscription system.

The Supreme Commander's solution will probably be to continue according to his plan and argue that it is necessary to wait for real, substantial changes in the security environment, since Sweden has already discounted more than the changes seen so far.
If no more money is allocated, the focus must be on identifying which missions the Defense Forces are not required to fulfill.

The political solution will still be based on conscription, which leads to a relatively big army. The quality of at least some of the units must be lowered and costs must be cut wherever possible. The arguments will probably focus on the smaller threat, and that a higher risk is acceptable over the transition period. A little more spending on our armed forces is realistic. The main reason is not the threat-based need, but the desire to avoid difficult decisions concerning peacetime organization, the future of the military industries and changes in the conscription system. "Wait and see until the new DD 96" may be the final outcome. And even if that solution costs a lot, it may be the best in a world in flux.

ENDNOTES

1. A background can be found in:  


3. Ibid., p. 10.

4. Ibid., p. 20.

5. Aström, p. 15.


7. Ibid., p. 7.

8. Ibid., p. 8.


10. Ibid., p. 21.

11. Ibid., p.IV


16. Ibid., p. 49.


18. Originally 275,000. President Bush proposed 195,000 for each side plus 30,000 additional U.S. troops in other countries
than Germany. President Gorbachev has later approved.


21. See # 18.

22. Different estimates have been mentioned in the media. Most of them between 20-35 days. The Committee on Armed Services' Report, mentions an increase by five to ten days. p.11.


29. Ibid., p. 13.

30. Ibid., p. 16.

31. Aström, p. 16.


33. Ibid., p. 16.

34. Ibid., pp. 27, 67.


36. Ibid., 3 December 1989.