THE EVOLVING SOVIET THREAT: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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THE EVOLVING SOVIET THREAT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Evolving Soviet Threat: A Historical Perspective

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Examines the evolving military, economic, and political threat to United States national security from a Soviet historical perspective. Compares the development of Marxist/Communist ideology with current Soviet initiatives providing rationale for recent and dramatic shifts in Soviet domestic and international policy objectives. Defines and characterizes the threat facing the United States as a result of these policy changes and suggests initiatives to neutralize Soviet successes while sustaining a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance and world leadership role for the United States.
BIographiesKetch

Lieutenant Colonel Wm. Michael Hogan earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and Government from Southern Illinois University, at Carbondale, in 1969. He entered the Air Force and was commissioned through Officers Training School in May 1970. He is a career aircraft maintenance and logistics plans officer having served in Vietnam, Thailand and in a multitude of logistics positions at Squadron, Wing, and MAJCOM levels. He has twice served as an aircraft maintenance organizational commander in CONUS and Europe. Most recently Lieutenant Colonel Hogan served in the NATO/SHAPE arena as the Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics and Manpower, Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe where he became interested in the impact of Soviet domestic and foreign policy changes within the NATO alliance. Lieutenant Colonel Hogan earned his Master of Arts degree in Industrial Production and Management from Central Michigan University in 1975 and is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1989.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In January 1988, President Ronald Reagan formally presented the National Security Strategy of the United States (US) to the Congress and the American people. Within this strategy framework the President noted:

A nation's security today involves much more than the procurement and application of military forces. The key national interests which our strategy seeks to assure and protect include:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

2. A healthy and growing United States economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors.

3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to United States interests.

4. The growth of human freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.

5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

(20:3)

The rather elementary conclusion follows that in order to achieve and sustain these national interests, our national security strategy must effectively encompass and employ all elements of national power: military, economic, and political. Today, the threat to the United States capability to employ these elements of national power to protect national interests has never been greater.
President Reagan fully recognized this threat when he stated:

Despite reforms that the leadership of the Soviet Union has recently undertaken, the most significant threat to US security interests remains the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union. (20:5)

Indeed, never before has the threat been so comprehensively mounted as to include a simultaneous assault on all three elements of United States national power. In just over three years, one man has effectively and quite dramatically altered both the course of the Soviet Union and the attendant world perception of the Soviet threat.

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power as the General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) in April 1985 signalled an unprecedented and quite unexpected redirection of Soviet philosophy and objectives both domestically and internationally. During the last three years, Mr. Gorbachev has initiated what would appear to be a revolutionary modification of historical Soviet inwardness and short sightedness militarily, economically and politically. In very short order, Mikhail Gorbachev has captured the attention, sympathy and support of many Western and European observers for the concepts of "perestroika" and "glasnost" he appears so dedicated to implement domestically and internationally. Although "restructuring" and "openness" may appear revolutionary to many Western
observers, they are not quite so revolutionary when viewed from a historical perspective.

The belief that Mr. Gorbachev has offered "...an unprecedented blueprint for change that can only have profound implications for the world...," (10-i) and "What Mr. Gorbachev is trying to do is truly revolutionary and unprecedented," (9) pales quickly when one views these changes in context. If history can teach us anything in regards to Soviet behavior, it must certainly be to expect change, often times wide ranging and dramatic. We must not overlook, for example, the Russian revolution, limiting the power of an aristocratic Czar and introducing socialism to the Soviet Union, occurred little more than a single lifetime ago. Further, the mass murder of literally tens of millions of Russians during the Stalin era of ill-conceived forced industrialization following World War II occurred during our lifetime.

Perhaps the ideas, concepts and changes the Soviet leader now appears so eager to affect do indeed appear to encompass Western principles of capitalism and representative government but nevertheless, the changes themselves are quite unremarkable. The plain fact that Mr. Gorbachev is attempting to implement significant political changes which remarkably resemble Western thought, is in itself what makes the initiatives a threat to Western security.
To date, Mr Gorbachev has offered a multitude of initiatives within the Soviet Union across the full spectrum of Soviet national-power: military, economic, and political. These initiatives have already gained significant attention within the US and among our allies, most notably Western Europe. To accept and embrace these initiatives without careful analysis of their cause and purpose however, can have disastrous consequences for US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security. So far, the US and Western governments have been and remain ill prepared to adequately address Gorbachev’s rapid fire and attention getting initiatives.

This paper is intended to provide a brief historical analysis of the causes for the Soviet military initiatives, highlighting specific factors which have brought them to sympathetic audiences around the world. Additionally, some analyses and ideas will be offered on how these initiatives fit into historical socialist/communist ideology, and more importantly what the Soviets truly are trying to achieve. Finally, some conclusions and recommendations will be provided on how the US must respond in order to strengthen national security while managing or regulating the growth of Soviet national power. The military element of national power is a most appropriate place to begin.
CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY BEAR

It remains virtually impossible to understand Soviet military strategy or doctrine which supports national objectives without at least a casual review of their historical struggle for survival. Historically, the Russians have shown little incentive for unprovoked armed conflict. Rather, they have repeatedly demonstrated a military resolve to reestablish or strengthen political influence/control along their borders. Nevertheless, the Eurasian land mass has effectively provided an invasion route to and through Russia for thousands of years with Russian people and resources laid waste at the hands of domestic as well as invading armies. According to the Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, invading forces from the 13th century Mongols through Napoleon have fostered a siege mentality among Russian leaders allowing them to use armed forces to support a centralized authoritarian government while perpetuating feelings of xenophobia. (5:994) The earliest known documented history of Russia, The Russian Primary Chronicles, dates back to 852 A.D. and vividly recounts the long and bloody development of Russia up through 1116 A.D. A few of the early entries read as follows:
Symean attacked Tsarigrad, ravaged Thrace and Macedonia ...then made peace with Romanus.

The Magyars attacked Tsarigrad for the first time and ravaged the whole of Thrace;

Igor attacked the Greeks, and the Bulgarians sent word to the Emperor that the Russes were advancing upon Tsarigrad with ten thousand vessels;

Yaroslav came thither from Kiev after a seven days march. He conquered Bryachislav, and returned the people of Novgorod to their city, while Bryachislav fled to Polatsk. (19:73, 137)

More recently, the loss of six million Russians at the hands of the Germans in World War I led to the 17 October 1917 Bolshevik revolution and eventual establishment of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which governs Russia today. (2) World War II highlights the more recent inability of Russia to effectively defend its borders and its people.

The Nazi Germany invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 witnessed a German army advance two thirds of the way to Moscow in less than one month. Although US estimates have long stood at 20 million, the Soviets have recently admitted up to 40 million Soviet soldiers and civilians perished in World War II with an extraordinary loss of more than one million people during the 900 day siege of Stalingrad. (12) Of three million Russians taken prisoner by the Germans, approximately 3%, or 100,000, survived. (25) For three years, Russia withstood the German assault and massacre alone until allied forces opened the Western front at
Normandy on 6 June 1944. By war's end, United States casualties reached nearly 260,000 soldiers, less than one tenth of one percent of Soviet casualties, minus the physical and economic devastation of the homeland. The consequences of the historical devastation of the Soviets by invading armies remain quite visible today.

Perhaps the most significant consequence of World War II is the fact it provided a united national cause for the Soviets as a nation, the first since the Bolshevik revolution, with a victory which firmly entrenched the CPSU as the legitimate and accepted spokesman, and more importantly guardian, of the Soviet people. Further, the initial war devastation and eventual victory legitimized the continued large investments of national wealth to defense, specifically the tremendous war-fighting infrastructures the Soviets have fielded over the past four decades.

Unlike the United States, the Soviets did not dramatically and rapidly demobilize following World War II, but rather continued to sustain and build upon large standing forces while occupying the buffer nations around their border. The war itself left the Soviets with a paranoia and determination to quickly and effectively defend and repel any future invasions against the motherland; but, did the allied and Soviet victory in World War II truly provide the degree of national security the Soviets desire?
From a Soviet perspective, certainly not. Rather, the war provided proof that the USSR could be invaded at any time.

During the few years following World War II, the Soviets watched as the United States poured millions of dollars into the rebuilding of Western Europe, including their former adversary Germany. They watched as a military alliance, NATO, was formed between the US and Western allies, excluding the former Soviet ally. During the years between World Wars I and II, the US had shown little interest in Western Europe militarily, economically, or politically. As a result, the Soviets perceived this genuine European interest and rebuilding as a new threat to security which certainly provided the initiative to establish the Warsaw Pact and legitimized formation of Warsaw Pact forces in the East European buffer states. Beyond NATO and the West, the Soviets had additional national security factors to consider.

Today as then, the Soviet nation borders 15 other nations, none of which, with the possible exception of Finland, are particularly friendly with the Soviet Union. Further to the East, they share a 4,000 mile border with what the Soviets view as their greatest potential adversary, the People's Republic of China with a population of one billion people. To the West, they face the NATO alliance with sizable and credible military force structures equipped
with both conventional and nuclear capability. With this immediate geographical threat, it is relatively easy to speculate on Soviet views of both the immediacy and the magnitude of the threat that faces them.

Appendix one demonstrates this Soviet perspective is manifested in the continual growth of Soviet conventional forces since 1970. Appendix two identifies a similar and significant numerical superiority for the Soviets in terms of strategic nuclear weapons. Finally, appendix three identifies approximately 2,000 Soviet space shots since 1957 and the purpose or program for each of those shots. It is interesting to note that during the same time period, 1957 through 1987, the remainder of the world combined launched a total of only 1,000 boosters. In 1987 alone, the Soviets reached earth orbit 95 times with 116 separate pay loads while the US, China, Japan, and the European Space Agency together could muster only 15 space flights. (14:1) Quite conclusively, the Soviets have and continue to perceive a significant threat from the West.

With a certain degree of numerical superiority in conventional, nuclear, and space programs (weapons) defined, one must turn to the fundamental question of why. Why have the Soviets fielded military forces so vastly superior in numbers to those of the US and her allies? With such a clear numerical superiority, why have they not used them
more effectively to establish a clearly dominant position of influence throughout the world? What do they intend to do with them? In order to find reasonable answers to these questions, the next chapter is devoted to an analysis from a historical perspective.
CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY BEAR

Ironically, the adversarial relationship between the US and USSR is strongly rooted in the allied victory in World War II and the uneasy establishment of corresponding spheres of influence in Europe. As mentioned earlier, the lack of trust which led to establishment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and failure of the Soviets to demobilize resulted in the world's two largest military powers, and former allies, becoming potential adversaries; a relationship which has seemingly grown in intensity until recent years. The importance of overwhelming military force is however, more deeply rooted in the means by which the allied victory was achieved.

With the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, neither the US nor the Soviets possessed sufficient military force to either repel Nazi advances or decisively defeat them. While the US spent three years gearing up its military industrial base to enter the war, the Soviets were required to industrially gear up for war and simultaneously defend themselves from the Germans. The tremendous military industrial buildup and logistical preparation on behalf of the allies resulted in an unprecedented and overpowering military force which in relatively short order defeated Nazi Germany in Western Europe. The importance and value then of
massive military might were permanently etched in the minds of Soviet leaders, especially Joseph Stalin. Even more interesting, and perhaps important, is the close correlation of quantitative or numerical superiority and communist ideology.

Marxist/Communist ideology is based on the concept of dialectical materialism. The communist view of the world, in both nature and social life, is quite different from Western metaphysical philosophy and thought; in fact, it is just the opposite. Rather than a set of metaphysical laws which govern the world, Marxism... holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away, quantity is transformed into quality. (24:7)

Joseph Stalin's conviction to this philosophy is found in his work entitled, Dialectical and Historical Materialism.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of the dialectical method to the study of social life and the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat. (24:12)

Although millions of Soviets lost their lives under Stalin's forced industrialization program to achieve quantitative production following World War II, one cannot deny quantity instead of quality in production remains the
rule of the day in the Soviet Union. One also cannot deny the validity of the quantity will produce quality axiom of communist ideology. While the quantity of Soviet military weapons has increased, so too has the quality. For example, as the Soviets built heavy weight strategic nuclear missiles, their accuracy was a continual short coming. Today, their heavy and mirrored missiles match those of the West in accuracy and thus by initially achieving numerical superiority, qualitative equality has followed. With such remarkable success in fielding the world's largest and most powerful military force, and Marxist ideology seemingly on track in turning quantity into quality, what has led Mikhail Gorbachev to conclude an Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, press for strategic nuclear force reductions, and recently offer to reduce Soviet conventional troop strength in Europe by 500,000? The answer has three facets, the first is timing.

The process of turning quantity into quality within the existing socialist society simply takes too long. In spite of the Soviets dedicated and historical attempts and partial success in closing the qualitative and technological lead of the West in industrial production, including weapons, it simply takes extraordinary effort and time. In spite of remarkable success, overtly and covertly, in stealing Western technology and duplicating it, they find
themselves in a constant race to catch up: a race they can never win. (appendix four) As the 1,132 page report, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, prepared for Congress' Joint Economic Committee points out, "Unfamiliarity with modern technology causes Soviet engineers to take more time to copy the design of an IBM computer than it takes IBM to develop it from scratch." (6:40)

From a Soviet perspective, the time, effort, and expense required to steal, understand, and either duplicate or defend against recent US weapon systems such as the Stealth fighter and bomber and research and development in the Space Defense Initiative (SDI), must appear rather staggering. In large part then, it is the technological lead of the US, estimated by Dr. Oles Smolansky to be five to ten years, which has led the Soviets to pursue negotiated force reductions. (23) The increasing development of new technologies and weapon systems must be viewed by the Soviets as a significant and real potential for the US to further widen the technological gap and strengthen the military element of national power. Additionally, the Soviets have recognized a significant shortcoming in the growth of their military force structure.

As Dr. Mark Kramer so aptly points out,

The tremendous Soviet investments in military growth, typical of the Leonard Brezhnev era, were intended to propel the USSR to an equal world power status of the US. Regrettably for the Soviets, their objective is yet
to be fully achieved as Brezhnev left a desperate economy with large and capable military forces. (15)

Indeed, in spite of the fact the Soviets have accumulated an enormous military capability with an attendant, yet moderate, capability to influence the nations of the world politically and economically, they remain largely a third world nation with nuclear weapons. Although the capability exists, they have not become large scale economic trading partners throughout the world nor have they even developed a world marketable currency. Any analysis of what lies behind the revolutionary Soviet initiatives under glasnost and perestroika in terms of military strength must give due regard to Soviet economic factors, domestically and internationally, and communist ideology, once again. The next chapter then, will address this second element of Soviet national power: economics.
In his book, Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev extensively discusses his rather shocking and closely capitalistic ideas for economic and social reform.

Of prime importance is for the people to be the true master of production, rather than a master only in name. In carrying out a radical economic reform, it was important to preclude the repetition of the past mistakes which in the 1950's, 60's and 70's doomed to failure our attempts to change the system of economic management... give the restructuring effort a profoundly democratic nature. (10:84)

The importance Mr. Gorbachev places on economic reform was clearly spelled out in his address to the twenty-seventh party congress in February, 1986. "The acceleration of the country's social and economic development is the key to all our problems." (11:87)

As appendices five through ten clearly illustrate, the Soviets are facing enormous economic problems which are increasing in intensity. (28) Writing in a Soviet perestroika program publication in 1987, Abel G. Aganbegian, Academician and Secretary of the Economics Department, USSR, Academy of Sciences writes,

During the Ninth Five-Year Plan, rates of development fell from 41 to 29% for national income, 21 to 13% for agriculture, and 50 to 43% for industry. During 1979-82 real growth of the national economy ceased, and it (the economy) began to stagnate. (1:7)
Economically, the Soviets, much like the US, have found that devoting such a significant share of their national wealth to the defense sector is becoming an increasingly difficult task. As appendix eight illustrates, both their net and gross national debt has more than doubled in just four years. In spite of this, Central Intelligence Agency reports estimate Soviet defense spending at 15 to 25% of Gross National Product (GNP) annually since the late 1970's with annual defense spending growth rates averaging 4% per year. (26:32) By comparison, the growing US debt has already resulted in a 10% decline in defense spending over the last three years. As alarming as these trends are for both the Soviets and the US, they are probably more dangerous for the Soviets.

As accustomed as the Soviet population may be to gross production inefficiencies in both industry and agriculture (it takes the Soviets two and one half times more coal and steel to produce $1,000 worth of GNP than West Germany) and chronic shortages of basic consumer goods (approximately 50% of all vegetables produced never reach the consumers), Soviet leaders undoubtedly see things getting no better and must certainly recognize that even Soviets have limits to their patience. (11:105) Further, Mr. Gorbachev is well aware that domestic economic problems and dissatisfactions have been the cause of more than one
internal revolution during the course of history. Ironically and perhaps dangerously, the openness and restructuring campaigns have and will likely continue to put pressure on the state and the Communist Party to provide the fundamental needs of its society. In addition to this more immediate threat, the value or importance of economics in Marxist ideology warrants further analysis.

According to Dr. Vadim Medish, author of *The Soviet Union*, the pillar of Marxist ideology is economics.

> It is the economic sphere that will ultimately decide the historic contest between capitalism and socialism (communism). Today, the Soviets promise to catch up with and surpass America is no longer a joke. (18:165)

Further, Marxist ideology specifically identifies the social and economic transition toward communism into five distinct stages. These stages, the representative societies, and the economic foundations are illustrated and briefly described in appendix 11. Quite interesting and problematic, in light of Mr. Gorbachev's economic reform, are the matters of property and ownership. As appendix 11 illustrates, this is an important issue throughout the developmental stages to communism and in fact is the fundamental flaw to economic growth under either socialism or communism. The problem which must be overcome under socialism is that of public or state ownership of property or more specifically, the means of production. More and more evidence is now reaching the US that indicates private
enterprise or collectives are beginning to provide more and more of the Soviet consumer goods. Some evidence suggests that as much as 50% of the agricultural products reaching consumers are now grown in private gardens and that private enterprises are springing up in the service sector of society (i.e. auto and home repairs). To date, Mr. Gorbachev appears content to allow this capitalist phenomena to continue. In all likelihood this phenomena will not only continue, but in fact will flourish in the years ahead for two quite fundamental reasons.

First, the emerging capitalism serves the needs (demands) of the people while simultaneously diminishing the pressure upon the state to provide the goods and services it has historically been unable to provide. Secondly, and by far more important, it marks the potential first step backwards from a socialist society to a capitalist society, a societal stage the CPSU and Soviet culture failed to traverse enroute to communism? Could it be the new grass roots economic developments now occurring, and being encouraged, mark both recognition and acceptance of a retreat to capitalism before progressing to socialism and finally to communism? A strong argument for this theory can be made if one closely examines the Soviet Union during the first two decades of the 18th century.
Historically, it is important to recognize that Karl Marx was an almost typical philosopher of 19th century England. Much of his philosophy, and indeed his writings, were developed from his perspective as a resident of a highly industrialized and capitalistic London of the 1830's and 40's. According to Dr. Mike Boll, Marx was probably one of the world's first economists and believed people came together, or societies developed, for their economic well being. (3) Further, as illustrated in appendix II, Marx believed capitalism, or private ownership of the means of production and free labor as well as representative government, was a necessary, in fact critical, step enroute to socialism and ultimately to communism. If one carefully considers both the means of production and government in the Soviet Union in the decades leading up to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, a rather convincing argument can be made that had it not been for the revolution, the Soviet Union quite probably would have developed into a capitalist society much like Great Britain or France.

Ironically, about the same time Abraham Lincoln freed the slaves in America (early 1860's), Czarist Russia freed the serfs, thus breaking an important historical labor relationship dramatically impacting on subsequent societal development. This was done, partially at least, because of the tremendous losses Russia suffered at the hands of Great
Britain and France when these nations attacked Russia in the Crimean War in the 1850's. Having decisively defeated Napoleon's invasion only a half century earlier, Czarist Russia concluded that the serf structure was responsible for their tremendous losses and followed the lead of both Great Britain and France who both had freed the serfs prior to the Crimean War. This in turn led to rather interesting and dramatic changes in Russian society and government.

By the turn of the 20th century, distinctively democratic processes had come to replace the serf society and private land ownership became the measure of wealth within Russia. Dual assemblies were elected by local voters with one-third of the membership elected by land owners to represent rural society. City assemblies (DUMAS) developed with members elected based on the amount of property taxes paid. And finally, the village elders represented the interests of peasant serf government and were referred to as what today we would call alderman. (3) Regretably for the Soviets, these initial democratic structures and institutions were never allowed to flourish.

Just as these structures were in the developmental stages and private ownership of property beginning to flourish, the Soviet Union found itself in the turmoil of yet another war, World War I. The political, military, and economic drain of this war eventually gave rise to the
Bolshevik revolution of 1917 which ultimately brought to power the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, from the time the serfs were freed until the means of production were taken over by the government and Communist Party, capitalism had been allowed to emerge and survive less than one generation. This move away from capitalism effectively prevented the Soviet Union from following the lead of Great Britain and France, which through capitalism and industrialization had become world economic powers. As one might expect however, the General Secretary does not agree with this analysis.

In his book, *Perestroika*, Gorbachev writes,

There are people in the West who would like to tell us that socialism is in a deep crisis and has brought our society to a dead end. We have only one way out; to adopt capitalist methods of economic management and social patterns, to drift toward capitalism. They go so far as to claim that the October 1917 Revolution was a mistake which almost completely cut off our country from world social progress. To put an end to all the rumors and speculations that abound in the West about this, I would like to point out we are conducting all our reforms in accordance with the socialist choice. We will proceed toward better socialism rather than away from it. (10.36)

Although the General Secretary disagrees with the previous analysis of the causes of Soviet economic backwardness, he could not disagree however, that the truly democratic and capitalistic nations of the world have been the only nations to become world economic superpowers. If the economic arena is the true battle ground between East and West ideology as
communist philosophy suggests, and if Gorbachev truly aspires to seriously challenge the world super power status of the US, the socialist economic system will continue to serve as an effective stumbling block. However, the very initiatives of openness and restructuring have and will continue to erode the socialist economic system giving rise to the growth of capitalism. Additionally, one can easily examine recent and potential Soviet economic developments in the international arena.

The Soviets have historically been disadvantaged by the lack of a world marketable currency due primarily to their economic inwardness and backwardness. This lack of true value associated with the ruble and an out of balance supply and demand economic system is often times paradoxical. For example, it has been estimated that as much as half of the bread sold in state stores is bought to be fed to livestock because of its artificially low price due to government production subsidies. From an international perspective however, the Soviets have a few important opportunities for progress.

Since Gorbachev's rise to power, the Soviets have demonstrated an increasing awareness and interest in the world economic community. They have expressed interest in a world valuation of their currency as well as an increased interest in financial assistance to third world nations via
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Further, they have convinced many US allies of their financial honesty and reliability and have recently gained an estimated ten billion dollars of hard currency credits from Western European nations. (11) The Soviet's vast reserves of natural gas also offer a significant opportunity to enhance their economy.

In 1982, oil and oil by-products made up 60% of the Soviet Union's hard currency income ($16 billion). Currently, the Soviet Union is the world's largest producer of oil (22%) and natural gas (33%) and possesses one-tenth of the world's proved oil reserves. (13:90)

Natural gas production is currently growing faster than any other branch of the Soviet national economy...and is likely to make the Soviet Union the world's primary natural gas producer before the end of the decade. (13:146)

The tremendous potential to recover and export gas to a gas hungry Western Europe presents an equally tremendous potential for the Soviets to obtain hard currency while driving an economic wedge between the US and Western European allies. Politically, such an arrangement would effectively serve the long standing Soviet strategic objective to diminish US influence in Europe.

This final aspect of national power, the political arena, is the arena in which Mikhail Gorbachev has made the most advances, often at the expense of the US, in the
Soviet's effort to become the dominant power of the world. Any analysis of the "new look" of the Soviet Union would be incomplete without due regard to the political initiatives of the Soviets in recent years, the success they have and are likely to achieve, and most importantly once again, the reasons for the new look. The next chapter then, will address the Soviet political sphere.
CHAPTER V

BEAR IMAGE ENHANCEMENTS

Similar to the severe and potentially volatile economic conditions inherited by Gorbachev, the domestic political problems inherited stand equally ominous and perhaps contain even greater explosive potential. The Soviet Union consists of over 130 separate ethnic groups and nationalities with no common language. In fact, only a minority of the population actually speak Russian. Further, the Great Russians, which by far is the largest ethnic group of the Communist Party governing the nation, is expected to become the minority ethnic group giving way to an Asian minority within the next few decades. (12) As previously discussed in chapter two, the long history of struggle and war within the nation among a tremendous variety of ethnic groups has left only partially healed ideological, cultural, and ethnic rivalries; rivalries which glasnost may in fact be fueling rather than serving as a mechanism to resolve. This unrest is most recently notable in the transcaucasus republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia where violence and death have recently occurred. Literally thousands of Armenians have become refugees in their own land due to fear and rivalry of neighboring Azerbaijan. As reported by the 30 November 1988 Yerevan International News Service in Armenia,
Masses of Armenians have relinquished their homes in Azerbaijan and are pouring into Armenia under threat of death. According to a report from the Republic Council of Ministers, the number of refugees from Armenia exceeded 78,000 as of 2 December 1988. (4:96)

Although official Soviet news reports claim this exodus and refugee problem are based purely on unsubstantiated ethnic fears, the problems none the less exist and highlight the truly multi-national character of the Soviet Union. Whether or not glasnost and perestroika have precipitated or contributed to this problem or were developed as a means to deal with anticipated ethnic problems, is debatable.

Regardless, Gorbachev's future as General Secretary will in large part be determined by his effectiveness at dealing with ethnic/regional clashes and unrest in the Baltic Republics. Unfortunately, his political image domestically and internationally is challenged more than ever before by a growing mass media and communications capability.

The declining ability of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party to control communications and information within their country from both domestic and international audiences can be attributed to an explosion in mass media communications capability within the last decade as well as the glasnost initiative. Now, more than ever before, news events such as the Chernobyle nuclear power plant disaster, the unrest and earthquake in Armenia, the Soviet airliner high-jacking, and indeed any newsworthy event reaches
domestic and international audiences in uncensored form and in record breaking time. One could safely argue the almost instant news media coverage capability and the tremendous resources necessary to manage or censor communications inevitably have, in themselves, resulted in a more open Soviet society. During a December 1988 meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee to discuss the Armenian unrest, Gorbachev offered an enlightening complaint of the media coverage: "Passions are being heightened by the local press that frequently allows instigatory calls, whips up tension, and is under the thumb of antirestructuring forces." (4:85) This more spontaneous and uncensored news coverage coupled with the openness campaign will continue to have a dramatic impact on Soviet domestic politics in the years ahead because of an enlightened population.

More than ever before, Soviet citizens are witnessing the insufficiencies and oppressive nature of their socialist political structure. They are learning, for example, what the large investment in military forces and structures deprive them of socially; they are learning about a political system responsible for the death and imprisonment of literally millions of Soviets who have spoken out against the political order; they are learning about natural and man made disasters within their borders and most importantly, they are learning of previous and
removing attempts to control information within their own country. One can only speculate as to the course and consequences of such an expanded knowledge base. However, it is entirely conceivable the man most responsible for the enlightenment will himself become the source and focus of existing and future frustration and disasters previously unknown to the Soviet citizens. In spite of a gloomy political picture domestically, Mikhail Gorbachev has made remarkable changes in the international political arena. However, these are changes that should come as no surprise.

As outlined previously, the fundamental concept of communist philosophy is one of motion and change. In this regard, the drastic changes in Soviet policy and direction simply mark a return to the path of communist evolution which came to a rather abrupt halt under the leadership of Leonard Brezhnev. As Daniel Springer points out,

We can only nod as, trying to justify the inexorable inevitability of change, Mikhail Gorbachev and his followers echo arguments from old diagnosis. The surprising thing is not that Soviet society is on the move again. The astonishing thing is that the Brezhnev interlude lasted for so long, that more than two decades elapsed between the fall of Nikita Khruschev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. (22:29)

Quite accurately, Mikhail Gorbachev is not the anomaly, Brezhnev was. This return to an active communist evolution does encompass significant and potentially crippling consequences internationally for both the US and Western allies.
Recalling earlier assertions that the Soviets intend to supplant, or at least diminish, the national power and world leadership role of the US politically and economically, the means they have selected to achieve this objective are discussed at length by Gorbachev in his book Perestroika. Simply stated, the Soviets intend to reduce or eliminate the threat perceived by the US and its allies; a perceived threat largely responsible for the establishment of NATO, the military force structures the US and West have today, and to a large degree the political and economic success of the US. As an illustration, Gorbachev writes,

An imaginary or real enemy is needed only if one is bent on maintaining tension, on confrontation with far-reaching and I might add, unpredictable consequences. Many in the West believe the real threat will arise if the Soviet Union accomplished its plans of accelerating socio-economic development and shows its new economic and political potential. Hence the desire to exhaust the Soviet Union economically. (10:220)

To date, the General Secretary has been highly effective at politically reducing the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and bolstering their international image as both a politically and economically reliable member of the world community. Appendices 12 through 15 represent recent public opinion polls in Western Europe, clearly demonstrating Mr. Gorbachev's success in image modification. (16)

Politically, the Soviets have come to recognize their historical inwardness does little to build their influence around the globe. The Soviets have adopted a role
as mediator both independently and through established international organizations such as the United Nations to reduce or eliminate situations the US may consider hostile. The Soviets for example have stepped up the pressure on Vietnam to withdraw troops from neighboring Cambodia and reach a peaceful settlement to conflicts in Southeast Asia. Further, it is likely that Soviet pressure on Yasar Arafat recently led to his recognition of Israel and his proposal for a negotiated peace in the Middle East. And finally, the refusal of the Soviets to introduce a significant military presence where opportunities exist in Latin America, all effectively serve to politically diminish threats to US national security while simultaneously enhancing their image as champions of world peace through international cooperation. Regretably, the US has unwittingly fallen into the Soviet game plan on several occasions. The recent US Secretary of State's decision to refuse Arafat entry into the US to address the United Nations is a case in point. The subsequent United Nations vote to move to Geneva to receive the address (unanimous vote with exception of US and Israel) only serves to strengthen the world perception that the US is uninterested in a negotiated Middle East peace settlement, thus creating a vacuum for the Soviets to fill, once again, as a champion of peace. The rapid fire initiatives from Gorbachev coupled with the inability of the
US to effectively respond politically, have already had a dramatically positive effect for the Soviets. Recent public opinion polls in Western Europe for example, rate Mr. Gorbachev ahead of former President Reagan in popularity, trustworthiness, and in leading the charge for world peace. This image of world peace maker has not come about accidentally for the Soviets, but out of design and necessity.

As Andrew C. Goldberg suggests, the Western rearmament which began in 1978 challenged the Soviets during the Brezhnev era of economic stagnation when it could no longer keep pace with the Soviet military spending rates of the 1960's and 70's. Further, the rearmament posed a threat to the most vulnerable area of the Soviet military: technological inferiority.

If one assumes that Gorbachev would like to buy breathing space from the super power military competition and build additional bridges to East-West trade and economic cooperation, a natural vehicle would be the reduction of NATO-Warsaw Pact military confrontation. Since the impetus for NATO military modernization and political cohesion has been the Western perception of the Red Army's superiority, any amelioration would have tremendous political pay offs. (8:165)

To this, one should also add that the Soviet role as peace negotiator throughout other regions of the world, also has and will continue to have tremendous political pay offs. The Soviet's acceptance of the double zero option on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, pressure for strategic
nuclear arms reductions, and agreement in principle to asymmetrical, and even unilateral, conventional force reductions fall quite in line with Gorbachev's stated intentions of fielding a force structure sufficient for defensive purposes but insufficient to conduct offensive operations. Although these concepts and initiatives are in fact significantly contributing to the political strength of the Soviets, while allowing them economic breathing space, there exists a final and important motivation from the Soviet perspective: the growing number of problems common to all nations of the world and the resultant need for international cooperation to address and resolve them.

The Soviets have come to recognize, perhaps even more than than the US, there now exist world social, economic, and environmental problems which transcend political systems and national boundaries. Further, without international cooperation and coordination, both the magnitude and quantity of problems will likely increase. In spite of 40 years of experience with nuclear energy for example, nuclear energy plant disasters in both the US and the USSR have highlighted both a degree of ignorance and the potential benefits international nuclear research and regulation may provide.

The proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons, particularly surface to air missiles, and perhaps
even small, tactical nuclear weapons, among radical third world nations pose an obvious threat to all nations and societies. Continuing terrorist acts around the globe, including the 2 December 1988 kidnapping and aircraft hijacking of a Soviet IL-76 from the Soviet Union to Israel, vividly illustrate the susceptibility of even the Soviets to terrorism. Threats imposed upon the world's environment such as the green house effect and industrial pollution of ground water and oxygen producing rain forests all extend beyond the capability of any nation to independently study and effectively resolve.

The inability of some nations, particularly Bangladesh and the African continent, to prevent mass starvation and illness deserves world recognition and assistance. The lack of an effective organization to study and provide binding peaceful solutions to regional conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Irish Republican Army movement and killings in Northern Ireland, all deserve international attention and efforts to resolve.

Indeed, any and all of these vacuums provide fertile ground for the Soviets to gain international political acclaim and support; and in some areas they are doing just that. For example, it was after all a Soviet ice-breaker which finally freed three whales trapped in the northern ice cap after they became international celebrities and an
international cause. Although in itself quite inconsequential, this rescue mission displayed at least to the American public and the world a sense of compassion on behalf of the Soviets.

With a brief analysis now provided in regards to a few of the Soviet challenges across the spectrum of the military, economic, and political elements of US national power, where do we go from here? The final chapter will briefly redress a few of the initiatives offered by the Soviets and provide a few suggestions on how the US should seize the initiative or respond as appropriate in order to regain and sustain its leadership role throughout the world.
CHAPTER VI
ASSESSMENTS

Military

As chapter two addressed, history has not been kind to the Soviets in terms of conflict and warfare both from internal as well as external forces. As a result they have built the largest military force in the world at the expense of their own society. Today, the Soviets are faced with overwhelming, domestic, and economic problems; and yet, they must still respond in kind to a modernization of NATO forces and technological advances in US military systems. As the economic problems mount, they have recognized that they will be unable to compete with the industrial capacity and technological superiority of the West in the arms race. They have but one alternative which will satisfy their paranoia for security and simultaneously devote national resources required to domestic problems: convince the West that they have no offensive intentions and thus the large standing forces, both conventional and nuclear, are unnecessary and in fact counterproductive to economic and political cooperation and progress. Thus far, their initiatives to achieve this objective have been at least partially successful with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty and they are continuing to gain popular support throughout the world. The US cannot remain stagnant
on the issue of arms reductions, we must act. We must act however, intelligently, deliberately, and in a manner which will not jeopardize US national security interests.

First, we must continue to capitalize on the very military advantages we possess which have brought the Soviets to realize they cannot match our technical progress, and in fact advantage, due to their own inherent and systemic economic constraints. We must therefore not allow advanced weapon systems such as stealth aircraft, nor defensive systems such as the Strategic Defense Initiative to become bargaining chips in arms reduction negotiations. We must, however, actively respond and pursue Soviet initiatives toward arms reductions. Further, we must take the initiative instead of simply responding to Soviet ideas and initiatives. Thus far we are dismally unprepared to do this, but must not and need not remain in this posture. We can in fact afford significant and proportional conventional force reductions in Europe, for example, as long as the Soviets remain convinced we will respond to covert or overt aggression there with long range strategic weapons, conventional or nuclear, either at the point of aggression or against the motherland itself. We must therefore establish a corps of military personnel to study existing force structures and defense needs in order to determine what forces can be sacrificed for the greatest economic gain
with the least loss in the deterrent capability of US and NATO military forces. To date, we have no military agency capable of providing our political leadership with the advice they require to intelligently enter arms control negotiations with the Soviets, and the world is beginning to notice.

Secondly, we must, as Mikhail Gorbachev suggests, return to a truly defensive military posture with an appropriate capability to inflict an unacceptable retaliatory strike against any aggressor. We must therefore once again, vigorously pursue Strategic Defense Initiatives and similar defensive systems which can provide the capability to blunt an offensive attack from the Soviets or future strategically capable nations. Once again we must target the least capable and most costly weapon systems and force structures to match asymmetrical Soviet reductions.

Thirdly, we must attack the dark world of Soviet covert activity in Western Europe. We must hold Mr. Gorbachev publicly accountable when he suggests all nations have the inherent right to develop domestic systems of government and social welfare free of external influence. We must not overlook the fact that the recent Soviet initiatives to reduce force structures is in fact contrary to communist ideology whereby quantity begets quality. Either the Soviets have achieved the levels of quality they
deem necessary, they are now willing to forego this fundamental precept of ideology, or they realize the military quantities they have achieved are too slow in evolving into qualitative superiority.

Finally, we must actively engage the Soviets and other developed nations of the world in negotiations and agreements concerning unified or cooperative approaches to nations sponsoring terrorism while limiting the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons among third world nations. Although the US and the Soviets must take the lead in this area, joint pressure must be applied to all nations of the world to prevent the unnecessary growth of such weapons.

**Economics**

As discussed in chapter three, the true source of recent Soviet initiatives is the economic stagnation and decay systematic of socialist society aggravated by the tremendous national wealth placed into defense by the Soviets. It is indeed the economic arena which offers the West the greatest opportunity for improving relations with the Soviets and thus diminishing tension. One school of thought suggests the West should not come to the aid of the Soviets but rather ignore their economic plight, thereby forcing them to unilaterally redirect resources from the military to the domestic economic sector. Although there is
indeed some logic in this approach, this approach alone would most likely be ineffective. Suffering is a common thread throughout Russian history and indeed is deeply imbedded in early Russian religious philosophy. In short, the Russian people have and, if necessary, will continue to demonstrate an incredible ability to be denied the comforts of life for the sake of defending the homeland. Advanced weapons development in the US and NATO forces modernization have served to heighten the military threat perceived by the Soviets and they will therefore match or develop systems to counter these threats. Therefore, what course should we chart?

Perhaps the most significant opportunity for the West lies in the development of private enterprise within the Soviet Union which under Gorbachev has at least been tolerated and partially encouraged. As previously argued, the Soviets have indeed failed to pass through the era of capitalism enroute to communism. State ownership of the means of production has historically proven ineffective; a fact well known throughout their nation. Now for the first time, some opportunity exists for the West to force, or at least encourage, the growth of capitalism especially in light of truly democratic elections of government and cooperative officials now occurring at local levels. Although Gorbachev insists he is not turning away from
socialism, one must conclude the true dilemma will become the distribution of wealth provided via capitalist methods. Specifically, I recommend the US foster Soviet economic dependence on, rather than competition with, the West.

The US and Western Europe are certainly capable and in many cases willing to provide the basic consumer goods needed by the Soviets. I therefore strongly urge the establishment of a Western-Soviet economic commission to study the existing and future needs and trading arrangements to facilitate a Soviet economic dependency on the West while encouraging, underwriting if necessary, private investment and enterprise within the Soviet Union. Existing US governmental agencies must, however, regulate the flow of hi-tech Western industrial production equipment during the process. Where possible, economic agreements and concessions should be offered in turn for reductions of Soviet military involvement and adventures outside their borders. In short, my recommendations are based on the belief that the more successful the West can be in transforming the Soviets into a capitalist society, or the more we can make them look and behave like us, the more successful we will be in reducing international tensions and fostering a genuine sense of coordination and cooperation throughout the world to address and resolve problems common to all nations.
As discussed in chapter four, the Soviet Union remains a deeply divided nation geographically, culturally, and politically. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the Communist Party leadership will be required to make at least limited political concessions in some regions of the nation. The CPSU and governmental agencies will not be able to escape the effects of glasnost and perestroika. In my estimation, real changes and progress will continue or these concepts will die a sudden death due to overwhelming pressure from below to which the existing party and social system will be unable to quickly and effectively respond. Thus far, the Soviet people are responding relatively well to the new openness and change and therefore we must encourage the process.

Initially, we must applaud and encourage the development of truly representative governments, even at the local level, which existed prior to the Bolshevik revolution. We should encourage reciprocal visits of US and USSR government officials, participate in student and cultural exchanges, and encourage tourism. I am convinced the Soviet people, if given both the opportunity to digest life in the capitalist West and the ability to mold government and society at home, will once again begin to
look and think more like us. Unfortunately, history has denied them, and us, this opportunity.

From a national perspective, the US must cautiously yet diligently support the glasnost and perestroika initiatives. We must hold Mr. Gorbachev accountable for open news media coverage of events, negotiated settlements in regional disputes, responsible membership in international political and economic forums, and participation in international organizations to study and resolve or prevent problems detrimental to the world environment and the world’s economic growth. As with the military and economic elements of US national power, the most crucial aspect within the political arena is seizing the initiative.

Thus far, the rather startling and even remarkable changes and suggestions put forth by Mikhail Gorbachev have caught the US and her allies quite flat footed. As this analysis has demonstrated, Soviet historical development itself is one of motion and change and thus we must expect continuous and often dramatic change from the Soviets. If the initiatives now on the table do not produce the desired results, other initiatives, perhaps radically different, will follow. The task before us is to call the defense from the field and send in a well organized and trained offensive unit to capture the leadership momentum across the military,
economic, and political spheres throughout the world in order to take the game to the Soviets. We cannot remain content to respond to Soviet proposals which superficially appear quite reasonable to the world audience, but rather we must effectively anticipate Soviet objectives and provide the proposals which will sustain US national power and influence throughout the world. We must recapture the eroding image as a nation dedicated to world problem solving and peace; a nation sensitive to human suffering and willing to cooperate in any initiative for the betterment and preservation of mankind. The new administration now entering office, indeed, has a large task before it; a task nevertheless that must be done to sustain the world super power and leadership role of the United States.
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY FORCE LEVELS

Source: R.S. Dudney. "Gorbachev's Economy"
Air Force Magazine, Mar 1988
NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISONS
(IN PLACE / RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE - EUROPE)

DIVISIONS
MAIN BATTLE TANKS
ARTILLERY/MORTAR
GUIDED WEAPONS
ARMORED VEHICLES
ATTACK HELICOPTERS
FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS
FIGHTER/BOMBER
RECONNAISSANCE

Source: Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat - 1988
Part 2, Chp VII
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

LONG RANGE BOMBERS
MEDIUM RANGE BOMBERS
SHORT RANGE BOMBERS
SUBMARINES
NUCLEAR MISSILES
ICBM

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Source: The Military Balance 1988-89
The Institute for Strategic Studies
London
SOVIET SPACE SHOTS BY PROGRAM

PHOTO RECON
COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONIC INTEL.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT
MINOR MILITARY
NAVIGATION/GEODETIC
SCIENTIFIC/DEV.
WEATHER/NATURAL RES.
EARLY WARNING
VENUS/MARS MISSIONS
ASAT RELATED
LUNAR MISSIONS
FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOM
UNKNOWN

Source: R.S. Dudney. "Gorbachev's Economy"
Air Force Magazine, Mar 1988
## TECHNOLOGICAL/WEAPON SYSTEM LOSSES WEST TO EAST

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<thead>
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<th>UNITED STATES WEAPON/TECHNOLOGY</th>
<th>SOVIETS INCORPORATED INTO</th>
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<td>Minuteman ICBM Silo</td>
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<td>YC-14 (Stol Acft)</td>
<td>An-72 (Stol Acft)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Space Shuttle</td>
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<td>E-3A (AWACS)</td>
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<td>B-1A Bomber</td>
<td>Blackjack Bomber</td>
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Source: "Moscow's Technology Parasites."  
Air Force Magazine, Dec 1984
Source: "Would a Rich Russia be a Cuddly Russia."
The Economist, 14-20 Feb 1987
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
(AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE - %)

Source: "Would a Rich Russia be a Cuddly Russia"
The Economist, 14-20 Feb 1987
USSR Economic Performance Under Gorbachev and His Predecessors

Average annual growth rates

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brezhnev</th>
<th>Andropov</th>
<th>Chernenko</th>
<th>Gorbachev</th>
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<tr>
<td>1965-70</td>
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Source: "Would a Rich Russia be a Cuddly Russia."
The Economist, 14-20 Feb 1987
APPENDIX 8

USSR ESTIMATED HARD CURRENCY DEBT

1975-87

GROSS DEBT

NET DEBT

Source: "Would a Rich Russia be a Cuddly Russia."
The Economist, 14-20 Feb 1987
Source: "Would a Rich Russia be a Cuddly Russia."
The Economist, 14-20 Feb 1987
Source: "Would a Rich Russia be a Cuddly Russia?"
The Economist, 14-20 Feb 1987
## COMMUNISM DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES

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<td>Primitive Communism...Indian</td>
<td>Indian Society With...No Property</td>
<td>All Worked for Common Good</td>
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<td>Discovery of America</td>
<td>No Government</td>
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<td>Slave Capitalism...Roman</td>
<td>Roman Empire...Classes Arise Around</td>
<td>Government Arises to Keep</td>
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<td>Empire</td>
<td>Society Functioning</td>
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<td>Feudalism...9th Century France</td>
<td>9th Century France...Work Monarch</td>
<td>Nobles &amp; Serfs (own means of production)</td>
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<td>From Each According to Ability;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>According to Ability</td>
<td>to Each According to Their Needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: V. Medish. The Soviet Union. 1985
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
1981-88

All in all a good opinion about....

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow
7 Feb 1989
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
1981-88

The Soviet Union ....

is serious about detente

abuses our interest in detente

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow
7 Feb 1989
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
Comparison of U.S., Soviet Peace Images
1954-1987

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow
7 Feb 1989
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

Comparison of U.S., Soviet Peace Images
1954-1987

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow
7 Feb 1989
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

Trends in NATO "Essentiality"

BRITAIN 1969-1988

FRANCE

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow
7 Feb 1989
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
Trends in NATO "Essentiality"
1969-1988

FRG

ITALY

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow
7 Feb 1989
WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

Source: C.W. Maynes. Regional Issues of Tomorrow. 7 Feb 1989
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