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THE FOCUS OF THE U.S. ARMY'S OPERATIONAL ART:
A QUESTION OF BALANCE

A Monograph

by

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Field Artillery



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The document concludes that the current focus of operational concepts is too limited. It proposes that the definition of operational art should be changed to reflect a broad and all encompassing approach to the process of translating strategic goals into the tactical application of Army forces and resources throughout the spectrum of conflict. Lastly, it implies a need for corresponding adjustments to the definitions of other related operational terms including: campaigns, major operations, and operational maneuver.

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A Question of Balance

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
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"Doctrine-(DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application."¹

--JCS Pub. 1

I. Introduction

The United States Army is confronting one of its most significant periods of challenge since the First World War. In 1914, the Army had to address the nation's role in a major land war on foreign territory, and the involuntary posture of America as a major military power. Until recently, the ability to conduct large scale campaigns and operations was the mark of Army readiness. Today, we face changing threats, limited resources, and influential emerging states. How the U.S. Army prepares to translate strategic objectives into tactical events during this dynamic period will have a profound effect upon its future.

The following research question is addressed in this monograph: Is the emphasis upon "campaigns and major operations" expressed in the definition of operational art in the current FM 100-5, Operations, consistent with the most probable threats facing the U.S. Army of the 1990s and 21st Century?

The operational level of war and operational art were introduced to U.S. Army doctrine in 1982 and 1986 in FM 100-5, Operations. The definition of operational art recognizes the requirement for a deliberate process that governs the employment of military forces to achieve strategic aims. The means to accomplishing these aims are

expressed as the "design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."² This fundamental concept within the Army's "keystone warfighting manual"³ is profoundly significant because it has the potential to drive the Army's supporting doctrine, education system, research and development priorities, and competitiveness in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

It can be said that the U.S. Army has become myopic in its approach to the operational level of war. An examination of our current publications, exercises, officer education system, and systems acquisition priorities reflects a perpetuated comfort with large unit conventional operations in a European-like environment. While the Army must prepare for such conflicts, it must also balance its efforts against the new and diverse threats that may be more common in the future. The Army's future as a service will depend upon its ability to contribute to military operations in these challenging environments. This document considers how we are facing up to the task.

The methodology includes the following: an examination of the key operational concepts; a survey of the Army's mission and projected strategic challenges; an analysis of the implications of operational art in Low-intensity Conflict (LIC); an assessment of current doctrinal publications, officer education programs, and major training initiatives; and a review of the PPBS. Finally, I offer a judgment concerning our approach to operational art and a revised definition of the term.

"FM 100-5, Operations, is the Army's keystone warfighting manual. It explains how Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements in conjunction with other services and allied forces. It furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education, and individual unit training...It provides operational guidance for use by commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army service school curricula."⁴

FM 100-5, 1986

II. Operational Concepts

FM 100-5 is intended to have a profound effect upon how the U.S. Army conducts its affairs. The attention it receives is a tribute to its concepts and applicability. However, this section examines its terms and suggests that the FM is focused upon large unit conventional operations, and that lesser applications of resources are construed as unrelated to operational art.

In the Command and General Staff Officer Course and the Advanced Military Studies Program, I have witnessed repeated debates about the role of operational art in conflicts and missions that do not require the movement of heavy corps and army groups. It appeared that many officers believe that the magnitude of the force determines the presence of the operational level of war. The present tone of FM 100-5 appears to support this assertion.

In 1982, FM 100-5 introduced the concept of three distinct levels of war--strategic, operational, and tactical. It defined the "operational level of war" as:

"The operational level of war uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns." (my underlining)⁵

The current edition advanced the discussion and

introduced the concept of "operational art".

"Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war... A major operation comprises the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign or in a critical battle. Major operations decide the course of campaigns." (my underlining)*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) publications do not define operational art, the operational level of war, campaigns, or major operations, but they do define strategy, tactics, operations, and campaign plans. The latter two terms are defined as:

"Operation-(DOD, NATO) A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign."⁷

"Campaign Plan-(DOD) A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space."⁸

JCS Pub. 1 and FM 100-5 subdivide warfare into categories. JCS refers to them as the "spectrum of war-(DOD) a term which encompasses the full range of conflict: cold, limited, and general war."⁹ FM 100-5 addresses a spectrum of conflict including "the full range of threats from terrorism through low-intensity and mid-intensity operations to high-intensity and nuclear operations."¹⁰ It is essential to recognize that the strategic challenges confronting the U.S. are radically diverse, and that they require equally diverse solutions.

The first half of the operational art equation can be viewed as the act of translating strategic objectives into

tactical actions by Army, Joint, and/or combined forces. Given the spectrum of conflict, these tactical actions could range from combat on a highly lethal battlefield to peacetime nation-building programs.

Operational art, therefore, is the road that must be traveled to get from here to there. It is based upon the strategic tasks assigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA), JCS, or Unified (Theater) Commanders, and includes the estimates, planning, deployment, employment, and sustainment factors that yield tactical action. Facilitating tactical actions can never be achieved through simple osmosis; thus, a link between these actions and the strategic decisions is demanded.

In the context of the latter half of FM 100-5's operational art equation, the Army's definitions of campaigns and major operations can imply that the art is limited to the realm of large unit operations. The FM asserts that "no particular echelon of command is solely or uniquely concerned with operational art"¹¹, but the bulk of the text focuses upon conventional operations on the mid-intensity, high-intensity, and nuclear battlefields.

The JCS interpretation of operations and campaign planning is more liberal and all-encompassing. It includes the planning, execution, and sustainment of military actions in whatever form necessary to achieve strategic aims. It is only aligned with the first half of the FM 100-5 operational art equation.

"An Integrated Strategy. Because our problems in the real world are connected and because budgets compel trade-offs, we need to fit together strategies for a wide range of conflicts: from the most confined, lowest intensity and highest probability to the most widespread, apocalyptic and least likely."¹²

--Discriminate Deterrence

III. Strategic Analysis

This section addresses four issues relating to the question of balance in the development of operational art. First, the role of strategic objectives as the starting points for operational endeavors is examined. Second, the image of the Soviet Union as the source of all evil is considered in light of dynamic international events. Third, the Army's charter is presented because it is the foundation for doctrinal development, force design, and operational and tactical activities. Lastly, a strategic analysis based upon the AirLand Battle Future studies is presented identifying Army missions in the 21st Century.

The Role of Strategic Objectives

The FM 100-5 definition of operational art begins by addressing the function of employing military forces to attain strategic goals. Thus, the first ingredient in the operational sequence is the presence of expressed strategic objectives. These objectives flow from analysis and input accomplished at the highest levels of national leadership.

"All military operations pursue and are governed by political objectives. Today, the translation of success in battle to desired political outcomes is more complicated than ever before. At one extreme of the spectrum of conflict, the risk of nuclear war imposes unprecedented limitations on operational flexibility. At the other end, terrorist activities resist conventional military solutions...Despite this complexity, the ability of Army units to fight in high-, mid-, and low-intensity conflicts in concert with other services and with allies remains critical to the nation's survival."¹³

By definition, the operational art carries the Army forward from the political requirements, and it must orchestrate the efficient employment of resources to achieve the desired end state. Prior to 1945, most of the Army's warfighting involved the conventional application of firepower and mass to seek a swift decision. Today, we operate in a more complex and sophisticated era, and the means to be considered by operational planners are as diverse as the threats. In spite of this environment, it appears that our operational thinking is restricted by traditional biases that are not applicable to our most probable strategic requirements.

"Land forces must be committed at a level of strength which, from the outset, provides a favorable ratio of combat power to insure a swift military decision...The Army closes with and defeats the enemy forces, seizes and controls critical land areas and enemy populations, and defends those areas critical to US national interests."¹⁴

This FM 100-1, The Army, assertion reflects operations in the traditional conventional environment, but has little utility for the operational artist attempting to solve problems in the most likely area of challenge--low-intensity conflict. LIC often presents an illusive enemy who is not tied to a specific piece of ground, and whose vulnerabilities can only be attacked by more indirect means over an extended period of time.

Combat units of the U.S. Army are only committed when the political leadership authorizes the introduction of ground forces. Since operational art translates strategic goals into tactical events, it is necessary to propose a

contemporary definition of tactical events. Tactical events are the employment of U.S. Army forces and/or resources by conventional and/or unconventional means to accomplish specific combat and non-combat missions within the framework of an operational plan.

The Soviet Centered Threat

Since 1945, the U.S. and her major allies have focused upon containing the threat posed by the Soviet Union. U.S. government and military publications have stressed the role of the Soviets in all of our international challenges.

While we must be prepared to counter any Warsaw Pact threat, we must balance our assessment of international threats against a more comprehensive world view. Many nations, with whom it is in our national interests to develop healthy relations, do not share our concern for the Soviet threat because of threats posed by their immediate neighbors. A recent study prepared for the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs states that:

"The Alliance must obviously plan for the extreme contingencies. But excessive emphasis on them can leave us unprepared for other more likely kinds of aggression...conventional attack by the Soviet Union is frequently characterized as a "worst case" scenario, and many assume that if we can defend against such attacks then surely we can also handle the "lesser included cases"...An emphasis on massive Soviet attacks leads to tunnel vision among defense planners...They have overemphasized war on Europe's central front...Because they are so ingrained in the traditional thinking about defense, the extreme contingencies also warp decisions at a deeper level. They provide an inadequate conceptual framework for the Pentagon's decisions on defense priorities, requirements for weapons systems, or arms control criteria."¹⁵

During several Command and General Staff College

exercises portraying scenarios in regions other than Central Europe, I have observed a tendency to develop campaign plans and operations orders that simply turn the indigenous population into Soviet type forces. Though many nations receive Warsaw Pact aid, it is doubtful that all will organize and fight like the large and deeply echeloned Pact forces. We fail to dig deeper and determine the new enemy's capabilities. By transposing a Soviet template to another situation, we may be learning the wrong lessons.

The point is that the focus of operational art must be flexible. It must acknowledge that there is no stereotype enemy or strategic setting; thus, large unit conventional solutions are not the only form of "major operations" that decide the course of campaigns in a theater of operations or theater of war.

The Army's Charter

FM 100-1 is the "Army's capstone document for describing the broad roles and missions which...are the essential underpinnings for national security."¹⁴ It presents the Army's foundations, and asserts that FM 100-5 is the primer for U.S. Army combat doctrine.

The FM maintains that war is a politically directed act for political aims that must be reflected in military missions and tasks. It clearly implies the need for operational planning that is not limited to the movement of army groups and corps to attain strategic goals. As the nation's primary landpower instrument the Army must be prepared for any contingency.

"The U.S. Army, by virtue of its capability to establish and maintain control over land, must have the capability to operate across the spectrum of conflict. In a dynamic international environment, this capability provides a hedge against uncertainty and a full range of choices in foreign policy: in negotiating treaties, in dealing with foreign governments, and in establishing alliances for mutual security. In conjunction with the other military Services, the Army fulfills three major strategic roles: conflict prevention, conflict control, and conflict termination."¹⁷

Projected Regional Analysis

"Although the U.S. must maintain a credible combat force capable of effective defense of our nation, the trend for military force in the 21st Century nevertheless will be to improve its capabilities for operations short of war (e.g., nation assistance) and this area presents the most opportunity for military involvement. The ultimate goal is to provide forces and military options to the National Command Authority for accomplishing the mission, whether in support of civil authority, operations short of war, or general war."¹⁸

This quotation from a draft document prepared for the ongoing AirLand Battle Future study predicts that the Army will continue to face diverse strategic challenges in the 21st Century. The mission analysis in this study reveals that the most probable employment of Army forces and resources will be in the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The product of this study should have a profound effect upon the orientation of Army doctrine, planning, and programming in the near future.

The study includes a regional analysis with projected Army missions and force requirements. It accounts for the development of the emerging nations, and the economic and political environment that the established states may face. The Soviets continue to be our principal adversary, but other threats will present the most tension.

The regions under examination are: Europe, Middle East/Southwest Asia, Pacific, Atlantic, Latin America, Africa, North America, and Space. The following Army mission projections, a product of the regional analysis, demonstrate the complex requirements for the contemporary operational artist:

- "Ground combat against Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces in the central region and NATO flanks.
- Tactical nuclear delivery.
- Intelligence support/coordination with allied ground forces and other U.S. forces.
- Humanitarian aid/nation assistance operations.
- Defend U.S. staging bases.
- Support and participate in counter-terrorism missions.
- Support and participate in peacekeeping missions.
- Support and participate in joint/combined exercises.
- Reinforce deterrence of hostile land force aggression against allies/friends.
- Respond to enemy land force incursion to restore regional balance.
- Protect U.S. citizens and economic interests.
- Evacuate U.S. nationals.
- Plan for and execute land defense of CONUS; coordinate with Navy, AF, civil agencies.
- Provide terminal defense for aerospace defense of North America.
- Plan for joint military support to civil agencies (FEMA).
- Support engineer civil works program.
- Operate defense satellite communications system.
- Provide security for space support and space control facilities.
- Contribute to space control operations (ASAT...).
- Interface with joint ballistic missile/C3I system.
- Provide for land defense of the Panama Canal.
- Conduct combat operations in Iceland and Norway.
- Assist in operations against illegal arms/drugs." 17

"low-intensity conflict-(DOD) A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC."²⁰

--JCS Pub. 1

IV. Low-Intensity Conflict

This section examines low-intensity conflict in the context of strategic missions requiring the orchestration of tactical events through an intermediate step--the operational step. The text addresses the ambiguity of the term low-intensity conflict (LIC), identifies its "operational categories" per FM 100-20 (Draft), Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, offers an insight into the operational mechanics of LIC through a hypothetical scenario, and revisits the terms "campaigns and major operations" as they apply to this arena.

Though the JCS publications contain concise definitions for LIC and its related terms, it appears that LIC is enormously complex and difficult to embrace. The economic, military, political, psychological, and social aspects of the lower end of the spectrum of conflict are so diverse, that it is, perhaps, a greater challenge for the military planner to contend with than the movement of large units in the conventional theater of operations. Comments offered by key DOD leaders, professional writings, and the delays in publishing FM 100-20 attest to the endless problems with LIC. The term is so ambiguous that it is debatable whether the word "conflict" is appropriate, or it could be proposed

that there are more than three levels within the spectrum of conflict.

In spite of the ambiguity, LIC missions will be directed to the Army, and it is prudent to expend the appropriate amount of energy and thought in this area. "Low-intensity conflict has remained and is likely to be the most prevalent threat to our security and to the peace that is so essential to our world."²¹ "Since 1945, the United States has used force or the threat of force over 500 times, mostly in the Third World. Virtually all of these have been LIC situations, many of them involving multiyear U.S. commitments."²² The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy offered this warning:

"These conflicts in the Third World are obviously less threatening than any Soviet-American war would be, yet they have had and will have an adverse cumulative effect on U.S. access to critical regions, on American credibility among allies and friends, and on American self-confidence. If this cumulative effect cannot be checked or reversed in the future, it will gradually undermine America's ability to defend its interests in the most vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific."²³

Operational Categories

FM 100-20 (Final Draft) divides military operations in LIC into four basic categories: "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Combatting Terrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacetime Contingency Operations."²⁴ The following paragraphs describe the categories in accordance with the FM.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Missions within this category must be conducted in concert with the efforts of allied, indigenous, and U.S. government agencies. They

involve a wide variety of conventional and unconventional units over an extended period of time. As with other LIC categories, military participation must be tempered by political and social sensitivities within the area of operations and at home. Operational planners influence the situation through "intelligence, PSYOP, civil affairs (CA), populace and resource control (PRC), tactical operations, deception, and advisory assistance."²⁵

Combatting Terrorism. The Army's terrorism counteraction (TC/A) program has two distinct, yet interrelated, aspects: antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Antiterrorism requires planners at all levels to develop programs to reduce the vulnerability of equipment, personnel, and installations. This is accomplished through intelligence activity, enhanced security, related education and training programs, site hardening, and cooperation with other military and civilian agencies. "Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism."²⁶ Since 1981, the Army has participated in the DOD established counterterrorism JTF with permanent staff and specialized forces.²⁷

Peacekeeping Operations. "These are military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution."²⁸ Army elements may be committed by the NCA to facilitate withdrawal and disengagement, cease-fire, prisoner of war exchange, arms control, or demilitarization and demobilization. Any

involvement is highly sensitive and strategically significant, and requires detailed planning and execution. U.S. Army participation in the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) agreement is an example.

Peacetime Contingency Operations. These operations are politically sensitive, of short duration, conducted rapidly, employ tailored forces, and contribute to crisis avoidance and crisis management under NCA direction. Army forces could be employed independently or as part of a joint or combined task force to conduct: disaster relief, shows of force and demonstrations, noncombatant evacuation operations, rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids, peacemaking, unconventional warfare, security assistance, or support to civil authorities.²⁹

Drug interdiction is relevant to most of the FM's LIC operational categories. Military participation in this effort is increased by the political leadership of the nation. The Army must consider this problem in the context of insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. The legal and military implications of drug interdiction are substantial, and great care will be needed to evaluate and direct the Army's role in meeting the political and social expectations.

Operational Mechanics

The fundamental issue in this monograph is whether or not FM 100-5's definition of operational art is balanced in the light of strategic requirements. Is operational art

practiced in situations not calling for the employment of large units, and, if so, is the Army spending enough time preparing for such situations? FM 100-20 suggests the presence of the operational level of war in its discussion of LIC "campaign planning". The following "Operational Planning Considerations" are addressed in the FM:

- "What conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic goal?
- What sequence of events will most likely result in the desired conditions?
- How should resources be applied to produce the sequence of events?"³⁰

These three considerations indicate the need for a deliberate process that directs "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals"³¹, and this is the first part of FM 100-5's definition of operational art.

The following is a hypothetical LIC scenario. It suggests the need for an operational level effort to analyze the strategic end state, gather intelligence, develop courses of action, identify the appropriate resources, phase deployment and employment, and strive for synchronized and synergistic application of resources.

Here, the U.S. is responding to a Third World government's request for assistance. The host nation is experiencing severe economic difficulties, and fears that an insurgency could soon arise if the government does not display some credibility. Maintaining favorable relations with the nation is in the U.S. national interest, and the political leadership has directed efforts to help ease the

problems. The Army is one of many participating agencies, and has developed a three-part supporting plan that includes engineer, medical, and psychological operations.

The engineer effort responds to a need for improved communications, mapping, sanitation, and transportation systems in the country. It is to be conducted over an extended period of time, and is aimed at displaying a high level of cooperation between our two countries. Training indigenous agencies to ultimately meet their engineering requirements with minimal assistance is included in the plan. The engineering operations must be synchronized with all other aspects of the Army's plan, and with those of other agencies. Selection, deployment, and sustainment of active and reserve component units are necessary.

The following "Engineer Strategy" provides an example of a U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) concept:

"NEAR TERM (0 to 2 years): Establish military-to-military relations at low level.

- Subject Matter Expert exchanges
- Mobile Training Teams
- Personnel Exchange programs

MID TERM (2 to 5 years): Begin formal nationbuilding efforts.

- Assessments of civil and military engineer capabilities
- Use exercises to build needed infrastructure
- Use security assistance funds to buy equipment

LONG TERM (5 years plus): Continued support for nationbuilding.

- Joint Venture financing for projects
- Joint construction/Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract construction
- Joint Exercises/Planning and Execution"³²

A properly executed medical plan has the potential to touch the target population more than any other aspect of direct involvement. It provides desired services to all ages, is difficult to attack politically, and is extremely

visible. The medical plan is designed to complement the engineer and PSYOP concept, and is subject to the same selection, employment, deployment, and sustainment considerations as the engineer plan. It supports the confidence building intent of the operation, and has peripheral benefits such as intelligence gathering.

The psychological operations plan is designed to maximize the benefit of the engineer and medical mission, assist the host nation in confidence building, and discredit any effort by potential insurgents. It requires the careful identification, deployment, and employment of units and individuals possessing the requisite language and technical skills. The mechanics for close integration with all U.S. and host nation agencies is included in the plan. "Rules of engagement" must be clearly understood by all forces in the area of operations to minimize incidents that could undermine the entire psychological effort.

Army planners in LIC must think in terms of "branches" and "sequels". What happens if U.S. nationals in the country are threatened or targeted? What are the noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) requirements? What if an insurgency gathers strength, and direct combat is expected? What happens if political opposition arises in the U.S., and the participation of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units is reduced? What is the response to a Soviet or insurgent disinformation program? If the U.S. strategic goal for stability is achieved, what next? How does the Army disengage and redeploy, and what more

permanent presence can be anticipated? These questions fall somewhere between the establishment of strategic goals and the tactical events--they are operational in nature.

Terms Revisited

There is an ongoing debate about applicability of the term "campaign" to LIC. The term "peacetime campaign planning" is sometimes used in LIC discussions at CGSC. It is not an official term appearing in FM 100-20 (Draft) or other military dictionaries.

FM 100-5 states that: "A major operation comprises the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign or in a critical battle. Major operations decide the course of campaigns."³³ It also states that campaigns are a sequence of actions to attain strategic goals in a theater of war. This is often interpreted to mean that campaigns and major operations are limited to large scale mid- to high- intensity conventional/nuclear combat.

Having addressed the complexity, duration, implications, and probability of LIC in this section, I contend that the "campaign", as a planned sequence of actions to attain strategic goals, is applicable to LIC.

"This emergency Deployment readiness exercise (Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT, Honduras, 15 March 1988) was a highlight of last year's events at Forces Command (FORSCOM) and one that effectively demonstrated the preparedness of FORSCOM units to execute a key operational mission. It also demonstrated how the projection of combat power can affect national and foreign policy."³⁴

--CINC, U.S. FORSCOM

V. Doctrine, Education, and Training

The National Command Authority's (NCA) decision to deploy elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 82nd Airborne Division to Honduras, on a "readiness exercise" in response to a March 1988 Nicaraguan incursion, exemplifies the type of missions the Army can expect in the future. The above quote by General Palastra called the deployment a "highlight" of the year and emphasized its strategic significance. Had this situation deteriorated, how would the show of force mission have changed, what would the Army's options have been, and how well was the Army prepared to execute those options?

This section examines three elements related to the question of how well the Army is preparing to meet its present and future challenges. First, it comments upon the nature of U.S. Army doctrinal publications that have been produced since the release of FM 100-5 in 1986. Second, it discusses the education programs that present the doctrine to the officer corps. Third, it addresses the orientation of major training events.

Doctrinal Publications

Since 1986, Army writers have been prolific in producing doctrinal publications. A comparison of these documents to their 1970s and early 1980s predecessors reflects the profound influence of the AirLand Battle concepts, a reduction in the quantity of Soviet specific threat chapters, and increasing

attempts to recognize the diverse spectrum of conflict. However, the bulk of the texts have been related to heavy operations in a European-like conventional environment.

FM 100-25, Training the Force, is the cornerstone document addressing the Army's training philosophy and concepts. It recognizes that unit commanders are pressed to meet all requirements in their training programs, and establishes the Mission Essential Task List (METL) as the guide to developing training strategies. To produce the METL, the commander and his staff analyze their war plans and external directives to establish an integrated priority listing of tasks. This step should insure that units with LIC type missions give training priority to the appropriate tasks. It is step one to breaking the stereotype training bubble. The question remains: Is there sufficient doctrinal material to assist the commander in preparing the METL and the subsequent required training events?

About fifteen FMs, in draft or final form, with dates subsequent to May 1986 are issued to students at CGSC. These manuals focus upon training, mechanized operations at battalion, brigade, and division levels, logistics at all levels, airspace command and control, nuclear weapons employment, combat planning factors, and senior level leadership. Though many of these publications have general application, they orient upon conventional high- and mid-intensity conflict (HIC and MIC). Field Circular (FC) 71-101, Light Infantry Operations, is not issued, yet most students have great difficulty in envisioning their proper use in any scenario that is presented.

Four draft publications merit examination in the context

of their focus upon a diverse spectrum of conflict. FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations, acknowledges the diversity of the "operational environment", but the content of the manual is dominated by operational maneuver employing theater armies and corps on the AirLand Battlefield. It includes concepts of operational maneuver, fires, sustainment, and deception which have reduced application in the context of many strategic goals addressed in sections III and IV of this monograph.

FM 100-15, Corps Operations, devotes 22 of 300 pages to "Corps Independent Operations" in LIC. Five pages explain deliberate and crisis action planning within the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). It briefly addresses several LIC related combat and noncombat missions. It identifies the corps LIC roles as facilitating rapid deployment, force package development, forced entry, and command and control.

FM 71-100, Division Operations, devotes 19 of 290 pages to "Low-Intensity Conflict Operations". Like FM 100-15, it includes a list of most LIC related missions. It scans operations, sustainment and analysis of the area of operations. Again, it is dominated by HIC and MIC employment.

FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, was addressed in section IV, but some key points should be highlighted. First, it is a necessary document because of its implications for ongoing and future missions in LIC. Second, it has been in draft form for a considerable period of time, and this attests to the uncomfortable and complex nature of the subject. Third, should FM 100-1, The Army, be amended to reflect two cornerstone documents for how the Army fights--FM

100-5 for HIC and MIC, and FM 100-20 for LIC? If so, there will be overlap since HIC and MIC campaigns may include LIC operations. Lastly, it references 22 FMs containing related material, but unlike the key conventional manuals, the majority of these were published before 1986, and are generic in nature.

Officer Education

"The education and training of our young officers...will be based on our vision of modern warfare....An officer's effectiveness and chance for success, now and in the future, depend not only on his character, knowledge, and skills, but more than ever before, on his ability to understand the changing environment of conflict."³⁸

The curriculum being presented by officer educational institutions reflects improving efforts to offer courses of study that represent the spectrum of conflict. Recent studies and symposiums concerning officer education indicate that the Army may have an edge over the other services. While this shows promise, there is much to do to balance the programs against the most probable requirements that the Army faces. The following is a look at Army officer education with respect to LIC instruction.

Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³). This program trains captains to function as staff officers in the field environment. Though a study of the Soviet model threat, mobilization of a division for European deployment, and a European exercise consume a significant portion of the program, a Central American LIC scenario has been introduced. LIC consumes about 10% of the core curriculum.

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). The core curriculum consumes 590 hours. "Combat Operations"

consumes 189 hours of the core program. "This integrated subcourse examines warfighting at corps and division levels using various scenarios and settings in Europe as a basis for study."³⁴ Only 39 hours of core time are specifically devoted to LIC. When presenting contingency scenarios in other geographic regions, such as Southwest Asia, the introduction of Soviet or Soviet-like forces appears to be the norm. Many of the supporting subcourses are based upon the European AirLand Battlefield. Only six of the 116 electives listed in the 1988-1989 CGSOC course catalog are specifically dedicated to LIC. The Combat Studies Institute's Battle Analysis course is a major core course, and focuses upon the U.S. VII Corps operations in Europe during World War II.

School for Professional Development (SPD). This school serves all components of the Army through courses and conferences that enhance warfighting and combined arms skills, and provides education for specific duty assignments. It offers force development, history, mobilization, operations, pre-command, and other courses. Two of 19 courses focus upon LIC: the Terrorism Counteraction Instructor Training Course, and the Low-Intensity Conflict Course. The operational emphasis in the pre-command courses is the European conflict scenario.

School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship Program (AOSF) focus upon the theory and dynamics of the "operational art". LIC is

addressed, but it consumes only 12% of the course hours, and focuses almost exclusively upon insurgency and counterinsurgency. Of the many detailed tactical and operational exercises conducted, only one Philippine scenario directly explores LIC. Though Green, Lawrence, Mao, Vietnam, and Afganistan are studied, the emphasis in the campaigns and operations courses is primarily upon large scale conventional activities including Napoleon, Grant, von Moltke, Bradley, Rommel, Slim, and MacArthur.

U.S. Army War College (AWC). The strategic nature of this senior institution lends itself to a balanced approach to the operational aspects of the spectrum of conflict.

The seven major courses in the core curriculum are:

- Course 1 - The Senior Leader
- Course 2 - War, National Policy and Strategy
- Course 3 - Joint Forces, Doctrine and Planning
- Course 4 - The Army's Role in Support of National Military Strategy
- Course 5 - Regional National Security Strategies
- Course 6 - Joint and Combined Theater Warfare
- Course 7 - U.S. Global Strategy³⁷

The LIC related study includes the regional analysis of Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, and Asia, a Central American LIC scenario exercise in Course 6, and some integration of LIC concerns in other exercises. LIC occupies less than 30 hours of the AWC curriculum.

The relatively few hours spent in educating officers about LIC indicates an imbalance in how we are preparing to conduct operations. Studies indicate that LIC training for all officers must start early, be molded into more cohesive packages, include all aspects of the problem--not just

insurgency and terrorism, emphasize interagency requirements, and be expanded in class time and content.

Training

Training consists of those events that enable the Army to evaluate its doctrine and prepare its units for their missions. The Army's theme for 1988 was the "Year of Training", and a tremendous amount of resources was expended on training endeavors. This segment addresses the focus of the Army's significant training events.

The National Training Center (NTC) has become the centerpiece of tactical training. The expenditure of manpower, money, and other resources is producing excellent results, and the focus is on MIC to HIC against Warsaw Pact type forces. It is the mark by which the Army measures the mission readiness of its battalions and brigades.

The Joint Readiness Training Center has just completed a two-year evaluation, and has the potential to challenge light and special operations forces in low-intensity scenarios. This program has a long way to go before it reaches the level of the NTC. The most substantial obstacle to its progress is funding, and it must stand in line behind the NTC and the present effort to establish a sophisticated training center in the FRG.

The Army participates in a variety of exercises and training programs in the CENTCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM areas that contribute to LIC preparedness. Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT in March 1988 exemplifies an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) that was designed to attain a

strategic goal as well as provide training for the units. Reserve component organizations have been performing training projects in Central America that have contributed to SOUTHCOM's real-world missions.

REFORGER and WINTEX/CIMEX in Europe, and TEAM SPIRIT in the Republic of Korea provide the Army with major opportunities to exercise its headquarters and units in the MIC and HIC contingencies. These events provide some of the best opportunities to evaluate AirLand Battle doctrine in the conventional and nuclear surroundings that it emphasizes. The relative cost of these exercises is high.

Army professional journals attempt to capture many training accomplishments. While conventional air and mechanized concepts and training continue to dominate most Army publications, they have begun to present an increasing number of articles concerning conventional and unconventional LIC issues and training.

Given the concept of METL, all echelons of the Army must endeavor to provide adequate training environments, events, material, and resources to prepare the force to contribute to the attainment of anticipated strategic missions across the entire spectrum of conflict.

"Today, both the Army and the Air Force have joined the Marine Corps and the Navy in Third World interventions, less out of an objective requirement for the presence of all four services in strength in every instance than to remain competitive in what has been called "the annual Pentagon budget sweepstakes" and to carry the logic of joint operations to a predictable conclusion."■

--Alan Ned Sabrosky

VI. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)

A recent distinguished visitor to the School of Advanced Military Studies (who must remain anonymous under the CGSC non-attribution policy) suggested that, in his theater, operational art must be perceived from the broad perspective of peacetime preparation through wartime employment of forces. He stated that the transition from the strategic to the tactical includes policy, force design, systems development, and other actions and decisions that must be accomplished prior to war. To him, operational art is more than the physical conduct of air and land operations.

This section examines PPBS in the broad context of operational art. It underscores the need for the Army to secure funds and spending authority for the forces, systems, and training that will enable it to transition from the strategic to the tactical level in an effective and expeditious manner.

PPBS is the DOD process for determining the force, system, and program costs for the Armed Forces to execute the military missions required by strategic policy. The process is complex, and includes the participation of all levels from major military commands through the President.

The system begins with National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) and the National Security Study Directives (NSSD) that identify national security objectives and direct the conduct of supporting studies. These are prepared by the National Security Council (NSC) and are signed by the President.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commanders are involved in the process that develops the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and the Defense Guidance (DG). These key documents establish the policy guidance, strategy guidance, force and resource planning guidance, and study program to be used by the Military Departments in developing their Program Objective Memorandums (POM). The POM contains the services recommendations for the application and distribution of resources to meet the DG requirements. The Joint Staff and the CINCs review the POMs and document their differences in the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). The issues are resolved by the OSD Defense Resources Board (DRB) and are documented in Program Budget Decisions. These decisions are incorporated into the Defense Budget within the President's Budget, which must receive Congressional approval.

The operational implications of this process are significant. Operational commanders must digest the stated national/strategic objectives for their area of operations, and carefully assess the operational requirements necessary

to achieve them. The individual service POMs require detailed analysis by the major unit commanders and staffs. In an environment of constrained resources, the competition for funds is intense.

Testimony before Congressional committees by the JCS, CINCs, and other individuals is common and important. The arguments supporting budget requests must be convincing and reflect a realistic approach to meeting strategic requirements in the world as perceived by the Congress.

The DOD Total Obligation Authority (TOA) for FY 89 is 291.6 billion dollars. The Army's portion of the TOA is 78.0 billion or 26.8 percent. The remaining distribution is 33.2% to the Navy/Marines, 33.4% to the Air Force, and 6.6% to other DOD agencies.³⁹

Systems acquisition under the current budget reflects the following Army systems priorities: M1 Abrams Tank, M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64 Apache Helicopter, Patriot, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), Forward-Area Air Defense System (FAADS), and Advanced Antitank Weapons System (AAWS).⁴⁰ These systems decisions reflect the Army's focus on the conventional HIC and MIC battlefields, but they say little for the Army's approach to the more probable LIC missions.

There are elements present today that threaten the Army's position in the critical PPBS cycle. First, the initiatives by General Secretary Gorbachev to reduce conventional and nuclear forces in Europe may create a

political climate in NATO and at home that significantly weakens the Army's arguments for heavy force structure improvement and maintenance. Second, the DDD is a prime target for the ongoing efforts to balance the budget, and fiscal resources are increasingly scarce. Unless the Army can articulate operational concepts and related requirements for dealing with strategic goals and believable threats to national security, it will continue to be last in line for precious dollars. Lastly, there is competition between the services for their piece of the LIC pie. The Marines have published a collection of articles that demonstrates their utility in any level of conflict. In the context of LIC, it acknowledges this arena as our most likely threat, reminds the reader of the high level of Marine involvement in LIC actions since 1945, and contends that their expeditionary forces are ready and suitable for most military LIC missions. One article takes a direct shot at mixing Army and Marine units simply for the sake of jointness:

"Joint operations are obviously a function of the Marine Corps-Navy team, and in sustained operations the Air Force at least would become involved in support of a Marine amphibious brigade...A more contentious issue is the mixing of the Army and Marine Corps ground components, seemingly for the sake of interservice harmony."⁴¹

The Army and its operational commanders must realize that PPBS is a critical peacetime step in facilitating the transition from the strategic to the tactical. Its input must be based upon balanced and convincing operational concepts and doctrine.

"One of AirLand Battle's contributions to American military thought has been the reintroduction of the operational art in the conduct of war as the focus of military activity between tactics and strategy."⁴²

--An Army of Vision

VII. Comprehensive Assessment and Conclusion

I submit that operational concepts are still in the developmental stage, and that there is room for necessary evolution. Eight years is not a long time for an army to adopt and implement a fundamentally new doctrine. Though the elements of operational art have been around for a long time, the U.S. Army did not officially accept the concept of an operational level of war until 1982.

Since that time the environment in which the Army functions has evolved significantly. The Army has performed in Grenada, El Salvador, Honduras, the Persian Gulf, the Sinai, and other areas. It is concerned about the more remote, yet ever present threat in Central Europe, but even that threat is changing as a result of dynamic political action by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In short, the Army must develop an ability to translate strategic goals into a variety of tactical actions in diverse operational environments.

This monograph concludes that the important concept of operational art is too narrowly defined to serve the Army's most pressing challenges, and that it is not balanced against strategic realities. The general acceptance of large unit maneuver in the conventional setting as the essential building block for major operations and campaigns places operational art within the traditional comfort zone.

A recommended definition of operational art is: the total process of translating strategic goals, in concert with other elements of national power, into the tactical application of military power, through peacetime and wartime command and control, force design and development, campaign planning, employment, and sustainment in a theater of operations or theater of war.

An understanding of the operational level of war and the operational art is fundamentally important to the Army. They must be effectively integrated into its functions. The steps that follow achieve this in a more balanced way.

The first step is to revise the definition of operational art along the lines of the above recommendation in the next editions of FM 100-1 and FM 100-5. FM 100-5 can still stress AirLand Battle concepts, but it should state unequivocally that the practice of operational art is not limited to conventional battles and engagements.

The concept of the operational level of war should be specifically addressed in the future FM 100-5. The operational level should be presented as a level between the strategic and the tactical that can be quantified in scope and space. Scope includes the strategic goals, constraints, and restraints, and space is the theater of operations or theater of war. The definition of operational art could be linked to this concept as the sum of all creative actions performed within this level of war.

There seems to be a need to capture the art of maneuver and operations involving large units with an accepted term.

I recommend adopting the terms "grand tactics"⁴³ and "grand tactical maneuver" to answer this need. It should also be stated that "grand tactics" are but one option to be considered within the practice of operational art. The term "operational maneuver" should be deleted because it can confuse and limit the understanding of the operational level of war and the operational art.

FM 100-20 needs to be published as soon as possible. The ambiguity of LIC prohibits the fielding of a perfect manual, but the nature of present strategic challenges demands the immediate dissemination of the best available information. The operational level of war, operational art, and campaign planning must be included in the text. The manual should recognize FM 100-5 as the guide for AirLand Battle in HIC and MIC because of the potential to conduct LIC in conjunction with high-intensity warfare.

FM 100-1 must be revised as the cornerstone manual expressing the Army's charter, mission, and fundamental strategic, operational, and tactical philosophy. It must clearly establish two "doctrinal pillars" that develop the philosophy in detail: FM 100-5 for HIC and MIC doctrine, and FM 100-20 for LIC doctrine.

The term "campaigns" should be redefined to include the broader concept of operational art. There should be no term like "peacetime campaign planning", since campaigns could be defined as the sequencing of military events to achieve operational goals in any level of the spectrum of conflict.

The product of strategic analysis and the broad focus of operational art should drive the Army's key initiatives. These include doctrine, the education system, training programs, force structure, systems acquisition, PFBS activity, and professional writings.

Once FM 100-20 is published, doctrine writers should be as aggressive in revising and developing supporting publications as they were when AirLand Battle doctrine was adopted. FMs pertaining to large conventional units should continue to expand those portions involving contingency roles.

Officer education programs must be scrutinized to find more time for LIC programs and a more balanced approach to developing contemporary leaders. Cadres should be developed with a level of proficiency in crisis action that is equal to that of the more conventional tactics departments. Exercises pertaining to LIC should not be limited to insurgency and terrorism scenarios, and low-intensity issues should be considered when exercising HIC and MIC campaigns and operations. Correspondence courses, electives, and student text material should be more representative of the broad spectrum of conflict.

Training programs must challenge units to rapidly respond to diverse requirements. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) should be a high priority project. TRADOC can assist units by developing training concepts and packages that address the most likely contingencies.

Force structure should follow the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) so that the Army produces units that are responsive to the strategic needs of the nation. Light Infantry Divisions and other rapid deployment forces must be examined closely, and, if necessary, revolutionary adjustments to their TO&Es should be adopted.

Systems acquisition priorities should be better balanced. There is a need for lighter and more mobile systems, enhanced communications, expedient airfield materials, engineer equipment, aviation assets, and other items that have utility in all environments. CBRS should drive this effort as well. The Army must be prepared to justify its systems priorities in the face of diminishing resources.

Efforts in the budget process must become more representative of accepted threats. The development of the Army POM is a critical element of the PPBS. The Army must focus beyond the European Theater. It will have to compete against the other services, and they appear to have an edge in the budget battle. There is a tremendous role for the Army across the spectrum of conflict, but, without funding, it will not be able to remain faithful to its charter.

Finally, the broad concept of operational art and its implications must continue to be challenged and explored in professional writings and presentations by senior leaders. Only continued examination will yield balanced operational concepts that are consistent with the most probable threats facing the U.S. Army of the 1990s and 21st Century.

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