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A CASE STUDY: THE EFFECTS OF  
 THE BRITISH ARMY AGAINST  
 THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

THESIS

Kenneth S. Hahn  
 Captain, USAF

AFTT/GSM/LSM/89S-14

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THESIS

Present to the Faculty of the School of Logistics  
of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirement for the Degree of  
Master of Science in System Management

Kenneth S. Hahn

Captain, USAF

September 1989

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## Preface

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects of troops in a terrorist situation. To accomplish this study, the significant events in Northern Ireland since 1969 which involved the British Army and the Irish Republican Army were chronicled.

Presently, terrorism is a major problem facing governments. Terrorists force governments to expend resources to counter their attacks. By determining the effects of troops against terrorists, insight can be gained that will aid in formulating future anti-terrorist policies involving troops.

In closing, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my thesis advisor, Dr. Craig Brandt. His assistance and guidance was greatly appreciated.

Kenneth S. Hahn

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects British troops have had while countering the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The study involved the following research objectives. First, terrorism and the IRA as a terrorist organization was defined to form a basis for the research. Following these definitions, the Irish history, the IRA goals, and the British goals were discussed. After the British goals were defined, the significant events involving British troops or the IRA were reviewed to identify effects. Finally, the effects of the British Army and any contributing factors in the Northern Ireland situation were outlined.

The study found that troops can have a wide variety of effects. In particular, this study found three major effects of troops. First, troops can prevent a civil war. Second, the Army can contain the level of violence created by a terrorist group but not totally defeat the organization. Finally, by mishandling situations and implementing unpopular policies, troops can alienate the community.

In conjunction with the findings on the effects of the military, there were several contributing factors noted. It was noted that public support was necessary for

successful military operations and two actions should be taken to avoid alienation of the public. First, troops should be trained to handle civil disturbances so mistakes can be avoided. Second, governments should review the public sensitivity to a policy before implementing the policy.

Finally, this research report noted that governments can use troops to show resolve and determination not to bow to terrorist pressures.

A CASE STUDY: THE EFFECTS  
OF THE BRITISH ARMY AGAINST  
THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

I. Introduction

General Issue

In the last two decades, terrorist attacks have increased and become a major world problem. Terrorists have not only caused damage and many deaths but have caused governments to increase the dedicated resources to counter their attacks (43:9). Unfortunately, governments do not have unlimited resources available to fight this threat, and "terrorists have caused governments to expend resources out of proportion to the actual threat posed" (40:1;43:1). Accordingly, governments should use efficient and effective plans to handle terrorism.

Research Problem

The focus of this research will be to analyze the intervention and use of British troops in Northern Ireland to counter the attacks of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This case study will highlight the overall effects troops have had on the internal security of Northern Ireland and determine the effect troop intervention has had while countering the IRA.

### Scope of the Research

Although terrorist acts have occurred for many decades, the bulk of the literature on the topic has been written in the last two decades. For example, the Rand Corporation, a research firm, was not commissioned until 1973 by the United States government to perform research on terrorism (40:1). In addition, British troops were not introduced until 1969 to control rioting in Northern Ireland (28:47;56:1). Therefore, this research effort will concentrate on literature written and relative to the British government's placement of troops in Northern Ireland after 1969.

### Research Objective

The objective of this research is to determine the effects of placing British troops in Northern Ireland. To do this research the following investigative questions need to be answered.

1. What is terrorism?
2. How does the IRA fit into the definition of terrorism?
3. What are the history, goals, and objectives of the IRA?
4. What are the goals of the British government in Northern Ireland?
5. What have been the effects of British troops in Northern Ireland?

6. Are there any contributing factors which affect the countering of domestic terrorism?

### Sequence of Presentation

Chapter 2 of this thesis will contain a literature review. This chapter will start with a broad overview and definition of terrorism. Following the overall definition of terrorism, the various types of terrorist groups will be discussed and categorized. Finally, chapter 2 will present a brief discussion on the typical responses governments have used against terrorism.

Chapter 3 will contain the body of the research. First, the history of the IRA will be discussed. Next, the relationship of how the IRA fits with the overall definition of terrorism and the goals of the IRA will be outlined. Finally, the significant events involving British troops in Northern Ireland from 1969 to the present will be presented.

Chapter 4 will present the analysis. First, it will be determined if the goals of the British government and IRA have been met. Second, the effects of British troops will be analyzed. Finally, any contributing factors to the effect of the use of the military in Northern Ireland will be discussed.

Finally, Chapter 5 will outline the findings of the research in the conclusions and recommendations.

## Methodology

The primary source of data for this research will be literature from professional journals such as Rand Corporation reports and research documents from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). In addition, documents and books from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), the Air Force Institute of Technology library, the Wright State University library, and interlibrary loans will be reviewed. Also, articles from wire services, such as the United Press International, and periodicals such as Newsweek, and Time will be used. Based on the research, the effects of British troops to counter domestic terrorism will be determined.

## II. Literature Review

### Justification of Research

A government has resources (money, the military, foreign aid, and so forth); boundaries; goals (the economy, internal security and so forth); and interacts with the environment. The environment consists of organizations outside of the government such as other countries, corporations, and even terrorist groups. Governments do not have unlimited resources available; therefore, effective and efficient policies and plans must be developed to accomplish their goals. In particular, effective and efficient policies must be implemented when outside organizations such as terrorist groups impede the accomplishment of the government's goals.

"Historically, terrorism has tended to be episodic" (44:2). However, in Northern Ireland IRA terrorist activities have been fairly constant since the 1970's (30:1-2;44:8). Namely, the IRA has been consistent in strategy, tactics, and destructiveness (30:1-2). This consistency gives an opportunity to study the effects of the British government's policies to eliminate or counter this terrorist group. This case study will focus on the policy of placing British troops in Northern Ireland to counter the IRA.

Internal security is a legitimate goal of any government. Governments do not have unlimited resources to counter threats and terrorist groups that try to block the accomplishment of this goal. While the IRA is primarily a problem for Northern Ireland and the British government, Great Britain is a western democracy similar to the United States. Furthermore, Britain is a free state, and it is trying to maintain that freedom while effectively countering a terrorist threat. By examining a counter terrorist policy of another Western government, the effects of that policy can be determined. Accordingly, determining the effects of military troop involvement can be useful to the United States in the development of counter terrorist plans.

#### Definition of Terrorism

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. However, expert analysts do agree that terrorism is composed of many common aspects. Walter Laqueur, a well published expert in the field, defines terrorism in the following way.

Terrorism is the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.  
(49:88)

Furthermore, Laqueur believes "terrorism is not an ideology but a strategy that can be used by people of different political convictions" (49:90).

Like Laqueur, Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation believes terrorism is the actual or threatened use of violence (39:2;43:2) and its main intent is to cause fear and alarm (39:2;41:2). In addition, Jenkins believes that "terrorism is aimed at causing widespread disorder, demoralizing a society, and breaking down the existing social and political order" (39:10). Jenkins too considers terrorism a violation of humanitarian norms because terrorist attacks do not recognize neutral territory or noncombatants (41:2). This violation of the "rules of war" is the main driver in Jenkins definition of terrorism (39:4). He believes that the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrator, is what defines terrorism (43:2). Therefore by Jenkins definition, anyone, even a government, can commit an act of terrorism if the intent is to cause fear and alarm, violates the rules of war, and is designed to create a social or political change in society.

Next, Konrad Kellen, also of Rand, defines terrorism in a very similar manner to that of Jenkins and Laqueur. He defines terrorism as the use of violence and terror to cause a change in the political system or a change in public opinion (46:8-9). Kellen also believes terrorists "take the law into their own hands" (46:23), and use violence for political and social purposes (46:8,10).

Finally, Donna Schlagheck defines terrorism as having five main points. First, it is the use or threatened use of violence. Second, the violence is unpredictable (74:1,2).

By unpredictable, the victim does not know where and when the terrorist attack will occur, what the target will be, or how the attack will be executed. These unknown aspects tend to increase victim anxiety and the impact of the attack. Third, terrorist targets are symbolic. In other words, the targets symbolize something the terrorist is protesting against. For example, in 1968 the Baader-Meinhof Gang burnt a department store in Frankfurt, West Germany. Andreas Baader directed the attack because the store was a symbol of "consumerism" (74:2). The fourth point is that terrorists want a large audience. Typically, ordinary criminals want to remain anonymous. Terrorists, on the other hand, want an audience and the publicity for their actions (74:3). Finally, terrorists have political goals. Typically, these goals are related to a political orientation or nationalism (74:5). In summary, Schlagheck's definition of terrorism is the following.

Terrorism is unpredictable violence or the threat of violence. It targets symbolic victims and exploits publicity to obtain political goals through coercion. It can be used by groups or states against groups or states. (74:8)

These definitions are not exactly alike, but they are similar enough to form a consensus definition for this thesis. Based on these definitions, for this thesis terrorism is the actual or threatened use of violence that is used to induce a political or social change in society. This violence or threat of violence can be used by any group seeking social or political change. Finally, the factor

that distinguishes terrorist violence from legitimate acts of violence is terrorist acts of violence are not restrained by any social norms or rules of war. This means civilians are legitimate targets and are often victims of terrorism.

Unfortunately, this definition of terrorism is too broad to explain the motives behind the various groups seeking change. Therefore, it is necessary to further explain the ideologies behind the different terrorist organizations to fully understand terrorism.

#### Classification of Terrorist Groups

Every terrorist organization has different motives and goals. No two groups are exactly alike. Therefore, one could argue that each terrorist organization should be placed in its own classification. This would not only be very time consuming but would not aid in understanding the commonalties in terrorism. Accordingly, it is useful to look at the overall ideologies behind the various groups.

Bruce Hoffman was able to develop a classification scheme for terrorist groups based on two broad categories. These categories are the "religious political" terrorist and the "secular political" terrorist.

The religious political terrorist is similar to a religious fanatic. The distinguishing factors of the religious political groups are their goals, how they view their constituency and their use of violence.

The religious political terrorist's prime goal is to effect "wide changes in the existing world order based on a religious imperative" (30:3). Although trying to establish a regional or global hegemony inherently involves political power, religion is still their predominant motive (30:13).

A constituency for a terrorist group is the body of people supporting their actions. A constituency can be either external or internal to the group, or both. The religious political terrorist is appealing to no external constituency (30:14). They view themselves as outsiders trying to seek vast changes in the world (30:15). Therefore, they are not fighting for anyone but themselves or their internal constituency (30:23,24). This in turn effects their use of violence.

First, the religious political terrorist has no external constituency to alienate from use of excessive force. Furthermore, religious political terrorists view anyone outside their movement as an enemy (30:14). Finally, their prime method of reaching a hegemony is eradicating all enemies (30:17). Accordingly, these groups use violence more indiscriminately than secular political groups (30:14). "Violence is often an end in itself for the religious political terrorist" (30:15). Any group conducting a Jihad (religious war) could be classified in this category.

Any of the violent sects of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement could fit into this religious political category.

For example, the Shi'ite Muslims in Iran could be classified into this group. The Iranian Shi'ite Muslims have gone so far as to justify in their 1979 constitution fundamentalist Islamic terrorism (74:58). This constitution essential authorizes

the clergy to govern Iran ... and stated the ideological mission of the army and the Revolutionary Guard included extending the "sovereignty of God's law throughout the land". (74:58)

Essentially, the constitution supports, protects, and promotes Shi'ite Islam terrorism (74:58).

The second category is the secular political terrorist. These groups can be classified based on their goals and use of violence.

The goal of the secular political terrorist group is to make a "sociopolitical change within the existing world order and terrorism is a means to that end" (30:3). This category includes all groups whose aims are primarily political (30:3).

Like religious political groups, secular political terrorist are capable of inflicting mass destruction and performing indiscriminate killings; however, they avoid such tactics (30:9). These groups tend to tailor their violence to appeal to their external constituents and sympathizers (30:5). Therefore, secular political terrorist have typically "place bounds on their level of destruction so not to alienate these constituents" (30:9). In this way,

they can "avoid public revulsion, alienating sympathizers, and triggering severe government countermeasures" (30:4).

Typically, groups that fall into this category are left wing political terrorist, right wing political terrorist, nationalist groups (30:3), and state terrorism.

Left wing groups use violence very narrowly so not to alienate sympathizers (30:5). They consider themselves revolutionaries and use violence to educate the public about their cause (30:6). Their prime goal is the replacement of an existing government with a socialist state (30:3). An example of a left wing group is the Red Army Faction (originally the Baader-Meinhof Group of West Germany) (30:5). The Red Army Faction maintains a Marxist philosophy and opposes "consumerism, capitalism, and military imperialism" (74:7). Its primary goal is to start a revolution to change the West German government from a liberal democracy to a Marxist state (74:7).

In contrast, right wing terrorist groups do not consider themselves revolutionaries but the catalyst to form an authoritarian government (30:10,11). Although not revolutionaries, their primary goal is also political. They use violence to intimidate the public into acceptance of their demands and to destroy the present government structure (30:10,11). The neo-fascist Black Order in Italy is an example of a right wing terrorist group. As a right wing group the Black Order opposes Italy's parliamentary

democracy and attacks any group that attempts to "bridge the gap" between the extreme political elements in the Italian political system (74:7).

Nationalist groups can also be placed in this category. Nationalist groups can have left or right wing political orientations, but their primary motivation is the formation of an independent state (48:207). Although more destructive than strictly left wing organizations, nationalist groups also consider themselves a revolutionary vanguard. They use violence to educate and create fellow nationalist. Furthermore, their acts are designed to gain international support for their cause. By gaining international support, the nationalist gain credibility in their struggle for a separate state (30:7). Finally, nationalist use terrorism to "embarrass and coerce their opposition into acceding to their separatist demands" (30:7). The Basque organization or ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) is an example of a nationalist terrorist group (28:24;74:6). The ETA is a Marxist organization (28:25), but its prime goal is the formation of a homeland for the Basque people (74:6). This homeland would consist of three French and four Spanish provinces (74:6) located in the western Pyrenees (28:23). Their fight for independence and terrorist activities have been primarily directed at the Spanish government (28:23;74:43), because of the abuses and repression suffered under the Franco regime (48:223;74:43).

State terrorism fits into the secular political classification. State terrorism is when a government uses terrorist tactics or terrorists as surrogates (39:19) to "repress and intimidate groups that challenge the state's security" (74:47). In this type of terrorism the government is the terrorist and is using violence for political reasons. Although terrorist surrogates can be used, generally, state terrorism uses the police and the military as their "instrument of terror" (74:47). Use of state terrorism has occurred in both left and right wing governments to repress perceived dissidents (74:48).

Examples include

Argentine's "dirty war" against "subversive elements" (1976-1983) and the Soviet Union's use of psychiatry to intimidate and terrorize dissidents. (74:48)

The last type of terrorism that needs to be classified is international terrorism. International terrorism is any terrorist act that has an international consequence (39:4). If a terrorist act meets any or all of the following three requirements it can be considered international. First, the attack is directed against foreigners or foreign targets. Second, two or more governments or terrorist groups are involved in the performance of the attack. And third, the terrorism is aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government (12:6). By this definition, international terrorism can be conducted by either religious political, or secular political groups. For example, an Islamic

fundamentalist hijacking an United States airliner is international terrorism performed by a religious political group. On the other hand, an IRA attack on British troops stationed in West Germany is international terrorism performed by a secular political group (nationalist group). Therefore, depending on the underlying motives of the terrorist organization, international terrorism could fall into either category.

With terrorism defined and the major terrorist organizational types categorized, it is appropriate to discuss the main ways that governments have tried to counter terrorism.

#### Government Reactions Against Terrorism

There have been six general counter-terrorist policies. Three of the policies are directed at the supporters of terrorist organizations. These policies are "improving economic conditions, making reforms, and collective punishment" (28:54). The remaining three policies focus on countering the terrorist organizations. These actions are "cease-fires and negotiations, emergency powers acts, and the use of security forces" (28:54).

Some experts believe that in many cases poor economic conditions produce social conflict and terrorism (28:63). Therefore, by improving the economic conditions in the country, the government can eliminate the source of the conflict and eliminate the support for the terrorist group.

The philosophy is with the support gone the terrorist organization will not be able to continue to exist.

Another established view is that "violence is a result of popular grievances" (28:68). The policy to counter these grievances is similar to improving economic conditions because it is also aimed at the supporters of terrorism. It is believed that by making social and political reforms the government will appease moderates and decay the support for the terrorist (7:300;28:68;89:461). Accordingly, by making reforms and removing the grievances, the government can eliminate the support terrorist groups need to exist (28:68). An example of economic and social reform occurred in Canada when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau made concessions to the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ). Trudeau made major reforms that aided French Canadians. These reforms included granting minority rights, establishing welfare programs, and making political appointments (7:300). By granting these concessions, Trudeau was able to destroy the public support for the movement and the FLQ was "defused" (7:301).

The final policy directed at the supporters of terrorism is collective punishment. This policy has been used extensively throughout history. It involves holding the civilian population responsible for any terrorist actions within that area (28:77). An example of collective punishment was the 1955 Emergency Powers Regulation in Cyprus. Under this regulation the government could levy

finer against the population, close shops and businesses, seize property, and close personal dwellings in response to terrorist actions (28:91). It is believed that, by levying collective punishment against the civilian population, the general population will discontinue supporting the terrorists rather than continue to suffer under the imposed sanctions. This policy also places pressure on the terrorist groups. If the general population suffers for a terrorist action, the terrorist risk alienating the civilians by continuing to operate in the area.

The first policy that directly affects the terrorist group is cease-fires and negotiations. In this policy, the government attempts to stop the violence long enough to negotiate a permanent settlement. Unfortunately, cease-fires usually are short lived and "the discussions between the government and terrorists rarely lead to conflict resolution". Historically, cease-fires have only been useful in reducing violence in the short-term (28:58).

The next method used against terrorist is implementing emergency powers acts. Emergency powers acts involve the government using unusually authoritarian measures with the general population. By lowering the overall freedom in the country, the government can more effectively combat the terrorist group. Generally, emergency powers acts have included all of the following measures:

Controlling the possession of firearms; requiring identification cards; granting security forces with the powers to arrest, search, and curfew the population; restrictions on the due process of law; and the limiting of political rights. (28:83)

This is a very controversial policy because it involves liberal democracies instituting the oppressive measures of the authoritarian states that they ideologically oppose.

The final policy involves the use of security forces to control the actions of terrorist groups. Typically, a government will use military security forces in two ways. First the government will attempt to augment its police force through the use of military units. In this role security forces engage in guarding, patrolling, conducting random searches, and conducting intelligence operations (28:106). Secondly, the government may use security forces to conduct a campaign to eradicate the terrorist threat. An example of this was when the government of Uruguay used military troops to eliminate the Tupamaros (89:460). In both ways, the government is trying to bring more "repressive force against terrorism" (28:101).

This research will focus on the effects of the last two counter-terrorist policies: security forces and emergency powers acts. In particular, this report will focus on the effects British troop intervention into Northern Ireland has had on countering the IRA. As for emergency powers acts, this report will only deal with them as they relate to the effects of British troops exercising control in Northern Ireland.

### III. Body of Research

#### Irish History

To understand the goals and objectives of the IRA, it is useful to look at the historical roots of the conflict in Ireland.

The conflict between Ireland and Great Britain can be traced back over 800 years (21:2) with Pope Adrian IV in 1171 making King Henry II of England the King of Ireland (4:34;58:15). This Papal grant started the cycle of land confiscation and colonization by the English, rebellions by the Irish, and oppression of the Irish to control the rebellions.

During the Tudor monarch reign, there was a fear that Spain or France would use Catholic Ireland as a stepping stone for invasion of Protestant England (4:35;21:4). In response to this perceived threat, Queen Elizabeth I sent the Earl of Essex to Ireland to conquer and colonize the island (21:4). This action began the systematic colonization of Ireland (4:35), and the massive Irish land loss (21:4;50:43). This land confiscation from colonization, or plantation, of Protestant Englishmen and Scots primarily occurred in the northern province of Ulster (50:43). The Catholics revolted in response to the land loss. In 1641, one Irish rebellion killed 30,000 Protestants (58:15). In retaliation, Cromwell, in 1649,

invaded Ireland and subdued the rebels (4:36;58:15). Cromwell's invasion not only killed 504,000 out of 1.5 million Irishmen but continued the policy of land confiscation (4:36). Furthermore, in an attempt to control future revolts and solidify the policy of colonization, the Penal Laws were passed in 1691 (62:2). The Penal Laws denied the indigenous Irish (Catholics) the rights of voting, holding public office, owning firearms, receiving an education, and owning or inheriting land (4:36-7;62:2; 74:32).

The final event that solidified the anti-British sentiment was the handling of the potato famines between 1841 and 1851. During these famines there was mass starvation, death, and emigration (4:38;58:18). Despite the starvation the British government was exporting food from Ireland to England (4:38). This disregard for the plight in Ireland laid the foundation for a nationalist revolt.

In 1858, a secret organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), or Fenians, was formed (4:38;21:5;62:5). The IRB opposed British rule in Ireland (4:38) and advocated a policy of obtaining home rule for Ireland (21:5). To achieve this separatist goal, the IRB was prepared to use physical force against the British (50:48; 62:5).

With the formation of the IRB, a violent nationalist campaign for home rule began. However, everyone in Ireland

did not support this movement. There was a sectarian split on the issue of home rule. Historically, Protestants had benefited from English support and protection. Accordingly, the Protestants were Unionist and opposed home rule (58:19). On the other hand, Catholics had suffered under British rule and supported the fight for independence (56:5;58:19). Unfortunately, this split only increased the violence in Ireland. By 1914, in an attempt to stop the violence, the Westminster Parliament passed the Home Rule Bill (56:5; 62:7). However, the bill was never enacted (56:5). With the issue of home rule still unresolved, a historical nationalist uprising occurred in 1916.

On Easter 1916, the IRB and the Irish Volunteers, another Catholic nationalist group, marched into Dublin and proclaimed sovereignty for Ireland (4:40;21:6;62:8). Their intent was to "sweep British authority out of Ireland" (56:5). However, within one week the British had crushed the revolt and the Easter Uprising had failed (58:21). Following the defeat, the British brutally punished the rebels (62:10). As a result of the revolt, the British arrested thousands (62:9) and held secret courts to sentence the leaders of the rebellion (58:21). Fifteen Easter Uprising leaders were sentenced to death and executed (58:21;62:10). The British tried to crush the IRB but in the process they created martyrs (58:22). Also, the desires for independence and the support of national separatism grew (56:5;58:22;62:10). The IRB had been destroyed, but the

survivors formed the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (58:19). The IRA intensified the nationalist campaign for independence (21:6).

By 1920 IRA terrorism had made Ireland ungovernable and the British government was searching for a solution (56:6). As a compromise to Protestant Unionism and Catholic Nationalism, Prime Minister Lloyd George enacted the Better Government of Ireland Act of 1920 (21:6;56:6). This act granted home rule of the southern part of Ireland but partitioned the six northeast counties from the south (21:6). The Better Government Act laid the foundation for the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. The treaty formalized home rule and partitioning. The treaty formed from the southern 26 counties an Irish free state with home rule and commonwealth status (28:16;58:24;74:32). These 26 counties were primarily Catholic and formed the Republic of Ireland (28:16;58:24). The remaining six northeast counties stayed a province of Britain (56:6-7). These partitioned counties in Ulster were primarily Protestant and formed Northern Ireland (58:24). The six partitioned counties are Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and Tyrone (50:54;74:32-3). Unfortunately, the Irish "hard-line republicans" did not agree with the treaty and continued to fight as the IRA for a united free Irish state (21:7).

As the IRA continued to fight for reunification (74:33), most of its terrorism between 1920 and 1960 consisted of "sporadic bombings, riots, and raids" (65:344).

For two reasons the IRA slowly became less of a terrorist threat. First, in 1932 the Fianna Fail Party came to power in the Irish Republic (Southern Ireland) (4:43). The Fianna Fail proclaimed a policy of unification through peaceful means (4:43;21:9). Those IRA members who could not be convinced to join the Fianna Fail were imprisoned (21:9). Secondly, the general public in the Irish Republic lost the overwhelming desire for unification (21:12). The attitude in Southern Ireland became "they would rather live peacefully in a divided Ireland than in a war-ravaged united Ireland" (21:12). As members defected to the Fianna Fail party or became imprisoned and popular support diminished, the IRA became a disorganized and split terrorist group (66:113).

Finally, between 1956-62 the IRA conducted a border campaign between the Republic and Northern Ireland (6:221:21:9;74:33). The IRA used ambush tactics, snipers, and bombings (74:33) in an attempt to harass British security forces (66:113). However, police units from Northern Ireland quickly contained the outbreak to the border region between Northern Ireland and the Republic (66:113). By 1962 this terrorist campaign had failed, and most of the IRA members were imprisoned (4:44;74:33). Following this failed border terrorism the IRA lost its credibility as a viable military force (66:13). With its leaders discredited, the IRA made a drastic shift to the political left (6:128). The IRA became a Marxist organization

(4:50;50:157). Furthermore, it abandoned its violent tactics (50:157). The IRA believed promoting fighting in the working class only benefited the British in controlling the Irish people (21:14). The IRA had not become a "pacifist organization" (50:161), but believed that uniting the working class Catholics and Protestants was the best way to oppose British rule and develop a united Ireland (4:50). With this Marxist orientation, the IRA was no longer a serious terrorist threat until the civil rights movement in the late 1960's.

In 1967, civil rights problems in Northern Ireland led to the formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) (4:46-7;50:79;58:110). The NICRA focused on the economic and religious discrimination against Catholics (74:33). In particular, the NICRA was protesting housing discrimination, unemployment, gerry-mandering to create under-representation of Catholics, and the lack of free speech and assembly (6:137;50:79;74:33-4).

As the NICRA began its marches, violence broke out between Catholics protesters and Protestant Unionist (21:14). In addition, the police authorities, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), often reacted in questionable ways. For example, in October 1968 in Londonderry civil rights marchers were beaten by the RUC (56:10). Also, in January 1969 during a civil rights parade from Belfast to Londonderry Protestant vigilantes ambushed the marchers while the RUC watched. Overall, the RUC did not protect the

Catholic protesters or arrest Protestant vigilantes (74:105). This criticism of the RUC would be later upheld by a report by Lord Cameron. Lord Cameron was a prominent Scottish judge who investigated the civil rights riots. In his report, Cameron confirmed that the police did mishandle the civil rights marchers and contributed to the violence (83:54). Finally, in August 1969 the situation reached a violent peak.

On August 12, 1969, the "Apprentice Boys March" was held in Londonderry (50:90;58:107). This Unionist/Protestant parade celebrated the Protestants closing the gates of Londonderry on Catholic James II in 1688 (58:107). In addition, the NICRA organized a march from Belfast to Londonderry (74:34). As Catholics and Protestants met rioting erupted in Londonderry and Belfast (4:47). The RUC responded to the rioting with armored vehicles and machine-guns which provoked further violence and rioting (50:91). In addition, the "B"-Specials, an auxiliary unit of the RUC, overacted by attacking Catholics (4:47). By August 15, 1969 the RUC had lost control and could not contain the violence (50:91). On August 16, 1969 British troops were committed to Northern Ireland to restore order (50:91).

During all this violence the IRA remained neutral (21:14). As sectarian violence continued the lack of action by the Marxist IRA caused a division to develop in the organization. By December 1969 the split occurred and the

provisional IRA (PIRA) was formed (4:50;21:14,16;38:98). The PIRA was formed by the traditional nationalists in the IRA who advocated the use of violence to drive the British from Northern Ireland (56:15).

Because the PIRA is the predominantly violent sect of the IRA, any further reference to the IRA in this report will mean the PIRA. The Marxist sect will be referred to as the Official IRA (OIRA).

### IRA Goals

History has shown that the conflict in Northern Ireland is divided along religious lines. The majority of Protestants are Unionist while the majority of Catholics have been nationalists. Despite this sectarian split in the country, the conflict has been and is essentially political. In particular, the IRA has political ambitions and can be classified as a nationalist terrorist group (30:7).

National terrorist groups have three general political goals. First, they want to form a separate sovereign state (28:58). Through the use of force nationalist terrorist can destabilize and make the rival government seem impotent in defending its people (30:7;49:87). In this way nationalist terrorist attempt to coerce the ruling government to accede to their demands for sovereignty (30:7).

Second, nationalist terrorists have a well defined target or enemy (30:7). That target is anyone directly or

symbolically linked to the rival government. For example, "a vast majority of the IRA's victims have been low-ranking government officials, ordinary soldiers, and policemen" (30:7).

Finally, nationalist terrorist groups want to appeal to the international community for support for their cause. By gaining international support, these groups gain credibility for their fights (30:7).

The IRA's goals closely parallel these general nationalist terrorist goals.

First and utmost, the IRA wants to form a united 32 county Irish state (4:52;6:175;28:18;38:98). To form a united Ireland the IRA calls for not only the removal of the government in Northern Ireland (6:175;21:10), but also the replacement of the government in the Republic of Ireland (6:175;21:10,11;28:18). The IRA advocates the removal of the Dublin government because Dublin betrayed the original ideals of the nationalist movement of the 1916 Easter Uprising (21:11). As a replacement the IRA advocates the formation of a democratic socialist republic (4:52;38:98; 58:28).

Although reunification is the long-term goal, the IRA realizes that the short-term goal of British withdrawal must come first (12:36;58:28,113;74:34). To gain British withdrawal the IRA has targeted the British government and symbols of that government in Northern Ireland. As mentioned earlier, most IRA attacks have been against

British troops and the RUC. Through bombings, assassinations, and sabotage, the IRA is trying to break the British will to remain in Northern Ireland (4:8;6:175). Only after the British withdraw can the Irish people have self-determination and reunification.

Another major goal of the IRA is the unconditional release and amnesty of all political and IRA prisoners (12:36;58:119;74:34).

Finally, the IRA is acutely aware of the benefits of propaganda and has tried to appeal to the international community as often as possible.

#### British Goals

Since 1969, the British government has had fairly constant goals for Northern Ireland. The cornerstones of these goals have been trying to maintain peace and order, and maintaining a functioning government in Northern Ireland that is linked with the Great Britain.

When violence erupted in Northern Ireland in the late 1960's, the British government had two goals and priorities. First, the Westminster Parliament wanted to keep the peace and regain order in Northern Ireland (6:139). Consequently, in August 1969 the British troops were sent into Northern Ireland as a peacekeeping force to impose order (6:139;56:13). Second, the British government intended to make reforms in the Northern Ireland (Stormont) government. These reforms were to be made quickly enough to

satisfy both the Protestant majority and Catholic minority in Northern Ireland (6:139).

In 1972 the goals still were to form a moderate government in Northern Ireland and to maintain peace; however, maintaining order now involved not only stopping rioting but defeating the IRA (6:149).

Ten years later, at an international conference on terrorism, the British government outlined its goals toward handling terrorists in general. These goals were fourfold. The first goal was to retain a legitimate government in place in the face of a terrorist threat. Second, the government would maintain control of the crisis. Third, the government would attempt to deter future incidents. Finally, goal four was to save lives (42:74). These general goals can be easily applied to the situation in Northern Ireland. These objectives would involve maintaining an effective government and defeating the IRA.

In summary, the British government has attempted to maintain an operating government and impose order in Northern Ireland for the past 20 years. Their prime tool for maintaining peace and order has been the British Army. During the past 20 years the British Army has had few successes and many failures in trying to maintain order and defeat the IRA. This report will outline the significant events since 1969 which involved British troops. These events will be analyzed to determine the effects and project

any useful lessons for other democracies, such as the United States.

### Significant Events Since 1969

Since 1969, British troops have tried to maintain order in Northern Ireland. However, more often than not their actions have failed to stop the IRA and have caused public alienation. In studying the effects British troops have had on the situation in Northern Ireland, this report will outline major events since 1969 that have involved the IRA, British troops, or both. Those events considered are the introduction of troops in 1969, reinstatement in 1971 of the policy of internment without trial for suspected terrorists, "Bloody Sunday" on January 30, 1972, Operation Motorman on July 31, 1972, the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the death of 18 soldiers in Warrenpoint in August 1979, the hunger strikes of 1981, the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984, the rocket attack on a police station in Newry in February 1985, the bombings in Enniskillen in November 1987, and an ambush attack against British troops in August 1988 in Dungannon.

### Initial Troop Intervention - 1969

When sectarian violence erupted in August 1969, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland thought the OIRA would come to their defense (6:138). However, because of their Marxist orientation, the OIRA remained neutral (21:14). Furthermore, the Catholics viewed their Protestant rivals,

the Stormont government (21:15), and the RUC as their enemies (20:66). Catholics felt they had no one to trust or consider protectors. Consequently, when British troops intervened Catholics accepted and welcomed them as protectors (6:151;20:66;48:203;70:249). However, this goodwill would not last long.

As a neutral peacekeeping force, the British Army's objectives were to use minimum force, respect the law (56:13), and be evenhanded when handling disturbances (6:139). As the primary security/police force the troops were initially able to maintain the perception of fairness and had a calming effect. For example, by September 1, 1969, the British troops were able to end the initial rioting and violence (84:29). This by no means was a permanent peace, but showed the calming effect that the presence of troops can have. Another example of their calming effect occurred one month later in Belfast. In October 1969, Protestants started a violent protest against proposed civil rights reforms which would aid the Catholic minority. In response to the riot, the British Army was summoned to Belfast. The troops effectively confronted the protesters, broke up the riot, and prevented a major conflict from occurring (59:54). Although these examples show early success in maintaining domestic order, political climate and public opinion would soon shift against the British Army.

Up to December 1969, the British Army was handling sectarian rioting. However, with the split of the IRA, the Army now had to counter an organized terrorist threat. The troops had to deal with bombings and snipers and more importantly an IRA policy designed to provoke the Army into confrontations with civilians, namely Catholics (4:52; 67:228). This IRA policy, unpopular government policies that the Army was to enforce, and the Army's mishandling of community protests would cause alienation of the population. For example, in April 1970, 400 Catholic youths confronted the Royal Scots in Belfast (70:254). The Royal Scots dispersed the crowd with tear gas. Unfortunately, the gas drifted into uninvolved neighboring sections of the town. Consequently, the troops actions were criticized by the local population as too harsh and the support for the Army began to decay (6:140). Despite incidents like this which decayed public support for the Army, reinstating internment without trial in August 1971 caused even greater alienation.

#### Internment Without Trial - 1971

By the end of 1969 there was 6,107 British troops in Northern Ireland. By the end of 1970 that level had risen to 7,537 (4:106). Despite this increase in troop strength, fighting and terrorism continued to escalate in early 1971 (5:58). In April there were 37 IRA bombings. In May there were 47 bombings. And in June 1971, IRA bombings tallied 50

(6:142). By August 1971 the IRA violence level caused the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, to call for re-enactment of the policy of internment without trial for suspected terrorists (74:106). Under the Special Powers Act of 1922, British troops would have the authority to arrest and detain without charges for 48 hours any suspected terrorist (67:229). On August 9, 1971, the policy was re-enacted (20:69;50:132). The effects of the British Army enacting this policy were disastrous (20:69). First, internment caused violence to increase, and second it alienated the Catholic population.

On August 9 the internment raids began (67:229). Catholics were outraged (61:19). In response to the policy rioting immediately broke out in Belfast, Londonderry (3:36;67:229), Newry, and Fermanagh (67:229). For example, "in Belfast, Catholics set fire to buildings, hurled nail and gasoline bombs, and exchanged gunfire with troops" (67:229). Rioting was so intense that by the end of a week, over 20 people were dead and 100 were injured (3:36).

This increased violence continued through the remainder of 1971. Following the policy's enactment terrorist activities in Belfast alone continued at a rate of eight to ten bombings and two to three shootings a day (60:52). By the end of 1971 the escalated violence caused 174 deaths compared to 25 deaths in 1970 (4:107;50:172). This increase occurred despite the increase of troop strength from 7,537 in 1970 to 11,322 in 1971 (4:106). Overall,

the internment policy was a failure at curbing terrorist violence, but more importantly it alienated the public from the Army.

When instituted, the policy of internment aimed at destroying the IRA (23:216), but had little effect on "crushing" the IRA (60:52). Instead, the policy "polarized" many moderate Catholics behind the IRA (60:52) because the Catholic community was intensely against the basic principle of the internment policy (61:19). Furthermore, this polarization built IRA support in Catholic areas when support was slipping (31:464). In addition, the Army was the primary police force, so the British soldiers made the internment arrests (60:52). As the implementing arm of the policy the British troops were the target of criticism against the policy, and the division between the Army and the Catholic community grew (4:53-4;23:262).

Although the policy was to crush the IRA, it was also to be applied fairly against both Catholic and Protestant terrorists to return domestic order (23:261). This did not occur. The internment arrest sweeps did not arrest only suspected terrorist and were perceived as discriminatory (6:143). For instances, on the first day 342 arrests were made but only 12 people were detained and interrogated as suspected terrorists (20:69). Furthermore, by the time the policy was abandoned in December 1975, almost 2,000 people were detained (23:261;50:133); 1,874 Catholics and 107 Protestants (23:261). In addition, the chief of staff of

the IRA, Joe Cahill, used the policy for propaganda by calling it a "draconian and oppressive measure" (70:256-7). As a result of the perceived inequities, charges of brutality were brought against the troops (60:52). Also, the credibility of the British troops was destroyed (6:143), and there was a perception in the Catholic community of Army favoritism toward Protestants (23:262). Alienation was so immediate and intense that after the policy's enactment Catholic women and children marched in Londonderry to express their hatred toward the British troops (61:18).

The Stormont government had underestimated the potential resentment against the measure. As a result, instead of breaking the IRA, the government had created greater support for the terrorists. By alienating the Catholic community from the Army, the government made it more difficult for the troops to maintain order. The troops were losing their image as evenhanded peacekeepers. As one writer stated, the policy made the Army appear as a "vindictive weapon of the government" (6:143). Although this politically insensitive measure of the government caused the Army's job to be more difficult, the Army's direct actions would decay popular support even further.

#### "Bloody Sunday" - January 30, 1972

On January 30, 1972 over 20,000 protesters gathered for a march in Londonderry to protest the policy of internment

without trial (50:179;85:30). Initially, the march was orderly and under control (50:179). However, British troops still halted the parade at a barricade (50:179; 85:30). The Catholic marchers responded by throwing rocks at the troops (50:179;85:30). The troops retaliated with tear gas and fire hoses (50:179). Suddenly, shooting broke out. When the shooting and rioting stopped, 13 demonstrators, including 6 teenagers, were dead (48:210; 50:179;85:30).

Following the incident, an official investigation was conducted by Lord Widgery, Britain's lord chief justice (50:180;67:232). The investigation revealed that the Army mishandled the situation (48:210). The investigation decided if the Army had maintained a lower profile in handling the demonstrators violence could have been avoided (50:180). Major General Robert Ford, commander of all British troops in Northern Ireland, retorted that the soldiers only reacted after coming under an initial gunfire attack (85:30). Lieutenant Colonel Derek Wilford, the commander of the troops involved, repeated this sentiment when he reported that two snipers fired the first shots (67:323). However, no soldiers were wounded in the exchange (85:30). Furthermore, the Widgery Board found that none of the deceased were handling bombs or firearms (50:180). Despite this fact, the Widgery report concluded that an "IRA sniper had fired the first shot" (67:232).

Northern Ireland Catholics immediately denounced the report as a "white-wash" (67:232).

Finally, the board found that despite Army mishandling the protesters were at fault for creating a "highly dangerous situation" (50:180;67:232). As a result of the incident, anti-British sentiment raged throughout the Catholic community (85:30). Community relations between British troops and the Catholic minority could be considered at their lowest immediately following "Bloody Sunday" (4.54).

In less than three years after intervention, British troops had gone from being accepted and welcomed to being loathed. Through mishandling riots, and implementing the hated policy of internment without trial, the Army managed to alienate the Catholic community. This alienation had two effects. First, the Catholic community was now united to eliminate internment and abolish the Stormont government (81:58). And secondly, the alienation solidified Catholic support behind the IRA.

Although by January 1972 community support was low for the Army and high for the IRA, British troops were still able to perform probably their most successful campaign in July 1972. This campaign was Operation Motorman. Operation Motorman's success can be traced to three factors. The first two factors are events that helped shape the political climate. Those events were the suspension of the Stormont government in Northern Ireland, and "Bloody Friday" on July

21, 1972. The final factor was the handling of the operation.

Operation Motorman - July 31, 1972

By March 1972, IRA and community violence forced the British government to take a drastic measure to return domestic order in Northern Ireland. This drastic measure was the suspension of the semi-autonomous Stormont government and the establishing of "direct rule" of Northern Ireland by the British government (71:71). On March 24, 1972, British Prime Minister Edward Heath announced that the British government was taking control (71:71;82:32). Direct rule essentially involved two aspects. First, all security forces in Northern Ireland, including the RUC and the British Army, would be under the control of the British government (71:71). Second, Westminster would control all of Northern Ireland's political decisions. On March 31, 1972, Cabinet Minister William Whitelaw became the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the acting Prime Minister of Northern Ireland (1:41;71:71).

It was Heath's opinion that the Catholic community was afraid of the Stormont government (80:25). Direct rule would be a political move to change this attitude and introduce reforms in Northern Ireland. By seizing power, Heath hoped the Catholic community would feel released from their perceived discriminatory Protestant rulers (1:32). Therefore, direct rule was intended to pacify Northern

Ireland Catholics and dry up support for the IRA (9:24). Although IRA sniping and bombings continued after direct rule, the move did ease tension in Ulster. First, there were increasing signs of relaxed tension between Protestants and Catholics (88:50). Next, moderate Catholic leaders voiced a predominant mood of relief from the suspension of the Stormont government (9:24). Finally, expectations for a political solution and reform were so high that a Catholic peace movement against the IRA was started (1:42). Although relations between the Army and the Catholic community were still strained, direct rule had accomplished Heath's goal and eased tension and raised hopes of ending the internal strife and violence. However, the hope for a peaceful settlement would be betrayed, not by the British government, but by the IRA.

On July 21, 1972, the IRA conducted a violent and indiscriminate bombing attack which would become known as "Bloody Friday" (6:224;10:22;50:182). On that day 22 bombs exploded in Belfast (6:224;50:182). The targets were bus stations, shopping centers, railway stations, and a bridge (50:182). More important than the property damage, the bombings caused 11 deaths, 2 soldiers and 9 civilians, and 130 injuries (10:22;50:182). The IRA claimed the Army was given adequate time, 30 minutes, to remove the bombs and that the Army's slow response was to blame for the carnage (50:182;69:26). This excuse was not accepted by the Northern Ireland population. The public, especially the

IRA's Catholic constituency, was enraged by the indiscriminate targeting and killing of civilians (20:70; 50:182;69:25). Even the OIRA denounced the IRA's action and called them "enemies of the people" (69:25). The IRA had essentially alienated their supporters. Therefore, when the Army stepped up patrols and searches in response to the attack, the troops met with limited resistance as Catholics even assisted by informing on the location of IRA arm caches (50:182;69:26).

Although community relations between the Army and the Catholic minority remained low, in general Catholics were more alienated by this recent IRA violence. Therefore, the political climate was adequate for an extreme military campaign. That campaign would be Operation Motorman.

On July 31, 1972, Operation Motorman began (10:22). The goal of Operation Motorman was to eliminate all, Catholic and Protestant, "No-Go" areas (10:22;25:31;63:32). No-Go areas were communities that had set up barricades to keep out troop and police patrols (58:109). Catholic No-Go areas were considered secure areas for the IRA to hide and plan operations (10:22). After Operation Motorman the IRA would no longer have these secure bases (10:22).

In the wake of "Bloody Friday", Catholics recognized that the IRA had forced Whitelaw to take a drastic measure (25:32). However, not only was the political climate in favor of the Army, the operation's success was also due to excellent preparation and handling. For seeing

possible clashes and riots in Catholic communities because of this major military operation, Whitelaw warned the public of the impending operation (25:31;63:32). In the evening of July 30, 1972, Whitelaw announced that the troops would be coming to destroy the barricades and advised all people to stay off the streets during the operation (25:31). Furthermore, the troops were given strict orders to limit the use of violence to restrict the possibility of civilian deaths (25:31-2). The overall result was a successful operation.

In the morning of July 31, over 15,000 troops with armored vehicles rolled through the No-Go areas (10:22; 25:31). The barricades which were located in Belfast and Londonderry were destroyed with minimum confrontation (10:22; 25:31). For example, in Belfast no shooting broke out (63:32). In Londonderry there were only brief flurries of conflict that resulted in two deaths (25:32;63:32). The dead included one teenage boy and one private in the IRA (25:32). In addition to destroying the barricades, the troops conducted a massive arms search in Londonderry (25:31). This too resulted in limited conflict and overwhelming success. The Army confiscated 11,000 rounds of ammunition, 2 tons of explosive, and over 50 guns (25:31). Overall, Operation Motorman was a success for the British troops. The No-Go areas were destroyed, clashes between the troops and the civilians were minimized, and there was no community backlash to this large military campaign.

Despite the success of Operation Motorman, 1972 was the bloodiest year from 1969 to the present with 467 total deaths related to terrorists (4:107;50:172;74:105). However, following 1972 deaths due to terrorism dropped. In 1973, deaths totaled 250 (4:107;50:172;74:105). The drop was contributed to the ever increasing "repudiation of violence by Northern Ireland's Catholic minority" (36:20). Also, Catholics were informing more on the IRA. Finally, Operation Motorman proved to have a positive effect as the IRA ran out of sanctuaries in 1973 (36:20).

In 1974, an unidentified IRA spokesman admitted to Time Magazine that the IRA was at a "stalemate" with British troops (27:47). The spokesman was quoted as saying "they (the Army) can't defeat us (the IRA) and we can't defeat them" (27:47). This apparent stalemate can be seen by reviewing the death toll figures from 1973 to 1976 (see Appendix A). Between 1973 and 1976 deaths from terrorists fluctuated between 200 and 300 people per year.

By 1976, the British government initiated the policy of "Ulsterization" to break this stalemate. Ulsterization lowered the military involvement in Northern Ireland by returning the security role to the RUC (4:10;23:262; 50:147). Although the Army was relegated to a support role, it still conducted patrols and searches. Ulsterization had two goals. First, the policy intended to lower the profile of the Army and improve community relations. Unfortunately,

after Ulsterization, relations between the Army and the public remained strained (50:147). Second and more importantly, the policy intended to lower IRA violence by placing "Irishman against Irishman" (58:94). Although after 1976 and Ulsterization yearly death tolls dropped, the drop could be contributed to other factors other than Ulsterization. For example, starting in 1977 total deaths per year dropped below 120 persons (4:107;50:172;74:105). In 1978, the leader of the Community of Peace, Ciaran McKeown, attributed this decline to further "dwindling popular support" for the IRA (55:40). However, Roy Mason, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was not as optimistic. In Mason's opinion the IRA had not given up and was still a potent force (55:40). Mason's position is supported by the death toll figures and the remaining major events to be outlined in this report. Although a large drop in deaths from terrorists occurred after 1976, primarily the drop occurred in the civilian category. The statistics indicate that after 1976 the IRA's attacks were more discriminate and tended to avoid civilians. Finally, the remaining major events to be outlined indicate that the IRA is still a potent threat to domestic order.

#### Lord Mountbatten's Assassination and Warrenpoint - 1979

On August 27, 1979, two events occurred that indicated that the IRA was not a dead terrorist group. Those events

were the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and an attack in Warrenpoint, Northern Ireland that killed 18 soldiers.

Lord Mountbatten's assassination occurred when his fishing boat exploded in Donegal Bay (13:28;57:30-1). Donegal Bay is located on the northeast coast of the Republic of Ireland near the town of Mullaghmore (13:28; 57:30). Although Mullaghmore is in the Republic of Ireland, it is only 12 miles from Northern Ireland and was a well-known refuge for the IRA (57:31). Immediately following the attack, the IRA took responsibility for the incident (13:29;57:31).

Lord Mountbatten was not just another British citizen who was a victim of an IRA bombing. Mountbatten was a British war hero, a diplomat, and a member of the royal family (50:188;57:30;86:21). His status in Britain was that of a beloved "folk hero". Mountbatten was the IRA's "most illustrious victim" (13:28). Unfortunately, his importance and popularity were the prime reasons for his death. First, the IRA had chosen Mountbatten to gain international attention to the situation in Northern Ireland (13:29;37:57;57:31;86:21). However, the attack which also killed Mountbatten's grandson, a teenage boat boy, and 82 year old Dowager Lady Brabourne received negative publicity (13:28;57:30-1). The killings spurred public outrage (13:28). Furthermore, the attack on Mountbatten strengthened Britain's resolve (86:22). After the bombing, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced that Britain would

continue its battle against the IRA with "relentless determination" (86:22).

Second, Mountbatten's death signaled a definite switch in the IRA bombing strategy. The IRA was now going away from indiscriminate bombings which killed Catholic and Protestant civilians and alienated the public. Instead, the IRA was now aiming at symbols of British authority such as troops, police, and prison officials (86:21). The second bombing event on August 27, 1972 further confirmed that change in strategy. This attack occurred at Warrenpoint, Northern Ireland.

In southeast Northern Ireland near Warrenpoint, a British paratroop truck convoy hit an IRA bomb (13:28; 57:31). The survivors of the attack radioed for help (57:31). A squad of the Queen's Own Highlanders came by helicopter to aid the stricken convoy (57:31). While assisting the truck convoy, the rescue force was struck by a second IRA bomb explosion (13:28;57:31). Twelve Highlanders were killed in the second blast (13:28;50:188;57:31). The final toll of the two bombs at Warrenpoint was 18 dead soldiers (13:28;57:31). This bombing incident demonstrated that the IRA was still lethal because this was the "single worst military loss the British had suffered in Northern Ireland since the 1916 Easter Uprising" (13:28).

### Hunger Strikers - 1981

On March 1, 1981, in Maze Prison south of Belfast, a convicted IRA member, Bobby Sands, started a hunger strike (50:192;72:32;90:59). Sands went on the hunger strike to force the British government to grant political prisoner status to imprisoned IRA members (72:32;90:59).

Soon after Sands started his strike, other IRA members joined him in the protest for political prisoner status. However, Sands' strike brought the most international coverage for two reasons (50:192). First, although a convicted member of the IRA, Sands was also an elected member of the British House of Commons from Northern Ireland's Fermanagh and South Tyrone constituency (51:40). Second, British Prime Minister Thatcher refused to even consider granting any of the IRA's demands (52:38;68:35; 87:59). It was the government's opinion that meeting any of the prisoners demands would legitimize the IRA and improve IRA support (51:40;68:35). On the other hand, Thatcher's critics said that allowing the strikers to die would only create martyrs, inflame anti-British sentiment, and increase violence in Northern Ireland (68:35). Although Thatcher eventually would win the battle of wills (31:56), her critics were correct about the reactions in Northern Ireland.

As Sands' physical condition deteriorated, tension grew (72:32). By the end of April 1981, gangs of Catholic youths in Londonderry and Belfast rioted and confronted police and

troops (51:40;72:32). On May 5, 1981, Bobby Sands died. Following his death, further rioting erupted in Belfast and Londonderry (68:35). Eight days after Sands' death, the second IRA hunger striker, Francis Hughes, died (87:59). When Hughes died rioting again erupted in Belfast with Catholics throwing gasoline bombs at police and exchanging gunfire with British troops (87:59). This cycle of erupting violence would continue as each additional striker died (24:36).

In October 1981, the strike finally ended but not before ten IRA convicts died (50:192;79:58). The strike ended when four of the strikers' families forced the prison to intervene and not allow the IRA men to die (34:56;79:58). After seven months, the sentiment was that the hunger strike had failed and had "placed little or no pressure on the British government to yield to the IRA's demands" (79:58).

Although the strike failed to cause the British government to concede to the IRA's demands, it did illustrate two points. First, the strike demonstrated the IRA's continuing ability to gain international attention for the situation in Northern Ireland. And second, the strike showed that the IRA still had a strong following. Furthermore, this constituency could be motivated to confront security forces and cause domestic disorder.

Attempted Assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher - 1984

On October 12, 1984, the IRA attempted its "boldest" strike against Britain (64:50). On that day an IRA bomb exploded in the Grand Hotel in Brighton, England (11:7; 22:12;64:50;75:1). This attack was significant because the Brighton Hotel was the sight of the British Conservative Party annual conference (2:40;11:7;75:1). Because of the conference, thirteen of the twenty Thatcher cabinet members, including the Prime Minister, were staying at the hotel at the time of the blast (64:50). Although Prime Minister Thatcher was the target of the bombing, she escaped uninjured (2:40;11:7). However, the blast did kill four and injured 32 others (2:40;22:13;45:1). Among the dead were two prominent Conservative Party members. They were Sir Anthony Berry, former Conservative deputy chief whip, and Eric Taylor, the chairman of the Conservative Association in northwest England (45:1;64:50). Essentially, the IRA was trying to destroy the British government but failed (64:50).

In the wake of the attack, Prime Minister Thatcher reiterated the British government's position that the terrorists will ultimately fail and democracy will prevail (11:7). Furthermore, the overall British public's resolve to keep troops in Ulster increased in reaction to the bombing (75:1). Despite strengthening the resolve of the British government, the IRA once again demonstrated its ability to conduct a spectacular and devastating attack.

Newry Police Station - February 1985

By 1985, the death toll from IRA terrorists had remained below 100 people per year for 3 consecutive years. Furthermore, in late 1984 the IRA suffered several setbacks. For example, in September the Irish Navy intercepted a boat and confiscated over seven tons of arms intended for the IRA. Also, in December, the Republic of Ireland managed to seize over \$1.6 million in IRA assets in a Dublin bank (8:44). Therefore, by early 1985 officials believed the IRA was close to being defeated (8:44;35:48). However, any thought that the IRA had faded was erased by another record setting attack in February 1985.

In Newry, Northern Ireland the IRA fired nine 50-pound mortars at the local RUC police station (8:44;15:1). The attack resulted in "nine RUC constables dead and 37 people wounded, including 25 civilians" (8:44). The dubious record set was the most constables killed in a single IRA attack since violence broke out in 1969 (8:44;15:3;35:48).

After the shelling, both IRA and British spokesmen commented on the incident. "The IRA called the attack a well-planned operation that indicated the IRA's ability to strike when and where they wanted" (8:44). In addition, Danny Morrison of the Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, added that the IRA was still a solid organization (32:3). David Gilliland of Britain's Northern Ireland office agreed with the IRA spokesmen. He said that the attack demonstrated a peak in the continuing violence in

Northern Ireland (32:2). Furthermore, in Gilliland's opinion the IRA remained very capable of creating more such peaks (32:2). Finally, as a result of the attack, Gilliland did not "foresee a time when the British Army would not be needed in Northern Ireland" (32:3).

#### Enniskillen Bombing - November 1987

On November 8, 1987, the IRA's claim that it was only targeting the military came into question (54:42). On that day an IRA bomb exploded in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland during a war memorial ceremony (54:42;73:14;76:1). The explosion caused 11 Protestant civilian deaths and over 60 injured elderly pensioners (54:42;73:14;77:2). Also, the explosion indicated the IRA was still capable of inflicting mass destruction.

After the blast, an IRA spokesman reiterated that the bomb was intended to kill soldiers not civilians (73:14). It was the IRA's contention that a British Army radio scanning device detonated the bomb (54:42;73:14). Despite the IRA denials, there was "widespread revulsion among both Protestant and Catholic moderate politicians" (77:2), and public outcry against the IRA (76:2). Part of the outcry called for the reinstatement of internment without trial. However, Ulster officials and the British government refused (54:42). Apparently, the British government had learned a

lesson from 1971-75 and determined that enacting internment without trial would only "play into the IRA's hands" (54:42).

#### Dungannon Ambush - August 1988

On August 20, 1988, an unmarked military bus filled with British troops was traveling from Belfast to their Omagh barracks (16:1;18:1). When the bus reached Dungannon, 55 miles west of Belfast, a 200-pound IRA bomb planted in a parked car exploded (16:1;17:1). The explosion ripped through the bus killing 8 soldiers and wounding 28 others (18:1). The bombing incident was the "worst single act of violence against security forces in Northern Ireland since February 1985 in Newry" (16:3). Again, after the attack, "Northern Ireland politicians petitioned Prime Minister Thatcher to re-enact internment without trial for suspected terrorists (17:2,18:1). However, Thatcher "refused to consider the idea" (26:34).

Once again the IRA demonstrated their ability to cause large scale death and destruction. Furthermore, the IRA used a Czechoslovakian plastic explosive in the attack which confirmed British officials' beliefs that the "IRA is better armed than ever before" (18:1). Therefore, despite yearly death toll figures well below the peak years of the 1970's, the IRA appears to still be a potent and dangerous terrorist group.

#### IV. Analysis

##### IRA Goal Attainment

As stated earlier, the IRA has four goals. First, the IRA wants a united 32 county Ireland with a sovereign government (4:52;6:175;28:18;38:98). Second, the IRA wants British withdrawal from Northern Ireland to include all military forces. Third, the IRA wants all IRA prisoners released (12:36;58:119;74:34). Finally, the IRA wants to appeal to the international community for support. The following discussion will outline how well the IRA has accomplished these goals.

The IRA's first goal of a united Ireland with an independent government has had only minimum success. That success came when, through their violence and the Stormont government's inability to maintain order, the British government suspended the Stormont government and instituted direct rule from Westminster. Although the elimination of the Stormont government was the IRA's first step in uniting Ireland, this achievement has backfired on the IRA. Presently, under direct rule, Northern Ireland is more closely tied to the British government. Furthermore, the future prospect of the IRA accomplishing this goal is also not bright. In 1983, Prime Minister Thatcher expressed the British government's view, which holds today, that Northern Ireland would "remain a part of the United Kingdom as long

as the population (Northern Ireland's population) wished" (14:1). With Northern Ireland predominantly Protestant and Unionist, this change is not likely to occur and IRA violence has not "dented Protestant determination to stay British" (47:47).

The IRA's second goal of British withdrawal from Ulster has not occurred. Presently, there are over 10,000 British soldiers in Northern Ireland (47:47;53:1). Although recent surveys indicate that the majority of British citizens favor troop withdrawal (4:3;53:47), "Thatcher is under no pressure from the opposition British Labor party to take action based on these surveys" (53:47). Consequently, the possibility of troop withdrawal in the near future is also unlikely.

Third, the British government maintains an active policy of imprisonment of IRA members and has steadfastly refused to deal with prisoners. The hunger strikers of 1981 stand as a prime example of the British policy against making concessions to IRA prisoners.

Finally, the IRA has been very successful at drawing international attention to Northern Ireland. However, the majority of the publicity has been negative. The Lord Mountbatten assassination, the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher, and the Enniskillen bombing in 1987, to name a few, all drew negative responses and public outrage toward the IRA. One of the few exceptions was the hunger strikers of 1981. The hunger strikers were able to

draw attention to Northern Ireland and spur international opinion against the British government (4:23). However, the international publicity against Britain was for the government's inaction in the situation to prevent the deaths of the prisoners rather than support for the legitimacy of the IRA movement. Overall, the IRA has accomplished its fourth goal of getting international attention, but outside of support from other terrorist groups such as the ETA and the Libyan government, the IRA has not developed world wide support for their cause.

In general, the IRA has had minimum success in accomplishing their goals. On the same issue, the British government has not done much better at reaching their goals.

#### British Goal Attainment

Essentially, the British government has had two goals. The first was to maintain a functioning and moderate government in Ulster. Second, the British want to maintain peace and order. The tool to maintain this order has been the British Army.

As far as maintaining a functioning government, the British have been successful but not in the manner which they intended. There has been a functioning government in Ulster, but that government has been Westminster. The British government would prefer the Northern Ireland government to be semi-autonomous like it was prior to 1972 and direct rule. Therefore, ideally the British government

wants Ulster to return to a position of self-government. Although "polls show 7 out of 10 people in Northern Ireland approve of a Catholic-Protestant power sharing government" (47:47), there is limited support for returning to self-government (47:48).

As for forming a moderate government, "under direct rule, Britain has scrapped the laws that gave Protestants disproportionate power and ended housing favoritism" (53:4). However, Catholic politicians say there is more improvement necessary. They point to the 85 percent male unemployment rate in some neighborhoods of Belfast as an example of one area that still requires improvement (53:4). Overall, the British government has maintained a more moderate and functioning government in Northern Ireland, but the reforms are not complete and the government is not semi-autonomous. Therefore, Britain has only been partially successful at this goal.

Rating the success of maintaining peace and order and defeating the IRA is even more difficult. Some would point to the decline of violence as an indication of winning the battle with the IRA. For example, the number of IRA shooting incidents went from over 10,000 in 1972 to only 230 in 1985 (29:2). Also, as indicated in the research, the yearly death tolls from terrorists have been below 120 persons since 1977. However, despite the decline in yearly shootings and deaths, the IRA proved to be a potent terrorist group. After 1977 the IRA set many of its record

single incident death tolls. For example, Warrenpoint in 1979 and Newry in 1985. In addition, the IRA has been able to conduct its boldest attacks in the same timeframe, for example, the Mountbatten assassination in 1979 and the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1984. Gerry Adams, head of the Sinn Fein, pointed out in August 1985, the situation in Northern Ireland could not be judged on the "body count" (33:3). In his opinion, the struggle was "far from over" (33:3). Therefore, it can be stated that the British government has contained the IRA but not eliminated the group. At best, the British government has only partially accomplished this goal also.

Although the British government has made more progress toward its goals, neither side in this 20 year struggle has been able to accomplish any more than partial success of its goals. Consequently, the conflict is at a stalemate. The following section will discuss the effects the British Army has had in reaching this balance.

#### Effects of British Troops

The British Army has had a wide variety of effects on the situation in Northern Ireland. The main effect has been the prevention of a civil war.

In August 1969, sectarian violence had reached a peak. After four days of rioting, the RUC had proven it could not control the fighting. Northern Ireland was on the brink of civil war. Consequently, the British Army intervened.

By September 1969, the presence of the Army had calmed the situation. The troops were able to bring order when the local authorities were incapable. Unfortunately, this order was not permanent.

On the contrary, troops have not eliminated all fighting between Protestants and Catholics. The riots caused by the institution of internment without trial in 1971, and the riots spurred by the hunger strikers in 1981 stand as examples of the continued community violence. However, the riots of 1971 and 1981 do illustrate the effect of the Army's presence to limit the violence and avoid a civil war. For example, these riots were isolated incidents. Since 1969 rioting has not been continuous. Quiet the opposite, rioting has been sporadic and in response to a particular action of the government. Most importantly, when these outbreaks occurred the Army was able to quickly end the fighting.

Finally, the fact that the Army has been the primary security force or supporting the RUC since 1969 and that anarchy has been avoided lends credibility to the Army's ability to prevent civil war.

The second effect the Army has had is containing IRA violence in Northern Ireland. Essentially, the effect on containing and countering the IRA has been discussed under the accomplishment of Britain's second goal of maintaining peace and order in Northern Ireland. To reiterate, the British Army has been able to contain the violence but not

totally defeat or eliminate the IRA. Violence is contained but at the expense of keeping over 10,000 soldiers in Ulster. Furthermore, the IRA has shown they maintain the capability to cause devastating death and destruction. Some examples of this capability are the Warrenpoint bombing in 1979, the Newry shelling in 1985, and the Dungannon ambush in 1988. Overall, the British Army has reached a stalemate with the IRA. The attitude of being at a stalemate was voiced in 1988 by Tom King, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In a public release, King stated the IRA could not be defeated by military means alone. King went on to say a military presence was necessary but an ultimate resolution depended on a political solution (78:1). King's view of no military solution "echoed the sentiment of General James Glover, former head of the British Army in Northern Ireland" who also believes there is no purely military solution to the problem (78:2).

Because the Army is at a stalemate, the question arises of whether another organization, such as the RUC, could be more successful. In 1969, the RUC could not contain community rioting. In addition, Lord Cameron confirmed that the RUC contributed to rather than eliminated that violence (83:54). Therefore, in 1969, the RUC would have been an inappropriate organization to confront IRA violence. However, in 1976, the British government did attempt to break the stalemate with the policy of Ulsterization.

Ulsterization returned the primary security role to the RUC and relegated the Army to a support role. Although figures in Appendix A initially indicate that Ulsterization resulted in fewer deaths, the lower death tolls can be contributed to fewer civilian deaths. Since the late 1970s the IRA has maintained a policy of targeting British symbols of authority rather than civilians. The IRA statements made after the Mountbatten assassination and the Warrenpoint bombing confirmed this policy. In addition, it has been since Ulsterization that the IRA has set their single incident death records. Examples of these record are Warrenpoint and Newry. Therefore, the lower yearly death tolls are more a function of a change in IRA strategy rather than the effect of the RUC, Ulsterization, or troops.

Finally, although the primary security force, the RUC still has the support of over 10,000 British soldiers. In its support role the Army handles intelligence gathering activities, patrols, and searches. Therefore, the Army has been a major contributor to any success the RUC has had since 1976.

Despite the positive effects of preventing civil war and containing violence, the Army can cause negative effects in a terrorist situation. The most significant negative effect in Northern Ireland was the alienation of the public, namely the Catholic minority which the IRA courts for support. As Brian Jenkins has written, when using the Army, a government is running the risk that an action of the

troops may be seen as overreactive or that an error in judgment may cause further violence (42:211). This point has been poignantly proven in Northern Ireland. The Royal Scots using tear gas on rioters in 1970 in Belfast and the shootings on "Bloody Sunday" in 1972 stand as two examples of how overreaction and mishandling of the situation can cause immense alienation and loss of necessary public support. Presently, this large rift remains between the Army and the Catholic community.

#### Other Contributing Factors

Public support is very influential in the effect a security force, such as the Army, can have on a situation. The importance of public support can be seen by comparing "Bloody Sunday", "Bloody Friday", and Operation Motorman.

"Bloody Sunday" occurred less than six months after internment without trial was enacted. As stated in the research, the Catholics inherently loathed the policy of internment without trial. In addition, the Army, as the primary security force prior to 1976, had the burden of making the internment arrests. Consequently, the Catholics identified internment with the Army. Accordingly, the hatred toward the policy was directed at the Army and resulted in severe alienation between the Catholics and the troops. Finally, the parade on "Bloody Sunday" was to protest the policy of internment without trial.

On "Bloody Sunday" the troops merely blocked the progression of the parade. However, public relations were strained, and the marchers were halted by the symbol of the policy they were protesting. Consequently, the crowd responded by throwing rocks at the soldiers and rioting and shooting resulted.

This incident highlighted two aspects. First, if the public is alienated from the the security forces a volatile and disastrous situation can result from an initially simple act such as a parade. Second, as the Widgery report indicated, the troops were partially at fault for mishandling the confrontation. As a result, "Bloody Sunday" demonstrated the consequences of no or poor training. Therefore, soldiers should be trained to handle civil disturbances before being placed in a tense crowd control situation.

In contrast, after "Bloody Friday" the public was enraged at the IRA for its indiscriminate bombing. The relations between the Army and the Catholics were still strained but public opinion and support was more against the terrorists. Consequently, when the Army increased its patrols and searches in the wake of "Bloody Friday", it met no resistance. As a matter of fact, Catholics even assisted troops by informing on the location of IRA arms caches. If public attitude and support had resemble that on "Bloody Sunday", the patrols could have easily been confronted by crowds and caused rioting.

Finally, Operation Motorman was a large scale and aggressive military campaign primarily conducted in Catholic neighborhoods. By its size alone, Operation Motorman could have caused severe public unrest and resulted in rioting. Fortunately, the operation was conducted in the wake of the suspension of the Stormont government and the IRA's "Bloody Friday" attack. As indicated by the research the public support could be described as neutral. Consequently, the Army was able to conduct a very aggressive campaign with minimum resistance and confrontation with the public. Again, during the subsequent searches Catholics continued to inform on the location of IRA arms dumps.

These three events illustrated the importance of public support. After "Bloody Friday" and during Operation Motorman, public support and attitude was neutral. Consequently, the Army was able to conduct very aggressive measures against the IRA and not encounter opposition from the public. The public was more enraged at the terrorists than at the soldiers. Therefore, the population either watch or assisted the troops in the operations. If public support was low, as on "Bloody Sunday", there could have been a violent public backlash. Finally, to reiterate the contrast, if public support is low an event like a parade can end in disaster.

There are three additional issues that directly relate to alienating the public. First, as highlighted earlier in the "Bloody Sunday" incident, troops should be trained to

handle civil disturbances before being placed in that situation. In that way, a "Bloody Sunday" may be avoided.

Second, the government should consider the possible public response to a controversial policy such as internment without trial. As described in the research, when enacted the policy of internment caused wide spread alienation, decayed public support for the military, and rioting. The Thatcher government has recognized this sensitivity and subsequently has rejected calls for re-enactment of the policy after the Enniskillen bombing and Dungannon ambush. The British government believed that enacting the policy would only "play into the hands of the IRA" and enhance support for the terrorists.

Finally, once destroyed, public support may never return. In Northern Ireland alienation occurred quickly. It took less than three years for Army and community relations to reach an all time low. Despite the fact that no similar "Bloody Sunday" incident has occurred and 17 years have elapsed since the incident, public relations remain strained. Furthermore, it is not foreseeable that the relationship between the Catholic minority and the Army will ever return to the acceptance and welcome the troops received in 1969.

The final aspect of troop intervention is a government can use the Army to show resolve against the terrorists. After 20 years of violence and over 400 British soldier deaths (4:107;19:1), Westminster and Prime Minister

Thatcher remain steadfast in keeping troops in Ulster. The mounting deaths of servicemen were intended to force Thatcher to withdraw troops from Northern Ireland (CA:34). However, the IRA attacks have backfired. For example, following the Dungannon ambush the British public was infuriated, and there was increased "pressure on Thatcher to break the back of the IRA once and for all" (CA:34). By keeping troops in Northern Ireland despite attacks such as Warrenpoint and Dungannon, the British government has voiced its resolve that the Army will remain until a permanent solution can be accomplished. The British government has through the use of the Army demonstrated it will not bow to terrorist threats or violence.

## V. Conclusions

Terrorism is a very difficult term to define. Every expert researched had a slightly different definition. However, there was enough commonality among those definition reviewed to form a consensus. For this thesis, terrorism was defined as the actual or threatened use of violence used to induce a political or social change. This violence or threat of violence can be used by any group and is not restrained by any social norms.

After terrorism was defined the different terrorist groups were classified by their primary motive. These primary motives were either religious or political. The IRA was categorized as a political terrorist group. Namely, the IRA is a terrorist group whose goal is the formation of a separate sovereign state in Ireland. In other words, the IRA is a Nationalist terrorist organization.

The nationalist movement is deeply rooted in Ireland's history. Its origins can be traced back over 800 years. Essentially, the movement is based on the desire for self-determination for the Irish.

As a Nationalist terrorist group, it was determined the IRA had four goals. These goals are the formation of a united 32 county Ireland, British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, the release of all political and IRA prisoners, and to gain international support for their movement. In

contrast, the British government has two goals. First, the British government wants to maintain a functioning and moderate government in Northern Ireland. Second, Westminster wants to maintain peace and order in Ulster. To gain peace and order, the British government has used the Army to counter IRA violence.

Since 1969, the British Army has been in Northern Ireland. During this time there have been several significant events. The significant events reviewed in this research report were the introduction of troops in 1969, reinstatement in 1971 of the policy of internment without trial for suspected terrorists, "Bloody Sunday" on January 30, 1972, Operation Motorman on July 31, 1972, the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the death of 18 soldiers in Warrenpoint in August 1979, the hunger strikes of 1981, the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1984, the rocket attack on the police station in Newry in February 1985, the bombings in Enniskillen in November 1987, and an ambush attack against British troops in August 1988 in Dungannon.

After the events were reviewed and analyzed, eight conclusions were reached. The first three dealt with the effect the British Army has had on the situation in Northern Ireland. First, it was determined the British Army has prevented a civil war in Ulster. Second, troops can contain the violence level of a terrorist group, but an ultimate military defeat of the IRA is unlikely. Finally, through

mishandling situations troops can alienate the public and destroy local support.

The remaining five conclusions are contributing factors that a government should consider when using troops to counter a terrorist threat. First, public support is very important to the success of a military operation. Second, troops should be trained prior to being placed in a civil disturbance situation to avoid errors in judgment and mishandlings. Third, the government should review the public's sensitivity to a controversial policy before implementation. In that way alienation of the public can be avoided. Next, once public support has been destroyed it cannot be quickly regained if at all. Finally, a government can use troops to show their resolve and determination not to bow to terrorist threats and violence.

Appendix A: Deaths Caused By The IRA

Year	British Army Strength	Security Forces Deaths	Civilian Deaths	Total Deaths
1969	6,107	1	12	13
1970	7,537	2	23	25
1971	11,322	59	115	174
1972	21,200	146	321	467
1973	16,814	79	171	250
1974	15,914	50	166	216
1975	14,701	31	216	247
1976	14,906	52	245	297
1977	14,286	43	59	112
1978	13,452	31	50	81
1979	12,986	62	51	113
1980	12,141	26	50	76
1981	11,098	44	57	101
1982	10,538	40	57	97
1983	9,882	33	44	77
1984	9,090	28	36	64
1985	*	29	25	54
1986	*	24	37	61

\* Not available from references.

(4:106,107;50:172;74:105)

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Block 19. Abstract (Continued)

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects British troops have had while countering the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The study involved the following research objectives. First, terrorism and the IRA as a terrorist organization was defined to form a basis for the research. Following these definitions, the Irish history, the IRA goals, and the British goals were discussed. After the British goals were defined, the significant events involving British troops or the IRA were reviewed to identify effects. Finally, the effects of the British Army and any contributing factors in the Northern Ireland situation were outlined.

The study found that troops can have a wide variety of effects. In particular, this study found three major effects of troops. First, troops can prevent a civil war. Second, the Army can contain the level of violence created by a terrorist group but not totally defeat the organization. Finally, by mishandling situations and implementing unpopular policies, troops can alienate the community.

In conjunction with the findings on the effects of the military, there were several contributing factors noted. It was noted that public support was necessary for successful military operations and two actions should be taken to avoid alienation of the public. First, troops should be trained to handle civil disturbances so mistakes can be avoided. Second, governments should review the public sensitivity to a policy before implementing the policy.

Finally, this research report noted that governments can use troops to show resolve and determination not to bow to terrorist pressures.

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