CLIC PAPERS

KEY LIC SPEECHES
1984 - 1989

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
This paper presents speeches concerning low intensity conflict (LIC) given by a number of our nation's civilian and military leaders. It is by no means intended to be all-inclusive, but rather to provide a sampling, a flavor if you will, of the thinking that has shaped much of the US national policy and strategy on LIC over the past few years. It is also hoped this collection of speeches may serve as an eye-opener in the sense that while much has been said about LIC, we are still far behind where we need to be in doing something about it.
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THE ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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CLIC PAPERS

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PREFACE

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KEY LIC SPEECHES
1984-1989

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about low-intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively in the effort to contain the slow erosion of human liberty and self-determination around the globe.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
January 1986

These words were spoken three and one-half years ago and, unfortunately, they are still true today. Many of our nation's leaders, both civilian and military, have recognized for some time the threat posed to our national security from what has become popularly known as low intensity conflict, or LIC.

So what is being done about it? Not much. True, there is now an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, a new specified command, the Special Operations Command, and a Low Intensity Conflict Board within the National Security Council (NSC). But these innovations, as well as a few others, only came to fruition because they were Congressionally mandated. Take away the Congressional mandate, and we're left with very little meaningful progress.

For example, the Army and Air Force began developing multiservice doctrine on military operations in low intensity conflict in late 1986, but that effort has been besieged with the bureaucratic slow-rolling that usually befalls something unpopular and uncomfortable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are just now staffing the initial draft of joint LIC doctrine, so only time will tell its fate. Progress outside the DOD has also been negligible. The fact that the NSC Low Intensity Conflict Board has never met is but one case in point. However, this should not be construed as a signal that the Board is not needed. The need for top-down, clearly defined LIC policies, strategies, and implementing plans and guidance has never been greater.

Like it or not, there is an accepted, interdepartmental definition for low intensity conflict. And yes, there has been Presidential-level guidance provided. June 1987 saw the signing of a National Security Decision by President Reagan entitled National Policy and Strategy for Low Intensity Conflict. So it's time to quit debating about the definition and to put aside academic differences of opinion about a LIC concept. We need to
focus our efforts on achieving a common understanding of the problem and implementing concrete steps to address the LIC threat.

As the old saying goes, "Talk is cheap." It's time for our national leadership to "put its money where its mouth is." If, as the text of these speeches would indicate, they are as serious about low intensity conflict as they say they are, then it's time to get on with implementing those programs and policies that will make a difference. Those who refuse or fail to take up this challenge have only themselves to blame if, and when, Congress mandates further initiatives because of the failure to make effective progress. It is time to work in a spirit of partnership rather than to be brought kicking and screaming to the task at hand.

The speeches contained in this paper cover only a fraction of those given over the last four and one-half years, but they reflect the thinking of key leaders, both civilian and military. Can we continue to just sit back and listen? No! Now is the time for action in planning, preparing, and implementing effective low intensity conflict policies, strategies, plans, and programs at all levels within all government departments and agencies.

Military men, however, feel uncomfortable with warfare's societal dimension and tend to ignore its implications. Societies are hard to understand, let alone predict, and difficult to control. Conflict on this plane does not fit our current beliefs about military success or failure; therefore, it is not a subject that we are, for the most part, anxious to pursue.

General John R. Galvin
1986
THE USES OF MILITARY POWER

Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

National Press Club
Washington, DC
28 November 1984

The single most critical element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of support and agreement for its basic purposes. Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will never work.

Of the many policies our citizens deserve -- and need -- to understand, none is more important than those related to the uses of military power. Deterrence will work only if the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping the peace... and only from a well-informed public can we expect to have that national will and commitment.

Under what circumstances and by what means does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interest or to carry out our national policy? This is perhaps the most important question concerning keeping the peace.

National power has many components. Some tangible -- like economic wealth and technical preeminence. Other components are intangible -- such as moral force and strong national will. Military forces, when they are strong and ready and modern, are a credible -- and tangible -- addition to a nation's power. When both the intangible national will and those forces are forged into one instrument, national power becomes effective.

In today's world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us as a new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then lay two-three months by sea over the horizon. The United States was protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.

Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war comes. Yet, the lines between open conflict and half-hidden hostile acts have become so blurred that we cannot confidently
predict where, or when, or how, or from what direction aggression may arrive. We must be prepared, at any moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated terrorist acts to guerrilla action to full-scale military confrontation.

Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, said that "it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." If it was true then, how much more true it is today, when we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such serious indirect challenges to the peace as proxy wars and individual terrorist action. And how much more important it is now, considering the consequences of failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible. While the use of military force to defend territory has never been questioned when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force to invade, conquer, or subjugate other nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the host of other situations that fall between the extremes of defense and aggressive use of force.

We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern paradox: The most likely challenges to the peace -- the gray area of conflicts -- are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response must be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources needed.

Because we face a spectrum of threats -- from covert aggression, terrorism, and subversion to overt intimidation to use of brute force -- choosing the appropriate level of our response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ some degree of force has been made and the purpose clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the purpose has been achieved. That, too, has been difficult to accomplish.

The issue of which branch of government has authority to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress demanded and assumed a far more active role in the making of foreign policy and in the decisionmaking process for the employment of military forces abroad than had been thought appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality of decisionmaking authority in the executive branch has been compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes with that process. At the same time, there has not
been a corresponding acceptance of responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of military forces.

Yet the outcome of decisions on whether ... and when ... and to what degree to use combat forces abroad has never been more important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict in its early stages, to contain and control it -- but to do that, our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner and be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged, because many of those difficult decisions must be made extremely quickly.

Some on the national scene think they can always avoid making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid grappling with a complex issue because, despite clever rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While they may maintain in principle that military force has a role in foreign policy they are never willing to name the circumstances or the place where it would apply.

On the other, some theorists argue that military force can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are American forces of any size present, they will somehow solve the problem.

Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or satisfactory solutions. The first -- undue reserve -- would lead us ultimately to withdraw from international events that require free nations to defend their interests from the aggressive use of force. We would be abdicating our responsibilities as the leader of the Free World -- responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the aftermath of World War II, a war, incidentally, that isolationism did nothing to deter. These are responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked throughout the world. In an international system based on mutual interdependence among nations and alliances between friends, stark isolationism quickly would lead to a far more dangerous situation for the United States. We would be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent nations.
The second alternative -- employing our forces almost indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our diplomatic efforts -- would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam War, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric of our society, endangering the single most critical element of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.

Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops, who would have an understandable opposition to being used -- in every sense of the word -- casually and without intent to support them fully. Ultimately, this course would reduce their morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must win. And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership, recruitment would fall off, and I fear an end to the all-volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so wracked the country in the '60s.

We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have fought so hard to regain?

In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.

Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars, involving every aspect of our society. All our means of production, all our resources were devoted to winning. Our policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the unconditional surrender of our enemies . . . the only acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our freedom.

But in the aftermath of World War II, we encountered a more subtle form of warfare -- warfare in which, more often then not, the face of the enemy was masked. Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of "national liberation," but far more frequently ideology or religion provided the spark to the tender.
Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open society and our freedom of speech and opinion to use alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda campaigns to achieve their ends.

They realize that if they can divide our national will at home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad. So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to intimidate Western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile, they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in their countries, because public opinion there is simply prohibited and does not exist.

Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is true that until democratic nations have the support of the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a conflict. But when they do have that support, they cannot be defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling message to friend and foe alike by the vote of their citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by reelecting a strong chief executive. They know that President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for his actions and is able to lead us through these complex times by insisting that we regain both our military and our economic strength.

In today's world where minutes count, such decisive leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of whether conflicts are limited or threats are ill defined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of the United States and its allies . . . and then responding appropriately. Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on our territory, and our response may not necessarily require the immediate or direct defense of our homeland. But when our vital national interests and those of our allies are at stake, we cannot ignore our safety or forsake our allies.

At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and should offer substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies in their time of need and help them maintain forces to deter attacks against them, usually we cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.
We should engage our troops only if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory -- without their strong invitation -- when our own freedom is not threatened.

On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the United States has seen the need to join forces with other nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with negotiations and by separating warring parties, thus enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years to both the Sinai and Lebanon for just such a peacekeeping mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for combat -- they were armed only for their self-defense. Their mission required them to be -- and to be recognized as -- peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they were in danger, or if, because of the actions of the warring nations, their peacekeeping mission could not be realized, then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the number and arms of our troops -- in short to equip them for combat -- or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when we faced just such a choice because the warring nations did not enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the President properly withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping.

In those cases where our national interests require us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient numbers, and we must support them, as effectively and resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops to combat, we must do so with the sole object of winning.

Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada, we did just that.

Just as clearly, there are other situations where United States combat forces should not be used. I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad.

The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course, if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then could perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.

If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it." War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.

The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then our combat requirements must also change. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interests?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be in combat.

Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to combat,
we must support those forces to the fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and understood and supported by the widest possible number of our citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that may be required later. We must never forget those isolationists in Europe who shrugged that "Danzig is not worth a war," and "Why should we fight to keep the Rhineland demilitarized?"

The tests I have just mentioned have been phrased negatively for a purpose -- they are intended to sound a note of caution -- caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is morally required.

In many situations, we may apply these tests and conclude that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should interpret what I am saying as an abdication of America's responsibilities -- either to its own citizens or to its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal that this country or this administration is unwilling to commit forces to combat overseas.

We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those interests. Let no one entertain any illusions -- if our vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are resolved that if we must fight, we must win.

So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have learned from the past, they also can, and should, be applied to the future. For example, the problems confronting us in Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize. If this happens, we will clearly need more economic and military assistance and training to help those who want democracy.

The President will not allow our military forces to creep, or be drawn gradually, into a combat role in Central America or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement. This means we will need sustained congressional support to back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
I believe that the tests I have enunciated can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist incremental approach which almost always means the use of insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where it is not vital to our national interest to fight.

But policies and principles such as these require decisive leadership in both the executive and legislative branches of government, and they also require strong and sustained public support. Most of all, these policies require national unity of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the policies and leadership to gain that public support and unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the strength of character to protect peace with freedom.

In summary, we should all remember these are the policies — indeed the only policies — that can preserve for ourselves, our friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.

I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs around the world. We can enable our friends in Central America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed by the unfolding complexity of the 1980s.

We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this century amid a peace tempered by realism and secured by firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will enable all of us — ourselves at home and our friends abroad — to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream.
We in the administration have thought long and hard about how the US Government should deal with anti-communist insurgencies throughout the world. We have a strong and profound sympathy for those groups which have devoted their efforts, and in many cases, their lives, to opposing tyranny, and in particular, that tyranny associated with various communist regimes throughout the world. Their resistance is consistent with our own national interests and to ignore or deny this would be inconsistent with the historical roots of the United States. We believe that the appellation of "freedom fighters" to many of these groups is accurate and apt, and as such, we are compelled by our own traditions and history to support such movements. As the President has stated:

We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives -- on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua -- to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.

And as Secretary of State George Shultz recently wrote:

The American people have a long and noble tradition of supporting the struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy, and independence. In the nineteenth century, we supported Simon Bolivar, Polish patriots and others seeking freedom -- reciprocating, in a way, the aid given to us in our own revolution by other nations like France. If we turn our backs on this tradition, we would be conceding the Soviet notion that communist revolutions are irreversible . . . .

In the contemporary world, anti-communist groups in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere are engaged in deadly struggles with the forces of tyrannical regimes. These anti-communist groups deserve our support and assistance not only because we as a nation stand for liberty, but also because their struggles have undercut decisively the ideological claim that the spread of communist regimes is inevitable. Indeed, their resistance alters what the communists call the correlation of forces in favor of those who believe in liberty. In our view and that of resistance groups, the Brezhnev Doctrine is dead:
Socialism is not irreversible. So, for us, the issue is not whether freedom fighters deserve our support; the real question is what support should be offered.

This question should be seen against two general aspects. The first is that anti-communist insurgencies tend most often to emerge from those societies and nations in which the communist regime they oppose has been imposed, either by the Soviet Union directly or with the material and military support of the USSR. Thus, to the extent that we are successful in strengthening the democratic institutions within nations and the capacity of those nations to resist Soviet influence, we will be successful in deterring Soviet aggression and subversion. In short, our security assistance programs of today are an important form of insurance.

The security assistance we give to such nations as the Philippines, which today faces a virulent communist insurgency, can obviate the potential requirement to support anti-communist opposition in the Philippines in the future. This does not mean that unlimited security assistance funds would solve the problem of Philippine insurgency. Funds alone will not. There must be a broad program of reform -- economic, political, and military -- to complement our security assistance. But the most far reaching political reform, the most effective economic policies and the most humane social programs will fail if they fall prey to an unrelenting communist insurgency.

Indeed, the security assistance we have provided El Salvador has been key to preventing the further spread of Marxism there and has been a major success in helping pro-democratic groups there build a nation better able to meet the aspirations of its citizens and better able to defend itself against external and internal threats. There is a logic that ties successful security assistance programs to viable democratic nations and, ultimately, to no need for anti-communist insurgencies. It is absolutely essential that Congress and the American people understand the true and important nature of our security assistance programs and how they make possible the stability and security under which democracy can grow and flourish.

The second observation is that the vigor of resistance to communist regimes in various parts of the world is growing and will continue to grow. This partly reflects the growing recognition that communism, and in particular, the Soviet brand of communism, offers little for the spirit or material benefit of mankind -- particularly when it is exported by force to nations like Afghanistan and Cambodia. There is a democratic revolution afoot in the world, built on the spirit of freedom, independence and national development.
But the rising opposition to communist regimes also reflects an expanding recognition that the United States has regained its primacy and now strongly supports the traditions and principles on which it was founded. The United States stands as a beacon for those seeking freedom in distant, and not so distant, lands, not only because our Declaration of Independence and history have committed us to such a role, but because our growing economic, international and, yes, military strength is increasingly acknowledged by the world. Accordingly, it is certain that anti-communist resistance groups will turn to us for assistance in their struggle and that we will increasingly face the question of how to respond.

To answer this question correctly, we must consider a number of factors and recognize that there may not always be quick, easy answers. Always, we must take into account the direction the country is moving and the regional dynamics which are involved. But there are some considerations which may apply to the varied and different situations in which the question comes up -- working guidelines, if you will -- which may help determine the nature and extent of our support to groups which oppose communist regimes. Among these guidelines are the following:

**Worthiness of Support**

The enemy of our enemy will be assured of our friendship if he shares our values in his opposition to our enemy. A fundamental basis of any decision to support a resistance group will be our judgment that if it succeeded, it would be preferable to the regime in power.

Obviously, every resistance group will not be perfect, and not every group that professes anti-communism deserves our support. The resistance of one tyrant to another's tyranny is not a sufficient claim on US assistance, for we do not believe it is correct or useful to overthrow one tyranny in favor of another.

There are cases where we cannot support resistance groups because of their own tactics and principles. For example, US assistance in virtually any form to the Khmer Rouge would be a classic example of where a lack of discrimination on our part would be wrong. Pol Pot and his henchmen are unworthy of our support regardless of how much they may share our conviction that the Vietnamese communists should leave Cambodia. Support for the Khmer Rouge, even if indirectly supplied, would be ludicrous and reprehensible. Support for the non-communist opposition in Cambodia, however, is consistent with our values and should be continued. The only real issue here is the type of support which should be offered. In short, our assistance must be designed to improve the prospect of self-determination, liberty, long-term stability and democratic expression wherever possible.
Overt or Covert Support

A critical decision we must make early on is whether overt or covert assistance will be of greatest utility. In our democracy, our aid must be acceptable to Congress and the American public. Wherever practical, our aid should be openly proposed and provided. Assistance openly proposed and openly arrived at has political solidity and demonstrates concretely the solidarity of the American people. This method of providing aid is most consistent with our history and our values.

But in some instances, too public a stance on the details of our assistance can undercut its utility. Let us be frank. In cases where the battle between contending parties is fought over national legitimacy and we publicize our support while the Soviet Union and its allies disguise theirs, we can actually hurt the group we intend to help. This does not mean that we should not aid those groups where our assistance would be less effective if it were highly publicized. But it may mean that low-key assistance may be more effective than openly acknowledged and highly publicized assistance can be. Far too often it can work to our disadvantage to have groups described as "US-backed rebels."

Thus, in some cases, our open advocacy of groups opposing communist regimes may be counterproductive in the sense that it provides a rationale for those regimes to avoid the justified criticisms and opposition of internal groupings. Too public a stance and highly publicized details of our assistance may delay resolution of the problem in other ways also. Afghanistan may be a case in point. Our immediate objective there is to get the Soviets to withdraw. But a Soviet withdrawal might be easier to obtain if the Soviets are not confronted with highly publicized, detailed discussions of our assistance to the Afghanistan freedom fighters.

In other cases, open and publicized assistance may be far more valuable and effective than covert aid ever could be. It may be very effective to signal clearly to the communist regimes and the people suffering under those regimes that we stand with and support the opposition.

The point is, I think, that there will always be instances when we must look very carefully at the specific case involved and recognize that highly publicized assistance can be less effective in promoting freedom and democracy in some cases than in others.
Suitability of Aid

Obviously, our aid to anti-communist groups should meet their needs. Ideally, our assistance should be adequate and timely, reflecting the particular circumstances of the insurgency. Useless assistance can be worse than no assistance at all. And the definition of what is useful, effective and helpful depends very much on what group is the recipient and the circumstances of its struggle. In some cases, economic or medical assistance can be immensely more beneficial than weaponry. In some cases, radios can be of much greater efficacy than rifles. And, in some cases, simple vocal, political or informational support may be better than material aid. The point is that the groups which deserve our help vary in terms of the assistance that can be most helpful, and a blanket commitment of assistance without regard to these differences would not only be mindless, it could also be counterproductive.

There is one need which is probably common to all recipients, namely that they should have a good idea as to the extent of our support and a good sense of what they can and cannot expect from us. And once we have extended aid, the recipients should have a reasonable expectation that the aid will continue. The long-term nature of our assistance is extremely important and should be assured wherever possible.

Aid with Regard for Broad US Security Concerns, Including East-West Relations

The effect of US assistance on East-West relations must also be considered. This is a fact of life. Ever since the United States assisted Yugoslavia in its struggle against Soviet hegemony, the US-Soviet relationship and the effect of US aid programs on the relationship have figured in decisions with regard to the mode, extent, and character of our assistance to anti-communist freedom fighters.

This is not to say that we should fear to aid those groups which deserve our help because such assistance is disturbing to the Soviet Union. Absolutely not! But for policy makers, it is essential to view the problem in its full international dimensions and assess the actions we take to assist freedom fighters in terms of how the Soviet Union will react. In Afghanistan, for example, we see little advantage to supporting the Mujahidin in ways which would stimulate the USSR to attempt to spread its control of that country by either more draconian measures internally or by spreading their military operations into Pakistan.

The point is not that we should accord the Soviet Union any kind of veto over the aid we might give to freedom fighters. We should not, for to do so would undercut the fact that our aid is
directed precisely to limit and exclude Soviet influence. It is simply that choosing the mode and style of our assistance without regard to how it will affect the Soviet Union would disregard the fact that the struggle of anti-communist groups takes place within and affects an international context in which the stakes are very high.

Aid in Concert with Friends and Allies

Finally, we believe it is generally to our advantage to enlist other nations in assisting freedom fighters rather than to seek to support these groups unilaterally. We share a common commitment to liberty with many of the world's nations, and by pooling our assistance, our aid can be that much greater. Support by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for the Cambodian opposition to the Vietnamese invaders is one of the Free World's successes. The United States has supported the association's efforts to deny legitimacy to the Vietnamese occupation and maintain pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces and agree to a political settlement that will enable the long-suffering Cambodians to live in peace under a government of their own choosing.

We believe these general considerations can help us in dealing with the thorny questions of who should be assisted and how. I hesitate to claim that they are either complete enough or explicit enough to define the character and amounts of aid that should be offered to anti-communist insurgencies wherever they may occur. But we think they are necessary considerations in determining our specific policy with regard to each anti-communist insurgency now under way and those that may emerge in the future.

I believe there are many shared executive and legislative views on this subject, at least on the basic morality and necessity of supporting those groups abroad which oppose tyranny. It is obviously difficult to state precisely and comprehensively how this support should be implemented. It is also obvious, however, that we cannot and should not simply react, without due regard to existing circumstances, to instances in which groups in opposition to communist regimes request our assistance.

Let me conclude with a few observations. The first is that the United States has a broad range of ways in which it can assist those groups struggling against communist regimes. The issue is which of these and which combinations of political, economic, information, humanitarian and military hardware are appropriate. It is not an issue that can be resolved by the executive branch alone, nor should it be. The answer should and can be forged on a case-by-case basis by the responsible members of the executive and legislative branches working together.
The second observation is that once a decision has been made to support a group struggling to promote democracy, it is important to maintain that support for as long as the struggle lasts and for as long as the group we support remains committed to its struggle for the right reasons. Intermittent support and broken promises to deserving anti-communist insurgents are as much a shame as continued support to groups that shift from worthy opposition toward efforts to simply replace communist tyranny with another form of tyranny. But while we must always monitor the progress of the opposition to communist regimes and the actions and views of those groups we may choose to support, the world should not perceive us as fickle in our commitment to those groups that deserve our support.

The third observation is that we should be clear about why we support anti-communist insurgencies. Our objective is to help people help themselves. Our support is and has been devoted to containing or preventing an expansion of turmoil, conflict, death, and war. Indeed, our support of opposition groups has been and is now devoted to containing and preventing these miseries. In each case of support for anti-communist insurgency, this administration has sought to encourage negotiations and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We intend to continue along this course.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm pleased to be able to join you this morning as we collectively attempt to come to grips with one of the most vexing problems confronting our nation. The fact that we're gathering here in March of 1985 illustrates the complexity of low intensity conflict. Many of us have been worrying about LIC for years. Many of us were here in March of 1984 wrestling with the same problems. Many of us have been kicking the issue around ever since.

Sam Sarkesian [Professor of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago] has given us key insights into the dynamics of low intensity conflict in the last hour. What I'd like to do now is take the next step by addressing the implications of that threat for US national security, and specifically, the capabilities and policy our country must have to deal with that threat.

The Threat

I should not, and will not, attempt to embellish on Professor Sarkesian's discussion of low intensity conflict. I would simply like to note the results:

- Since World War Two, the world has seen 1,200 conflicts -- eighty percent of those were low intensity.
- Seventeen countries have fallen to low intensity conflict since Cuba went communist.
- Twenty-one insurgencies are active today.
- And, counting the other "small" wars, one out of every four countries is engaged in some form of conflict.

The results, themselves, are sufficient cause for concern. The process that led to these results is even more troubling. The truth of the matter is that this apparent instability is no
accident of history or geography. Nor can we accept the premise that low intensity conflict is merely the playing out of the charges resulting from the post-war breakup of the old colonial empires. Rather, what we confront are the fruits of a conscious policy pursued by the Soviet Union and their proxies.

Since World War II, the Free World's nuclear and conventional military strength has prevented open, large-scale war. The Soviets, in assessing that fundamental fact concluded, however, that outlets for the pursuit of their objectives still exist -- those being in the realm of low intensity conflict, or what they call "Wars of National Liberation." By promoting and supporting this form of conflict, they have been able to advance their position without direct confrontation with the Free World.

In large part, the success of this policy can be traced to the simple fact that low intensity conflict rarely, if ever, rises above the Free World's collective consciousness horizon, and when it does our typical halting effort to find a response, in general, mirrors the diversity of opinion that is the basis of a free, pluralistic society such as ours. As General Nutting noted in 1983, there clearly is a war going on -- a war that we "institutionally do not understand . . . and are not organized very effectively to cope with . . . ."

Unless we are willing to accept the erosion of our interests around the world, we must recognize this insidious threat. And we must recognize that the strategy and forces to deal with it are as important to our national security as the strategy and forces we have developed and maintained against the more violent but far less likely eventuality of conventional or nuclear war.

The Response

Americans have always been an optimistic people. The moral fabric of our own society leads us to presume that right will ultimately prevail elsewhere in the world. By the same token, America seeks no empire. When we have chosen to use our country's might, it has not been for conquest, but rather for the restoration and preservation of liberty. For Americans, diplomacy has always been the tool to peace -- military force has always been the tool of war.

The dilemma for Americans is that low intensity conflict is neither "true" peace nor "true" war. As Secretary Weinberger observed in November, "the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at any time in our history." Given these realities, we must recognize that for low intensity conflict there can be no purely military or diplomatic or economic solution. Rather than view the tools at our disposal as options, low intensity conflict demands that we view them as complements. Lacking such a recognition, our tendency will be to rely on
diplomatic solutions -- to the exclusions of the military component -- only to call on the military when diplomacy fails. And at that point a military "solution" may no longer be achievable.

In November, Secretary Weinberger warned of the "consequences of failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible." If we are to avoid those consequences, we must look at the challenge of low intensity conflict as one that requires an integrated national response -- one that demands the best efforts of the military, diplomatic, economic, and psychological components of our national power both from the beginning and throughout our involvement. The engagement of these components must be carefully balanced and appropriate to the circumstances. It must, as Secretary Weinberger pointed out, reflect the fundamental values of our society. But above all, the components must be brought together in a concerted effort. That must be the essence of our low intensity conflict strategy, and that is what we have set out to accomplish.

The Military Component

While I believe our strategy must be an integrative one, for the purposes of this symposium I want to dwell on the military component. Nearly a quarter of a century ago, President Kennedy had this to say about low intensity conflict:

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "Wars of Liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."

For us in the 1980s, the perceptions (and the tasks) are much the same. The threat of low intensity conflict has continued unabated, and the need to build a military component capable of dealing with it persists. In that context, I would like to focus specifically on special operations forces (SOF).
Special Operations Forces

When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, SOF were close to being a memory. During the 1970s -- a decade of neglect -- SOF funding was cut by 95%, units were deactivated, and modernization needs ignored. In the wake of Vietnam, the conventional wisdom was that SOF were a force without a mission. But those with greater insight perceived that, in reality, we had a mission without a force. That recognition was the genesis of our SOF revitalization policy.

The effort is one of the most important being pursued by this administration. In 1983 Deputy Secretary of Defense Thayer described the revitalization of SOF as "a matter of national urgency," and the President's National Security Advisor has noted that SOF revitalization "is essential to our national security" and "should be a top Defense Department priority." Deputy Secretary Thayer's successor, William H. Taft, IV, has revalidated the emphasis, noting that "the Secretary of Defense has assigned the highest priority to the restoration of our Special Operations Forces."

The fundamental goals of the Reagan Administration's SOF revitalization program were articulated in a 3 October 1983 policy directive. That directive called for the rebuilding and maintenance of SOF "capable of conducting the full range of special operations on a worldwide basis." In specifying that the necessary enhancement would be implemented as rapidly as possible, it directed that full revitalization would be achieved not later than the end of FY 1990.

The emphasis placed on SOF revitalization has already borne fruit. By the end of FY 1985, we will have added a Special Forces Group, a Ranger Regimental Headquarters plus a Ranger Battalion, a Psychological Operations Battalion, a SEAL Team, and 36 naval special warfare craft, light to the SOF force structure. As the result of DOD emphasis and the identification of deficiencies by the master plans produced by the Services, we will add another Special Forces Group, another SEAL team, 18 naval special warfare craft, medium, and 21 MC-130 Combat Talons between FY 1986 and FY 1990.

Overall, active duty manpower will grow by 80 percent -- from 11,600 in FY 1981 to 20,900 in FY 1990. But even with these increases, SOF will account for only about one-tenth of one percent of US military manpower, and a like amount of the Department of Defense budget.
Special Operations Forces in Low Intensity Conflict

Now what will these increases buy us in terms of our capacity to deal with low intensity conflict? In the broadest sense, the fact that SOF are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations during periods of peace and hostilities means that SOF can add a great deal.

More specifically, the extent of that capability can be demonstrated by looking at SOF's six fundamental missions.

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID)** is the military component of nation-building. While any military component can conduct FID operations, SOF are uncommonly qualified to do so -- especially those elements such as Special Forces and Psychological Operations that count area orientation and language training among their skills. SOF have conducted more than 500 training missions in some 60 countries in the last decade and, with one-tenth of one percent of the military manpower, currently account for about one-third of our training operations.

**Unconventional warfare (UW)** is the flip side of FID -- military and paramilitary operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas, normally in support of indigenous personnel.

**Reconnaissance**, as a method of intelligence collection, is essential to low intensity operations. SOF are capable of such operations either unilaterally or in support of other operations.

**Direct action** involves military action against targets in hostile or denied areas. SOF provide us a flexible capability to conduct such operations, especially at the lower end of the spectrum.

**Psychological Operations** are designed to destroy an enemy's will to resist and/or bolster friendly forces' will to prevail, and can be especially effective in low intensity conflict.

Finally, **civil affairs** encompass the relationship between US forces and the indigenous civilian authorities and population, and can be crucial to the civil-military nation-building process.

Because of this unique set of capabilities, SOF provide the US the essential bridge between peaceful competition and more violent forms of conflict. In some instances, a carrier battle group "showing the flag" would be both appropriate and effective. In others, Marines may be needed for peacekeeping operations or the 82nd Airborne Division may be needed for crisis response. In still others, routine military airlift operations may be sufficient.
In some cases, however, the employment of sizable, highly visible elements of the US military structure may be inappropriate or politically infeasible. It is precisely that set of circumstances for which SOF, by virtue of their specialized organization, training, and equipment, are uniquely capable.

US SOF have not yet regained the capability needed to carry out their global responsibilities. More specifically, if we are to respond effectively to low intensity conflict, we need to take a number of steps.

First, we have to follow through with the revitalization program already underway. Because the program is a matter of intense controversy among the uniformed military, success will depend on sustained national emphasis.

Second, we have to develop a coherent national strategy for low intensity conflict. Because of our national Vietnam "hangover," we have a strategy void to fill. Gatherings such as this one reflect that need. Third, we need to develop doctrine that is consistent with that strategy. If you read Army doctrine (contained in FM 100-20) your conclusion would be that low intensity conflict is no different from any other situation susceptible to a conventional military "solution." That simply is not the case.

While I applaud the thinking that has gone into the application of electromagnetic pulse, space-based weapons, and the B-1 bomber to low intensity conflict in preparation for this symposium, I believe the bulk of our attention should be focused on the forces directly and singularly designed to deal with such conflict.

Fourth, we need to expand and improve dramatically the skills specifically needed for low intensity conflict. Language capabilities, for example, are essential. But while Special Forces' language skills are sufficient for Spanish-speaking regions of the Third World, where other languages predominate, the US can deploy no more than one fully language-qualified twelve-man Special Forces A-Detachment. Similar language deficiencies persist in PSYOP forces.

Fifth, we need to recognize that low intensity conflict has unique force structure implications. The MC-130 Combat Talon and HH-53 Pave Low have tremendous capabilities that are unique in the world. However, some of their capabilities may be superfluous to the demands of low intensity conflict, and their cost could, on occasion, limit our employment flexibility. We should be thinking of taking a technological step backward -- to systems such the AC-47 and T-28 that have long since been relegated by the US to the "boneyard."
We in DOD should also be thinking innovatively, looking at ways to employ the A-10, for example, or considering the procurement of aircraft such as the Dehavilland Buffalo.

I hope we'll have the opportunity to address some of these issues during this symposium.

The Requirement

In closing, let me sum up what I believe are the two essential elements in the United States' response to low intensity conflict.

First, we must recognize that low intensity conflict is neither "true" peace nor "true" war. Our response requires the integrated use of our nation's political, social, economic, diplomatic, and unconventional military power, and that response must be carefully orchestrated at the highest national levels.

Second, the unconventional military component of that response must be rebuilt as a matter of national urgency, and that rebuilding must take forms that will be both unfamiliar and distasteful to traditional thinkers. Gatherings such as this can play a key role in defining that process and breaking down the barriers.

If we fail to build a military capability that encompasses the tools of war and the skills of peace, and integrate that capability into a national strategy, our options will be reduced to two.

On the one hand, we can treat low intensity conflict solely as a peacetime problem and attempt to deal with it through political, economic, and diplomatic channels. Those channels, however, offer an imperfect shield for our vital national interests against armed aggression at whatever level of intensity. The cost, should we choose this option, could be default on our vital national interests.

On the other hand, we can treat low intensity conflict solely as a wartime problem and attempt to deal with it through conventional military means -- mass and firepower. However, as history has shown, this "solution" is of questionable appropriateness in the LIC context. Moreover, because the very nature of a conventional response carries the seeds of escalation to wider confrontation, the cost, should we choose this option, could be political and security perils of far broader magnitude.

In my view, these are not "true" options at all. The costs in either case are too high for our Republic to bear. We must, in fact, as Secretary Weinberger proposed, be prepared to deter conflict at the lowest level possible.
UNCOMFORTABLE WARS: TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM

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We in the military often are accused falsely of "preparing to fight not the next war but the last." That criticism is not well-placed: we are not, for the most part, obtuse enough to fight yesterday's war -- but we might be doing something worse still. When we think about the possibilities of conflict we tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war, a theater with battlefields we know, conflict that fits our understanding of strategy and tactics, a combat environment that is consistent and predictable, fightable with the resources we have, one that fits our plans, our assumptions, our hopes, and our preconceived ideas. We arrange in our minds a war we can comprehend on our own terms, usually with an enemy who looks like us and acts like us. This comfortable conceptualization becomes the accepted way of seeing things and, as such, ceases to be an object for further investigation unless it comes under serious challenge as a result of some major event -- usually a military disaster.

The Grindstone

One reason we have accepted the comfortable vision of war is that we keep our noses to the grindstone of bureaucratic business and don't look up very often. We are led away from the important tasks by the urgent tasks, the exigencies of day-to-day operations -- husbanding sophisticated equipment, doing the housekeeping and administration, balancing this year's budget while justifying the requirements for next year, answering the mail. In naval terms, we are keeping things shipshape; what we are not doing is reading the stars and charting the course. We could say, I suppose, that this kind of distraction always must be overcome, that such things as budgets and maintenance and paperwork have been part of the environment in which soldiers have lived since time immemorial. The difficulty begins, however, when these activities cease to be distractions and instead become the focus of all our efforts.

Things are changing. Think about today's lieutenant, and compare him and his challenges with those that confronted lieutenants of the past. The categories of knowledge are basically the same -- leadership, weapons, tactics and
techniques, administration -- but there is a monumental difference in what he needs to know about each. He must contend with an amazing assortment of weapons, vehicles, and supporting technology. He is required to keep his platoon at a high state of readiness for combat. This demands his full commitment to individual and collective training, maintenance of his large stock of equipment, and unit administration, in addition to taking care of his soldiers. The lieutenant is consumed by all of this, and while no doubt it is a great education for him, we may be developing a leader who does little thinking about the abstractions, the principles of his trade, the doctrinal foundations of his profession.

The preoccupation with day-to-day concerns is not just characteristic of the existence of lieutenants; it is true as well of the lieutenant's higher leadership. Colonels and generals fill their time with day-to-day work while professors and journalists are left to think and write about doctrine and strategy. Yet the atmosphere of East-West confrontation and the level of violence throughout the world make it imperative that we consider whether our military leaders are truly developing professionally or merely performing, working out daily problems.

It is a convenient argument that the normal routine of military life constitutes sufficient training and development, that the leader "learns best by doing." This notion must be challenged. We must go beyond routine and develop, through continual training and education, leaders capable of adapting to a changing environment. The great eighteenth century marshal of France, Maurice de Saxe, recognized the danger of failing to do so. He wrote in his *Reveries*,

In the military, very few men occupy themselves with the higher problems of war. They pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the only branch of the military art. When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know.

The Fortress-Cloister

As a group we have sought a life not only of proud service to country, of challenge and adventure, but also one which is a microcosm of tradition, order, hierarchical structure, predictability, and unequivocal responses to clear demands. There is an element of the cloister in this, our life of dedication and sacrifice, full of the satisfactions of early rising and hard work -- our carefully structured life, routinized, homogeneous, full of universally understood symbologies.
In this highly satisfying environment, however, we should recognize implicit limitations. Ours is a protected and isolated existence, hemmed in by the grindstone work schedule, lulled by predictability. But what is salutary in the cloister is not good for the Army; isolation and protection make it difficult to conceptualize, to question conventional wisdom, to look at things another way. Changes do occur within the walls of our military cloister, but usually only when preceded by the long process of consensus-building, in which more time is spent overcoming resistance to change than in examining new ideas. The grindstone work schedule and our cloistered existence too frequently suppress our creativity, and over time have fostered generally unquestioning acceptance of a vision of conflict that has not kept pace with the expanding environment of modern warfare. We remain with our comfortable, confident vision of the wars that we might have to fight.

Intrusions

Intruding on this vision, however, are realities that make us uneasy, raising questions not adequately addressed with the existing paradigm. For example:

- Why did the Governments of Haiti and the Philippines collapse so quickly? Substitute Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, or other countries that recently have undergone rapid political change.

- Why does the frequency of internal conflict, with its political turmoil, civil disorder, guerrilla warfare, and indiscriminate violence continue to grow?

- Why have we seen the rise of terrorism over the last decade? Has the overall level of fanaticism somehow increased?

- Why do the news media seem consistently antagonistic?

- How involved are international drug traffickers in the conflicts internal to many Third World states?

Surrogate war, general violence, subversive activity, multiplication of small wars, widespread training of terrorists -- each of these has intruded on our vision of war. As they have become more noticeable, however, we have tended to view them as being on the periphery of warfighting, at the limits of our set of beliefs about the nature of conflict. They do not fit into our image of war, so we search for ways to categorize and then dismiss or relegate them to theoretical pigeonholes where they can be dealt with. hopefully by someone else, while we fight the main battles. What we know and understand -- to a large degree -- is what we have come to call high intensity warfare. Therefore, these other phenomena come to be called "low intensity conflict" in our books, a kind of appendage, an add-on, a lesser
thing. This reaction, while unfortunate, is not new; regulars have demonstrated their disdain for irregulars, partisans, or guerrillas throughout the history of warfare.

But what kind of war will we be called on to fight? We continue to show our fascination with the ever-increasing conventional and nuclear power of the Soviet Union -- focusing almost exclusively on our potential opponent's capability to fight a high intensity, massive war in Western Europe. But there is no conflict in Western Europe; in fact that part of the world has enjoyed 40 years of peace, the longest period since Europe came of age. The Soviets will continue to threaten Western Europe -- but where are the Soviets and their surrogates moving today?

They are moving in the Third World, attempting to outflank the industrialized democracies in developing nations around the globe.

I believe Winston Churchill has been quoted as saying, "Even the best of tacticians, on occasion, has to take the enemy into account." Our doctrine and strategy too must take account of the enemy: to respond to the worldwide situation we must first see that situation clearly. A hard and professional look at low intensity conflict is warranted. Why, we should ask ourselves, does this concept -- low intensity conflict -- continue to crop up? Why is it so hard to define? Is it a mere appendage of "real war" or is there a closer relationship?

In reality the concept has been present for centuries, and a direct relationship has existed frequently between armed forces engaged in the conventional form of warfare and those fighting in an irregular manner.

Is there some new dimension here, some situation that we do not entirely comprehend? We know that there have been times in the past when far-reaching political change was brought about by a few men under arms. The forces of Harold and William at Hastings, for example, where the Crown of England was at stake, numbered under 20,000 men. At Agincourt, Henry V destroyed the power of France with 5,000 men on a battlefield only a quarter of a mile wide. And at Waterloo, Wellington's 86,000 men covered only about three miles from flank to flank. Today the British Army of the Rhine occupies over 50 miles of front. Yet by the time of World War II, the situation was different. Political change could no longer be brought about by a few armed men. One hundred million soldiers fought a global war in which 15 million of them were killed. Not only was the physical scope of the war much greater, but such mass involvement resulted in 34 million civilians killed -- more than double the number of soldiers that died.
The Societal Dimension

Warfare is no longer fought simply by the military. It now encompasses entire populations, large and small, sophisticated or developing, and its outcome depends more and more on their collective will, what Clausewitz termed "the popular passions," the compelling motivation and defiant attitude of the people upon whose commitment and readiness to make personal sacrifices military power ultimately depends. We soldiers are accustomed to thinking about defeating our enemy by bringing combat power, primarily firepower, to bear on him. For us, the utilization of any other form of power against an adversary is secondary and supplemental, a lesser consideration. We must recognize, however, that in fighting an enemy today and in the future, even in high intensity conflict, the situation has changed.

We can see this change in at least three ways. First, the distinction between soldier and noncombatant has blurred to the point of being unrecognizable. The advent of strategic bombing during the Second World War showed the difficulty of distinguishing between the military figure and the noncombatant, the strain that this situation can place on social cohesion within a country, and the important role played by public opinion. Second, ideological mass indoctrination has become an important part of combat power, particularly, but not exclusively, in lesser developed societies where some common belief system is a dominant part of the culture. Third and closely related, the aspirations of the civilian combatants have exerted an increasingly powerful influence on the military outcome. If this influence is not recognized or if the sociopolitical struggle is not conducted with skill based on a realistic assessment of the social situation, as British military theorist Michael Howard has reminded us, "No amount of operational expertise, logistical backup, or technical know-how could possibly help."

Douglas Pike noted the increased importance of the societal dimension of modern warfare in a recent examination of the Vietnam war. He described two differing perceptions -- one view that saw the war as an orthodox, though limited-scale, conflict, another that saw it as primarily revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Vietnam, he wrote, could also be viewed as "something new in history," a "people's war" that "erased the line between military and civilian, between war and politics, between combatant and noncombatant. Its essence was a trinity of organization, mobilization, and motivation in the context of protracted conflict."

It is that form of war, a synthesis of conventional and guerrilla warfare, with greater importance accorded the societal dimension, that appears a likely model for the future.
Military men, however, feel uncomfortable with warfare's societal dimension and tend to ignore its implications. Societies are hard to understand -- let alone predict -- and difficult to control. Conflict on this plane does not fit our current beliefs about military success or failure; therefore, it is not a subject that we are, for the most part, anxious to pursue. At the same time internal war -- in which the societal dimension takes on crucial importance -- has become a dominant form of conflict throughout the world. Of the 125 to 150 conflicts that have taken place in the past four decades, 90 percent occurred in developing regions and are best characterized as internal wars.

There are many indicators that we are moving into a world in which subversive activities, civil disturbances, guerrilla warfare, and low levels of violence will grow and multiply. A number of factors contribute to this growth of violence at the low end of the spectrum of conflict, among them: the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which calls for political and psychological warfare as fundamental to Soviet success on a global scale; changes in traditional authority relationships; the maturation of thought-influencing techniques in such fields as marketing and telecommunications; the rediscovery of "war-cum-negotiation"; and the general historic trend toward the type of war that involves more and more of the populations of the warring factions. Although these trends have been obvious for a long time, there is little indication that we, or indeed anyone else, including the Soviets, have understood the need for adapting our doctrine to take into account the whole spectrum from low to high intensity. We have not grasped the new environment -- the high-low mix -- and its new conditions.

French author Jean Larteguy vividly captured the difference between traditional warfare and the situation we confront today. In his compelling novel, The Centurions, he portrays French officers turning from defeat in Indochina to face an apparently similar struggle in Algeria. Larteguy's dialogue of the protagonists conversing in a Viet Minh prison camp contrasts the French and Viet Minh methods of waging war:

It's difficult to explain exactly, but it's rather like Bridge as compared to Belote. When we (the French) make war, we play Belote with thirty-two cards in the pack. But their game is Bridge and they have fifty-two cards: twenty more than we do. Those twenty cards short will always prevent us from getting the better of them. They've got nothing to do with traditional warfare, they're marked with the sign of politics, propaganda, faith, agrarian reform . . . . What's biting Glatigny? I think he is beginning to realize that we've got to play with fifty-two cards and he doesn't like it at all . . . those twenty extra cards aren't at all to his liking.
The dimension beyond traditional warfighting, the twenty extra cards, can best be understood not by focusing on the guerrilla and his tactics, but by examining the structure of the struggle itself. It then becomes more apparent that indeed we are experiencing something new in warfare, something that requires us to restudy our doctrine, tactics, organization, and training.

The Triangle

The dimension beyond traditional warfare recognizes the triangular nature of any struggle today. In each case in high or low intensity conflict, the struggle involves the interaction between three elements: the government with its armed forces, the enemy, and the people. This triangular relationship is easier to visualize, and more relevant, in revolutionary warfare: in this situation a government, with its police and military, and an insurgent movement, with its terrorist arm, compete principally for the support of the national population. The insurgent movement -- at the outset too weak militarily to seize political control of the country -- focuses first on destroying civic responsiveness to the state, and then on eroding the effectiveness of the military and administrative establishments. Meanwhile, the insurgents seek to develop their military arm to the point where it can effectively challenge the regular forces in conventional battles supported by guerrilla operations and terrorism.

During the early stages of the struggle, violence is less an instrument of destruction than a psychological tool to influence the attitudes of specific sectors of the population. The conflict becomes a form of political education that forces a reluctant, basically neutral civilian populace wanting only to be left alone to take a stand in support of the insurgent. Such a strategy is not easily pursued. It takes time. But the insurgent retains the initiative and pushes relentlessly to gain support by discrediting the government.

To counter this sociopolitical challenge, the government must first recognize what is happening and then be willing to acknowledge that its civic support is fragile and its control over the populace contested. To reestablish the government's political legitimacy, it must address contentious, long-ignored, but popular issues tied to key facets of national life -- sociopolitical, economic, educational, juridical -- as well as engaging the guerrillas on the battlefield. The resulting burden on the military institution is large. Not only must it subdue an armed adversary while attempting to provide security to the civilian population, it must also avoid inadvertently furthering the insurgent's cause. If, for example, the military's actions in killing 50 guerrillas cause 200 previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurgent cause, the use of force will have been counterproductive.
Military forces fighting a counterinsurgency must, therefore, use other yardsticks to measure success than the traditional indicators of enemy killed and terrain captured. In El Salvador, for example, the military has come to attach greater importance to the number of guerrillas remaining than to the number of guerrillas killed. The Salvadorans recognize that reducing the size of the guerrilla force can often be pursued as effectively in other ways than just killing the insurgents -- pursued through actions that cause the guerrillas to desert their cause, return to their home, or surrender. Though harder to measure than "body counts," other indicators of success have been adopted, such as the frequency of insurgent defections, the availability of volunteer informers, and the willingness of former insurgents to collaborate publicly with the established government. Such adjustments are essential if a government is to adapt to the triangular nature of an insurgency and accord proper emphasis to the societal element of such struggles.

Conclusion

The education and training of our young officers understandably will be based on our vision of modern warfare. Our current approach, however, does not go far enough. The realities of contemporary conflict challenge us to attain what the 1984 Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer, General Bill Richardson, called "the blend of enduring objectives and tradition together with a willingness to change in the light of changing times." Said in another way, an officer's effectiveness and chance for success, now and in the future, depend not only on his character, knowledge, and skills, but also, and more than ever before, on his ability to understand the changing environment of conflict.

Kermit Roosevelt was a soldier, an adventurer, an innovator, the kind of man who might enjoy a ramble such as this -- one that included grindstones and cloisters and new paradigms. He would, I think, be very interested in the question of the societal dimension of war. As we prepare for the future, therefore, we should take note of his flexibility of mind and his versatility as a soldier. Above all, we should recognize that if war comes, we will continue to see involvement of the entire population; this will be true of all war, not simply in conflict at the low end of the scale.

I began with lieutenants, the source of our future leadership, and my theme has been a plea for flexibility and an open mind when it comes to our profession. The defense of our homeland and the protection of our democratic ideals depend on our ability to understand, and our readiness to fight, the wars of the future. Let us get our young leaders away from the grindstone now and then, and encourage them to reflect on developments outside the fortress-cloister. Only then will they develop into leaders capable of adapting to the changed environment of warfare and able to fashion a new paradigm that addresses all the dimensions of the conflicts that may lie ahead.
Tonight, one out of every four countries around the globe is at war. In virtually every case, there is a mask on the face of war. In virtually every case, behind the mask is the Soviet Union and those who do its bidding.

Much has been written about low intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively in the effort to contain the slow erosion of human liberty and self-determination around the globe.

We may see the protean nature of this phenomenon in the welter of descriptions attached to it: low intensity warfare, low intensity conflict, insurgency, guerrilla war, and others. What we can agree on, I think, is that the least accurate term is the one popularized by the Soviet Union, and that is "war of national liberation."

We in this land take special exception to so Orwellian a corruption of language, for we are ourselves the children of revolution, and we well know what liberty means. It has nothing to do with guns and searchlights and barbed wire and censorship and labor camps. In fact, the object of their activities is not liberation at all, but subjugation.

If we are to deal with it, we must understand it, and understand the circumstances which gave rise to it.

When the Second World War was ended, those of us who served in it and the families of those who were lost believed, and had a right to do, that we had seen the last of the great wars of conquest, and that our children might live in a better world, at peace. We were not complacent that such a hope would consummate itself through some mystical mutation driven by the numbers sacrificed, the pain suffered, or the hardships endured. Rather, we were prepared, even anxious, to work to assure that what had been achieved should be nourished and sustained.
To former adversaries and erstwhile allies alike, we offered assistance through the Marshall Plan. History should not wonder that a melting pot nation, representing so many of the world's people, should have approached the aftermath of a World War as we once approached the close of a Civil War; no vanquished, really, and no victors; only people needing help, and people having help to give. We had it, and we gave it, without ulterior motives. The results would later be recorded in a series of so-called "economic miracles."

Yet even as compassion and faith and common sense worked to keep the better world we fought to build, another power sought to go another way. As the lights went on again in the Pacific and Western Europe, they flickered out, one by one, in Eastern Europe. As old colonies became new nations, old nations -- Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and half of Germany -- became new colonies.

We were witnessing, though we did not know it, a new kind of warfare. At length we called it the Cold War, but it was hotter than we knew, and insidious.

In the preindustrial age, the object of those at war was to destroy the opponent's army. In the industrial era, it was to destroy not only armies but that economic infrastructure by which armies were fed, armed, transported, and supplied. And this we called total war, so brutal in its exigencies that we believed the art and science of war could not go further, but must impress itself and its dangers so profoundly upon the minds of men that they would turn away from it, and seek some other means to resolve their differences.

The opportunity was there. The mechanisms were there. God knows the need was there. Yet in the face of it all, we were presented with a further step in the evolution of a phenomenon we prayed had run its course. Where once it was the goal of aggression to destroy armies, and later to destroy the fruits of men's labors, now we saw a form of warfare directed at the destruction of hope itself.

As the Soviet Union, unhindered, was consolidating its hold over its neighbors, the emergence of new nations in the aftermath of colonialism created a new international political phenomenon, which we came to call the Third World. And as it emerged, so too did the opportunity for the extension of a strategy proven in the takeover of Russia herself, and refined in the enslavement of Eastern Europe.

It was a strategy which benefited from the confluence of a number of new circumstances and old realities. On one hand, the expectations of Communist dogma for the collapse of capitalism and the automatic "economically-determined" spread of Communism
had itself long since collapsed. Thus, the justification for the
very existence of the ruling party of the Soviet Union had no
force. Against this backdrop, there could certainly be no
pretense that Communism would expand through some inevitable,
dialectical process. If it were to expand, it must expand by
aggression.

On the other hand, the advent of nuclear power, and the
means to deliver it, gravely increased the risks of open
aggression. While the West monopolized that power, it presented
no threat to world peace, and certainly no threat to legitimate
Soviet interests. It did, however, present a threat to Soviet
Expansionism. Thus, if the Soviets were to expand, they would
have to do so below thresholds that would trigger a Free World
response. Not to expand meant for them to sit in a global
backwater, among the dust and ashes of a governing theory without
political dynamism or historical validity.

Added to these considerations were two others of
significance. One was the simple fact that the Soviet economic
system itself led to the perpetual impoverishment of the nation.
The Soviets had also to conjure with enormous losses in manpower
from the Second World War, the need to hold manpower both for
their regular military forces, and for those security forces
required to control their own population and those of their
satellites.

The other consideration was the reluctance of the
industrialized democracies, particularly the United States, to go
to war. Historically, the American people had and have wished to
be left in peace, and could be moved to war only through the most
egregious and galvanizing impact on their sensibilities. Further
to the point, US military doctrine, reflecting the larger
traditions out of which it grew, aimed at the rapid resolution of
conflict through the rapid application of overwhelming power.
And the American nation was and remains culturally disposed to
quick conclusions -- not least in the prosecution of so ugly a
work as war.

Taken whole, the situation offered constraints and
opportunities. Poor and ill-prepared peoples were reaching for
nationhood. Within them, men and women avid for power, and
willing to pursue it with violence and keep it by force, could be
coopted at bargain basement prices. And the process could be
represented to the industrialized democracies as the liberation
of nations -- a process not merely of no threat to us, but one
congruent with our values. So we saw the exploitation by brute
force of the efforts of others to free themselves from
oppression. It is not necessary here to recount each event. A
central consistency links the betrayal of the Russian Revolution
and the betrayal of the Nicaraguan Revolution.
Nowhere have Communist governments acquired and maintained power through the freely expressed will of the governed.

The world today is at war. It is not global war, though it goes on around the globe. It is not war between fully mobilized armies, though it is no less destructive for all that. It is not war by the laws of war and, indeed, law itself, as an instrument of civilization, is a target of this peculiar variety of aggression. It benefits from the pernicious sophistries of those who wish to construe these wars as the efforts of sovereign people to pursue their own destinies: as such, no business of our own.

Yet, in a world as small as our own, the destruction of human liberty anywhere resonates everywhere, and affects all of us. So it matters that we understand the means by which such destruction comes, and that we trouble ourselves to discover not merely how to end the destruction of liberty, but how to reverse it, and to recover and restore what has been destroyed. Because if it is proper and just that we should help those who wish to remain free, then we can hardly turn our backs on those who have lost their freedom and want it back. It is certain that we cannot coexist with the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine -- an impudent diktat that argues like a bullying child cheating at marbles: "Whatever I can get, I get to keep." Nothing is brought to life with bullets and bombs, least of all an absurd doctrine dead before the dictator who proclaimed it, and buried by the brave people of Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Kampuchea, and others who look to us to look to our heritage. We cannot ignore their aspirations without betraying our own.

For twenty-five years we have considered how to prevent the voices of freedom from being stilled. We cannot abandon that obligation. But neither can we turn away from the obligation to help now-smothered voices of freedom to be heard again.

This is the work in which we are now engaged, and the purpose that brings us to this occasion. It is no small task. From Augustine to Aquinas to Grotius, and coming forward to successive efforts of various conventions at Geneva and elsewhere, men have labored to contain war, to limit its ferocity, to hold harmless the innocent, to mitigate destruction, to infuse mercy. We share in, and are instructed by, these civilizing impulses. Every American officer, soldier, sailor, airman and Marine is indoctrinated in the principles flowing from them, and is held accountable for the most rigid adherence to them.

The conflict we face today violates, by design, these principles.
In those depredations known as wars of national liberation, any effort to improve the lot of peoples is a target. A nation's stability is a bar to its capture; its stability is a product of its prosperity and the means of broadening access to its prosperity; as is the educating of its people, and their health, and their conveniences, their progress and their hope. Therefore, in these obscenely misnamed "wars of national liberation," it is not a nation's military forces that are attacked. Instead, agricultural assistance teams are murdered, as are medical assistance teams, teachers, judges, union leaders, editors, and priests.

It is not a nation's military structures that are targeted, but its clinics and classrooms, its power and transportation systems, its livelihood, its possibilities, its hopes for a better future . . . .

The social and economic dimensions of these conflicts are of paramount importance. For the sake of their own lives, people are intimidated into a mute tolerance of subversion in their midst. Among the means to this end are disinformation and propaganda -- including what is euphemistically known as "propaganda of the deed." Such deeds may include assembling an entire village to watch the village headman disemboweled, proving thereby that the established government cannot assure anyone's physical safety, and that the better part of wisdom consists of resignation to the will of the insurgents, be they ever so small in number, brutal in behavior, or unrepresentative in their goals. The object is to instill fear, to institutionalize anxiety, to rob men of their manhood, and make of craven survival the ultimate value.

On the economic front, people are coerced into paying taxes to support their alleged liberation; crops are burned, marketing systems destroyed, and people living on the economic margin are further impoverished. So the burden on the established government grows, the presumption that it cannot provide for the security of its people grows; people move into the urban areas for greater security or better economic circumstances, the land is abandoned and cities become more and more crowded, with more pressure on the urban infrastructure and, withal, the creation of better targets for urban attacks.

In its early stages, much of this activity is like nothing so much as garden-variety crime -- vandalism, arson, kidnaping, extortion, murder: thuggery flying under the specious legitimacy of "political liberation."
Against such actions, well-integrated societies interpose police forces. But targeted nations are not well-integrated societies, and their police are rarely equal to the threat. We should be able to assist in improving the police capabilities of threatened nations, but we are now prohibited by law from doing so. And so long as this prohibition stands, the treats to others will be permitted to grow unimpeded until the violence is sufficiently great and sufficiently well organized that the use of overt military assistance finally can be justified. This gives to aggression an advantage we should not give it, and virtually assures a more protracted violence and greater bloodshed.

What is the role of the US military in all this? The question has existed and propounded itself in varying configurations, most especially during the Vietnam War and since. It has given rise to disagreements ranging from the philosophical to the visceral, and has generated criticism of our military, and its willingness and capacity to confront the conflict before us.

Let me say, on behalf of the most selfless segment of America's public servants, that, contrary to what some have said, it is nor preeminently the role or the object of our military to preserve hallowed doctrine, nor to preserve honored traditions, nor to preserve budgets. It is to preserve freedom. And they need no instruction as to that obligation.

They do need, and the Constitution mandates it, to be told what is wanted of them. They do need, and have a right to expect, the support of any American government which commits them, and the support of the people from which they come, in the efforts to which they are asked to risk their lives for us all.

On another occasion, I expressed my thoughts on the general question of those criteria which ought to govern the use of military force. Some have questioned whether the assurance of support is a reasonable criterion. But the assurance of support is a function of the national will in the area of low intensity conflict, far more than it is the capacity of our adversaries to prevail in that arena. And the strength of the national will depends, as it always has, on how far our cause is just, and seen to be; on how vital it is to our interests for us to be engaged; and, on how our efforts in such endeavors are conducted in accordance with our national values.

It will readily be seen, in the framework of a conflict which is prosecuted in such a way as to erode and destroy the values of civilization itself, that we have a special obligation to act so as to uphold those values. The strategy of low intensity conflict is such as to make a liability of that obligation. Yet we dare not, for the sake of expediency, abandon it. For example, to pursue terrorism we cannot commit acts of
blind revenge that may kill innocent people who had nothing to do with the terrorism. This necessity complicates our task, as it is intended to do. So we must think carefully, and in certain respects rethink entirely, what are the imperatives and exigencies of this war, as it now reveals itself to us.

It is among the highest skills of the medical profession to be able to diagnose an illness in its earliest states, and then to act to cure it before it becomes dangerous. Low intensity conflict presents a similar challenge to our skills at diagnosing political and geostrategic ills at their incipient stages. Such troubles do not begin in advanced, educated, stable, and prosperous nations which are well led and which, even if badly led, have the means, peacefully, to change their leadership. Nor do they begin in nations of little or no geostrategic significance.

You may be certain that no dictatorial excess, no violation of human rights, however outrageous, will attract the solicitous ministrations of the Soviet Union or its surrogates to a nation having no resources, a nation contiguous to no other nation of strategic interest, or a nation not situated upon some global chokepoint. The Soviet Union will not go to the aid of anyone for what we call humanitarian reasons.

Analyzing the situation at even so elementary a level, we will have little difficulty determining prospective targets for Communist subversion through low intensity conflict. Superimpose over this matrix other indicators: weapons thefts, assassinations of police and other officials, attacks on critical infrastructural nodes, and further, more refined, conclusions may be drawn. It is at the critical point at which these conclusions can be drawn that some basic decisions must be made, and not years later when whole populations are polarized, and countrysides set aflame.

We must decide if our interests justify intervention. We must decide if the leadership of the country threatened is capable of using our assistance to proper effect, which is to say for the security and well-being of the nation, rather than merely to sustain itself in power, and to reinforce those abuses which may have contributed to the nation's difficulties from the beginning. We must decide whether an existing leadership is better or worse for its people and our interests than possible alternatives. We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives. We must decide what form intervention should take, if we are to intervene, and by what means, and through which agencies it should come. If our involvement is warranted, we must be prepared to act alone.
We have had at times an unfortunate tendency to believe it is essential to multilateralize every exertion on behalf of freedom in the international arena, as though our judgment must be validated by others before we could trust it ourselves. Yet it remains a fact that for the most part, where freedom is in jeopardy, it is to us that the world looks for leadership.

We are belabored in some quarters with being too "interventionist." And yet we remember, and those who belabor us remember too, other times and other places in which our earlier intervention must have saved the world from monstrous crimes and profligate destruction and bloodshed.

Finally, as a pacific people, we cling fiercely to the hope that solutions to international aggression may be found short of the use of power, and by this tendency delay in the recognition of aggression for what it is, and of our duties for what they are.

There is a place for power in responding to low intensity conflict. What is important is to understand the role of military force, and the role of other responses, and how these fit together.

Those particular skills and supporting capabilities which the military offers to the prosecution of low intensity conflict are chiefly to be found in our special operations forces.

Each of the services contribute to these capabilities, some more than others according to the mission and the level of conflict involved. At the low intensity end of the spectrum, which concerns us here, Army special forces bear a very large share of the burden. They are trained to instruct others in providing for their own defense. In this mission, their knowledge of foreign languages, as well as their specialized foreign area orientation, are essential elements of their capabilities. They are familiar with the full range of weapons to be found in other nations and can provide training in the use of those weapons and other ordnance, as well as instructing in small unit tactics, reconnaissance, communications, field medicine, escape and evasion, and equipment maintenance.

As one looks at the strategy of low intensity conflict, however, in all its multiple dimensions, it is clear that defending the nation is only one part of the required response, and a highly problematical part at that. For this conflict strategy is one of destruction, and it is always easier to destroy than to build up, and easier too, to destroy than to defend against destruction. So we must assist in the business of building and, by doing so, of providing the nation's people with a stake in their future -- a stake they themselves will choose to protect in the face of all efforts at destruction.
Our special operations forces play a role here as well, through civic action: the construction and restoration of infrastructure, the assisting of others in the improvement of their own lives, whether by restoring land, building roads, digging wells, or helping to provide medical and educational services. In the past, such work was not thought to be the work of the military. This is the popular wisdom, at any rate. But here popular wisdom fails, for it divorces us from our own history -- from the memory of the Mlinueman, standing by his plow, with his musket in his hand; and the pioneer defending what he built even as he built it.

There is, in short, no gainsaying the argument that we know something about nation-building, having built one ourselves. Nor is it deniable that the larger conflict -- or, the competition, for those who prefer it -- has everything to do with those political and economic constructs which form the skeletons of nations. The question then is what forms of government, what kinds of economic systems, are most in accord with human realities and conduce to the betterment of mankind? On our own terms, we can compete with shovels and win. Our adversaries require guns. It is an instructive difference. The greater share of our assistance to the lesser developed nations is in economic aid and, of our security assistance, in non-lethal aid. The Soviets offer relatively little in foreign economic assistance; virtually all of their subventions go to the provision of weapons.

So our military can help with the contemporary equivalent of the use of plows and muskets. But that help must be designed into a strategy which involves diplomacy, and economic leverage, and the proper management of our technological riches, and the proper, unashamed and unremitting willingness to make our case at the bar of public opinion abroad and at home. Absent such a strategy, the use of military assets alone will be feckless, wasteful, and unfair.

The private sector that is the wellspring of our power and prosperity must see the greater long-term economic advantage of access to marketing opportunities in a broad and stable world market, rather than in the short-term benefits to be derived from those whose aim it is to prevent the emergence of a broad and stable world market. The self-serving notion of tempering Soviet aggressiveness through trade is the most fraudulent excuse for making a quick dollar that can be imagined; Lenin himself recognized that that proclivity would help the Soviets survive the ravages of their own self-imposed economic incapacity. He said that "The capitalists will supply us with the materials and technology which we lack and will restore our military industry which we need for our future victorious attacks upon our suppliers. In other words, they will work hard in order to prepare their own suicides."
We must not gratify that expectation, or fulfill that prediction.

Similarly, we must see the foolishness in subsidizing governments, produced by Communist insurgencies, in their effort to consolidate a totalitarian hold over their nations. We should not be so mesmerized by our self-imposed obligations to international organizations, dedicated to the peaceful development of nations, that we acquiesce in the shoring up of hostile governments through various international financial institutions and agencies of the United Nations. Our stature and credibility as a peace-loving and generous nation will surely survive our effective objection to such contradictory and self-defeating actions. And if we are unwilling to make such objection, and make it effective as only we can, then we must surely not ask our own military to go in the way of guns indirectly paid for through our own financial assistance.

Those who mold public opinion in America, and who should refresh our convictions and thus save us from a smug complacency and the slow unwitting betrayal of our founding values, must see the failing in a fatuous objectivity which affects to judge the ambitions of the wolf and the lamb by an equal measure. There is still the obligation to distinguish right from wrong, and as we have no reluctance to judge ourselves by standards we set for ourselves, we should not, out of a misplaced sense of fairness, refuse to judge others merely because they have no standards. We know what are criminal means to the acquisition of power, and we know, with Burke, that "Criminal means, once tolerated, are soon preferred." To be tolerant for the sake of an intellectual fastidiousness is to be an accessory to the behavior at issue.

The servants of public opinion and founding conviction, by which we are admirably governed for more than two centuries, must see the fragility of our freedom, and that national longevity is not divinely assigned but is a product of alertness and selflessness, which selflessness must extend even to the sacrifice of political advantage from time to time. "It wonders me," as the old Pennsylvania Dutchman said, when I hear the defense budget attacked on the basis of what the attackers are pleased to call a "fairness doctrine," as though our security is merely one of a competing set of national priorities. When nations place their comfort before their security, they end with neither.

These are some of the concerns we must take into account and the adjustments and sacrifices we must be prepared to make, as we consider the role of the military in the very real conflict we face today. What is important is that we never lose sight of the fact that the military is an instrument of the national will, and not a substitute for it.
LOW INTENSITY WARFARE: THE CHALLENGE OF AMBIGUITY

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Conference on Low Intensity Warfare
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I commend the Department of Defense, the National Defense University, and Secretary Weinberger for convening this conference. It comes at an important time, for it addresses one of the most pressing problems in US foreign and defense policy today.

The problem of low intensity warfare requires us to confront a host of political, military, intellectual, legal, and moral questions. The label, indeed, may be misleading. When they are shooting at you or trying to blow you up, it's pretty high intensity. Nor is low intensity warfare the same as limited war.

No, it's a more complicated set of new and unconventional challenges to our policy. It is the scourge of terrorism worldwide; the struggle for Nicaragua between the democratic resistance and the communist regime; it is the ins urgencies against the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia; the civil war and terrorism in Lebanon; our rescue of Grenada; and the Cambodian resistance against the Vietnamese occupation. It is the heroic struggle of the Afghan people against Soviet aggression and occupation. It is a matrix of different kinds of challenges, varying in scope and scale. If they have a single feature in common, it is their ambiguity: the fact that they throw us off balance, that we grope for appropriate means to respond, and that we as a society even debate sometimes over the need to respond.

The ironic fact is, these new and elusive challenges have proliferated, in part, because of our success in deterring nuclear and conventional war. Our adversaries know they cannot prevail against us in either type of war. So they have done the logical thing: they have turned to other methods. Low intensity warfare is their answer to our conventional and nuclear strength -- a flanking maneuver, in military terms. They hope that the legal and moral complexities of these kinds of challenges will ensnare us in our own scruples and exploit our humane inhibitions against applying force to defend our interests. Ambiguous warfare has exposed a chink in our armor.
The Nicaraguan communists, for instance, have done all they can to hide their true ambitions. Some were fooled by this. The Nicaraguans used progressive rhetoric to obscure their totalitarian goals. They imported Cuban experts to construct a totalitarian state, but, at first, only a small number, so as to not attract attention. Then, as the numbers rose, we were told the Cubans were teachers or construction workers -- who happen to handle guns quite well, as we learned in Grenada. Now we are told they aren't really organized troops, just advisers -- who seem to wander into combat. We warned against the Nicaraguans' import of MiGs and other advanced weapons: so they have brought in powerful weapons below that threshold, like Hind helicopters. They have committed aggression against their neighbors and provided arms to terrorists like the M-19 group in Colombia, but cynically used the International Court of Justice to accuse us of aggression because we joined with El Salvador in its defense.

These tactics obviously play on the moral scruples that discipline our power, on the American people's antipathy to violence and desire for peace. Well, the truth -- which most of us here long recognized -- is now gaining wider and wider acceptance. A consensus is emerging in Congress that the Sandinistas are not reformers -- or even Sandinistas -- but Leninists who seek a monopoly of power at home and subversion of their democratic neighbors -- and who must be stopped.

But look at the time the Nicaraguan communists have gained to consolidate their tyranny. Years in which we have been consumed in acrimonious internal debate have been used by them to tighten their grip and heighten the danger to the whole region.

In Grenada, the tactics were similar. Documents we captured when our forces landed there two years ago reveal how ambiguity and deception were employed as tools of power. The construction of an airport whose true aim was to serve as a Soviet/Cuban base was, we were told, for civilian purposes to aid the local economy. And if we had not intervened when we did, that "civilian" airport might have been in service today, as a transit point for sending more Cuban mercenaries to Angola or more Libyan arms to Nicaragua or more terrorists to our hemisphere.

In southern Africa, of course, the problems are not solely the result of communist subversion. There is the profound problem of South Africa's internal policies and Namibia's right to independence. But there is a serious East-West dimension which we, because of the Clark amendment, prevented ourselves from grappling with for ten years: this is the extraordinary Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola, in which we have just seen a massive escalation in the last year and a half. Some will argue that this threat is not serious enough to warrant a response from us, or that we'll be on the wrong side, or that we would be escalating. This illustrates the seeming ambiguity
of such geopolitical challenges to Western interests. But what would it mean globally, or for Africa, if Soviet/Cuban military intervention -- and escalation -- became the arbiter of local or regional political conflicts?

Terrorism, of course, is the most striking example of ambiguous warfare. Terrorist acts are a form of criminality, waged by surprise against unarmed men, women, and children in cold blood. Terrorist attacks are sometimes the random, senseless acts of zealots; more often, they are systematic and calculated attempts to achieve political ends. Despite the horror they inflict and the widespread recognition that their acts are criminal, few terrorists are caught, and fewer still are punished to the full extent they deserve. They know we abhor the loss of innocent lives; so they live and train in the midst of their women and children. And we debate among ourselves over the appropriate targets or the foreign policy consequences of a punitive blow. Terrorism is the newest strategy of the enemies of freedom -- and it's all too effective.

We are right to be reluctant to unsheathe our sword. But we cannot let the ambiguities of the terrorist threat reduce us to total impotence. A policy filled with so many qualifications and conditions that they all could never be met would amount to a policy of paralysis. It would amount to an admission that, with all our weaponry and power, we are helpless to defend our citizens, our interests, and our values. This I simply do not accept.

So we must meet this challenge of low intensity conflict and ambiguous warfare. We have no choice.

The Intellectual Challenge of Ambiguous Warfare

Our first task, it seems to me, is to come to grips with the problem intellectually.

For various reasons, at least in this century, we Americans have been uncomfortable with conflicts involving limited uses of force for limited ends. Nor have we had to confront systematic terrorism here at home, as Israel has for almost four decades. We have, sometimes, been slow in confronting dangers from abroad, waiting until a limited or ambiguous challenge has escalated into one of global dimensions. Today, we are faced with demands that we be absolutely certain of the need to act before doing so; that we act openly, swiftly, and conclusively; and that we support only those whose aims and conduct we approve in every way.

We know, today, that such simple clarity in the use of power is often elusive in the modern world. We have seen and we will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous threats in the shadow area between major war and millennial peace. Americans must
understand, and I believe most Americans do understand, that a number of small challenges, year after year, can add up to a more serious challenge to our interests. The time to act, to help our friends by adding our strength to the equation, is not when the threat is at the doorstep, when the stakes are highest and the needed resources enormous. We must be prepared to commit our political, economic, and, if necessary, military power when the threat is still manageable and when its prudent use can prevent the threat from growing. We have far less margin for error today than we did even thirty years ago. We cannot afford to be complacent about events around the world in the expectation that, in the end, we will have the strength to overcome any challenge. We do not have the luxury of waiting until all the ambiguities have disappeared.

This is the essence of statesmanship -- to see a danger when it is not self-evident; to educate our people to the stakes involved; then to fashion a sensible response and rally support.

Our intellectual challenge is especially to understand the need for prudent, limited, proportionate uses of our military power, whether as a means of crisis management, power projection, peacekeeping, localized military action, support for friends, or responding to terrorism -- and to coordinate our power with our political and diplomatic objectives. Such discreet uses of power for limited purposes will always involve risks. But the risks of inaction will, in many circumstances, be greater.

Our political analysis must be clear sighted. Allies and friends may object to our action -- or say they object. But this cannot be decisive. Striking against terrorism in the Middle East, for example, is bound to be controversial. But the worst thing we could do to our moderate friends in the region is to demonstrate that extremist policies succeed and that the United States is impotent to deal with such challenges. If we are to be a factor in the region -- if we want countries to take risks for peace relying on our support -- then we had better show that our power is an effective counterweight to extremism.

Among other things, this has to include the military supply relationships we have long had with our friends in the Arab world. This is tangible backing for their security in a dangerous period and an important factor for regional stability.

And we must show staying power. Americans are a nation of problem solvers, and that is a mark of our greatness. Yet many of the problems we face are not susceptible to a quick fix. Few threats can be dealt with as rapidly as Grenada. Most will require perseverance and a longer term commitment. The struggle against terrorism will not be ended by a few dramatic actions. The safeguarding of fragile democracies and vulnerable allies against subversion and covert aggression, in Central America or
elsewhere, will require more than brief and quickly completed uses of American power.

Our objective in these situations will always be to prevail. Sometimes, as in the case of Grenada, success will take the form of a total military victory and the removal of foreign troops. In other cases, success will consist of denying victory to the adversary so that political solutions become possible.

We must avoid no-win situations, but we must also have the stomach to confront the harder-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement, even when the results are slow in coming. Steadfastness and endurance are the keys to success; our adversaries notice when we are impatient, uncomfortable, or vacillating. Thus, we lose our leverage, and we make the problem more prolonged and more difficult to resolve.

The Political, Legal, and Moral Challenges

Unfortunately, in the wake of Vietnam, our endurance against any kind of challenge has been open to question.

Recent decades have left a legacy of contention between the executive and legislative branches and a web of restrictions on executive action embedded in our laws. The result has been a loss of coherence and recurring uncertainty in the minds of friend and foe about the constancy of the United States. The War Powers Resolution sets arbitrary 60-day deadlines that practically invite an adversary to wait us out, that invariably send signals that the United States, despite all our power, may be "short of breath." That description -- "short of breath" -- was offered by a Syrian, two years ago, who watched our congressional debates and concluded that we lacked staying power; this undercut the prospects for successful negotiation. The rationale of our diplomacy -- that the May 17 agreement was the way to bring Israeli withdrawal -- was itself undercut when Israel pulled back. This problem can recur as we seek to meet other challenges.

We must tackle this political dilemma head on. Recently, a legislator criticized us for not consulting with the Congress before our interception of the airliner carrying terrorists who had killed an American. But if we delayed acting in order to consult, the terrorists would surely have escaped. I have no doubt that the American people want to see their President acting flexibly, effectively, and decisively against the terrorist menace to defend our citizens. Surely there can be accountability without paralysis.

The fact is, we will never face a specific threat that does not involve some hard choices that are difficult for a democracy. The simple, tragic truth about many low intensity challenges is
that the "rules of the game" are often blurred, at best. Terrorists do not abide by the Geneva convention. They place a premium on the defenselessness and helplessness of their victims. The more heinous the crime, the more attention terrorists attract to their "cause."

The same is true of communist guerrillas, whose fundamental tenet is that the goal of seizing power justifies any method that comes to hand -- urban terrorism or waging war on the civilian economy, as in El Salvador. They believe, as Castro once said, that history will absolve them. In the Philippines, the communist guerrillas are men of extraordinary brutality; they have been compared to the Cambodian communists, and this is not a wild comparison.

In the wake of the recent attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, we have heard it asserted that military action to retaliate or preempt terrorism is contrary to international law. Some have suggested that even to contemplate using force against terrorism is to lower ourselves to the barbaric level of the terrorists. I want to take this issue head on.

Unlike terrorists and communist guerrillas, we do not believe the end justifies the means. We believe in the rule of law. This nation has long been a champion of international law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the UN Charter as a code of conduct for the world community.

But the Charter's restrictions on the use or threat of force in international relations include a specific exception for the right of self-defense. It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas. International law requires no such result. A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens when no other means is available. The law requires that such actions be necessary and proportionate. But this nation has consistently affirmed the right of states to use force in exercise of their right of individual or collective self-defense.

The UN Charter is not a suicide pact. The law is a weapon on our side, and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent. Cooperation in law enforcement, international agreements against hijacking and terrorism, extraditing and prosecuting terrorists when captured -- these are indispensable tools. But we can go further.
There should be no confusion about the status of nations that sponsor terrorism against Americans and American property. There is substantial legal authority for the view that a state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other activities within its own territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state under international law. As the President said last week:

By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack US citizens, Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law, just as if it had used its own armed forces.

Think about the practical and strategic implications of allowing a state to evade responsibility for the acts of its terrorist surrogates: a nation like Quadhafi's Libya would acquire immunity while carrying on the secret or ambiguous warfare which poses such a threat today to the security and well-being of free nations. And to let ourselves be deterred by Quadhafi's threats from doing what is needed to stop him will only establish in his mind, and in the minds of other fanatics, that the scheme has worked. State-supported terror will increase through our submission to it, not from our active resistance.

The future will be grim, indeed, if we permit this. The potential gravity of terrorist acts is certain to increase as terrorists obtain the means to use weapons far more destructive and harmful than guns, grenades, and bombs. In fact, state support will probably be the single most important factor in enabling terrorists to acquire such weapons, which may well include nuclear devices small enough for terrorists to assemble but devastating enough to destroy a government's leadership and a nation's morale. We must use the law to preserve civilized order, not to shield those who would wage war against it.

The armed ideologues of the world may believe that our devotion to international law will immobilize us abroad, just as they may believe our political system will immobilize us at home. As we have shown in response to Nicaragua's hypocritical suit in the World Court, we will not permit our enemies -- who despise the rule of law as a "bourgeois" notion -- to use our devotion to law and morality as a weapon against us. When the United States defends its citizens abroad or helps its friends and allies defend themselves against subversion and tyranny, we are not suspending our legal and moral principles. On the contrary, we are strengthening the basis of international stability, justice, and the rule of law.
Our morality must be a source of strength, not paralysis. We cannot walk away from every situation that poses a moral dilemma. The use of force at any level involves moral issues. We should use our military power only if the stakes justify it, if other means are not available, and then only in a manner appropriate to a clear objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest. We cannot wait for absolute certainty and clarity. If we do, the world's future will be determined by others -- most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and the most hostile to everything we believe in.

A Strategy for Ambiguous Warfare

Thus, the United States needs an active strategy for dealing with ambiguous warfare. We must be better prepared intellectually and psychologically as a nation; we must be better prepared organizationally as a government. Many important steps have been taken. But more needs to be done.

First of all, our policy against ambiguous warfare must be unambiguous. It must be clearly and unequivocally the policy of the United States to fight back -- to resist challenges, to defend our interests, and to support those who put their own lives on the line in a common cause. We must be clear in our own minds that we cannot shrink from challenges.

For this, there must be public understanding and congressional support. That is why, again, I applaud you for holding this conference -- not only for probing deeper into the problem but for contributing to the body of public knowledge and education.

In fact, we are much farther along as a nation in this regard than we were a few short years ago. Unfortunately, much of what we learned, we learned the hard way. Public discussion and debate about the problem must continue -- not to magnify our hesitations but to crystallize a national consensus.

Second, we must make the fullest use of all the nonmilitary weapons in our arsenal. Strengthening the collaboration of governments, developing new legal tools and methods of international sanctions, working to resolve conflicts through diplomacy, taking defensive measures to reduce our vulnerability -- all this we must keep doing.

Our programs of security and economic assistance to friends are essential. In this era of budgetary stringency, I want to record an urgent plea on behalf of security assistance. As the President has said, "Dollar for dollar, security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget." In El Salvador, we see how the wise provision of sufficient economic and military assistance obviates the need to
consider any direct involvement of American forces. And we must extend moral or humanitarian or other kinds of support to those resisting totalitarianism or aggression. Our ideals and our interests coincide.

We must also strengthen our intelligence capabilities -- not only intelligence collection and intelligence cooperation with allies but also our means for covert action. In this regard, it is imperative that we stop leaks. There is no disagreement within this Administration that unauthorized disclosure of military or intelligence information is a crime. Since time immemorial, governments -- including democratic governments -- have conducted sensitive activities in secret, and the democracies only court disaster if they throw away this instrument through indiscretion.

One of the cliches one hears these days is that covert operations leak, so why try to do things covertly? First of all, I think we can keep things secret if we try harder. Second, other countries working with us often have good reasons not to want publicity, and unacknowledged programs afford them some protection, even if there are leaks in the press. It can mean the difference between success and failure for our effort. In addition, unacknowledged programs mean a less open challenge to the other side, affording more of a chance for political solutions. Covert action is not an end in itself, but it should have a place in our foreign policy.

Finally, there is the military dimension of our strategy. Just as we turned to our men and women in uniform when new conventional and nuclear threats emerged, we are turning to you now for the new weapons, new doctrines, and new tactics that this new method of warfare requires.

I have no doubt that we have the physical resources and capability to succeed. To combat terrorism we have created the Delta Forces; we have created the Special Operations Forces for a multitude of tasks; the Army is forming new light divisions; the Marines are developing new capabilities; the Air Force and Army are developing new concepts and doctrines. The courage and skill of our armed forces have been proven time and again -- most recently in Grenada and in the capture of the Achille Lauro hijackers.

But the challenge we face continues. I am confident you will know what is required to ensure coordination and effectiveness. I do know we will need the closest coordination between our military power and our political objectives -- because I, as Secretary of State, know full well that power and diplomacy must go together. We need to relearn how to keep our military options and preparations secret. There may be an important new role for our military in the area of covert operations.
Cap [Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger] and I discuss these issues and these challenges frequently, and we will be working together, in full agreement on the urgency of the problem.

Prospects

So, in conclusion, I can tell you that your topic is a prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century. The future of peace and freedom may well depend on how effectively we meet it.

I have no doubt we can succeed. We have learned much in recent years — about terrorism, about Soviet-backed insurgencies, and about how to use American power prudently. Our armed forces are better equipped, both physically and psychologically.

The American people are today more confident in themselves, in their nation, and in the rightness of their principles, and this will be a source of enormous strength in the future. And we draw strength from the newly democratic nations which have joined our ranks and look to us for leadership.

With the necessary will, hard work, and a degree of wisdom, we will prevail over this challenge, as we have prevailed over so many others in our proud history.
Thank you for inviting me here today. You are giving me an opportunity to speak on an issue of great importance to the success of our foreign policy and one about which I care a great deal. I also welcome the opportunity to do what I can to support the efforts of General Paul Gorman's Regional Conflict Working Group. General Gorman has made a great contribution to our thinking about US policy in the developing world. His Working Group and this workshop continue those efforts.

All of you know how essential security assistance is to US foreign and defense policy. It is a cornerstone of our strategy of collective security. Obviously, we cannot defend the free world alone. Our military assistance programs provide a cost effective way to help our friends and allies bear a major part of the burden of maintaining deterrence and defending our vital interests. These programs help us maintain close relations with many nations around the world, and they are a principal element of our strategy for dealing with conflict in the Third World. Finally, security assistance reduces the chance that US forces will have to be committed to combat overseas.

This workshop will look at a particular aspect of the security assistance program -- its performance as a US policy instrument in the developing world. In particular, you are here to consider how we might do a better job at providing military assistance to developing countries fighting insurgencies, terrorism, and inter-state warfare.

Your study of security assistance to developing nations is very timely. As many of you know, the President recently signed a National Security Decision Directive promulgating our national strategy for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). In it he states that security assistance is a principal instrument of US strategy for helping nations facing such conflicts. The Board for Low
Intensity Conflict, which was created by the NSDD, is studying the role of foreign assistance in LIC as one of its first priorities. Your efforts here will be integrated into the Board's work.

I want to kick off your study of security assistance by discussing what I believe are three of the most salient issues now confronting the security assistance program: the drastic shortfall in foreign assistance funding, the need to make security assistance as efficient and effective as possible, and the requirement to match our security assistance programs to the special needs of developing nations facing internal and external threats to their security. You may criticize me for dwelling too much on the problems and not enough on how to solve them. Permit me, however, to focus your thoughts on finding solutions to these problems and putting them into effect.

A Program in Crisis

We face a crisis in security assistance because of inadequate funding. The Congress reduced the President's request for International Affairs from $19.1 billion to 16.2 billion. In the security assistance sub-account, we fell 16% below Fiscal Year 1986 funding, and approximately 11% below 1987 funding, or about 16% short of the funds we need just to maintain minimum essential programs and follow on support. This funding level will disrupt, and in some cases force us to terminate, vital security assistance programs. For want of a relatively small amount, we are about to gut US geopolitical strategy.

The problem of inadequate funding is compounded by Congressionally mandated earmarks which take an ever larger piece of a shrinking pie. Ninety-nine percent FMS credit was earmarked in FY88. Half of MAP funding was earmarked, as was 97% of ESF funding. Earmarks and other restrictions force us to conduct foreign policy with our hands tied. We are losing the ability to allocate resources according to our strategic priorities, and we have virtually no leeway with which to respond to unforeseen circumstances through reallocation of funds. Earmarking hits the developing world particularly hard. With only a few exceptions, programs in Africa and Latin America that are supporting countries actively engaged in Low Intensity Conflict are unprotected. Thus, they must bear a disproportionate share of the burden when earmarks are maintained at a constant level while the overall security assistance program is cut.

The foreign policy implications are obvious. Cuts of the proposed magnitude will damage relations with some of our most important allies such as Turkey, Greece, and Spain, and will undermine our common defense. It will be difficult to provide adequate funding for Chad -- a nation which has successfully repelled Libyan aggression and dealt a major political and
military blow to Quadhafi. Chad faces continued threat of Libyan attack, and it will be impossible for us to help this embattled but determined government without repeatedly resorting to emergency allocations of DoD assets. In a number of other Third World countries facing active insurgencies, we will have to pare down or eliminate programs. Finally, we will not have enough money to run even token programs to offset Soviet military assistance to countries such as Peru.

If we are to maintain an adequate security assistance effort, we need bipartisan support in Congress and a general recognition among the informed public of the importance of our international programs. This is not an Administration priority, it is truly a national priority. Building such support is difficult, however, particularly in a budget making process that makes foreign aid an easy target for cuts by those seeking to protect domestic programs. I ask that you consider how we can best get our message across; how we can convince people that security assistance is money well spent; how we can demonstrate the seriousness of the threat that instability in the developing world presents to our national interests; how we can show that security assistance is vital in combating these threats?

The Need for Greater Efficiency

The funding crisis makes it absolutely imperative that we run the most efficient and effective security assistance program possible. Every assistance dollar is precious; we cannot tolerate unnecessary costs. I ask that you explore ways for us to attain the goals set out for our security assistance program, but under sharply constrained resources.

You may want to look at pricing and overhead costs and ask if more can be done to provide the greatest benefit at the lowest cost. There may be legal or administrative changes that could be made that would allow us to provide necessary services and support, but at lower cost. You may also want to consider the issue of increasing concessionality in our assistance programs. We are heading in that direction, but maybe we should be going further. In addition, some attention could be usefully focused on reducing the debt burden derived from past loans.

At the same time, we must be very careful when identifying areas for improvement that we do not simply shift costs from one account to another. You are aware that the Defense Budget is a separate funding account from the foreign assistance account. No doubt you are also aware that the Defense Budget itself is under pressure. Proposed solutions that merely swap foreign assistance programs, particularly since such solutions inevitably hit the Services' operations and maintenance accounts, which are already overburdened.
You should search for creative approaches to financing and managing programs that meet the needs of developing countries. In particular, you should explore creative ways to extend the resources we have -- or to use resources not normally associated with security assistance in ways that complement and reinforce assistance programs. A few ideas come to mind:

Can we establish more productive relationships between the security assistance programs of our friends and our own regional objectives? We are working closely with the French in Chad to ensure that our programs are coordinated. We should look for such opportunities elsewhere.

Can we conduct our own military exercises and training in a way that has added security assistance benefits? The Army National Guard runs an extensive overseas training program that establishes useful military-to-military contacts and conducts extensive civic action projects. Can we do more? I am not suggesting that we should use up limited operations and maintenance funds strictly for security assistance purposes. What I am suggesting, however, is that we consider spin off political-military benefits when planning our operations. This approach may require some changes in the law, but I think it is worth looking into.

Can we find better ways to exploit the large amount of older US equipment in foreign inventories? Should the US initiate a program designed to modernize older equipment at an acceptable cost? What are the best candidate systems for such an approach, and which countries are most likely to benefit?

Can we enhance our ability to react to unforeseen requirements through such mechanisms as establishing contingency funds, increasing the flexibility of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund, increasing the utility of the President's authority to reallocate funds among accounts, and expanding the scope of our Section 506 authority to make emergency drawdowns from Defense stocks?

Finally, can we find creative approaches for financing sales of military equipment? Should we change our way of doing business so as to facilitate commercial financing where appropriate?
Security Assistance and Strategy

So far, I have been talking mainly about resources -- arguing that the total foreign assistance pie is too small and that we must increase the efficiency of our programs. We must also consider how well our programs match the needs of the recipient. Our strategy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict centers on helping governments obtain the levels of security and stability necessary to sustain political and economic development. Clearly, appropriate and carefully coordinated economic and military assistance programs must be at the heart of such a strategy. The trick is to design these programs so that they are attuned to the special requirements of developing countries. Our assistance programs must meet several requirements:

Assistance must be responsive and predictable. We must be able to respond to quickly changing events both within an individual country and a region. At the same time, however, we must recognize that most conflicts in the developing world are protracted and that our assistance programs cannot be at the mercy of short-term budget concerns. Therefore, we must explore whether multi-year approaches to funding coupled with greater flexibility in program administration will better support our national strategy.

Assistance must be appropriate to local needs. Developing countries often have little use for sophisticated, costly military equipment. Sometimes they need special items that are not found in US military inventories. Our assistance programs must be able to identify what is required and to supply it. Additionally, the developing nation's logistics support structure must be addressed.

Assistance must be integrated. We must ensure that each relevant facet of our foreign assistance effort matches our overall strategy for the region and the individual country. This approach requires close coordination with the recipient government to ensure that our assistance supports their strategy needs. It also requires careful coordination within the country team and here in Washington to ensure that our various efforts complement each other.

Assistance must be balanced. Our goal is to eliminate the causes of instability by fostering democracy and economic development. However, such development often needs to be protected by an adequate security shield. Balanced country packages of military and economic assistance are necessary; neither type of assistance alone can rectify instability. Economic assistance by itself does not provide the means to deter external aggression nor can the development it fosters safeguard against internal security threats.
In some situations, such as El Salvador, ad hoc and specially tailored solutions to coordination and integration problems have been successful. However, normal structures and procedures are not necessarily flexible enough to provide the tailored, responsive forms of assistance required to combat a low intensity conflict. We must look carefully at the problems of providing adequate security assistance in these situations, learn from the success and mistakes we have already experienced, and institutionalize what works.

We must ensure that all our assistance programs are mutually supportive -- to include development as well as security assistance. This suggests a country approach to planning assistance programs -- one that finds an appropriate mix of security and development programs for the recipient. We must also place assistance programs into regional context so that we develop programs that address common needs.

Finally, thinking about security assistance in a strategic context will help us build support for the program while we go about improving its contribution to our security. By relating military assistance to overall security requirements -- that is, to the global threats that we must have capabilities to address -- we can better identify how shortfalls in assistance resources impact on our ability to meet the challenges we face. In planning security assistance, and in justifying it on the Hill and elsewhere, we must place it into a context of comprehensive security. We must understand, and be able to explain, how security assistance helps protect our national interests as part of an integrated approach to using all policy instruments available.

You have a difficult task ahead of you. However, it is extremely important. Above all, let us not put off valuable initiatives because we are nearing the end of an Administration or because Congressional calendars make delay seem attractive. The problems we face are too serious. The Administration is willing to act now to implement good ideas.
NATIONAL STRATEGY AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

General Paul F. Gorman, US Army (Retired)

Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee

28 January 1987

Among the tasks before this Committee, none is more difficult than ascertaining what strategies may be appropriate over the long run for the US in responding to terrorism, insurgency, and the regional wars of the Third World -- that genre of recourse to violence for political purposes referred to these days as low intensity conflict.

What should be US objectives?
What concepts or premises should guide us?
What shall be the means to our ends?

Strategic Challenges

I can not start our discussion, as some who have spoken before me have, with a brief characterization of principal threats to US interests, because interests and threats relevant to my topic are so diverse as to defy compact generalization. The strategic challenges which I have been asked to address are surely not simply manifestations of the relationship between the United States and the USSR.

Rather, I might usefully begin with a reminder that no President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has been able to avoid serious domestic political problems arising from involvements with the Third World. Moreover, a significant number of these difficulties, however aided and abetted by the Soviets, had origins in, and derived perpetrators from, radical political, religious, or racial forces beyond the Kremlin's control. And I might observe that Presidents Carter and Reagan have had to cope with some such non-Soviet crises which were without precedent. Trends are adverse. Future Presidents, with less relative national power at their disposal, will face larger numbers of Third World antagonists with access to sophisticated armaments, impelled by militant nationalism, ethnocentrism, and sectarianism.

As I understand the trends -- and I hasten to disclaim expertise concerning most -- we can expect, among the "less developed nations" of the Third World, future troubles which will stem from:
1. **Industrialization.** It is not clear how the fundamental economic transformations ongoing within the advanced industrialized countries -- the substantial conversion from hard-good manufacturers to service industries will affect Third World futures, but there is definite potential for presenting new military threats to US interests, for exacerbating have/have-not differences, and for inducing high-volume migrations, as well as for opening new opportunities for trade. It is already evident that the growth of arms industries indigenous to the Third World has contributed to the worldwide proliferation of advanced conventional weapons; while the US and the USSR continue to be the main suppliers, Brazil, Israel, China, and India are now capable of exporting armament and munitions competitive in quantities and quality with those manufactured in NATO or in the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, it seems just a matter of time before a number of Third World nations will possess both nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over ranges of a thousand miles or more.

2. **Unbalanced Growth.** There is already more socioeconomic dynamism among such rapidly industrializing giants as India, Brazil, or the People's Republic of China, or among industrializing mini-powers like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, than in either the stagnated communist-bloc, or the much-slowed free, industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere. Controversy over markets, tariffs, credit, and international money management seems likely to heighten, and even to dominate other aspects of US policy toward industrializing states. Perhaps as importantly, our progressively more aged population will contrast with their characteristically young populations, and we are apt to be perceived as a "status quo" power, obstructing rather than facilitating a brighter future.

3. **Oil Supplies and Oil Prices.** The Middle East remains the only major source of petroleum fuels without substantial local claimants, and without high accessibility costs. Exploratory wells there typically produce 100 times what flows from similar wells in the US. The chances are that OPEC will reassert itself as a major political-economic factor. But even OPEC reserves are limited, and the entire world is going to have to confront the reality that petroleum can continue to serve societies as it has over the past century only for a few decades to come. A shift to natural gas, coal, and nuclear power is inevitable, and is bound to have profound implications for US national strategy.

4. **New and More Restive Neighbors.** The prowess of air transportation and modern information media have brought the US into unprecedented intimacy with peoples worldwide. The recent waves of immigration, and the newsworthiness of Third World developments attest to these transformations. We live in an ever-smaller, ever more interdependent world, and find ourselves
caught up in national, racial, and religious quarrels for which our geography, history, and mores have not prepared us. Even the most familiar international relations require redefinition in the light of current and portended realities: the premises which have heretofore governed US relations with Mexico are questionably relevant for the future, for Mexico faces political, economic, and social urgencies which auger for both more internal instability and increasing tensions with the US.

5. Smuggled Drugs. Most of the illegal narcotics sold in the US come from Third World countries. The US has not been able, as yet, to curtail illicit drug consumption at home, or to develop techniques for decisive intervention, on behalf of a friendly government, against narco-traffickers abroad.

6. Shrinking Base Structure. The divestiture of US overseas military bases, which has been a hallmark of US experience in the Third World over the last two decades, is likely to continue, and we are likely to become ever more dependent militarily on naval power and force projection from the US itself to protect our interests abroad.

7. Exported Violence. Whatever their rhetoric about "peaceful competition," the USSR and its client states behave as though they are deeply committed to future political violence, and are determinedly preparing to foment, to augment, "support, or to capitalize upon it. The Soviet Union and Cuba, in particular, continue to train, year by year, thousands of young men and women from Third World nations for terrorism, insurgency, and subversion. Moreover, over the past decade, the presence and influence of Soviet Bloc nations has grown substantially in the Third World, as the following charts attest:

### ECONOMIC ADVISERS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cuban</th>
<th>East European</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that sometime in the mid-‘70s, strategists of the USSR, seeing the United States in the throes of Watergate, and perhaps encouraged by the War Powers Resolution and the Clark Amendment to believe that the US did not intend to contest a more aggressive policy in the Third World, launched a vigorous effort to suborn developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Like their war materiel, their undertakings were initially clumsy and trouble-prone; but they retrofitted in service, and today their overseas operations are quite serviceable. From the strategic point of view, the Soviets have managed "low intensity conflict" far better than the United States. They prefer to work low profile, preferably at the top. They are particularly adroit at installing their own or proxy command, communications, and intelligence systems. Their hand is often hidden, or clad in the velvet of humanitarian aid. They have an effective coalition strategy: their use of "fraternal nations" has been masterful. While their political and economic doctrines are patently vapid, and while association with them seems to offer to any Third World country only subjugation to a new, more oppressive form of imperialism, they probably consider it significant that the number of Marxist-Leninist garrison states in the Third World has grown. And now a Cuba-like Nicaragua is on the same continent with the United States.
But I hasten to reemphasize that the future security environment in the Third World can not be assessed only in East-West terms. There are ample indigenous causes for tension and violence, and year by year, armaments increase in range and lethality. It is possible to anticipate a time when nuclear weapons will be in the hands of Third World nations, such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq, whose recent history has been marred by instability and international ruthlessness. For example, the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College published last summer a paper entitled, A World 2010, A Decline of Superpower Influence, in which the author, Charles W. Taylor, speculates that national holdings of nuclear weapons might look like this:

YEAR 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post Industrial</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Preindustrial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR [1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam [4]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advanced Industrial</th>
<th>Transitioning Industrial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan [3]</td>
<td>Chile [4]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1] 2000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2] up to 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3] up to 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4] up to 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[5] up to 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implications of these speculations are not pleasant to contemplate: a world in which trained terrorists and subversives abound, operating in league with drug cartels, in which irresponsible nations will possess devastating military power. There will probably be a decline in the ability of any US President to influence events abroad, and an increase in the risks to national security with which our leaders, and the American people, will have to live. Sound strategy will be more important than ever.

Strategic Objectives

As you know, the President's Commission on Defense Management, the Packard Commission, recommended revision of the procedures by which defense budgets were prepared to emphasize the importance of the Commander-in-Chief's first eliciting from his principal advisers recommendations on national strategy, and
his providing them guidance relating strategic ends to means. I believe that the Republic is indebted to the leaders of this Committee not only to the attention they are directing to these matters in this Congress, but to their role in enacting the Nichols-Goldwater legislation on national security management, and on national readiness for special operations and low intensity conflict. Clearly, to arm for the future, we need to bring to bear all we can learn from the past, all our intellect, all our ingenuity.

Many Americans, and some Senators, believe, since violence is inevitable in the Third World, so inflexible are societies and governments there, so intractable are the problems of overpopulation and livelihood, that the objective of the US should be non-involvement. But we live today in a world so interdependent as to involve this nation with violence there, whether the President intends involvement or not, whenever:

- American citizens are assaulted, killed or held hostage.
- A representative democracy, respectful of human rights, faces violent extinction, or such a government might emerge from ongoing violence.
- American economic holdings are seriously threatened, or the regional climate of investment is severely impaired.
- It causes a considerable flow of refugees to the US.
- It facilitates international criminals preying upon US citizens, as in cocaine trafficking.
- It engages significant geostrategic imperatives, such as access to fuels or raw materials, protection of sea or air lines of communications, or denial of military bases to the USSR or its proxies.

To illustrate one approach to devising national strategy, let me offer a very hypothetical example, simply to show how one might proceed from presidential generalities to budgetary specifics. A President might want to establish national objectives something like the following:

Illustrative Strategic Objectives

L. Optimally, a community of free nations committed to open political systems, to eschewing political violence, and to respecting individual rights and freedoms. Minimally, reliable friends and allies committed to political ideals similar to our own, willing to act to preserve their independence and to help
others whose freedom is threatened. As a corollary, fewer states affiliated with Moscow, or governed in ways inconsistent with our precepts of human rights and dignity, or wedded to political violence in any form.

M. Equitable trade, financing, emigration, and aid policies within the community of free nations, coupled with concerted action against international criminality, especially illegal narcotics trafficking.

N. Concerted security arrangements within that community which shield political and economic developments consistent with Objectives A and B above.

O. Reduction in the risks to American citizens at home or abroad from international terrorists.

P. Security for international airways and waterways, and for access to fuels and raw materials.

Strategic Concepts

Objectives say what we want to do, but strategy also requires articulating broad principles of how to do it, and considering with what to do it.

What concepts might be relevant to achieving the foregoing objectives? The President might want to consider some like these:

Illustrative Strategic Concepts

17. Intelligence will be central to ascertaining the best course of action for the US in any nation or region, and in any given contingency. Intelligence is what we can best provide any threatened friend or ally. Accordingly, first priority should be given to collecting and analyzing information about people, places and events likely to affect achieving our objectives, and to disseminating intelligence to underwrite effective planning, diplomacy, and other actions.

18. Outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with few exceptions, the United States' role should be to support another party, or a regional group, willing to act on its own behalf. Our main contribution should be to help others to help themselves. But our deeds and our word should leave no doubt in Moscow that use of Soviet military forces anywhere in the Third World will precipitate prompt counteraction, at a time and place of our choosing.
19. In supporting developing free nations, we must proceed conscious of the real limitations upon our ability to act alone. Our aid should be selective, calculated to effect maximum deterrence among our antagonists, and greatest encouragement among our friends. We should try to obtain the cooperation of all advanced nations in proportion to their wealth, and to their economic and military capacity. Moreover, we should seek acceptance of responsibility by any free nation, whatever its wealth and state of development, to help another with money, manpower, or materiel, even if the donor can afford no more than token aid.

20. We should seek to obtain the cooperation of all nations to stop international terrorists, illicit arms shippers, and illegal narcotics traffickers. Particularly vulnerable terrorist targets, such as airliners and airports should be hardened by international compact. We should be prepared to support nations willing to cooperate, primarily with intelligence. And we should be prepared to act unilaterally as necessary ourselves.

21. We should maintain military readiness to attack with precision and discrimination to eliminate any direct threat to our homeland, but we should do so with mobile forces as independent of foreign basing as possible.

. . . . .

Strategic Means

How can these concepts be translated into national power? Past presidents, and occasionally the Congress, have translated a strategic idea -- or "doctrine," as these are sometimes referred to -- into a capacity for action by one or more of the following:

(1) Reorganization. Setting up a special command apparatus to signify to prospective foes, and to Congress and the American people, watchfulness, and intent to use force if necessary. Examples are President Carter's establishment of the Joint Caribbean Task Force at Key West to meet anxieties generated by the "discovery" of Soviet troops in Cuba in 1979, and President Reagan's assumption of the Carter Doctrine on the Persian Gulf by establishment of the US Central Command. An even more recent, and perhaps further reaching example, is the law establishing a new Assistance Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and authorities within the National Security Council to over watch interagency actions on low intensity conflict.

(2) Funding. Seeking extraordinary resource allocations to build new capabilities, as in the drive for a 600 ship Navy, or the Strategic Defense Initiative, or by canceling or postponing programs (e.g., B-1, Sergeant York).
(3) **Diplomacy.** Initiating action to alter strategic relationships by forming new alliances, revising old ones, or negotiating arms control agreements.

(4) **Restructuring.** Directing alterations of force structure as in the case of the recent Army initiative to form light infantry divisions, or the recent Congressional action to bolster special operations forces.

(5) **Redeployments.** Changing the disposition of US forces, such as moving the 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean, or withdrawing a division from Korea.

This Committee has been at the center of strategic concept and action for the past several years. The attention you have directed to management of the Department of Defense, to the capabilities of our unified and specified commands, and most recently to [an] organization to deal with SOF and LIC, has provided us all renewed strategic vision, and heightened awareness of what is necessary to pursue strategy, and, as importantly, what is superfluous or disfunctional.

Since my charge was to discuss strategy appropriate for low intensity conflict, I want now to focus on the recent legislation pertaining to that matter. The law gave a much needed boost to special operations forces. It was an excellent example of addressing "how" in strategy, in that Congress mandated the establishment of a new unified command with a Commander-in-Chief, and a new Assistance Secretary of Defense, both charged with seeing to it that special operations forces were properly funded, structured, and readied for employment. If these do their job, they will also assure diplomatic action to guarantee access for SOF as needed.

But I doubt that the law did as much to enhance US readiness for low intensity conflict. The new Assistant Secretary of Defense has a legislated charter to concern himself with low intensity conflict, but then virtually every other DOD official of comparable rank has overlapping responsibility, and low intensity conflict is the concern of a number of Cabinet officers other than the Secretary of Defense. The mandated Deputy National Security Advisor for Low Intensity Conflict is in a better position to deal with the interagency issues which LIC presents, and presumably the advisory board established by the law can assist the NSC in laying down a long range strategy for LIC. But unresolved are a wide range of questions, including how to organize to implement LIC strategy, how and for what to obtain funding, to what ends diplomatic action, and what forces where. To be sure, better SOF will help our LIC posture, but special operations are not synonymous with low intensity conflict, and I fear that making SOF a better competitor for defense resources may make LIC less likely, in the shouldering among claimants, to
receive the support it deserves within DOD, and less likely to attract Congressional interest.

As you well know, special operations forces are a unique set of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, with specialized training and equipment. Low intensity conflict is a form of warfare in which the US deliberately accepts limits on the kind and amount of force it brings to bear. These distinctions occasion very different requirements and attitudes within the armed services, within the Department of Defense, and within Congress, as the following indicates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Operations Forces</th>
<th>Armed Services</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>SOF/LIC Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires elites; Prime</td>
<td>Services abhor elites; actor</td>
<td>Supports, promotes; Provides ASD, CINC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Special operations forces have missions across the entire spectrum of war. Both US SOF and their Soviet counterparts were conceived for the apocalyptic contingencies of World War III. Much of the capabilities with which we endow our SOF have little or nothing to do with combatting terrorists, or training Third World forces to cope with guerrillas. Rather, SOF are organized and trained to lend an unconventional dimension to deterrence, and in particular to pose a threat of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities to nationalist dissidence. To be sure, they are manned by the sort of individuals one would want on his team in any dangerous, chancy, unstructured operation, of the sort we have often had to mount in the Third World. But we must not equate SOF with counterterrorist forces -- although counterterrorist forces are SOF -- and we surely must not consign them to the dustbin of "counterinsurgency." SCF are assuredly more catholic than "low intensity conflict."

It was the British, I believe, who first pointed out how useful it was for a nation possessing nuclear weapons to remind itself in its strategic doctrine that there are forms of conflict for which the possession of nuclear weapons is simply irrelevant -- a number of possible cases of recourse to violence for political purposes which are unlikely to be deterred by a nuclear arsenal, nor resolved by its use. Frank Kitson's 1971 book, Low Intensity Operations, is a case in point. I do not know whether
those who teach strategy at the Soviet equivalent of our War Colleges point out that the USSR's supporting international lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency is a low risk, low cost way of achieving the stated objectives of Leninism. Soviet strategy in the Third World would certainly suggest that such is the case.

But note that the Soviets have not made extensive use of their "special operations forces" outside their borders (with the significant exception of Afghanistan). Rather, they have pursued their ends indirectly, through training, aid, and advice for Third World proxies, avoiding the employment of elite combat forces. The telling fact about the Soviet role in Central America is that two-thirds of their nationals in Nicaragua are in a military field hospital in Chinandega: they appear before a people sensitive to foreign domination as benefactors.

The United States ought to approach low intensity conflict no less thoughtfully. We can not pursue our objectives in the Third World exclusively with the Peace Corps on the one hand, or the Green Berets on the other. We need a broader range of instruments for creating and maintaining the security shield for development rather than recourse to special operations forces alone.

Two years ago I imposed on this Committee the following chart, a depiction of a continuum of possible wars, or war-like uses of violence in which US interests might be involved:
The continuum is shown as broken to suggest that there is a categorical difference among conflicts pitting US forces against those of the Soviet Union, or of another power armed with weapons of mass destruction and intercontinental ranges, and conflicts with lesser adversaries. After all, US troops have not exchanged shots with the Red Army since it skirmished with the Michigan National Guard in the winter of 1918-1919, and going to war against the Soviets themselves would be to cross a significant, long-standing "firebreak." Similarly, we may be confronted with other enemies who could attack the US itself with chemical or nuclear weapons. In this paradigm, "low intensity conflict" occupies the left sector, where probability of occurrence is high, but intensity, referring to use of weapons of mass destruction, relatively low. "Low intensity conflict" then includes both terrorism and guerrilla warfare, as the following diagram suggests:
Note that I categorize any use of conventional forces for fire support or maneuver as mid-intensity; hence, as I see it, Grenada and Tripoli are outside the rubric of "low intensity conflict" (but I know that there is not general agreement on that point).

We can now visualize what sort of forces one might need to enact the concepts for achieving our national objectives. There are two contextual imperatives: (1) strategic or national intelligence, which provides a means of assessing threats, of anticipating their actualization, is essential for deciding if, when, where, and how to commit US forces; (2) mobile forces, especially naval forces which can collect intelligence and convey to potential adversaries our potential for using force should our interests so require. Admiral James Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, used this construct for naval contributions to low intensity conflict:

![The Spectrum of Conflict Diagram]

**THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT**

**Peacetime Presence**
- Surveillance

**Crisis Response**
- Show of Force
- Use of Force

**Limited War**
- Global Conventional War
  - Theater Nuclear War
  - Strategic Nuclear War

**Level of Violence**

LOW  HIGH

FIGURE 5
But if our fundamental goal is to help others to defend themselves, then our own forces would avoid direct action except in those rare circumstances where speed, surprise, or lack of alternatives dictate the use of our own special operations forces. Rather than engagement (fire support or maneuver), the force functions most likely to be needed ashore are security assistance, intelligence, and communications. On the following diagram, I have portrayed US force functions in the order in which they are likely to come into play inside a country afflicted with low intensity conflict:

![Diagram of US Force Functions in Low Intensity Conflict]

**US FORCE FUNCTIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**

- SOF Direct Action
- Security Assistance
- Theater Intelligence
- Communications
- Civic Action/PSYOPS
- Mobility
- Construction
- Medicine
- Logistical Support
- Fire Support
- Maneuver

**PROBABILITY**

**LOW**  **MID**  **HIGH**

**INTENSITY**

**FIGURE 6**
I believe that adroit use of US forces capable of performing the cited non-combatant functions in Third World countries might obviate the need to proceed beyond logistical support of indigenous forces to use of US general purposes forces for fire support or maneuver.

I regret to say that professional colleagues have obscured this issue by justifying the Army's new light infantry division on the grounds of utility for "low intensity conflict." One way the Army's natural repugnance for elites manifests itself is in a propensity to advertise all infantry as elite, and to claim for light infantry attributes one would be pleased to have in Rangers or Special Forces.

The facts are, of course, that light infantry divisions were built for strategic mobility, designed to deploy in a specified number of C-141s for use in intercontinental force projection to meet conventional threats. Their training may harden them to SOF standards, but I find it hard to conceive of useful missions for light divisions in "low intensity" conflict. It is fallacious to assume that readiness for one form of warfare automatically insures readiness for another; I suspect that readiness to defend the defiles of the Zagros is questionable preparation for serving on a mobile training team in El Salvador, or even for securing an airbase in Honduras. As for fighting, we would no longer be talking about LIC. US combatants would transform the intensity of any conflict. Any time a US infantryman dies in combat anywhere, we will be impelled to wage mid- or higher intensity warfare, to use ordnance in quality and quantity which almost surely will escape sensible definitions of "low intensity."

The diagram [Figure 6] emphasizes the importance of security assistance, theater intelligence, and communications, and each deserve comment as elements of readiness for low intensity conflict.

Security Assistance

The second of the "Illustrative Strategic Concepts" set forth above stressed helping others to help themselves. That is, of course, the fundamental premise of the "Guam Doctrine," a strategic concept which President Nixon and every President since has espoused. Given the increasing diversity of the world, and the growing limitations on American military power, such a concept reflects the only realistic way we can play an active role in the Third World. We and our friends face increasing threats from internationally supported subversion, terrorism, and criminality. As a strategic response, we have little recourse beyond helping those friends to deal with the perpetrators within the framework of their own laws and culture. Our alternatives, passivity or unilateral action, are unattractive, and would almost surely eventuate in more violence, at higher levels of intensity.
My impression from teaching and speaking around the country is that most Americans agree that we ought to provide security assistance. But it does not seem to have solid support in the Congress. Security assistance is provided for under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, as a part of "foreign aid." In the Budget, it is classified as "International Affairs" (Budget Function 150), not "national defense" (Budget Function 050). Twenty-five years of Congress's compromises have layered over the procedures for devising, reviewing, and justifying expenditures under the law to the point that, in my judgment, the resultant program is overly rigid, and no longer responsive to strategic reality. Let me be clear, however, that I believe that the several Administrations must bear responsibility for this state of affairs with the Congress.

In recent years, most security assistance funds have been spent as quid pro quo for overseas bases (e.g., Spain, Portugal, the Philippines, Korea), or to Cain/Abel pairing in which we seek to bribe one of a fraternal pair to eschew attacking another (e.g., Egypt/Israel, Greece/Turkey). Very little is left for Third World nations struggling with low intensity conflict. The following chart portrays how little is set aside for Africa and Latin America; the diagram is based on figures which exclude economic support funds, but show funds for military assistance, foreign military sales financing, and training:

![FY86 Security Assistance (Proposed)](image)

FIGURE 7
The Administration's total proposal for Fiscal Year 1986 security assistance (which are the latest figures I have to work with) amounted to some $6 billion. But within that amount just six nations were allocated over 80%; Egypt and Israel received more than half:

FY 86 Security Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Total Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But issues concerning security assistance are much more profound than simply cutting the resource pie, or arguing over whether the pie should be bigger or smaller. Even if budgets were not likely to grow smaller over the coming years, the United States can no longer be of much material help to any Third World nation wrestling with low intensity conflict because this nation no longer produces the sort of inexpensive, simple, rugged military equipment they require. Even more crippling, we charge too much for services, such as training and transportation.

Let me give an example: anyone who travels in the Third World appreciates that in most countries the sinews of nationhood include a fleet of rickety, but still serviceable C-47 (DC-3) aircraft, built in the US 3 or 4 decades ago. LIC crisis thrusts on any developing nation urgencies for use of air transportation -- for them, those old two-engined, unpressurized C-47s constitute strategic airlift. But we now have no American-manufactured aircraft which is a modern equivalent of the C-47 in versatility of operations, simplicity of maintenance, ease of manning, or cost of operation. The current US Air Force counterpart, the C-130, is much too complicated and demanding for most Third World countries, and when we present aid-clients C-130s, as we did to Chad a few years ago, we hang an economic millstone around their neck. Since 1966, there has been a recognized requirement within the US armed services for a fixed wing air transport capable not only of freight and transport duty, but also use in medical evacuation, communications relay, reconnaissance, and fire support. Because of competing demands for funds, and the lack of a constituency for so modest an airlifter within the Air Force, we still have nothing to fill that requirement, a "Third World airlifter" to offer LIC-beliequered friends anywhere.
I do not see how any Administration could implement the "Illustrative Strategic Concepts" above without some substantial revision of the Foreign Assistance Act as it now stands, a revision which would permit the Administration to engage our military professionals and American industrialists in imaginative, extended research and development programs seeking rational sets of equipment germane to LIC, some of which might then be manufactured overseas by one of the industrializing nations of the Third World. The strategic objectives and concepts under discussion would be the more viable were we thus to extend the notion of collective security within the Free World to include cooperative programs for integration into our security assistance -- meaning that we ought to set out, deliberately and energetically, to help others help others.

Theater Intelligence

That intelligence plays a critical role in low intensity conflict seems a truism, but there is a difference between the sort of intelligence which is available to the United States on a day-to-day basis, from our national collection systems or from our military forces in their normal pursuits, and the kind of detailed, fine-grain intelligence which can be generated by activating an intensive collection and analysis effort within one of the regional unified commands. The United States has had among its armed forces resources which might be used for such purposes, of proven efficacy, but currently scarce. By and large, they were brought into being for other purposes, chiefly as a hedge against high intensity conflict, and their diversion to LIC tasks entails acceptance of risk. Military intelligence units are often awkward to hosts abroad, equipped and manned as most of them are for missions in more intense warfare. Non-military intelligence services, and some Ambassadors, are understandably often reluctant to employ them. But I believe that developments in communications and processors (computers) now make it possible to contemplate new, economical intelligence architectures very different from the past.

Communications

To meet the exigencies of LIC, the President should seek, and the Congress should support, a National Command Communications System which makes possible secure image-conferencing among Ambassadors and CINCs abroad with officials of the several departments and agencies in Washington, the better to exchange information and judgments, and to evaluate collectively fast-moving situations. State Department communications have, in my experience, been inadequate for the task; DOT communications are more versatile and reliable, especially for intelligence dissemination. Intelligence is, after all, information that has been sifted, transmitted, and placed between the ears of a decider or operator. But we will not have effective intelligence
for LIC, in my view, until we remedy three major deficiencies in DOD communications:

(1) Most DOD assets have been reserved for the contingencies for mid- and high intensity conflict, and have been only reluctantly and sparingly made available for LIC situations.

(2) Most are expensive, complicated, and manpower intensive, buttressed as they are against electromagnetic pulse and the energetic high technology countermeasures of a world-power adversary.

(3) Most are not welcomed in embassies; diplomats have been prone to resist installing communications which they do not directly control.

But we are entering into an age of communications plenty; we need but a plan for exploiting technology. Communications for supporting LIC functions need not be provided at the expense of other missions, and need not be either expensive or complex.

Other Force Functions for LIC

Civic action, the provision by military forces of aid to the populace, is a contentious undertaking. Most Ambassadors and AID Country Directors look upon it with suspicion that it will lead to the military's usurping projects which should properly be performed by civilian agencies or the private sector. When it comes to using US forces in civic action, these complications multiply. But if civic action projects are carefully selected, military forces will be assigned tasks only when and where there are no civilians to perform them. As far as US forces are concerned, civic action projects overseas often provide opportunities for training unavailable in the US, given the EPA and other constraints on what military units, such as engineer battalions or well-drilling detachments, can do at home station.

I have mentioned four other "force functions" -- possible US force contributions to coping with low intensity conflict:

- Construction
- Mobility
- Medicine
- Logistic Support

Were the Administration so to direct, and the Congress to support, I am convinced that the United States could:

- Acquire capabilities to communicate broadly and effectively with peoples anywhere on the surface of the globe.
o Greatly increase our own capabilities, and those of foreign governments, to develop and act on intelligence on terrorists, guerrillas, and international criminals.

o Develop and teach pioneering and construction techniques which could significantly change the orientation of foreign armed forces.

o Create similarly useful medical cadres and medical service organizations within foreign armed forces.

o Modernize and rationalize logistics within foreign forces, to the betterment of their military efficiency, and the improvement of their nation's economy.

The payoff for such a strategy would be more free nations, and confounded and deterred terrorists, insurgents, and traffickers. The payoff would be diminished chances that US armed forces, SOF or any others, would have to be committed to combat.
My topic for today deals with the myths and trends of low intensity conflict, and what I hope to do is tie that discussion in with some reflections on what is left undone and what we in the low intensity conflict community can contribute to the task of coming to grips with this important challenge to US national interests.

Low Intensity Conflict Myths

It's difficult to think of an area more prone to enduring myths than low intensity conflict. In fact, we have even managed to make these myths the basis for policy on occasion.

LIC MYTHS

- The Lesser Included Case
- Equals SOF
- Primarily A Military Problem
- No Useful Definition
- Bipolarity

One myth long held to be true by military policy makers was the idea that low intensity conflict is the lesser-included case, that if you prepare adequately for high or mid intensity wars you have, by definition, prepared for low intensity threats. In football terms, this is the idea that, "If you can beat the varsity, you can beat the JV!" Of course, in football, this is generally true. The problem in low intensity conflict, to stretch the analogy slightly, is that the JV may not be playing football at all. In other words, the rules of the game may be so different that your most expensively acquired capabilities may be irrelevant.
As recently as 1975, this idea had official status:

US planning attempts to ensure that overall forces generated for major conflicts have the inherent capability to engage in the full spectrum of plausible lesser conflicts.

NSSM 240-1975

While no longer an official part of our policy, the underlying assumptions persist.

The effect of this myth, of course, has been to rationalize the continued commitment of resources almost exclusively to capabilities needed at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. In some cases, the resulting capability may be less useful in low intensity conflicts than the equipment it replaces, for example strategic bombers may be replaced by stealth aircraft which are fewer in number, more expensive to operate, and have limited applicability to the low intensity conflict environment, or in our acquisition of surface combatants with little or no gun capability. Of course, the danger to national survival reflected by nuclear or general war mandates concentration on our strategic capabilities; but we ought not deceive ourselves into thinking that we are also buying inherent security from threats at the other end of the spectrum.

A second myth, one which persists even among key decision-makers, is that low intensity conflict equals SOF, that we can leave the task of preparing for and conducting operations in the low intensity conflict environment exclusively to special operations forces. No doubt this misperception has been strengthened by the 1986 legislation which created both an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the US Special Operations Command. In truth, of course, CINCSOC is not in charge of low intensity conflict, and recent US low intensity conflict involvement has been predominantly conducted by conventional forces. In the Persian Gulf, Grenada, and the strike on Libya, conventional forces provided the bulk of the deployed combat power. And that is the lesson: although SOF have important capabilities across the spectrum of conflict, they are neither necessarily nor uniquely the force of choice for low intensity conflict. The reality will most often be a combination of special and conventional forces and capabilities.

And that leads to the next myth, that low intensity conflict is primarily a military problem, amenable to mostly military solutions. This idea endures because low intensity conflicts usually get attention in this country only when they reach the stage of military conflict. But the President's National Security Strategy clearly states that there are four instruments...
applicable to the low intensity conflict environment: political, economic, informational, and military. When military power must be applied, indirect applications of military power, especially security assistance, are preferred over direct applications. Only when vital US interests are at stake are we to consider the introduction of US combat forces. So the role of other, non-DOD agencies, is key to success in low intensity conflict. State, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, DEA, and others all must contribute to an integrated US Government effort in a country or region.

There are also those who believe that we have no useful definition of low intensity conflict, or that another term would better describe the phenomenon. Some have suggested that "non-career enhancing conflict" would better describe the reality. But we do have an approved DOD and US Government definition of low intensity conflict:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

This definition is useful for the very reason that it has been agreed to by all of the agencies concerned. Ultimately, it doesn't really matter whether we totally agree with the definition; we must use it to ensure that we focus our debate and begin to achieve a common understanding.

Finally, the myth of a US and Soviet dominated bipolar world retains a stubborn attractiveness for policy-makers in the context of low intensity conflict. This myth has significant consequences for our concept of low intensity conflict. It is no longer possible to say, for example, that sources of external support to low intensity conflict are limited to the superpowers. Venezuela and Panama have been principal supporters of the FMLN in Nicaragua. France has provided important support to the FMLN in El Salvador. Libya has provided arms to the IRA in Northern Ireland. And China has provided substantial amounts of arms and equipment to insurgents in Afghanistan and Cambodia and belligerents in the Persian Gulf.
Certainly, recent US involvement in low intensity conflict tends to support the multi-polar view. United States actions in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Sidra, and Grenada were occasioned by complex combinations of factors, not primarily by Moscow.

It's interesting to note, by the way, that the bipolar view of the world retains its charm at very high levels:

Tonight, one out of every four countries around the globe is at war. In virtually every case, there is a mask on the face of war. In virtually every case, behind the mask is the Soviet Union and those who do its bidding.

Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Jan 1986

I do not mean to imply that the Soviets are not the principle US adversary. They are and will remain so for the foreseeable future. But we will fail to confront adequately the low intensity conflict threat if we focus only on problems clearly inspired by the Soviets or their surrogates, or if we ascribe our difficulties in the Third World solely to our differences with the Soviet Union.

Low Intensity Conflict Trends

Let me now turn to a discussion of trends in the low intensity conflict environment. Low intensity conflict is a phenomenon which lends itself poorly to understanding through snapshots; the environment is constantly changing. We can safely predict the likely effects of some of these trends; about others we can only say that they will have important effects and bear watching.

LIC TRENDS

- Soviet Policy
- World Economy
- Strategic Nuclear Balance
- Lethality Of Conventional Weapons
- Availability Of Weapons
- Insurgent/Terrorist/Narco-trafficker linkages
- Third World Economic/Demographic Changes

One of the most widely discussed trends evident today revolves around the changes apparent both with the Soviet Union and in its relations with the outside world. I will not detail these changes; you will have read about them in the press and formed your own opinions. It's too soon to attempt to predict whether Secretary Gorbachev will be successful in transforming Soviet political culture, or what the effects will be on Soviet actions in the Third World. One hypothesis is a scenario in
which a restructured economy and reduced military outlays due to arms agreements could result in "discretionary funds" to support increased Soviet adventurism abroad. Yet another possibility is that Soviet internal problems and difficulties with Warsaw Pact allies might lead to increased Soviet willingness to cooperate in settling long-standing regional conflicts. And of course there are many other possible scenarios. We will have to watch very closely as these forces work themselves out in the next few years, and be alert to the consequences for our policies in the Third World and elsewhere.

A second trend apparent to most observers is that there are significant changes taking place in the world economic order. Some of the aspects of this trend include a rising gap between the global "haves" and the "have-nots," increased economic interdependence, and a decreasing US ability to police the international economic system, especially as our own economic situation grows less stable. These factors portend both enhanced conditions for Third World instability and a reduced capability on our part to deal effectively with those conditions. The US can no longer impose its will on the world economy as we could for a decade or so after World War II, but must encourage other emerging and established economic powers to play constructive roles.

The change in the nuclear balance of power, to a position of rough parity between the superpowers, along with nuclear proliferation now at the margins of the Third World, has important implications even in low intensity conflict. Some argue that this parity poses a restraint on the actions of the superpowers, while not restraining the adventurism of such regional actors as Cuba, Libya, or Syria. The superpower nuclear threat has little credibility to deter these kinds of aggression.

A relevant technological trend is the revolution in conventional weapons. For example, we and others can now deliver potent conventional weapons over great distances with extreme precision. But high tech weapons are not the exclusive property of the superpowers, and that means that the risks inherent in so-called "small wars" may be extreme. Remember the impact of a small number of Exocet missiles on our operations in the Persian Gulf, and on the British in the Falklands campaign. Other examples include the introduction of Stingers in Afghanistan, a weapon credited by some analysts as tipping the scales in favor of the Mujahidin, or the use of recent vintage Soviet mines to threaten the approaches to the Suez in 1984. Of course, the proliferation and possible use of chemical weapons, a cheap and easily produced commodity, further restrains our freedom of action in the low intensity conflict environment.
Allied to the revolution in conventional weapons is the proliferation of large numbers of weapons, both sophisticated and not, throughout the Third World. It is instructive to note that Third World arms imports increased an average of 7 percent each year from 1970-1984. Should US troops be introduced into a Third World conflict, they will not be likely to find themselves in "permissive environments."

Another recent trend is the increasingly well-documented linkage between insurgents, terrorists, and narcotics traffickers in some regions. The very survival of some governments under threat from this combination is in question. The implications for us are more instability in the Third World, and greater difficulty in dealing with it, as the narco-traffickers buy security from the terrorists and insurgents, while providing them with weapons and funds.

Finally, we must take note of economic and demographic changes within the Third World which are likely to exacerbate unrest. Such factors as increased urbanization, uncontrolled population growth, and the shift to an export economy more dependent on world market trends all complicate our comprehension of the low intensity conflict phenomenon and make our planning task more difficult.

Prospects for Low Intensity Conflict

It's not possible to specify with any precision the cumulative effects of these trends, but it seems safe to predict that low intensity conflicts will continue at the present level of activity or higher, that the presence or absence of Soviet involvement will be less critical in determining our own role, that we will be unable to avoid involvement, sometimes direct involvement, and that such involvement carries with it greater risks than ever.

Nor is it possible to predict with any great confidence how the "grand US low intensity conflict strategy" will evolve in the next few years. We are about to transition to a new administration and a new Congress, and we don't yet know how low intensity conflict will figure in their various agendas. But I would argue that those of us in the military community cannot afford the luxury of ignoring low intensity conflict needs. History shows that the bill payers of failed policy and short-sighted national security planning are the military forces of the nation.

I think that's especially true in the low intensity conflict environment. As Clausewitz pointed out, "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means." While the economic, political, and informational policy instruments are preeminent in the earliest stages of low intensity conflict
situations, often the only remaining resort when our policies have failed or circumstances have conspired against us is to use military forces in a direct role. The alternative may be to do nothing, and when US interests are at stake, as they sometimes are, we will not be able to afford that. This is exactly the situation which has played itself out in the Persian Gulf in recent years, in which a regional conflict spilled over in ways which affected vital US interests, including access to resources, relations with allies, and our credibility as a superpower. The result was a decision in favor of military intervention.

It's instructive to examine the Persian Gulf example a bit more closely in terms of low intensity conflict. Were we ready for the threat which presented itself? Were our capabilities suited to the situation we found ourselves in? Were the risks clearly understood before the decisions were made? I'm not going to attempt to answer these questions in this forum, but these are the kinds of questions on which we must focus in our analysis for the future.

The Low Intensity Conflict Community

At the beginning of my remarks, I asked how the DOD low intensity conflict community can contribute to an understanding of the low intensity conflict challenge and help find useful solutions. Before I tackle that one, let me first try to explain what I mean by the low intensity conflict community.
The DOD low intensity conflict community is just a part, though a very important and a very active part, of the larger low intensity conflict community which includes both governmental and non-governmental actors. These linkages, although informal and often at the working level, are critical, and we must work to strengthen them through fora such as this.

The DOD community is a loosely connected network of people and organizations interested in low intensity conflict either by the nature of their missions or by avocation. Many of those people are probably in this room this morning. What connects them in most cases is the notion that low intensity conflict is important to US national security interests, and that we can do better than we are currently doing.

Low Intensity Conflict and National Defense

What does the DOD low intensity conflict community have to offer? This is more than a rhetorical question. If you accept the premise that the United States will continue to be involved in low intensity conflicts, and that the role of the military will be as described earlier in my remarks, then you must accept a part of the responsibility for ensuring that we are ready.

The first contribution we can make is that of perspective. Perspective includes bringing your expertise and appreciation for the low intensity conflict threat to bear on our organizational
tasks. Perspective includes insuring the leadership is made aware of low intensity conflict requirements. It means advocacy of low intensity conflict programs. It includes providing focus for low intensity conflict issues to ensure proper attention and consideration. Providing perspective applies both inside and outside DOD circles; low intensity conflict must be a total government effort.

Secondly, we must begin the difficult task of defining, and quantifying where possible, low intensity conflict requirements. This includes formulating doctrine, structuring organizations, defining training requirements, and identifying equipment needs. We must find the appropriate resources balance between our nuclear and general war needs and the requirements for the most likely form of conflict, low intensity. In practical terms, this means that a Navy surface combatant capable of engaging and destroying state-of-the-art Soviet air, surface, and sub-surface threats may also be required to neutralize a 40 foot high speed gunboat. It means that an AWACS aircraft designed for battle management in a high intensity environment may also be required to support the on-scene commander during the evacuation of non-combatants from a hostile country or region. And it means that a soldier trained to deal effectively with a T-72 tank must also be able to contend successfully with a 15-year old hurling Molotov cocktails.

How do we achieve these objectives? One answer is that a lot is already happening. Many low intensity conflict-related initiatives are already underway in the Services and Unified and Specified Commands. But more remains to be done. If we are to truly define low intensity conflict requirements, the warfighting CINCs must be the primary advocates, as they address the low intensity conflict threats in the AORs and identify resource and capability shortfalls. The Services and the Joint Staff can only respond effectively to validated CINC priorities.

Although many separate efforts are underway, there is no mechanism for coordination and integration of those efforts. One possibility would be something like a DOD Master Plan for low intensity conflict, a process which has worked well in other areas, such as psychological operations. I have asked the Executive Session on Thursday, which will include Service and CINC representatives, to address the question of whether such a framework would be useful, and if so, how we might get started producing one.

Closing Remarks

The last message I would leave with you today is this: don't lose heart. You may feel frustrated and discouraged by a perceived lack of support in your organizations and agencies for systematically addressing low intensity conflict. But this is important work, key to our national security. If you and I don't do it, who will?
I want to thank you for inviting me to address this conference on low intensity conflict policy planning. The Director of Central Intelligence and I, as you may know, coordinate the national level activities and budgets of all the elements of the US intelligence community -- including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), CIA, and the foreign intelligence elements of the FBI, the Departments of Energy, State, and Treasury and the military services. It is in the context of our overall intelligence community responsibilities that I speak today, for the critical role of intelligence in the American conduct of low intensity warfare transcends the capabilities of any single agency. Indeed, bureaucratic parochialism and turf battles -- within and among policy and intelligence agencies -- have in the past been an obstacle to US conduct of war against subversion, insurgency, terrorism and narcotics.

Nearly three years ago, in January 1986, Secretary of State Shultz said "low intensity conflict is the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century. The future of peace and freedom may well depend on how effectively we meet it." That same month, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said, "much has been written about low intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively."

In my DDCI confirmation hearings in the spring of 1986 I said that "we face a very complicated international environment." Resistance movements are fighting Soviet aggression in their country. There are groups resisting the imposition of Marxist-Leninist regimes supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam in their countries. The Soviets have a very active covert action program aimed at political destabilization that we estimate broadly is costing them on the order of $4 billion a year. We are confronting problems in the world of narcotics, terrorism, proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and a host of other problems. I think that the experience of the last 10 years would suggest that in many of these cases, diplomacy alone is not
an effective instrument. I think that experience also would show that in many of these instances, overt military action by the United States is either not appropriate, or would not be supported by the American people or the Congress. At that point, the United States has two options. It can develop other instruments by which to carry out its policy and to try and protect its interests, or it can turn and walk away. This conference and others like it contribute to developing the other instruments for waging low intensity conflict. We cannot and must not walk away.

Low Intensity Conflict: What Is It?

Low intensity conflict presents us with a major national security challenge. Unfortunately, the meaning of "LIC" still lies in the eye of the beholder. Just what is it that concerns us so much? As a point of departure, NSDD 277 defines "LIC" as political-military confrontation between contending states or groups, below conventional war, and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. These conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

The important thing to remember is that "LIC" is a strategy of conflict, where dilatory tactics are employed with increasing violence to wear down the opponent. As Jean-Paul Sartre put it, "(the insurgent) tires out his adversary until they are sick of him." To the insurgent, "LIC" is a process; to us, it's an event. The difference is fundamental.

I know that the military considers foreign internal defense, contingencies, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism as "LIC" missions. I believe that one day you will add counter-narcotics, narcoterrorism and the adversarial actions of states governed directly or indirectly by narcotic cartels as discrete LIC tasks.

We are only beginning to come to grips with defining the LIC issue coherently, attacking it analytically and countering it operationally. And, while many parts of our national security machinery are -- or soon will become -- involved in confronting the threats posed by low intensity conflict, the foundation of our efforts to meet these threats lies in intelligence -- in understanding the problem, collecting information and analyzing it, in providing the decision maker with a framework and, increasingly often, the means for combating it.
Low intensity conflict is the "weapon of choice" in the Third World, and its many manifestations constitute the slings and arrows of availability and economy against larger, more developed powers whose defenses are designed primarily for nuclear and conventional military conflicts and whose strengths are in economic development and democratic values. It is a classic case of the capacity to destroy arrayed against the capacity to build.

All of this brings me back to Secretary Shultz's statement that low intensity conflict is our primary challenge through the rest of this century. It also brings me to the focus of my remarks here -- the role of intelligence in support of our efforts to manage low intensity conflict.

The Role of Intelligence

The intelligence community once allocated almost all of its resources against the Soviet Union and China, but this has changed dramatically over the last decade. As the challenges of low intensity conflict have grown over the last several years, the intelligence community has responded. The community started an aggressive rebuilding program in the early '80s that has come to include, to a great degree, the intelligence ingredients of low intensity conflict support. We have added to our agencies a sizable number of operations officers, attaches and analysts in the Third World, and greatly expanded our information base on the Third World. We've established the Central America Joint Intelligence Team, a joint terrorist center, and built a community terrorist data base. We've developed better and quicker ways to deliver SIGINT and imagery support to the field. We're now working to strengthen the intelligence community's contribution to the war on overseas narcotics production and networks. Time and again in recent years, from Grenada to the Achille Lauro to major offensives against drug refineries and networks, we have made a major contribution to successful US actions and policies, and at the same time, used each experience to strengthen our capabilities even more.

Intelligence has two roles to play in LIC. The first is strategic -- to anticipate challenges to this country and its friends and allies and thereby provide the basis for preventive -- or damage limiting -- measures to preempt or limit those challenges. The whole idea is to deal with these challenges early, when they are more susceptible to outside influence, and in time to preclude the need for direct military intervention. To do this, we must learn more about developments in the Third World and provide early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation. It is important that we have in place resources to carry out this task.
The second role of intelligence is tactical support, both informational and operational, once our government decides to react to a specific threat. The immediate objective at this level is to stabilize the situation without the introduction of US combat forces, to provide an environment within which our broader nation building effort can be undertaken. We are usually trying to buy time for the host country to get its act together, the premise being that it is their struggle and they must fight it.

Low intensity conflict targets are more difficult in certain respects for the intelligence community to address than the traditional Soviet intelligence target. Specific threats are all too often very difficult to forecast. They are rarely foreseen in time to have any impact on scheduled programmatic actions, and frequently they occur in areas where we have little or no intelligence infrastructure. Low intensity conflicts are often less susceptible to national technical means and demand dependence as well on traditional HUMINT, tactical signals and reconnaissance means, and analysis. Making matters still worse, access to the local country may be denied to us and often there may be no official US presence of any kind. When we have not adequately anticipated a low intensity conflict situation, we often must quickly develop an adequate intelligence infrastructure.

One aspect of low intensity conflict that is common to many low intensity operations involves supporting friendly governments -- in most cases, Third World governments. Perhaps the single most important challenge is instilling in host governments a sense of the critical role of early and consistent use of intelligence. We are repeatedly finding that this is our number one priority and problem. What often holds us back, however, is that in many Third World areas the term "intelligence" is often synonymous with "internal security." There are significant cultural, power and resource implications of focusing the country's attention on "intelligence." Even after the value of true intelligence is accepted, there remains the task of organizing and applying timely and sustained intelligence. We in the United States may believe that intelligence is one of the key ingredients to success in low intensity conflict operations, but if we don't convince the local leadership, it can't play its crucial and beneficial role.

Common to much of low intensity conflict is the importance of being "target smart." Low intensity conflict may be mostly a conceptual issue in Washington, but in the field it can concern minutiae about exact warehouse locations and such small details as which way doors open. Failure to know these kinds of details can literally be fatal. Usually we need to work hard with the local country's targeting and analysis people and encourage support by the proper local users to instill an appreciation for this.
Another requirement is the need to build, or at least improve local intelligence organizations. This often calls upon us to provide direct SIGINT, imagery and human collection support and product capabilities for a sustained period. It also frequently means tailoring our own collection systems or even devising new systems peculiar to the local requirements.

We must also help with developing and providing intelligence communications and training. Very often, intelligence is available in the capital but does not reach units in the field on a timely basis. More often than not, government forces are using communications equipment and techniques that are wide open to compromise, another factor which weakens their ability to respond forcefully and erodes morale.

Further we must focus on the critical need for many of our allies in the Third World to improve their counterintelligence capabilities. This is particularly valuable to insurgency operations where agent penetration can have a devastating effect.

Finally, I should point out that intelligence serves numerous other purposes related to LIC. We provide significant support to friendly and allied countries, support resistance movements, aid in the suppression of drugs, and work to deter and respond to terrorism. And we regularly develop intelligence in support of other national-level activities, ranging from security assistance, aid, trade, economic development, human rights, and political and social issues, such as promoting democracy. All of these activities go to the heart of low intensity conflict.

Management

Let me comment briefly on the management impact of all this. Much of the management problem relates to the issues that I mentioned just a moment ago of setting priorities and allocating resources. Here is an area where we can use your help.

I think we'd all agree that the intelligence community needs to place special focus, on a community-wide basis, on low intensity conflict intelligence support issues, at least to assure that we understand low intensity conflict and can improve intelligence support. But we must also remember that intelligence is a supporting community and not a policymaking organization. No major shifts of resources or priorities can be sustained without a policy consensus. We are seeing such a consensus develop around counterterrorism and drug enforcement.

The management of our collection assets is another issue that cuts across priorities in allocating and melding resources. There is no question but that our classic collectors do a terrific job collecting against low intensity conflict targets and that they will continue to be tasked. At the same time the
old "keep it simple" rule is unquestionably essential to low intensity conflict collection. This is particularly true when one of your objectives is ultimately to turn the collection and the collector over to the host country. Here is another place where technology -- particularly low cost, simple to operate and maintain technology -- can help.

Another challenge we, as managers, confront is the difficulty of anticipating the next hot spot and committing resources. Who could have anticipated in 1980 that Grenada or even Lebanon would become the focus of US military action. How could we allocate resources well in advance to be ready for crises in the long list of countries, many of them small and obscure, where the US has supported friends or allies in recent years?

This places a premium on surge capabilities that can depend on already existing data bases, and specialists on the general art of combating or waging insurgencies, of countering and thwarting terrorism, of tackling narcotics networks. We need a core of experts -- still thin and fragile -- in each area to ensure that new tactics, new information and old and new experience are adequately integrated. This often will require bureaucratic flexibility to create new organizations as they are needed, as well as the innovativeness to identify ways in which American strengths -- economic, political, technological -- can be brought to bear. And it puts a premium on protecting expertise even on small, currently or seemingly unimportant countries.

Finally, let me address a critically important aspect of intelligence support. For far too long, we have been content to be passive participants in low intensity conflict. We collect information, we analyze it, and we send reports to policy agencies and officials. Yet, we know -- as I said before -- that traditional diplomacy and military measures are usually not effective against low intensity conflict -- especially insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, terrorism, and subversion. Often the most effective offensive weapons available are those either in intelligence or are deeply dependent upon the aggressive use of intelligence. We in intelligence must think offensively about our role. Covert action; in intelligence training, collection, and targeting intelligence assistance to friendly governments threatened by communist insurgencies; action to thwart, disrupt, frustrate, and divide terrorist groups; the pinpointing of vulnerabilities of terrorist and narcotics networks; the public exposure of subversive, terrorist and narcotics activities; and the development of new strategies, tactics and technologies to wage low intensity conflict are but some of the many ways intelligence can help combat low intensity conflict effectively. But we can no longer think or behave as passive observers. We in intelligence are the shock troops of
low intensity conflict. Managers must lead this change in attitude and priority.

Future Challenges

Let me close with a personal observation about low intensity conflict. It is essential to appreciate that low intensity conflict is preeminently still -- war without declaration, without mobilization, without massive armies. It is, in many respects, that long twilight war described a quarter century ago by President Kennedy.

In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere we are seeing the fruits of American policies and programs. Major changes are under way inside the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries. But it is critical for us to maintain our vigilance. We cannot allow these currently favorable -- and welcome -- developments to lull us into a weakened security posture, especially regarding intelligence. Intelligence capabilities will be increasingly important, as we seek to anticipate change and provide early warning of impending threats or situations that demand attention.

Third tier countries and subnational groups will be far more sophisticated in conducting low intensity war than they are today. Technology developments in recent years seem to favor the adversary more than governments. Indeed, some elements, such as the narcotics traffickers, are often better armed and equipped than the government forces they face. Some of the most advanced armaments are now available on the legitimate and gray arms markets. Military power itself no longer serves to deter those adversaries whose strategy is one of the indirect approach. Thus more sophisticated and enduring approaches are required to deal with the underlying causes of LIC, to inhibit the growth of militant insurgencies.

You know that shrinking budgets will inevitably lead to increased friction between and among the various competing agencies of government. Accordingly we need -- perhaps more so than at any earlier time -- to rise above parochial concerns and look to the national interest. A strengthened intelligence posture in the Third World would be a strong indicator of our commitment to deal effectively with this increasingly important arena of conflict.

Let me conclude by noting that as you consider low intensity conflict and how to deal with it, it is imperative to remember that the sources, the wellsprings of such conflict often are still governments. And, I further submit to you that, as in the past forty years, these political-military wars of varying scale will demand our attention and that of our leaders as far into the future as we can see. If we deny or simply fail to recognize
that most low intensity conflict is war and often is conducted or
sustained by states and forces deeply hostile to us, we will
underestimate its durability, its danger to us, and its scope.

I set forth these propositions and analysis because too many
treat low intensity conflict as a new and narrowly viewed
phenomenon, the latest fad -- the newest bandwagon bureaucracies
and contractors alike are climbing aboard because it's perceived
to be where the action and the dollars are. If we fail to see
the larger strategic picture, if we ignore the lessons we can
learn from our past experience in these conflicts, if we regard
low intensity conflict as a transitory phenomenon rather than an
enduring element of the international environment to be
strategically managed, then we will constantly be on the
defensive, we will be reacting -- dancing to the tune of
subversion and aggression, of terrorists and drug dealers. We
must develop realistic policies, public support for those
policies and make the long term investment in resources,
technology and information essential to overcoming or winning low
intensity conflicts.
THOUGHTS ON LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

John O. Marsh
Secretary of the Army
ASD/SO-LIC and DIA/DIC
Low Intensity Conflict
Curriculum Symposium

Defense Intelligence College
Bolling AFB, DC
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We're very grateful to you for your [Dr. Olson, ASD/SO-LIC, Director for LIC] leadership, particularly your intellectual leadership in a very vital field of our national defense endeavors. I'm very pleased that I could be here with Ambassador Whitehouse. I think he has made enormous strides in the Pentagon and indeed in our government in focusing on this issue. His task as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict is not an easy one. I can assure you because I had an opportunity to work in an acting capacity for six or seven months before he assumed the helm. We're also fortunate that we have with us both Max Thurman [Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command] and Jim Lindsay [Commander-in-Chief, US Special Operations Command], two individuals that have enormous responsibilities in the Army and the Department of Defense in this very special field. Max is our senior educator in the Army and was the architect of the Army's modern recruiting plan.

Jim Lindsay has had the task of establishing the first ever command as the CINC in this area. This has not been without challenges and difficulties. I'm not going to say obstacles, but he has an outstanding military background that well adapts him to that task.

In the 1962 elections, the issue that ultimately dominated in the last two to three weeks of the campaign was the Cuban missile crisis. If you recall, those very tense days when you had this confrontation in the straits of Florida and world peace hung in the balance. Campaigning in '62 at that time, I know its impact on the electorate. It was my first election to the House of Representatives.

On the Saturday following that election, I was called by a farmer who lived about six or so miles from my home in Strasburg. He asked me if I would come down to his farm to meet with him and other farmers about a natural phenomenon that was occurring on a group of adjacent farms where suddenly, without any warning, a
large sinkhole, or sinkholes, 10-15 feet deep, 20 or 25 feet wide, would suddenly appear on the farm, probably caused by the pumping of underground water by a quarry operation a mile or so away. I went down to this farm. It was a cold, dreary, drizzling November day. When I got there, there was a group of farmers in the backyard of this farmer's home, 30 or so yards from his house. They were looking down into this crater. I walked over there with the farmer, and down in the bottom of the crater was a dead horse. Now this is a true story. The farmer said to me, "We had to shoot the horse because he fell in the hole and broke his leg." We were all standing around with our heads in somewhat reverent status, I guess looking down into this crater, and maybe my responses were not just everything the farmer expected. For some reason, in a voice with a little anger in it, he turned to me and he said, "Mr. Marsh, that hole is a helluva lot more important to me than Cuba, because it's in my backyard."

I have never forgotten that. I realized that day, that as a member of Congress, campaigning where I'd spent maybe 75 to 80 percent of my time on national security issues, that I was going to a Congress where I'd be devoting 75 to 80 percent, maybe 90 percent, of my time to things that did not relate to national issues, and I would have 10 percent of my time to devote to things that I felt were very important. But I also concluded on national security issues we must make these issues a hole in the backyard of every American. Now that's what we're trying to do here. We want to make low intensity conflict a hole in the backyard of every member of military service, particularly the officer leadership of those services, in the non-commissioned officer leadership, where they can understand it. And we should realize that we're not dealing with something that is necessarily of Soviet origin. We've got to get that out of our minds.

The Soviets will exploit it, but it is not necessarily of Soviet origin. It may be, it may not be. In Afghanistan, there was a clear Soviet presence. In Nicaragua, there is a clear Soviet influence. There are other areas in the world today in the 20 to 22 conflicts that are currently being waged and, with the exception of the Iran-Iraq war which is in the stages of partial truce, they are all low intensity conflicts. And whether we like it or don't like it, that's the war we're in, and that's the war we've got to train our people to fight. The strategy of deterrence that we've used in Western Europe has been a brilliant stroke of American foreign policy. It has kept the peace in Western Europe for a longer period since the fall of the Roman Empire. But the military challenge today requires another brilliant stroke of foreign policy, and this is in the Third World where the 20 or 22 conflicts are being waged.
Now we have a tendency to beat up on the Congress. I know that because I've been a member of Congress and I've beat up on them myself and I've been beat up on enough as a member of Congress to know that this happens. But I want to tell you something. In this field (LIC), the Congress is ahead of the Executive Branch of government. If you look at the legislation of 1987, you see several major things have occurred: 1) the creation of the Special Operations Command which General Lindsay commands; 2) the establishment of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict which Ambassador Whitehouse so ably leads and 3) development of the Low Intensity Conflict Board at Cabinet level for the purpose of focusing national attention of our government on this very, very critical area.

If you look at the classified report that the President sent to the Congress, as required by law that he do, you see an excellent statement by the President summarizing the Congressional action and it should not be lost on us. Congress, in the Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization Bill, defined the requirement for this report specifying that it address the capability of the US to engage in low intensity conflict and conduct special operations, identify deficiencies in these capabilities, summarize actions that are being taken to correct deficiencies, describe principal low intensity conflict threats, and provide a status report of actions being taken to implement this report and appropriate sections of the National Defense Act of 1987. That was signed by the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief. It seems to me that those of us who serve in defense capacities should listen to what is being said by the Commander-in-Chief, the President, and that is why we're here today to further develop what we might do in that regard.

Let me mention something to you, because Ambassador Whitehouse can't say it, and Jim Lindsay can't say it, but I can say it. One, I have resigned and I'm leaving the post, and secondly, I've been Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict as well as the Secretary of the Army. That is a unique relationship in our national defense structure. The command that General Lindsay has is the only command that has a dedicated Assistant Secretary of Defense to represent that area of interest on the Secretary of Defense's staff. That is very unusual because you have an advocacy at a very senior level who can play a very unusual role, and it is structured that way in the Defense Resources Board process whereby this advocacy can emphasize the needs of the command, doctrine and policy and fight budget fights inside the Department of Defense. Now that is not an easy task. A debate is still raging in that building about what was meant in the statute in reference to what is termed Program 11, and what is, in the words of the statute, "SOF peculiar" from the standpoint of acquisition as well as other things it encompasses.
Because you're military people and I have an obligation to give you a heads up, I would tell you that the JCS are not completely comfortable with that relationship, and I understand that. One of things Ambassador Whitehouse and the other civilian leadership must do is ensure this relationship is a very productive one and does not become an avenue between the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the CINC in any way that bypasses the appropriate function of the JCS. This is something we must be sensitive to. I am aware of it as it has been pointed out to me, and I think we need to take those necessary steps to allay any concerns in that regard. It is a delicate situation. I would also tell you there was not overwhelming enthusiasm in the Department of Defense on the creation of this particular post of the Assistant Secretary. But it is working out in my view very, very well.

In these comments I think you can see this is an area that is somewhat controversial. In seeking to stake out the ground and define it, let me read to you a definition that is used in the Report to the Congress by the President in reference to low intensity conflict, and I ask you to keep it in mind. I think it is an excellent statement, and I hope you'll discuss it later. It is a very precise definition. "Low Intensity Conflict is a military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above peaceful competition among states."

This is a recognition that there will always be competition between national entities, probably a very healthy thing. But this is carving out an area between an all out war and above peaceful competition. And then it goes on to say how the United States is threatened by what in many instances are lesser, more insignificant types of conflicts which really are not going to determine singularly the real course of this country. It says the threat facing the United States generated by low intensity conflict is not found in individual cases of insurgencies, economic instability or in isolated acts of terrorism and subversion, but rather in the accumulation of unfavorable outcomes from such activities. The accumulation of the 20 or so insurgencies. Look at the straits of Bab El Mandeb and the Horn of Africa. Look at Soviet interest in the Yemens and in Ethiopia. There is where you begin to see this accumulation that we're talking about.

Historically there's been this question of coming to grips with what is the unconventional. I can recall a very good friend of mine who became a General Officer and a leader in the development of the air mobile concepts and the use of the helicopters in Vietnam who, as a Colonel, headed a project and study group that went to Vietnam in the early years before the build up and during the advisory stage to assess in Vietnam the application of Army aviation, in particular, the chopper. And everywhere he went in talking to advisors it became apparent that
this struggle was escalating. We were seeing now the introduction of battalions and regiments both of the VC and the NVA, and so as he did his exit interview with the very senior General Officer, it was with trepidation that he reported this dimension of his findings, and to his surprise, the response was, "Thank God, now we'll be able to fight them." Now that is a conventional mindset that two centuries ago is not unlike that of the British officer pursuing the swamp fox, Francis Marion, in South Carolina who, in exasperation, sent a message to Marion, "Why don't you come out and fight like a gentleman and Christian?"

So you have this conventional attitude. Now if you look at it, it's not unreasonable because 90 percent of our resources and 90 percent of the time of our senior leadership must be devoted to where 90 percent of our resources and our efforts are. And we must understand that. What we seek to develop is a mindset where people understand the nature of this dimension of the conflict and develop the strategy and tactics to deal with it.

As Ambassador Whitehouse has said, it's not exclusively military and it's not. It involves almost all of our Federal agencies. The commission appointed by the President on what is called Discriminate Deterrence -- I don't know whether you've seen this manual which is much broader than low intensity conflict and gets into strategic and other systems -- points out what we need to do. I call it to your attention because it is a very distinguished committee which Dr. Ikle chaired. John Vessey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General Gorman were members, Mr. Brzezinski was a member, and Dr. Kissinger was a member. They observed to defend it's interests properly in the Third World, the United States will have to take low intensity conflict more seriously. Now this is a broad mixture of distinguished people with backgrounds in the military and diplomacy. It is a form of warfare in which the enemy is more or less omnipresent and unlikely ever to surrender.

In the past we've seen these attacks as a succession of transient and isolated crises. Now we have to think of them as a permanent addition to the menu of defense planning problems. We need to think of low intensity conflict as a form of warfare that is not a problem just for the Department of Defense. In many situations, the United States will need not just DOD personnel and materiel, but diplomats and information specialists, agricultural chemists, bankers, economists, hydrologists, criminologist, meteorologists, and scores of other professions. This gives us, I think, a very broad canvas on which we will have to paint.

There is also an unclassified version of the Presidential Report to the Congress that relates to low intensity conflict. I think that you'd would want to take these documents I referred to
and have them reviewed by members of your staff because the statements they make are very clear and in my view very profound. It says in the final analysis the tools that we have at our disposal are of little use without the support of the American people and their willingness to stay the course in what can be protracted struggles. We cannot prevail if there is a sharp asymmetry of wills; if our adversaries' determination is greater than our own. At the same time, we hold important advantages. We represent a model of political and economic development that promises freedom from political oppression and economic privation. If we can protect our own security and maintain an environment of stability and open trade and communications throughout the Third World, political, economic, and social forces should eventually work to our advantage.

That is a statement that we very much, in my view, need to remember. I mentioned to you that this is a war that we're in. This is a war of the Third World. It's a war where there is economic instability, where there is governmental immaturity, where there is poverty, and in some instances illiteracy. There are problems that relate to disease and overpopulation. But in a geopolitical sense, and that is the way that we must perceive it, it relates to bases and transient rights. It means access to mineral resources and, if not denial, the possibility of instability creating problems of supply and also adversely affecting price. These areas also are potential marketplaces for manufactured products. It is absolutely essential that in these areas there emerge some form of national identity that reflects Western values in order that we can maintain at least a dialogue in the international community. You cannot do that with Cuba, and you cannot do that with Albania, you cannot do that with Libya. These areas as you know, and I'm not here to teach granny how to suck eggs, but these areas are also the spawning grounds of insurgency and terrorism. And terrorism is a modern day scourge that we have yet not been able to develop the tools and the means to cope with. Now we see overlaying that another very significant and very dangerous ingredient or threat and that is the threat that is posed by narcotics.

I was struck when I was engaged in the task of the SOLIC of the difficulties that we have in this country, which probably stems in part from our great strength of being a pluralistic society, of our inability to deal governmental with both the terrorism problem and the narcotics problem. There is a similarity there, and I reflected on it. I would say to you that in my view we have made in an organizational sense, more headway in the last several years in dealing with the terrorism problem than we have with the narcotics problem. But both of those challenges, both of those problems, require a coordinated Federal action and in some instances a state and even local coordination in those actions. But in each of them, you find very capable, very dedicated people who are missioned frequently by law and by
a clear jurisdiction to have a part or major part of the responsibility in that area. These departments and agencies can point to their jurisdiction and to their qualifications and their mission, but trying to coordinate that at the highest level of our government is a very difficult task. You're dealing with very well meaning people, all of whom recognize the problem, but the nature of our society with the complex interrelationships in government introduces a dimension that impacts on, in my view, how we approach and develop an antinarcotics strategy and an antiterrorism strategy. We see sometimes where effective action has been frustrated in counterterrorism and in counternarcotics because of a failure to get everybody aboard for one reason or another in some program of action and execution, and I suspect there are some people in this room that can cite their own examples of that.

The word tailored was used in developing our response. Both tailored from the standpoint of the military and tailored beyond the military. In some instances the military threat will be a very dominate one, El Salvador, the Philippines, but in other instances the military threat as you know will not be that significant. And in some instances, notably in Colombia, we see a marriage of convenience between the narco interests and the insurgent interest. And I say marriage of convenience because in the long run they have different goals, but in the short run you can see a merger between narcotic and insurgent interest although they have different leadership and they have different goals. We also see in this area that there are some very significant limitations that immediately come to the fore as we tailor a military response, and we should not overlook the application in either the fields of counterterrorism or in the narcotics field of Posse Comitatus or the limitations on active military forces to take certain police types of actions. Nor should we overlook the Congressional restrictions that apply to certain military forces doing police training in other countries.

I tell people that raise the question in the narcotics field and in the counterterrorism field what you can do in the United States is different than what you can or can't do outside the United States. We are more limited significantly what we can do inside the United States as opposed to what we can do outside the United States. I think that's a very broad but useful definition and very important in my view to keep in mind as we plan things. In this regard we see that in the United States we can avail ourselves in certain instances of our National Guard forces. Their relationships to the state and some of their jurisdictions and authorities in these fields I've referred to are much different and can become a very valuable resource.

In other areas, many of our challenges are going to be economic and political. In looking back on the Vietnam experience it seems to me that one of the major areas that we
unfairly imposed burdens or expectations on our military officers related to the political field. This is not a military area. The military are the first to point that out. That's why it becomes so important in the political dimensions of the struggle that we get the military out of it and get those in the non-military fields into it, and have deeply involved in what we're doing and fully aware and apprised of what we're doing, the Congress of the United States. To that end, I believe we have to make the Congress very much a partner in what we do and have a program of constant advice and reporting to them in order that they can assist us in that task.

As you know, our military and our security assistance program is severely handicapped, and I hope this is one area that will be thoroughly discussed in this conference and seminar. Quite frankly, for the purposes of LIC we need a major revamping of our security assistance program. Currently it cannot be tailored into the strategy and into the action program that we need. We need that arrow in our quiver, and right now it is not in our quiver.

So what I see as the tasks ahead -- I've mentioned to you already the question of public awareness. But I don't believe in this country that people understand the long-range impacts that these indirect actions may have on the United States and on our well-being. Somehow we've got to relate the mineral resources of Africa to jobs on the assembly line in Detroit and Akron. Our people must know and understand that this is a world of interrelationships and that these very troublesome and disturbing things that are occurring actually are going to have impacts. If we need the Rotary Club in Charleston, West Virginia or Atlanta, or the Lion's Club in Houston to say that, we need to get them to do it. But they must know, understand it, and see it.

So what I'm saying is that we must develop a national strategy, and I really believe that many of the ingredients of that national strategy which, incidentally were prepared by some people in this room, are right here [in the National Security Strategy of the United States]. But we're moving into a new administration and it's very important that it be a part of our national strategy in what is a very important area.

As a part of that awareness, this must be understood in the Executive Branch. Across the totality of the Executive Branch, not just State, not just the CIA, not just the DIA, not just Defense, but it must be understood in Commerce, and Agriculture, and Labor, and our other agencies.

It was concluded some months ago that the quickest way to reach those in the defense sector is through education; through the school systems of our very Services. I'm not certain that we have moved as quickly or as rapidly as we need to in that regard.
That's why you're here. We need to carve out hours, blocks of instruction, at our national schools, the Army War College, the Naval War College, the Air War College, the National Defense University. But we also need to get into Command and Staff level and indeed we need to get down to the officer basic and into our NCO schooling and indeed into the ROTC program and our military academies in order that at the earliest stages of the careers of our future leaders, they know and understand something of this environment and how it impacts on them and their careers.

Some time ago, Gen Thurman asked me to speak at a TRADOC training conference where they discussed vision, and I cited at that time the enormous impact that Portugal had on the world of the 15th and 16th centuries. Portugal dominated exploration and with that came commerce and national influence. And although a very, very tiny small country even then, both in population and area in Western Europe, it moved into a position of great dominance and world influence in those centuries. Much of that has been traced to what was really an educational program established by Prince Henry the Navigator called the School of the Navigators. What Prince Henry did was to sponsor a school to bring these navigators back to and to study navigation and maritime exploration. They exchanged logs and experiences and introduced technology that was available at that time in order that they had the state of the art. By an educational program that focused on this very important area at an unusual time in our world's history, they were able to advance the exploration of the western world and indeed the globe and were able to dominate navigation and marine commerce because of it.

I cite that example because we don't have to reach, for these purposes, the entire population of our Armed Forces. We need to reach the leaders. We need to educate our leaders.

As we look at the times in which we live, and as we focus on the development of our light forces, there is another area of extraordinary importance, and Harry Soyster [Director, Defense Intelligence Agency] has referred to it, and I don't think we have adequately utilized it, and that is the role of intelligence in low intensity conflict and special operations.

Incidentally, I would make an observation to you. If you would take those two and sever them -- special ops and low intensity conflict -- you will find that, in my view, we are much further down the road on the special ops side than we are on the low intensity conflict side. We have made enormous strides in that area [special ops], and I think others would agree with that.

Intelligence is the war that we're in now, everyday, and we have enormous capabilities in that, both in a technological sense and in a human sense. We have extraordinarily able people in
this building that represent that. Admiral Roop [Commandant, Defense Intelligence College], Harry Soyster, and others. But I'm not certain that we are adequately using our intelligence in this area, and I also think we need to develop greater capabilities in the use of our communications. We have enormous communications capabilities which, tied to intelligence, give us a tremendous advantage.

Finally, as we view the tasks and the challenges that lie ahead, I ask you to look to the year 2000. If you look at the year 2000 from the standpoint of history you see that it's not just the end of a century. The year 2000 marks the close of an age. A thousand years of human history that began in the depths of the dark ages, and at that time you didn't know which way it was going to go. And if you take those thousand years of history and look at one of the greatest forces that occurred there, it was the formation of the American Republic under the oldest written constitution that exists in the world today. We are the true revolutionaries. That is the greatest message that we have to the Third World. Two centuries ago, at the time the American Revolution was waged, we were the area of low intensity conflict as has been observed. These were the backwaters of the world and what was happening in Philadelphia, Boston, and Williamsburg was not being discussed in the polite part of society of either Paris or London. I'm not sure that many British officers that were being posted to this wilderness wondered why they couldn't have gotten some assignment as an attaché to Paris or Rome. But here was where the future of this world politically was being determined, and those who are principals in a drama of history never know the consequences of their actions.

So we must look to our own heritage. They say Americans are not good at intelligence. I don't agree with that. The most sophisticated intelligence operations ever operated by this country, or by any country, were conducted in the American Revolution. We have the background, we have the heritage, and we have the ideas, and we have the ideals, and we have the resources to shape the course of human events in the next millennium. And will we. I believe that we will. And I want to see that come out of this type of conferences repeated over and over again throughout this country.
I want to welcome you on behalf of my office and the Defense Intelligence College.

This is the first conference designed to bring together the diverse US government schools and colleges to capture the lessons of the past, assess current activities, and integrate low intensity conflict (or LIC) more effectively into our educational process. Your efforts to date to develop a LIC curriculum have made an important contribution to the evolution of a comprehensive national program. It is now time, however, to pool our resources to build a long-term consensus on how to respond to LIC.

While there are remarkable developments on the international scene, US-Soviet rapprochement and negotiated settlements in the Persian Gulf, southern Africa, Cambodia, and elsewhere will not resolve serious, long-term problems in the Third World. Narcotrafficking, insurgency, terrorism, and debt will persist and will have a direct impact on US interests. Of necessity, they will require a sustained, effective US response.

These threats are subsumed under the rubric of LIC, an environment in which we face a major challenge in developing the most fundamental of skills and knowledge. You, as the educators of our future leaders, therefore, have an important role to play, and this conference thus takes on special significance.

This gathering affords a unique opportunity to establish direct links with other schools and colleges; share information and techniques; work toward a common or core curriculum; and explore ways to expand instruction time. As you spend the next few days examining LIC issues, you should have as your ultimate goal developing the courses and instructional materials that will sharpen the issues, developing greater awareness, promoting consistent approaches and unity of effort, and producing individuals more attuned to the political and military realities of LIC.
The Environment

Three years ago Secretary of State Shultz noted that "Low intensity conflict is the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century. The future of peace and freedom may well depend on how effectively we meet this challenge."

Secretary of Defense Weinberger observed that, "Much has been written about low intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively."

The reasons for this are many. For years, we suffered from a "hangover" after Vietnam, simply refusing to admit that the threat persisted. Even in the absence of our experience in Southeast Asia, we have historically found it difficult to recognize a threat that is protracted, ambiguous, and cumulative. We have also tended to view problems in the Third World through the prism of US-Soviet rivalry. The current warming in relations may, in part, remove that distorting prism, but the problems will remain. Overlaying these perceptual difficulties are turf issues and a business-as-usual approach that impede innovation and timely response.

In addressing the world scene, Robert Gates, the new deputy national security adviser, recently noted that, "the experience of the last ten years would suggest that in many of these cases, diplomacy alone is not an effective instrument." He went on to say that, "experience also would show that in many of these instances overt military action by the United States is either not appropriate or would not be supported by the American people or the Congress. At that point, the United States has two options. It can develop other instruments by which to protect its interests, or it can turn and walk away."

We cannot afford to "walk away." It is clear that the problems will not allow us to do so. We must respond, and our responses must be as cogent and effective as possible.

Low intensity conflict is not well understood, nor is the need for sustained, patient response. To address the threat we must develop the right personnel, equipment, concepts, and institutional structures. Our response cannot be limited to, or dominated, by military action. Rather, we must develop the full range of political, informational, economic, and military tools with which to assist others in achieving a just and enduring stability.
We must also remember that low intensity conflict and special operations are not interchangeable terms. Low intensity conflict is an environment in which we must use a tailored blend of the instruments of our national power. Special operations forces, on the other hand, are only one of those instruments. They are a small, if important, part of our overall military capability, but we must also rely on conventional forces for peacetime contingency responses, peacekeeping operations, and medical, logistic, and engineer support, as well as deterrence.

The Response

If we are to deal effectively with low intensity conflict, we must have a reliable, flexible, and enduring security assistance program. We must develop better understanding, improve interagency coordination, build a sustainable consensus, and press for more flexible laws and additional funding. The consequence of failure will not be immediate, but the cumulative effect of indifference or inconsistency will ultimately be a weakened United States.

Our second task is to preserve the gains already made in special operations revitalization, complete the revitalization process, and maintain a highly ready force through the 1990s and beyond. This will require the sustained attention of both the legislative and executive branches of government.

Third, we must develop a coordinated response, recognizing that a business-as-usual approach does not adequately address the problems encountered in LIC. Preparedness for a "big war" simply does not constitute preparedness for a "small" one.

Fourth, we must build a national consensus. We must make clear to the American people the reality of the threat and the need for a consistent and sustained response. And we in government must reach consensus on the cooperation essential to an effective response.

The Challenge

Those are the broad goals. Let me now turn to the specifics and outline for you what I think we are trying to accomplish through this conference.

One of the fundamentals of our country's participation in foreign irregular warfare is that the number of Americans will be very small. And what does this mean? It means they have to be good. They have to be knowledgeable. They have to be persuasive. They have to have a high degree of professional competence.
The history of low intensity conflict reveals again and again the important -- indeed overriding -- role that one man can play: Col Ed Landsdale in the Philippines, Brigadier Orde Wingate in Burma, Col T.E. Lawrence in Arabia. I think also of Col Frank Merrill of Merrill’s Marauders in Burma, and his associate, Col Philip Cochran, the Flip Corkin of "Terry and The Pirates."

Men like these brought imagination and courage and the ability to improvise into different forms of LIC. All of these men played remarkable individuals roles. One of the things I hope will be achieved by this conference is an understanding of this factor. One has to pick the right man, and that man has to be well prepared.

So one of our jobs is to prepare officers to be the Lawrences or the Landsdales of some future conflict somewhere in the world. But behind such a point man is the need to prepare the staff officers and advisors who sill work in the field or in the supporting headquarters or, indeed, back in Washington, so that they, too, understand how complex our efforts are and can anticipate and solve the problems that emerge.

None of this is easy. Our Armed Forces have, understandably, been maintained in a high state of readiness for a big war -- for a worst-case scenario. The role of advisor to foreign troops is seldom perceived as being career-enhancing. Recognition of the importance of language and area expertise has been a sometime thing in personnel management and many gifted officers have feared getting stuck in a blind alley if they learned Chinese or Urdu or some other difficult language, or if they become experts on the passes through the Hindu Kush or all about the river network of some faraway land. So I am calling on you to help bring about a cultural change in the Services and to sensitize your students to the challenges of a particularly difficult form of warfare.

I repeat that while we may hope to prepare tomorrow's Lawrence of Arabia we are also looking at the military skills that are needed to make many officers in our Armed Forces effective in this field. And, of course, the first skill is that of understanding one's enemy as well as understanding one's ally. Intelligence is the key to irregular warfare. Without good intelligence, one is no place. But the kind of intelligence needed can be quite different from that needed in conventional warfare.

Doubtless, some of you had experience in irregular warfare in Vietnam. I did. And I learned there how difficult it is to find out what you need to know and how difficult it is to analyze information intelligently once one is dealing in a craft that goes beyond conventional order of battle. Training people to handle intelligence in the environment of a low intensity conflict will be a real challenge.
I remember how General Abrams used to stress the importance of working on what he called the enemy system -- their intelligence, their logistics, their finance, their communications, their often apparently confusing command structure. He saw how important this was.

Another wide open field is tactics. It may seem odd for a civilian to get into this, but it has been my experience that we are not crafty as a nation. In nearly two years at II Field Force, I could count on the fingers of one hand the number of operations I saw planned in which deception and stealth and guile were serious ingredients.

In low intensity conflict, the other side is usually crafty and full of guile. Our young officers must learn to think that way and must learn to plan operations that do not depend on overwhelming fire power or massive support. Low intensity conflict is a cat and mouse game, usually with a small number of military players. Our people must know that game.

Logistic and supply problems are different in low intensity conflict. Again, one is usually dealing in small numbers of beans, bullets, and band-aids, but they must be the right ones, and they must reach the people we are supporting promptly. As a lot of you know, this can be a lot more difficult than stuffing large numbers of consumables into a pipeline.

There is also a wide field of necessary research to be performed for LIC. You know and I know what causes most casualties in this kind of warfare. Mines and booby traps. We saw that in Vietnam and Laos. We are seeing it in Afghanistan. We are seeing it in El Salvador.

I was at a command briefing some time ago when an officer commented that one could always drive cattle through a minefield. That really is not helpful in countries where farmers are desperately poor -- where cattle, or even a single cow, may represent both livelihood and food.

Thus, coping with mines and booby traps in a Third World environment should be a very high-priority program.

In many ways a lot of the big ticket items which the Services have acquired for a Big War are ill-suited to low intensity conflict. We have as a nation a tendency to think in terms of high tech weapons systems, and to believe that technology can solve many problems. I don't deny the need for improvement in our communications gear or in sensors or in other systems, but in low intensity conflict we need things that are simple and reliable. One of my favorite projects is to establish a requirement for what I call the "follow-on DC-3." Helicopters are expensive and hard to maintain. In my view there is a real
need for a rugged, adaptable transport plane to do the many things the "gooney bird" did so well for so many years.

A final crucial area for you as educators is the "art" of low intensity conflict. That art is by no means new. Sun Tzu understood it well six centuries before Christ. However, as warfare evolved from the Masadonian Phalanx, to light cavalry, to trench warfare, to saturation bombing, we, especially in the West, lost sight of many of those ancient realities. Recently others, Mao and Ho Chi Minh among them, nurtured the "art" in the context of their peculiar circumstances.

Mac had only three rules that governed relations between his guerrillas and the Chinese people: (1) All actions are subject to command. (2) Do not steal from the people, and (3) Be neither selfish nor unjust. Simple, yet effective, and the kind of "art" that makes low intensity conflict work. Clausewitz, in these cases, is not enough.

As I mentioned a moment ago, we, despite our revolutionary beginnings, forgot these lessons as we focused our attention on "big" wars. It has been nearly fifty years since the Marine Corps issued the Small Wars Manual. I recommend it to those of you who have not studied it. The lessons are still there for the taking.

Perhaps it is time, however, for a new Small Wars Manual. Here I am not talking about a collection of the bureaucratic dicta that consume so much of our time "inside the Beltway." Rather, we need a sleeves-rolled-up, mud-on-the-boots volume that speaks to this "art" and leads to a mindset foreign to most Americans.

There is a prophetic passage in the Small Wars Manual. It goes this way:

If Marines have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the past, they must now prepare themselves for the increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in the future.

There is a warning here for all of us. The threat today is no less real, and the problems of responding no less daunting. If, however, you succeed in the enterprise we are undertaking today, you will make a valuable difference.
The events of the last week in Panama make today's conference especially timely. A challenge to American interests that extends beyond traditional diplomacy -- and cannot be understood in traditional East-West terms -- is what I am here to talk about. We have not yet figured out how to deal with the Noriegas of the world -- but there is increasing understanding that we must learn.

The security environment that has shaped our adult lives is changing. The Cold War conflict which has dominated the post war era is undergoing fundamental change. The rise of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union has posed new challenges -- and opportunities -- for the West. As President Reagan said a year ago in Moscow, the winds of change are blowing in the Soviet Union.

Elections have taken place. Old leaders have been rehabilitated. History has been rewritten. And unprecedented freedom has been allowed in Eastern Europe. I hope to observe some of that freedom in three weeks when genuine elections will be held in Poland.

As the nature of the Soviet threat has changed, so too has the nature of threats that do not stem from the East-West conflict. New transnational challenges do not fit old labels.

Global environmental damage has captured the attention of the world. Oil spills. Amazon deforestation. Ozone depletion. Acid rain. Global warming. These threats to human security do not discriminate between borders.

Illegal narcotics trafficking has become a major national security threat. It is not just American youth that are threatened by drugs -- democratic governments throughout Latin America are jeopardized by the power and violence of multinational drug cartels.
Economic security is -- in many parts of the globe -- the number one concern. In the US, recent polls have consistently shown that Americans view the economic threat from Japan more seriously than the military threat from the Soviet Union. The thesis of an America in decline topped the bestseller lists and became an issue in the presidential race last year.

Immigration from Third World states facing turmoil and instability continues to change the face of the United States. Our country is the only great power in history with a diverse racial population. Unlimited immigration will lead to an explosive political reaction but we will continue to absorb the consequences of low intensity conflicts from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Disease -- especially the AIDS virus -- has become an international political issue for the first time in the modern era. Some estimate that Central and Eastern African elites will be decimated by the disease -- regions that can ill-afford the loss of trained people.

Virtually all the world's wars in the last 45 years have been in the Third World. Localized conflicts have played a major role in the US-Soviet competition. The consecutive presidential doctrines that have been linchpins of our security policy -- Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Reagan -- have all had Third World security concerns at their base.

The events that have reshaped geopolitics in the last four decades have been revolutions -- in China, in Iran, in Nicaragua. We spend much time and energy debating Lance modernization in Europe or funding levels for the Midgetman, yet the impact of a revolutionary victory by the FMLN in El Salvador or the New People's Army in the Philippines would have much greater implications for US security.

Despite the importance of revolution, insurgency, and political violence for our security, they have received too little attention from policy makers, legislators, academics, and the American public. So-called "low intensity conflicts" may -- at long last -- be getting the focus they deserve. This conference is a good example.

Just over a year ago, the President's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy pointed out that for too long US defense policy has centered on the most extreme -- and unlikely -- scenarios: thermonuclear war and conventional attack in Central Europe.

We cannot, of course, ignore the need for continued vigilance to maintain deterrence in either of those two apocalyptic cases. But neither can we ignore the conflicts that
are taking place all over the world. In the Commission's words: "We need to devote our predominant effort to a wide range of more plausible, important contingencies."

What, then are these "more plausible" contingencies? You have heard Colonel Dixon [Reserve Affairs Advisor, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict] talk about definitions of low intensity conflict. You have heard Dr. Shultz [Associate Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University] talk about the Soviet approach. This afternoon you will hear two experts address Central American cases. What I would like to do is lay out ten principles to keep in mind when considering these conflicts and talk about the nature of our response.

First, to paraphrase the old saying, "We may disagree over exact definitions, but we sure know low intensity conflict when we see it." Low intensity conflict lies in the realm between regular international relations and conventional war. I think we can all agree on the following: It includes acts of terrorism, like the Achille Lauro hijacking or the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. It includes insurgency, such as the US role in El Salvador or Afghanistan. It includes peacekeeping operations, such as the attempt to enforce the accord on Namibia. I would argue that it includes aiding a government transition from authoritarianism to democracy, like our actions in the Philippines or Chile. It does not include Grenada-style invasions -- conventional warfare at a less than global scale. It does not include every use of special operations forces.

Second, we must learn the right lessons from the past. Agreeing on what low intensity conflict is -- and is not -- is an essential prerequisite. We can -- and must -- learn from the past but we must also develop new models for new situations. Fighting the New People's Army in the Philippines, for example, should involve lessons from the successful campaign against the Hiks in the 1950's. Aiding insurgents, however, is a far different proposition than support for the French Maquis was in World War II. Bill Casey [former CIA Director] used to think you could apply the lessons from the OSS to support for UNITA or the Contras. Misapplying such a historical analogy can lead to neglect of the importance of building a political -- as opposed to simply military -- opposition force.

Third, if a conflict is important to US security, it cannot be ignored. Low intensity conflicts do not go away. Neglecting to take the steps necessary to counter an insurgency will only increase the chances for insurgent success. If US interests are at stake, inaction -- or wrong action -- only increases the likelihood that more direct action will be necessary in the future. If we do not act wisely in Panama in the coming days, we will be faced with more difficult decisions and less attractive options in the future.
Fourth, not all low intensity conflicts matter to US interests. They can have greatly different implications for our security. We can -- and should -- have humanitarian concern for ethnic violence in Sri Lanka or Senegal, but these low intensity conflicts do not directly affect US interests. The insurgency in Mozambique or in the Western Sahara -- Colonel Dear's [Professor of Aerospace Studies, University of Minnesota] area of special expertise -- may be more important for the US. Other conflicts -- insurgencies in El Salvador or the Philippines -- clearly do affect important US interests.

The task for the statesman is to distinguish between the genuinely important and the only tragic. Ethnic, nationalist, and ideological strife in the Third World will continue. The US cannot and should not get involved in every conflict. Eisenhower once said, "If someone tells you 'It's a small war,' you tell them, 'Then you go fight it.'"

Some propose a simple test for US involvement: opposing communists. As we have seen in the Reagan years, this test is too simple for cases such as Mozambique -- where a brutal insurgency opposed a Marxist regime supported by Great Britain and South Africa. And it was too simple for Cambodia where indigenous butchers were the strongest force in opposing foreign communist occupiers.

The anti-communist criterion also fails when considering the threat posed by drug lords. United States troops have been deployed in Bolivia. Democracy in Peru and Columbia is under siege by the new phenomenon of "narco-guerrillas" that has no East-West dimension.

Fifth, we need to define our goals. Supporting a fledgling government against anti-democratic insurgents in El Salvador is a very different proposition than supporting insurgents. And supporting insurgents aiming to end a foreign troop presence -- in Afghanistan or Angola or Cambodia -- is very different from enforcing an internal political settlement. There has been success in the former but not in the latter.

Sixth, such conflicts tend to come in various shades of gray -- not black and white. As Secretary of State Shultz said in a landmark speech three years ago, "We have seen and we will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous threats in the shadow area between major war and millennial peace." Unlike World War II or much of the Cold War, the issues in modern low intensity conflicts are not always clear cut. Insurgency is a violent form of war with civilian populations often caught in the middle. International propaganda obfuscates the issues at stake while escalation takes place over months or years.
Ambiguity can make US public support difficult but it does not make it impossible. Supporting the Mujahidin in Afghanistan while Soviet troops occupied their nation was a clear case; continued involvement in what could become a civil war is a far more difficult issue.

Ambiguity requires that stakes be explained clearly. It requires intellectual honesty; exaggeration will only lead to counter-reaction. Nicaragua and El Salvador are important. Panama dwarfs those two in importance, yet US Central American policy has focused almost exclusively on the former, not the latter. If Nicaragua is as important as often claimed in the last administration, many wondered why the direct use of US force was ruled out early. And states that are more important — notably Mexico — are virtually ignored in developing policy.

Seventh, low intensity conflicts are protracted. Opposing Syrian supported terrorism or armed insurgents in the Philippines are long-term propositions. A policy for low intensity conflict must recognize that quick victories are a chimera. That results will only take place over years. That events around the world do not conform to Congressional appropriation cycles or US election dates.

Eight, intelligence is vital in deterring and dealing with low intensity conflicts. Timely tactical intelligence, derived from human and technical collection, can preempt terrorist attacks and counter — or aid — insurgents. Only with accurate strategic intelligence can we develop a proactive policy.

Assessing trends that will influence key countries and regions is the essence of intelligence analysis. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran provides a classic example of intelligence failure. Long-term analysis of political, social, and economic trends in the Third World is exactly what Bill Casey and I worked together on. We framed a National Intelligence Strategy while I was chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that was designed to respond to future threats in advance.

Ninth, intelligence has been misused in the US approach to one form of low intensity conflict. The "Re... Doctrine" of aiding insurgents fighting communist regimes was conducted as a "covert action" despite the fact that the US role was widely and regularly reported in the media. The CIA was tasked with implementing a policy designed to affect events, while also being tasked to report objectively on those events. The result was that both analysis and operations suffered.

Using the CIA to implement major regional security policies is a mistake. There can -- and should -- be a covert action element in such policies. But just as war is too important to be
left to the generals, supporting insurgents is too important to be left to the CIA. Such policies should be entered into only after full and open debate of the stakes, means, and consequences. Oversight of such policies must be in the foreign relations committees -- not the intelligence committees. The only way to build public support for such endeavors is to use secrecy when necessary -- not just for expediency.

Finally, low intensity conflicts cut across traditional bureaucratic lines. Dealing with such conflicts will involve the US Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, as well as USIA, AID, and the intelligence community. Other elements of the government can also be involved. Fostering economic development, for example, involves the US Trade Representative, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Department of Commerce.

A proper counterinsurgency policy involves economic, social, and political elements. The military is not the only -- or even the most important -- part of defeating insurgents. As John F. Kennedy said, "The basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible to a military solution." That remains as true today as it did in 1962. Digging wells, building housing, or providing health care is at least as important as arms interdiction or rapid response teams. Winning "hearts and minds" is more than a cliche -- it is a recipe for success.

Low intensity conflicts are inherently complex. The US response to LIC has not met the challenge of this complexity. Security assistance programs remain rooted in the past, beset with conflicting goals, and driven by inertia. The military services continue to resist special operations forces for bureaucratic reasons. Many oppose low intensity conflict in general because the scars of Vietnam remain.

After years of frustration -- and failures in Vietnam, Desert One, and Grenada -- Congress forced action in the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act. The legislation -- over the strong opposition of the military and defense bureaucracy -- took a number of necessary organizational steps, including the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. After months of struggle, the Reagan Administration filled the position with a State Department retiree with little experience in the field. The Board for Low Intensity Conflict -- also created by the legislation -- hardly met.

There may be change under the current administration. Opposition within the Services and within the Pentagon to a more realistic approach to LIC was cited by Secretary Cheney in his confirmation hearing; whether he takes a leadership position on the issue remains to be seen.
Immediate problems of staffing, strategy, and oversight are only part of the low intensity conflict dilemma. As I indicated at the outset, our world is changing and our thinking needs to change as well. Future challenges will require new perspectives from the national security paradigms of the last 40 years. Many of our policy makers and thinkers have grown comfortable with the realities of the post-World War II era. But as we move to the 21st century, new realities are taking hold. We are now as distant from the Second World War as that conflict was from the Spanish-American War -- in which there was no Soviet Union, no airplane or machine gun, no nuclear weapons, and only 45 United States. Our world -- and our geopolitics -- will change as much in the next 45 years as in those.

The major global political development of the 1980's has been the democratic revolution. The tremendous increase in the practice of democratic principles throughout the globe is a tribute to the power of the democratic ideal. From Burma to Budapest, from China to Chile, it is democracy that inspires hope and instigates action. Yet we have little institutional capability for furthering the democratic revolution. The National Endowment for Democracy received only $15 million for this year -- barely a third of the $40 million we spent investigating the Iran-Contra affair.

Academics have given little sustained attention to fostering and sustaining democratic transitions. Policy makers approach the issues in an as hoc fashion. Supporting democracy around the world is a policy that can win the sustained support of the American people -- especially as the perceived Soviet threat diminishes. Yet as a nation and as a government, we still cannot deal coherently with threats to democracy -- as the response to last Sunday's elections in Panama reveal.

The world will change in many ways. Third World nations are beginning to acquire ballistic missiles and the increasing ability -- and willingness -- to use chemical weapons.

The economic rise of Japan and China will reinforce traditional American isolationism, as many voices will argue for turning inward.

The US reliance on overseas bases will evolve in the coming decade -- whether we like it or not. There is little strategic reason for the Southern Command to remain in Panama, especially when its presence is repeatedly cited as a reason not to act more firmly against Noreiga. The bases in the Philippines could very well be phased out through an expression of democracy.

The NATO alliance faces increased strains on both sides of the Atlantic. The American people are weary of paying for troops in Europe. Europeans are weary of the militarization of their continent. Gorbachev has masterfully played on such sentiments.
Our distinguished moderator told me several weeks ago that "The Cold War is over because we won." Whether it is over, whether we are in the end game now, or whether we are in a new phase, there is a new reality in US-Soviet relations. It should force all of us to think creatively about the future.

Former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director General Burns told a conference organized by Dr. Shultz last fall about a paper he wrote as junior officer. Its title was, "What do we do when the threat is gone?" A diminution of the Soviet threat would leave, as I have argued, a range of important threats for the US. That is the challenge of low intensity conflict.