A STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTING AND EVALUATING SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL

VOLUME I

by

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DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this report are the author's alone and should not be construed as necessarily representing those of the Department of the Navy or any other U.S. government agency.
This report distinguishes between Soviet interest in (1) making arms control proposals; (2) negotiating arms control agreements; (3) signing arms control treaties; and (4) actually complying with agreements once signed. It suggests that four sets of factors condition Soviet arms control interests at each of these levels: (1) Soviet threat perceptions; (2) Soviet bargaining leverage; (3) Soviet leadership stability; and (4) Soviet foreign policy orientation. Specific reference is made to strategic nuclear arms control issues. Four conditions are identified as prerequisites for Soviet interest in reaching agreement on strategic arms reductions, thus providing a basis for policy forecasting.
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I. REPORT OBJECTIVES

A. Thesis

This report is comprised of two volumes. Volume I develops a strategic planning framework for predicting and evaluating Soviet interests in arms control, with particular reference to nuclear arms negotiations. Volume II applies this framework to the first phase of the START negotiations, from 1982 when the talks began, to 1983 when the Soviets suspended discussions in the aftermath of NATO's deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

This introduction provides a summary overview of the thesis, objectives, and analytical framework adopted in this report. A full elaboration of the objectives and analytical framework is developed in Chapters One (objectives) and Two (framework). This introduction is therefore presented in the spirit of an executive summary.

The scope of this report has been limited in three respects. The time frame under examination is the period
from 1981, including the beginning of U.S.-Soviet INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Force] negotiations, when U.S. preparations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START] began, and continues to the Soviet suspension of all bilateral arms negotiations in November and December 1983. The second manner in which the scope of this report has been limited is by focusing on Soviet policy toward reductions in long-range strategic weapons. Soviet START policy was early on subordinated in many respects to its INF policy, which was formally presented in 1981. INF issues are treated only where they shed light on Soviet interests in reducing intercontinental-range nuclear forces.

This report takes as its thesis the following question: Were the conditions for Soviet interest in reaching an agreement on strategic arms reductions present during the 1981 to 1983 time frame, or was the Soviet Union interested only in negotiating strategic arms reductions? The formulation of this thesis question requires some qualification.

First, interest in arms control, as in any alternative policy option, will always be relative to other factors, such as a nation's conceptions of its national interests (in this case, Soviet national interests). "Interested for what reasons?" is another way of putting this. Western scholars have posed many answers to this
question, and they are treated at greater length in Chapter One.

Interest in arms control will also be relative to the specific nature of the arms control options under consideration. "Interest in what?" is a question, then, that this report seeks to qualify and elaborate upon in Chapter Two.

B. Secondary Objectives

Identifying the roots of Soviet interest or disinterest in arms control agreements is a major underlying objective of this report. This exercise should hopefully contribute to a rethinking of such fundamental issues as:

(1) the underlying assumptions of arms control theory;

(2) basic principles and assumptions of U.S. arms control policy and approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union; and,

(3) popular and current (although flawed) remedies and suggestions that inadequately account for the Soviet approach to arms control.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

A. Levels of Analysis

Defining the nature of Soviet interests in arms control is a complex and difficult task due to the elusive nature of the data. The Soviet Union neither conducts open hearings on its arms control and defense policies, nor does it regularly publish detailed justifications of its weapons
procurement practices -- as does the United States. Furthermore, nearly all Soviet commentaries that are allowed to be published, broadcast, or translated deal almost exclusively with propaganda attacks on U.S. arms control policies and defense decisions, rarely if ever mentioning the particulars of Soviet proposals.

In non-Soviet analyses of Moscow's policies and postures, then, many approaches have been adopted, several of which are referred to in the following chapters. Basically, they fall into two categories. On the one hand are those attempts that assume a more or less genuine intent on the part of the U.S.S.R. in arms control matters. These analyses tend to ascribe some degree of substance to Soviet arms control policies. That is, they see Soviet interests in arms control as motivated by concerns not unlike those in the West, such as establishing greater East-West military and political stability through the establishment of international law by treaty. This view is likely to characterize the U.S.-Soviet competition as non-zero-sum, with mutual benefits from cooperative behavior accruing to both sides.

On the other hand are those assessments that view Soviet interests in arms control as lacking in substance, as motivated primarily by desires to deceive its partners for unilateral gain, and as symptomatic of a zero-sum outlook, where one side's loss is the other's gain. This report does
not seek to address this dispute directly. Its conclusions with specific respect Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions from 1981 to 1983, however, support the perspectives of this second category.

In grappling with the nearly intractable problem of defining Soviet interests in arms control, it occurs that (whatever their substance or lack thereof) Soviet interests could conceivably be categorized into four groups. These may be considered four phases in a conceptual process of increasing Soviet interest, and they have often sometimes manifested themselves in this way. Chapter Two is devoted to an elaboration of these categories of Soviet interest in arms control. They are briefly introduced below.

The four phases, or levels, of Soviet interest in arms control adopted as part of the analytical framework for this report are:

1. Soviet interests in proposing arms control initiatives;
2. Soviet interests in negotiating arms control initiatives;
3. Soviet interests in concluding agreements on arms control initiatives; and,
4. Soviet interests in complying with arms control initiatives.
1. Soviet Interests in Proposing Strategic Arms Reductions

The first category above refers to Soviet arms control proposals whose intent is to bring about negotiations, or to those instances prior to agreeing to negotiations when the Soviet Union issues statements either advocating disarmament or arms control in principle, or makes some offer with the ostensible desire that negotiations will ensue.

The Soviet Union has, since its inception, promoted itself as foremost among the champions of peace. There have been both practical and propaganda purposes for this. At times the survival of the Soviet regime has depended on peace, making pacifism a matter of expediency. At other times, when Soviet national survival was assured by Western acquiescence (as during the 1920s), by collective security and alliances (as during the 1930s), or by its own military strength (as during much of the postwar era), Soviet interests in arms control assumed a primarily propagandistic function.

For either reason, beginning in 1921, Soviet leaders adopted the position that global disarmament would promote progress toward global peace. This stance has been consistently upheld by Soviet leaders up to the present time.
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2. Soviet Interests in Negotiating Strategic Arms Reductions

Soviet interests in proposing arms control initiatives are sometimes, but not always, supplemented by demonstrations of Soviet interests in negotiations on these proposals. In practice this manifestation, or phase, of Soviet arms control interest occurs less frequently than does Soviet interest in simply making arms control proposals. The conditions under which negotiations take place are much more stringent than those conditions when the Soviet Union finds it appropriate to announce its espousal of arms control in principle, and involve the objectives and interests of the potential Soviet negotiating partners.

3. Soviet Interests in Concluding Agreements on Strategic Arms Reductions

Most analyses of Soviet arms control policy or motives focus implicitly on Soviet interests in arms control agreements or treaties of one kind or another. This report suggests that agreements may not always be the Soviets' preferred outcome, that in many cases on-going negotiations that never culminate in a treaty may adequately serve Soviet foreign and military policy objectives. It will also be argued that there are very limited conditions under which the Soviet Union will find it advantageous to enter agreements.
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4. Soviet Interests in Complying with Strategic Arms Reductions

An assertion developed more fully in Chapter Two is that the West has traditionally assumed that Soviet interest in signing an agreement also means Soviet interest in complying with agreements, as evidenced by the following quote from a recent and popular arms control textbook: "Countries that want to keep open the option of undertaking an activity that would violate an agreement generally do not sign it in the first place."1 This report suggests that Soviet interests in entering an agreement do not necessarily correspond, ipso facto, with Soviet interests in complying with it once signed.

B. Sources of Soviet Interests in Arms Control

Having identified four levels, or phases, of Soviet interest in arms control, the conceptual framework of this report is only partially completed. It is also necessary to identify explicitly the factors that may determine the relative level of Soviet interest. The actual content of Soviet arms control policy may be constant throughout all four phases. That is, the Soviet Union may propose, negotiate, sign, and comply with the same strategic arms

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... reduction initiative, but for different reasons at each phase. Or each phase may be affected by changes in the context of Soviet arms control policy. Because of the difficulties associated with analyzing Soviet intentions and behavior, this report will focus on the context of Soviet arms control policy as an indicator of the level, or phase, or Soviet arms control interest.

There are four key factors relating to the context of Soviet arms control policy which appear to determine the degree of Soviet interest in arms control. They are:

1. Soviet perceptions of the international threat situation, referred to herein as threat perceptions, and discussed by Soviet literature in terms of the "correlation of forces;"

2. Soviet assessments of the negotiating parties' relative bargaining positions, including assessments of the other party's vulnerability to arms control;

3. the status of Soviet leadership in terms of succession episodes; and,

4. the policies, priorities, and orientation of Soviet foreign policy.

1. Soviet Perceptions of the Correlation of Forces. Soviet perceptions of relative advantage in the East-West confrontation are measured and analyzed in terms of the correlation of forces. This correlation is figured by assessing both the material and moral qualities of the opposing systems. Measures of relative East-West advantages or disadvantages in nuclear weapons are the most important...
(but by no means the only) indices on the material side. Indications of political will and popular support are among the most important indices on the moral side. Soviet interests or disinterests in any given arms control proposal are loosely based on calculations of its impact on the correlation of forces, both in material and moral terms.\(^2\) Chapter Two of Volume II will explore Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces in the early 1980s, and analyze their impact on Soviet interests in negotiating and/or concluding a START agreement.

2. Soviet Perceptions of Bargaining Leverage. While the correlation of forces may determine Soviet interests or disinterests in arms control on a general, or more abstract level, it is the perception of bargaining leverage an opponent brings to the negotiating table that determines Soviet interests in arms control proposals on a more immediate level. There are two dimensions to any analysis of bargaining leverage from the Soviet viewpoint.\(^3\) The first involves Soviet perceptions of U.S. programs the Soviet Union wants to limit and Soviet perceptions of its ability to influence U.S. arms control decisions and weapon

\(^2\) Of the two, impact on the moral dimension of the correlation of forces is probably the most important in the Soviet view.

\(^3\) These two dimensions are developed in Robert J. Einhorn, *Negotiating From Strength: Leverage In U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations*, (New York: Praeger, 1985).
programs through negotiations. The second involves the degree to which the Soviets are willing to accept limits on their own programs in order to secure restrictions on American forces. Volume II Chapter Three is an analysis of the interplay between these two dimensions of bargaining leverage in the context of START.

3. Leadership Factors. While the two previous categories (Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces, and Soviet assessments of relative bargaining leverage) are, in effect, efforts to replicate, or second-guess, Soviet decision-making inputs relative to issues of strategic arms reductions, this category deals with the structural ability of the Soviet Union to engage in tactical or strategic concessions at the negotiating table. For the purposes of this report it is assumed that the Soviet Union is more likely to enter far-reaching arms agreements after leadership succession crises (or processes) have been resolved than during them. This appears to be especially true for agreements with profound implications for Soviet security (e.g. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk). Chapter Four in Volume II provides an analysis of this factor relative to Soviet interests in a START agreement.

4. Foreign Policy Orientation. Scholars of the Soviet Union have noted a cycle in Soviet foreign policy orientation, with alternations between peaceful-coexistence and greater interaction with the West, and internal
retrenchment with open hostility toward the outside world. The Soviet Union is more likely to enter diplomatic agreements (including arms control arrangements) when its foreign policy is oriented toward peaceful-coexistence. Historically, major diplomatic treaties between the Soviet Union and Western nations have usually been signed during eras of greater emphasis in Soviet foreign policy on cooperation with the West (e.g. the SALT agreements). This is an important indicator of Soviet interests in arms control agreements, and Soviet foreign policy orientation and objectives during START are treated in Volume II, Chapter Five.

III. SOURCES

The following principal sources of information have been used in the research for this report:

1. Western newspaper articles and other media sources;

2. U.S. government documents, including State and Defense Department publications, as well as Congressional hearings and reports;

3. translated Soviet sources; and,

4. other U.S. publications, books, journal articles, monographs, pamphlets, and reports, including publications by former government officials,
participants in U.S.-Soviet negotiations, and scholars on Soviet arms control policies.

Western media sources are heavily relied upon for this study of START because Soviet sources rarely gave details of their own position, whereas Western media sources often gave detailed reports on Soviet proposals and objectives -- provided, apparently, by information from U.S. negotiators. Also, the contemporary nature of the subject matter dictates an unusually high degree of reliance on Western media sources.

U.S. government documents cited herein include primarily State and Defense Department publications, but also Congressional hearings and reports as well.

Translated Soviet sources provided ample access to available Soviet data. Agencies of the U.S. government (and some European institutions) translate enormous amounts of Soviet literature on a daily basis. In addition to daily reports with translations from major Soviet media sources, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency also provides regular translation services on the following Soviet topics:

Military Affairs
Economic Affairs
Political and Sociological Affairs

Other English language publications, books, journal articles, monographs, pamphlets, and reports were found to be very useful due to the wealth of information and the quality of analysis available to the modern researcher. Frequently, issues of importance to the substantiation of themes in this report had been thoroughly analyzed in previously published sources. Whenever this was found to be the case -- and the analysis sound and compelling -- summaries of these materials were used, and footnoted, rather than duplicating the analysis.
CHAPTER ONE

U.S. PERSPECTIVES
ON SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL

I. REASONS FOR STUDYING SOVIET INTERESTS
IN ARMS CONTROL

There are important reasons for undertaking a study of
Soviet interests in arms control, particularly Soviet
interests in strategic arms reduction. The Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), which began in 1982, represented
the first time that disarmament (in its traditional sense)
was the ostensible focus of Soviet arms control efforts
since the Soviet Union temporarily abandoned its quest for
"General and Complete Disarmament" (GCD) in the early
1960s.¹

¹ The Soviet Union resurrected a form of General and
Complete Disarmament with Gorbachev's 15 January 1986
proposals for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.
See Serge Schmemann, "Gorbachev Offers to Scrap A-Arms by
the Year 2000," New York Times, 16 January 1986; Gary Lee,
"Moscow Proposes A Timetable for Nuclear Arms Ban: Gorbachev
1986; and, "Excerpts From the Soviet Leader's Statement on
Of all the forms of arms control, disarmament, particularly strategic nuclear disarmament, poses the greatest potential challenge to national sovereignty and survival. This, plus the fact that it is the most rare form of arms control in modern history, suggest that it is the most difficult of all arms control measures to achieve. Its espousal or rejection presents a standard against which to gauge Soviet interests in genuine "peaceful coexistence." An effectual and observable Soviet commitment to propose, negotiate, sign, and comply with initiatives providing for reductions in strategic nuclear weapons would certainly be an important step toward lasting strategic stability.

Determining the nature of Soviet interests in arms control can help us evaluate the prospects for affecting Soviet arms control policies in general and using arms control to stabilize the transition to a defense-dominant deterrence regime.

The basic thesis that this dissertation will seek to prove or disprove is that, during the first Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) -- which lasted from 29 June 1982 to 8 December 1983 -- the Soviet Union was relatively uninterested in agreeing to substantial reductions in strategic weapons. It is possible that Soviet political, diplomatic and military objectives were adequately served by negotiations without agreement.
In retrospect, the fact that the Soviets did not sign an agreement may make the foregoing thesis seem self-evident, and should therefore require little elaboration. The Soviet Union repeatedly asserted that progress in START was subordinate to, and conditional upon, Western concessions in the INF negotiations. The Soviets walked out of the START negotiations, not because of any disagreement intrinsic to START, but because of NATO's insistence on carrying out its INF modernization plans. Furthermore, the Soviets made no substantial changes in their original START position throughout the course of the negotiations. During the last two rounds of START, offers of major concessions by the United States went virtually unanswered by the Soviet Union -- further evidence that the Soviets were uninterested in agreements to reduce strategic weapons during the 1981 to 1983 period -- independently of forestalling NATO INF deployments.

For the Soviet Union, the so-called "SALT era" (characterized by agreements to limit strategic weapons or even to codify certain expansions in their numbers, rather than providing for actual reductions) came to an end in December 1983 when its representatives walked out of the START and INF negotiations. As will be argued more fully below, a primary objective of the Soviet Union in START was to perpetuate the SALT II framework of limits on strategic weapons. In the present Geneva negotiations on "space and
nuclear arms," the Soviet Union no longer talks of enhancing or even restoring the SALT II framework, although minor elements of the SALT approach persist in Soviet arms control proposals. This in itself is evidence that President Reagan's stand on arms control has had an ameliorating effect on Soviet strategic arms limitation and reduction policy.

The focus of Soviet arms control proposals has shifted since December 1983, the end of the period examined herein. It has since aimed at "preventing the militarization of space." Such Soviet proposals predate the START negotiations, but began in earnest in the summer of 1984. Since March 1985 this has been a primary issue of discussion in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations at Geneva. In fact, both U.S. and Soviet officials have endorsed the principal of seeking 50 percent cuts in strategic weapons, ostensibly far more substantial even than the reductions sought by the U.S., and resisted by the Soviet Union, in START.

Further evidence that START was the last phase of the SALT era for the Soviet Union can be found in the phrase used by the Soviets to refer to the START negotiations: "The Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Talks." Although there is a START component of the current Geneva Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms, there is no public evidence to indicate that the Soviets continue to employ
this phrase implying that limitations of strategic weapons should be at least one of the principal outcomes.

In the course of identifying and elaborating on Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions during the first START negotiations, two secondary objectives for this dissertation will hopefully be achieved. First, it is anticipated that important insights will be developed into those circumstances under which the Soviet Union would find it in its interest to seek strategic arms reductions. Second, Soviet willingness to sign an agreement cannot be the only criteria by which a U.S. decision to sign an arms control agreement is judged. A better understanding of the basis of Soviet disinterest and interest in strategic arms reductions should help the United States determine those circumstances, if any, when it is in the U.S. interest to seek strategic arms reductions with the Soviet Union. As will be argued in the concluding chapter, this entails a much more narrow range of circumstances than is ordinarily assumed.

An examination of those issues identified in the foregoing paragraphs contributes to the literature on Soviet arms control in several ways. First, this dissertation is one of the few substantial treatments of Soviet START policy for the period under consideration. As the attention of the media has been focused (with help from the Soviet Union, on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and as
U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations have taken up the issue of weapons in space, START has slipped into history as a brief and fruitless experiment in reducing strategic arms, and rarely receives attention in academic, government, or media sources.

Second, while there is a profusity of books, articles, and monographs on Soviet interests in arms control in general, and strategic arms limitation in particular, there is a dearth of studies examining contemporary Soviet interests (or disinterests) in strategic arms reductions. This is true despite the fact that recent Soviet proposals for strategic arms reductions are interesting contemporary manifestations of earlier Soviet proposals for "General and Complete Disarmament."\(^2\)

Third, this dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature of the field by developing a new framework for evaluating Soviet interests in arms control based on the recognition that there are distinguishable levels of Soviet interest in arms control. For example, as will be suggested in the conclusion to this dissertation, Soviet interests in agreeing to an arms control measure may not correspond, or even influence, Soviet interests in complying with that agreement.

Studying the strategic arms control process of the last several years seems particularly relevant since it has posed intriguing questions (while suggesting equally intriguing answers) relating to the conditions and circumstances surrounding Soviet arms control motivations. These questions may be grouped in three categories; those relating to Soviet START objectives, those dealing with the Soviet decision to discontinue participation in START and INF negotiations at the end of 1983, and those involving Soviet motives for resuming negotiations in 1985, after a year's interregnum. A full answer to these questions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but they may be phrased as follows:

(1) What was the substance (if any) of Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions during the START negotiations? Did START have any prospect of successfully engaging the Soviets in strategic arms reduction agreements?

(2) Why did the Soviets walk out of START and INF negotiations in November 1983, despite the fact that considerable movement in U.S. positions had been manifested earlier that Fall?

(3) If the Soviets were concerned about President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) when it was first announced in the midst of the START negotiations, why did they not agree to negotiate on "space arms" until a year after having walked out of START? How much of a bargaining chip is the U.S. SDI research effort in Soviet eyes?

By focusing on the first set of questions (the substance of Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions
during the START negotiations), answers might suggest themselves for the other two sets of questions. In fact, we cannot fully understand what motivated the Soviets to resume strategic arms negotiations in 1985 without appreciating why they walked out of START and INF talks in 1983. And likewise, those factors contributing to the breakdown of negotiations in 1983 cannot be fully appreciated without understanding what the Soviets hoped to achieve in the first place, and what conditions and circumstances affected their objectives.

This being said, the U.S. debate over the breakdown in strategic arms control negotiations in 1983 is of interest because this debate displays a critical failure to comprehend or even acknowledge the possibility of Soviet disinterest in strategic disarmament as a reason for the failure to achieve an agreement. When the Soviet Union walked out of the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in November 1983, and out of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) just days later, the first phase of the Reagan administration's experiment in strategic arms control came to an end. The resulting "stalemate" elicited a surprisingly prompt response from the American arms control community. Then, and later, the Reagan administration was blamed for this apparent breakdown in negotiations. The fact that negotiations were not taking place was itself taken as evidence that the Reagan
experiment had failed. Refering to this hiatus with journalistic hyperbole as "the most serious and protracted breakdown [in U.S.-Soviet arms talks] to date" Strobe Talbot subtitled his anecdotal 'expose:' "The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control," with an explicit focus on why the Reagan administration contributed to this breakdown in arms talks through its alleged inherent hostility and cynicism toward the process and results of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations and agreements since 1972.3

Later that same year (1984), Michael Krepon published a book purporting to analyze "nuclear weapons and arms control in American politics," provocatively titled Strategic Stalemate.4 Again, the underlying implication was that the Reagan administration had presided over, and been responsible for a collapse of U.S.-Soviet arms control.

3 Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control, (New York: Knopf, 1984), p. xi. The cover of this book bills it as "A revelatory inside account of the personality clashes and power struggles that shaped American policy and helped bring about the most serious breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations in a generation." The implication is that the Reagan Administration was responsible for this breakdown. The crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was certainly as serious, if not more so, and had only occurred three years earlier, a short span of time to be termed a "generation." But of course, the Soviets were clearly responsible for that crisis.

Soviet culpability was ignored, downplayed, or rationalized. The forward to this book was written by Paul C. Warnke, and is an example of the explicit Soviet apologism characteristic of many views in the U.S. arms control community:

Despite increasing acceptance of the fact that nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would mean their mutual destruction, efforts to achieve negotiated limits on the weapons and the threat they pose have achieved remarkably little. Mr. Krepon's analysis shows why this is so . . . While the Soviet Union has not been an easy negotiating partner, the reason for recent failures to achieve significant arms control is not simply Soviet intransigence. The major concessions leading to both the SALT I agreements and the unratified SALT II Treaty were made by the Soviet leaders, notably by General Secretary Brezhnev when he met with President Ford at Vladivostok in November of 1974.5

Krepon's theme is that lack of consensus in the American body politic on how to integrate arms control objectives and defense requirements is responsible for the "strategic stalemate:"6

The reasons for failure cannot simply be explained by obstreperous Soviet behavior or by administrative incompetence within the executive branch. As difficult as the Kremlin is to deal with on nuclear weapons and arms control, its actions have not been so excessive in one sphere and so recalcitrant in the other to explain how badly disjointed U.S. policies have become. The

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problem goes far deeper, to contrary impulses within the body politic and deep divisions among those who express our hopes and fears on the nuclear issue.

Strategic nuclear force survivability is considered the sine qua non of strategic nuclear stability between the superpowers. What Krepon's analysis lacks, and others like it, is a treatment of the Soviet contribution to the failure not only of the START and INF negotiating processes, but to the failure of arms control in general to enhance the survivability of America's strategic nuclear deterrent force since negotiations with the Soviet Union began in the early 1960s.

The following reasons for Soviet disinterest in a START agreement were fairly self-evident in December 1983, yet receive very little attention or credence in the aftermath of START:

(1) Diplomatically, the Soviets were not achieving the desired effect on NATO Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) modernization decisions. Suspending the negotiations was a tactic for increasing the pressure on already beleaguered NATO members to accommodate Soviet demands at the bargaining table.

(2) Militarily, the Soviets had little to gain from an agreement that altered their condition of virtual monopoly in ground-launched ballistic missiles in Europe, or their condition of virtual superiority in SALT-accountable intercontinental nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets were satisfied with maintaining the SALT I and II limits, and the deployment of American missiles may not have provided the requisite incentive for serious Soviet negotiating.
(3) Internally, the necessary negotiating leadership had become paralyzed by Andropov’s illness, and there may have been an anticipation of a continuing succession crisis with poor prospects for an early resolution.

All these factors have some merit, yet insufficient attention to these facets of Soviet arms control behavior is symptomatic of the bulk of Western literature purporting to analyze the subject. Most contemporary Western analyses on Soviet arms control behavior suffer from one or more of several characteristic deficiencies.7 Arms control, as understood and practiced in the West is inescapably a "cooperative" venture. Original Western arms control theory postulated a 'cooperative' pursuit of security that required mutual interests. In view of the record of Soviet noncompliance with arms control, as demonstrated by the

several reports put out by the Reagan administration, it seems prudent to pose such questions as: What was the basis of this mutual interest? What were Western conceptions of Soviet interest in arms control? Why did the West believe the 'cooperative' pursuit of security possible?

Western analysts originally thought that a mutual interest in avoiding war would be sufficient basis for substantive arms control agreements, but failed to realize that East and West might choose contradicting strategies for avoiding nuclear war -- the West choosing self-imposed perpetuation of vulnerability; while the East pursued war-fighting capabilities.

Western assessments of Soviet 'interests' in arms control have either mirror-imaged Western interests in arms control; (due to the assumption that both countries have a mutual desire to avoid war), took Soviet interest in arms control for granted (by accepting Soviet statements of interest in arms control at face value), or, focused too

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narrowly on issue-specific reasons for Soviet interests in arms control (i.e., specific short-term reasons) without regard for the overall Soviet approach to foreign policy, diplomacy, and arms control (sometimes mistaking a tactical, short-term Soviet interest in some specific arms control outcomes for a long-term interest in 'detente,' 'peaceful coexistence,' or some other form of East-West accommodation).

These deficiencies seem largely due to an apparent misreading of Soviet political interests, arms control interests, and negotiating strategies — based upon a mirror-imaging of our own. These misperceptions have frequently expressed themselves in such hopes as "raising the Russian learning curve" with regard to Western strategic "truth,"\(^9\) and the still prevalent belief that Soviet acceptance of the ABM Treaty signals adherence to the tenets of Mutual Assured Destruction, despite impressive and mounting evidence to the contrary.\(^10\)


II. SOVIET INTERESTS AND DISINTERESTS IN A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT, 1981-1983

A study of factors affecting the substance of Soviet interests in reducing strategic nuclear weapons, especially in light of the record of START from 1981 to 1983, is particularly relevant and critical to current American national security concerns.

The United States has since 1969 manifested a decided preference for arms control solutions, rather than unilateral defense initiatives, to enhance its security. Despite President Reagan's recent announcement that SALT II would no longer be a criteria in future U.S. weapons procurement decisions, several circumstances seem to insure that arms control will continue to be a fundamental element of our nation's security posture. First, the Scowcroft Commission, for example, repeatedly stressed the importance of arms control in the context of MX and Small ICBM survivability. Second, many believe that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not materialize, nor a "defense transition" occur, without a certain minimal level of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the form of arms control arrangements.


Third, Congress has threatened to take steps to "legislate" the limits of SALT I and II.12 Finally, current proposals from both Soviet and American delegations appear headed toward salvaging the ABM Treaty by promoting restrictions on strategic defenses. These actions, many of which seem ill-advised, will keep arms control alive for the foreseeable future.

With that prospect in mind, near-term U.S. security choices will contain some mix of arms control and unilateral action outside the context of arms control. At some point, compromises are inevitable between arms control and unilateral defense efforts involving some form of strategic defense. Specifically, the choice facing American policymakers will be to continue observing the ABM Treaty or to pursue development of some form of strategic defense.

Before these choices are made, it is imperative that the arms control record be objectively reviewed with respect to re-evaluating the interests and motives of the U.S.S.R. Those reviews of the arms control record that have so far been published suggest that there were significant errors in the theory and assumptions of early American arms control

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thinking that layed the foundations for the SALT process. One of the most substantial errors was, as noted above, the degree to which the U.S. and the Soviet Union could find and exploit areas of "common interests." These common interests have almost certainly been exaggerated by the United States, with deleterious consequences.

To work the issue of Soviet interest in START chronologically backward, a question that seems to have passed from the American consciousness, but whose answer holds valuable insight into the Soviet approach to arms control, is: why did the Soviet leadership abandon the START negotiations? Even in the aftermath of the Soviet walkout, when the Soviets had given blunt testimony to their disinterest in placing high priority on strategic arms reductions, voices in the West sought to explain the Soviet action in terms that found fault on both sides of the negotiating table. Having failed to absorb the object lesson in Soviet arms control diplomacy represented by the Soviet walkout, some continued to suggest that there were reasons for the Soviets to seek an early resumption of

negotiations which involved political, economic, and military incentives -- the traditional categories of Western interests in arms control.

One such analysis is offered by Dimitri K. Simes. He gives five reasons for the failure of the START negotiations, and then suggests several incentives for the Soviets to seek resumption of the U.S.-Soviet arms control dialogue.

Simes first proposes that Soviet perceptions of the respective negotiating positions left little prospects for success: "rightly or wrongly, there was a feeling that positions on either side were so fundamentally incompatible that there was little to lose by interrupting the discussions." According to this line of reasoning, the Soviets were not impressed by U.S. negotiating flexibility exhibited in the Fall of 1983, during the last two rounds of the START and INF negotiations. In Simes' view, the U.S. reaction to the KAL-007 incident removed all doubt about inherent U.S. hostility toward the Soviet state. Yet, the U.S. went out of its way not to allow that incident to disrupt the talks. The U.S. response to the KAL-007

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15 Ibid., p. 150.

incident should have had the opposite effect, proving U.S. sincerity about insulating bi-lateral talks from political tensions and placing arms control negotiations above the vagaries of superpower crises.17

Second, Simes faults the character of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, which called for parallel efforts to modernize intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) while pursuing arms control limitations on such forces:

[Paradoxically, the very format of the December 1979 dual-track NATO decision encouraged fierce Soviet opposition to Pershing II and cruise missile deployment and their eventual withdrawal from the talks. . . . In effect the Soviets were requested by NATO to express their opinion about the nuclear modernization program directed against them. Needless to say, that could only enhance skepticism in the Kremlin regarding the alliance's determination to proceed with the deployment if negotiations fail. Moreover, for all practical purposes, Moscow found itself under pressure to launch a major propaganda effort against the U.S. missiles. Once the effort failed, it would be difficult to continue talking without losing face.18

The dual-track decision was bound to make the Kremlin wonder about the alliance’s dedication to arms control. However, it would be erroneous to suggest that this decision 'forced' Moscow to launch a major propaganda effort against the U.S. missiles. In fact, all Moscow had to do to secure significant results in terms of weakening Europe's

17 This event is treated at greater length in Chapter Three.

incentives for nuclear force modernization was demonstrate flexibility in the arms control arena.

Third, Simes implicitly recognizes that the Soviets primary objective is "mobilizing opposition to the Reagan administration" and suggests that in Soviet calculations, sometimes arms control is an appropriate instrument for that purpose, while sometimes it is not:

[T]here was hope that the withdrawal from Geneva would serve as a sort of shock therapy on the West. Since arms control was not delivering much, they were willing to take a chance to test whether refusal to negotiate could work more effectively in terms of mobilizing opposition to the Reagan administration policies in Western Europe and in the United States itself.19

Simes explains the fourth reason for Soviet withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations as an attempt to provoke polarization in NATO:

[I]n anticipation of the presidential elections in the United States, the Soviets appeared eager to dramatize the poor state of the superpower relationship and to make sure that it would become a major campaign issue.20

A fifth reason cited by Simes is as follows:

Finally, there was probably a psychological dimension. Since the beginning of SALT negotiations in 1969, the momentum of nuclear programs constantly favored the Soviet Union. ... Now, for the first time, the tables were turned: the Reagan administration acted as if it

19 Ibid., p. 159.
20 Ibid., p. 151
was negotiating from strength, as if time was on its side. The USSR was getting a bit of its own medicine and found it difficult to swallow.\(^{21}\)

Arguing that in the aftermath of START, Soviet leaders were now disabused of an earlier belief that arms control would gradually evolve into East-West 'military detente' thereby creating a political environment in the United States unconducive to U.S. defense modernization efforts,\(^{22}\) Simes then determines that there are three important reasons for the Soviet Union to seek resumption of a dialogue on strategic weapons. One is for political image-building: "the USSR does not want to be perceived as a warmonger. . . . Furthermore, the Soviets traditionally value bilateral arms control with the United States as a way to demonstrate their superpower status. . . . a major arms control deal [with Reagan] can be viewed by the Soviet rulers as a vindication for past humiliations."\(^{23}\)

Second, Simes is among those Western analysts who feel there are strong economic incentives for Soviet interests in agreements to reduce strategic weapons:

As far as the economics of arms control is concerned, every Soviet leader starting with Nikita Khrushchev

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 152.
[has] stated that military spending represented an unfortunate burden on the nation's economy.24

Simes does concede that "to some extent, of course, the arms race 'imposed by the imperialists' is nothing more than a convenient excuse for the failures of the Soviet economy."25 However, he also feels that economic incentives, as well as calculations of technological inferiority compelled Soviet interests in SALT, and should do so again:

Military appropriations are subject to general budgetary constraints and there is an incentive for both the civilian and military leadership to try hard to save on expensive weapons systems, particularly those in the area of high technology where the USSR is behind the United States. Such a combination of economic and technological considerations played a key role in persuading Brezhnev's Politburo to conclude the ABM treaty in 1972.26

A third incentive, in Simes view, for Soviet interests in resuming strategic arms reduction talks is "the Soviet desire to preserve strategic stability:"

For the Soviet Union, strategic stability means primarily the stability of the arms race, and the focus is not so much on numbers of weapons as on emerging technologies.27

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 153.
These incentives combined with others, according to Simes, to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table just one year later:

The Geneva agreement between Secretary of State George Shultz and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko was to a great extent made possible by the Soviet fear of Star Wars. The reelection of Ronald Reagan, his continuing interest, despite the landslide victory, in resuming dialogue with the USSR, and the consolidation of Chernenko's power in Moscow were other factors affecting the Soviet decision to reenter arms control negotiations.  

III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL

This section will explore the following themes: (1) the West has failed to appreciate Soviet interests in arms control as unique from their own; (2) Western scholars and politicians alike have tended to believe that the Soviets were interested in arms control for the same reasons they were; and, (3) current Western perceptions of Soviet interests in arms control are the product of the same era that produced concepts of "mutual" deterrence without regard for Soviet approaches to deterrence.

A survey of Western analyses of Soviet interests in arms control serves several purposes relevant to the subject of this dissertation. First, it suggests certain weaknesses, problems, and deficiencies in the literature on

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28 Ibid., p. 154.
Soviet arms control policy that warrant reinvestigation or further study. Second, it also suggests a framework for an approach to the problem of analyzing Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions. Third, it lays the groundwork for the thesis that the Soviets may be interested in strategic arms reductions for entirely different reasons than the United States, yet many American analyses of Soviet interests in arms control conclude that the Soviets have reasons to seek disarmament that differ only slightly, if at all, from our own.

A survey of Western analyses of Soviet interests in arms control extending from the beginnings of the Soviet state throughout the SALT era reveals certain characteristic deficiencies. The first problem one encounters is that unique Soviet interests in arms control are rarely treated in Western analyses of arms control issues. When they are, problems of mirror-imaging are evident in the emphasis given domestic economic factors as the basis of Soviet interests in arms control, the belief that the Soviets espouse similar strategic philosophies and objectives, and the belief that strategic nuclear parity is a Soviet objective. In short, it is often assumed that the Soviets are interested in arms control for the same reasons as the U.S., that the Soviets will respond favorably to the same kinds of arms control initiatives as the U.S., and that the Soviets are just as
interested in complying with these arms control agreements as is the United States.

Some of these deficiencies are the result of methodological issues. The Soviet Union is a closed society, and much analyses of Soviet policy is inferential or speculative. However, Western analyses of Soviet interests in arms control have sometimes suffered from a preoccupation with superficial indicators of Soviet interests in arms control and with an over-reliance on interpretations of variances in Soviet negotiating behavior as a barometer of Soviet interest in particular proposals or agreements.

There also appears to be a studied reluctance to account for the possibility of Soviet disinterest in arms control and a consequent failure to distinguish between levels of Soviet interest in arms control proposals of varying nature and with varying impact on Soviet priorities.

The following paragraphs give a brief history, not of Soviet interests in arms control, but of Western perceptions of those interests. These perceptions are divided into three periods -- pre-World War II, post-World War II, and pre-SALT I (Western perceptions of Soviet interests in SALT will be treated at greater length later in this chapter). This section will also seek to identify consistent themes in Western perceptions of Soviet interests in arms control and
disarmament and to suggest characteristic deficiencies and problems in these perceptions.

An early example of Western perceptions of Soviet interests in arms control is to be found in a book titled *Disarmament* by Salvador De Madariaga, published in 1929.29 Madariaga writes:

Russia is perhaps after the United States and Great Britain the most formidable obstacle for the success of disarmament. In a sense it might even be classed first, for since our diagnosis is that the trouble is due to lack of unity in the world, the existence of a great nation ruled by a kind of 'heresy' would appear to be the most serious difficulty of all for the achievement of what is our true aim, namely the establishment of a well organized World-Community.30

Madariaga then argues that there are two types of Soviet leaders, one driven by ideology, and one inclined toward a more practical interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. This is an interesting early precursor to the "hawks-dove" dichotomy, which posits that the Soviet leadership consists of both "hawks" devoted to ideological hostility toward the West, and "doves" who are convinced that the nuclear threat lessens the importance of ideology and necessitates practical ways of cooperation with the West. The thrust of Madariaga’s analysis is that the League of Nations must "ease the conversion of the Soviets to true international


30 Ibid., p. 316.
He concludes his discussion of Soviet interests in disarmament thus:

Two points must be borne in mind with regard to the Russian situation: the first is Russia's dependence on foreign finance, the second the dependence of the Soviet system on peace, for it is but plain common sense that what the war brought to them another war would take away. If there is one thing that Soviet Russia cannot afford to risk, it is a war. For these two reasons, even if we deny to Russian Bolsheviks the pacific tendencies which are normal in every capitalistic or socialistic State, Soviet Russia is on the whole an element of peace in the world which can and should ultimately be absorbed into a world organization for cooperation.

With this analysis, Madariaga establishes a certain precedence for themes in Western perceptions of Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament. These themes are threefold. First, the Soviet Union needs disarmament for economic reasons. Second, the Soviet Union needs disarmament for reasons of peace. Third, Marxist-Leninist ideology is discounted and ideological obstacles to seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union are essentially dismissed.

Western perceptions of Soviet interests in arms control in the post-war era can be divided into three phases. First, a strong consensus existed until the late 1950s that the Soviets were uninterested in arms control. In the second phase this consensus began deteriorating.

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31 Ibid., p. 318.
32 Ibid., p. 320.
Following the launching of Sputnik in 1957, many analysts and scholars in the West came to believe in theories of "mutual deterrence" and the concomitant need for cooperative approaches to avoiding nuclear war. These theories laid the foundation for the third phase -- the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, whose outcome would be used to prove the alleged correctness of the mutual deterrence theories formulated in the second phase.

A genuine consensus existed among Western observers regarding Soviet intransigence and disinterest in arms control throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. Some studies suggest that this intransigence began to change by the mid-1950s, but nonetheless, the Soviets were generally believed to be uninterested in substantive arms control measures until the test ban negotiations were concluded with a treaty in 1963.

The image of an intransigent Soviet stance toward arms control acquired great currency in the immediate post-war era. Many factors underlay the consensus on Soviet disinterest in arms control during this period. The Soviet Union, it was felt, certainly wanted to "catch up" to the U.S. in terms of nuclear weapons, and would disdain efforts to contain or restrict its efforts to do so through arms

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control. Also, the Cold War was at its apex. The West had grown disillusioned by Soviet obstructionism during the later wartime summit conferences (Yalta and Potsdam). 34

This disillusionment was substantiated by the Soviet performance during the negotiations for international control of atomic energy. A participant in those negotiations described Soviet disinterest in reaching an accord, as reflected in the intransigence of its negotiating representatives, in the following manner:

[T]he representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the Soviet satellite (first Poland and then the Ukraine) differed markedly in their behavior from all the others. The Soviet representative was quite evidently under specific instructions both as to what he was to say and as to his conduct. He was at all times to question the motives of the others; he was to try to split the other nations apart from each other, but never to conciliate the smaller nations, to whom he was always to be arrogant and truculent; he was never, under any circumstances, to concede a point except on specific instructions from the Kremlin, and then only in the exact language given him; and, finally, he was to talk as much as all the others put together, to delay, to confuse, and never to admit his true intent or to tell the truth. 35

34 The Western wartime and immediate post-war negotiating experience with the Soviet Union was analyzed and consolidated in a volume edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, Negotiating With the Russians, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951). A useful summary of the Western image of Soviet negotiating behavior can be found in the closing chapter of this book by Philip E. Mosely, "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation," pp. 271-303.

This source confirms that the Soviets were interested only in negotiating for "side-effects," rather than for an agreement:

At no time did any of these men give any honest clarification of their proposals; at no time did they indicate any possibility of compromising any issue, though there were plenty of times when they made compromise proposals, patently fraudulent to the other delegates, for purposes of propaganda. At no time did they discuss the proposals of the other delegates on their merits. . . . The Soviet representatives were there to make certain proposals, and to make propaganda if the proposals were not accepted.37

The author notes that "at the end of the three years all of us came to believe that we had not been negotiating, except among ourselves," and concludes with this observation:

If there is a lesson to be learned from these meetings with the Soviet Union over a period of three years, it is this: that the word negotiation should not be used to define meetings in which only one of the parties is actually attempting to negotiate. Such a 'negotiation' must inevitably fail, and it is not always easy to make it clear to the public who was to blame for the failure.38

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36 The term is Fred Ikle's, see How Nations Negotiate, (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 43-58.


In a book-length analysis of the atomic energy negotiations, Joseph L. Nogee lists the following objectives of the Soviet Union:39

(1) To reject the American atomic energy proposals without appearing to do so.

(2) To link Soviet policy with popular aspirations throughout the world.

(3) To portray the policies of the Western bloc -- and the United States in particular -- as aggressive.

(4) To prevent the United States Government from using its atomic superiority to gain political advantages.

(5) To stall for time.

In a survey of "postwar negotiations for arms control" Bernhard G. Bechhoefer reaches the following conclusions regarding Soviet disinterest in arms control prior to 1960:

[I]t is suggested that the record of fifteen years of negotiations does not yet support the proposition that controlled disarmament is an urgent Soviet objective. The Soviet Union apparently still hopes to achieve its preferred alternatives of disarmament of the West or of disarmament without controls. It has not yet shown a desire to sacrifice any of the strength that it derives from its secrecy in an early stage of a disarmament program.

There is no present indication that maintenance of relative Soviet military strength vis-a-vis the West is incompatible with betterment of the Soviet standard of living. There is even some indication that Soviet hopes

of avoiding some of the devastation of a two-strike nuclear war have slightly increased. In these circumstances, it is difficult to find a Soviet motivation for speeding the achievement of controlled disarmament.40

The above cited views fairly represent a Western consensus on Soviet disinterest in arms control during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. However, shortly after 1957, this consensus regarding Soviet disinterest in arms control began to deteriorate. Three factors combined to precipitate a Western re-evaluation of its negative assessment of Soviet interests in arms control. They were the launching of Sputnik, the formulation of mutual assured destruction deterrence theories, and overt shifts in Soviet arms control policy that led Western analysts to believe changes in the Soviet system would facilitate greater Soviet interest in limited agreements.

On the first factor, the shock of the new vulnerability to intercontinental means of delivering nuclear weapons demonstrated by the Soviets' ability to orbit Sputnik provoked a surprise attack panic which led to the convening of the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference.41


Nothing substantive came of this conference of experts gathered from the U.S., the Soviet Union, and other countries, but it did establish important precedents for later arms control efforts. For example, it established limited objectives as the principal aim of arms control negotiations (as opposed to schemes of General and Complete Disarmament) and it established the technical approach of the West, whereby arms control is used to place constraints on the technical manifestations of the arms "race" rather than using arms control to "relax international tensions."

Second, the years following the Surprise Attack Conference (1958-1963) were a formative period for Western theories of strategic stability, mutual deterrence, and arms control. Out of the thinking of this period emerged a uniquely American conception of mutual deterrence, a Western theory of arms control and how it could contribute to promoting and perpetuating a condition of mutual deterrence, a Western agenda (objectives) for arms control, and a new assessment of Soviet interests in arms control.

Four basic assumptions characterized the thinking regarding arms control and deterrence that was precipitated by Sputnik and germinated in the Surprise Attack Conference. Robert Gilpin, in discussing the contributions of American scientists to this new thinking, accurately and concisely summarizes these assumptions as follows:
nuclear weapons have brought the world into a new and exceedingly dangerous era whose outlines man can as yet only dimly perceive;

nuclear weapons have outdated the conviction that political settlements must precede or at least be undertaken in conjunction with disarmament or arms control;

nuclear weapons are a cause as well as a symptom of international political tensions; and,

the United States and the USSR, despite their grave mutual antagonisms, have a strong mutual interest in taking steps to prevent nuclear warfare. In particular, they [American scientists] emphasize the need for the United States to develop policies which will encourage the Soviet Union to modify its policies tending toward accidental war.42

The new theory and objectives for arms control were delineated in a book titled Strategy and Arms Control by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, published in 1961.43 With regard to the theory, Schelling and Halperin suggested that arms control could be the mechanism of a "cooperative" pursuit of mutual security interests:

While a nation's military force opposes the military force of potentially hostile nations, it also must collaborate, implicitly if not explicitly, in avoiding the kinds of crises in which withdrawal is intolerable for both sides, in avoiding false alarms and mistaken intentions, and in providing -- along with its deterrent threat of resistance or retaliation in the event of


unacceptable challenges -- reassurance that restraint on the part of potential enemies will be matched by restraint on our own. It is the responsibility of military policy to recognize that, just as our own military establishment is largely a response to the military force that confronts us, foreign military establishments are to some extent a response to our own, and there can be a mutual interest in inducing and reciprocating arms restraint.44

With regard to the objectives of arms control, Schelling and Halperin wrote:

We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.45

As mentioned earlier, two trends in Western thinking converged to change the American assessment of Soviet interests in arms control during this period. The theory of mutual assured destruction that emerged by the mid to late 1960s (but that was beginning to take shape by the end of the 1950s) was based on several key assumptions that were often implicit rather than explicit. Among these were the belief that the Soviet Union had accepted, or soon would

44 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
accept, the immutable fact of mutual societal vulnerability in a nuclear age.\(^{46}\)

Along with the appreciation of this ineluctable vulnerability would come a desire to stabilize and institutionalize it through arms control mechanisms. The logic of Mutual Assured Destruction dictated that the Soviet Union cooperate in arms control measures to regulate the superpower nuclear relationship on the basis of mutual vulnerability and permit the avoidance of needless expenditures on weapons that would constitute "overkill."

The second trend in thinking during this formative period became known as Cold War revisionism, and was elaborated in the writings of William Appleman Williams, D.F. Fleming, Gar Alperovitz, David Horowitz, Gabriel Kolko, Diane Shaver Clemens, and Lloyd C. Gardner, among others.\(^{47}\)

This school of thought transformed the traditional image of an intransigent, ideologically hostile Soviet Union into a

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beleaguered, paranoid state encircled by a United States bent on pursuing a global "Open Door" policy for the sake of economic and trade advantages. Ironically, this line of reasoning, with its emphasis on economic explanations of national behavior, was inherently Marxist, and neatly played into the Soviet lament of "capitalist encirclement." It also placed the blame for Cold War tensions on the United States and implied that since the U.S. was responsible for a (U.S.) action - (Soviet) reaction arms race, the United States could and should take the first steps to halt, then reverse this dynamic.

Soviet mistrust (justified by Western actions ranging from the Allied Intervention in Russia in 1918 to Truman's "abrupt" cancellation of Lend-Lease in 1945) and nuclear weapons (posing an inescapable threat of mutual extinction) -- not Marxist-Leninist ideology -- were the major obstacles to reduction of superpower tensions according to Cold War revisionism. In light of this new thinking, even the Soviet rejection of international control of atomic energy was subjected to re-evaluation:

[T]o Stalin the Baruch Plan was nothing more than an American attempt to impose on the world a nuclear Pax Americana, a device to relegate the Soviet Union forever to second-class status. Stalin saw no generous offer: rather he probably suspected that, in the end, the United States would not really relinquish its atomic weapons but would manage to force the Soviet Union to submit to international inspection, thus laying bare the terrible weaknesses of postwar Russia, and to fasten
upon the world American control of the authority to exploit, and reap the profits of, the peaceful atom.\textsuperscript{48}

Not all analyses of Soviet interests in arms control from this period were valid reflections of these criticisms. In the early days of the first SALT negotiations, Roman Kolkowicz and others published an analysis of Soviet interests in arms control, and identified the following basic Soviet motivations:\textsuperscript{49}

(1) to seek gains in military, political, and economic areas;

(2) to reduce uncertainties in the superpower arms competition; and,

(3) to create 'favorable' political and psychological conditions in the West to facilitate the promotion of Soviet arms

The third actor which combined to precipitate a Western re-evaluation of its negative assessment of Soviet interests in arms control was the apparent change in the Soviet arms control stance from insistence on General and Complete Disarmament to acceptance of limited arms control


measures occurring in the mid-1950s. Note the following statement by Alexander Dallin, et al., alluding to the fact that surveillance technologies were then making verification of arms agreements less uncertain, and pointing up the emerging U.S. view that an over-riding community of interest would make possible limited approaches to arms control due to changes in the "dominant Soviet outlook:"

It is our conclusion, in essence, that as of 1964 continuing changes in the Soviet system have not yet significantly diminished the underlying causes of international conflict; nor have they removed the fundamental obstacles to substantial disarmament agreements. However, the effect of changes both in military technology and in various areas of Soviet life on the dominant Soviet outlook may make possible a more productive approach to reducing the chances of general war and perhaps the scope of war, should it come. Unlike the more distant goal of disarmament (in its traditional meaning), this approach would be based on the recognition that even adversary systems share a common interest in dampening down the danger of thermonuclear war, even while lower-scale military clashes and especially non-violent forms of political, ideology, and economic conflict persist.

The reasons for this optimistic outlook shed interesting light on the sources of Soviet interests in arms control from a Western perspective. First, Dallin notes that "one principal determinant of the shifting Soviet

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51 See Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament, p. 11.
outlook has been the state of the economy." Second, it was felt that "the requirements of a complex developing society" had led to a softening of Soviet attitudes toward arms control. Third, these authors stated that "the collapse of the unitary Bloc" and a preoccupation with "the process of fragmentation within its camp. ... appears to strengthen Soviet interest in moves intended to produce some relaxation of tensions with the United States." Fourth, Dallin's study suggests that there was substance to the Soviet desire for "peaceful coexistence" which may have increased Soviet interests in arms control:

The exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute has also obliged the Soviet leadership to articulate and defend the fundamental assumptions upon which its strategy of 'peaceful coexistence' is based. ... [and which] has been evolving into the long-range strategy of a Soviet elite increasingly preoccupied with international power and politics rather than with social revolution. Since the Twentieth CPSU Congress the 'coexistence line' has been acquiring a theoretical underpinning from the reformulation of related doctrines, such as the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism and the non-inevitability of war.

The authors of this study then summarize their view of an "adaptation of the Soviet leadership to reality" in the following manner:

This process marks another stage in the step-by-step adaptation of the Soviet leadership to reality: to the
radical changes that have been taking place in the character of international politics since 1945; to the technological revolution which has changed the nature of war and its anticipation; to the seeming upsurge of national consciousness in countries where 'proletarian' bonds have proved to be weak or non-existent; to the many strains and stresses within the U.S.S.R. itself.

The most important consensus to come out of this rehabilitation in Western eyes of the Soviet Union as a suitable and trustworthy negotiating partner was the conviction that both sides shared common interests that could and should form the basis for effectual arms control agreements. While acknowledging a residual Soviet ideological enmity, Western scholars became convinced that the Soviets would join them in taking measures to prevent nuclear war and preserve peace:

How can the Soviet Union and the United States have parallel or common interests in measures to control armaments if their basic purposes are antagonistic?

The answer lies essentially in the changing nature of war, especially general war. ... If large-scale war meant mutual destruction, it would not advance the political interests of either side; both would be better served, despite basic political hostility, by preventing its occurrence. ... both sides have possible common or parallel interests in preventing an unintended all-out war and in minimising the burden of the deterrent.

To summarize, the philosophy of Mutual Assured Destruction provided the grounds for acknowledging that

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., pp. 165-66.
nuclear weapons were the principal enemy, to be confronted and constrained by a joint U.S.-Soviet arms control effort, while Cold War revisionism provided the grounds for doubting the moral basis of traditional U.S. foreign policy and at the same time rehabilitating the Soviet Union as a legitimate and reasonable partner in international negotiations. This was the thinking that carried the United States into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning in 1968 -- an experience that was interpreted as confirming the assumptions of Western arms control theorists from the late 1950s and early 1960s, and reviewed below.

A review of U.S. perceptions of Soviet interests in SALT makes several contributions to this dissertation. It shows that the early 1960s' U.S. assessments of why the Soviets would be interested in arms control were confirmed almost in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy. SALT I by no means entailed reductions in strategic weapons -- it therefore provides an example of those circumstances when Soviet interests in arms control fall short of agreeing to actual weapon reductions. Nevertheless, it helps establish the validity of the four factors that condition Soviet interests in strategic arms reduction (i.e., threat assessment, bargaining leverage, leadership, and foreign policy orientation) and which comprise the research framework for this dissertation discussed in the next chapter.
As mentioned earlier, Soviet interests in arms control did not receive thorough or systematic analysis until the Alexander Dallin study published in 1964, and then the basic conclusion was that the Soviets would be interested in limited arms control measures for much the same reasons as the United States. The SALT experience was interpreted by many in the United States as confirming that conclusion.

Although not developed fully until the following chapter, it may prove useful to preview those factors that most impact on Soviet interests in arms control. This dissertation suggests that Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions will be conditioned by at least four factors. They are: (1) Soviet perceptions of a foreign threat and an evaluation of the degree to which that threat is amenable to an arms control response; (2) Soviet perceptions of the bargaining leverage an opponent brings to the negotiating table; (3) the internal status and degree of interest on the part of the top Soviet leadership; and, (4)

56 Although Bernhard Bechhoefer, among others had made significant contributions to an understanding of Soviet negotiating behavior and arms control policy in the 1950s. See his Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, and his "Negotiating with the Soviet Union," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 269-281. As noted in the analysis above, this understanding of an intransigent Soviet negotiating partner was eventually rejected by the mainstream of Western thought in the 1960s.
the extent to which Soviet foreign policy is oriented toward 'peaceful coexistence'.

The presence of all these factors are found in principal U.S. evaluations of Soviet interests in SALT. For example, according to Marshall Shulman, the following factors contributed to Soviet interests in going beyond proposing strategic arms limitations to actually agreeing to a SALT accord:

(1) a decade of strenuous effort through which the Soviet Union had overcome the inferiority in nuclear weapons under which it had lived since World War II, as a result of which the principle of 'equal security' could now be invoked;

(2) a growing realization by the Soviet political leadership of the limited political utility of strategic weapons and of the futility and high cost of an unregulated strategic competition;

(3) a crystallization of the preference of the Party leadership for obtaining long-term increases in the flow of grain, technology, management, and goods from abroad as a way of dealing with economic shortcomings in the Communist system, rather than the alternative of institutional modifications;

(4) a tentative acceptance of the possibility that the political leadership of the United States was prepared to move in the same direction ('the era of negotiation');

(5) a mounting concern by the Soviet leadership with the rise of China in international diplomacy, and the desire to offset developing relations between China and the United States.57

It is fair to say that the above formulation represented a consensus among most U.S. SALT analysts and observers at the time the negotiations were underway.

Gerard Smith has provided important insight into U.S. assessments of Soviet interests in SALT. Smith, however, speculates with caution on this subject, noting: "Why did the Soviets agree to enter the negotiation? We do not know for sure." He then advances some qualified answers. For one thing, the Soviets wanted to avoid a competition with the U.S. in ABM systems. Furthermore, they may have "calculated that prospects for unilateral constraints on the American MIRV program might be improved once SALT negotiations got under way." Smith thus acknowledges that negotiations, even if they yield no agreements per se, serve to promote certain Soviet military and political objectives.

An important Soviet objective, according to Smith was "formal registration of strategic equality:"

There was a feeling in 1969 that a 'window' in time was approaching when the forces of the Soviets' and the Americans' would be sufficiently in phase and the

59 Ibid., p. 33.
60 Ibid.
psychology of the two leaderships was such that a nuclear arms control agreement might be feasible. It was impossible to calculate when such an opportunity would return. Each side was confident that it had ample power to dissuade the other from any temptation to attack -- even in a deep crisis.\textsuperscript{61}

That is, significant stability had come to characterize the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition.

This line of reasoning concluded that the Soviets were anxious to demonstrate their commitment to 'peaceful coexistence,' were satisfied with the strategic balance, and were determined to shift resources from military to civilian needs:

The United States undoubtedly was not alone in wanting to divert more of its resources to civilian needs rather than to additional strategic weaponry whose value was questionable. There must have been people in the Soviet leadership urging a different balance in meeting civilian and military needs.\textsuperscript{62}

Smith also figures that the Soviets wanted to head off a possible U.S.-Chinese rapprochement: "China, while never formally mentioned at SALT, was a constant presence."\textsuperscript{63}

Also according to Smith, "both [the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.] were beginning to realize that above a certain

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 35.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 35.
level nuclear weapons were more a psychological than a military force," that an element of "overkill" had been reached in their respective accumulation of nuclear power -- "what counted was not so much the actual strategic power one had but how other nations rightly or wrongly perceived that power and the relative will to use it."64

A faith in U.S.-Soviet doctrinal convergence around the principle of stability via MAD was the key to the view that America and the Soviet Union shared essential common interests, and that a common view of strategic nuclear stability based on MAD could be the basis for successful arms control negotiations:

If there was to be success at SALT, I felt that the two sides would to some extent have to pursue a similar strategic doctrine, that the prime (but not necessarily sole) purpose of strategic nuclear weapons is to deter the use of such weapons by the other side through maintenance of a clear threat that such use would lead to intolerable damage to the attacker. This in simple terms is the doctrine of 'assured destruction'.65

Smith, however, once again cautions his readers:

Soviet views were unknown. The Soviets seldom take up their strategic pens to try to rationalize the irrational. They for the most part restrict their rhetoric to propaganda against American military power. SALT seemed to offer a virgin field to cultivate a

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 24.
better understanding of Soviet concepts of how our strategic relationship could most safely be managed.66

John Newhouse undertook to write a history of these seminal negotiations, and he also portrayed the endeavor as codifying a view of stability based on Mutual Assured Destruction, explicitly imputing this view to the Soviets:

The talks were launched, not from a common impulse to reduce armaments, but from a mutual need to solemnize the parity principle -- or, put differently, to establish an acceptance by each side of the other’s ability to inflict unacceptable retribution in response to a nuclear attack. (The assumption here is that neither side will initiate a first strike if the other’s retaliatory capability is strong enough to survive its impact. Mutual deterrence, then, rests on the awareness by each side of the other’s retaliatory -- or second-strike -- capacity.)67

If the Soviets had not by then demonstrated any actual belief in such a view of stability, Newhouse argued they would learn it from the Americans through the educational process of arms control negotiations:

The Russians . . . are in the talks partly because they have caught up with the United States in strategic weapons. Their efforts, after the Cuban missile trauma, to match the Americans by achieving a balanced second-strike force have succeeded. Now, the Soviet leaders, like America’s, hope to head off another major offensive weapons cycle. They know that to succeed they must inhibit ballistic-missile defense, an insight acquired from the Americans. Baldly, this means that

66 Ibid., p. 25.
67 Newhouse, pp. 2-3.
defending people is the most troublesome of all strategic options, for stability demands that each of the two societies stand wholly exposed to the destructive power of the other. Acceptance of this severe and novel doctrine illustrates the growing sophistication of Soviet thinking and some willingness to break with fixed attitudes, including the old Russian habit of equating security with territorial defense. And it points up the American interest in raising the Russian learning curve -- in creating a dialogue that will encourage, however gradually, a convergence of American and Russian thinking about stable deterrence.68

Along these same lines, Samuel Payne has observed:

The most important reason for the Soviet agreement to begin the SALT negotiations in 1969 was the Soviet Union's attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States.69

There is a curious circular logic at play in the Western belief that Soviets wanted arms control because of commitment to parity. Prior to SALT, Western analysts determined that Soviet commitment to parity and stability is both a prerequisite for successful arms control agreements and is in the Soviet national interest. After 1972, Soviet participation in SALT is taken as confirmation of this evaluation, as proof that the Soviets were committed to strategic nuclear parity with the United States.70

68 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
69 Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 18.
IV. SUMMARY

American concern with Soviet interests in arms control reached something of an apex in the early 1960s, concomittantly with the intellectual maturation of a theory of arms control.\(^71\) One of the most important elements of this theory was the assumption of an adversary who recognized common interests and was willing to embark on cooperative enterprises for mutual enhancement of each other’s security. When the Soviet Union was considered, the people responsible for this arms control theorizing reached a fundamental conclusion: namely, the Soviets were interested in arms control for much the same reasons they themselves were. Soviet policymakers, it was asserted, feared the devastation of a nuclear war, desired to reduce the costs of defense in order to transfer the resulting savings to domestic sectors, and wanted to promote stability by reducing political tensions.

A parallel assumption, reached about the same time, was that Soviet nuclear strategy was similar in critical respects to that of the United States, and therefore would have the same requirements, and was driven by the same

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\(^71\) A representative early study of Soviet interests in arms control has been cited earlier, see Dallin, *The Soviet Union and Disarmament*. On the intellectual development of Western arms control theory, see Ranger, *Arms & Politics*, especially pp. 20-27.
irrational arms race dynamics exacerbated by mutual distrust.

This chapter has critically reviewed the history of Western assumptions regarding Soviet interest in arms control. It has stressed three basic themes. First, Soviet interest is recognized as essential to the success of any East-West arms control endeavor. In fact, contemplated U.S. proposals are often evaluated in terms of their acceptability to the Soviets. Second, Soviet interest in arms control is often implicit or taken for granted. There are at least two reasons for this: (1) the Soviets constantly declare their interest in it, and frequently make symbolic gestures (such as the recent nuclear testing moratorium) to underscore this; (2) arms control seems like such an imminently sensible thing to the Western mind. Our own interest is taken for granted, and it is easy to project that interest onto an ambiguous opponent. Third, when assessments of Soviet interests are explicit, or not taken for granted, they often suffer from two problems. One, Soviet interests are assessed as being based on the same factors and conditions that motivate our own interests. Two, the nature of Soviet objectives in arms control are incorrectly, or only partially understood. Soviet objectives in arms control are frequently assessed in the West as being no different than our own.
To summarize the objectives of this dissertation, a study of factors determining Soviet interest or disinterest in strategic arms reductions prior to the preoccupation with strategic defenses should achieve several things. Among them:

-- delineating those factors affecting Soviet interests in proposing and negotiating, versus signing, a strategic arms reduction agreement

-- determining what constitutes incentives for Soviet interest in arms control negotiations and in achieving actual agreements

-- promoting a better understanding of Soviet arms control objectives, particularly with regard to the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons;

-- exploring the Soviet role in the 1984 post-START nuclear arms control "stalemate";

-- placing Soviet START policy within the overall historical context of Soviet diplomacy and foreign policy; and,

-- clarifying the relationship between Soviet defense strategy and its arms control policy.

Recent U.S.-Soviet negotiations for strategic arms reductions have been separated into two parts. The early phase began in 1982, and ended in December 1983. START negotiations resumed in 1985 as part of a newly structured
"umbrella" format including separate delegations for INF, space and defense arms, as well as strategic offensive weapons. As noted, the focus of this dissertation will be on the early START period for several reasons that need to be made explicit.

START was a test of Soviet disarmament sincerity. The Soviet Union had spoken often of the need for disarmament, and had frequently and loudly proclaimed a desire for it. START gave the Soviets an opportunity to demonstrate their devotion to the concept of disarmament by engaging in serious negotiations on reducing what they had repeatedly termed the most dangerous and destructive weapons engineered by man.

START (and, perhaps even more so, INF) was also a demonstration of Soviet concepts of "equality and equal security." The Soviet approach to START, perhaps more so than with any other arms negotiation in the nuclear age, clearly demonstrates the role and instrumentality of arms control in Soviet foreign and defense policy.

Apart from the lessons of Soviet arms control behavior that can be derived from START, there are indicative lessons to be drawn for the role arms control plays in U.S. politics. START was supposed to represent a

new approach to arms control; having learned and absorbed the lessons of SALT, START represented a return to disarmament (in the sense of reductions in weapons) as opposed to strictly arms control (in the sense of limitations without cuts).

START was the first real test of classic Western arms control theory -- the cooperative pursuit of strategic stability by negotiated reductions in the most destabilizing weapon systems. Although the goal of reductions in strategic nuclear weapons had been implicit in U.S.-Soviet negotiations prior to this time (and had been the basis of Carter's early arms control policy as evidenced by his March 1977 "Deep Cuts" proposal) the START negotiations marked the first time reductions in central strategic systems (rather than their limitation) were the explicit primary goal of both sides.\(^7\)

It is in this sense that the talks represented a radical departure from the SALT process, as indeed President Reagan intended.

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CHAPTER TWO
DEFINING THE DEGREE AND SCOPE
OF SOVIET INTERESTS IN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

I. DETERMINING SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL

The foregoing survey and critique of Western analyses of Soviet interests in arms control demonstrates some of the methodological difficulties inherent in attempting to understand the substance of Soviet motivations. Often, commentators resort to relatively superficial indicators to determine Soviet interests in arms control. For example, some Western scholars have suggested tests of Soviet "seriousness" in arms control negotiations. Two such tests relate to the nature of Soviet proposals and the nature of their presentation. When Soviet leader Gorbachev announced, on 15 Jan. 1986, sweeping proposals for complete strategic disarmament by the year 2000, Paul Nitze indicated that the U.S. used both the manner of its presentation and the content of the proposals to reach a judgement on Soviet seriousness:

- 69 -
Our study of the Gorbachev proposal in detail and in its overall effect caused us to conclude, based on both the manner of presentation and the substance, that it had been designed primarily for its political and propaganda impact.

Bernard Bechhoefer has offered the following historical insight into the problem of gauging Soviet seriousness in arms control negotiations:

Over the years, one test of the seriousness of Soviet negotiations has been the length and degree of detail of their proposals. In June 1946, the Soviet suggestions for an organ of international control were somewhat detailed. Thereafter, the Soviet proposals became shorter and less detailed, and finally degenerated into mere slogans of propaganda. Not until 1955 did the Soviet Union reverse itself sufficiently to submit proposals approximately as detailed as in 1946. The Soviet positions in 1959 and 1960 on the cessation of tests are sufficiently detailed to permit a precise treaty, if agreement can be reached. This is an unprecedented development in the negotiations. . . . On several occasions John Foster Dulles pointed out that an agreement in principle on arms control with the Soviet Union might have little significance. The true test of Soviet intentions would arise with the negotiating of the detailed annexes intended to implement the agreement in principle.

It appears to be common wisdom among observers in the United States that the Soviet Union is less interested in achieving progress toward agreement in negotiations when it

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engages in a high degree of public posturing, for example when it uses a public, rather than a private, forum for first presenting a proposal. On this score the Harvard Nuclear Study Group found that:

The extent to which the Soviet Union publicizes its role in negotiations seems to tell something about the seriousness with which it wants a compromise agreement.\(^3\)

Also, an earlier study of Soviet negotiating behavior in the Test Ban negotiations suggested that "Soviet willingness to remove negotiations from public forums preceded by a hardened propaganda line may be an indication that the Soviet Union sought agreement."\(^4\)

As a basis for establishing a framework to aid in the understanding of Soviet interests in arms control, the relative public or confidential nature of Soviet posturing is deemed deficient for the purposes of this dissertation because of the impracticality of researching and gauging the private negotiating record. It may be worth noting, however, that the Soviets conducted START negotiations in a highly public manner, indicating a lack of interest (by this standard) in progress toward agreement in that forum.

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The reasons that Soviet negotiating behavior have also been ruled out as an indicator of Soviet interest or disinterest in strategic arms reductions are as follows:

(1) the evidential base for the negotiations under consideration is too small (i.e. not enough data on the START negotiating interchange is publicly available);

(2) existing studies on Soviet negotiating behavior do not present a consensus on whether the Soviets take on a more serious stance when sincere about achieving agreement; and,

(3) there may not be enough variation in Soviet negotiating behavior to indicate a change in sincerity during the START negotiations, or to provide a contrast from which inferences may be drawn.

In fact, sufficient evidence exists to suggest that Soviet negotiating behavior remained rather constant during the eighteen months of START, and therefore cannot serve as an adequate barometer of shifting Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions.

Fred Iklé has commented on the Western predilection to see indications of Soviet interest (whether waxing or waning) in subtle changes in the wording or proposals of Soviet announcements:

5 The study of Soviet negotiating behavior in the Test Ban negotiations cited earlier finds that negotiating behavior did in fact undergo shifts throughout the course of the negotiations, and, although the study stops short of reaching this conclusions, it does imply that these shifts corresponded to shifts in the seriousness with which the Soviets sought agreement. See Christer Jonsson, Soviet Bargaining Behavior, op. cit.
[T]here is a widespread notion that Communist
governments announce important changes in their
negotiating position through subtle modifications in
rhetoric or through slight nuances in the wording of
their proposals. It is not clear why this notion has
gained such currency. A study would show that changes
in Soviet negotiating positions, particularly important
ones, were announced to us almost always loudly and
clearly and usually in quite short statements, while the
undulations in wording and daily rhetoric were
misleading as often -- or perhaps more often -- than
serving as harbingers of new Communist positions.  

This observation brings to mind a similar view expressed by
Henry Kissinger. Although on a different subject,
Kissinger's remark makes the point that the Soviets feel no
need to be subtle when expressing their concerns:

The anti-ABM campaign [of the late 1960s] was given
inadvertent impetus when Secretary of Defense Laird
disclosed that the Soviets seemed to have slowed down
the construction of new ICBMs. This was taken by many
as one of the ubiquitous Soviet 'signals' by which those
diffident fellows in the Kremlin hinted at their
intentions. This was a puzzling concept, considering
the repetitive abandon with which those same Soviet
leaders were bludgeoning us on all issues of real
concern to them.  

Again, a recent incident gives a good example of this
kind of Western effort to compensate for the feeling of

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6 From Fred C. Iklé, "American Shortcomings in
Negotiating with Communist Powers," International
Negotiation, Memorandum prepared at the request of the
Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations, Committee on Government Operations, United
States Senate, 91st Congress, 2d Session (July 2, 1970).

7 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little,
frustration in trying to penetrate the closed Soviet system, and of having to fall back on extremely superficial indications of Soviet interests in arms control. Datelined Geneva, Switzerland, it is worth citing:

With both superpowers imposing a tight information embargo on the talks here, a joke by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko might provide the best clue that formal nuclear arms negotiations may follow in Moscow.

A senior U.S. policy-maker said that Gromyko, near the end of yesterday morning’s meeting with Secretary of State George Shultz, told him he needed a 'more appropriate hat' to protect him from the Russian winter.

According to the American, the 75-year-old Gromyko, who has negotiated with 13 U.S. secretaries of state, told Shultz his hat was 'inappropriate for a Russian winter' and joked about giving Shultz a Russian hat.

That was a strong hint, the official said, that Gromyko had arrived in Geneva prepared to issue a formal invitation to Shultz to visit the Soviet capital within the next two to three months. Soviet winters can last through early April.  

In other words, a casual joke was the most substantial evidence on which the media based a judgment of relative Soviet interest in significant arms control outcomes. This report went on to cite another "strong hint" that the Soviets desired progress in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations:

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[The U.S. official] said there was another sign of possible Soviet flexibility. 'Shultz did his educational number on 'Star Wars',' he disclosed, 'and Gromyko was sarcastic in response -- but he did not blow up.' He said this is being interpreted as an indication that Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko will not let the issue of space weapons block either a Moscow trip by Shultz or resumption of formal nuclear arms talks.  

Unfortunately, American analyses of Soviet interests in arms control have paid insufficient attention to the sources of Soviet disinterest in arms control, perhaps indicating that those sources are taken for granted. Obstacles to Soviet interests in arms control might include feelings of strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the West, plain mistrust, or Marxist-Leninist ideology. One problem encountered early in Western attempts to identify and explain Soviet interests in reaching arms control agreements with the West concerns Marxist-Leninist ideology, particularly those of its tenets relating to the inevitability of war and the irreconcilable hostility between opposing socials systems. An early analysis of "the Soviet approach" to disarmament explained:

The judgement of sincerity is particularly difficult when negotiating with the Russians. In the background there is the Communist doctrine that world revolution and the triumph of Communism everywhere must be the unswerving aim, that sooner or later this aim will inevitably be attained, and that agreements with non-Communist countries are only tactical and temporary expedients. Moreover in any negotiation Communists, if we are to believe that they are the Marxist-Leninists they claim to be, are out to secure their total

9 Ibid.
objectives and do not regard any compromises as a permanent solution.  

One Western approach is, of course, to dismiss the relevance of Marxist-Leninist ideology to Soviet foreign policy and arms control objectives. This is currently the most common solution to the "ideological dilemma." Since the advent of nuclear weapons, it has become easier to dismiss the relevance of Marxist-Leninist ideology on the grounds that the prospects of nuclear war has forced a moderation in the doctrine of the inevitability of war. A closer examination of the 1950s Soviet doctrine of the non-inevitability of war would probably show that the Soviets believe war is not inevitable as long as socialism retains a healthy margin of military superiority over capitalism, or at least is benefitting from substantial trends in that direction.

Alexander Dallin and others have identified four hypothetical Soviet positions that reconcile ideology and national interest in arms control:

1) "The view that disarmament is a good issue to advocate but an impossible one to reach hard-and-fast agreements on, given the ultimate irreconcilability of the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

2) "The view that in the thermonuclear age a minimum of arms-control and disarmament agreements, especially

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with regard to war prevention and perhaps non-proliferation of weapons, is an essential prerequisite for survival.

3) "The view that an emerging but limited community of interests among the powers makes possible the negotiation of certain arms-control and disarmament agreements which are of distinct and probably asymmetrical benefit to the Soviet Union and its allies.

4) "The view that regardless of the prospects of its realization, substantial moves in the direction of and including general and complete disarmament (GCD) would ultimately redound to the benefit of the Socialist camp."11

Certainly in the SALT era American officials were determined to believe that the Soviet Union had acknowledged a "community of interests" -- however limited, as noted in the previous chapter.

Western analyses of Soviet interests in arms control during the 1950s often determined that the Soviets sometimes were interested in proposing and even negotiating on certain issues of strategic arms reductions while apparently remaining uninterested in actually reaching agreement. They thus distinguished between Soviet interests in proposing arms reductions (and appearing interested in negotiations and agreements), and Soviet interests in becoming party to formal treaties. It is often true that Western analyses of Soviet interests in arms control fail to make this distinction between levels of Soviet interest, implying that

if the Soviets are motivated to make a proposal, they will also be motivated to enter formal negotiations and, with the proper concessions from their negotiating partner, sign accords on the basis of those proposals.

The overall objective of this dissertation is to determine and evaluate the substance of Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions, in order to assess the lessons of START and provide grounds for speculating on the prospects for strategic arms reductions in the future. The key to achieving this objective is appreciating the degree, or level of Soviet interests in a strategic arms reduction agreement. The following line of reasoning was used to determine and define these levels.

First, Soviet declaratory interest in some form of disarmament has been remarkably consistent since the early 1920s when the concept and necessity of "peaceful coexistence" first began to take shape. It was at this time that Lenin adopted what has since become the standard Soviet propaganda advocacy of peace and disarmament. Therefore, since Soviet statements of interest in disarmament have been nearly constant, they do not serve as an adequate basis for measuring and fathoming the sincerity or genuineness of Soviet interests in disarmament, unless such statements are taken at face value.

Second, the propaganda value of Soviet advocacy of peace and disarmament appears to have been quite beneficial
to the Soviets. Western observers have been quick to assume Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions based largely on no other basis than Soviet claims of interest and the repetition of Soviet proposals for strategic arms reductions. Also, there are significant contradictions among Western analysts over interpretations of the substance of Soviet interest in strategic arms reductions. This is compounded by the fact that minor events, random incidents, casual remarks, and subtle gestures are often anxiously interpreted as "evidence" or "signals" of Soviet interests in strategic arms reductions.

Third, apart from their historical constance, and obvious superficiality, Soviet interests in proposing strategic arms reductions tell us nothing about what determines such interest. It is therefore important to distinguish between Soviet interests in:

(1) proposing strategic arms reductions;
(2) negotiating strategic arms reductions;
(3) concluding and consummating a strategic arms reduction agreement; and,
(4) complying with such agreements once signed.

Soviet interest may vary at each of these stages in the arms control process. The Soviets may be interested in portraying themselves as devoted to peace, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence. They may even be interested in
subjecting such portrayals to discussion in a negotiating forum. But they may not be interested in bringing such negotiations to a successful conclusion by signing a strategic arms reduction treaty, or -- if interested in signing a treaty -- the Soviets may then proceed to violate it.

It appears there are certain "preconditions" that determine the substance of Soviet interest in each of these stages in the arms control process. If these "preconditions" could be identified and substantiated, they could provide valuable insights into those circumstances under which Soviet agreement to a strategic arms reduction treaty might be possible.

II. SOVIET INTERESTS IN PROPOSING ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

As noted above, the Soviets have proposed some form of strategic arms reduction nearly constantly since the early 1920s. Of course, prior to 1945 the phrase "strategic arms" refers to weapons of strategic significance, such as battleships and aircraft carriers. Only after 1945 did "strategic arms" come to connotate "nuclear arms."

Nevertheless, elimination or reduction of armaments has been a constant Soviet objective, as reflected in public Soviet proposals since the early 1920s, as confirmed by Walter Clemens:
Beginning in mid-1921 the Soviet government adopted the posture it has assumed until the present day, claiming to be the leading and probably the only sincere supporter (excepting the Soviet bloc) of disarmament.12

There was a time when the Soviets eschewed advocating any form of arms control or disarmament. During this period Soviet policy attempted to faithfully reflect Marxist teachings on class struggle and proletariat revolution and the inevitability of war. Lenin was pressing armed insurrection. Any Soviet espousal of disarmament would have been interpreted as an abandonment of world revolution. Identifying the main elements of this period, and the factors leading Soviet leaders to reverse their stand is important to an understanding of why the Soviets have strongly favored arms control proposals ever since.

Walter C. Clemens has argued that "Lenin's views on disarmament seem to fall into two distinct and contradictory phases, the first lasting from as early as 1905 until 1920, the second from 1921 until Lenin's death in 1924." Clemens is quick to point out, however, that despite this seeming contradiction there have always been underlying constants:

Lenin's position on disarmament during these two periods was entirely consonant with a standard he laid down in 1916, when he said: 'Every 'peace program' is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to explain to the masses the

need for a revolution, and to support, aid, and develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses.'

Although Lenin's tactical position on disarmament shifted sharply in 1921, his strategy remained the same. Lenin, like Clausewitz, saw that policy could be continued by many means. The Bolshevik leader viewed armaments and disarmament -- like war and peace -- as possible methods for pursuing the grand strategy of proletarian revolution.13

It is to this "first phase" that our analysis now turns. Of this period in Lenin's thinking, Clemens writes:

For several years before and after the Bolsheviks took power, Lenin condemned all endorsements of 'disarmament' as counter-revolutionary. Disarmament, like the idea of a United States of Europe, was regarded as a pacifist illusion nurtured by the bourgeoisie in order to stave off mass discontent with capitalism. Lenin's most articulate denunciations of the slogan of disarmament came during revolutionary upheavals which he feared might become emasculated if the masses were told that 'peace and disarmament' were possible without the overthrow of the ancien régime.14

This view is confirmed by references to other statements by Lenin during this period:

Let the hypocritical or sentimental bourgeoisie dream of disarmament. So long as there are oppressed and exploited people in the world, we must strive, not for disarmament, but for the universal arming of the people.15

13 Ibid., p. 504.
14 Ibid., pp. 504-505.
In a pamphlet apparently published around 1916 entitled "On the Military Programme of the Proletariat," Lenin wrote in the clearest terms regarding his position on disarmament, and the conditions under which disarmament could be achieved:

Our slogan must be: arming the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie. These are the only tactics possible for a revolutionary class, tactics that follow logically from, and are dictated by, the whole objective development of capitalist militarism. Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historic mission, to consign all armaments to the scrap-heap. And the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.16 (emphasis in original)

Beginning in 1921, Lenin began actively campaigning for disarmament measures, rather than condemning them as

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'pacifist illusions.' Clemens gives the following concise summary of the reasons for this "volte face:"

The Soviet government needed a breathing space, foreign aid, and trade in order to rebuild the country's war-torn economy. Soviet leaders and newspapers spoke of the need to transfer the men and resources employed in the Red Army to productive pursuits.

In other words, Lenin's change in stance on disarmament was a tactical move, made possible and necessary by: (1) perceptions of a hostile foreign threat; (2) Lenin's acknowledged leadership position; and, (3) a determination to aim Soviet foreign policy more toward a conciliatory stance in order to win trade and credit concessions from the West.

The Soviets clearly determined that a public advocacy of disarmament would be to their advantage. There were direct as well as indirect benefits to be derived from a stance that championed disarmament:


18 Clemens, p. 516.
By attending international conferences and championing disarmament, the Soviet regime hoped to enhance its prestige, divide its enemies, and win friends among the opponents of war and (for example, in Turkey) of European imperialism.19

Two aspects of this Soviet change-of-heart as regards disarmament shed particular light on why the Soviets might be interested in proposing strategic arms reductions. First, the decision to begin advocating disarmament was a temporary rather than a permanent policy change. Nothing in Lenin's pronouncements on the subject indicated that this was a new interpretation of Marxist thought to be adhered to and espoused without condition from then on. In fact, as the above quotes demonstrate, Lenin was quite clear about the tactical nature of this new dimension of Soviet foreign policy. Note that as late as 1928 Soviet ideological pronouncements continued to echo the pre-'volte face' position:

... the aim of the Soviet proposals is not to spread pacifist illusions, but to destroy them. . . . Disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of capitalism.20

19 Ibid., p. 520.

20 From the Sixth Comintern Congress, 1928, cited in Dallin, The Soviet Union and Disarmament, p. 17.
In 1930 an authoritative Soviet journal reiterated that "the road to true disarmament is to be seen not in diplomatic agreements but in the proletarian revolution."\(^{21}\)

Second, it is important to realize that Lenin viewed Soviet disarmament policy as an instrument for carrying on the Communist offensive against the West. Clemens elaborates on this point:

Clearly, considerations of power politics and of revolution, of defense and of offense, were intermeshed among the reasons for the Soviet campaign for disarmament. Lenin and his colleagues, whether they served in the Soviet government or in the Comintern or in both, were anxious to divide the capitalist states vertically and horizontally. They would pit one government against another, such as Lloyd George against Poincare; one bloc against another, such as Eastern Europe against Western Europe; they would split the pacifist elements from the rest of the bourgeoisie; and they would turn the proletariat of Europe and the masses of the East against the whole capitalistic-imperialistic structure, thus paving the way for world revolution at a later date, a revolution which Soviet Russia could aid, provided she could regroup her forces in the interim.\(^{22}\)

Clemens continues by stressing the tactical character of Soviet disarmament policy:

Disarmament, for the Bolsheviks, was not a feasible policy objective, although it remained a remote almost utopian ideal. After 1921 agitation for disarmament became a tactic in a grand strategy which, while defensive in the short run, was meant to be offensive in

\(^{21}\) Journal of the Communist Academy, Moscow, 1930, cited in Ibid., p. 17.

\(^{22}\) Clemens, p. 525.
the long run. It was the continuation of revolution by other means.\textsuperscript{23}

From a modern perspective on this point Richard Pipes has claimed that:

The basic political tactic employed by the USSR on a global scale since its acquisition of nuclear weapons has been to try to reduce all politics to the issue of preserving the peace. The line it advocates holds that the principal danger facing humanity today is the threat of a nuclear holocaust, for which reason anything that in any way risks exacerbating relations between the powers, and above all between the United States and the Soviet Union, is evil.\textsuperscript{24}

Pipes finds two Soviet advantages in adopting propaganda proposals as a tactic: (1) "It offers [the U.S.S.R.] an opportunity to silence external criticism of the Soviet Union, for no matter what the Soviet Union may do or fail to do, good relations with it must never be jeopardized." (2) "It allows the Soviet Union to avoid questions touching on the nature of the peace that is to result from détente. Peace becomes an end in itself."\textsuperscript{25}

The Soviets may have other specific purposes or objectives which promote an interest in making proposals without necessarily wanting to subject them to negotiation. British scholar P.H. Vigor elaborates on the potential

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 28-29.
tactical purposes of Soviet disarmament proposals of the interwar period in the following manner:

There is no doubt that one of their purposes in putting forward these schemes was that the 'bourgeois' should reject them; that the potential supporters of the USSR should see that the 'bourgeois' had rejected them; and that they should therefore be brought to be sympathetic to the argument that so long as 'bourgeois' governments held power, no progress towards disarmament was possible.26

Accordingly, among the important advantages of Soviet disarmament proposals made on behalf of 'peace,' is that objections by other countries can be used by the Soviets to "unmask" imperialist bourgeois war-mongering, that is, to reveal them as opposed to 'peace.'27

Are Soviet proposals sometimes bluffing? Soviet disarmament initiatives are often clearly intended for propaganda purposes, but does that mean the Soviet Union would undertake important international obligations merely for propaganda purposes as well? The Soviet Union is unlikely to make a disarmament proposal it cannot live with. This is true for several reasons. First, Soviet proposals are carefully phrased to insure protection of vital Soviet interests and objectives. Ambiguous wording serves to make


violations difficult to determine, and noncompliance difficult to prosecute. Second, the Soviet Union is not likely to embarrass itself by being placed in a position of repudiating its own proposals. However, it may effectively do so by including a demand it knows is unacceptable to its negotiating partner as a precondition for agreement (as it did recently at the Fall 1986 Reykjavik Summit), and then using the negotiating partner’s failure to agree to that demand a reason for breaking off the talks or for repudiating an earlier Soviet position.

III. SOVIET INTERESTS IN NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

The advantages of ostensible Soviet interests in proposing strategic arms reductions, without necessarily being interested in negotiating or agreeing to such reductions, were discussed above. There are also important advantages that may accrue to the Soviets from going a step beyond proposals, and entering actual negotiations on strategic arms reductions.

The Soviet Union has in the past demonstrated an interest in proposing disarmament initiatives, in entering negotiations on those initiatives, but has then failed to show an interest in reaching agreement. P.H. Vigor draws attention to an incident in 1960 where the West in effect adopted the Soviet position, whereupon the Soviets -- seeing
an agreement was imminent -- discontinued the proceedings.\textsuperscript{28}

Vigor quotes John Strachey on this event in the following manner:

\begin{quote}
\ldots once again, as in 1955, the crucial moment had arrived when someone had to a considerable degree accepted someone else's disarmament proposals. And the result was the same. The Committee of Ten was to meet on June 27th. Without even waiting to hear exactly what the West's new proposals were, but, it may be surmised with some confidence, having got wind of the fact that they came embarrassingly near to being an acceptance, the Russians simply took to their heels; they broke up the Committee of Ten and went home, uttering loud cries that the West was once again proving itself an incorrigible warmonger.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

This was a clear case of Soviet interests in proposing and negotiating arms control initiatives while being disinterested in an agreement based on its own proposals. One point this episode demonstrates, and others like it, is that acceptance by the other party of one's own proposals is not necessarily the only (or even the principal) condition for producing a signed agreement.

Soviet START diplomacy reveals characteristics of those periods when the Soviets maintained an interest in negotiating but spurned consummation of formal agreements. In 1983 a U.S. State Department publication characterized the Soviet approach to START in the following terms:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{28} Vigor, pp. 135-138.
\end{flushright}
The Soviet Union seems to approach arms control less as a tool for achieving stability and balance and more as a political instrument to be used to secure advantages either through actual agreements or through the politics of the negotiating process itself.

A formal agreement is not always necessary to achieve basic Soviet objectives with regard to arms control and disarmament. In fact, it has been suggested that the Soviets may at times be primarily interested in sustaining an arms control "process" that asymmetrically inhibits Western defense, whether or not that process yields an agreement. Colin Gray notes that: "In Soviet perspective, an on-going arms-control process offers a golden opportunity for securing unilateral advantage. So long as a major arms-control process either is alive, or is alive in prospect, Soviet leaders can hope to:

-- "Convince Western leaders and publics that they are responsible and willing to be cooperative.

-- "Manipulate Western public fears of nuclear holocaust, through the fueling of 'peace-loving' or 'realistic' forces in the West with ammunition appropriate for thwarting the evil intentions of defense-minded, peace-through-strength ciricles.

-- "Encourage the popular Western fallacy that there is a 'happy ending' to East-West rivalry. 'If only your leaders would be reasonable...' etc. There is nearly

always a vocal and politically significant constituency for 'peace through self-restraint' in Western countries.

-- "Persuade Western politicians and publics that restraint and reasonableness today will be rewarded tomorrow. The history of SALT is, in good part, the history of Western security problems that will be alleviated' in the next round.'

-- "Exploit the Western emotional investment in the process itself, so as to influence Western behavior in other policy areas.

-- "Perpetuate the Western belief that arms control can be a panacea for security concerns."31

Arkady Shevchenko has also confirmed the benefits accruing to the Soviets from an on-going negotiating process despite the absence of an agreement (or even the absence of prospects for one):

Brezhnev felt that even without a treaty the mere fact that the SALT negotiations were proceeding was beneficial. They could help create pressure on the U.S. Congress to cut some military programs. They could be exploited to create the appearance of Soviet-American collusion against China and evoke suspicions among the NATO allies. That was one of the main reasons the Soviets favored strictly confidential negotiations without reporting to the United Nations, a drastic departure from their traditional preference for open negotiations on disarmament.32


A recent analysis of Soviet objectives in arms control (with specific relation to Soviet calculations of arms control compliance) determined that there were two additional reasons for engaging in negotiations leading toward an agreement:

-- to seek strategic superiority over the adversary at a minimum risk to the Soviet military posture, at best sanctioned by treaties in such a way that only the adversary would be obliged to follow their stipulations;

-- to seek all necessary information on the adversary's strength and determination to use force, while at the same time lull his vigilance through all available means of disinformation and deception, or outrightly confuse him.  

Theoretical perspectives from Western research suggests some answers to the question of what conditions might promote Soviet interest in passing from the posturing to the negotiating phase. In an analysis of circumstances when entering negotiations is appropriate, William I. Zartman and Maureen R. Berman have found that a primary factor is altered power relationships: "... when power relations change within a system, the need for negotiation is even greater, since even the minimal rules of procedure that existed before are liable to be called into

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THE DEGREE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET INTERESTS

question.\textsuperscript{34} Zartman and Berman also find that parity is a necessary circumstance for negotiating, confirming the traditional SALT wisdom to that effect:

The moment is propitious for negotiation when power relations shift toward equality: when the former upper hand slips, or the former underdog improves his position.\textsuperscript{35}

They also found that "the will to end an existing situation" that was considered unacceptable by the parties to be a necessary prerequisite to negotiations.\textsuperscript{36}

IV. SOVIET INTERESTS IN AGREEING TO ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

The Soviet Union has appeared interested in making strategic arms reduction proposals of one kind or another almost constantly since 1921, under almost any kind of circumstance, but it has shown interest in negotiating strategic arms reduction proposals under a much more narrow range of circumstances. Only once has the Soviet Union actually gone beyond proposals and negotiations and agreed to strategic arms reductions -- as part of the SALT II Treaty.\textsuperscript{37} It is instructive to note that the Soviet Union

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{34} William I. Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, \textit{The Practical Negotiator}, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1982), p. 49.
    \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 54.
    \item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 66.
    \item \textsuperscript{37} Article III, Paragraph 2 calls for a reduction to 2,250 in the numbers of (launchers of) strategic offensive
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
has so far declined to comply with this provision of SALT II (and, in the aftermath of President Reagan's November 1986 decision to exceed SALT II limits on B-52s armed with cruise missiles, it is unlikely that the Soviets will comply with this provision short of a strategic arms reduction agreement).

Peter Vigor has suggested that there are only two basic reasons for the Soviets to seek peace treaties -- either to gain time or register a gain or loss.

... The first is to obtain a breathing-space, a temporary respite from hostilities. It is something to be sought of the enemy when things are going badly, and when it is necessary to buy time in order to regroup and refuel. As Lenin said: 'A peace treaty is a means of gathering strength'.

Vigor usefully recalls a famous phrase from Lenin's speech to the Seventh Party Congress: "peace is a breathing-space for war, and war is a means of obtaining a somewhat


better or a somewhat worse peace." Vigor then elaborates on Brest-Litovsk as an example of an agreement based on this kind of motivation:

Brest-Litovsk is the classic example of a treaty of this kind. Lenin never regarded Brest-Litovsk as having ended the fighting permanently; he always believed that the concessions he made to the Germans would be, and should be, retracted the moment that Russia was strong enough. But he needed time; he needed a breathing-space. The Germans would only grant him this at a price, so he paid that price. But, as he himself said repeatedly, the moment that Russia had recovered her strength, the struggle would be renewed. This was 'peace', as Lenin understood the term; it was a 'temporary, unstable armistice between two wars'.

Vigor continues by discussing the other reason the Soviets may seek an agreement:

The second reason for a peace treaty that is acknowledged by Marxism-Leninism is the desire or the expediency of making a formal and public register of the gains or losses produced by the actual fighting.

Vigor then cites the Treaty of Riga between the Soviet Union and Poland (signed in 1921), and treaties with Finland (signed in 1940 and 1947) as examples of Soviet interest in agreements codifying some condition they want perpetuated. As an example of registering a gain he cites the Helsinki Accords of 1975. The Helsinki Accords granted Western recognition (and hence legitimacy) to the postwar Soviet domination of Central Europe -- a major Soviet

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 171.
objective since 1945. According to Jiri Kotas, chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Council-in-Exile, based in Ottawa, the Russians were very eager to get the Helsinki agreement:

Only the Helsinki agreement, with its clause about the inviolability of the postwar boundaries in Europe, in a sense legalized the Soviet military gains. In the East, the overwhelming feeling after the Helsinki agreement is that what the Russians grabbed in 1945 now is theirs -- with the full consent of the European states, the U.S. and Canada.42

It is a relatively simple step to extrapolate lessons from Soviet diplomatic practice (such as discussed above by Vigor) for arms control. First, according to Vigor’s line of reasoning, one reason for Soviet interest in reaching agreement might be to obtain a breathing-space in the arms competition when the United States is ahead, to gain time to achieve some advantage or mitigate an opponent’s advantage. A second reason would be to register the gains or losses achieved by Soviets in its strategic competition with the United States. This might also include registering achievement of super-power status in terms of nuclear weapons.

A third reason which may be added to Vigor’s conceptual framework on the basis of recent experience involves the use of arms control agreements for purposes of

deception, propaganda, or other indirect political objectives.

Further insight into Soviet interests in agreements is offered by Nathan Leites in his seminal analysis of the 'operational code' of Soviet leaders -- the standards of behavior by which Soviet leaders live, and by which they evaluate the fitness of their peers and subordinates for leadership and advancement within the ranks of the Soviet hierarchy. Regarding agreements, Leites found three fundamental operational codes. He explains them in the following terms:

"1. Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these groups and as barriers against the liquidation of the Party by them. . . . there is no essential difference between coming to an ostensibly amicable arrangement with an outside group or using violence against it; they are both tactics in an over-all strategy of attack.

"2. When an attempt by the enemy, or by the Party, to advance by violent means has failed, the conditions for an effective agreement between the Party and the enemy come into existence.

"3. The Party must always expect outside groups to violate agreements."43

These passages from Leites underscore the point that, for the Soviet Union, agreements will always be

fundamentally tactical in character -- that is, they will always be instruments serving some greater objective. Leites is clear on what that "greater objective" is: "The fundamental law is to do all that enhances the power of the Party, the great and only instrument in the realization of communism, the great and only goal."\(^{44}\)

V. SOVIET INTERESTS IN COMPLYING WITH ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

Soviet interests in complying with agreements has often been assumed in the West because the ability to verify an agreement was deemed sufficient to deter Soviet violations. Furthermore, the West assumed that if the Soviets found it in their interest to sign an agreement, it would be in their interest to comply with the agreement. However, Soviet interests in complying with an agreement may differ from its interests in proposing, negotiating, or signing the agreement.

Until very recently, Western literature on Soviet arms control objectives rarely made a distinction between Soviet interests in reaching an arms control agreement and Soviet interests in complying with that agreement once signed. A contemporary arms control text illustrates the

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 7. See also the section on "War By Negotiation" and the chapter on agreements in Leites' expanded version of his operational code study, *A Study of Bolshevism*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 60-63 and 527-533 respectively.
assumptions behind this failure to distinguish between interests in agreement and compliance:

To date, no major violation of any U.S.-Soviet agreement on the control of nuclear arms is known to have occurred. This may be because a variety of political factors weigh against abrogation of an agreement once it has been concluded. Countries that want to keep open the option of undertaking an activity that would violate an agreement generally do not sign it in the first place. (emphasis added)

The assumption that countries do not sign agreements unless they intend to comply with them completely ignores the possibility of deception or other ulterior motives that may prompt a country to sign an agreement which it either does not intend to comply with, or which it may decide later to violate. It also ignores the possibility that the Soviet Union in particular may have different conceptions of what it means to comply with treaty obligations, or else may have an entirely different interpretation of those obligations.

Western scholars and policymakers have traditionally felt secure about Soviet incentives for compliance with arms control agreements based on the further assumptions that violations would be unambiguous and easily detectable, or else would be militarily insignificant and not worthy of attention in the first place:

...most arms accords have not limited weapons so drastically that a minor violation would be of

significant advantage to the lawbreaker. When the United States and the Soviet Union together possess fifty thousand nuclear warheads, cheating in order to build an extra thousand hardly seems worth the risk. Moreover, a violation large enough to be militarily meaningful would probably reveal itself to the other side by virtue of its very magnitude. Finally, a violation would probably involve a major bureaucratic decision by either side, which if taken in peacetime could be accompanied by leakages and dissent that might well be detected by the other party.\footnote{Ibid.}

This traditional viewpoint on compliance also took for granted the threat of U.S. sanctions in response to unambiguous, militarily significant Soviet violations. Subsequent Soviet compliance practices and U.S. policy responses have cast considerable doubt on these assumptions.\footnote{See Senator Malcolm Wallop, "Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements: So What?" \textit{Strategic Review}, 11, 3 (Summer 1983): 11-20; Amrom Katz, "After Detection -- So What?" in Richard F. Staar, ed., \textit{Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality}, (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1984), pp. 166-175; and William R. Harris, "Breaches of Arms Control Obligations and Their Implications," in \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 134-53.} It can no longer be assumed that the Soviet Union will be motivated to comply with agreements for the same reasons it felt compelled to sign them. So what specific interests might the Soviets have in complying with arms control agreements, as opposed to signing them?

There are probably several factors which go into Soviet calculations of the risks and benefits of noncompliance with international agreements. As noted above, the West has traditionally relied to a very great
extent on the disincentives to cheating posed by the threat of simply being found out. There is good reason to believe that even this does not constitute much of a deterrent to Soviet noncompliance, since the West has declined to take substantive responses even when evidence of Soviet cheating has been incontrovertible.48

As early as 1962 Fred Charles Iklé outlined the basic elements of an effective compliance-enforcement policy for arms agreements.49 He gave four conditions a country must be willing to accept if it were to deter noncompliance:

"1) The injured government must acknowledge the fact that there has been a violation.

"2) The injured government must be willing to increase military expenditures and to offend pacifist feelings.

"3) The injured government must accept the new risks created by its reaction to the violation.

"4) The injured government may have to reach agreement with allies before it can react."50

48 here is, in fact, wide consensus that the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk is an unambiguous violation of the ABM Treaty since it is obviously not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union as required of any such radars -- no matter what their ultimate purpose, yet the U.S. continues to abide by the ABM Treaty.


50 Ibid., pp. 225-228.
American policy has faced tremendous obstacles in implementing the first of these conditions, let alone the others. For example, prior to the release of any Reagan administration reports on Soviet noncompliance, members of the arms control community in the United States made an elaborate series of arguments against publicly revealing questions about Soviet cheating on arms control agreements. Such arguments were made as the following: (1) "The accusations, if badly handled, could bring back dangerous cold war days;" (2) "important national security interests could be harmed if such charges are blasted into orbit without Washington's first going through the prescribed and agreed procedures;" (3) "A finger-pointing accusation of Soviet violations would be based on shaky evidence;" (4) "Public opinion would be polarized;" (5) "The Administration's sincerity in pursuing arms control along with its defense buildup would be hardly credible;" (6) "America's respect for international agreements and agreed procedures for settling disputes would be questioned;" and, (7) "Our NATO allies and their nervous publics would be

It was also argued that such revelations would seriously injure chances for agreement on improved verification measures in future arms agreements, and that Moscow would derive important propaganda benefits (from revelations that it was cheating on arms control agreements?).

The point is that there are formidable internal pressures that prevent or discourage the U.S. from responding to Soviet noncompliance, and that the threat of being revealed by the other side, or the threat of sanctions, cannot be very credible in Soviet calculations of the risks involved in cheating on arms control agreements with the West.53

What other incentives might the Soviets have to comply with a strategic arms reduction agreement? Joseph Douglass has identified five categories of risks the Soviets would have to take into account when weighing the consequences of cheating on arms agreements. They include:

52 These arguments are from Anne H. Cahn and James F. Leonard, "Don't Accuse Moscow," New York Times, 26 April 1983.

1. Increased likelihood of major military actions;
2. Compromise or loss of Soviet state secrets;
3. Increased Western military or political awareness;
4. Degradation in Soviet peace image; and,
5. Economic repercussions.\(^{54}\)

After reviewing these five categories, Douglass notes that none of them have posed significant challenges to Soviet interests, and concludes that "the Soviets appear to run few risks when they violate or circumvent arms control agreements because there have been few significant adverse reactions on the part of the United States."\(^{55}\)

It might be useful to conclude this section with some reflections on the question of what positive objectives the Soviets might see in complying with agreements once signed. Again, as is the case with Soviet objectives in proposing, negotiating, and agreeing to arms control measures, a policy of compliance (or maintaining the appearance of compliance) can be touted as proof of the Soviet commitment to peaceful


co-existence. Compliance reinforces the Soviet seizure of the propaganda high-ground. It can also induce reciprocal compliance on the part of the other parties to an agreement.

Wisdom from the past often finds relevance to contemporary dilemmas. This is especially true for arms control thinking. In regards to Soviet noncompliance risk assessment, it was long ago recognized that arms control can only be trusted and/or effective if it is in the Soviet 'national interest:'

The safest premise is this: in breaking or keeping agreements, the Soviets can be trusted to pursue their own interests as they see them. Hence, measures for arms control should be reliable if they can be so devised that compliance will be more in the Soviet interest than evasion or violation.56 (emphasis in original)

VI. SUMMARY

This chapter has sought to suggest that Soviet arms control objectives might fall into four categories. First, the Soviets see important advantages in consistently favoring arms control negotiations. It reinforces the Soviet propaganda theme that nuclear weapons, and not Soviet aggressive ambitions, are the principal threat to global survival, and it provides a basis for accusing the United States of endangering that survival when the U.S. fails to

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cooperate with Soviet arms control initiatives. As Pipes noted, it also serves to divert world public attention from the kind of peace that the Soviets desire.

Second, history has shown that the Soviets from time to time wish to demonstrate the sincerity of their disarmament proposals by engaging in multilateral or bilateral negotiations. An on-going arms control negotiating process offers the Soviet Union additional advantages over merely proposing arms control initiatives. It diverts attention from Soviet strategic weapon programs, and places pressure on Western governments to demonstrate their good faith by refraining from actions which might upset the atmosphere of the talks.

Third, under a much more narrow range of circumstances than either of the preceding two categories of Soviet interest in arms control, there are conditions when the Soviets find it advantageous to reach agreement with Western states on issues of arms control. The foregoing analysis has suggested that there might be three basic reasons for which the Soviets would want to sign an arms control agreement. The Soviets may want to buy time to catch up to an opponent in some category of weapons technology. The ABM Treaty example comes to mind. The Soviets may want to register their superpower status in terms of nuclear weapons. Or the Soviets may want to secure
propaganda, political, diplomatic, or some other objective extraneous to the agreement.

Volume II contains a case study application of the foregoing framework, and will seek to prove or disprove the hypothesis that during the 1981 to 1983 time frame (1) the Soviet Union was interested only in proposing and negotiating on issues of strategic arms reductions, but not in signing an agreement, and (2) the START negotiations adequately fulfilled Soviet diplomatic, political, and military objectives without an agreement.
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