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RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

DOWNGRADING THE MILITARY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Scott R. Atkinson

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Work conducted under contract N00014-87-C-0001.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS			
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for Public Release; Distribution unlimited.			
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE						
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) CRM 89-41			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Center for Naval Analyses		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL <i>(if applicable)</i> CNA	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
6c. ADDRESS <i>(City, State, and ZIP Code)</i> 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268			7b. ADDRESS <i>(City, State, and ZIP Code)</i>			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING ORGANIZATION Office of Naval Research		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL <i>(if applicable)</i> ONR	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER N00014-87-C-0001			
8c. ADDRESS <i>(City, State, and ZIP Code)</i> 800 North Quincy Street Arlington, Virginia 22217			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. 65154N	PROJECT NO. R0148	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE <i>(include Security Classification)</i> Downgrading the Military in Soviet Foreign Policy						
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Scott R. Atkinson						
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO		14. DATE OF REPORT <i>(Year, Month, Day)</i> April 1989		15. PAGE COUNT 41
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION						
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS <i>(Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)</i>			
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Attitudes (inclinations), Foreign policy, International politics, Literature, Military doctrine, National security, Political science, USSR			
05	04					
19. ABSTRACT <i>(Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)</i> A series of recent events indicate that the correlation of domestic forces has been turning against the Soviet military. This has been reflected in an unprecedented, wide-scale press assault on Soviet military; linked with the criticism are signs that the economic aspects of national security are being pushed to the forefront.						
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED / UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS				21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL			22b. TELEPHONE <i>(Include Area Code)</i>		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL	



CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

A Division of Hudson Institute 4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268 • (703) 824-2000

26 May 1989

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Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 89-41

Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 89-41, *Downgrading the Military in Soviet Foreign Policy*, by Scott R. Atkinson, April 1989

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Memorandum presents strong evidence that the Soviet military is losing its dominance in the determination of Soviet foreign and defense policy. At least since early 1988, the military has been subjected to widespread criticism in the press, focused on its privileged status, excessive secrecy, and its claim to primacy among the instruments of policy that secure the Soviet state against its enemies. If this unprecedented trend continues, the military seems destined to play a lesser role in Soviet security policy and may itself undergo far-reaching structural changes. If so, primacy will shift to the economic sphere--for an indeterminate period.

Bradford Dismukes
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CRM 89-41 / April 1989

DOWNGRADING THE MILITARY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

A series of recent events indicate that the correlation of domestic forces has been turning against the Soviet military. This has been reflected in an unprecedented, wide-scale press assault on the Soviet military; linked with the criticism are signs that the economic aspects of national security are being pushed to the forefront.

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Justification	
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CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
The Izyumov-Kortunov Article	2
Shevardnadze's July Speech	8
Later Remarks on Military Deemphasis	11
<i>International Affairs</i> Targets the Military	12
Military Secrecy Under Attack	13
Historical Revisionism	16
The Military's Response	19
Implications for the Present and Future	24
Notes	28

INTRODUCTION

To those following the Soviet press closely, Mikhail Gorbachev's recent announcement of a 500,000-man cut in the Soviet Army and his pledge to cut defense spending by 14.2 percent were not wholly unexpected. In fact, the announcements marked a turning point in a steady, unmistakable press campaign, which, although not of the traditional Soviet style, included many telltale elements. Through the many official pronouncements, debates, and ostensibly random letters to the editor, one theme stood out in bold relief: the correlation of domestic forces has been turning against the Soviet military. This is linked to the onset in 1988 of glasnost' in the foreign policy sphere in which many past policies are being criticized for the first time.

Although the present "new thinking" line had been developing throughout 1986-87, two events in July 1988 marked a clear intensification and elaboration of the new assault on the position of the military in Soviet foreign policy. First there was the appearance of a key article, "The Soviet Union in a Changing World," by A. Izyumov and V. Kortunov in the journal *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (hereafter, *International Affairs*). Then there was a speech by Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze during a closed-door "scientific-practical" conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 25-27, 1988, later published in the same journal. Since then, the new line has been further developed and has become increasingly apparent in the Soviet press, and particularly in *International Affairs*. It should be noted that this journal, under the aegis of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has become a vanguard of the "new thinking."

This paper will examine the two events described above and the press campaign that followed in the latter part of 1988 and early 1989. Specifically, the attempt is one of analyzing the tenets of the "new thinking" as they relate to the Soviet military and its traditional positions. In so doing, the strategy, aims, and tactics of its proponents are largely explained as well. The paper will then describe how the military, especially as their views are reflected in the military press, has responded to the "new thinking" challenge and to some of the events that have accompanied it.

In essence, the "new thinking" lifts nonmilitary factors of national security to the forefront. In particular, the importance of a strong Soviet economy and political means of attaining objectives are emphasized. Oppositely, the utility of military power has clearly come into question. These conclusions have potentially serious implications for future Soviet policy, especially in the Third World. There is now a perception that Soviet military presence in many cases had only a temporary effect, as economic and scientific-technical needs ultimately brought developing nations into the Western orbit.

Beyond these larger issues related to the downgraded position of the military in Soviet foreign policy, the military finds itself the

target of lesser attacks related to secrecy, first-ever revelations about a Soviet military-industrial complex, institutional attempts to assert control over the military and weaken its influence in formulation of security policy, conversion of war industries, and denigration of past military performance. Attending these press trends are other signs of declining prestige of the military, including: (a) an unfolding debate about possibly curtailing the draft and restructuring the Army; (b) new admissions related to internal military problems such as bullying, poor living standards for soldiers' families, interethnic friction, and others; (c) an increasingly visible civil-military conflict over various cultural-historical issues; and (d) a widespread boycott of military science courses by college students recently, among others. These developments will also be briefly assessed.

THE IZYUMOV-KORTUNOV ARTICLE

Turning to the Izyumov-Kortunov article, it is important to identify some articles associated with and apparently bearing an influence on it. Here one must mention three articles written by V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, and the same V. Kortunov that appeared in late 1987 and January 1988. In addition, Izyumov had an article in the April 1988 issue of *International Affairs* that hinted at much of what was forthcoming in the July article, which is the starting point of this discussion.

In the introduction to the Izyumov-Kortunov article, there is an arresting overview of current Soviet evaluations of the USSR world position. There is allusion to defeatism in some circles, which are said to describe the USSR as no more than a "developing country with an atom bomb" that is heading for second-rate power status. The criticism, they say plainly, has reached the point of self-flagellation.

Rather quickly thereafter, the authors move to what is likely the central conclusion of their analysis: they allege that the link between the economy and foreign policy has long been ignored by Soviet policy-makers. A main validation of this reasoning is that the Soviet economic decline of the late 70s and early 80s was closely correlated with setbacks in foreign policy. Specifically, the West is credited with having exploited the economic decline to "take the offensive against our positions in the military, political, and ideological spheres." Thus the authors assert that the U.S., after a long-term defensive position, went on the attack by utilizing Soviet economic weakness. The key effort here was in "forcing a new stage in the arms race."

The Soviets have traditionally accused the U.S. of whipping up an arms race with the aim of achieving military superiority. However, what is new in this formulation is that the U.S. is now accused of forcing an arms race that will bring about economic exhaustion of the USSR. The more serious implication underlying it is that countermeasures are necessary.

Thus an "economic exhaustion" scheme has been identified, and it has been noted with increasing frequency in the Soviet press. Its origins can be traced to V.V. Zhurkin et al., who, in a January *Kommunist* article, claimed that the U.S. is trying to bring about "the economic exhaustion of socialism in the arms race process, in particular by means of foisting onto socialism innumerable military expenditures."¹ Izyumov and Kortunov cite this article on this point.²

Izyumov and Kortunov mention National Security Directive No. 75 to support their contention that the U.S. attempts to force massive military expenditures on the USSR.³ Thus, in their words, the U.S. goal would be "achieved by the 'competitive strategy' that envisions imposing an intensive arms race on the USSR in a maximum number of directions." This also matches the Zhurkin line, which also described a U.S. plan to force an arms race "in a maximum number of directions" and identified the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as part of the effort.⁴ One should note that General Secretary Gorbachev probably provided the impetus for these writings. Most recently he accused the U.S. of using SDI to tire out the USSR economically in his Murmansk speech (October 1, 1987), and the whole economic exhaustion hypothesis is evident in his 1987 book on perestroika.⁵

Just as the U.S. is seen to be drawing the USSR into the arms race, so it is accused of pulling the Soviets into Third World entanglements. Once again, consistent with the earlier series of articles, the "new thinking" proponents see attempts at "dragging our country into a broad geopolitical rivalry with the U.S." The Zhurkin team perceived this as a component of the overall economic exhaustion plan, wherein the U.S. stirs up regional conflicts "with the aim of intensifying the involvement of the USSR and other socialist nations" and forces the USSR to "disperse its resources in many directions," which in turn arouses anti-Sovietism and internationally isolates the USSR onto the path of economic autarky.⁶

U.S. foreign policy in the Third World, interestingly, is rather favorably contrasted with its Soviet counterpart. The U.S. is credited with having a policy based on *khozraschet* (i.e., self-financing, a much-sought element in present Soviet economic reform attempts) in that profits from U.S. corporate holdings, supposedly, more than cover the expense of U.S. military operations in regional conflicts. Thus, considering its "cost effectiveness",⁷ the "low-intensity campaign" has become quite popular with American leaders, they conclude.⁸ They note the favorable (from a U.S. perspective) situation in Afghanistan, where the U.S. had been spending less than a billion dollars annually versus the Soviets' 5 billion rubles; as elsewhere during the 80s, they remark, the USSR finds itself in the unfavorable position of protecting the status quo, as the U.S. had done in the 60s and 70s.

Soviet aid is always of the "planned loss" type, they complain. Soviet Third World aid is also called inflexible, and the "gigantomania" (i.e., the preponderance of huge, long-term projects that are ultimately

unprofitable) is also under attack. And so, the Soviets end up footing the bill for regional stability while the U.S. takes the profits, as in Angola, where Cuban troops (backed by huge Soviet financial outlays) defend U.S. oil company holdings against UNITA bands. The choice to specifically cite the Angola situation, which is plainly called absurd, underscores the authors' contention that the concepts of economic interests and influence have long been ignored.

Inveighing against the overwhelmingly military character of Soviet Third World aid as well, the two academicians plainly admit that once a pro-Soviet regime has consolidated its control, it approaches the Western nations for economic aid. Thus, Soviet Third World aid has had only a short-term effect and has been unprofitable both financially and influence-wise.⁹ Notably, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola are mentioned in this context. The suggestion is that Soviet military aid or presence in these countries was an illusory foreign policy gain and in fact ultimately only led to a weakening of the overall Soviet world position.

In other words, the new formulation is that in many cases Soviet economic power and scientific-technical expertise has not been up to the tasks of peacetime, such as rebuilding war-torn nations. While Soviet military power had been effective in establishing political influence during the initial armed conflict phase, its effect was ultimately negated as the tasks of reconstruction and development came to the forefront.

Izyumov and Kortunov also observe that, according to international statistics, the USSR spends 1.4 percent of its GNP in all types of aid to the developing countries, while the corresponding U.S. figure is 0.3 percent. The authors conclude that this is indicative of a "much heavier burden" for the USSR.¹⁰ Moreover the U.S. is said to be far more successful now at convincing leaders of the developing nations that the socialist economic model is inferior, that Soviet help has a political "catch", and that it is of a low scientific-technical level.

Thus by a whole series of parameters it is becoming more and more difficult for the Soviet Union to compete with the Western countries in the "third world". Under these conditions, direct or indirect involvement in "low-intensity conflicts" and attempts to create new opportunities for influence by raising the level of mobility of our armed forces can only exacerbate existing difficulties.

In identifying a clear "economization" of international relations, the authors sharply disparage some orthodox concepts of military power itself. First and foremost, they question the old equation of military might automatically equaling political power and influence. In fact, another article, notably anonymous, in the same issue of *International*

Affairs goes much further: "And it is simply naive to suppose that military strength can automatically be transformed into political power and influence" and "here we have oversimplified far too much, and have unwittingly become prisoners of collective miscalculations."¹¹

Those who historically had been oblivious to the link between Soviet foreign policy and economy are pardoned because indeed the two had historically not always seemed to parallel each other. In surveying the history of Soviet foreign policy, they confirm that, despite relative economic weakness, the USSR had long had an active and offensive foreign policy, the successes of which were essentially based on noneconomic factors. And thus the authors give due respect to the Soviet military power that was the sole element by which they were able to compete effectively with the West. They impart that it was the attainment of military parity with the U.S. that compelled it to reckon with Soviet foreign policy interests. Such an admission, that the USSR had competed essentially on the basis of military strength, is unusual. The disparity between military and economic power, however, ultimately began to have a negative impact. "Beginning approximately in the mid-70s, the Soviet Union began to slow the pace of its economic growth more noticeably." For the first time in modern history, the Soviet economy began to lag behind the American in rate of growth.

And the economic slide at last began to be reflected in the military sphere. Economic stagnation and a slowdown in scientific-technological progress finally halted the impact of the noneconomic factors that had previously furthered Soviet foreign policy objectives. "Thus, according to NATO experts, who are scarcely inclined to understating Soviet military power, by the mid-1980s the USSR was at the U.S. level in only 5 of 20 basic types of military technology."

From the mid-1970s onward, the authors contend, the USSR experienced a declining rate of political return from military investments. Moreover, the buildup of Soviet forces led to an overall weakening of the Soviet position in the world. As an example, the situation in Europe at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s is described:

Never had the the military balance in Europe been so favorable for the USSR and its allies as at the start of the current decade. However, it was precisely in this period that our European position began to weaken, the most important political initiatives began to 'misfire', and anti-Soviet and conservative elements in Western Europe grew.¹²

The Soviet military buildup also led to closer integration of the Western European countries around the U.S. And, in his April article, Izyumov suggested that the economic decline of the late 1970s-early 1980s could be linked to heavy defense expenditures.¹³

Moreover, among some Soviet military leaders and experts, a "cult of parity" mentality was said to have set in, reducing everything to a correlation of the two sides' military potentials. Remarkably, this is openly identified as in part an endeavor to compensate for the weak Soviet economy. Thus, scrupulous parity with the U.S. is questioned by the authors, as is the Soviet military buildup. On this subject, recent evidence suggests that much of the Soviet foreign policy community is reevaluating the need for scrupulous parity with the U.S. in the military sphere.¹⁴ It should be added that there have been plenty of appeals for unilateral disarmament measures;¹⁵ however, they had been rebuffed by a united front of the military leaders. Thus, Gorbachev's U.N. announcement of unilateral troop reductions, coupled with Chief of Staff S. Akhromeyev's resignation, signified another setback for the military.

Izyumov and Kortunov offer two options in charting the future course for Soviet foreign policy. The first is to continue compensating for the relative weakening of the Soviet economy by increasing the share of expenditures in the foreign and military policy areas. The second is to stabilize or lower those expenditures, lessening the gap between economic and foreign policy strength, and to reduce the burden of military expenditures and strengthen the economic foundations of Soviet foreign policy. Apparently directing their arguments at a specific readership, Izyumov and Kortunov then employ military terms to describe the options, likening the first to "holding positions at any cost" and the second to "withdrawal to previously prepared positions to cut losses and build up forces."

In this vein, it is significant that the term *peredyshka* ("breathing space" or "respite") is used; in past Soviet lexicon, it has been associated with temporary retreat followed by solid offensive action. Whether the authors are serious about a counteroffensive in the military sphere, after a certain amount of time necessary to bring about the economic reform, is open to conjecture. One should note that several items suggest that the authors are attempting to win over some of the military leadership to temporary cutbacks. It would certainly be logical, furthermore, to gain their support through allusions to future growth in the military sector. In any case, their emphasis is on the "forseeable future" (i.e., the next 10 to 15 years), and their position regarding it is clear.

Although the second option has been gaining strength under Gorbachev, it is observed that "the final choice clearly cannot be considered as having been made."

The authors convincingly explain that only short-term gains at best can be expected from the first option, and that presently all non-economic means of strengthening Soviet foreign policy have essentially been exhausted and are counterproductive.

Through the criticism of the first option, one again senses an almost defeatist tone as well as cynicism: if world tension were to increase as a result of an "activation of military factors," Soviet ideology would surely be discredited. Moreover, it will be impossible to return to secrecy and a "solid iron curtain."

More ominously, the authors raise, in the plain talk that has become a sign of the times, the startling spectre of mounting future defeats for the USSR in both foreign and domestic policy if the first option is followed. They state that the high military expenditures "can lead to a reduction in the living standards of the population, and reserves of patience in this area are not unlimited." Moreover, the Soviet military is implicitly condemned as being overfed: "Even now, in terms of the share of national income going to military needs and foreign aid, we are far ahead of the U.S., while in the share (not to mention absolute expenditures) going to important social expenditures, we lag well behind it."

With the hope of "a rapid arrival of reinforcements" (in the form of an economic revitalization) dashed, "the exhaustion of the economy under the growing burden of military-political expenditures will increasingly be reflected in the purely military component of our power, especially if the arms race spreads into space." And, coming right back to the economization theme, the authors note that "even the U.S., with its enormous economic and scientific potential," seeks to involve its Western allies in developing the SDI program. And so, employing the first option will cause the exacerbation of problems.

In this case a "vicious circle" may arise, in which attempts to strengthen foreign policy at the expense of the economy will lead to even greater weakening of our foreign policy, etc. As a result, instead of strengthening our international positions we will be forced to give them up one after another over time.

These harsh revelations, one should note, are being echoed elsewhere.¹⁶ In the aforementioned anonymous article, military expenditures are called unproductive and there is the clear statement that "the situation is such that it is now possible and also essential to raise the question about how long and how carelessly we can think in terms of increasing strength, even in the interests of defense. Everything has a limit. Evidently it is here also."¹⁷

In concluding with a favorable review of the second "more realistic" option, the authors call for "a radical reexamination of our

foreign policy strategy, including a realistic assessment of our strengths." Greater selectivity and pragmatism in the choice of priorities and goals are to be sought, including gradually abandoning attempts to compete with the U.S. throughout the world.¹⁸ Socialism, they contend, cannot be the defender of Third World regimes that lack a social base and are unable to defend themselves. The ideological basis of the far-flung Soviet military presence is even questioned, as it contradicts Marxist theory. And a "sad paradox" of the 60s and 70s is depicted: in the 60s, when the national liberation movement and socialist ideas were on the rise in the Third World, the Soviet armed forces were not so widely dispersed. Oppositely, in the 70s, when the armed forces had a more forward deployment, the developing nations began to swing toward the capitalist path of development.

Izyumov and Kortunov are evidently promoting the idea of at least a temporary Soviet retreat from some military commitments, especially in the Third World. It is important to note that other Soviet press statements during the period indicate dramatically shifting views on the viability of the socialist model in the Third World, not to mention an erosion of several orthodox Marxist dogmas about colonialism, transnational corporations, capitalism, and others.¹⁹

Meanwhile, these other statements overwhelmingly argue in favor of greater attention to nonmilitary means of attaining USSR foreign policy objectives, and here they particularly emphasize economic power. It is observed that the U.S. has always had economic interests, while the USSR has ignored them. They mockingly remark, "as if we were so rich that we need not pay attention to such things." Thus, the USSR must oppose U.S. attempts to involve it in regional conflicts that would lead to "the inexcusable dissipation of resources and discrediting of the new social system"; besides, the contest will not be decided in the Third World. Finally, they recall Lenin's dictum that "the new social order will vanquish the old only through higher labor productivity" and "any attempts to find the 'easier' way will ultimately and inevitably lead to great losses."

One should note that Izyumov and Kortunov are civilian academicians from the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Many of the leading voices in promoting the "new thinking" are from this and other nonmilitary institutes. Moreover, like many of the most vocal advocates of the "new thinking," Izyumov is an economist. It is hard to avoid the impression that the *institutchiki* (i.e., institute academicians), and especially the economists, have increased their influence in policy formulation under the Gorbachev regime.

SHEVARDNADZE'S JULY SPEECH

At an unusual Ministry of Foreign Affairs "scientific-practical" conference, held July 25-27, 1988, several speakers echoed conclusions similar to those in the Izyumov-Kortunov article. Most notably,

Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze delivered a stunning reinforcement of the economic emphasis of the Izyumov-Kortunov article.²⁰ He stated that "the economic aspect of national security comes to the forefront" in the modern era, and that in the competitive struggle with the West, socialism must show that it can offer more than any other sociopolitical system through "economic successes and higher individual and social labor productivity." This, he said, was the main national interest, and "the category of national security and all of its aspects can and should be viewed solely in this connection."

Also stressed was the idea that future superiority would rest with the society that has the greatest scientific-technical and intellectual prowess. On the economization theme, Shevardnadze underscored the idea of the economic profitability in foreign policy, wherein "each step has a price." He also adhered to the line on the U.S. economic exhaustion strategy, mentioning it three times and once likening it to "bleeding an enemy white." He also upheld the new view that there had long been inattention to political means of achieving security, in this regard blasting the "slamming of the door" approach to negotiations characteristic of the Brezhnev era. Also repeated were other now-familiar elements of Gorbachev's "new thinking" approach in foreign policy: collective security, common human values, the absence of the class struggle in peaceful coexistence, growing unity and interdependence in the world, and the de-ideologization of international relations.

Most surprising in Shevardnadze's speech were his statements dealing with the military. Shevardnadze went far beyond Izyumov and Kortunov in downplaying the military factor; in fact, he subjected the military leadership to shattering criticism on specific issues, even having the temerity to lecture them about strategic planning and theory. And in discussing military issues, once again he stressed the economic component: "For today, as never before, the ability of the armed forces to fulfill their mission depends directly and chiefly upon a powerful economy and highly-developed science." Later, he expanded on this thesis in some statements about the course and outcome of war that could have only come as a shock to military strategists.

By way of introduction, he described "old thinking" and "obsolete professional views" in the military establishment that are working as a braking mechanism on the new foreign policy. More seriously, he claimed that many of the lessons derived from World War II (which are the bread and butter of Soviet military theoreticians, who continually discuss and elaborate on them) "have not been rethought with adequate clarity in light of recent experience." He also considered many of the lessons open for discussion, a view that also runs counter to military interests, since this had until recently been almost exclusively their domain. Thus, such a comment serves as a further encouragement to the civilian academicians, who have been let loose to present their own views on Soviet military doctrine and other military issues, at times to the dismay of the military leadership. And, indeed, it is symbolic of the state of affairs for the military that Shevardnadze has been joined

by civilian academicians in lecturing the military--not just on general foreign policy questions but on specific military issues as well.

Shevardnadze also declared that defense is "too serious an area to allow superficial views" and thus it is essential to investigate what represents the greatest danger to the USSR.²¹ This no doubt amounts to rather thinly veiled criticism of previous threat assessments given by the military planners and is another invitation to the *institutchiki* to provide alternative evaluations to those of the Ministry of Defense.²² Shevardnadze's bold assault on three specific elements of Soviet military planning was perhaps least expected. First, on arsenal stockpiling and the course and outcome of war, he said:

The world war showed that the arsenal reserves of weapons on the side subjected to attack were not of decisive significance in repelling the aggression. It turned out that here any advantage of the aggressor could be nullified by the state having a well-developed industry and a scientific-technical base.

The experience of the war testifies to the fact that the outcome of the conflict on the technical level is determined by the state's ability to create fundamentally new types of weapons, communications, and control and command.

The Foreign Minister's position on arsenal stockpiling is noteworthy because some Western analysts have long suspected that a considerable and underestimated portion of Soviet defense investment has gone into it.

Shevardnadze's position on the vital importance of a strong economy for the course and outcome of war was alluded to by Izyumov and Kortunov, who made statements about the obvious economic superiority of the Western coalition of states. They also underscored the point with straight talk about the real state of affairs in the economy, noting that the Soviet Union had "not once come even close" to the U.S. standard of living; such blunt economic assessments have become a regular feature of the *glasnost*' period.

Second, on Soviet chemical weapons, Shevardnadze stressed the high cost of developing and now eliminating them, and said that one could call the notion of some planners that they were built in the name of national security as "primitive and perverse." He even went on to

deride the geostrategic knowledge of the planners by stating that "even an elementary level (of knowledge) would be sufficient for us to understand that chemical weapons are more dangerous for us" than for the U.S., which enjoys a geographic advantage.

On war planning, Shevardnadze remarked that it was wrong and even dangerous to assess the strength or weakness of a state using "traditional indicators" without considering the will of the people to resist; moreover, one should not judge these "on the basis of superficial data." Surely in part owing to the Afghanistan experience, Shevardnadze tied this postulation with a more general perception that the use of military force had often not only not led to the expected result for the stronger side but had sometimes resulted in a boomerang effect for the aggressor. Similarly, he denied any lasting political or other benefits for the side that had first used force in the many "little wars" since World War II. "On the contrary, all of them and each individually complicated those problems over which the conflicts arose and created new ones."

In a clear shot at the beliefs of several military leaders, Shevardnadze denounced as "absolutely fallacious" and "in outright contrast to national interests" the notion that the Soviet Union can be as strong as any possible coalition of states.²³ Similarly, he blasted "jingoistic statements that we would respond to any challenge" in the arms race. Finally, he repeated the general line that "armed conflict is losing its function as an instrument of rational policy."

LATER REMARKS ON MILITARY DEEMPHASIS

Shevardnadze's remarks and the Izyumov-Kortunov revelations were followed toward the end of 1988 by more materials in support of the military deemphasis. In this regard, Shevardnadze's speech at the U.N. in September and Gorbachev's words there on December 7th should be cited. Shevardnadze's speech was replete with the "new thinking" on foreign policy, once more promoting "common human interests" over class struggle and the "de-ideologization" of international relations. Shevardnadze also again reflected the mania for economic profitability in foreign policy, speaking of "assets" in the collective effort to decrease tensions.

Gorbachev too described a common "investment" (and, not surprisingly, the need to ensure a return on it) in this new process. Also predictably evident in Gorbachev's speech were calls for "universal human interests," collective security, and "de-ideologization" of international relations. More significant were his statements on military power. Downplaying the possibility of relying on military power to resolve conflicts, Gorbachev declared that "one-sided reliance on military power ultimately weakens the other components of national security."²⁴ He also answered positively to the question of whether or not conversion of war industries was possible. Notably, this was the conclusion and the precise phrasing of the question used for the title

of an important series of *New Times* articles, one of which was written by Izyumov (see note 49).

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TARGETS THE MILITARY

Throughout the latter half of 1988, the press assault on the military, especially in *International Affairs*, intensified. In the August issue, another discussion of the weakening effects of military expenditures on the Soviet socio-economic and technological situation appeared.²⁵ It is noteworthy that the authors also employed the tactic of claiming that military power was not only less useful as a tool of Soviet foreign policy but also has been applied less frequently by the West. Further, they noted a general trend toward decreased military expenditures and demobilization in the West as well as in China; employing this evidence seems to be increasingly popular among the "new thinking" constituency. Often the experience of the Khrushchev demobilizations of 1956-1960 are favorably recalled in this context.²⁶ Favorable mention of both decreased military expenditures abroad and the Khrushchev demobilization have often also belied arguments for unilateral disarmament measures.

One should also note that the authors of the August article stated that "more flexible and diverse means" of expanding one's influence have come into practice, among them manipulation of credit, capital investment, and other financial-economic and social instruments. In this scenario, military power is said to be only an auxiliary tool, while "economic, and first of all scientific-technical potential" play the "definitive role."²⁷ The authors see these developments resulting from the increasingly active factors of world interdependence and economic stresses.

In September and October, more strong support was given to the new line. A. Arbatov published a significant article solidly supportive of the "new thinking" at this time. Particularly noteworthy was his detailed analyses of the U.S. competitive strategy and his affirmation of the economic exhaustion scheme.²⁸

No less noteworthy were his revelations about the much-discussed Kennedy book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Not surprisingly, Kennedy's conclusions about the burden of military expenditures have been accepted²⁹ and applied to the USSR by *institutchiki* like Arbatov and A. Kokoshin.

Another important article on the evolution of present tank asymmetries favoring the Warsaw Pact over NATO was published in November.³⁰ The author called the asymmetries "one of the very most graphic examples of how deeply a worship of quantitative perimeters of military power and a striving to have in hand more weapons and troops than all potential enemies has taken root" in the minds of the top Soviet military leadership. Largely on the basis of Western sources, he went on to describe a clear Soviet superiority in tank forces. At one

point, a table taken from the U.S. journal *Armor* was used to show that Soviet tank production over the 1966-1975 period was roughly ten times that of the U.S. In accordance with the economic exhaustion scheme, the author contends that the U.S. "consciously promoted" this asymmetry, which he claims was economically and politically disadvantageous for the USSR. Notably, this article, which goes into considerable detail about the tank warfare, development, and production, was written by an economist.

Beyond the straightforward assault on the utility of military power, guerrilla actions from critics on issues of secrecy, military history, and various issues in contemporary Soviet culture, among others, have been gaining momentum. Perhaps most prominent of these during the latter half of 1988 was the heavy press campaign against military secrecy.

MILITARY SECRECY UNDER ATTACK

Military secrecy and the absence of official Soviet data regarding its armed forces have become the focus of a chorus of criticism from various nonmilitary Soviet officials and journalists.³¹ In the July 9th issue of *New Times*, one author typically noted that many Soviets rely on Western sources for relevant data about Soviet military capabilities, and he observed that even the figures cited for Soviet weapons in the limited-distribution yearbook *Disarmament and Security* are rough and based on Western sources.³² He goes on to affirm that even then-Chief of Staff Akhromeev cites Western figures in discussing the Soviet Armed Forces, although in this case "somehow the thought that the minister does not know our figures does not integrate well into the mind."³³ Soviet commentators have also complained that they only use Western designations for USSR arms systems, since the Soviet Ministry of Defense refuses to publish the titles.³⁴

Critics claim that the excessive secrecy plays into the hands of the adversary for propaganda purposes, and, with the advent of modern means of electronic surveillance, is becoming more and more meaningless.³⁵ In a recent *Arguments and Facts* article, the inefficiency and absurd confusion that some Soviet military secrecy has caused was described. Some worried readers had been expressing the view that, if the U.S. spends \$300 billion annually on defense to the Soviets' \$20 billion (the official Soviet figure, which excludes acquisition, R&D, and probably much more), will the country not find itself in the same straits as in June 1941 (i.e., grossly unprepared)?³⁶ The same article ties secrecy to the much-vilified bureaucrat, and the observation is made that secrecy is also used as a way "of showing power and demonstrating the prominent and essential nature of one's work."³⁷

Characteristic of many recent discussions, the depiction of military secrecy has been followed closely by statements about the necessity of establishing a legislative mechanism in which, according to

Shevardnadze, "all departments concerned with military and military-political activity will be controlled by a higher national elective organ."³⁸ This body would also be concerned with questions of the use of military force beyond the borders of the USSR and development plans and the defense budget.³⁹ Open hearings on various foreign policy questions are also foreseen. Notably, Shevardnadze indicated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference that he is also favoring expanded powers for his ministry in security policy formulation at the expense of the military leadership. During his discussion of his ministry's role, he made the following key statement: "Moreover, there is a greater need to create a more well-defined, autonomous mechanism for elaborating realistic and comprehensive assessments of the threats to our national security, free from any outside volitional pressures."⁴⁰

Often associated with discussions about Supreme Soviet controlling functions are negative remarks about past practices for adopting important foreign policy decisions. In this vein, secrecy is certainly one of the issues that belies the intensified obloquy of various recent-past military and foreign policy decisions, such as the introduction of the SS-20s and stockpiling of chemical weapons. For example, one author lamented that the USSR had long denied the presence of its chemical weapons arsenal, instead using "aesopian language" in answer to questions about it rather than openly admitting to having the weapons.

Sometimes a "very narrow group of people" adopted key decisions in closed discussions;⁴¹ in fact, there have even been claims recently that not all the members of the Politburo took part in the decision to send troops into Afghanistan. The Afghanistan experience no doubt weighs heavily in the plans to bring the Soviet military into line, as Shevardnadze recently indicated: "The decision of the 19th All-Union Party Conference on organizing a constitutionally-empowered mechanism for discussing and implementing the most important foreign policy decisions has been gained by the suffering of our people. It has been gained by the sad experience of Afghanistan, by the drop in the people's standard of living, and by the damage done to the good name and organic, innate ideals of socialism."⁴²

There has also been discussion of the possibility of establishing Supreme Soviet commissions "which would deal with military matters and have the right not just to approve the decisions taken, but would also make their own suggestions and perform controlling functions."⁴³ Typical of this sort of discussion are accompanying comparisons with Western or U.S. practices. "Any expenditure, including that on specific types of arms, is appropriated by Congress. Evidently we also need to elaborate a corresponding legislative procedure for the approval of military appropriations," writes one author.⁴⁴ Often such statements are followed by noting the now well-known plans of the Soviets to publish a comprehensive military budget in a few years, after a price reform.

The question of secrecy and the Soviet military-industrial complex has also recently been illuminated. Mere mention of a Soviet military-industrial complex is noteworthy, for officially it has never existed. At a July press conference recorded in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (*Literary Gazette*), a "problem of the role of the Soviet military-industrial complex" in post-INF Europe was plainly described by the mediator.⁴⁵ Participating was Lev Mendelevich of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who, unlike most at that ministry nowadays, appeared to take the role of defender of the military. This turned out to be a difficult assignment, because he soon found himself parrying blows from the other commentators, and especially from outspoken economist O. Bogomolov from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. While defending secrecy and other military practices, Mendelevich made some interesting remarks about a military-industrial complex. He asserted that there was no friction "between diplomacy" (i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) "and that which they call the military-industrial complex" over matters of policy. However, he admitted that "arguments, discussions, and heated debates do occur" and that "naturally, military people think first of all about maximal means of assuring national security."

Academician R. Sagdeyev has also claimed recently that the "objective laws that brought about the development of military-industrial complexes" in other nations have been active in the USSR as well.⁴⁶ Much more serious were the conclusions of Major Pavel Ventur presented in the November issue of *Twentieth Century and Peace*. He wrote that "the presence of *voenshchina* ("military-mindedness" or "soldiery"), the military-industrial complex and militarism" are a fact of life in the USSR and that the military leadership will always try to deny this.⁴⁷

Shevardnadze also drew attention to secrecy and the military-industrial sphere by stating at the July Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference that "fundamental innovations in the area of defense development should go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to verify their legal conformity with existing international agreements and enunciated political positions."⁴⁸ Here again, Shevardnadze also seems to be asserting greater authority for his ministry over the military. Izyumov has also complained about the absence of information about the Soviet war industry, despite the fact that "our press sufficiently covers the activity of the Pentagon's contractors."⁴⁹ It would appear that the Soviet military, and its industrial complex, are scheduled for more public scrutiny:

In the West, for instance, it is often written that Soviet foreign policy is greatly influenced, and may be influenced in the future, by our "military-industrial complex." It seems that in order to avoid playing hide-and-seek, we shall sooner or later have to study all the internal factors on which our foreign policy depends.⁵⁰

At times there has been discussion of the dilemmas posed by the Soviet military-industrial complex cloaked in reports ostensibly about the U.S. "military-industrial complex." Characteristic of many such items are passages mentioning the loss of economic competitiveness owing to military expenditures and discourse on the future prospects for conversion of war industries. On the issue of the U.S. military, one should note another tactic of the "new thinking" proponents. In contrast to military leaders who exaggerate the power of the U.S. military lobby, some *institutchiki* have played down the influence of the U.S. "military-industrial complex." Some have specifically noted the slowdown in the growth of the U.S. defense budget after 1985 or have downplayed the impact of the defense buildup under Reagan.⁵¹

It is worth noting that discussion of conversion is often associated with mention of the military-industrial complex and criticism of secrecy. Conversion itself has become a much more frequent topic in the Soviet press lately.⁵² A very candid series of opinions on the issue have been recently published in *New Times* under the heading "Conversion. Is it Possible?" The most recent article of the series, from January 24-30, 1989, goes perhaps the furthest in revealing both the state of affairs⁵³ in the conversion effort and also the agenda of those promoting it.

Without doubt, much of the campaign against excessive secrecy and the related discussion of the military-industrial complex and conversion constitute indirect criticism of the military and an attempt to wrench from it certain classified information. This would make it easier to weaken the military's influence and provide alternative evaluations on security issues.

HISTORICAL REVISIONISM

Often associated with the press campaign on secrecy is the growing number of press exhortations to eliminate the so-called "blank spots" in Soviet history as depicted in officially sanctioned textbooks and other literature. The "blank spots" are items and events that have received distorted and/or negligible explanation in the literature, or that have not been acknowledged at all. Military history looms as a key battleground in the fight to eliminate the "blank spots," and thus it has suddenly become another avenue through which civilians, this time mainly historians, are taking aim at the traditional military view. Of utmost significance is the discussion of Soviet performance in the Great Patriotic War (i.e., World War Two). Recently, several "blank spots" of wartime and the prewar period have been addressed, provoking sharp debate. On the World War, it has now been acknowledged that there were desertions, colossal tactical errors, an erroneous military doctrine, and related unpreparedness in many areas at the war's outset. One should note that some of these issues have been raised before, but never before with such candor and accompanying discussion.

While in the military press itself an open discussion of these wartime issues has been underway for some time, it is of note that the nonmilitary press has recently gone much further in critically evaluating Soviet wartime performance. A remarkable example of this is historian B. V. Sokolov's article about the ostensibly uncontroversial issue of Soviet losses in World War Two.⁵⁴

Sokolov's article is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it gives a larger figure for Soviet casualties than had previously been the case. Using publications from the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods, Sokolov places total Soviet losses at 21.3 million killed, higher than the 20 million figure often cited both in the USSR and the West. Second, the author states that German military losses amounted to approximately 6 million killed on all fronts, "3.5 times less than Soviet losses." Previous Soviet figures for total German losses have often been much higher. A recent example is provided by former Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief V. Kulikov, who claimed that German losses "against the USSR" alone amounted to 10 million.⁵⁵ Thus, the traditional depiction in official statements and military histories has been that on the Eastern Front Soviet troop losses were in fact greater than the Germans', but not drastically so.

Sokolov dispels that notion, not only by giving the above figures but by claiming, in contrast to Kulikov, that German military losses (killed in battle or later died of battle wounds) on the Eastern Front amounted to a mere 2.45 million. This figure corresponds with several Western calculations, and in fact the authors cite a West German study to this effect! Although it is not stated outright, the calculations indicate that Soviet military losses (11 million killed in action or died later of battle wounds) were 4.5 times higher than opposing German ones. This is a remarkable admission.

The author also challenges the versions of events provided by official Soviet histories and generals' memoirs. He claims that the correlation of the two sides' forces has often been distorted to portray them as more even than they really were; i.e., the numerical Soviet advantage has been historically understated. On a related theme, Sokolov also takes exception to the standard view that improvements in weapons technology and production toward the end of the war played a key role in Soviet operational success. Amazingly, he again cites Western, and especially West German, studies to buttress his arguments. Taken together, the author seems to make the heretical implication that the USSR overwhelmed the Nazis by sheer numbers, a point of view that is sharply at odds with the prevailing line until now.

In answering the question as to why Soviet losses were so high, Sokolov states bluntly that the Soviet soldier was, in the immediate prewar years, increasingly looked upon as a "simple cog in the state mechanism." After the mass repressions of 1937-38, he observes, "the value of human life turned out to be insignificant." Moreover, "the faulty practice of taking separate cities on the dates of holidays and

the striving to seize this or that position at any cost, regardless of the tactical, operational or strategic value" led to high casualties. Stalin is blamed for meddling in purely operational-tactical matters and is specifically accused of being responsible for the disasters at Kiev in September 1941 and at Kharkov and the Crimea in the fall of 1942.

Of course it is in vogue to debunk Stalin for his many wartime and prewar errors and crimes, but top generals have also not been excluded from castigation. "The heroism of the Soviet people was shamelessly exploited," and so was their willingness for self-sacrifice, as troops were thrown into "hopeless frontal assaults" against the enemy's relentless firepower. He concludes that, had military operations been carried out more rationally, the Soviet Union would have been able to halt the German war machine sooner.

Other historians and literary figures have recently made similar criticisms. One writer stated that "we simply covered the fascists with our blood and corpses" and that Soviet troops did not know how to fight.⁵⁶ He also said of the Soviet 12-volume History of World War Two (featuring the standard overly complimentary depiction of Soviet performance): "Our history, including our literary history, has not known a more falsified, concocted and fabricated publication."⁵⁷

V. Shlykov drew conclusions similar to those of Sokolov on the understated Soviet numerical advantage. Shlykov claimed that, contrary to the conventional view, the Soviets had possessed a clear superiority over the Nazis in quantity of tanks--throughout the war.⁵⁸ Moreover, he assailed the Supreme High Command for not having a clearcut concept for tank utilization during the war, which led to unnecessary losses. He tied all of this to a sort of "tank mentality" among the top military, which, he claimed, persisted well beyond the war period.

No doubt such writings present a step forward in eliminating some "blank spots" in Soviet military history. It is important to again stress that these and other recent historical discussions⁵⁹ are deliberately oriented toward providing an interpretation at odds with the traditional military history literature. Much of the traditional literature was written by top military leaders and strategists, or others linked or sympathetic to the military. By downplaying Soviet military performance, the attempt would seem to be one of demythologizing Soviet military history, which has of course been for decades so prominent and glorified in Soviet society. It is noteworthy that, in the absence of official Soviet data, the "new thinking" writers, whether discussing military history or economic policy, have employed Western sources to bolster their contentions. This practice, along with the publishing of articles written by Westerners,⁶⁰ has seemed to expand steadily over the Gorbachev period.

THE MILITARY'S RESPONSE

By contrast, support for many of the elements of this "new thinking" approach have been hard to come by in the military press. There is little or no discussion of economic exhaustion schemes, military secrecy, or any adoption of conclusions about wasteful Soviet wartime losses. Instead, there are more and more complaints about the pacifist offensive. There are also more visible attempts to deflect the rising tide of hostility from outside. In addition, the military evidently additionally has in its arsenal some sophisticated apologists; these people are now fighting on the front lines of an often angry, abusive battle with the antimilitary members of the cultural intelligentsia.

Maintaining vigilance is the leitmotiv of most discussions in the military press of the threat from the Western "imperialist aggressors," and so it is hard to be tolerant of those who downplay the threat: "The position of some people, who are trying to assert that the military threat for our country is an outdated notion, is incomprehensible. Unfortunately, this is far from the case."⁶¹ It is acceptable to observe that tensions have been lessened recently, and that political means of achieving security are preeminent at the present, and to make other minor concessions to the "new thinking." However, most commentaries quickly add that no radical change has yet occurred, and thus the threat of war is still to be taken very seriously.

A disturbing element of the present situation is the pacifist moods of many youth, who "think up the most diverse reasons for avoiding military service."⁶² It is also hard for the military to take the decadent onslaught of "the rockers, the breakers, the punks" and other riffraff that have proliferated.⁶³ They obviously cannot be counted on to defend the Fatherland, nor can they, even with "a superliterature concocted by pacifistically-minded writers nor by rock groups singing peace songs," respond to SDI, if "we do not wish to become a colony or be occupied by the United States from space."⁶⁴ Mutual antagonism between, on the one hand, young rock-music enthusiasts, hippies, and other like types and, on the other, servicemen has occasionally led to incidents of intimidation and violence, including deaths.⁶⁵ Recently, such clashes have been alluded to in the journal *Military Knowledge*.

The journal *Twentieth Century and Peace*, which has presented some of the most clearly antimilitary sentiments lately, has repeatedly provoked a negative response in the conservative *Communist of the Armed Forces*. In one case, a writer for the first journal was attacked for having suggested that the military had an interest in derailing disarmament, that there existed a "military opposition" to Party policy on the matter, and for having too liberally interpreted the new military doctrine.⁶⁶ Some military writers have discredited their external critics by asserting that they have never served in the military or did so from "inside the kitchen."

But while sarcastically mocking the "naive" and "amateurish" warblings of the pacifists, some military commentators have found their antimilitary attacks unprecedentedly fierce. "The very categories-- army, defense--are presently the subject of intensive research and fierce attacks for the most part by our cultural intelligentsia."⁶⁷ Detractors have publicly "poured mud" on the Army and the Armed Forces,⁶⁸ and it has even been trickling down onto the enlisted men, upon whose honor a shadow has been cast.⁶⁹ The antimilitary intelligentsia has accused the military of committing atrocities in World War Two, and academician Sakharov recently criticized the "war on the villages" in Afghanistan.⁷⁰ It is worthwhile to note that Sakharov has been a leading proponent of sizable Soviet unilateral defense cuts. It is also clear that the antimilitary intelligentsia plans to exploit new findings about *dedovshchina* (i.e., the bullying and hazing of young incoming recruits) and other internal weaknesses to beat down the military. This and the ferocity of an increasingly visible civilian-military conflict is well captured in the "Army and Society" debate, as well as Prokhanov's ongoing polemic with the pacifist intellectuals, with both sides firing threats and sarcastic, cynical criticism at each other.

Prokhanov is evidently one of the foremost experts on the anti-military attacks and as a result is perhaps one of the ablest defenders of the military. In a much-noted article in early 1988, Prokhanov laid out a detailed critique of the present antimilitary trend.⁷¹ Very probably representing a significant segment of military opinion, Prokhanov contended that the "new thinking" is neither new nor eternal, and that it was only made possible by fending off the Western threat and attaining military and strategic parity. He also averred that it is meaningless to blame the military for the exacerbation of political tensions. Beyond that, in his view, it will be possible to achieve disarmament only with the participation of the military, since only they have the necessary knowledge to demobilize the war machine. Because of the forced circumstances, he articulated that "the best minds, the flower of the nation in both the intellectual and physical sense, are working in the defense complex" and that, in converting to civilian life, they should be treated gingerly. He likened this process to transplanting, and under no circumstances should this rich source be "patronized or thrown into a pile and discarded." He goes on to identify an emerging military convergence between East and West and peculiarly speaks of an eventual "superheadquarters" that would oversee the general staffs of the U.S. and the USSR.

Prokhanov, it should be noted, has been well known for his pro-military writings and his two recent books on the Afghanistan war in particular. On Afghanistan, Prokhanov devoted considerable attention to the returning soldiers, who he believed are uniting into an important social force. His description of their difficulties in resettlement is strikingly reminiscent of that of returning Vietnam veterans. Among those trying to exploit the Afghan vets for selfish ends are bureaucrats who try to assimilate and obscure their identity as quickly as possible, and liberals "who are trying to give them an inferiority complex, to make them into a social victim on the altar of an unnecessary and terrible slaughter, calling them cannon fodder, the lost generation."

These and Prokhanov's other ideas presented in the above-cited article have drawn a sharp response in the liberal *Ogonek* (Light),⁷² in which he has been linked to the notorious Nina Andreyeva (a Leningrad woman held up as the symbol of the conservative, anti-perestroika forces).

Prokhanov, in turn, has teamed up with D. Volkogonov of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy and others to excoriate Ales Adamovich, a well-known writer whose pacifist tendencies have infuriated the military. First, there was the contention in the Adamovich book *Breakthrough* that in the nuclear age "military-patriotic" education should be superseded by "antimilitary-patriotic" education; then there was his collaboration in the recent film *Pain* that painted an overly realistic, too unfavorable, picture of the Afghanistan war.⁷³ One should note that another recent film, *Assa*, has been criticized in the military press for its unflattering treatment of the military.⁷⁴ One scene of the film reportedly shows a drunken airman being beaten up to the tune of a patriotic Soviet Air Force song.

Like others sympathetic to the military, Prokhanov stresses as great feats the overcoming of various military challenges, in particular the struggle to achieve parity with the U.S. Like R. Bogdanov, his message would seem to be that the essence of Soviet power and greatness has been military prowess. Apart from upholding a still-substantial threat of war from the West, other military apologists have imparted that protection is needed from the contagion of Islamic fundamentalism in the southern provinces; that tremendous effort was necessary to attain parity, so that it would be a serious waste to give it up so easily; that the Army supports restructuring fully, that it is on the people's side, and that it has played an important role in providing aid as necessary, e.g., during the Chernobyl' and Armenian disasters.

The military's proponents have had a mixed approach toward criticism of secrecy. On the one hand, the observation is made that the Western intelligence agencies have stepped up their actions in the USSR by exploiting new opportunities created by perestroika, and thus there is vital need for vigilance over secrecy.⁷⁵ This line has also been taken at times by the KGB and was evident in remarks by Deputy Chief of General Staff M. Gareyev in a recent interview.⁷⁶ On the other hand, on

this occasion, Gareyev also defended the military by pointing out how glasnost' has been reflected in loosened controls on information related to the armed forces. He noted that censorship restrictions over certain data regarding military hardware, tactics, and training had been lifted and that more may follow; that figures for losses in Afghanistan have been published; that wider coverage of negative phenomena connected with service in the Armed Forces has occurred; and that military leaders have become more active in openly debating defense issues. He also mentioned several other examples of expanded information now available on the Soviet Armed Forces.

But Gareyev's comments nonetheless justified continued secrecy. He stated that the Defense Ministry, by the very nature of its work, had to have secrecy, and that the need for it had been "confirmed by the experience of recent years." He also warned that the process of eliminating secrecy "has its limits, because much information that constitutes state and military secrets cannot be unilaterally revealed, in the interests of ensuring the country's reliable defense capability." One should note that Gareyev, like other military leaders, ties future lifting of secrecy, just as arms reductions, to bilateral agreements. Mendelevich of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also defended military secrecy as a necessity but claimed that "there is nothing secretive" about the way foreign policy decisions are adopted in the USSR.⁷⁷

Nonetheless, there has generally been very little defense of military secrecy in the face of mounting disapprobation.⁷⁸ This may reflect a realization on the part of the military leadership that the correlation of forces in this particular case runs strongly against them, so it is best to not commit effort to a lost cause, especially since there are much more crucial issues to address. It could also reflect a begrudging acknowledgement, at least among some of the leaders, of just criticism. With regard to the latter hypothesis, a recent statement by USSR Defense Minister D. T. Yazov is especially instructive. After having heard about various personnel problems and the criticism the military now must deal with, Yazov said, "I feel pain, perhaps more than you, when we are being criticized. However, if we are being criticized justly, we have to correct the situation rather than try to brush the criticisms aside."⁷⁹

Naturally there have been few words about a Soviet military-industrial complex or Supreme Soviet monitoring bodies in the mainline military press. The military, and Soviet propaganda in general, has of course long denied the existence of a Soviet military-industrial complex. Typical in this regard is a recent statement by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff V. N. Lobov to the effect that the notion of there being a Soviet military-industrial complex is an "absurdity."⁸⁰ On Supreme Soviet controls over the military of the kind Shevardnadze proposed, there has been at least one recent statement in support. This came from Fleet Admiral A. Sorokin, also First Deputy of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. He enumerated the

new controlling functions for the Supreme Soviet (although not precisely as Shevardnadze had done) and claimed that he had voiced approval for them "without hesitation."⁸¹

There were other signs at the end of 1988 that some of the military leadership might be adopting more of the new line. In an October 15th Studio 9 discussion, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff V. N. Lobov stated that "our economic enemies, and first of all the United States, are doing all they can to tire us out economically."⁸² Although immediately thereafter he felt obligated to nonetheless return to the familiar threat of war from the U.S., his prior statement accepted the economic exhaustion hypothesis. The significance of adopting it lies in the fact that, if such a plan exists, one simply cannot play into the hands of the imperialists, and that of course means not getting involved in an arms race. It is important to recall that until now the economic exhaustion scheme and the related theories on the arms race have come only from nonmilitary commentators.

Another notable recent supporting move from a military-political figure in favor of the "new thinking" package appeared in the November 1988 issue of *World Economy and International Relations*.⁸³ Y. Y. Kirshin, a General-Major in the Army and Deputy Director of the Institute of Military History in the Ministry of Defense, went further than the norm in backing the "new thinking." Most notable perhaps, and more substantive than Lobov's utterance in its implications, was Kirshin's acceptance of the Izyumov-Kortunov conclusions on the Third World as well as on the economy. On nuclear war, he stated that it had become an anachronism as the world has become so "united and close."⁸⁴ Here, the notoreity is not in the part about nuclear war but in the adoption of the "growing interdependence" hypothesis. Further, one's own security, paradoxically, could not be assured "even by surprise attack," and military power was no longer sufficient for "large-scale victories" in local conflicts.⁸⁵ No less noteworthy was Kirshin's appeal to bring foreign and defense policy discussions to a wider circle of people, whereby "alternative ideas and recommendations" could be offered.⁸⁶ He also spoke of the "common human factor," the need to eliminate the "enemy image," and the primacy of common human interests over those of any one class. All of this is of course standard to the "new thinking" these days.

On past foreign policy, Kirshin observed that, while Soviet military power aided several developing nations in starting onto the socialist path of development, subsequently the Soviet Union was unable to provide the "necessary economic assistance." And so, in the 70s, the USSR pursued "petty gains" in the Third World, forgetting that "socialism should demonstrate its advantages by internal successes in the political, social, economic and spiritual spheres, and not in any case by military means."⁸⁷

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE

It is evident that at present the Soviet military, and the Army in particular, is being compelled with increasing frequency to defend itself. Concurrent with this are other signs of the new state of affairs. There were no strategic missiles on display at the November 7th Military Parade on the occasion of the 71st anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. And Gorbachev's announced troop reductions and Akhromeyev's resignation have been accompanied by other developments suggestive of lowered military prestige.

The military has become introspective, for the first time coming out in the open about its various internal difficulties. Among these are the spartan living conditions many military families must contend with, which often result in dissatisfaction for soldiers and their families. This in turn often leads to marital strife and other predictable consequences. Unique for the Soviets are recent admissions of drug use and interethnic problems in their armed forces. Revelations about *dedovshchina* and lowered prestige of the military man (including many such complaints by enlisted men themselves) have become common. Admissions about *dedovshchina* have become especially numerous, indeed appearing in most articles in the military press on increasing discipline or addressing problems of dealing with the youth. Undoubtedly, the larger number of youth trying to avoid military service reflects not only the increased confessions about *dedovshchina* but also more articles reporting the abysmal living conditions many servicemen must tolerate.

There has also been an unfolding debate over restructuring the Army. Among the options being discussed are limiting terms of military service; limiting or curtailing the draft of students; and going over to either a cadre-militia, regional militia, or all-volunteer army.⁸⁸ New Chief of the General Staff M. Moiseyev noted and rejected the latter three and a proposal for a 50-percent troop cut in the Army during a recent interview.⁸⁹ Gareyev, Yazov, and other military leaders were reportedly outraged by a *Literary Gazette* roundtable discussion in May 1987 at which the drafting of first- and second-year college students was scored; thereafter, it seemed that the military leadership had managed to hold off the criticism.⁹⁰ In addition, many other military figures have defended both the draft and the existing structure of the armed forces.⁹¹ However, the drafting of college students has remained a controversial issue. And during November 1988 both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze promised that the length of service would be "examined" in the near future, the latter stating that it would be taken up by the Supreme Soviet.⁹² Further, Colonel-General B. Omelichev reported in January 1989 that the draft would be cut "by about a quarter over the next few years" in line with the troop cuts announced by Gorbachev.⁹³

On a related issue, disgruntled Soviet students recently boycotted military science classes at several institutions across the USSR. Such classes are mandatory for students approaching or returning from terms

of service, and, like the draft, they are very unpopular and increasingly the subject of criticism. Reportedly, the students' demands ranged from reorganization of the training system to its outright abolition. One should note that the popular fronts in the Baltic States have called for both abolition of military training in the schools and limiting or curtailing the draft of students. This has not been missed by military commentators, who have expressed their disapproval.⁹⁴ Among the reasons for the student boycott are an overly strict dress code; loss of study time in main career-track courses; abusive, crude instructors; and outdated, inaccurate textbooks.

Colonel General A. Demidov, Chief of the Ground Forces Combat Training Main Administration, discussed the boycott in a December 1988 interview. He blamed "rabble-rousers" and "a clear desire" on the part of the press "to 'play up' to some of the pacifistically-minded students, who are far from understanding the demands of contemporary defense development" as being partly responsible.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, Demidov took a conciliatory tone on several of the students' demands and criticisms. Most importantly, he said that he was convinced that in the near future it would be possible to maintain combat readiness "without enlisting students for military service."⁹⁶ Students at Kiev University at an October 15, 1988, conference were apparently already given assurances that the dress code will be abolished and second- and third-year students will be exempted from military courses in the following academic year.⁹⁷

Owing to the more visible antimilitary public mood, the more and more widespread view that no U.S. attack is imminent, the economic crisis and problems of supplying and training new soldiers (not to mention having to have larger numbers of them learn Russian so they can understand commands), reforming the draft system, and going over to a smaller cadre-militia or all-volunteer force would seem to be a logical option at this point.

The Soviet military leadership is faced with a serious demographic problem because the number of Slavic conscripts as a proportion of the total draft pool has dropped as a result of the declining birth rate of the Slavs. At the same time, the percentage of Central Asian recruits has risen steadily as their population growth has remained comparatively robust. These two trends have had a negative impact on cohesion and discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces, in a large part owing to the fact that many of the incoming Central Asians speak poor Russian or none at all. Communication breakdowns occur with increasing frequency, causing not only inefficiency but also augmenting interethnic friction and the growth of the "microgroups" of single nationalities that shun outsiders. Conceivably, these negative trends could be halted by revising the existing draft and service system so as to favor recruitment of Slavs.

From almost the beginning, Western observers had noted that Gorbachev's "new thinking" approach to foreign policy had seemed to

deemphasize the military, but 1988-89 in particular have witnessed a widening assault on the perceived positions and interests of the military leadership. Thus, the advance of the liberal "new thinking" has brought about not merely fine verbiage about growing interdependence and unity in the world, or the primacy of human values; it has also heralded a stage in which criticism of past Soviet foreign policy has become increasingly shrill. The primary tool of traditional Soviet foreign policy, the military, has come under attack in an unprecedented manner. There would seem to be convincing evidence that, along with the overall cataclysm the Gorbachev regime has brought to Soviet society, a sort of Soviet form of the "Vietnam syndrome" has begun to set in with regard to military power.

Nonetheless, one should judge the Soviets on the basis of actions and be careful not to be taken in by pious rhetoric about the declining utility of military power. A repeated problem for the Soviets has been the lag or gap between word and deed. Moreover, the Soviets are obviously aware that such revelations will play well abroad in some circles. One could argue that nothing of the kind would be heard were the Soviet GNP growing at, say, 5 percent annually. Moreover, a return to the posture of the 70s is always feasible, principally if the Gorbachev regime is overturned. In this author's view, such an event is quite possible, especially given that there are few signs at present that the economic reform effort will succeed. A great deal depends on the economic reform and Soviet attempts to integrate economically with the West. Finally, one should watch carefully Soviet appeals for a respite to "accumulate forces" for a later offensive. Some may be genuine; however, others, as in the case of Izyumov and Kortunov, probably represent an attempt to win over a resistant military.

Thus, it is worthwhile to be aware of the press campaign underway, for it may well give clues to future Soviet actions (and already has done so). Moreover, it would be foolish to dismiss the recent evidence as mere propaganda, because the Soviets cannot afford to confuse their own people, especially over national security issues. One could also argue that there is already evidence of some implementation in the field of the "new thinking" as related to the Soviet military, and this would itself be a good topic for debate. In this connection, it is of note that the trend would seem to be one of more often stating things outright rather than always relying on surrogates or aesopian and/or cryptic phraseology.

Although one would expect Soviet unilateral measures to go into a holding pattern pending Western response, Gorbachev has obviously shown himself capable of waging an innovative political campaign and an offensive diplomatic posture fraught with the unexpected. Beyond that, there are few indications as of February 1989 that the new line on military power is letting up. In fact, the "new thinking" proponents seem to be acting opportunistically on the heels of the announced unilateral troop reductions. Thus, several have already argued (as some did after the INF Treaty) that, if the measure in no way weakens Soviet

security, does this not bring into question the necessity of, and conditions related to, creating the given deterrent in the first place? A. Arbatov, in a recent article, employed this argument and again argued solidly in favor of unilateral disarmament measures. He also claimed that reasonable sufficiency "can be achieved without parity."⁹⁸ He specifically and sharply denounced four military theoreticians of the "old school": I. Tretyak, A. Gribkov, Y. Lebedev, and A. Podberyozhkin.⁹⁹ Major changes in the Soviet military appear to be certain if such trends continue; nonetheless, the Soviet military is apt to battle tenaciously for its interests, and is apt to do so more openly as the "new thinking" in foreign policy unfolds.

NOTES

1. V. Zhurkin et al., "The Challenges of Security--Old and New," *Kommunist*, January 1988, pp. 42-50, this from p. 48. Echoing the economic exhaustion hypothesis, a top Soviet official recently stated that the time of heavy Soviet military expenditures is passing, and, as has become common lately, claims that the efficiency of the Soviet military will be determined primarily by "qualitative" perimeters in the future. A. Bessmertnikh, "A Few Thoughts From the 19th Party Conference," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, August 1988, pp. 3-10, especially p. 10.
2. Another recent article to cite the Zhurkin *Kommunist* article is A. Kislov, "New Political Thinking and Regional Conflicts," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, August 1988, p. 39-47.
3. This point is evidently taken from the second article of the series, V. Zhurkin et al., "About Reasonable Sufficiency," *SShA*, December 1987, pp. 11-21, this from p. 14.
4. For the U.S. competitive strategy, SDI, and the repeated devaluation of Soviet assets, *ibid.*, and Zhurkin et al., "The Challenges of Security," *op. cit.*, pp.48-49. For another example of the hypothesis of a forced arms race in a maximum number of directions, R. Bogdanov, "From a Balance of Forces--to a Balance of Interests," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, March 1988, pp. 81-88, especially p. 82.
5. M. Gorbachev. *Perestroika, New Thinking for Our Country and the World*. New York: Harper and Row, 1987, pp. 219-20.
6. Zhurkin et al., "The Challenges of Security," *op. cit.* Several other authors have voiced support for the Zhurkin et al. hypotheses: e.g., on drawing the Soviets into Third World conflicts and, once having succeeded, forcing heavy economic losses and political isolation on the USSR, A. Kislov, *op. cit.*
7. Many discussions of U.S. foreign policy in the "new thinking" style have employed economic terms; thus, U.S. foreign policy has been at times described as "profitable," "cost-effective," and efficient in its "utilization of the international division of labor."

8. An earlier discussion of the suitability of limited regional engagements (e.g., the U.S. involvement in Grenada) or "half-wars" to U.S. strategists appeared in V. Zhurkin et al., "Reasonable Sufficiency," *Novoye vremya*, October 2, 1987 (No. 40), pp. 13-15, especially pp. 14-15. Special thanks to James McConnell who first detected this article and alerted me to its presence. For his analysis of it, see James M. McConnell, "SDI, the Soviet Investment Debate and Soviet Military Policy," *Strategic review*, Winter 1988, pp. 47-62, pertinent discussion of Zhurkin, pp. 56-57. On the trend of U.S. preference for limited engagements, Zhurkin is also supported by A. Gavryushkin and N. Sokov, "The Arms Race: a Senseless Proposition," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, August 1988, pp. 82-86, among many others.
9. Another article sharply critical of Soviet Third World policy, and especially of the weakness of its economic component, is A. Kuprianov, "The Near and Far 'Third World,'" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, September 28, 1988, p. 14.
10. This defense expenditure burden was even more strongly emphasized in an earlier Izyumov article: A. Izyumov, "The Other Side of Disarmament," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, April 1988, pp. 86-94, this from p. 87.
11. Anonymous, "The Party Conference: the Foreign Policy Aspect," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, July 1988, pp. 74-80, this from p. 76.
12. It is noteworthy that this depiction of the European correlation of forces in the late 70s-early 80s has been repeated almost exactly by A. Arbatov, "About Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, September 1988, pp. 80-92, quotation p. 87. Also very close is O. Bykov, "To Break the Logic of the Arms Race," *Pravda*, August 11, 1988, p. 4, and I. Malashenko, "Security--Non-Military Aspects," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, December 1988, pp. 44-55, especially p. 46. Malashenko supports all of the major points and arguments of the Izyumov-Kortunov article.
13. A. Izyumov, "The Other Side," op. cit.
14. "They Cannot All Think the Same," *Moskovskiye novosti*, August 7, 1988, p. 7.
15. The promotion of unilateral measures is especially evident in the Zhurkin team's writings, as McConnell noted (McConnell, op. cit., p. 57). While political means of attaining foreign policy objectives were identified as most important in the earlier articles, Izyumov and Kortunov are backing the economic approach

as preeminent, as others have been recently. As a corollary to the political option, Zhurkin et al. called for more flexible negotiating methods, including acknowledgment of the opponent's interests and a readiness to compromise ("About Reasonable Sufficiency," op. cit., pp. 17-18).

Zhurkin also questioned the likelihood of the attack from the West ("Reasonable Sufficiency," op. cit., p. 13), and on a July 30th appearance on the "Studio 9" program, boldly criticized widespread Soviet exaggerations of the U.S. military threat over the last one or two decades, including some he himself had made. He also implied that the old Soviet contention of always being reactively on the defensive against Western military actions was false by noting that, while the Soviets had protested the implacement of U.S. missiles in Europe, one had to admit that they were very much like the ones the Soviets had already deployed on their side. "Studio 9 Discusses Disarmament, Glasnost," *FBIS-SOV*, August 2, 1988, pp. 9-16.

16. Another author recently warned that both the nonmilitary and military sectors of the economy would be "undermined and destroyed" unless the economy was reoriented from the military emphasis. D. Proektor, "A Balance of Power: Authority or Loss of Authority?" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 9, 1988, p. 14. Proektor also condemned the "dogmatization of 'military balance philosophy'" by which he is surely referring to the "cult of parity" that Izyumov and Kortunov criticized.
17. "The Party Conference," op. cit., p. 80. Another reference to the economic limits of the military effort is Zhurkin et al., "Reasonable Sufficiency," op. cit., p. 13.
18. Also Zhurkin et al., *ibid.*, pp. 14-15, and Zhurkin et al., "On Reasonable Sufficiency," op. cit., p. 20. These passages further claim that Soviet attempts to oppose "all potential opponents" worldwide are unrealistic and economically untenable.
19. One of the most far-reaching recent examples is A. Kiva, "The Developing Countries, Socialism, and Capitalism," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, February 1989, pp. 57-67. This article is remarkably laudatory of capitalism and its achievements, not only in the Third World but in the more developed nations. Meanwhile, it takes a clearly defeatist, cynical tone about socialism in the Third World and the Marxist theories related to it.
20. E. Shevardnadze, speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs scientific-practical conference July 25, 1988, published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, September 1988, pp. 3-35.
21. Others have posed this question in a similar manner. See comments of I. Malashenko, "The Army and Society," *Vek XX i mir*, pp. 18-28.

22. Judging from the press, there has lately been a noticeable downplaying of the military threat from the West and from the U.S. in particular. Aside from numerous letters to the editor expressing disbelief in the likelihood of U.S. attack, several participants at the "Army and Society" debate strongly and even sarcastically downplayed the threat. Also, S. Kondrashov, "Conventional Forces," *Izvestia*, April 2, 1988, p. 6, and Proektor, *op. cit.*
23. The attempt to be as strong as all possible enemies has been widely criticized in a manner that bears a resemblance to the Izyumov-Kortunov strike on the "cult of parity" mentality. Proektor, *op. cit.*, "Army and Society," *op. cit.*, Zhurkin et al., *op. cit.*, I. Malashenko, "Security--Non-Military Aspects," *op. cit.*, p. 45, etc. One economist came very close to repeating Shevarnadze word for word on the issue. He called the effort to be as strong as "any possible coalition of states absolutely groundless and going against the national interests of the Soviet Union." S. Blagovolin, "The Strength and Weakness of Military Power," *Izvestia*, November 18, 1988, p. 5. This author also cites the economic exhaustion scheme, the vast superiority of the Western economies in the context of war, and the erroneous one-sided reliance on the military for national security. Another economist in support is V. Chernyak, "We Are in the Same Boat," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, October 15, 1988, p. 2.
24. Gorbachev's speech excerpted in the *Washington Post*, December 8, 1988, p. A32.
25. A. Gavryushkin and N. Sokov, *op. cit.*
26. E.g., Zhurkin et al., *op. cit.*, p. 14 and pp. 18-19, respectively, and A. Izyumov, "The Other Side," *op. cit.*, p. 90. These writers also proclaimed that the Khrushchev demobilizations did not all weaken Soviet national security or influence; on the contrary, they argue, the USSR's standing in the world was enhanced.
27. A. Gavrushkin and N. Sokov, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
28. A. Arbatov, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 85. His father, G. Arbatov, is in full agreement on the conclusions about the competitive strategy and economic exhaustion, e.g., see V. Kocherov's interview with him, "Disarmament and Security," *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 31, 1988, p. 5.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 87. Also, N. Dolgopolov and A. Kokoshin, "What Do the Destinies of the Great Powers Teach?" (review of Kennedy's book), *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1988, pp. 115-121.
30. V. Shlykov, "Strong Is the Armor," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, November 1988, pp. 39-52.

31. Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister V. Karpov, *Pravda*, January 15, 1989, p. 4; D. Pogovzhel'skii, "And if the Maps Are Opened?" *Novoye vremya*, No. 31, July 29, 1988, p. 9; V. Zaikin, "The 'Secret' Stamp Has Been Removed," *Izvestia*, September 3, 1988, p. 2; A. Illesh and B. Reznik, "After the Explosion," *Izvestia*, July 25, 1988, p. 4; "Studio 9 Discusses Disarmament, Glasnost'," *FBIS-SOV*, August 2, 1988, pp. 9-16; "From a Balance of Forces--to a Balance of Interests," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 29, 1988, p. 14; U. Vorontsov, "Military-Political Aspects of National Security," (third session at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference July 25-27), *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, September 1988, pp. 42-44; Y. Gontmakher, "Military Secrets," *Sovetskaya kultura*, September 17, 1988, p. 5; V. Kocherov, "Disarmament and Security," *op. cit.*, among many others.
32. Pogovzhel'skii, *op. cit.* A. Arbatov also noted the absence of reliable data about Soviet forces in the disarmament yearbook and was critical of the continued absence of official Soviet data. "The Peak of Stability Had Arrived at the Beginning of the 1970s," *Novoye vremya*, No. 26, June 24, 1988, pp. 12-13.
33. Another author recently attacked First Deputy Chief of Staff V. Lobov for behaving in a similar manner. He quoted Lobov as citing Western estimates to the effect that the 500,000-man unilateral cut announced by Gorbachev would amount to 10 percent of the Soviet military potential. The author also sharply criticized military secrecy, the reverse side of which he said was "a lack of control and accountability to the people"; he also raised the economic exhaustion scheme (S. Kondrashov, "Finding Out About Ourselves," *Izvestia*, January 4, 1989, p. 5).
34. "Studio 9 Discusses Disarmament," *op. cit.* Also annoyed with the continued use of Western names for Soviet weapons was I. Malashenko, "Security and the Expense Approach," *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1988, pp. 115-119. Malashenko also assailed the "more is better" approach of the Soviet military (p. 117) and called for the establishment of "anti-expenditure mechanisms" related to defense.
35. One of the first and most frequently cited presentations of this position was that of V. Zhurkin et al., "Reasonable Sufficiency," *op. cit.* Zhurkin et al. also argued that excessive military secrecy was counterproductive to Soviet interests because it tended to cause the opponent to plan for worst-case scenarios. Recent arguments have also given a central role to overall inefficiency caused by secrecy.
36. Translation of the *Argumenti i fakti* article, *FBIS-SOV*, August 18, 1988, pp. 24-27.

37. Recently, another prominent article tied secrecy to the bureaucrat--V. Rubanov, "From a 'Cult of Secrecy'--to an Information Culture," *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1988, pp. 24-36. The author criticizes excessive governmental secrecy and the absence of legal restraining mechanisms in this area.
38. Report of E. Shevardnadze at scientific-technical conference, op. cit., p. 20.
39. Ibid. Also, "The Diplomats Are Unfastening Their Coats," *Moskovskiye novosti*, August 7, 1988, p. 6. Shevardnadze reiterated most of these points and claimed that the constitutional mechanism "is being put in place." Speech by E. Shevardnadze at the United Nations, *Pravda*, September 28, 1988, p. 4.
40. Shevardnadze at conference, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
41. Gontmakher, op. cit.
42. Shevardnadze, op. cit., p. 13.
43. "The Party Conference," op. cit., p. 76. Also A. Kozyrev, "Trust and a Balance of Interests," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, October 1988, pp. 3-12. Along with standard criticism of military secrecy, the author states that "the examination of such a type of question (i.e., crucial decisions in the military sphere-SA) should become the prerogative and an expression of the new role of the Supreme Soviet" (p. 9).
44. G. Dadyants, "The Echo of the Saryozek Explosions," *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, August 17, 1988, pp. 1-3.
45. "From a Balance of Forces," op. cit.
46. A. Sagdeyev, "A Person Who Is Able To Say 'No,'" *Novoye vremya*, No. 47, November 18, 1988, pp. 26-28.
47. Major P. Ventur, "A Military Man Against 'Soldiery,'" *Vek XX i mir*, No. 11, 1988, pp. 2-4. Ventur launched a vicious assault on the military. Specifically, he asserted that the Soviet serviceman was the most deprived of basic rights of any citizen in the USSR and was often subject to intimidation. Beyond that, he criticized overly long terms of service for officers and made remarks about nepotism and dynastic tendencies among the military elite.
48. Shevardnadze, op. cit., p. 17.
49. A. Izyumov, "Conversion. Is It Possible?" *Novoye vremya*, No. 30, July 22, 1988, pp. 21-22.
50. "The Party Conference," op. cit., p. 75.

51. On the U.S. defense budget, G. Svyatov, "The Third Postwar Peak of Militarism in the USA," *SShA*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 21-28. Concluding his detailed study, Svyatov makes this revealing statement: "It is no less harmful to overstate the U.S. military potential than to play it down" (p. 28). He also criticizes past Soviet attempts to symmetrically respond to every new U.S. military program, thus allowing the USSR to get pulled into the arms race (i.e., economic exhaustion). On the limited influence of the U.S. "military-industrial complex," A. Izyumov, "The Other Side," op. cit., p. 88. Downplaying the actual effect of the increase in defense spending under Reagan is A. Vasilev, "Some Results of the Military-Political Course of the Reagan Administration," *MEMO*, May 1988, pp. 43-56. The author further reveals his agenda by mentioning the U.S. economic exhaustion scheme (p. 56).
52. E.g., S. Men'shikov, "The Economy Without Weapons: Utopia or Reality?" *Pravda*, June 27, 1988, p. 6; A. Kireyev, "Disarmament: the Quest for Ways," *Pravda*, August 20, 1988, p. 4; V. Konobeyev, "Conversion of Military Production," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, January 1988, pp.33-42; V. Romanyuk's interview with the Minister of Medium Machine-Building L. Ryabev, *Izvestia*, November 9, 1988, p. 4; A. Izyumov, "Conversion," op. cit. This latter article was the fourth of a running series of articles, beginning the one in *Novoye vremya*, No. 39, 1987, pp. 8-10. Izyumov is clearly one of the leading proponents of disarmament and conversion. Some of his strongest statements came from his April *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* article. In it, he expressed agreement with the thesis that higher military expenditures result in declining labor productivity, reduced employment, and a drag on scientific-technical progress (Izyumov, "The Other Side," op. cit., p. 86).
53. A. Kireyev, "Cost Accounting for Disarmament Economics," *Novoye vremya*, No. 4, January 24-30, 1989, pp. 14-16. Kireyev claims that conversion is needed to enrich the civilian industries with the latest technology, "which the war industry holds in secret." With Soviet security shifting from the military-technological to the political plane, Kireyev states that "it is time for the defense industries and the Army to give back to society that part of the national resources that exceed the actual reasonable need for defense sufficiency." Like other critics of the military, he also implies that, if Gorbachev's announced reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops will not undermine national security (as top military spokesmen have maintained), does this not mean that the expenditures related to their deployment were unnecessary?

On the practical tasks of conversion, Kireyev also complains that only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (predictably) has come up with a specific plan for conversion, while the Ministry of Defense, the other defense-related departments and the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) have kept quiet. The only things planned for 1989 are the conversion of "2-3 defense establishments." It is also

noteworthy that the author favorably refers to the experience of the Khrushchev demobilizations of 1956-60. He claims that it aided in opening up the resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East (this is interesting because recent Soviet pronouncements related to the Far East suggest increasing desire to tap into the economic vitality of the region by various means).

Recently TASS military specialist V. Chernyshev predicted that workers in the military industries will have to absorb wage cuts and lose bonuses and privileges in the conversion process. He also said that there will be related problems because there is "not enough information" about these industries. Managers will have to change the way they do business, he added. (*RFE/RL Report From the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 6, February 10, 1989, p. 37).

54. B. Sokolov, "About the Correlation of Human and Military Equipment Losses on the Soviet-German Front in the Course of the Great Patriotic War," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, September 1988, pp. 116-125.
55. V. Kulikov, "Always on Guard," *Agitator*, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 21-24, this from p. 22.
56. B. Astaf'yev, "Half-Truths Have Tormented Us," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 33-35.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 33. He admits that it is difficult to discuss grievous Soviet losses, but then, mocking previous practice, he sarcastically announces that "it is better, of course, to proclaim to the drumroll that, we won!"
58. V. Shlykov, "And Our Tanks Are Fast," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, September 1988, pp. 117-129.
59. Another article to address "blank spots" of World War Two in a substantive manner was a round-table discussion entitled "Do We All Know About the Great Fatherland (War)?," *Politicheskoye obrazovaniye*, No. 17, 1988, pp. 37-45. Among many issues raised were tactical and planning errors on the part of Stalin, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, and the Supreme High Command (pp. 37-38). One historian placed Soviet losses at 10 million and German losses at 2 million killed on the Soviet-German front (p. 43) and that there was no reason to hide this fact; he also decried attempts to understate the number of Soviet troops taken prisoner and provided a figure for Soviet POWs of over 5 million (p. 42), apparently taken from a West German study. Astaf'yev expressed shock at learning that 3 million Soviet troops fell prisoner in 1941 (Astaf'yev, "Half-Truths," *op. cit.*).

60. Including those regarded as having a conservative orientation, such as former President Reagan, who was recently published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* on the basis of an interview he recently gave to Boris Pyadyshev, the new editor-in-chief. Pyadyshev, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is definitely on record as a promoter of the "new thinking." In a July 16th television interview, he called Soviet foreign policy up until Gorbachev "extremely unprofitable" and stated that "the boundaries of our power were stretched beyond any measure." "Pyadyshev on Debate in Foreign Policy Magazine," *FBIS-SOV*, July 27, 1988, p. 51.
61. "To Deepen Restructuring," *Voennaya znaniya*, No. 9, 1988, p. 1.
62. Quotation from "Restructuring--the Cause of Patriots," *Voennaya znaniya*, No. 11, 1988, p. 1; also on pacifist youth, the interview with S. Yepifantsev, "Our Common Cause," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 20, October 1988, pp. 10-17, relevant passage p. 12.
63. A. Prokhanov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking," *Literaturnaya rossiya*, May 6, 1988, pp. 4-5.
64. Ibid. General-Major N. Chaldymov made a similar observation in "Army and Society," *op. cit.*, p. 19. Evidently the rock culture has reached a zenith among Soviet youth.
65. Julia Wishnevsky, "Conflict Between the Military and the Intelligentsia," *RFE/RL*, August 22, 1988, p. 2.
66. A. Pavlov, "The Correlation of War and Politics: Discussions and Problems," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 21, November 1988, pp. 23-30, especially pp. 24-25.
67. Prokhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
68. Statements of Sergeant N. Khorin at the Komsomol activists' meeting at the Frunze Military Academy, *Agitator armii i flota*, No. 23, 1988, p. 13.
69. "Restructuring--the Cause of Patriots," *op. cit.*
70. Alex Alexeyev, "Soviet Military Increasingly Seen as Stalinist Legacy That Impedes Reform," *RFE/RL Soviet/East European Report*, Vol. VI, No. 13, February 1, 1989, pp. 1-3.
71. Prokhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 5. Support for various elements of Prokhanov's arguments are not hard to come by in the military press; e.g., Captain O. Boltunov, "Irresponsible Appeals," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 1, 1989, p. 22, and an interview with General M. Sorokin, "Time for a Sober Assessment," *Sovetskoye voennoye obozreniye*, No. 12, 1988, pp. 2-4.

72. Natalya Ivanovna, "Crossing the Swamp," *Ogonek*, No. 25, June 18-25, 1988, pp. 13-15.
73. V. Dashkevitch, "Careful: Paid for in Blood," *Krasnaya zvezda*, October 21, 1988, p. 2. Also, Captain V. Novinkov in a letter to the editor, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 27-28. Adamovich's revelations about "antimilitary-patriotic education" have been attacked again recently by V. Lutovinov and V. Loskutov, "Who Will Join the Army's Ranks Tomorrow?" *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 23, 1988, p. 22-25, on Adamovich, p. 23.
74. Captain N. Belitsky, "A Conference Delegate Has the Floor: the Prestige of the Military Service," *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 24, 1988, p. 1.
75. V. Snezhko, "To Be Alert, To Strictly Preserve Military and State Secrets," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, (12) 1988, pp. 72-78.
76. "The Armed Forces in the Conditions of Glasnost'," *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 39, September 24, 1988, pp. 4-5.
77. "From a Balance of Forces," op. cit.
78. Of note in this regard are the statements of V. M. Shabanov, Deputy Minister of Defense, made at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs scientific-practical conference in late July. While supporting Soviet defense by strongly emphasizing recent U.S. weapons development, he did not mention secrecy at a forum where he might have been expected to do so, under the rubric of the need for "vigilance." V. M. Shabanov, "The Doctrine of Security and Peace," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, October 1988, pp. 22-26.
79. "I Serve the Soviet Union" program, op. cit., pp. 86-87. An important sidenote here is that Yazov has reportedly supported the new "qualitative perimeters" directive for enhancing the Soviet military by leading the glasnost'-perestroika crusade, in particular by attempting to confront internal military difficulties openly. It seems unusual in itself that a top military leader would give a personal expression of emotion at such a forum, but this too may reflect an attempt to support glasnost' and the more personalized, "human factor" emphasis that is integral to the "new thinking." Whatever the case, in the above-cited utterance and in others he has made publicly, Yazov has shown greater caution in adhering to the new line than some of his comrades.
80. Notably, on this occasion the well-known historian V. M. Falin was participating with Lobov on a "Studio 9" TV program. While ostensibly agreeing with him on the issue of the Soviet military-industrial complex, Falin noted that there had been people in the Soviet leadership who were predisposed to involving the USSR in an

arms race lasting many years. These were people, Falin claimed, who ignored all but military means of achieving security. A. Ostal'skii, "Is There a Military-Industrial Complex in the USSR?" *Izvestia*, October 16, 1988, p. 7.

81. Interview with A. I. Sorokin, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 3-11, quotation and key passages from p. 5.
82. "Studio 9" television program, October 15, 1988, reported in *FBIS-SOV*, October 18, 1988, pp. 82-89, this from p. 83.
83. Y. Y. Kirshin, "Politics and Strategy in the Nuclear Age," *MEMO*, No. 11, 1988, pp. 35-45.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.
88. A. Savinkin, "What Kind of Army We Need," *Moskovskiye novosti*, November 6, 1988, p. 6. Interestingly, the author, a lieutenant-colonel in the Soviet Army, admits that no immediate military threat to the USSR presently exists, and, given the internal problems and strained relations between the Army and Soviet society, it would be desirable to make the revision to a cadre-militia system. Two other officers were calling for a smaller professional force in an October 15th television broadcast of the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program (which has itself been subjected to ridicule for presenting an idealized, overly cheerful view of Soviet military life), reported in *FBIS-SOV*, October 25, 1988, p. 91-92. Several people have suggested cutting mandatory military terms in half, most recently A. Korotkov, in a letter to the editor, "Service Reflected in Figures," *Izvestia*, October 6, 1988, p. 6. The writer linked the request to controlling spending, among other things.
89. M. Moiseyev, "From the Position of the Defensive Doctrine," *Krasnaya zvezda*, pp. 1-2.
90. Wishnevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
91. There were many examples of this in late 1988 and early 1989 in *Agitator armii i flota* and *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*.
92. Interview with Shevardnadze by *Le Nouvel Observateur*, reported in *FBIS-SOV*, October 21, 1988, pp. 1-4.

93. *RFE/RL Report From the Soviet Union*, Vol. 1, No. 4, January 31, 1989, p. 31.
94. E.g., Captain V. Verbitskiy, "Autumn Games With the Spring Draft," *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 9, 1988, p. 4. Also V. Lutovinov and V. Loskutov, op. cit., p. 24.
95. Major V. Kazakov's interview with A. Demidov, "Why Are the Military Departments 'In a Fever'?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 15, 1988, p. 2. Many military figures have defended the status quo with regard to both the draft and the structure of the armed forces.
96. Ibid.
97. Kathleen Mihalisko, "Report From Kiev University on the Future of Student Military Obligations," *RFE/RL Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 4, January 27, 1989, pp. 3-5.
98. A. Arbatov, "Dilemmas of the Defensive Doctrine," *Novoye vremya*, No. 6, February 3, 1989, pp. 19-21.
99. Ibid. The first two were ridiculed for contemplating a "final rout" of the enemy in a counteroffensive. The latter two were more strongly vilified for their past positions. Most notably, Arbatov charged that "the limitation of the participants in defining military policy to a handful of 'professionals' and 'those with sufficiently specialized knowledge' have led our policy to a state of hypertrophied military methods for giving us security, as well as to excessive losses of resources and grave miscalculations." Arbatov also typically hit their secrecy and interpretations of wartime experience; he also noted gross military errors and losses "manifold greater" than the Germans'.