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Parameters is a journal of ideas, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.
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For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb

WILLIAM E. DEPUY

Officers of the armed forces have been tendered a new and exciting career opportunity—that of becoming qualified and recognized as a Joint Specialty Officer. Those who choose to follow this route will be on the leading edge of a new wave. The opportunity has been fashioned by Congress. It is the product of long-festering congressional unhappiness about the state of joint affairs within the Department of Defense. Still beset by concerns over the outcome in Vietnam, Congress was irritated further by the Mayaguez incident of 1975 and especially by the failure at Desert One during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. The momentum for reform within Congress was given a mighty twin boost by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October 1983—241 Marines were killed and scores more wounded—followed only two days later by Urgent Fury, the Grenadan campaign marked by serious problems of joint execution.

In October 1985, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report which became the inspiration for subsequent hearings resulting ultimately in the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. That act represents an astonishing and historic intervention by Congress in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense.

Officers who contemplate following the new joint specialist path as a major career option should read the Senate staff report from cover to cover in order to understand the perspectives, motives, and objectives of Congress. The most zealous of such officers may also wish to study the transcripts of the hearings. The stilted language of the law itself does not convey the spirit and drive of its intent.
The basic theme of the new legislation is to strengthen the joint establishment vis-à-vis the service departments. The most important aspects are these:

- The responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are greatly increased. He is now the chief joint military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the entire national security apparatus. He has clear control over the Joint Staff.
- A four-star Vice Chairman has been provided to assist the Chairman.
- Minutely detailed instructions are contained in the law regulating the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of Joint Specialty Officers.
- The commanders of the unified commands (the CINCs) have been given increased authority over the service components of those commands and direct access to the programming and budgeting processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- The service departments have been reorganized to increase civilian control.

With respect to the distribution of power within the national security apparatus, there is the unmistakable presumption of a zero-sum game in the package as a whole. That is, Congress seemed to believe that strengthening the joint establishment required the weakening of the services. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary as we shall see. What is required is the strengthening of both.

Thus Joint Specialty Officers, and those who plan to become such, stand under the influence of this historic legislation, learning the ropes in respect to the organization, functions, and procedures of the reinforced and elevated joint establishment. In proceeding, it is wise to remember that it is the product, not the process, which counts and for which JSOs will be judged in the long run. The realization of the goals established in the new law and its implementing directives now passes to the hands and talents of a new generation. And full realization will take just that—generational change.

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Let us now turn to five selected opportunities for improvement and innovation in the joint arena, five steep hills to climb:

- Raising the quality of joint military advice.
- Improving the track record in operational art.
- Determining joint force requirements.
- Providing joint command and control over joint collateral support operations.
- Creating the conditions required for the synchronization of cross-service support at the tactical level.

**Hill One: Quality Advice**

The government turns to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military advice on a very wide range of national security issues and policies. There is no higher military authority and thus nowhere else to turn for such assistance. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsive and useful and when the views of the incumbent administration and those of the Joint Chiefs are generally compatible, the relationship is healthy and productive. When either of these conditions is absent, there is a pattern of mistrust, rancor, and bad decisions. Therefore there is much at stake in these relationships, which are complex at best.

The environment in which military advice is rendered to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the national security apparatus is interesting in an open democracy. Under the new law, it is the Chairman, JCS, who is personally responsible for advice to the government and is also responsible for strategic planning. This suggests the existence of a grand Clausewitzian design to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff can refer for answers to all the lesser included questions. It is not quite like that.

In the first place, historically in this pragmatic nation there has been no true codified national strategy within which the military strategy could fit as one of several components alongside an economic strategy, a political strategy, and perhaps social and technological strategies. Congress has been goading the executive branch to produce such a national strategy, and efforts have been made.

But the reality remains that the real US strategy consists of the whole loosely bound portfolio of current security policies dealing with individual problems and issues, both foreign and domestic, facing an administration. If a grand design were to be drafted which projected changes in current policies, it would have to be so closely held as to be ineffective as an instrument of government. Current policies are delicately balanced between opposing sets of pressures. Any prospects for future change announced publicly would produce a firestorm of contention within our political system and amongst our allies. And of course real national strategy requires public and congressional support, so it cannot be closely held. Do not hold your breath for a grand design.
Military strategy is confined by the policies it serves. The real military strategy, therefore, is the compendium of plans, deployments, operations, and programs supporting the long list of national security policies, which range from the defense of NATO to the transfer of defense technology and the size of an advisory group in country X. There is of course a necessity to protect actual military operational plans and to protect from the eyes of our adversaries our priorities for the distribution of military resources across all the plans. This is the closest we come to a military strategy.

The business of military advice is booming. Always active whenever a new administration arrives, we now have the added dimension of the extreme turbulence generated by Gorbachev’s initiatives, instability in China, and a roiling Middle Eastern scene. And this is not to mention the budget crunch in the United States and economic trauma in much of the Third World. It is unlikely that there are any policies not under some kind of review, and the former planning assumptions associated with a bipolar world are now all up in the air. Even before the congressional measures to strengthen the joint establishment have taken their full effect, the new system has been plunged into this maelstrom of activity. That condition may be expected to persist for a long time. And when policies change—military strategies must follow.

The perspectives of the Congress on JCS performance were downbeat in 1985 and 1986. In the Senate staff report two comments from former luminaries on the defense scene were quoted as follows:

Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger: “Advice proffered by the JCS was generally irrelevant, unread, and largely disregarded.”

Former Chairman, JCS, General David Jones: “JCS advice was not crisp, timely, useful, or very influential.”

What this means to the new joint specialist is that the Schlesinger-Jones assessments of the quality of military advice must be fully turned around—stood on their head so to speak. In short, military advice must be crisp, timely, useful, persuasive, intellectually rigorous, and logically compelling. That is a tall order. The joint establishment works in a highly competitive environment not all friendly. The other departments of government and other philosophies compete for influence and the same shrinking resources. It is not enough to be convinced of the virtues and rightness of one’s positions. It is also necessary to win in the fierce competition within the government. We might add that there is no law which requires a president or his administration to accept military advice. History tells us that often they do not.

This is the environment into which joint specialists are moving. To the extent that they are professionally sound, completely candid and clear, and devoted to the best interests of their country in the broadest sense, they will have done their duty as the law and the people require.

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Hill Two: Operational Art

If military strategy is the compendium of existing plans, then the quality of the strategy is the sum of the quality of those plans. At the joint level these are operational plans connected at the top with policy and at the bottom with the tactical employment of forces.

Recently there has been great emphasis on operational art throughout the structure of professional military education. Much of that study has been devoted to past masters, theorists, and campaigns. That is good, but since the advent of nuclear weapons and the appearance of limited wars, the criteria for victory have tended to change. It is wise, therefore, to study our own experiences in the second half of this century from the operational perspective. The track record is spotty but illuminating. It seems to tell us that success is defined as the attainment of political objectives in a reasonable time, at bearable cost, and with public support until the end. These criteria have become the bottom line in our time. Any other outcome equates to failure. Failure is cruel. It ignores the elegance of tactical performance, the good intentions, and the devotion and sacrifice of individual members of the armed forces and their families throughout the country. Failure is corrosive. Success, then, is the business of today’s joint specialist.

Let us review some of our recent military experiences from this perspective and while so doing pay special attention to the baleful consequences when policy and operations diverge or are otherwise disconnected.

Korea. When President Truman sent our enfeebled armed forces into Korea in 1950, at least the mission seemed clear—stop the North Koreans and protect the fledgling government in the South. But the outcome could have gone either way—as Wellington said after Waterloo, “It was a close run thing.”

General MacArthur’s brilliant operational stroke at Inchon cut the North Korean line of communications and collapsed the invasion by the already exhausted and overextended North Korean army encircling Pusan. Then General MacArthur sent his forces north in pursuit of a broken enemy. The debate continues as to whether he and his Washington superiors were in any kind of agreement on policy goals and objectives in respect to the North Korean government, people, and territory. It seems probable that MacArthur had run out ahead of Washington thinking—a disconnect which can probably be laid at the feet of the government, not the commander in the field, who naturally wished to finish the matter off once and for all.

In any event the Chinese came in, revealing the utter inadequacy of the policy and the forces available at the time. When MacArthur’s army was back in the South, very precise policy instructions were issued to confine operations to the border area with a mission of preserving the political and territorial integrity of the South. The United Nations forces recovered and faithfully executed the new policy, driving the Chinese and North Koreans back to, and slightly beyond, the original demarcation.
Since the advent of nuclear weapons and the appearance of limited wars, the criteria for victory have tended to change.

But with the reins held so tightly, there was no leverage to end the war, which went on inconclusively at high cost, eventually losing the support of the people. There was no workable concept for ending the war militarily. Attrition warfare against China was unappealing. President Eisenhower broke the stalemate with a nuclear threat rendered via India, and we achieved an armistice which extends to this day. The nuclear option is probably no longer available, and we should be mindful that wars are easier to start than to stop.

Vietnam. An entirely different kind of war at the beginning, the Vietnam War came to resemble the Korean War at the end. Starting as a counterinsurgency in the South plus retaliatory air strikes in the North after the Tonkin Gulf affair in 1964, the war ended with massive bombing in the North and a full-fledged invasion of the South by a North Vietnamese army which threw five army corps, comprising 17 divisions, at Saigon in 1975.

US policy lagged behind the transitional realities throughout the war. Even after the North Vietnamese army began to arrive in the South in 1965, the policy remained one of counterinsurgency and attrition, while the bombing of the North—prior to the heavy bombing of 1972, which was simply too late—was used to send admonitory messages to Hanoi rather than to destroy its warmaking capabilities.

The command in Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff both failed to persuade the Administration that the North Vietnamese line of communication (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) needed to be cut and that the port of Haiphong needed to be mined. The Administration considered these measures inconsistent with the nature of the war, which it persisted in viewing as an insurgency. Washington was also afraid of a Korean-like Chinese intervention—indeed, Chinese air defense and supply troops were already in North Vietnam.

So the war went on inconclusively and expensively, and the American people gradually withdrew their support. The American government was forced to withdraw its forces from Vietnam in an agonizing failure of both policy and operations.

Beirut. The mission of the Marines in Beirut in 1983 at the time of the bombing of their barracks was “peacekeeping.” It was never quite clear what that meant. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense opposed the deployment. There was never an operational plan. The Marines at the airport were just waiting. This tragic episode counsels us to beware of vague missions for which no discernible military operational plan seems relevant. Some say the Marines were a “presence.” The Shiite factions were not impressed. Vague, exploratory deployments like “showing the flag” or “presence” are doubly dangerous because they permit incremental, flabby thinking in Washington. That is, little time or analysis is spent on the possible consequences of a contemplated action or the next steps to be taken should the first move prove to be ineffective or even disastrous.

Grenada. This was a success by all of our criteria—it was fast and relatively inexpensive, and the public had no time in which to become disaffected. On the other hand, execution was ragged. We seem to have a problem in organizing, training, and equipping joint headquarters before they are needed. They are therefore not always fully prepared for the complexities of modern joint operations. It is a problem worthy of the joint specialist’s most urgent attention.

Persian Gulf. The tanker escort mission was well done—no disconnects between policy and operations (with the exception of the Iranian airbus shoot-down, which was a tragic mistake)—and the means were adequate to the ends. However, let us suppose, hypothetically, that we had gone into Iran in pursuit of Silkworm missiles or earlier in accordance with the Carter doctrine. Would we have set ourselves up for the same dilemma that plagued us in Korea and Vietnam? If we had prosecuted a vigorous war against Iran, would it have brought in the Soviet Union directly or indirectly? And if we had held operations below the threshold of Soviet provocation, how would we ever have ended the war? The study of neither Clausewitz nor Napoleon reveals easy answers to this dimension of operational art in an era of limited wars and nuclear deterrence. It seems to be the classic operational trap of the last half of the 20th century. True, things went well with the Air Force and Navy’s punitive airstrikes against Tripoli in 1986, when the means seemed to fit the ends. But the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Noriega in Panama present us with different but no less vexing dilemmas as we approach the 1990s.
Three: Joint Force Requirements

Disturbed by the service-centered promotion of the 600-ship Navy, the Army’s light divisions, and the Air Force plan to substitute F-16s for the aging A-10s as the preferred close air support platform, Congress wants force requirements to be derived in the future from the war plans of the combatant commanders—the CINCs.

However, it is not that simple. There are four essential participants in this centrally important function. The resource availabilities are set forth by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic plans and direction; the CINCs draw up the war plans; and the services develop the forces.

None of these functions is transferable. No one but the Navy can organize, train, and equip carrier battle groups; the Army—corps and divisions; the Air Force—wings and squadrons; and the Marines—amphibious forces. The force development process is therefore circular, iterative, interactive, and complex. It represents a vast sharing of responsibility across several huge bureaucratic institutions. It does no good to simplify it on paper. It won’t simplify.

The pendulum of influence should swing toward the joint establishment, but not too far. Congress doesn’t seem fully aware of the seminal contribution of the services in combining technology and tactics within fighting organizations and in training individuals and units up to high performance in the employment of those forces.

To some extent the shift from service dominance to joint participation is a cultural process. It may also be generational. That points to the emergence of the joint specialist.

Hill Four: Joint Control of Collateral Operations

In 1944 the Allies conducted a collateral deception operation which kept the German 15th Army pinned in the area of Calais waiting for the “real” invasion. Even after seven weeks of combat in Normandy, the Germans kept one eye on the Pas de Calais. Had it been otherwise the invasion might not have prospered. The deception operation was run directly out of the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander. In 1985 the Israelis wished to invade Lebanon to force out the PLO. After performing a protracted joint intelligence operation, which mapped the Syrian air defenses down to precise locations and communications links, nodes, and frequencies, the Israelis conducted a preliminary set of collateral operations. Drones activated the defenses; aircraft, artillery, and electronic warfare measures attacked the system simultaneously; fighters shot down the reacting Syrian air force; and commandos knocked out the central control headquarters. Then, and only then, did the
Israeli army begin to roll. This preliminary set of collateral operations was controlled by the chief of staff of the Israeli air force.

It seems certain that US joint commanders will wish to conduct similar collateral operations at their level in support of their joint concepts of operations. Over time, they might include any or all of the following candidates: joint intelligence; joint deception; joint command, control, and communications countermeasures; joint suppression of enemy air defenses; joint special operations; joint counterfire; joint regional air defense; joint special logistics; joint deep attack (FOFA); and others.

Each requires a commander, a concept of operations, a task organization, specified command relationships, and a qualified and seasoned joint staff. At the present time only special operations have such staffs and headquarters. For the others there are none, and in most cases such command arrangements have not even been conceptualized. This is exactly the kind of problem the joint specialist will wish to take on.

Hill Five: Synchronizing Cross-Service Support to the Tactical Level

The several armed services are specialized around the mediums in which they operate—land, sea, air, space, etc. But some of their specialties are also required by the other services. The organizational dilemma has always been whether to duplicate functions or share them. Sharing is the heart of jointness.

The Army has always been the leading proponent of jointness—not because it is more earnest or altruistic, but because it is massively dependent upon the other services. The Army can neither deploy nor fight exclusively with its own resources. In fact, there is cross-service involvement in every single Army combat and support function.

The Army deploys by air or sea. Army intelligence operations depend upon cross-service surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, target acquisition, and help in intelligence fusion. Fire support always includes close air support and battlefield air interdiction—and sometimes naval gunfire support. Tactical maneuver may involve airborne or amphibious operations which depend upon Air Force or Navy support. Army and Air Force electronic warfare efforts are joint. Joint air defense is commanded by an Air Force officer. The Army depends constantly on air and sea lines of communication, including air delivery to forward units of critical munitions and repair parts. The Army in the field is a joint force.

The Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS) is simply an extreme example. JSTARS, which is operated by the Air Force, is to the Army what the AWACS is to the Air Force itself. By locating and tracking the movement of enemy ground forces, JSTARS provides the real-time information required by corps, division, and brigade
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commanders to maneuver their forces and target the enemy. It is therefore at the heart of Army tactical operations. It is not just nice to have—it is indispensable.

On the basis of JSTARS information, the Army corps, division, and brigade commanders rapidly develop their concepts of operations, which key all the battlefield functions to the support of maneuver. This is the way a commander concentrates combat power against the enemy in decisive bursts of intensity to win battles. Obviously, this process of synchronization must embrace the now integrated and essential cross-service support. Seizing the initiative in battle requires not only precision, but also very rapid synchronization. For this purpose command relationships must be tight, effective, and thoroughly understood. There is a certain looseness in the system today which can and should be tightened up. The term support is the key. It is not sensible to even think about attaching elements of the fleet to an Army corps for naval gunfire support nor extending the command authority of an Army division commander over the air bases from which his close air support is launched. But at the same time it is no longer tolerable to even think about withdrawing the Air Force JSTARS from support of an Army corps in action.

The modalities of support developed over the last century which regulate the command relationship between artillery and maneuver within the Army may have broader application to these increasingly intimate and time-sensitive cross-service relationships. For example JSTARS sorties could be placed in direct support of a corps—meaning they would not be withdrawn except in the most extreme and unusual emergencies. The divisions and brigades would receive a continuous stream of information on the location and movement of enemy forces. And yet JSTARS would remain unequivocally under Air Force command and control.

Close air support and battlefield air interdiction could be placed in general support, reinforcing the fire support of a particular corps but not necessarily in support of each division at all times. It would continue to operate within the Air Force tactical air command and control system. Deep
air interdiction could be placed in general support of the Army group or joint task force.

These modest adjustments to command relationships across service lines in the tactical arena might be beneficial and clarifying. They give a richer meaning to the term support. Just leaving everything up to the day-by-day or even minute-by-minute determination of a remote joint commander—the current practice—is not conducive to fast, effective synchronization of joint combat power and is not consistent with the degree of cross-service dependency which has arisen over the years.

Concluding Thought

How far the impetus of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation will carry the joint specialist up these five hills and many others only time will tell. We may find there are natural limits to the scope and utility of tactical jointness. But we most certainly have not even closely approached them thus far. Over the years ahead, the Joint Specialty Officer will need to introduce many changes in the joint establishment and in how it operates. He will bring a fresh generational viewpoint to the task, and that is exactly what is now needed.

NOTES

1. On 14 May 1975, 250 US Marines were landed on Koh Tang Island off the coast of Cambodia to rescue the 39 crew members of the SS Mayaguez, which had been seized along with its crew by a Cambodian gunboat. It turned out that the crew was not on the island chosen for assault, and the Marines, who encountered heavy Cambodian resistance, themselves had to be evacuated under fire. The operation resulted in 38 US dead, 50 wounded, and three missing. Although the Mayaguez itself was recaptured, the Cambodian government had already announced the release of the ship and crew when the attack began. See John E. Jessup, A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945-1985 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 534.


5. Pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the Secretary of Defense was to determine the number of joint duty positions within the defense establishment. The presently determined figure is 8,300 (Rick Maze, “Services Blasted Again for Handling of Joint-Duty Posts,” Army Times, 29 May 1989, p. 4). The Secretary is required to designate 1000 of these slots as “critical,” meaning they must be filled with a JSO. The law further states that approximately half of the joint duty positions must at any one time be filled with an officer who is or has been nominated as a JSO. With this half including the 1000 “critical” JSO-required slots. To educate JSOs, the Skelton Panel has recommended a two-phase process. Phase I would be taught at the intermediate or senior service colleges; Phase II would be presented in a TDY status at the Armed Forces Staff College, following graduation from the intermediate or senior service colleges, to JSO-nominees en route to a joint-duty assignment (see US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 101st Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print 4 [Washington: GPO, 1989], pp. 3-4 and chap. III).


Sustaining the Military Arts

G. MURPHY DONOVAN

In another era, a crusty Texas ranger justified his six-gun with quiet eloquence: “Better to have it when you don't need it than to need it and not have it.” In his own way, Captain Woodrow Call understood the prudent link between deterrence and capability. If he had to expand his views today, ranger Call would probably add: “. . . and you better know how to shoot too.”

In a larger context, the logic of deterrence, military capability, and military art is enlightened by the same common sense that energized Call’s epigram. Military capability isn’t just a function of weapons and forces, it must also be underwritten by military art—the ability to apply theories and principles of usage.

There are a host of programs under way today attempting to do just that, insure that military officers know how to use military forces effectively. Many of these efforts have been captured under the rubric of warfighting or warrior preparation. However, when the rhetoric is stripped away, too many of these programs are hollow. Fundamental obstacles to improved performance remain intact. This essay explores the origin of recent interest in warfighting, examines the obstacles, and suggests some new thinking on sustainability in the world of military ideas.

Whence “Warfighting”

The warfighting program began as a well-intentioned effort to get back to basics. In short, to reestablish some balance between military forces and prudent notions of how they might be used—successfully. How military art became uncoupled from the force structure is a complex question, yet it is fairly clear that the gap had become a chasm in the post-Vietnam era. Pundits, and many flag officers, are fond of dating the rift (and anything else wrong with the country) back to the early 1960s and the McNamara era. This is probably unfair.
Robert McNamara and his cohorts from the Rand Corporation may have revolutionized the acquisition process through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System at the Pentagon, but there is little evidence to suggest that new acquisition processes altered the need for sound military arts (strategy, operational skills, and tactics), the traditional province of generals. Surely it is ironic that PPBS has survived the test of time and military arts have not, but it is more than disingenuous to blame this neglect on civilians.

Indeed, US military performance in the field since the Korean War has been something less than spectacular. Some observers, like Harry Summers, have been modestly successful apologists for military professionals, claiming among other things that US forces never lost a battle in Vietnam. Such claims tend to be a little irrelevant in light of the debacle in Saigon in 1975. It is pretty clear at this point that even military historians will not be scoring Khe Sanh or Tet as victories. It was also fashionable for a time to lay the blame for military failures on politicians, the press, or an ill-informed public, yet more sober analysis now sees that generals too can share the burden of Vietnam. Moreover, military performance in the field since the fall of Saigon has done little to dispel the belief that the traditional military arts, theoretical or applied, were in trouble.

The true roots of the problem probably have more to do with the politics of peacetime armies than anything else. While US military forces have seen combat frequently since World War II, it is also worthy to note that there has been no declared war since that time, nor have US forces engaged a first-world enemy, nor has combat touched the US mainland. This is not to suggest that a declared war would have made us any better at it. Yet these conditions, especially the absence of a world war, have contributed to the illusion that somehow the mere possession of military forces might make their use unnecessary or unlikely. Indeed, this is the very assumption that underwrites the theory of deterrence. Deterrence has been successful, but it has been so only at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, the catastrophic margin.

In theory, it is clear that the military capability required to support deterrence is not necessarily the same capability that might be required when deterrence fails. In practice, the lines between the two may never be clearly

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drawn. A deployed force that is too capable might undermine the very strategy
it is designed to serve because it reduces the credibility of a threat to escalate
to nuclear war. Such ambiguities may be political assets and military hand-
ichaps—especially when capability is defined solely as force structure at the
expense of military art or competence.

Still, under the umbrella of deterrence and in the absence of catas-
trophe, the major world powers might fairly view the last four decades as an
era of peace or successful deterrence. How Third World historians might
categorize the same period is another matter. Nonetheless, peace is surely a
homelands perspective and the homelands of the superpowers have been safe
for a generation.

In an era when the policy agenda has been dominated by deterrence,
it is not difficult to understand why military leaders have worried more about
acquiring forces than using them. Further, as Barbara Tuchman reminded us,
peacetime soldiers are fond of preparing for the last war. US and Soviet
generals are especially keen on looking back at World War II—an unqualified
success. Thus modern military forces contain more than a hint of déjà vu. Cold
indeed is the citizen's heart that does not swell at the sight of a flock of
bombers, a column of tanks, a covey of carrier battle groups, or the majesty
of a battlewagon under way. Nonetheless, the difficult problems of military
competence concern strategy and operational art, not just procurement and
logistics where necessities are often confused with sufficiencies.

Military theory has never enjoyed a prominent place in the US
national security debate. Somehow, an ethereal strategic idea is no match for
the existential impact of an F-15 tearing the sound barrier. Just as surely, few
careers or fortunes have been made crafting or promoting strategy, while
many have been made pushing or selling weapons. There has been little
professional or pecuniary incentive to spend much time on military theory or
strategic applications. Until recently, the arms race had seldom been cast as
a competition of military art or strategy.

Yet the 1970s did see a modest revival of interest in the military arts
among some senior US Army officers. This revival was highlighted by a new
interest in operational art and the introduction of strategy options such as
AirLand Battle and Follow-On Forces Attack. More recently, Navy Secretary
John Lehman and Admiral James Watkins have weighed in with maritime
strategy options for the US Navy. Even the Secretary of Defense contributed to
the revival, as his posture statements came to talk less of deterrence and more
about competitive and war-winning strategies in the event deterrence failed.
Withal, the initiatives tended to come from individual military services, and
even there none of the strategic dialogue could hold a candle to the continuing
emphasis on weapons and procurement issues.

Nonetheless, at some point all of these separate and laudable initiatives
were joined, not by interservice consensus, but by a word—warfighting—and

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another pleonasm was born. It was here that a good idea went south and the nonsense began. The babble began with the concept itself, and it seems now that the rhetoric of warfighting is more important than any serious attempt to address the problems of military competence and performance.

**Conceptual Nonsense**

The term *warfighting* is at once redundant and ambiguous. It is redundant because we can safely assume that a war is expected to contain a fight or two. It is ambiguous because it misplaces the emphasis. War is not a collection of fights: it is a controlled series of joint military campaigns for political purposes. A fight suggests a brawl, often spontaneous, where the outcome is anybody's guess—as in prizefight or street fight. Indeed, many military dictionaries define *war* but none defines *fight*. The Soviet military lexicon refers to many *military actions*. There are no references to *fight*.

The term *warfighting* also suggests a simplistic understanding of how an adversary might see the problem. For the Soviets, war is not synonymous with nor does it necessarily call for armed conflict. They see it as a broader dialectical struggle where political, social, technological, and economic forces are equally important. Indeed, recent Soviet theoretical writings suggest that, even within military doctrine, the sociopolitical agenda may be assuming more relative importance than military-technical factors (i.e. troops and weapons).

The recent arms control offensive is a case in point. The Soviet diplomatic blitz has all the earmarks of a surprise attack which seems to have put the West on the defensive, President Bush's counterproposals notwithstanding. Moscow's unique view of war does not diminish the stakes, but it does reflect a prudent flexibility on venues for the competition. Military professionals have a vested interest in the inputs to, and the results of, arms control negotiations.

**Beyond Rhetoric**

Other than semantics, there was an even more fundamental problem. The coinage *warfighting* was a symptom, not a solution. Traditional and prudent military concerns didn't need to be obscured with mindless jargon. The real problem was military performance and the lack of attention paid to military arts (strategy, operational skills, and tactics). None of this was clarified by a gerund—a bad verb and a worse noun. Thus at the outset, a clear definition of the problem was lost when good intentions failed to move us beyond rhetoric. Strategic pidgin isn’t the antidote for strategic illiteracy.

The military arts of strategy, operations, and tactics are merely the creative bridges that allow officers to orchestrate the military sciences (intelligence, logistics, engineering, etc.) to successful ends. Yet, how we think
Strategic pidgin isn’t the antidote for strategic illiteracy.

about military arts and sciences is not merely a question of rhetorical clarity. Indeed, real solutions to questions of military competence will require a more substantial commitment to what might be called “intellectual sustainability,” a unifying framework that links training, education, intelligence, and exercises. The ultimate goal of such a framework would be some higher level of strategic competence.

Training and Education

We often think about military training and military education as different enterprises, and they are—at least to the extent that we do the former well and the latter not well at all. Problems of military education have been studied exhaustively in recent years—the just-completed Skelton panel deliberations are but a single example—and those efforts will not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that out of all this study, it would be helpful if some clear consensus emerged that training should focus on technical proficiency (military sciences) while education should focus on operational competence (military arts). The military sciences are lower-level skills of necessity, while military arts are higher-level skills of sufficiency. Training gives us the building blocks; education should provide the integrative skills that allow us to orchestrate the basics in creative ways, to effective ends.

Military literature reveals the symptoms of neglect at the professional schoolhouse. The contrast between American and Soviet military biographies is startling. A Soviet officer’s biography will show a lengthy list of published contributions to military theory. No such list enriches official American biographies. Soviet officers are expected to contribute to the world of ideas in their chosen profession. The American profession of arms is not enriched by similar expectations. While a senior Soviet officer might be motivated to publish or perish, an American might rewrite the maxim to read, “Publish and perish.” Too many American soldiers await retirement to find their professional courage.

Beyond the professional schoolhouse, the relationship of intelligence and exercises to warrior preparation is even more confused. On the one hand, intelligence does not overly concern itself with support to military training and education, while on the other, senior officers are reluctant to see exercises as an extension of the military schoolroom—an ongoing practicum for “warfighting” and strategic theory.
The onus for the neglect of military arts must fall, in part, at the feet of the military intelligence community. Since World War II, the growth of a large permanent military establishment has been supplemented by the growth of an equally impressive intelligence culture. Yet here, the focus has been skewed toward weapons, forces, and technology—not military arts. Indeed, if technology is a measure of merit, the modern intelligence apparatus is the most sophisticated collection, if not analytical, machine in the history of nations. The center of interest has been the Soviet Union, or more precisely the growth of Soviet military forces. Here we became mesmerized by the outputs of the Soviet colossus at the expense of understanding processes. Just as US military leaders worried more about acquiring military forces than creating doctrinal theories about how they might be used, so too intelligence analysts have worried more about what the Soviets had than how they might use it. We put our cart before their horse. In truth, many intelligence products are mere reading lists—lists of Soviet weapons and forces, not analyses of doctrine and strategy. The effect of this is that the weight of intelligence effort has gone to threat support for procurement or warning, not the education of or support to combat commanders. Small wonder that the competition with Moscow has often been cast as an arms race, seldom a competition of strategies.

Neglect by military intelligence is particularly bizarre. You might expect an institution whose product is ideas to be enthralled with enemy military thought. On the question of understanding Soviet strategy, operational arts, and tactics, the intelligence community has only recently begun to appreciate the value of theory in the Soviet system. Yet, this appreciation is clearly not having an impact on military schoolhouses, if curricula and reading assignments are any clues. There are small pockets of interest within the intelligence community where Soviet military texts are translated, but these efforts are meager and live in constant fear of the budget knife. The most obvious symptom of this neglect is the essential unavailability of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, a multi-volume tract that has been revised thrice since the Russian revolution. This document has yet to be translated in its entirety in the West. The contents of the bible of Soviet military thought is thus largely unknown to two generations of American officers.

Part of the explanation is that support to military schools has not been a high priority for the intelligence community. This phenomenon is another puzzle because logic dictates that military intelligence and military academic centers have a convergence of interests. Yet, the formal institutional linkages are sparse to nonexistent. Every major command has a large intelligence staff; professional military schools have no similar departments. And security is not the explanation for this neglect.
The picture is not much brighter at the operational level. Unit commanders are finally going public with criticism of intelligence support. The thrust of their complaints is that combat intelligence officers are not well versed in US or Soviet operational concepts. These complaints are right on target. Intelligence officers themselves are trained to know the what of the Soviet force structure, yet are seldom educated to understand the how of operational employment. Further, the “best” intelligence officers tend to gravitate to headquarters where promotion opportunities are better, military art is irrelevant, and ignorance is not necessarily a handicap.

Exercises

Of all the obstacles that inhibit real progress in the military arts, the attitude toward exercises and war games is the most perplexing—and the most sensitive. Exercises represent a benign application of military theory. They also serve a variety of purposes. Foremost among these are training, weapon testing, plans familiarization, and the exposition of doctrine. Exercises also provide an opportunity to develop fundamental insights about how adversaries perceive specific threats (our military plans and practices) and how they intend to defeat such threats (the enemy’s plans and practices). Short of war, military exercises and war games are the best available extended classroom for the development of military arts—strategy, operational skill, and tactics. Exercises are the one forum, other than combat, where the three elements of military art are joined on the same stage.

However, professional attitudes toward exercises and war games are ambiguous at best. On one hand, at the tactical level, we have excellent centers training some of the best units in the world. Exercises, practice, and drill are important for tank crews, ship captains, and aircraft commanders. If officers at this level fail to perform, the penalties are severe. A ship captain who endangers his crew or vessel or an aircraft commander who is found guilty of pilot error is likely to have an abbreviated career. Yet, at the operational/strategic level the exercise game is played by a different set of rules. Senior officers do not take exercises seriously as a venue to hone their strategic skills. There are few penalties for this neglect—except when it’s too late, when we win battles and lose wars.

It is common, especially at higher headquarters, to delegate exercise and wargaming duties and responsibilities. Junior generals sit for their seniors and colonels play for junior generals. Few brass hats feel obligated to test or hone the most important links in the strategic chain—operational/strategic decisionmaking. It is the rare general who plays his wartime role from start to finish in a major exercise or game. Flag officers seldom let the practice of their trade interfere with their managerial, protocol, bureaucratic, or budgetary preoccupations.

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At the Pentagon, an ironclad rule holds that you never send juniors or the second string to Congress to testify (especially on budget matters). No such maxim applies to exercises and war games. The Red commander is actually played by an intelligence officer at many war games, a staffer unlikely to be allocating forces in wartime. Casting the intelligence officer in the black hat role may be a delicious irony; he’s probably easier to whip in any case. Yet the real message here is failure, the failure of commanders to provide leadership and the failure of intelligence to educate real commanders well enough to play role reversals. Role reversal is a standard event in tactical drills, a rare occasion in strategic games. Unfortunately, in combat a thousand smart captains will not compensate for one dumb general.

Several recent studies have attempted to evaluate the quality of generals by comparing them to their industrial colleagues, using such criteria as IQ tests, educational levels, and psychological stability tests. With these criteria, senior officers fare quite well. Unfortunately, criteria such as military expertise, contributions to strategic theory, and exercise/gaming/combat competence didn’t play any role in the evaluations. What most of these studies tend to “prove” is that many senior officers have learned to excel in ways that have nothing to do with war.

Some “New Thinking”

Any military system which demands excellence at the tactical level and excuses it at the strategic level is a fraud. Having reviewed several of the standing obstacles to military competence, we can conclude that some of the more acute problems are roosting under brass hats. If this is where the responsibility ends, it is also where the solutions must begin. The first task is to forget the warfighting rhetoric and recognize the obstacles for what they are—the dead hands of inertia. Recognizing a problem is always half the battle; solutions are then a question of courage, stamina, and leadership, which brings us to the subject of the leader.

The leader, that most slippery of terms, is probably the most used and least understood noun in the strategic lexicon. In its worst sense, it is an office or position. In its best sense, it is an accolade. Managers and commanders are arbitrarily imposed, leaders are voluntarily acknowledged. The troops have nothing to say about who manages or commands, they have everything to say about whom they follow. Such is the reality of leadership in a democracy.

Those leaders entrusted with the power to use lethal force in the pursuit of national security must be held to high standards of competence. Armies, like ball teams, tend to perform the way they practice. American generals need to get serious about creating that unifying framework of training, education, intelligence, and exercises. They must set an example for those
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they would lead. The people at the top “should be the first to make sacrifice, not the last.” If flag officers must delegate some of their bureaucratic duties, so be it. As for congressional testimony, let some lieutenant colonel do it! If recent events are any guide, half-colonels are a hard act to follow in congressional hearing rooms anyway.

There should be no debate about obvious concerns such as the communications gap between military education and military intelligence. Senior officers should sponsor a shotgun wedding of schoolhouse and intelligence if educators themselves refuse to take the lead. Senior officers also need to recognize exercises as an extended classroom in which every commander plays every exercise and game where he has a wartime role. Common sense is the only evidence required to support these proposals.

Unfortunately, the leadership dilemma may be the schoolhouse problem come home to roost. The captains we educated as managers are now colonels and generals. The careerist tends to confuse rank with achievement, promotion with competence. Those who advanced in such a culture believe that their personal success is a validation of their way of doing things, even if their way includes ignoring the obvious. This confusion will not be undone without radical changes in the ways that officers think about warrior preparation. Warfighting rhetoric and reading lists will not get the job done.

Institutionalizing the Framework

If we are to create a unifying framework for strategic literacy and operational competence, we are forced to consider the institutional cement that would hold such an effort together. At the moment, there is no true joint/combined schoolhouse where integrating theories, military training, education, intelligence, and exercises come together. Each service still maintains separate senior schools and strategic gaming facilities, the crucibles of military thought. If we are to fight in a joint/combined environment, we certainly need to school and think in a similar medium. The creation of a senior joint school has received serious study and high-level support in recent months. Though the initiative for creating and sustaining such an institution must come from the JCS, it must receive the support of the services to achieve success.

In America, the question of consolidating military functions, especially near the top, nearly always resurrects fears of hidden agendas—oblique
plots to create a general staff along the lines of the Prussian model. In reality, however, there are probably more hidden agendas associated with general staff strawmen than have ever been associated with efforts to improve inter-service cooperation. The general staff bogeyman is just that, a perennial spectre exhumed to undermine serious military integration. Indeed, military centralization has been miscast as a political threat. It is not, and we should proceed with whatever unification steps are necessary to provide for cohesion and competence in our conduct of war.

The American military tradition is unique. In fundamental ways, Americans are not comfortable with large standing or professional armies. Still, both are a reality today. Given this reality, the issue isn’t too much centralized military power so much as it is too much parochialism, too much fragmentation of effort, too much bad performance. Congressionally mandated joint tours are just more Band-Aids. A senior joint school could be viewed as a kind of strategic insurance—insurance to guarantee the competence of senior officers should their military skills be required. By any measure, strategic competence is the ultimate leverage for any competitive strategy.

George Santayana told us that those who don’t remember history are condemned to repeat it. In American military history, there are at least two great lessons worth remembering. The first lesson comes from Lincoln’s experience in the first modern war. In the early years of the Civil War, Lincoln had to fire his high commanders after nearly every major battle. Good logisticians and engineers (military scientists) were common enough, but Lincoln couldn’t find commanders (military artists) who had experience with, or aptitude for, the successful orchestration of forces larger than division or corps. In short, it took Lincoln four years to find a general who had mastered “warfighting,” the military arts. We had a similar experience in Vietnam, only there no one fired the generals.

The second great lesson of American military history is that we keep forgetting the first lesson. We have never created that unifying framework for military arts and sciences where ideas about military training, education, intelligence, and exercises could germinate on common ground. In an era when weapon flight times are measured in minutes instead of hours, and force movements are measured in hours instead of years, such neglect is suicidal. A unifying framework, and a joint/combined institution, are ideas whose time has come.

NOTES


5. Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976), 1, 539. Military actions defined by the Soviets include strike, engagement, battle, and operation.


9. The intelligence community publishes a number of product lists and catalogues of interagency coordinating mechanisms, all of which are classified. In the military subject area, the overwhelming majority of products and interagency committees are devoted to forces and weapon capabilities, not doctrine or military arts.

10. With the exception of research, development, and acquisition, the processes within the Soviet military system receive comparatively little collection or analytical emphasis. Consequently, we know little about Soviet assessments of the calculus for their correlations of forces, or their measures of effectiveness. The exception is the translation efforts. GPO and "Soviet Press Selected Translations," published bimonthly by Current News and Research Service, US Army's SOE and "Soviet Scientific Reference Publications" (AFIS/OASD/PA). The other services sponsor similar, albeit modest, translation efforts.

11. Theater commands sponsor Tactics Analysis Teams which meet several times a year; however, no similar forums evaluate operational art or strategy developments. Several small centers outside of the intelligence community are attempting to fill the vacuum on doctrinal research. One notable effort is the US Army's Joint Training Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


13. The lack of a US or NATO military encyclopedia could also be viewed as another symptom of the military science problem in the West. Specialized dictionaries and encyclopedias are not only academic aids, but more important, they serve to capture precedents and standardize the operational application of concepts for any profession.


15. The US Air Force RED FLAG exercises at Nellis AFB and the US Army OPFOR exercises at the National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, are models for training officers at wing and battalion level.


17. Over the years, critics of American industry such as W. Edwards Deming, Joseph M. Juran, and H. Ross Perot have aired similar complaints about the captains of American industry. See David Zabecki's, "Rethinking the Management Ethic," Military Review, 17 (December 1987). 49. Zabecki argues that traditional American principles of management don't serve industry or the military in a competitive environment.


19. See "Congress May Push Strategic Studies Emphasis," Army, 39 (January 1989), 7, for an early discussion of US Representative like Skelton's proposals. The Skelton Panel's final report stated the following: the panel strongly supports the proposal . . . . that a National Center for Strategic Studies be established at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., where selected senior military officers, high-level government officials, congressional staff members, and private sector media, labor, industry, and other leaders could be brought together to research and study national strategy. The center would be made up of four components: a revamped National War College with its year-long program of study adapted to focus on national security strategy and to accommodate a smaller number of more senior, highly select officers; a "think-tank" for the study and formulation of national security and national military strategy, the Capstone course [a general officer familiarization course focusing on the services, the unified and specified commands, the joint Staff, and strategy]; and an institute for conducting seminars, symposiums, and workshops in strategy for both the public and private sectors. [Report of Panel on Military Education , . . . . , pp. 35-36.]

Two Armies

DANIEL P. BOLGER

Colonel Raspeguy, veteran of Dien Bien Phu: “I’d like France to have two armies: one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, fanfares, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals, and dear little regimental officers who would be deeply concerned over their general’s bowel movements or their colonel’s piles; an army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.

“The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage battle dress, who would not be put on display but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded, and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That’s the army in which I should like to fight.”

Colonel Mestreville, veteran of Verdun: “You’re headed for a lot of trouble.”

— Jean Larteguy, The Centurions

When Jean Larteguy first published those bitter lines in 1960, experienced French soldiers had employed almost every stratagem of conventional combat to grapple with determined insurgents in Indochina—and failed. When a similar situation arose in Algeria, some hard-eyed French paratroopers, like Larteguy’s character Colonel Raspeguy, discarded their army’s schooling in regular European warfare. They created the sort of army needed to fight and win savage little wars. But the ponderous weight of the conventional French military tradition and the deep cleavages in the French political landscape derailed and stifled the reform effort. France kept the display army and lost Algeria.

In the United States, Colonel Raspeguy’s sardonic dream has come true. Today, America fields two armies, one for show and one for real fighting. Unlike Raspeguy’s satirical prescription for a complete divorce between the show troops and the combat elements, America’s pair of ground forces exist in uneasy tandem, the result of a shotgun wedding between what worked.
yesterday and what is needed now. Both armies claim certain common traditions, regulations, and battlefield methods. Both armies share a solid mass of competent soldiers. Both armies practice for their tasks. But only one has the capabilities needed to fight and win America’s present and future wars.

Although the two forces exist side by side, they have been diverging since 1945. In the Second World War, a single United States Army met and bested the Germans, the Japanese, and the minor Axis forces. This army’s world view was simply summarized: it fought a war to the death, aimed at the utter subjugation of America’s enemies.

A power-drive operational style followed logically from that world view. America took advantage of its vast oceanic moats to marshal its substantial resources of manpower, machinery, science, production facilities, and popular enthusiasm. It took time, but once the mighty US forces began their offensives, they rolled relentlessly toward the enemy homelands. The GIs who landed at Normandy, the jungle fighters slashing their way across Luzon, and the flying soldiers who battered the Nazi Reich all shared the same ethos. They were mostly conscripted civilians, in for the duration (plus six months) of a national crusade to destroy the Axis powers. Their road home lay through Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo. Every weapon from grenades to atomic bombs, every tactic from sniping to aerial city strikes, every trick from codebreaking to electronic eavesdropping, every shortcut from island-hopping to the assassination of enemy commanders helped to speed the way to final victory. The armed forces were means to that end. What happened after demobilization interested very few serving soldiers.

Is the mission of the Army to deter war—or to fight war? Or can the issue even be framed thus simply? Much ink has been devoted to these questions over the last couple of years. Colonel Walter E. Mather, USA, supplied particularly spirited answers in his article “Peace Is Not My Profession; Deterrence Is Not My Mission” in the June 1988 issue of Armed Forces Journal International. Now, in the present article, Major Daniel P. Bolger continues in the same vein. His pungent advancement of the primacy of the warrior ethos may offend some, but the issue shows no signs of going away. Those who disagree with Major Bolger’s views are invited to reply. Parameters will air their opinions in a future Commentary & Reply feature.

— The Editors
The war ended with twin atomic blasts over Japan. Few thinkers in 1945 guessed that any armies would be needed again. Even if the Soviet Union caused trouble, America’s monopoly on nuclear weaponry rendered large-scale conventional forces unnecessary, or so it was thought. America’s new killer bombs would keep the Russians at bay. The huge wartime array of United States forces dwindled rapidly down to a skeleton crew of A-bomb caretakers and occupation constabularies.

Once the Soviet Union created its own atomic arsenal, the United States could no longer play its nuclear cards with impunity. Indeed, since 1949 or so, nuclear combat has become unthinkable, conflict doomed to yield only brutally wounded losers. With nuclear warfare so dangerous, even conventional clashes between the superpowers became too dicey to contemplate. Who could guarantee that things would stop at the conventional level? Although both sides have continued to probe and test, they prefer to employ surrogates or piggyback onto peripheral disputes to fight for advantages in this oddly cold war. So it has gone under the shadow of the fateful mushroom.

If the threat of nuclear exchanges frustrated American and Soviet pressures for a finish fight, the strategic stalemate bred a new concern for conventional forces. American military leaders worried that the Soviets might well decide to fight at middle or lower intensities, always staying just below the nuclear threshold. Spurred by the formation of NATO and the near-disaster at the outset of the Korean War, US generals urged the creation of a traditional expandable army, based upon a sizable regular contingent reinforced by strong reserve components. The thinking, as summarized by such Army leaders as General Maxwell Taylor, was that America needed the ability to fight a mid-intensity nonnuclear war, or else our leaders would be faced with "two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat."

Despite flirtation with a thin screen of troops as a tripwire element and the ill-considered plunge into the pentomic division experiment, the conventional force buildup during the 1950s and early 1960s produced an army to defend Europe against the Soviet tank hordes. Heavy with tanks, mechanized infantry, self-propelled guns, nimble helicopters, sophisticated electronics of all designs, and fleets of fuel and ammunition trucks, this army stands guard to this
day on the European frontiers. A smaller brother waits on the Korean Demilitarized Zone. Yearly REFORGERs and Team Spirits exercise and refine America’s ability to mobilize reserves, enlist civilian assets, transport units, and prove resolve. This is America’s demonstration army, and if the Wehrmacht should resurrect, these units are ready. But under the threat of radioactive death, they are strictly for show, a role currently capsulized in the word deterrence.

The real fighting since 1945 has been done by the other US Army and its Marine Corps brothers who together form the expeditionary army. It is a regular force, infantry-based, readily deployable, often (but not always) well trained, writing doctrine by the seat of the pants or not at all, having to unlearn the lessons of World War II in preference to the harder lessons of World War III. These are the grunts of Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, the Mayaguez incident, and Grenada. They are the leftovers of the NATO buildup, a nod to paratroopers like General Matthew Ridgway or Lieutenant General James Gavin, and a recognition that now and then there might be a half-war or limited war somewhere beyond Europe. The expeditionary army has done its best work when it operates independently of the display army, much as Colonel Raspeguy wished. But because the divorce is not complete, the expeditionary elements hobble along with borrowed display army doctrine, organizations, and weaponry. Worse, in the interests of personnel management, soldiers are transferred indiscriminately from the display troops to the fighting forces, as if they’re all the same.

Of course, they are not all the same. About the only idea the two armies share is one over which they have no control: an American-Soviet nuclear war cannot be won. But from that point onward, the pair are not complementary, but contradictory. America’s two armies differ greatly in world view, operational style, and institutional ethos. The soldier’s understanding of such concepts makes all the difference when United States forces go into combat around this treacherous globe.

The display army reflects the world view held by most Americans. This view proposes that the Soviet Union is America’s principal adversary, but that deterrence will prevail. The most important battles to be fought involve the yearly contests for money in Washington. Readiness is a key buzzword, although it is assumed that myriad intelligence assets insure that there will be a good bit of time to mobilize for the big one when it comes. Enemies outside the Warsaw Pact, other than the implacable North Koreans, do not merit much consideration. Such possibilities were judged worthy of a miniscule four pages of coverage in FM 100-5, Operations. The display army, in sum, is prepared to fight World War III as if it were a bigger, noisier, flashier version of the 1944-45 campaign in western Europe.

The expeditionary army’s picture of the world assumes World War III is a protracted conflict already in progress. Europe is the watched pot, a Mexican standoff fraught with nuclear perils. The expensive conventional
forces are bystanders to the confrontation. After all, given a war, which side would lose, or accept bloody stalemate, without blowing a few kilotons across their opposition's bow? NATO and Warsaw Pact forces all assume as much, and have woven tactical nuclear devices deeply into their organizational structures and doctrine. The risk of any conceivable European conventional war going nuclear quickly is too great for any sane political leader to accept. Perhaps insane Soviet leaders would go atomic at the outset, but if so why are we sweating the conventional military balance? Among sober people, a war that cannot be won or even fought to a draw is already prevented. Planning to refight the Second World War over the smoking corpses of once-nervous Europeans is merely an expensive diversion from the actual struggle for world dominance. Or so think expeditionary soldiers.

The real, ongoing World War III pits America and a few grudging allies against a determined constellation of anti-American forces of varied motivation. The prize is access to Third World allies, peoples, resources, and markets. Whether incited by Islamic fundamentalism, Marxism-Leninism.
resentment of Yankee imperialism, a lucrative indigenous drug trade, or just plain bad attitudes, America’s opponents all have a friend in the Soviet Union. Soviet contingents also operate and agitate for their own ends in many underdeveloped countries. Thus, American victories in this twilight struggle in the unhappy Third World certainly affect the continuing contest with the Soviets. More important, American citizens worldwide depend on the expeditionary army to bail them out when things turn ugly. The terrorists, insurgents, thugs, and tinpot Hitlers that bluster and sputter in odd corners of the world concern the expeditionary army. This fighting component is not at peace, but simply between operations, much like their grandfathers in the Pacific war with its discrete insular campaigns or their great-great-grandfathers in the internment Indian campaigns.

Such a grim picture would be viewed as alarmist by the display units. Their military style proceeds logically from their more orderly world view. If a major war should come, these units hope for plenty of warning as the Soviets gear up for battle. Show army planners expect ample time to formulate specific operations, mobilize reserve troops, transport reinforcements to the front, carry home dependents, reassign experienced officers to form new units, make draft calls, crank up training centers, and expand industrial production. There might even be time to declare war, like in the good old days.

Solid, secure command and control characterizes this system. In theory, the escalation of Soviet move and American countermove, made crystal-clear by technical intelligence collectors, will arrest the crisis before war erupts. The relevant examples are the 1961 Berlin episode, the 1962 Cuban showdown, and the 1973 October War alert incident. The goal always remains clear, as proclaimed in FM 100-5. Operations: “The overriding mission of US forces is to deter war.”

If the show of force miscarries owing to enemy miscalculation or friendly friction, then a redundantly titled process known as warfighting starts. Warfighting, as opposed to real fighting, exists in a fantasy world where tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, chattering helicopters, attack jets, and a blizzard of electronic communications and intelligence systems cooperate to dazzle, sidestep, confuse, destroy, and eventually roll back the lockstep legions of the Soviet Union, all on a battleground replete with smoke, fire, screaming men, scared civilians, and whizzing shell fragments, not to mention possible clouds of nerve gas or nuclear sunbursts. It will be like World War II jacked up to 78-RPM speed. Somehow, it will feature incredibly rapid movements and gruesomely efficient slaughter, concepts that have proven to be historically antithetical. How this roiling mechanized furball will be sustained, let alone tamed without Armageddon, is rarely addressed. Maybe this is what the authors of FM 100-5 had in mind in their marvelous understatement: “Today, the translation of success in battle to desired political outcomes is more complicated than ever before.”
The expeditionary army has its own operational style. This approach does not embrace deterrence. Deterrence is an effect, not a mission, and implanting fear of mortal injury in the minds of enemies is the responsibility of America’s powerful nuclear arsenal. The threat of immolation, not US tanks, keeps the Soviets in their own neighborhood. Nukes do not scare Soviet surrogates in the bushes at all—nor do the masses of tanks and tracks squatting in central Europe. But that is all right with the deployable grunts, because they are already at war with America’s lesser enemies. Expeditionary troops are ready to go, ready to fight, and ready to win.

The expeditionary army expects to fight with scant notice. Paratroopers might be quaffing beer at a pizza parlor near Fort Bragg one night and be in a desperate firefight in a distant hostile land the next afternoon. These regulars go into action as they are, with no mobilization. They can adapt to what they find, as in the Dominican Republic or Grenada; they can triumph over adversity and friction; and they can impose their will on America’s enemies. These forces must be standing in the door at all times, schooled to respond to daring and flexible leadership, experienced in all climes and scenarios, and capable of instant innovation and improvisation.

Expeditionary units have to be ready to fight when they hit the contested ground. They can place no faith in shows of force or escalation games. Speed of commitment and lift limitations insure that the troops will arrive in marginal strength at the outset. Expeditioners thus fight outnumbered far from friendly bases, and must rely on the collective skills imparted by sound leadership, demanding training, and shared pre-battle hardship. Expeditionary operations fall into two broad categories, neither of which shares much in common with those of the Second World War. An army built to fight in today’s actions must be ready for both foreign internal defense and contingencies, two missions commonly lumped under the deceptively benign rubric of low-intensity conflict. Each of these operations requires distinct military approaches. Though trained to undertake only the two expeditionary missions, expeditioners modify their basic routines with a bold, flexible tactical style, thus enabling them to respond successfully to the infinitely variable conditions actually encountered on the ground.

Foreign internal defense involves US intervention in support of a friendly government’s counterinsurgency effort. Here, the oft-trumpeted lessons of Vietnam come into play. In blunt terms, the locals must win their own war. Americans can help, but they cannot do it for their embattled allies. Foreign internal defense uses small picked US elements: regionally oriented military assistance advisory groups and skilled Special Forces teams. The objective is the loyalty of the populace, not killing revolutionaries. Although the Americans may arrive rapidly, their duties will not end quickly. Advisors and trainers will likely spend years tangling with wily insurgents. El Salvador offers an excellent example of this sort of expeditionary role.
Contingencies are more dramatic than foreign internal defense. In these cases, Americans deploy to repel invasion of an allied country, punish anti-American aggression, protect American citizens and property, rescue hostages, or preempt terrorist activities by outlaw nations or subnational factions. Force strength may vary, but it will seldom exceed a division of ground troops; a battalion or two is typical. Special operations contingents play a prominent and occasionally decisive role. Intervention forces must get there quickly and act boldly once on the scene. They can expect to make forced entries by landing craft, helicopter, parachute, assault airdropping, or even ground infiltration. Contingencies are almost always decided quickly, for good or for ill, freeing US units for their next mission. Grenada serves as an admirable model for this sort of operation.

Whether in foreign internal defense or meeting contingencies, the expeditionary units operate in a chaotic world of deadly danger, physical exhaustion, false and misleading intelligence, and Murphy’s Law, all exacerbated by a rapid descent into the soup. The troops’ tactical methods take advantage of the organizational excellence derived from their own harsh training regimen. Fighting outfits do not expect technology or numbers to win their wars, but trust in themselves and their own moral superiority.

Expeditionary troopers embrace the chaos of battle and turn it against their enemies. They move speedily and assemble quickly, day or night, under heavy loads, across all terrain and in all weather; they show up where they are not supposed to be. The habitual emphasis on speed, combined with discriminate firepower, creates shock. Getting there now is more important than extensive synchronization and inch-thick operations orders. These soldiers will discard tomorrow’s perfect solution for today’s good plan. Expeditionary forces seek enemy headquarters like sharks drawn to blood. Quick eradication of enemy command posts can befuddle and paralyze Third World opponents, and turn the struggle to the advantage of the better-trained Americans.

An intervention army will take and use enemy weapons as needed, much like Army Rangers who borrowed Cuban antiaircraft guns in Grenada. Even the sorriest Third World armies tend to have heaping stocks of modern weapons. Expeditionary soldiers realize that all equipment on the battlefield is available to whoever is fast enough, mean enough, and smart enough to grab it and use it. Every weapon torn from the enemy’s grasp is one more that

The threat of immolation, not US tanks, keeps the Soviets in their own neighborhood. Nukes do not scare Soviet surrogates in the bushes at all.

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will not have to be carried in by strained American logistical resources. Enemy spirits plummet when they realize that they are being ripped apart by their own hardware.

Clever fighters also use their opponents’ minds as well as their tools. Fear grips both sides in any battle, and shrewd American expeditioners can exploit enemy anxieties and turn them into panic with well-crafted deceptions and feints. Not only will such efforts confuse and slow opposing reactions, but the legions of phantom opponents thus conjured offer a very cheap way to even the numerical odds.

The most important thing about an expeditionary army, the idea that gives it purpose even under the nuclear umbrella, is its devotion to victory. These soldiers fight to win, and their triumphs are measurable things: civilian lives saved, friendly governments restored, terrorists killed, enemy forces defeated and ejected. There is no dalliance with deterrence or tripwires or escalatory firebreaks on the road to Ragnarok. Expeditions either succeed, as in the Dominican Republic or Grenada, or they fail, as in the aborted hostage rescue in Iran or the fruitless Marine efforts at the Beirut airport. But either way, soldiers know whether their work was worth it. If not, they know what must be done for the next round in this continuing Third World War.

The bold operational style of the fighting army demands a warrior ethos, and it is here that one can see the starkest difference between America’s display army and its real fighters. The display army has prepared since 1945—and in earnest since the mid-1950s—for the big one. But as the years have passed and the alerts and exercises become rote, the deterriers have gradually grown conscious of the improbability of executing their primary mission. The display soldiers are dedicated, competent, and still train hard—make no mistake about that—but to what end?

Let us be clear: deterrence is a wonderful thing. Milton was correct in his insistence that “they also serve who only stand and wait.” All sane-minded soldiers pray that deterrence continues and peace prevails. Soldiers who deter war are doing precisely the job their government has thrust upon them, and they can take just pride in what they are accomplishing. Mankind is truly in their debt. But let us be equally clear as to the effects on the deterriers: the deterrence mentality is at odds with the warrior ethos.

The show troopers’ ethos is a by-product of their improbable mission, a mission that grows ever more improbable with each new package of concessional goodies delivered by the hard-pressed Mr. Gorbachev. Display units are not focused on imminent combat. It is peacetime for them, a modern version of From Here to Eternity played out in motorpools, barracks, familiar ranges, and well-worn maneuver areas. Bureaucratic routine characterizes these forces. Indeed, in certain units, preoccupation with quotidian detail has taken precedence over readiness for a war that the commanders have begun to suspect will never happen. Luckily, the soldiers in the ranks still believe
and exert their best efforts, and at least some of their high-intensity battle training does translate to real Third World combat zones. The display soldiers’ readiness for service in contingencies or foreign internal defense, however, remains unknown and untested. Certainly, they sport sharp uniforms, set tough priorities, and carry their loads confidently along familiar paths. The US Postal Service can claim as much, but who would dare send them into the red maw of jungle combat?

Expeditionary soldiers must eschew bureaucratic miasma and exude the ethos of the pure warrior. That which does not contribute directly to success in battle must be ruthlessly excised. Warriorship is a way of life. This demands mental alertness, physical stamina, and spiritual dedication, all in the context of the real battlefield, not the science fiction nightmares of a great semi-nuclear fire storm in modern Europe.

Warriors need not be rocket scientists, but they must be both smart and clever. They should know their profession and understand the human nature of those who make war, both friends and foes. Above all, fighting soldiers seek study, training, and experience to develop the battlefield common sense to know when to break rules. The dispersed nature of modern tactics and the fluid, chaotic circumstances of expeditionary conflict make every soldier a critical piece of the action. Each deployable trooper carries the gold bars of a lieutenant in his rucksack. There is no room for automatons in an expeditionary force in extremis.

Physical stamina gives warriors the ability to use ground and speed in their favor. Real physical fitness is measured in miles of hard marching under heavy packs rather than pristine pushups on squeaky-clean gym floors. It is not just sweating for an hour in the morning, but sweating for many hours, indeed, many days, at the very limit of human endurance—and then beyond. The Argentinian commanders in 1982 knew that typical infantry could not hope to slog across the freezing, boggy hillocks of East Falkland Island. Yet British Royal Marines and paratroopers did it, because they had done it in training. That must be the standard for the expeditioner’s bodily fitness.

Finally, fighting soldiers have to be spiritually dedicated to winning wars. Solid units win wars, and real warriors serve their units, not vice versa. Such soldiers derive satisfaction from duty well done, not from EERs, OERs, awards, pay, or privileges. The respect of their comrades in arms, their military family, motivates them to perform. This selfless devotion to duty necessitates a service ethic that seems very much at odds with many modern American values. Expeditionary warriors do not conform to prevailing social norms of self-serv ing comfort; they conform instead to the pitiless calculus of armed struggle. The cohesive unit that perseveres despite the maelstrom will prevail. For expeditionary troops, the whole is always greater than the sum of the parts.

One might well ask why America bothers with an expensive display army at all. Surely five or so light infantry divisions could just as easily hold

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the line in Europe, particularly if some of the money saved by mothballing
the heavy force dinosaurs went into the fielding of effective antitank weapons.
This effort would seem a modest expenditure compared to the billions paid
out for current heavy tanks and sophisticated fighting vehicles.

The infantry could use a decent portable tank-killer; lack of such a
weapon speaks volumes about America’s willingness to buy things for its
show units at the expense of its most likely fighters. Reissue of venerable
90-mm and 106-mm recoiless rifles to supplement the TOWs and Dragons
would be a step in the right direction. Purchase of light armor, readily
transported by airlift, is equally essential. The combat-proven British Scimitar
and Scorpion light tanks fill the bill, and they are available right now. 7

Yet, there has been no major war, so—beyond any force reductions
negotiated with the Soviets—why tinker with the current organization and
structure? Similar voices made similar arguments in 1914, indeed, in 1916 as
well. When the Great War did not match preconceived organizations and
doctrine, tradition-bound generals attempted to bludgeon the conflict into
recognizable shape. They failed at great cost. In a similar vein, America sent
its deterrence-trained forces into Vietnam, where they tried mightily to re-
create World War II, also at cost, and to little avail. It was as if the United
States sent a fully-equipped NFL football team to play neighborhood pickup
basketball, then tore up chunks of the court in frustration when the locals
refused to play by the imported rules. America took its team home, and the
enemy won the war their way. 8

That, in essence, is the real danger of keeping two armies. When
trouble brews, America’s civil leadership may inadvisably send in the display
army. Nobody would send a team of nonspecialists to secure a defended
airfield and rescue hostages, yet American political authorities might do as
much if they mistake deterrence soldiers for the genuine items. This “era of
violent peace” cries out for expeditionary warriors. As they did on the harsh
American frontier, in the Philippines, in China, in Mexico, and in a hundred
hot, dangerous places since 1945, America’s fighting expeditioners will re-
spond to the call.

NOTES

4. Ibid.
6. FM 100-5, p. 169.
The NSC Staff: Rebuilding the Policy Crucible

CHRISTOPHER C. SHOEMAKER

The Iran-Contra affair, if it accomplished nothing else, put an institutional spotlight on the National Security Council Staff, subjecting it to scrutiny unparalleled in its 40-year history. If we are to glean anything meaningful from this tawdry episode, other than entertainment value, it is critical that the right institutional lessons be learned and that appropriate systemic remedies be applied. The most basic lesson is that the affair manifested the much deeper problem that has plagued every administration since Truman—the absence of clearly defined and functionally adequate responsibilities for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the National Security Council Staff he heads.

Even a cursory review of postwar national security decisionmaking reveals that different presidents have created different national security structures with differing degrees of success. Most analysts agree with the Tower Commission's view that the national security system "is properly the president's creature. It must be left flexible to be molded by the president into the form most useful to him."

At the same time, it appears that inexorable forces in the contemporary international system are driving modern presidents into more intimate involvement in national security affairs and the executive branch itself into what Zbigniew Brzezinski has described as a White House-centric presidential system of decisionmaking. It is no accident, for example, that every president since JFK has found the State Department wholly inadequate in the formulation of national security policy. Indeed, the existence of foreign policy as a discipline independent of the broader sweep of national security is itself a non sequitur. Diplomacy, it would now seem, is too important to be left to the diplomats.

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Within this context, several functional requisites must be performed if the national security system is to work: administration, coordination, supervision, adjudication, crisis management, policy formulation, and position advocacy. The extent to which the national security structure facilitates the execution of these functional requisites dictates the success or failure of the entire system.

Given the factors of centralized decisionmaking and the functional requisites, and with the caveat that no two presidents will structure the system identically, there should nonetheless be basic similarities across administrations in answering three fundamental questions:

- What should the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs do?
- How should the NSC Staff be configured?
- How should Staff responsibilities be articulated?

In the following discussion, we will attempt to provide answers to these questions, in the process outlining an NSC Staff model for the future.

The Role of the Assistant to the President

As distasteful as it may be to many in the national security business, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—let’s call him the APNSA—must be one of the three primary actors in national security. Former State Department official Leslie Gelb has argued that no administration can “turn the prince back into a frog” and return the APNSA to what some see as his ideal role—the low-key facilitator of national security policy along the McGeorge Bundy or Robert Cutler model. Indeed, the chaos of the early Reagan NSC was due in large measure to the efforts of Edwin Meese and Alexander Haig to turn the clock back to a system now rendered irrelevant by the evolving demands of national security. Instead, the basic document that organizes the national security system in the future should recognize and facilitate the modern role of the APNSA. As Philip Odeen, author of a major study on the NSC, has said, “There has been a fundamental change in the nature of the problems over the past fifteen or twenty years that has tended to give the national security adviser a much heavier role, a much more public role, and a much more important role.”

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Parameters
The APNSA must effectively function in two sometimes conflicting capacities. First, he must function as the manager of the national security system, wearing the hat of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Second, he must act as the personal counselor to the president on national security matters in his capacity as the National Security Adviser. If the APNSA/NSA is deficient in either capacity or if the structure creates insurmountable obstacles along either path, then the national security system as a whole will not work.

In his first role, the APNSA must oversee with objective eyes the operation of the National Security Council and its supporting staff. He must insure that the non-advocacy functions are executed by the Staff in an effective and judicious manner. As the Tower Commission asserts,

> It is his responsibility to ensure that matters submitted for consideration by the Council cover the full range of issues on which review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a full range of options is considered; that the prospects and risks of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to the principals; that difficulties in implementation are confronted. 6

In this capacity as manager of the national security system, he serves primarily the institution of the National Security Council, and he should be an honest, non-controversial broker of ideas and options. His neutrality on issues, however, should not be confused with passivity; he may indeed be very assertive in what Odeen calls “decision forcing” and in policy supervision.7 The APNSA will have to crack the whip to make the national security system work, to forge consensus at the lowest level possible, to insure that the bureaucracy is presenting issues fairly and imaginatively, and to demand adherence to the president’s decisions.

At the same time, as we have seen, the APNSA must serve in the role of personal adviser to the President. The Tower Commission reached the conclusion that “he is perhaps the one most able to see things from the President’s perspective [and] is unburdened by departmental responsibilities.” Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the beneficiary and the victim of a strong APNSA, contends that “the NSC advisor must do more than coordinate—he must represent the President’s views.” It is both unrealistic and dangerous to argue, as Haig does, that the “National Security Adviser should be a staff man—not a maker of policy.”8 I. M. Destler’s view that the position should be abolished altogether is even less feasible.9

Many critics oppose an assertive role for the APNSA primarily because of the high public profile some advisers have assumed in the past.12 This line of criticism is far more emotional than substantive, and it misses the more compelling issues. Suffice it to say that, in the execution of the functional requisites, it is not essential that the APNSA be a public spokesman.

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but if he is, then the administration needs to insure that he and the other public figures in the government are espousing a coherent and consistent national security policy line.

The issue of whether or not the APNSA is a public spokesman, however, should not be confused with the question of what substantive policy role he should play. The national security system must recognize that the elevation of the APNSA has been brought about, not solely as a by-product of powerful egos and dominating personalities, but by the demands of an increasingly complex international environment. For all its weaknesses, the Carter Administration eventually recognized this reality and produced some notable successes in national security by enhancing the position of Zbigniew Brzezinski. For all its strengths, the Reagan Administration did not, and the result was an unnecessarily chaotic and directionless national security system, particularly in the early years. Ever the journalist, Leslie Gelb summarizes the issue neatly in his two “iron laws.” The first point, Gelb argues, is that “things won’t work well with a strong national security adviser to the President. The second is that, without a strong adviser, things won’t work at all.”

How, then, does an administration design the national security system to facilitate the dual roles of the APNSA/NSA? Brzezinski, R. D. McLaurin, and others have proposed that the status of the APNSA be upgraded to formal cabinet level, either as the Director or the Secretary of National Security, possibly even subject to Senate confirmation. These dramatic proposals might well resolve the internecine squabbling that seems endemic in each administration and would position the incumbent to fulfill both his primary roles. But these proposals, however attractive from a functional perspective, are not politically feasible; they would surely elicit howls of protests from the media, the wrath of a Congress ever suspicious of White House centralization, and stormy resignations from irate cabinet members facing the relegation of their positions to subordinate status.

Short of that, the President needs to spell out in detail the specific roles and responsibilities assigned to the APNSA and give him the bureaucratic leverage he needs to follow through. At a minimum, the APNSA should chair the important sub-NSC committees in which most of the business of national security is conducted. Moreover, the NSC Staff should chair the
interagency groups (IGs) subordinate to those committees chaired by the APNSA; Alexander Haig was at least right when he argued that “he who controls the key IGs . . . controls policy.”

In addition, the APNSA should be explicitly assigned the crisis management portfolio and be given the authority to task throughout the government in the execution of this critical role. The APNSA must also be directly responsible to the president with no intervening superior on the White House staff. Finally, he must be afforded cabinet-equivalent status (without the formal designation) and be recognized as effectively coequal to the Secretaries of State and Defense. These recommendations run against the grain of many NSC critics, but they are essential if the United States is to return to an effective national security system.

From this outline, it is evident that the APNSA must be a person of singular ability: this is no position for an inexperienced political crony, a sycophant, or a stodgy bureaucrat. Qualities necessary for success as the APNSA/NSA include the following:

- **Competence.** The APNSA must be conversant in the entire range of national security issues or, at least, must know where his weaknesses are and act to redress them.

- **Experience.** The APNSA cannot come into the government as a novice. He must understand not only the formal structure of the bureaucracy but also where the entrenched issues and individuals are found. He must also understand how and when to pull the right levers to make policy happen.

- **Intellect.** He must be at once conceptual and pragmatic, able to generate ideas and then translate them into meaningful policy. Moreover, he must have an established intellectual reputation in order to command instant respect in the government, in the academic world, in the Congress, and in the media. He must be an intellectual magnet to attract the brightest and most innovative people to the NSC Staff.

- **Integrity.** The APNSA must have sufficiently strong character to be able to act as the honest broker in coordinating and integrating the national security system. As former national security adviser Walt Rostow said, “He must be able to present another man’s case as well as the man himself could.” The entire national security system must have confidence that the APNSA will present alternative views fairly and will not take advantage of propinquity in order to push his own positions at the expense of the integrity of the system. He must be able to present bad news to the president and to sniff out and squelch misbehavior before it becomes a problem. He must be scrupulously honest in presenting presidential decisions and in monitoring the implementation process. Perhaps most important, he must impart the same sense of ethical behavior to the Staff he leads. Much of the Staff’s work automatically implies the presidential imprimatur; the APNSA cannot tolerate abuse of such a precious mandate.

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Loyalty. If he is to function as a personal adviser to the president, the NSA must believe in the man he serves. He must consider that his first duty is to support the president while insuring that he never overshadows or upstages his boss. He must elicit the trust and confidence of the president in order to act effectively in his stead within the national security system.

Diplomacy. The APNSA will, by the very nature of his position, elicit envy and animosity from the departments. He must make a concerted and continuous effort to salve wounded egos, to maintain cordial relations with abrasive personalities all over the government, and to present triumphs and tragedies in a manner that helps smooth the way for cooperation on the next issue.

Confidence. He must be confident in his own abilities and in those of his staff in order to hold his own in the cacophony of conflicting opinions that marks any national security system.

A final quality is that the APNSA/NSA should normally be a civilian. A military officer, despite possession of all of the traits listed above, operates from two perceptual disadvantages. First, military officers are unfairly seen to possess only modest intellectual capabilities. This makes it especially difficult for an officer to be taken seriously in the formulation and advocacy of policy. Second, there remains within the government a psycho-historical suspicion of a strong role for a person in uniform in the development of policy. Many Americans are simply uncomfortable with an officer crossing the line between policy execution and policy formulation. For these reasons, the position of APNSA/NSA is better filled with a civilian.

Although this is a daunting list of qualities, there are certainly those in government, in academia, and in the private sector who meet them all. These should form the population from which the APNSA/NSA is drawn.

The National Security Council Staff

The NSC Staff must of course be supported by an external national security structure that allows for the smooth execution of the functional requisites. But internal to the Staff itself are key variables that will impact on the effectiveness of the entire system. These are size, organization, and composition.

Size. The NSC Staff has varied greatly in size, ranging over the years from three to nearly 100 professionals. In determining the appropriate size, one must strike a balance between efficiency and flexibility; the Staff must be large enough to comprehend the entire spectrum of national security issues with some degree of expertise, yet small enough to be responsive. Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser under Presidents Ford and Bush, points out that long-range planning is often inadequately done because “the NSC Staff is constrained as to the number of people available [and] our limited
personnel assets were used to put out fires.”17 At the same time, the Staff must be small enough to avoid the rigidity that marks most large organizations. Moreover, a large Staff creates yet additional evidence that a rival State (or Defense) Department has been created in the White House, a perception that leads to unnecessary private friction and public squabbling. Although persuasive justification for an exact size probably cannot be offered, it appears that 40-45 professionals is about the right number. A Staff much smaller than that cannot contend with the range of issues that must be considered by the NSC; a Staff much larger will become a bureaucracy unto itself in which individual Staff members will lose their personal relationships with the APNSA and with the president they support.18

**Staff Organization.** The Tower Commission, reacting to the aberration that was the Iran-Contra affair, recommended an organization designed to maximize supervision. “Clear vertical lines of control and authority, responsibility, and accountability are essential to good management.”19 This impulse provides a useful point of departure, but caution must be exercised; such an organization can become excessively structured and rigid. The designers of the next Staff organization must not try to remedy the Oliver North phenomenon by structural solutions. The Iran-Contra affair occurred primarily because of personality flaws in North and Poindexter rather than faults within the system itself. Supervision and accountability are necessary but should not come at the expense of flexibility and intellectual freedom. Staff members must be able to interact with each other across nominal staff lines, to form ad hoc working groups to deal with specific issues, and to draw upon each other’s expertise to resolve policy problems.

The organization that best supports these needs is a three-tiered system. The top tier is made up of the APNSA, his Deputy, and his Executive Secretary. The middle layer is composed of the directors of the regional and functional groups. These groups mirror those found in the Departments of State and Defense, thereby allowing smoother interdepartmental coordination. Finally, at the bottom, there is the layer of Staff members who serve under the supervision of the directors.

The Staff organization must be at once flexible and structured. It must be flexible by fostering horizontal coordination between Staff members and The Iran-Contra affair occurred primarily because of personality flaws in North and Poindexter rather than faults within the system itself.
between directors; it must be sufficiently structured to discourage direct, private, and unchecked relationships from developing between the top tier and the Staff members at the bottom such as occurred between Poindexter and North.

The position of Executive Secretary bears special mention. This is the only Staff position specifically authorized in the 1947 legislation, and it can be used to great advantage by the APNSA and the Staff in executing the process functions. In this, the Executive Secretary can help relieve the APNSA from much of the more mundane yet critical process functions, freeing him up to focus more attention on policy substance. The Executive Secretary position fell into disuse during the Nixon and Ford years but can be a post of great utility. In the same vein, there is value in establishing a small, relatively stable policy group within the office of the APNSA in addition to the current non-policy secretariat. This would allow for substantive and administrative continuity between presidencies and would help save each administration from having to grapple with the same lessons that its predecessor struggled to learn.

**Staff Composition.** In 1961, McGeorge Bundy said in a letter to Senator Henry Jackson that the NSC Staff “should be composed of men equally well versed in the process of planning and in that of operational follow-up.” Sound guidance. The members of the NSC staff should be drawn from the widest range of sources possible: the State and Defense Departments, the intelligence community, Treasury, the academic world, and the private sector. They should share the qualities of the APNSA, with emphasis on selflessness and confidence. They must be experienced within the government and be well-connected with all relevant departments and agencies.

But they should not stay on the Staff indefinitely. One of the conclusions of the Tower Commission is that members of the Staff should not remain for longer than four years. Rotation of the Staff members is the safest way to insure that new ideas and fresh approaches are continuously being introduced into the system. Moreover, and perhaps less idealistically, rotation of the members of the Staff is the best way to hedge against the greatest danger inherent in White House service—losing touch with the ethical foundations and constitutional idealism so essential to individual Staff members. Many members of the Staff have commented on the erosion of ethical values that occurs after the third year on the White House staff and how morally numbing the entire process becomes.

**NSC Staff Charter**

Many administrations, regardless of their individual national security systems, have developed implicit understandings about the roles and missions of the Staff. But no president has outlined his desires for the NSC Staff clearly and with formal presidential blessing. For example, PD-2, the basic organizational document in the Carter Administration, says only that
“the Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council staff, as provided by law.” NSDD-2, the Reagan Administration’s counterpart, is silent on the role of the Staff altogether.

In order to clarify lines of authority and eliminate the pointless groping for bureaucratic relevance that plagues every NSC Staff, the responsibilities of the Staff should be explicitly articulated in a presidential directive document. This document should be separate from that which lays out the basic national security system and should be clear in what the Staff should and should not do. In the figure on the following page is a proposed directive document which can serve as a point of departure for any administration in its efforts to insure that the national security system is functionally effective. The proposed directive is built to address the requisite functions and to clarify other aspects of the NSC Staff that have been long neglected. In paragraph one, the directive outlines the Staff’s responsibilities for the execution of the requisite functions and provides bureaucratic mechanisms by which these functions can be accomplished. Paragraph two provides a vertical NSC Staff structure that allows for flexibility and accountability. Next, the directive caps the size of the Staff and requires that a cross-section of national security talent be employed. Paragraph four resolves a long-standing if silent element of friction within the government by identifying the equivalent rank for each position within the NSC Staff. Finally, the directive allows the APNSA some flexibility in the regional and functional groups but does not allow him to expand the size of the Staff or the scope of its responsibilities.

Such a document could be useful, not as a final product to be signed immediately by the President, but as a vehicle to engender discussion long overdue and as a base upon which to construct a definitive charter for the structure and function of the NSC Staff.

It is important to make a final comment about the people who will fill this organization. The debate on the national security structure generally focuses on systems, wiring diagrams, and organizations, but it is the people who make it all work. The most skillfully designed national security system will fail utterly when it is not staffed by men and women of great character, intellect, and commitment. More than any other organization in Washington, the NSC Staff depends upon its people. There are no intervening layers to protect the system from the egocentric, the foolish, and the venal. The president must therefore select his APNSA with the full knowledge that it should be his most important, and careful, appointment. The APNSA must then select his Staff with equal care, demanding the highest standards of demonstrated competence, intellectual daring, and selfless dedication.

For the first 170 years of our existence, the management of our international affairs was quite effectively handled by the Department of State, with occasional help from the War and Navy Departments. Since the end of the Second World War, however, the international environment has changed.
In support of the National Security Council System mandated in NSDD-2 and in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council Staff is established.

I. Functions of the National Security Council Staff. The NSC Staff shall act in three capacities.

First, it shall serve as the staff of the National Security Council under the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In that capacity, the Staff shall be responsible for the administration of the NSC system. It shall also be responsible for the coordination and integration of policy in preparation for submission to the NSC for consideration. It shall also be responsible for supervising the implementation of my decisions and for interpreting specific policies.

Second, the Staff shall provide support to the Assistant to the President in his capacity as coordinator of crisis management. The NSC Staff shall effect coordination throughout the relevant agencies to insure the presentation of options and the implementation of decisions in a timely manner. It shall convene crisis management working groups subordinate to the NSC and composed of representatives of the involved departments and agencies. It shall also be responsible for crisis contingency planning, drawing upon the departments and agencies for support.

Third, the Staff shall support the Assistant to the President in his capacity as the National Security Adviser. In this regard, the Staff shall be one of my personal staffs and will provide me, through the National Security Adviser, with recommendations on national security matters.

II. Organization of the NSC Staff. The Staff shall be organized into three echelons. At the top shall be the Assistant to the President, his deputy, and the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Next, there shall be nine directors chairing groups in the following regional and functional areas: Europe and the Soviet Union, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Far East, Intelligence, International Economics, Transnational Issues, and Defense Policy. Third, there shall be Staff Officers in each regional and functional group whose work will be supervised by the Directors. In addition, there shall be established a Staff Secretariat responsible for administrative support to the NSC and composed of permanent civil servants. It is my intention that the Staff Secretariat provide the administrative continuity between administrations.

III. Size and Composition of the NSC Staff. The size of the Staff shall not exceed 45 professionals, excluding the Assistant to the President, his deputy, the Executive Secretary, and the Staff Secretariat. The Staff shall be composed of representatives of the Foreign Service, the armed forces, the intelligence community, the academic community, and the private sector.

IV. Equivalent Rank of the NSC Staff. For the purposes of seniority and protocol, the NSC Staff shall have equivalent rank as follows. The Assistant to the President shall rank as a member of my cabinet. The Deputy Assistant to the President shall rank as a deputy secretary. The Executive Secretary and the Group Directors shall rank as assistant secretaries. The Staff Officers shall rank as deputy assistant secretaries.

V. Modifications to this Directive. The Assistant to the President may change the composition and structure of the functional and regional groups as required.
so dramatically that this time-honored managerial system simply does not work any longer. Every administration since that of FDR has either implicitly recognized this phenomenon and moved to a White House-centered management structure, or has ignored it and created a chaotic national security process. It is now time to formalize what has been the de facto system and to create the sort of structure that will help guarantee the proper and efficient management of national security affairs into the next century. This can be accomplished only if we acknowledge the inability of an 18th-century system to deal with 21st-century challenges: we require a formal presidential mandate for the APNSA/NSA and the National Security Staff. The APNSA and his Staff are critical realities in the management of contemporary national security. We must now harness their energies and abilities by institutionalizing their role as integral players in an efficient and finely honed national security system.

NOTES

3. The functional requisites are themselves a matter for considerable study and discussion. The first five, which might be called the process functions, are generally accepted throughout the bureaucracy. It is the last two, the advisory functions, that cause the greatest consternation and outcry for they imply a special and direct relationship between the President and the NSC Staff.
13. Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 296.
18. The Scowcroft NSC Staff in the Bush Administration began at numbers significantly lower than those of the Reagan Administration.
Middleweight Forces
and the Army’s Deployability Dilemma

PETER F. HERRLY

The US Army stands at an important crossroads as it looks to the 21st century. On one hand beckons an inviting path of continuing its achievements since the trauma of Vietnam. In 15 years the Army has rebuilt its leadership, reasserted its discipline, and restored its morale, while fielding a new generation of potent, sophisticated weapons, embracing a classic warfighting doctrine, and organizing heavy and light forces with superb combat potential. Yet the Army’s accomplishments have not produced the full range of deployable, flexible, and capable forces demanded by a changing security environment. This article will show how emerging strategic and military trends point to another path, one which adds the potential of middleweight forces to the light and heavy units already in our arsenal, thus providing truly versatile land power readier to face tomorrow’s complex and difficult global challenges.

America’s future strategic challenges are clear. More independent allies, skillful Soviet public diplomacy, and emerging regional powers will complicate American security choices and erode US ability to maintain bases, port access, and overflight rights. Worse still, the lingering US debt will exert significant pressure to reduce military expenditures, security assistance, and foreign aid. Declining relative American economic power also reinforces domestic arguments against US overseas presence, deployed and afloat. The net effect will diminish (though not eliminate) American ability to rely upon forward deployments as a keystone of its national military strategy.

Underlying this increasingly complex set of problems for the United States in the international arena are the nation’s enduring strategic imperatives: safeguarding its security and ocean approaches in the Western Hemisphere;
maintaining its ability to link with free-market economies and natural resources throughout the world; and preventing the domination of the Eurasian landmass by any hostile power or coalition of powers. These fundamental national security requirements are not likely to diminish over the next 20 years. The Army's challenge is to insure that its forces will provide the most leverage possible in support of evolving American strategy.

Some crucial military trends affect the Army's choices for the future. Most important are the sophisticated combat capabilities presently spreading through the developing world. As Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono recently noted, more than a dozen developing nations now own over 1000 main battle tanks each. Such arsenals make outside intervention riskier and tougher. To wage quick, decisive campaigns against such threats (imperative for a nation intolerant of long conflicts) requires superior tactical mobility and devastating lethality. Though Third World heavy threats will not equal the sophisticated armored formations of the world's major powers, they cannot be overcome with inadequate weapons and mobility. The French-led Chadians, for instance, defeated large Libyan tank arrays not with foot mobility or rifles but with light motorized and mechanized transport and modern antitank technology. Thus American armed involvement in contingency areas—lacking forward-deployed forces and mature war plans—may not only be likely in tomorrow's less predictable security environment but will place more sophisticated demands upon our forces.

What about strategic lift? Are dramatic improvements in the offing that could enhance US ability to project military power and offset likely future decline in forward-based forces? Unfortunately, despite recent gains the prospects for achieving current DOD lift requirements are poor. The US Air Force is struggling to meet the DOD airlift goal of 66 million ton-miles per day. If full funding is obtained for the C-17 air transport, this target may be reached by the end of the century (though it continues to slip, and the long knives of budget cutters are already poised to whittle away at the $40 billion programmed for 210 aircraft). Moreover, the 66 MTM figure understates by nearly half the requirements identified in the many studies which preceded its adoption. According to the Air Force Airlift Master Plan, 66 MTM "represented a minimum goal constrained by fiscal pressures."

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The picture is worse in sealift. The precipitous decline of the US Merchant Marine, now barely ten percent of its post-World War II size and eroding daily, is matched by the disappearance of the US commercial shipbuilding industry, the recent sharp decline in NATO merchant shipping, and a shrinking pool of trained seamen. Nor is the Navy, anxious to salvage its dream of 600 line vessels, ready to devote more resources to sealift (for Marines or Army). Proposed ultra-fast surface effect ships (for instance, large 55-knot freighters based on current technology) would cut reinforcement times dramatically to any global troublespot. Yet the Navy has avoided pursuing this program.

None of the foregoing is new. There have been massive shortfalls in required US strategic lift since the 1950s. But in a future where trends demonstrate the increasing importance of lift to mitigate the effects of declining forward deployments, the chances of correcting this situation seem nil. The strategic deployability shortfall will continue.

A final important military trend with exciting potential lies in high-tech weapons and associated military systems. Here the prospects are good that the United States can develop significantly more lethal and discriminate land weapons. The projected improvements to current antiarmor weaponry, for instance, are likely to be matched in the future by even more lethal systems. Trends are also favorable for lightly armored or unarmored vehicular mobility. The possibilities inherent in America's traditional technological strength have important implications for the design of future ground forces.

Given these strategic and military trends, what are the ideal general purpose US military forces for the next 20 years? The following desirable features flow from the foregoing analysis:

- Strategic Deployability (light enough to get there quickly);
- High Lethality (able to kill a wide range of threats);
- Tactical (and Operational) Mobility (able to move quickly and decisively around the battlefield);
- Survivability (whether by protection, mobility, command and control, or a combination);
- Versatility (capable across a broad threat spectrum);
- Sustainability (logistically supportable within lift and theater infrastructure constraints).

How are the US armed services postured to meet these criteria? The answers are illuminating. The Air Force's tactical air power satisfies most of them, though its survivability and sustainability and the lack of capable airfields in various contingency areas present continuing challenges. Nevertheless, tactical air wings are widely and correctly perceived as an indispensable supporting component of the national warfighting potential. The Navy for its part has specifically postured itself to meet these requirements (though primarily in the context of maritime operations). Indeed, as the Soviet threat parameters...
recedes, the Navy will argue that its carrier-based fleets are even more valuable for contingency operations and power projection than for its sea control mission in the NATO/Warsaw Pact war scenario. Navy strategists are already touting the value of sea power for the future:

As the West further reduces the capability of its land power to guard distant frontiers in peacetime, President George Bush must be sure our naval forces can act in their stead. . . . Congressionally mandated economies can be accommodated in the reduction of American land power.11

Finally, the Marine Corps shares some of the Navy's advantages in strategic mobility, and in addition has been wrestling with the contingency area problem for many years. A service whose force development motto is "Light Enough to Deploy, Heavy Enough to Fight," whose divisions each include a battalion of tanks, substantial heavy artillery, and a wing of excellent close air support, and which can put every Marine infantryman at once on some transport (truck, amphibious tracked vehicle, or helo), must be recognized for its forcible-entry capability within the range of maritime forces.12 Indeed, to emphasize its flexible means of arriving at the scene of battle, the Marine Corps has recently renamed its units "expeditionary" (in lieu of "amphibious").13

For a nation which is both an aerospace and maritime power, these substantial capabilities of the Army's sister services are reassuring. Yet the United States is also a land power—its major conflicts in this century have all been decided on foreign soil. Is the Army well-postured to field ideal 21st-century land forces to "prosecute prompt and sustained combat on land to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas": Certainly the Army's modernized heavy forces (i.e. armored and mechanized infantry) are superb. The Abrams and the Bradley are marvelous tools of war. AirLand Battle perfectly fits the aggressive, confident psyche of the American soldier, and heavy battlefield tactics and techniques are constantly tempered in the cauldron of the National Training Center. Despite such advantages, however, heavy divisions and regiments cannot bear the full burden of strategic deployability. A powerful central reserve is worthless if it cannot get to the vital point in time. The Army is right to insist that forward deployments will remain a bulwark of American security, and that heavy forces will continue to be an indispensable component of land power. Nevertheless, divisions weighing 100,000 tons and equipped with 70-ton main battle tanks are simply too ponderous to comprise the total Army strategic force. Movement of just one of these divisions requires 2500 C5 and C141 sorties! Thus the Army faces an ever more acute deployability dilemma.

The strategic and military trends just described have been long developing, and the Army has grappled with the deployability dilemma for nearly a decade. Even while successfully ministering to the Army's post-Vietnam
malaise, the two previous Chiefs of Staff launched major initiatives in this area. Examining the history of these efforts yields important insights into the Army’s current situation. In the first months of his tenure as Army Chief of Staff in 1979, General Edward C. Meyer confronted a determined DOD move to make the Army even heavier by mechanizing its infantry divisions. Although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had not yet occurred and Southwest Asia had not yet been accorded public recognition as a US vital interest, General Meyer saw a clear need for lighter forces. The strategic lift situation was grim (the struggle with the Navy for fast sealift was just underway), contingency area requirements were growing, and the long-term prospect for retaining the current level of ground forces in NATO was doubtful. The new Chief favored converting infantry divisions to airmobile, but the expense of so many rotary-winged aircraft ruled out that option.

Pressed hard by DOD to mechanize his infantry divisions, General Meyer announced his intention to make the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, a “test bed” for a High Technology Light Division (which we’ll hereinafter refer to as the “HTLD”). This effort would examine the potential of advanced technology and tactics to make a division having both strategic and tactical mobility; able to deliver substantial antiarmor firepower (protected by light armor or mobility or both); and possessing superb command, control, communications, and intelligence. It should be able to defeat a range of heavy threats, including those in contingency areas or those which might be met by a strategic reserve in mature theaters. Thus, though “light” was part of its title, the HTLD was clearly meant to be—and was—a “middle-weight” force within the terms of this article. This division would be able to deploy by air in less than 1000 C-141 equivalent sorties (an initial planning goal General Meyer picked to discipline the development process). To design and test this division he created the Army Development and Evaluation Agency (ADEA), an off-line organization conceived to shortcut the Army materiel and doctrine development process. General Meyer hand-picked key leaders for this effort, and devoted substantial personal effort to insure his vision would be carried out.

Although given the Army’s highest priority, the HTLD developed more slowly than desired. The sortie constraint proved especially troublesome, and Army force developers concluded that the design could not be achieved under those limitations (1200 to 1400 C-141 sorties later became the optimum planning figure for a division of this type). Moreover, the existence of ADEA was an institutional irritant, requiring constant personal attention by the Chief of Staff (it survived his retirement by less than five years). Nevertheless, by the end of General Meyer’s term, much had been done. A test-bed brigade had been formed with surrogate systems for the proposed slimmed down armored and motorized forces, and a host of combat multipliers were devised to enable the HTLD to defeat a heavy threat: light armored vehicles, wheeled troop carriers.
precision navigation aids, night vision devices, self-propelled but unarmored heavy artillery, ground-launched HELLFIRE long-range antiarmor missiles, computerized command and control, and advanced intelligence gathering and processing. It would rest with General Meyer’s successor to see if this innovation would flower or not.

When General John A. Wickham, Jr., became Chief of Staff in 1983, the strategic trends driving a lighter Army were clearer still. General Wickham was even more pessimistic than his predecessor about the prospects for airlift, an increase of which he felt was vital. He had several other key personal convictions:

- He was disenchanted with Division 86, the Army’s redesign for its heavy divisions, which by 1983, he recalled, “had become everybody’s grab bag. . . . When all the good ideas were thrown in you had a 20,000-man division, and the Corps commander had very little with which to influence the battle.”

- The Army’s infantry needed a shot in the arm. Although he had commanded a mechanized brigade, General Wickham’s principal troop assignments had been with lighter infantry forces, and he felt that the Army needed more infantry with a renewed sense of purpose and training.

- Although unwilling to eliminate the HTLD (both from a felt obligation to sustain and continue the initiative and from his conviction that experimentation was healthy for the Army per se), General Wickham was not enamored with ADEA’s proposed design, which he felt was too heavy, too expensive, and infantry-poor. Moreover, he disliked the combined arms battalion idea—battalions with light armor and light infantry companies permanently cross-attached—presented as a vital part of the HTLD.

These convictions led General Wickham to adopt two important measures to reshape the Army: lightening the Army overall, and establishing Light Infantry Divisions. Both of these initiatives were to prove controversial (not least for the thorough and determined methods employed by the Army’s senior leadership to embed them deep into the service), but both served the Army’s growing need to shed weight.

The move to lighten the total Army evolved from the Army of Excellence study and met less resistance. Redirection of materiel development programs to ensure higher priority for lightness and deployability was long overdue and well executed. However, the Army of Excellence force design changes for the heavy divisions provoked considerable resistance. Although there was widespread agreement that Division 86 had grown too fat, the paring-down process bled off some important combat capability.

The Light Infantry Division—called the LID for short—caused the most debate, however. Designed to meet a rigid deployability constraint, a light division was to deploy on no more than 500 C-141-equivalent air transport sorties (based more on a desire to control the design process than on a formally
generated requirement). By design, the LID featured footmobile infantry, and its primary mission focus (at least initially) was low-intensity conflict. Outside the low-intensity arena, the new light division sacrificed four advantages of modern military technology: 100-percent organic tactical mobility, concentrated heavy antitank firepower, full logistical sustainability, and sophisticated C3I. Thus the world’s most developed country created what appeared to some a throwback—a manpower-intensive division that walked, not rode, carried rifles, not heavy antitank weapons, and often got its wounded out by improvised litter. (In fact, the LID looked much like the Army’s World War II light divisions, which were formed for combat in rough, mountainous terrain, but beefed up before actual combat employment or converted to standard designs because of concerns over firepower and support.)

The institutional tensions caused by the LID were worsened by the development of its strategic rationale. Thoughtful military professionals could agree that a couple of these divisions represented a useful addition to the Army’s sparse light forces, which at that time consisted solely of an airborne and an air assault division. But the rationale for a greater number was hotly debated. Owing to lingering domestic fears of “another Vietnam,” it seemed unlikely that the United States in the foreseeable future would be willing to commit sizable combat forces to a low-intensity conflict. This supposition undercut the rationale for converting a substantial proportion of our forces to light units, which were the principal instruments of low-intensity conflict. Nevertheless, owing partly to basing and other considerations, the Army’s senior leaders decided to field five LIDs, with important consequences:

- This increased number reinforced an emphasis on finding mid-intensity combat rationales for the light divisions, which substantially increased the training tasks for the new formations and thus eroded their training focus.
- Joint war planners at this early stage tended to feel that while smaller units of light infantry could be useful for urban, forested, and other restricted terrain, there was little perceived requirement for light divisions in their entirety (especially for Europe and Southwest Asia).
- Perhaps most critical for the Army’s less-than-heavy force structure, the HTLD suffered a serious loss of momentum. Instead of providing a model for conversion of other units, the 9th Infantry Division became “one of a kind.” With only a single-division requirement for the HTLD’s weapon systems, Congress could no longer be convinced that light armored vehicle procurement made sense. Efforts to demonstrate the HTLD’s utility to warfighting theater commanders effectively ceased. Moreover, the HTLD had no institutional sponsor. Fort Benning, home of the infantry, had its hands full trying to master the tactical implications of the Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicle and the new light divisions themselves. The Armor School at Fort Knox, in view of the increasing unlikelihood of developing actual light armored vehicles, found it easier to
Mounting the TOW antiarmor missile system on the HUMMWV—as shown here—adds middleweight punch to motorized infantry.

concentrate on heavy force issues. Likewise, owing partly to the independent status of ADEA, neither the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command nor the Army Materiel Command had much effort to spare for the HTLD. This institutional orphan soon deteriorated. Various proposals for a light armored vehicle quick fix, including the Marine LAV 25 and the Army’s old Sheridan light tank, were discarded one after the other."

Finally, in an attempt to field at least an interim HTLD, the 9th Infantry Division was converted to the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). Specifically, this version of the HTLD middleweight division mounted large masses of the TOW antiarmor missile system on the Army’s new high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle—the HMMWV—and put its rifle companies on a troop-carrying version of the same vehicle. As a legacy from the early HTLD design era, the motorized battalions had only three maneuver companies, not four as in Division 86 units, and had relatively little infantry (only nine motorized rifle companies in the entire division). The new division lacked many of the combat multipliers thought indispensable by its original designers. Lacking an urgent Army-wide priority, ADEA could not persuade the Army to field such systems as the ground-launched HELLFIRE long-range antiarmor missile, a self-propelled unarmored howitzer, precision navigation
equipment, an improved squad carrier, a light engineer vehicle, towed heavy mortars, and others. It should be stressed, however, that the term “motorized” in the interim middleweight context implied far more than simply wheeled transportation: the new motorized middleweight was based upon an operational concept codified in doctrine (specifically included in FM 100-5) and possessed a complete set of tactical procedures. Equipped principally with an innovative but often user-hostile computerized C³I system and a mass of slow-firing antitank missile carriers, armored with faith in the maneuver potential inherent in AirLand Battle and the American soldier, the middleweight division began operations in 1986.

The subsequent histories of these new lighter divisions, the HTLD and the LID, make a fascinating comparison. The LID continued to enjoy a high Army priority, demonstrating its show-the-flag utility with its much-publicized deployment to Honduras in 1988. There, the quick arrival of units from the 82d Airborne Division and the 7th Light Infantry Division defused a potential low-intensity conflict. This was precisely the kind of utility General Wickham had envisaged.

When training for more demanding mid-intensity combat scenarios, however, LIDs faced greater challenges. Particularly difficult was the need to integrate reinforcements from higher echelons, especially antitank and transportation assets, needed for LIDs to attempt combat on a mechanized battlefield. (These reinforcements, known as “corps plugs,” make an LID deployment significantly more cumbersome.) The problem here can be characterized as the “Task Force Smith” syndrome. Like that first American combat element to see action in the Korean War (which was thrown together quickly), units that have not habitually trained with reinforcing and supporting elements—particularly when such support provides a quantum jump in combat capability—have a harder time fighting together smoothly and cohesively.

The same challenges face the heavy-light rotations at the NTC, where light infantry battalions occasionally augment heavy brigades. Here concerted effort has yielded some success. Heavy task forces, always anxious to get more infantry, are increasingly willing to work around the penalties associated with transporting and supplying light infantry units. When properly employed by a heavy task force, light fighters can make significant tactical contributions. Nevertheless, current NTC experience demonstrates the continued difficulties in molding smoothly functioning teams from units with such diverse tactical capabilities. Finally, when employed alone, without corps plugs or ad hoc integration with heavy units, light infantry units still have only limited combat potential in open terrain against an armored threat.

As for the middleweight force as currently embodied in the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), it has demonstrated considerable utility, especially when measured against the future ideal force criteria outlined above. Its major deployments (by air, sea, rail, and road to Korea, the Middle East,
and throughout the western United States) have been models of efficient movement—tributes to the strategic deployability consciousness of its designers. Moreover, these movements have demonstrated the unique mobility of a middleweight force at the operational level of war. In contrast to light forces (which must be augmented for any intra-theater movement) and even heavy forces (which pay a substantial maintenance penalty for lengthy tracked moves), middleweight forces can make rapid, extended movements without augmentation or readiness impact.\textsuperscript{35}

The middleweight division has also demonstrated superior sustainability. Supporting a motorized force (which employs heavy force logistical doctrine with substantially less maintenance and service support requirements) has proven surprisingly easy, given the extended distances often associated with motorized operations. These forces not only can sustain themselves with much less difficulty than heavy units but require significantly less tonnage to support their operations. This is an important advantage for any operational planner considering force deployment to a contingency area.\textsuperscript{36}

As for tactical mobility, the HMMWV has proven remarkably effective, providing the middleweight force with tactical mobility essentially equal to heavy forces on virtually all terrain.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, the adoption of armor-type crew cohesion techniques, focused on the bonding of soldiers and vehicles, has notably facilitated the exceptional rapidity of motorized tactical movement.

Its own ability to engage and defeat enemy heavy units has presented a major challenge for the middleweight force. Having only towed artillery and medium air defense systems has proven a serious handicap. Also, the ground-launched HELLFIRE and the improved Mark 19 grenade machine gun have been sorely missed. Necessity has driven the division’s TOW gunnery to well above the Army’s average. Nevertheless, the reliance upon the slow-firing TOW as the sole long-range tank killer means that frontal offensive assaults and prevention of enemy leakage through defense sectors are difficult—though significant successes have been achieved in both missions.\textsuperscript{38}

Survivability is the most critical issue for a middleweight unit. The 9th Division’s first NTC rotations provide some indications of its potential in this area. Significantly, survivability in the face of enemy artillery, an obvious concern for an unarmored force, has been a workable problem. The middleweight units operated on extremely wide and deep frontages and employed a variety of tactics and techniques to avoid opposing force artillery. Their generally low losses to artillery tended to vindicate General Meyer’s belief that rapid mobility, clever tactics, and sophisticated \textsuperscript{C}3\textsuperscript{I} can compensate in considerable degree for lack of armored protection in many scenarios. Similar observations eventually applied to survivability against enemy air and direct fire systems.\textsuperscript{39}

The most pressing needs of the current middleweight force (as shown at the NTC and elsewhere) are for at least some rapid-fire gun capability, and
for more infantry (though the 9th Division's relatively few infantry companies generally perform well in shaping the battlefield). The consensus of seasoned NTC personnel, for example, was that the addition of about a tank company to each infantry brigade, and the addition of more infantry companies, would add substantial lethality and survivability to the present middleweight force—certainly enough to "demolish any Third World bad guys," in the words of one NTC observer, or to defeat the other likely heavy threats for a motorized force discussed above. (It should be noted that a tank battalion has in fact recently been added to the division, and an increase in infantry companies could be accommodated within the division's current equipment and strength.)

Of late, the middleweight force, reportedly on the edge of extinction, has continued to demonstrate its potential. Rapid no-notice self-deployments over many hundreds of miles to meet civic action contingencies and successful 102-mile mounted infiltrations during darkness against opposing Marine regiments typify the operational and tactical capabilities of middleweight forces."

Given the strategic imperatives for the next 20 years discussed earlier, and the history of the Army's recent efforts to fit itself to those strategic imperatives, what is the prescription for its future force? How might the Army best organize itself to match the ideal criteria described in this article?

First, concerning General Wickham's vision of a lightened total force, lighter main battle tanks—and indeed lightening of the Army's entire family of armored vehicles—are essential. They can be fielded only with a real commitment from the entire heavy community—hopefully forthcoming. As for force design, the important combat capability sacrificed in the slimming down represented by the Army of Excellence should be restored. In attempts to do so, however, heavy force designers must not forget the pressing need for deployability now so evident. Every ton and sortie saved will be vital in shoring up the role of heavy forces in years to come.

As for Army light forces, the prescriptions are simple. The XVIII Airborne Corps' 82d and 101st Divisions provide airborne and air assault capabilities that will remain indispensable. For their part, the five light infantry divisions (the 6th, 7th, 10th, 25th, and 29th) are now firmly established in concept and in practice, with a burgeoning doctrinal base. Their hand-picked leadership has trained a cohesive core of young leaders and helped revitalize our infantry, just as General Wickham envisaged. Their capability for low-intensity conflict is excellent and should continue to form the focus for their training efforts. So disciplined have they been in restraining their size that perhaps it is time to begin judicious enhancement of support capability (especially medical, service support, and C2). However, there are arguably too many light infantry forces for likely future strategic needs. The Army can and should upgrade some light infantry units to middleweight status so as to equip them to engage in mid-intensity conflict. Significantly, Army long-range doctrine writers, cognizant of the
The Army can and should upgrade some light infantry units to middleweight status to equip them to engage in mid-intensity conflict.

The trends discussed in this article, are proposing a range of options including increased reliance on heavy-light mixes and readily tailorable forces. These are vitally important initiatives, but by themselves cannot fill the gap caused by the lack of a middleweight capability. (The implications of the Task Force Smith syndrome and the continued need to reduce lift requirements should both be weighed carefully in this regard.)

The Army needs middleweight forces to provide the missing part of its future combat potential. Though the current middleweight division lacks many originally planned combat multipliers, it still embodies the wherewithal to execute AirLand Battle doctrine. The tactics and techniques employed by middleweight soldiers to wrest every particle of combat capability from their equipment represents a potentially powerful but as yet fragile grouping of skills and attitudes-too precious to waste for an Army that prizes initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.

In the short term, the Army should retain its interim middleweight force, which is relatively inexpensive and provides excellent combat capability. For the long haul, Army leaders and doctrine writers should refurbish the vision of an Army of all weights-light, middleweight, and heavy-so as to be capable across the full spectrum of conflict. This suggests increasing the number of middleweight divisions and continuing to develop the equipment unique to their role. In an era of brutally shrinking defense budgets and changing strategic needs, middleweight forces can provide a sorely needed bargain. Some current light infantry units (and some or all of the National Guard line infantry divisions) should be converted to middleweight status. The Army missed the chance to develop the ideal light armored vehicle for such a force—but the current middleweight force has proven that the ideal vehicle isn’t required. Weapon technology within our grasp will provide increased antiarmor lethality. Match that to current light mobility technology, mix with American ingenuity and fighting spirit, and the middleweight force of the future can take shape quickly.

The Army has been fortunate in the foresight of its senior leadership during the period when the deployability issue began to assert itself. Generals Meyer and Wickham recognized the trends reinforcing the Army’s role as the central mobile strategic reserve of the free world, and each launched major
initiatives in response. As a result, today’s proud and ready Army, though facing extraordinary fiscal pressures, is well positioned to refine and adapt those early initiatives so as to produce the ideal force for the 90s and beyond. As part of this endeavor, the Army should add some tough new middleweights to its ever-improving light and heavyweight fighter ranks—and become the flexible, deployable strategic force our nation requires.

NOTES

4. A million ton-miles is referred to as an “MTM.”
10. NWPI (Rev A), Strategic Concepts of the US Navy (May 1978), Chapters 1-4, passim.
13. Discussion with General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commandant, USMC, 17 March 1989, and interview with Mr. Jeffrey Record, 10 March 1989. General Gray denies the charge made by some Army observers that this name change was oriented specifically as staking out a role for the Marine Corps as the nation’s principal expeditionary force of the future. And indeed, although some maritime enthusiasts occasionally make that claim, the different and complementary capabilities of the Marines and the Army ensure that both will have indispensable roles to play in projecting US ground combat capability in the future. The issue in the present article is whether the Army is optimally suited to play its part in expeditions of tomorrow. See Jeffrey Record, “The Army’s Clouded Future,” The Washington Post, 15 November 1988, p. A21. Although some Army supporters took Mr. Record’s article as an attack on Army capabilities, he insists that his intention was to cause the Army to rethink its positions on the issues.
16. Ibid. Also based on a series of telephone interviews with Mr. Robert Keller, Director, Current Forces Division at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (The original name assigned to the Fort Lewis effort was the High Technology Test Bed [HTTB].)
17. Interview with General Meyer.
19. Interview with Generl Meyer.
20. Interview with General (Ret.) John A. Wickham, 27 February 1989. Division 86 was a major TRADOC-sponsored initiative in the early 1980s to examine the entire structure of the heavy division in light of the Army’s evolving AirLand Battle doctrine. The designers of the HTLD presumed that permanent cross-attachment of armor and infantry units would provide significant synergism as part of the combat multipliers whose cumulative impact would enhance HTLD capability. However, such organization is controversial within the Army. It is presently being tested by heavy units at Fort Hood and Fort Carson, with apparently favorable results as of this writing. Despite the hopes of its designers, the combined arms
organization (while an effective way to train and organize) is not in my personal experience an indispen-
sable part of the HTLD.
21. Interview with General Wickham. The Army of Excellence studies were another TRADOC-
sponsored series of efforts to examine Army force structure for savings in manpower and equipment, orien-
ted in part at saving spaces for use in fielding the new light divisions.
22. Telephone interview with Major Alexander, Doctrine Branch, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox,
    Kentucky. The combat capability included loss of divisional cavalry squadron tanks.
23. Interview with General Wickham.
24. Interview with Colonel Ron Corson (during the LID formation process, Chief of Systems Division,
25. Both Generals Meyer and Wickham were deeply impressed with the airmobile division's ability
to move its infantry units rapidly about the battlefield even though its numerous organic helicopters could
lift only about one-third of these units at one time. This neither felt that 100-percent tactical mobility was
particularly essential. However, neither apparently considered that the peculiar friction associated with
moving scarce ground vehicular mobility assets around the battlefield (e.g. getting truck assets from the
trains to link up with combat units) strongly argues for 100-percent tactical mobility. See NTC after-action
reports describing the difficulties associated with truck augmentation to light infantry units, dated 7 June
26. Telephone interview with Brigadier General William Stoff, Commander of the Army Center of
    Military History, 22 March 1989. The official Army history of World War II light divisions is now in draft.
27. Interviews with Jeffrey Record and Colonel Michael Stupka, former planner for the Deputy Chief
    of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff.
28. Interview with Colonel Corson.
29. Based on discussions with joint and Army war planners during the period 1985-1986, Colonel (P)
    August 1988, makes the strongest recent case for the utility of LIDs and their brigades in Europe.
30. Interview with General Wickham.
31. Ibid. The Light Armored Vehicle 25, a wheeled armored multi-purpose vehicle, was an outgrowth
    of a joint Army-Marine development effort; unfortunately the two services were unable to agree on a joint
    requirement and the Army pulled out of the program (interview with General Meyer).
32. Vuono, p. A21. See also his "The United States Army is a Strategic Force," Armed Forces Journal
33. Based on numerous personal observations and discussions with fellow soldiers, including NTC
    observers, and opposing force officers. I am indebted to Jeffrey Record for the Task Force Smith
    paradigm, though it should be noted that some of Task Force Smith's problems stemmed from its internal
    training failures.
34. Interviews with NTC opposing force commanders and observer-controllers; unpublished "heavy-
35. Steven D. Vermillion, "Forest Ablaze: Fort Lewis Troops Answer the Call," Army, February 1989,
p. 49. Some specific examples of such deployments include the 1988 sea and air Team Spirit deployment
to Korea of 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and its attachments; 9th Division deployments by air, rail,
and ground to Fort Irwin, California in 1986-1988, including the 3d Brigade combat team's movement in
1988 and the 1st Brigade's in 1989; deployment by air of 9th Division Task Force 3-47 to the Sinai
Peninsula in 1988; deployment by air of the 9th Division's 3d Brigade task force to Twenty-Nine Palms, California
in 1988; and deployment by air and ground to Montana and Wyoming in the summer of 1988 of two
brigade-sized units of the 9th Division. In each of these (and all other less lengthy movements during the
same period), deployment proceeded without significant problems.
37. Personal observations of the author. See also NTC After-Action Report for Rotation 88-9, dated
    26 May 1988. The HMMWV is a major success story of Army industry materiel design and development.
    Its rugged suspension, efficient drive train, wide wheel base, and simple yet sophisticated engineering have
    produced a vehicle optimally designed for rapid cross-country movement. 9th Division users, among the
    first in the Army to field the HMMWV, have been remarkably efficient at employing it at the limits of its
design potential and exploiting its many configurations and variants.
    Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel P. T. Mikolashek concerning his NTC rotation, 10 April 1989.
39. Ibid. The NTC scenarios attempted to mirror the contingency area environments for which the
    motorized force was principally designed.
40. Discussions with former Marine operations officer at Twenty-Nine Palms and with various
    members of the 9th Infantry Division's 3d Brigade combat team.
41. The Army National Guard standard line infantry divisions include the 26th, 28th, 38th, 42d, and 47th.

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A frightening contradiction dominates the counterinsurgent environment: there is little indication that US skill in this type of conflict has grown as rapidly as the strategic relevance of insurgency. This dangerous gap between capabilities and the extent of the threat, which first became evident during counterinsurgency’s post-Vietnam Dark Ages, can be traced to a number of factors. Among the most pressing is the lack of a coherent planning process to link strategic, operational, and tactical responses and bring order to the erratic, ad hoc way that the United States currently approaches counterinsurgency. Mao, who knew that “without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible,” remains unheeded.

Since planning tools abound, the logical explanation for the lack of a counterinsurgent planning process is the misallocation of responsibility among government agencies. Presently the State Department, acting through ambassador-led country teams, has the lead role in counterinsurgency. But the State Department is, by nature, weak at long-range strategic planning. State’s raison d’être is negotiation; the skills it cultivates are not those of the strategist—as John le Carré observed, “In diplomacy nothing lasts, nothing is absolute, a conspiracy to murder is no grounds for endangering the flow of conversation.” Given this institutional zeitgeist, diplomats are singularly ill-equipped to plan the integrated and sustained application of national power.

Clearly, then, some other agency must step forward, develop a method for coherent planning, and vigorously champion it in the bureaucratic morass that often surrounds counterinsurgency. The Army, which has given the most attention to the development of coherent planning methods for the orderly application of resources in conflict, is the logical choice for such an
The objective should be the application of campaign planning to counterinsurgency. While the recent attention given campaign planning by the Army is healthy, nearly all of the effort has focused on the conventional Fulda Gap type of conflict; the architects of campaign planning have shied away from the bureaucratic and strategic complexities of counterinsurgency. As a result, campaign planning in its present form is not directly applicable to counterinsurgency. Adaptation is required. The sooner such a process begins, the sooner American ineptitude at counterinsurgency can be transcended.

**Adapting the Structure**

Similarities between conventional warfighting and counterinsurgency allow campaign planning to be adapted. In both environments, the objective is a rigorous, coherent, rational method for the application of resources in pursuit of national interests. In both, the goal of planning is to expand control of the conflict—to integrate diverse factors and phase actions into the medium-term future.

There are, however, key differences vital to the planner. Most striking is a variation in the basic nature of victory. While political objectives are preeminent in both conflict environments—the Clausewitzian imperative still holds—in counterinsurgency the defeat of enemy armed forces does not automatically lead to the attainment of the political objective. Instead, the key is eradication of conditions conducive to violence and instability. In all cases, political, psychological, and economic methods must be fully integrated with military force. As Frank Kitson has noted, "Insurgency is not primarily a military activity." Thus the symbolic impact and psychological message of every use of force is equal to or greater than the tangible and direct effect.

While differences between the conventional and counterinsurgent environments are substantial, the essential logic holds. Even the format could be similar (see Figure 1). Certain factors, however, take on added importance, or at least importance of a different kind.

The function of strategic guidance is one example. As with all campaigns, a counterinsurgent campaign must take place within an overarching strategic framework. A campaign planner must negotiate "a tangled map of military crossroads imposed on political intersections." Unfortunately, it

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is easy to lose sight of the global or theater perspective in counterinsurgency; country-specific campaigns have been the rule rather than the exception. Therefore, strategic vision in both a global and theater sense is vital. To construct a strategy, the United States must have a clear notion of what we want the world in general, and the Third World in particular, to look like in the future—as Fred C. Iklé has noted, “Those who aim for nothing are guaranteed to hit it.” Currently we have no strategic vision for the Third World and thus no global strategy for low-intensity conflict. Strategic constraints—which always affect a campaign plan—are even more pressing in counterinsurgency. Most important, the global range of American interests and commitments limits our ability to devote resources to any given conflict. Gone are the days when a John Kennedy could pledge the United States to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship.
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.” Furthermore, public and congressional opinion form a lurking brake on counterinsurgent activity, often proscribing the use of the American military or weakening support for allied regimes perceived as oppressive or corrupt. In most cases, the campaign planner has no control over strategic constraints, but must carefully consider them when selecting methods of US support for an ally, the timing of the plan, and even the insurgencies within a theater that require American action.

Counterinsurgent campaign planning places heavy demands on the analytical ability of the planner. At the strategic level he must identify relevant US interests and usable elements of national power. This includes establishing a priority among competing national interests and developing sensitivity to the inherent advantages and disadvantages of each element of national power. At the operational level, the campaign planner must identify the source and causes of instability in the region and country, the viability and worthiness of the government in the country facing insurgency, and the nature of the insurgency itself. This requires understanding the essential nature of the society in which the insurgency exists. The campaign planner, in other words, must be part sociologist, part historian, and part political scientist—difficult tasks for officers schooled only in conventional warfighting.

In a deviation from conventional campaign planning, where the mission precedes all other aspects of planning, in counterinsurgency the mission is largely derived from the analysis of the situation. American objectives in a counterinsurgent conflict will always include stability and the promotion of democracy, human rights, and free enterprise; they may include protection of basing rights, access to resources, and investments. But all of this does not automatically imply that the mission of US forces is unqualified support of the government and full and total defeat of the insurgents.

As the United States slowly transcends its high Cold War, Manichaean view of the world and recognizes that any victory in insurgency that leaves the root causes of conflict unchanged is a chimera, reconciliation may become the primary objective of counterinsurgency. To seek the full defeat of the insurgents was a natural goal when strategy was based on the experience of World War II, but in a constrained conflict where the United States is unwilling or unable to pay the costs of massive involvement, American power should be used to bring settlement on favorable terms. In any case, the decision to seek full defeat of the insurgents or reconciliation should be guided by the analysis of the root causes of conflict, the American interests at stake, and, most important, the goals of the insurgents.

Mirroring a conventional campaign, operations in counterinsurgency form phased steps promoting attainment of the strategic objective. The plan should specify details of the first phase and a broad outline of subsequent phases, allowing for branches and sequels in response to various contingencies.

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Each phase should be composed of operational objectives, tasks, and requirements (see Figure 2). For all operational functions, establishing priorities is a key element of planning. Factors that influence this will again include the nature of the insurgency, available resources, and strategic considerations such as the sense of urgency. Whatever the priority among objectives and tasks, the four tools of counterinsurgency—security assistance, intelligence, psychological operations, and civil affairs—should be fully integrated.

Clarifying command and control relationships is always a central task of campaign planning. What is unique to counterinsurgent campaign planning is the importance of a type of liaison relationship which occupies the hazy ground between traditional political liaisons and military command and control. These will link the military and civilian sectors of the US government as well as the militaries, police, intelligence services, and development agencies of the United States and the allied government. Because liaison relationships are less structured than command and control links and not based on doctrine, they require more careful planning in order to clarify channels of communication and levels of authority.

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**Figure 2: Operational Phasing**

*Phase 1 through Phase n*

- **OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES**
  - Political
  - Politico-economic
  - Politico-social
  - Politico-military
  - Politico-psychological

- **TASKS**
  - Separate the people from insurgent political cadres
  - Protect the people from insurgent military forces
  - Defeat insurgent forces

- **FUNCTIONS**
  - Neutralization
  - Security
  - Balanced development
  - Social mobilization

- **REQUIREMENTS**
  - Security assistance (funds and managers)
  - Intelligence
  - Psychological operations
  - Civil affairs

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Risk assessment is vital for campaign planning. In counterinsurgency, strategic risks include the damage to US interests and prestige around the world that would accrue from failure or from association with an incompetent, brutal, or corrupt allied government; and the dangers of escalation if the insurgency turns into a superpower proxy confrontation. Most military planners feel more comfortable with the assessment of tactical risks, yet counterinsurgent planning requires the full integration of the strategic perspective.

The Planning Process

Counterinsurgent planning must be CINC-oriented, but also interagency. This demands the education of civilian participants in the merits and methods of a campaign-planning approach to conflict; regular coordination during the plan development, assessment, and revision processes; and clear procedures for passing primary responsibility from civilian agencies to the military if the insurgency reaches that level of military intensity.

A number of criteria should guide the planner, including the US national security strategy, US military strategy, US doctrine, allied strategy, the allied national plan, and the principles of counterinsurgent conflict. US national security and national military strategies are certainly preeminent planning criteria. While the planner must sometimes piece together and interpret various indicators of these strategies, solid sources of guidance include the annual National Security Strategy of the United States, Defense Guidance, the annual reports to Congress by the Secretary of Defense, and applicable National Security Decision Directives. The next criterion should be the CINC’s theater strategy. Equally important are US doctrine for low-intensity conflict, counter guerrilla war, psychological operations, civil affairs, and other appropriate functions. Also vital—and often overlooked as planning criteria—are the national counterinsurgency plan and the military strategy of the allied government. Finally, a version of the traditional principles of war, adapted to the counterinsurgent environment through focus on the political and psychological dimensions of the struggle and the problems of interagency and alliance relationships, can assist the campaign planner (see Figure 3).

Conclusions

Campaign planning can provide a logical, rigorous, and coherent method for linking understanding of the low-intensity conflict milieu and the actual application of all elements of American power in pursuit of national interests. It can ease the problems associated with force planning for counterinsurgency and provide a verifiable rationale for resource requests. Campaign planning, through proper modification, can unify the logics of low-intensity conflict and mid-intensity conflict while allowing the officer adept in conventional warfighting to more quickly adapt to counterinsurgency. Finally,
Figure 3: Principles of Counterinsurgent Conflict

- **LEGITIMACY**
  All actions should seek to eradicate the sources of violence and instability. In most cases this requires augmenting the legitimacy of the host nation government and eroding the legitimacy of the insurgents.

- **OBJECTIVE**
  Every operation should be directed toward a clearly defined and attainable political objective.

- **OFFENSIVE**
  Seize, retain, and exploit the political initiative.

- **FCONOMY OF VIOLENCE**
  Attain political objectives with the minimum of violence.

- **UNITY OF EFFORT**
  All efforts, whether military, political, or economic, should be under unified control and should support one another.

- **SECURITY**
  Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected political advantage.

- **SIMPLICITY**
  Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to insure thorough understanding.

- **SUPPORT**
  US efforts should be in support of the host nation strategy.

- **INTELLIGENCE**
  Information is the cornerstone of counterinsurgency, so no operation should proceed without substantial intelligence.

campaign planning for counterinsurgency can clarify the link between national interests and the application of power; through organization in phases, it can drive home that counterinsurgency is not a short-term contingency operation and thus lessen the adverse political effects growing from the protractedness of low-intensity conflict.

Even given these obvious benefits, serious obstacles remain to the adoption of counterinsurgent campaign planning. One of the most pressing is the bifurcated and transitional nature of planning responsibility. By the time the
military assumes the lead role from the State Department, an insurgency has passed the point where a politically and economically constrained United States can deal with it. Since it is the military that is closest to having a rigorous and coherent method for planning counterinsurgent campaigns, this means that such planning methods are likely to be used only in futile situations, thus eroding confidence in the planning methodology. Simply put, it does not matter how rational and coherent the military's method of planning for counterinsurgency is so long as the State Department and CIA do not subscribe.

A second obstacle is the “enemy within.” In this case the culprit is not a communist infiltrator, but rather the ossification that too often dominates Army thinking. Part of this manifests itself as what Andrew Krepinevich called the “Army concept” for the application of military power. This is derived from and oriented toward conventional, mid-intensity conflict against the Soviets or Soviet-style forces. Successful counterinsurgency planning requires transcendence of the Army concept. It demands thinking broadly in two directions: vertically, the planner must integrate country plans into theater and global strategies; horizontally he must penetrate the mental walls that separate the use of military force from economic, political, and psychological power.

These obstacles are serious, but not insurmountable. The solution to the bifurcation of planning into civilian and military methodologies is, obviously, a unified method operative from the initiation of American involvement to its conclusion. This, in turn, is contingent on organizational clarity.

Historical models of close civil-military cooperation in counterinsurgency exist. For example, in the Malayan Emergency commencing in 1948, General Sir Gerald Templar became the first military man to be named British High Commissioner. To encourage even greater integration, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, a retired officer considered an expert in jungle warfare, was appointed civilian director of counterinsurgent operations in 1950. Working immediately under the High Commissioner, he was able to coordinate the activities of the military, police, and government.

For the United States the key model is the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program instituted in Vietnam in 1967. This program fully integrated military and civilian efforts under a combined authority at all levels. The relationship was one of true equality: some regions had a military director with a civilian aide, other regions had the reverse. Rather than the method of transitional responsibility that exists today, a global or theater CORDS-type program should be constructed. While this degree of civil-military integration would radically alter the role of the CINCs, it would also facilitate campaign planning while there is still time enough in the gestation of an insurgency to tip the scales with reasonable levels of American involvement.

Even if no integrated theater-level authority is created, thinking of counterinsurgency from a campaign-planning perspective still has advantages.
In collective decisionmaking and planning situations such as the ambassador-led interagency country team, the best-prepared participant often plays a major role in structuring the planning process. Thus if the uniformed officer on a country team has given the most extensive thought to coherent methods of counterinsurgent planning and brings well-developed planning tools to meetings, he will strongly influence the group planning process. And, more important, counterinsurgent campaign planning could stress the integrated use of all elements of national power.

Overcoming the mid-intensity mind-set within the Army is both feasible and difficult. Consideration must, however, be given to critics who argue that it may be impossible to have a single officer corps adept at both mid-intensity conflict and low-intensity conflict. If this is true, the only solution may be the creation of a dedicated low-intensity conflict force. But given the serious implications of such a radical step, the immediate task of the Army is to cultivate a true understanding of the Third World and counterinsurgent environments in the officer corps.

The need for a coherent method of planning for counterinsurgency exists. So too does a usable model. All that is missing is the effort and initiative to make the adaptations required for the development of an effective counterinsurgent planning tool.

NOTES

6. Compare the suggested format in FM 101-5, Large Unit Operations, coordinating draft, 30 September 1987, appendix A.
14. See, for example, Edward Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters, 13 (December 1983), 11-18.
Korea and American National Security

STEVEN A. RAHO III

Throughout the 20th century, US policy with respect to Korea has lacked continuity and consistency. Prior to 1945, the United States was largely indifferent, acquiescing in the Japanese colonization of the peninsula. In 1945 we landed troops on Inchon, but by 1949 had determined Korea was a liability and withdrew our forces. In 1950 the US Secretary of State declared that Korea was outside the American defense perimeter in the Pacific—yet five months later we entered the Korean War and spilled the blood of thousands of soldiers on Korean soil. In 1954 we concluded the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to demonstrate our commitment to the Asian region, but in 1969 the Nixon Doctrine seemed to pull the rug out from under our 1954 treaty obligation. By 1976, under President Carter, we seriously flirted with the notion of pulling all of our ground forces out of Korea; but by 1981 we reversed our strategy and actually increased our military force structure. Now in 1989 the United States is once again considering a withdrawal of military forces from the peninsula as a means to assist in balancing the federal budget.¹

Asia—A Regional Perspective

By the first decade of the next century much of the political, economic, and military power in the world will be centered in Northeast Asia. According to a report issued by the President’s Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy, whose members include Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Fred Iklé, and General John Vessey (USA Ret.), most of the world’s leading powers will eventually be Pacific powers. The commission’s report predicts that by 2010 China may have the second largest gross national product in the world, followed by Japan and the Soviet Union. The GNPs of middle powers like Korea will also grow substantially relative to those of the countries of Western Europe.²
Owen Harries, in his article “The Coming Dominance of the Pacific,” cites a century-old quotation by Secretary of State John Hay: “The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the ocean of the present, and the Pacific is the ocean of the future.” Harries laments that even though the Asian-Pacific region is one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world, it gets little serious attention from America’s strategic planners—mostly owing to the penchant for strategists and generals to prepare to fight the last war.

The economic growth of the Pacific region over the past several years has indeed been phenomenal. Since 1980 the region has surpassed Europe as America’s largest trading partner, and the margin of difference grows each year. Trade with Japan alone exceeds trade with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France combined. China’s GNP has doubled in the last ten years, and Japanese foreign aid now exceeds US foreign aid.

The flow of natural resources throughout the Pacific is critical to the economies of industrialized nations. Asian nations provide most of the free world’s supply of strategic resources—such as rubber, chromium, tin, titanium, and platinum. Japan and South Korea receive over 50 percent of their oil from the Middle East via the region’s vital sea lines of communications. Over 50 percent of the world’s key maritime choke points are located in the Pacific Basin. Because of the multinational and interrelated nature of world economics, trade disruptions in the Pacific would be felt worldwide.

Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, recognizing the economic, political, and military potential of Asia, has significantly increased Soviet diplomatic efforts in the region. In a historic speech at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, Gorbachev made it clear that he has a sweeping and thoughtful agenda for the Soviets in Asia and the Pacific. Secretary Gorbachev’s strategy is to increase Soviet power and influence in the region while simultaneously undercutting that of the United States. His initiatives are unquestionably driven by economic necessity—a floundering domestic economy. Mr. Gorbachev realizes that he needs technical assistance from Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, in order to extract the vital raw materials (gold, coal, iron, nickel, copper, and gas) from resource-rich, permafrost-bound Siberia.

Although Soviet rhetoric now takes on a conciliatory tone, the USSR still maintains a significant military capability west of the Urals. In fact, throughout the last decade the Soviet military buildup in the region has been

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substantial. Currently, more than a quarter of the Soviet ground force (1.1 million men in 50 well-equipped divisions) is stationed along the border with China, and a 16,000-man army division is stationed in the islands north of Japan. The 860-ship Pacific fleet is now the largest of the Soviets' four fleets, and it includes an impressive array of surface ships with supporting aircraft. The submarine component has also increased substantially, now floating approximately 129 general-purpose, attack, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile undersea vessels.

Why Is Korea Important?

Korea is geostrategically and geopolitically unique. It is the only nation in the world where the interests of four major powers intersect—the United States, Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Because of the continued tension between the economically vibrant South and the militant, unpredictable North, Korea may well be the security flash point for Asia. Stability on the peninsula is important because renewed fighting could easily draw in all the major powers. In his book dealing with Asian perspectives on international security, Australian scholar T. B. Miller assesses the pivotal role of the Korean peninsula in global politics:

Northeast Asia is an area of dangers to world peace because it provides the nexus between four great powers with competing ambitions: the Soviet Union, determined to develop the resources of Siberia and to have unimpeded access to the Pacific for mercantile shipping and the projection of naval power; China, determined to be influential over its continental sphere; Japan, a maritime power, lying across the Soviet exits and dependent upon the US for protection against Soviet hegemony; and the United States, dependent upon Japan for its Western Pacific strategic presence. The Korean peninsula lies at the nexus, manifesting by its division the competing ambitions, pulled and pressed within and without, a self-propelled pawn in a complex power game.

At its southern end the Korean peninsula is separated from Japan by the Korean/Tsushima Strait, only 120 miles wide. This narrow sea lane is considered by the United States to be one of 16 vital maritime choke points for controlling Soviet naval operations. According to the Soviet Military Review, US imperialism has steered a course for world domination, and the Seoul regime has served as its accomplice to establish a nuclear missile presence for the United States in Asia. The article notes that in contrast to the Soviets' desire to turn the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and democratically unify the two Koreas, Washington has artificially whipped...
up tensions which pose “a serious threat to peace in the Far East and throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”

It is easy to understand why the Soviet Union attempts to foster disunity between the United States and South Korea. In addition to the Republic’s strategic importance, South Korea is an economic miracle arisen phoenix-like from the ashes of war. The emerging importance of the Republic as a newly industrialized country is evidenced by the fact that Korea is now the United States’ second largest trading partner in Asia (behind Japan), although trade relations remain tense due to the US $9 billion trade deficit. Korean merchandise exports to the United States were $34.7 billion in 1986, $44 billion in 1987, approximately $55 billion in 1988, and are expected to rise to $77 billion by 1990. The Republic’s GNP continues to rise at a stunning pace—real growth reached 11.1 percent in 1987 and was expected to exceed 12 percent for the year after. South Korea’s entrance onto the world stage was further solidified on 17 September 1988, when it became only the second Asian country ever

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to host the Olympic Games. These turned out to be the largest Olympics in history in term of numbers of participating countries and athletes. However, to the dismay of many Americans, most young Koreans attending the Olympic games openly and enthusiastically supported Soviet athletes rather than Americans. According to Sung-Chull Junn, such attitudes toward the United States should be of more than academic interest to Americans. He goes on to say:

Korea seems destined to become one of the world’s most powerful economies by the end of the century. That economy will be run tomorrow by those same students who are burning the American flag today. For that reason alone, anti-American sentiment should be viewed by the Bush Administration as a potentially serious foreign-policy challenge.13

Clearly, the United States has been an important ally for South Korea, and the maintenance of a strong US military presence on the peninsula has served as a deterrent to aggression from the North. However, as the United States ponders its future defense commitments, three major military issues should be addressed:

- The continued forward deployment of US ground forces in Korea.
- The alleged basing of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.
- The military command relationship which places a US general officer in operational control of Korean armed forces.

Forward Deployed Forces

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement on the Military Posture of the United States (FY 1989) notes that a key factor in the success of US alliances has been deterrence through the forward deployment of military forces:

These forces demonstrate the US commitment to the common defense and serve notice that an attack will be met immediately by US opposition. In peacetime, the American presence among allies reduces the coercive potential of Soviet and Soviet surrogate military threats and facilitates early reinforcement in crises. If deterrence fails, sufficient forward-deployed forces can facilitate an effective combined defense.14

Although the forward deployment of US military forces has maintained stability in Korea for over 35 year, there are mounting pressures to reduce our commitment of forces as part of an effort to reduce the federal budget deficit. Many of the arguments favoring withdrawal of forces are similar to those heard during the debates over the Carter withdrawal proposals in 1977.15

Edward A. Olsen, writing in the Naval War College Review, states that it is time the Carter troop withdrawal proposals be taken off the shelf. Mr. Olsen feels a sizable portion of ground forces could be removed if the
United States took more aggressive measures to strengthen the conventional military capability of South Korean military forces while simultaneously pressuring Japan to accept a greater share of the defense burden for East-Asian sea lanes, specifically as part of a trilateral US-Japan-South Korea defense agreement.  

Richard L. Armitage, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, takes an opposite view. Believing that Korea is the most dangerous flash point in Asia, he contends the benefits of the status quo on the Korean peninsula are underappreciated by many in the United States. As Armitage points out, the elimination of US forces from South Korea would save the American taxpayer nothing if our withdrawal resulted in a North Korean attack thus once again embroiling the United States in a war on the Korean peninsula. Here he sums up:

"Talk of removing US forces from Korea may play to xenophobic and isolationist public sentiments here at home; but they are seriously misguided. They fail to account for the underlying facts or consequences of such actions."

In a similar view, former Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV warns that in spite of the more conciliatory tone of the Soviets, Asia is still at risk. He cautions that the United States must be careful not to embolden the Soviets by indicating that America is growing tired of its forward defense strategy. Because security is the cornerstone upon which Asian development rests, a withdrawal of forces could send the wrong signal (to all of Asia) and suggest that we are withdrawing from our collective security responsibilities.

However, the greatest risk to withdrawing US forces from Korea ensues from the continued militarization of North Korea. While South Korea’s military forces number approximately 630,000 personnel, unofficial estimates now put North Korea’s military strength at over one million troops on active duty. Pyongyang’s armed forces are now nearly twice as large as those of France and West Germany, and three times as large as Britain’s, yet each of these countries is nearly three times as populous as North Korea. Moscow continues to supply the North with a wide variety of sophisticated weaponry, such as the MiG-23 jet fighter, Scud-B surface-to-surface missile, the sophisticated AA-7 Apex air-to-air missile, and the lethal SA-5 surface-to-air missile.

Both the United States and South Korea have stated that US troops will remain on the peninsula until South Korea is in a position to defend herself completely. Although estimates vary about when this will occur, most generally agree on a time frame between the mid-1990s and the year 2000. According to a collaborative analysis prepared by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis and the Rand Corporation, South Korea’s economic and technological advantages over the North will grow rapidly.
The question posed at the outset—“on whose side is time?”—can be answered directly: South Korea’s economic, technological, and military capabilities can be expected to grow substantially relative to those of North Korea during the next decade. The resulting balance should increasingly and predominantly favor the South.

There is no doubt, then, that at some point South Korea will be fully capable of beating back a North Korean attack. Even so, the pressing question that will remain is, “How important are US forces as a deterrent to an attack from the North?” It must not be forgotten that the South Korean capital city, Seoul, is only 25 miles from the demilitarized zone separating the two countries. Therefore, even a short thrust across the DMZ would put North Korean forces within artillery range of Seoul, which is already well within the range of the North’s missiles. Since approximately one-fourth of the South’s population and the preponderance of its financial/business institutions are in Seoul, an attack on the capital would be devastating in terms of physical destruction, casualties, and long-term economic impact.

It is important for strategists to be visionary when attempting to determine how long the United States should maintain ground forces in Korea: they must remember how quickly the world situation can change. In trying to determine the proper role for US forces 10, 20, or 30 years from today, it is important to remember history—only 15 years ago China was our devout enemy and Iran one of our closest friends! If the Soviet Union in fact achieves the economic volte-face it so desperately seeks, will it once again become bellicose and aggressive toward its Asian neighbors? Will another country in the region follow in the footsteps of Iran and turn fanatically anti-American? Will increased competition for scarce resources (oil, land, food, strategic minerals, etc.) cause border disputes that could seriously undermine regional stability? How confident would our Asian allies be of American support if no US Army forces were stationed in Asia?

It thus makes little sense to rush headlong toward reducing Army forces in Asia—our Army is already too small in force structure to carry out the wide range of strategic missions it has been assigned. A better alternative would be to restructure our Asian force in a manner allowing it to respond quickly to a wide variety of contingencies, from low-intensity conflict to conventional war. The risks inherent in premature withdrawal of forces far outweigh the costs of continued forward deployment. If we err, it surely should be on the side of continued stability.

It is important that in the future a US ground force in Asia be viewed mainly in the context of its larger deterrent and strategic role. As we move toward the “Century of the Pacific,” it is critical that the United States maintain the confidence of our Asian allies; such confidence can be maintained only through an irreversible commitment to keeping a US military ground force in

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As always, the most salient symbol of US resolve remains the presence of an American soldier on the ground.
States enhances its image in the eyes of the entire Asian region and serves to
counter the numerous “peace initiatives” of General Secretary Gorbachev.

**ROK/US Combined Forces Command**

An emotional issue with many Koreans is the continued military
command relationship whereby a US general officer, serving as CINC, Com-
bined Forces Command (CINCCFC), has operational control over virtually all
of the Republic of Korea’s combat forces. Although some Koreans still argue
in favor of the current system, an increasing number cite this command arrange-
ment as a sore point in US-ROK relations. Korean students consider such
American dominance over Korean affairs an affront to Korean nationalism.

The Combined Forces Command, established in 1978, has an extrem-
ely complex command and control arrangement. Command relationships
are established through a combination of strategic guidance, coordination
authority, operational control, and command less operational control lines of
authority. The CINCCFC also serves as the Commander, United Nations
Command, an awkward arrangement in which he must respond both to the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the ROK Minister of National Defense. Although
during peacetime the CINCCFC has operational control over major ROK
combat units, he has no peacetime operational control over US forces—with
the exception of a few air-defense assets.

Intertwined with this complex organization is the Combined Field
Army—another combined ROK/US command. The Combined Field Army is
commanded by a US lieutenant general. It operates with a combined staff and
has two ROK corps under its control in both peace and war. As with the
Combined Forces Command, no US Army element is directly under the
control of the Combined Field Army during peacetime. Once again, command
arrangements require a US general officer to exercise control over South
Korean military units—a relationship many Koreans feel is blatantly unfair.
Consequently, anti-US sentiments have spread widely. In a poll conducted
among Korean high school students at the end of 1988, the students listed the
United States as the country they dislike second only to Japan, the traditional
aggressor against Korea.

A short-term alternative that should be implemented is the estab-
ishment of a ground component command for the Combined Forces Com-
mand. This ground component would be commanded by a ROK army general
officer, thus removing ROK army forces from under the direct command of a
US general (CINCCFC). Placing ROK army ground forces under command
of a national commander would give South Korea greater direct control over
its own forces and help diffuse anti-American sentiment. Some argue that this
alternative does not go far enough, since the overall commander would still be
American (i.e. CINCCFC), but it is a progressive and logical first step.

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Simultaneous with the establishment of a ground component command under a ROK commander, the Combined Field Army should be disestablished. The current US Army lieutenant general commanding the Combined Field Army would become the ground component deputy commander, and key US officers assigned to CFA would be reassigned to the ground component command to form a combined staff. This would alleviate the current situation wherein the Combined Forces Command staff finds itself immersed in a large number of issues that are specific to the ground component. Further, it would allow the Combined Forces Command staff to better concentrate on the integrative nature of their combined role. The ground component command staff would thereby be in a posture allowing it to concentrate its efforts toward fighting the land battle throughout the peninsula.

The long term solution for the Korean command dilemma requires a truly visionary perspective, with a much broader regional focus. US strategists need to look down the road ten to 30 years to determine the most effective long-range options for our forces in the Pacific. For example, as a minimum the US Army should redesign its headquarters elements in the Pacific into a more efficient organizational structure, perhaps by combining Eighth United States Army in Korea, United States Army Japan, and Western Command into a single major command. In order to further streamline and simplify command and control arrangements within the theater, United States Forces Korea and United States Forces Japan could be combined into a single sub-unified command. This new command could be structured to serve under the US unified Pacific Command and be forward deployed in Japan. The elimination of superfluous headquarters elements would allow for a reduction of both military and civilian personnel spaces and thus make Congress happy. In addition, it would allow the Eighth Army Headquarters to vacate Yongsan garrison in Seoul, thereby making Korea happy, providing the US Pacific Command a single point of contact for Army forces in the Pacific, and insuring that a US Army headquarters remains in the Pacific to coordinate joint/combined operations when the Combined Forces Command in Korea is eventually disestablished.

Concurrently, the US Army should restructure the Second Infantry Division in Korea into a more mobile and self-sustaining force; thus, in addition to serving as a strategic reserve for Korea, it could respond to a variety of contingencies in the entire area. Although the Pacific will continue to be predominately an air/sea theater, it will be important to maintain a credible US Army ground force in Asia as a symbol of American commitment to the Asian-Pacific region.

Looking to the Future

There is no question that Asia is the fastest growing and most dynamic area of the world. The enormous economic, political, and military
potential of Asia justifies an enlightened, visionary, and consistent long-term US strategy which insures that our adversaries have no doubts about American resolve to defend our interests in the Asian-Pacific theater. As noted by a Future Security Working Group paper submitted to the President’s Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,

In the next two decades the security environment facing the United States will change as a result of broad economic, demographic, and military trends that are already taking shape [and] it is doubtful that US strategic thinking has absorbed them . . . The year 2010 will see a new global-military environment emerge—an environment that defense planners must understand today if they hope to shape it in years to come. 36

The current problems facing the United States in Korea are to a great extent the result of rising South Korean nationalism and self-confidence. Further, they are typical of the types of issues America will be faced with throughout Asia as newly industrialized countries emerge to take their place on the world stage. Actions the US needs to take are:

- Establish consistent long-range policy goals for Korea and the Asia-Pacific theater.
- Resist pressure to withdraw American forces from Korea. Maintain a forward-deployed ground force in Korea as a symbol of US commitment to the region.
- In consultation with our allies, restructure the Second Infantry Division into a more mobile and self-sustaining force which could respond to a variety of regional contingencies.
- As a symbol of US desire for peace and tranquility in Asia, insure that no US tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on the Korean peninsula.
- Disestablish the Combined Field Army and use its assets to establish a ground component command under the Combined Forces Command. The ground component should be commanded by a Korean general officer.
- Combine the headquarters elements of Eighth Army, US Army Japan, and Western Command into a single Army major area command for the Pacific theater.
- Establish a sub-unified command for the Asian-Pacific region.

The 21st century will be characterized by change—change in a shift toward a multipolar world, change in alliances, change in the current economic, political, and military environment. Asian countries will be on the forward edge of such change.

Current US strategy which emphasizes coalition warfare and deterrence through forward-deployed forces is sound. However, the United States cannot afford to be viewed as a lumbering giant frozen in the policies of the past. We need to take appropriate initiatives to relieve tensions in Korea while simultaneously maintaining our posture and influence in Asia. The United

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States cannot withdraw all US Army ground forces from Asia and expect to maintain significant influence in the area. US policy must be sufficiently adaptable to accommodate the dynamism of the region while signaling a strong commitment to the ideals of freedom and self-determination—ideals upon which our own nation was founded.

NOTES

4. Ibid.
7. “Gorbachev’s Asia Plans,” Asia Week, 10 June 1988, pp. 11-12.
10. Ibid., p. 98.
25. Nam, pp. 88-89.
27. Scicchitano, 26 December 1988, pp. 9-10.
The Admirals’ Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today

PHILLIP S. MEILINGER

“A soldier should be sworn to the patient endurance of hardships, like the ancient knights; and it is not the least of these necessary hardships to have to serve with sailors.”

—Bernard Montgomery

The supercarrier/B-36 controversy of 1949 was ostensibly a struggle between the Navy and the Air Force over funding priorities. At the controversy’s most basic level, the two services disagreed over the division of the defense budget. The Navy wanted the largest share of the defense dollar in order to build more aircraft carriers—specifically supercarriers—capable of launching large multi-engine aircraft. The Air Force, in turn, argued that it should receive the largest slice of the defense pie in order to expand to 70 combat groups. In the struggle that followed, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson seemingly sided with the Air Force and ordered the cancellation of the Navy’s new supercarrier.

In the aftermath of the cancellation, a number of rumors circulated that cast considerable aspersions on the characters of Johnson, Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, and Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg. These rumors alleged corruption in the procurement contract with Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation for its new bomber, the B-36. Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, scheduled hearings to examine the matter.

Those hearings, held in August 1949, proved conclusively that corruption was not involved in the B-36 contract, and the issue thus appeared to be settled. But the Navy insisted upon further hearings to examine the broader issues of national defense strategy and the conduct of a future war.
The result of this second round of hearings, also chaired by Carl Vinson, were less sensational, though no less important. Naval leaders disputed the overall defense strategy of the United States. They characterized contemporary war plans as being dominated by Air Force thinking that envisioned an "atomic blitz" by long-range bombers. The Navy's role in these war plans was its traditional one of coastal defense and control of the sea lanes. In the new atomic age, however, this role entailed a decidedly inferior status. The Navy wanted supercarriers so it too could participate in the atomic offensive. In other words, it did not reject the nuclear strategy, but rather demanded the right to play a greater role in that strategy. The cancellation of the supercarrier indicated to naval leaders a conspiracy to deny them such a mission. In the hearings of October they offered a new definition of naval strategy.

The Revolt of the Admirals, as the confrontation has often been called, was far more than a mere budgetary squabble. Naval leaders saw their very future at stake. In an effort to make their voice heard, they engineered a scandal to gain public awareness of their plight. Although many questioned this tactic, the Navy achieved its ultimate goal: heightened awareness of the Navy's predicament and a gradual reorientation of military strategy.

This article examines the war planning and budgetary constraints that culminated in the revolt. The incident also implies wider questions of professionalism and civilian control of the military. These last two subjects are of special interest. Although the supercarrier/B-36 controversy has been written about before, it has been addressed in considerably shaded hindsight: the Navy's mission was transformed; therefore, the seamen must have been right. This article, based largely on primary sources hitherto unused, will examine the Navy's methods and the implications of those methods.

Roles and Missions

The roots of the supercarrier/B-36 controversy reach back to the end of World War II, when demobilization and fiscal stringency caused all the services to reexamine their purposes. The term "roles and missions" raised far more than a question of doctrine—at stake was the lifeblood of the military services. The breathtakingly rapid demobilization after the war left all the

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services devastated. The Army Air Forces, for example, went from a strength of 2,253,000 on V-J Day to 303,000 at the end of May 1947. The aircraft situation was equally grim, with the number of combat-ready groups falling from 218 to two by December 1946. To make matters worse, little order or logic was used in returning the warriors to mufti. The primary and overriding concern of the American people was to “bring the boys home.” Those who had served the longest, and were therefore the most experienced, were the first to obtain discharges.

In addition, the nation was weary of wartime rationing and shortages, and President Truman knew he must dramatically curtail military spending and shift priorities to the domestic scene. Despite already disturbing events in Eastern Europe, the euphoria of peace was such that Americans could not be induced to continue tightening their belts.

In this climate, the services clamored for funds to maintain their combat capability. This period is often depicted as a time of selfish, childish parochialism orchestrated by a group of uniformed Colonel Blimps, but such an indictment is far too harsh. These men were self-confident and accomplished professionals; they had not risen to the top during the war by being passive and pliable. They sincerely believed that they were right and that the desires of their service were in the best interests of the country. It was assumed that unification of the services would clearly delineate roles and missions, but such was not the case. The National Security Act of 1947 had made only broad and vague references to these matters. The issue causing the greatest controversy was the Navy’s “private air force.” Army Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley and his Air Force counterpart, Hoyt Vandenberg, maintained that large Navy and Marine air forces were an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort, and they pushed to have them reduced.

In an effort to resolve this disagreement, Defense Secretary James Forrestal gathered his Chiefs at Key West, Florida, in March 1948 to effect a compromise. A result of these meetings was a statement of “primary” and “collateral” service functions. A primary function was one in which a particular service had a clear-cut responsibility; in a collateral function, a service supported and supplemented the service that was primary in that area. Forrestal realized that overlap was inevitable—some missions simply defied neat categorization—but he tried to make it clear that a service claiming collateral responsibility for a given mission could not use such a claim as a basis for establishing an additional force requirement. In other words, when a service was preparing its budget and force composition, it would plan on the basis of its primary responsibilities; if these were adequately covered and there were forces or funds remaining, they could then be allotted to collateral functions. Who would determine if the primary responsibilities were adequately met? The JCS. If the Joint Chiefs were unable to agree, then the matter would be decided by the Secretary of Defense.\footnote{\textit{September 1989}}
At Key West the JCS assigned 12 primary functions to the Navy; unfortunately, the wording in several of them was sufficiently vague to perpetuate, not resolve, the problems. These included,

- “To establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations.”
- “To conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.”

The primary functions assigned to the Air Force included,

- “To gain and maintain general air superiority.”
- “To defeat enemy air forces.”
- “To be responsible for strategic air warfare.”

This last term was then supplied with a definition:

Strategic Air Warfare—Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, concentrations of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

But what was “an area of naval operations,” and which air operations were necessary “for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign”? If such air strikes were against power or transportation systems, did they then come under the aegis of strategic air warfare, and hence become assignable to the Air Force? The more that such questions were addressed and “clarified,” the more muddied they became.

Although it was not included in the written text, an oral understanding between the Chiefs was somewhat tighter. Forrestal noted it in his diary. The Air Force recognized the “right of the Navy to proceed with the development of weapons the Navy considers essential to its function, but with the proviso that the Navy will not develop a separate strategic air force.”

This appears to have been an important decision. The Air Force was responsible for strategic bombing; the Navy could assist, but only after its primary missions were fulfilled and then under the direction of the Air Force. Unquestionably the Navy wanted the mission of strategic bombing. In December 1947 Vice Admiral David V. Gallery had written a clnemo stating that the Navy was “the branch of the National Defense destined to deliver the Atom Bomb.” Gallery admitted that the next war would not be like the last. He thought this fortunate because if it were like the last, the Navy would be obsolete. No, he predicted a war dominated by atomic weapons. Gallery wanted the Navy to control those weapons.
Open warfare over the issue of strategic missions broke out in 1949 when the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, canceled the order for the Navy's first supercarrier, the USS United States. This ship, whose keel had already been laid, was designed as a flush-top 65,000-ton aircraft carrier that would be capable of launching and recovering heavy, multi-engined aircraft—bombers. The Air Force consistently opposed the supercarrier as an infringement on its primary mission as defined at Key West. The resulting furor over Johnson's action led to a vicious and dangerous fight.

**Mutiny Between Decks**

As early as July 1947 General Vandenberg had expressed his thoughts to Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington on the proposed supercarrier. To him, aircraft carriers were inadequate weapons because, among other reasons, the aircraft they carried had short range and poor altitude performance. Vandenberg asserted that the carriers would be so busy defending themselves against air attack that they would have little time to do anything constructive. (If the carrier was as valuable as the Navy claimed, he felt, then it would be a prime target for enemy attacks.) He maintained further that this vulnerability, coupled with the limited range of its aircraft, would relegate the carrier to attacks against relatively safe, and therefore inessential, coastal targets. Looking back to the war, he stated: “Not until the Japanese air force was pounded into impotency did our carriers dare to venture sufficiently close to the Japanese main islands or strike at shore installations.” Moreover, Allied carriers had never been able to operate in the Mediterranean for fear of the Luftwaffe; Soviet land-based aircraft would make the ships just as vulnerable. The Navy disputed such opinions and historical conclusions.

The supercarrier had been under discussion in the JCS for some time. At the Key West Conference in March 1948 Forrestal reported that he would support its development “if so decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, ignored the qualification and joyfully announced that the JCS had approved the ship. Then the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz, angrily disputed this claim, though acknowledging in a letter to Senator Chan Gurney that at Key West he had been informed the supercarrier was part of the President's defense program. When asked if such a program was acceptable to him, Spaatz replied yes, he would never presume to contradict the Commander in Chief. Spaatz maintained that such a deferral to the President’s wish was not an expression of support for the carrier. In May, to clear up the confusion this denial caused, Forrestal asked the JCS for a formal opinion. Denfeld and Bradley supported construction, but Vandenberg (who had recently replaced Spaatz) replied: “I have not felt, nor do I now feel, that I can give my approval to the 65,000-ton carrier project.”
Verbal jabs between the Navy and Air Force continued during the next few months. The Navy organized a special secret office within the Pentagon called OP-23, a planning group led by Captain Arleigh Burke, whose purpose was to carry the fight for the United States to Congress and the public. Burke had pleaded with Denfeld to fight for the supercarrier, claiming that if the ship was scrapped, the next step would be the transfer of all Navy and Marine air units to the Air Force. Denfeld was sufficiently swayed by such arguments to authorize OP-23. Unfortunately, he neglected to notify his civilian superiors, and when Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan discovered its existence he was irate. He ordered the OP-23 office raided and its files impounded. The naval personnel working there were arrested and held incommunicado for the next three days. The office was permanently closed, but the issue remained very much alive.

Vandenberg brought in a Harvard law professor, Barton Leach, to prepare a public relations effort. One of the first fruits of this program was the stunning around-the-world flight of the B-50 “Lucky Lady II” on 2 March 1948. For the first time an aircraft had used aerial refueling to circle the globe non-stop. Vandenberg exuberantly compared the achievement to that at Kitty Hawk and Lindbergh’s 1927 solo flight across the Atlantic. “Our bombers,” he reported, were now “virtually invulnerable to enemy interception.” The implications of such a feat for a strategic air offensive were not lost on the Navy. The following month it mounted an experiment of its own: a Lockheed Neptune took off from the deck of the USS Coral Sea, flew 200 miles, and dropped a simulated bomb load of 10,000 pounds (the weight of an atomic weapon). Admiral Denfeld emphasized that “it is not the Navy’s intention to make strategic bombing a major Navy mission. But the Navy could do that type of bombing if requested.” (Denfield failed to mention that the Neptune was unable to land on the carrier and had to recover at an airfield on shore.)

On 18 April 1949 the keel of the United States was laid amid much fanfare; it appeared that the admirals had won their fight. Secretary Forrestal, however, had resigned the month before. The pressures of his office had become too burdensome, and it was apparent to everyone, including the President, that he was becoming mentally unbalanced. In two weeks he would commit suicide. His successor was Louis Johnson, a brash, abrasive businessman and former Assistant Secretary of War who believed in controlling people with an iron fist. It was said that he had been running for president for nearly a decade and looked upon Defense as his last stepping-stone. A contemporary account said that he was “used to being sworn at. Big, two-fisted, and tough-skinned. Johnson has been hitting hard and getting his way for most of his life.” Upon taking office, Johnson stated he had no preconceived notions about the supercarrier, but the dissension it was causing concerned him. He asked the JCS for their written opinion once again. The Chiefs remained hopelessly divided, submitting separate recommendations.
Denfeld justified the carrier with the following arguments:

- It could operate heavier aircraft capable of carrying "the more complex armament and electronic equipment presently available."
- It could operate larger numbers of smaller aircraft.
- It could provide for more defensive armament and radar.
- It could carry more fuel for prolonged operations.
- It could carry more armor to withstand attacks.

Denfeld stated that the United States was a logical progression in carrier development and was not designed simply for strategic air warfare, although it would indeed be capable of such a mission if so directed. 14

Vandenberg argued that the ship simply was not necessary, and was therefore a waste of money. The Navy maintained that it would cost $190 million; Vandenberg thought the figure more like $500 million, and even that amount was for the ship itself, without aircraft or a supporting destroyer squadron. When these extras were added together, the total would be $1.265 billion. 15 The carrier was also vulnerable to three types of attack: by air, surface vessel, and submarine. Vandenberg reckoned that the Navy was basing its plans for carrier operations on its Pacific War experience, circumstances that would not obtain in a future conflict with the Soviet Union, which had a very small surface fleet but many submarines. Since primary Navy missions were protection of sea lanes and anti-submarine operations, supercarriers were unnecessary: small escort carriers would be more efficient. Let the Air Force attend to strategic bombing. 17

Both these responses were predictable—that of General Bradley was not. Earlier, he had approved the project; now he reversed himself with a line of reasoning similar to Vandenberg's. "The Navy's mission as agreed to by the Joint Chiefs," he declared, "was to conduct naval campaigns designed primarily to protect lines of communication leading to important sources of raw materials and to areas of projected military operations. " The United States, however, was being programmed for strategic air operations, and that task fell to the Air Force. The only conceivable enemy was Russia; the existing fleet of eight large carriers was ample to carry out the Navy's role in war. The supercarrier was too expensive. 18

The illustrious General Dwight Eisenhower was also queried by Johnson regarding the new ship. Like Bradley, Eisenhower had originally supported construction of one prototype vessel, but again like Bradley, had changed his mind. Money was crucial, and the Navy's arguments were illogical. Eisenhower confided in his diary in January 1949 that the seamen continually claimed Air Force planes could not penetrate Soviet airspace, but for reasons inexplicable to him, carrier planes could. In April, when Johnson asked his opinion on the United States, Eisenhower said scrap it. Johnson then called Millard Tydings and Carl Vinson, chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, respectively, and they approved the proposed cancellation. 19
After conferring with President Truman, Secretary Johnson sank the supercarrier. The Navy was livid; Sullivan resigned in protest. The acting Navy Secretary then asked Johnson if the money thus saved could at least be used to remodel and upgrade two conventional carriers. The Defense Secretary asked the JCS for their opinion, and the verdict was once again two to one against. Vandenberg said the proposed conversion program was simply another attempt to build carriers capable of handling bombers, and that was unacceptable. He proposed instead that the funds be used to increase the Navy’s anti-submarine capability. Failing that, the money should be returned to the “national economy.” Bradley concurred. Even though Johnson overruled the majority and agreed to the conversion, Navy supporters were not mollified, and the hurricane warnings were sounded.

Battening Down the Hatches

The sailors felt outnumbered and surrounded, and even began referring to themselves as “the water division of Johnson’s Air Force.” No doubt owing to anger and frustration, anonymous individuals began circulating rumors that cast shadows on Johnson, Symington, the Air Force, and the new intercontinental bomber they supported, the B-36.

Rumors of impropriety became so frequent that Vinson decided the House Armed Services Committee should hold hearings concerning these disturbing reports. Noted military affairs columnist Hanson Baldwin, an Annapolis graduate, hinted darkly of fraudulent airplane contracts and “financial high jinks.”

When the hearings began, Representative James E. Van Zandt reiterated the charges of fraud and misdoings that had been circulating for weeks. Referring to an anonymous document, he stated that reports had reached him linking Symington and Johnson with Floyd Odium, president of Consolidated-Vultee Corporation, builder of the B-36. (Johnson had been a director of that company before taking office.) It was alleged that contracts with four other aircraft companies had been unfairly canceled in order to transfer funds to larger B-36 orders. It was then suggested that plans were afoot for Symington to resign from office and head Consolidated. Van Zandt called for a full investigation.

The B-36 hearings were a squalid affair. It was soon clear that Van Zandt had little more to offer in proof than his “anonymous document.” The innuendo and barroom gossip that he attempted to pass as fact finally riled Symington sufficiently to dare Van Zandt to drop his congressional immunity and make his allegations public so that he could take “proper recourse.” Van Zandt declined the offer. A host of Air Force witnesses then took the stand, stating under oath that the B-36 had been chosen entirely on its merits as the best aircraft available, and that there had been no pressure from anyone at any
time. General Vandenberg defended his civilian superior forcefully and convincingly: it was “utterly unthinkable” and “absolutely fantastic,” he maintained, that Symington would have bought planes for political motives when men’s lives were at stake. Vandenberg said that General Curtis LeMay knew more about strategic bombing than any man alive, and if he said the B-36 was a good airplane, then it was. As for the Navy charge that the B-36 was a “sitting duck,” the Chief replied that if so, it had a healthy sting to it.

The authorship of Van Zandt’s secret document was quickly becoming a crucial issue. If the charges were so demonstrably false, where did the Congressman receive the allegations, and why did he believe they were accurate? Demands were made on Chairman Vinson to reveal the anonymous accusers; the committee’s counsel threatened to resign if they were not revealed. At last relenting, Vinson called Cedric Worth to the stand on 24 August. Worth was a former Hollywood scriptwriter who held a top secret clearance as an aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Daniel A. Kimball. When asked if he knew the author of the document, Worth responded that he had written it himself, but then admitted that he had no proof as to its accuracy. (Kimball later claimed under oath that he was not aware Worth had been up to such activities. In fact, since Kimball had been curious as to the authorship of the document, he had directed his assistant to try to find out, but his assistant had been unable to solve the mystery. His assistant was Cedric Worth.) After some very hostile
questioning, Worth admitted that it was all a "tragic mistake," and that he had not intended to impugn the integrity of honorable men like Secretaries Johnson and Symington.\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Newsweek} called this admission a "knockout blow," concluding: "If the Air Force fights with the B-36 the way it fights for it, heaven help America's enemies."\textsuperscript{27} Hanson Baldwin wrote that the hearings were "an impressive Air Force vindication," and that its opponents had not displayed "perspicacity or judgment" in the matter.\textsuperscript{28}

Worth's testimony brought the hearings to a halt, with the committee finding that there was not one iota of evidence to substantiate any of the charges made by Van Zandt. Within days the Navy launched a court of inquiry to determine if Worth had received assistance from members of the Navy Department in composing his fable. The account of this investigation is even more disturbing than the congressional hearings.\textsuperscript{29} Testimony before the court of inquiry made clear that Worth had indeed had help—a great deal of it—although many who admitted passing "rank gossip" claimed they never expected it to be used.\textsuperscript{30} It was an alarming display of insolence and insubordination to civilian authority. Still, the episode was far from over.

When Vinson recessed the hearings in August, he announced that they would reopen in October, not to investigate more charges of wrongdoing, but to examine the issues of unification, national defense, and strategy. Once the Navy's own court of inquiry began turning into a fiasco, however, Secretary Francis Matthews (Sullivan's replacement), Admiral Denfeld, and Vinson quietly decided to postpone the hearings, perhaps indefinitely. Such was not to be: certain Navy officers had a definite case to make, and although \textit{l'Affaire Worth} was an embarrassment, it did not detract from their overall theory of the primacy of naval warfare. Consequently, a much-decorated war veteran, Captain John C. Crommelin, threw himself into the breach by releasing a classified document to the press that revealed wholesale discontent in naval ranks. He said it was "necessary to the interests of national security" that he make the report public. He wanted a public airing of the issues.\textsuperscript{31} Barely closed wounds immediately reopened as a group of high-ranking admirals, led by Admiral Arthur Radford, jumped to Crommelin's defense. Although Denfeld was loath to wash more dirty linen publicly, Radford insisted that the October hearings be used as a platform to debate defense priorities.

\ldots \textit{Two If by Sea}

When Vinson's gavel fell on 5 October, most of the Navy hierarchy was primed for battle. The admirals' arguments fell into three main categories: the concept of an "atomic blitz" was a poor strategy in the event of war; the B-36 was a substandard aircraft that could not successfully carry out the blitz even if it were an acceptable strategy; and the Navy was being treated as an unequal partner in the defense establishment as evidenced by the cancellation
of the United States. It was the Navy’s contention that the Air Force was deluding the American public with promises of a cheap victory to be won by an atomic air strike. The Navy maintained that strategic bombing would never win a war, and that reliance on it would only result in the loss of valuable time and allies.

Although the August hearings had demolished all charges of wrongdoing in the selection of the B-36, the Navy still maintained the air leviathan was technically substandard. Radford said the B-36 could easily be detected, intercepted, and destroyed by fighter aircraft then available. “I can sincerely say to you,” he testified, “that I hope the enemy bombers which may attack our country in any future conflict will be no better than the B-36.” What was worse, Radford maintained, the Air Force was concentrating on the bomber to such an extent—“putting all its eggs in one basket”—that other vital missions such as transport and close air support were deficient.

Finally, the Navy claimed it was not an equal partner in defense because the Army and Air Force consistently united against it. The admirals claimed their budget had been cut so drastically that it threatened to reduce them to impotency. The cancellation of the supercarrier was the symbol of this discrimination. They believed the carrier would prove to be an effective and efficient weapon system, tailored to the needs of modern war. The abrupt, and in their minds arbitrary, cancellation of the ship dealt a severe blow to Navy morale of all ranks.

The Air Force Association magazine referred to this performance as a “revolt against the Law of the Land.” General Bradley later wrote that he was aghast. “Never in our military history,” he asserted, “had there been anything comparable—not even the Billy Mitchell rebellion of the 1920s. A complete breakdown in discipline occurred. Neither Matthews nor Denfeld could control his subordinates . . . Denfeld . . . allowed his admirals to run amok. It was utterly disgraceful.” Admiral Denfeld, whom Bradley described as an “affable glad-handing Washington bureaucrat with only minimal naval combat experience and no grasp at all of large-scale land warfare.” bore the brunt of Bradley’s ire. Bradley charged him with complete dishonesty regarding Navy claims pertaining to American war plans. Bradley also said that the admirals had deliberately skewed data from atomic bomb tests to support their claims against the Air Force.

Vandenberg then rose to defend his service against the various Navy charges. In Bradley’s words, he was “icyly cool and precise” and “utterly demolished” the testimony of the “crybaby [Navy] aviators.” Vandenberg’s testimony was dispassionate, emphasizing logic for its own sake. Contemporaries often said that he was at his best in situations of this type: as things grew hotter, he became cooler and quieter. The effect was to be devastating.

Vandenberg began by describing the organization of the Joint Chiefs, who by law were charged with formulating strategic war plans. They were
Big, brash, and abrasive, Louis Johnson replaced Forrestal as Defense Secretary. A contemporary account said he was "used to being sworn at."

assisted in that task by a Joint Staff, composed of an equal number of officers from the three services. At that time the staff was headed by an admiral. The Joint Staff was advised by two important groups: the Research and Development Board and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, both led by distinguished civilian scientists. After many months of study and debate these diverse groups presented a war plan (TROJAN) that was officially approved by all members of the JCS. The claim that strategic bombing was an Air Force plan was simply not true; it was the national plan. The instrument of the air offensive called for in the war plan was the Strategic Air Command, under the direct control of the JCS—not the Air Force—and whose targets were selected by the JCS. The purpose of the strategic air campaign ... not to win the war: only surface forces could ensure that. Rather, its purpose was to serve as an equalizer to the hordes of enemy troops that greatly outnumbered our own. Then Vandenberg inquired of the alternatives. "Is it proposed that we build and maintain a standing Army capable of meeting the masses of an enemy army on the ground in equal man-to-man, body-to-body, gun-to-gun combat?"

As for the effectiveness of the B-36, Vandenberg stated that although the airplane was not perfect, it was the best bomber of its type in the world. and it would get through. It had already flown 10,000 miles, dropped a 10,000-pound bomb (again, the weight of existing atomic devices), and returned to its base, all at an altitude of 42,000 feet. When questioned about Navy claims that it could be intercepted and destroyed, Vandenberg replied that radar and fighter aircraft were not new; the bomber would get through. When asked if escort fighters should be provided, perhaps supplied from aircraft carriers, Vandenberg responded that such aircraft had insufficient
range. Escort was desirable but not necessary. The bomber still would get through.

Concerning the issue of overemphasis on bombers to the detriment of other air arms, Vandenberg noted that of the 48 combat groups in the Air Force, only four were equipped with the B-36. If plans to expand to 70 groups were fulfilled, still only four groups would operate the B-36. When all aircraft (including the reserves) available on Mobilization-Day were counted, the B-36 amounted to only three percent of the total. Moreover, as commander of the tactical Ninth Air Force in the European Theater during World War II, Vandenberg fully realized the crucial importance of close air support. As for the United States and claims that the Air Force was trying to absorb Navy and Marine Corps aviation, Vandenberg stated that such was not the case. He objected to the supercarrier because the ship was not needed for the Navy’s primary mission, and funds were too scarce to buy weapons not directly supportive of the nation’s war plan. Perhaps the carrier was a good weapon, but was it necessary? TROJAN called for specific tasks to be accomplished by specific forces; that was what unification was supposed to be all about. The fact that Army leaders agreed with him on this issue did not suggest a conspiracy; rather, they also thought the Navy was mistaken.

One is struck by the lack of vitriol in Vandenberg’s statement. Considering the emotional, sometimes personal, sometimes vicious charges that had been levied against him, his secretary, and his service, Vandenberg’s remarks are amazingly mild. After Cedric Worth’s charges were proved fraudulent, the Chief must have realized that the tide was flowing in his direction; he could now afford to be reserved and subtle, attempting to soothe bruised egos rather than worsening the split. Revenge was a luxury not to be afforded.

**Left in the Wake**

Few heads rolled in the Navy as a result of the hearings. Worth resigned—although not until the following year; Vice Admirals William Blandy and Gerald Bogan were nudged into retirement; and Captain Crommelin was eventually reassigned and given a letter of reprimand. Admiral Denfeld was not so fortunate. When the “Revolt of the Admirals” began, Matthews and he had fought a losing battle to maintain order within the bulkheads. When Denfeld testified, however, he “defected” to the enemy and joined the Radford group; Matthews stood alone in condemning the actions of those in uniform, and he did not like it. Denfeld was relieved, and Matthews gave his reasons in his message to the President. The Chief of Naval Operations did not accept unification. And far worse: “A military establishment is not a political democracy. Integrity of command is indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various official ranks.”

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The Navy had fought unification of the armed services from the beginning, ostensibly because it was a threat to civilian control of the military—the fear of “the man on horseback.” How ironic that the sailors would then deliberately slander their civilian superiors. In contrast, General Vanden-berg ran a very tight ship indeed.

In the long term, the effect of the incident was small. Within two years increased defense spending occasioned by the Korean War would permit the Navy to build supercarriers, and one of the individuals most responsible for the clash, Admiral Radford, would four years later be chosen by President Eisenhower as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. For Chief of Naval Operations he chose Arleigh Burke, the former head of OP-23. In the short term, however, the affair had more significance. Observers on both sides of the Atlantic were shocked by the whole incident; one called it a display of “pettiness, inconsistency, and hatred.” The London Economist asked: “What faith can the United States have in Chiefs of Staff who behave like children? What faith can the powers who signed the North Atlantic Treaty have when their strongest partner shows much internal weakness?” Of far greater significance, relations between the services were at their nadir, and in less than a year there would be war in Korea.

In the strategic sense the Navy was eventually proved right, but for reasons they had not anticipated. There is a role for a large surface fleet in the atomic age, but not simply as another arm of the strategic air offensive. The traditional roles of power projection and close support of ground forces engaged on land are still vital. Surprisingly, naval leaders did not anticipate that this would be the case and never advocated such a role in the 1949 hearings. The atomic bomb dominated the thinking of virtually all military and civilian theorists in the years after Hiroshima. The Gallery memo opined that wars of the future would certainly be general and dominated by atomic weapons. Korea was to show the fallacy of such thinking. Conventional tactical forces were still vital, and all the services had a role in limited conflict. Korea allowed a massive buildup and modernization of America’s conventional strength, a capability that was once again needed during the following decade in Vietnam.

But the revolt of 1949 spotlights a broader issue of professionalism. What was the proper role of Navy leaders when confronted with what they saw as a threat to their institutional survival? Admiral Denfeld and his colleagues were absolutely convinced they were right. A later generation of seamen felt similarly. But what are the acceptable limits of professional dissent? In the years ahead serious defense budget cuts seem likely. It is also likely that weapon systems seen as vital by a service will be denied because of fiscal constraints. When that occurs, how will the service leaders react? One hopes they will operate within the constraints of the law and the military ethic. There must be no more revolts, for the next one may prove fatal.
In the aftermath of the 1949 hearings, Defense Secretary Johnson told his recalcitrant Chiefs to shake hands and forget it; he recommended that they all go golfing together. Brad, Louie, Van, and Lauris Norstad dutifully donned mufti and headed for the Burning Tree Country Club. Afterward, Johnson congratulated the victors: "My informants stated General Vandenberg sank three fantastic 50-foot chip shots, and General Norstad constantly played over his head." It is reliably reported that Van and Larry won two dollars each.

NOTES

2. Press release to Defense Secretary James M. Forrestal, "Results of Key West Conference," 22 March 1948, Vandenberg papers, LOC. box 90.
9. Spatz's letter quoted in memo, Vandenberg to Forrestal, 8 February 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.
10. Memo, Vandenberg to Forrestal, 26 May 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.
12. Text of television address, 2 March 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 90. What Vandenberg did not mention was that another B-50 aircraft had made an attempt earlier that day and failed. Indeed, five different aircraft were standing by; it was hoped that at least one of them would make it all the way.
15. Memo, Dufeld to Johnson, 22 April 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52. The flight deck of the United States was to be 158 feet longer and 77 feet wider than the largest existing carriers, the Midway. More important, the United States would have no large "island" above the flight deck, thus allowing aircraft with large wing spans to take off unimpeded. *Aviation Week*, 24 March 1949, p. 12.
17. Memo, Vandenberg to Johnson, 23 April 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.
18. Memo, Bradley to Johnson, 22 April 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.
20. Memo, Vandenberg to Johnson, n.d., Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52; letter, Eisenhower to Forrestal, 19 December 1948 and Eisenhower diary entry, 27 January 1949, both in Alfred Chandler and Louis Galambos, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976-1986), X. 380-81, 486-89. Contrary to popular belief, the Air Force did not receive additional funds as a result of the supercarrier cancellation. Indeed, the division of the defense budget had already been

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determined several months previously. The Air Force was instead questioning how the Navy was spending its portion of the defense budget.


24. Ibid., pp. 172-79.


33. Ibid., pp. 350-61.


35. Unification and Strategy hearings, pp. 451-69. One of the ironic aspects of the hearings was that at the same time the Navy was accusing the Air Force of neglecting tactical air power, it was fighting against the Air Force expansion to 70 groups. Sixteen of the 22 groups in the proposed Air Force expansion were tactical units.

36. Ibid. That same day the President said in a press conference: “Nobody wants to take the air arm from the Navy. It is necessary that they have fighter protection all the time. I don’t think it is necessary for the Navy to go into the heavy bomber business.” Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1949 (Washington: GPO, 1964), p. 517.


40. Letter, Johnson to Vandenberg, 15 April 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 3. It is also reported that when the USS Missouri ran aground in Chesapeake Bay in January 1950, Vandenberg offered to loan the Navy a B-36 to tow it off. Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad was Vandenberg’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He had a reputation of being a “hatchet man” and had also been the point man in organizing the Air Force response to the B-36/supercarrier issue; hence, he went along golfing to help make amends. His Navy counterpart, Vice Admiral Arthur Radford, already had returned to sea and could not make the golf date.
Is the cold war over? And, if so, what does this mean for American policy toward the Soviet Union?

This is not a bad time, at the beginning . . . of a new administration, to stand off for a moment and to look at these questions from a longer historical perspective.

It might be worth recalling that, traditionally, Russia was never seen by Americans as an enemy of the United States. The czarist autocracy, to be sure, was distasteful to most Americans as a form of government. But we were prepared to take it as it was, to maintain normal relations with it, and to make the best of these relations so long as Russia posed no threat to our national security.

All this changed with the Russian Revolution in 1917. There seems to be a widespread impression in this country that the cold war, as something signifying a state of sharp conflict and tension between the two governments, began only in 1945, after World War II. The impression is erroneous.

Never were American relations with Russia at a lower ebb than in the first 16 years after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. Americans were deeply shocked by the violence of the revolution, by the fanaticism and cruelty of the new rulers, by their refusal to recognize the debts and claims arising out of the recent war, and above all by the brazen world-revolutionary propaganda they put out and the efforts they mounted to promote communist seizures of power in other countries.

Over all those 16 years, as many of us can today recall, we had no official relations whatsoever with the Soviet regime. Even after the exchange of diplomatic relations at the end of 1933, the relationship remained, during the rest of the 1930s, a distant and troubled one. The Stalinist tyranny was after all not a form of government with which it was easy for anybody to coexist. And the cynicism of Stalin’s pact with Hitler, at the outset of World War II, did nothing to improve the attitudes of most Americans toward the Soviet regime.

From 1941 to 1945, when both the Soviet Union and the United States were at war with Germany, the mutual antagonism of the two political systems was muted in the interests of their military collaboration. But this outwardly professed friendship never went very deep on either side; and no sooner were hostilities over than new and serious sources of friction began to emerge.
The outcome of the hostilities had placed the Soviet Union in military and political control of most of the eastern half of the European continent. This constituted a major displacement of the balance of power in Europe. Alone, this was bound to be disturbing for the Western allies. But the seriousness of the change was magnified by several other factors. One was the failure of the Soviet government to match, by any extensive demobilization of its own forces in Europe, the extensive demobilizations promptly carried out there by the Western powers. Another was the cruel suppression at the hands of Soviet police and party authorities of every trace of independent democratic government in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe the Soviet forces had overrun.

On top of this, it soon became evident that the Soviet leaders were trying to take advantage of the war-shocked, exhausted, and confused state of several of the Western European peoples with a view to fastening upon them communist minority regimes similar to those Moscow was already busy installing in the part of Europe under its authority.

And finally, there was injected into all of this a new and highly confusing factor—a factor without precedent in human history, overthrowing all traditional military concepts and inflaming all military fears and ambitions: the nuclear weapon and its introduction into the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

It was out of this witches' brew that the cold war emerged, as the symbolic expression of a new, highly antagonistic Soviet-American relationship. It represented, at the outset, a curious realization of Trotsky's famous formula of "no war, no peace." Diplomatic relations were to be continued, to be sure; and the guns, including the nuclear ones, were for the moment to remain silent.

But the threshold of actual hostilities was, at that time, never remote. Many people, including Stalin himself, thought it likely, if not inevitable, that this threshold would soon be passed. On both sides, great military establishments began to be trained, and taught to think, as though war, or some form of military showdown, was the way the conflict was bound ultimately to end. In many ways, in everything except the silence of the weapons, war already became a reality in the minds of millions of men, military and civilian.

Although there were to be successive later crises, the high point of the cold war was probably reached during the Korean War. And we all know the further course of events. Fortunately, for all of us, war between the United States and the Soviet Union did not break out. The crisis was surmounted.

And in the ensuing four decades, down to the middle of the 1980s, each of these components of the cold war, while often retaining its initial validity in the perceptions of people in both countries, diminished in sharpness, and often in reality. The peoples of Western Europe soon recovered their political balance, their prosperity, and their self-confidence. After the success of the Marshall Plan, there could no longer be any question of dangerous communist penetration in that region.

Both sides, furthermore, soon began to learn to live, after a fashion, with the nuclear weapon, at least in the sense that they came to recognize that this was a suicidal weapon that must never be used—that any attempt to use it would lead only to a disaster in which all concepts of victory or defeat would become meaningless. And as for the relationship of conventional military forces in Europe: not only did the development of the NATO alliance restore an approximate military balance in the heart of the European continent, but—more important still—it became increasingly
clear with the passage of the years that neither side had either the incentive or the desire to unleash even a conventional war, much less a nuclear one, in that region.

One might have thought that in the light of these changes, the highly militarized view of East-West relations that the term “cold war” signified might have faded. But military preparations and weapons races are stubborn things. They engender their own patterns of habit and suspicion. These ride along on their own intrinsic vitality even when the original reasons for them have largely faded.

So in this sense the cold war lived on in the minds of many people through the 1960s and 70s, even after most of the justification for it had faded. And it was only in the middle of the 1980s, with the emergence of a Russian leader intelligent enough to recognize that the rationale of the cold war was largely unreal, and bold enough to declare this publicly and to act accordingly, that the world was brought to realize that one epoch—the epoch of recovery from the enormous dislocation of World War II—had passed; and that a new one was beginning—an age that would, to be sure, create new problems, as all great changes in international life are bound to do, but would at the same time also present new possibilities.

This is the point at which we now find ourselves. The initial sources of contention between the two governments—the prewar ones, that is—no longer have serious significance. The ones flowing from the outcome of World War II have been extensively moderated and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has shown every evidence of an intention to see them substantially eliminated. Where do we go from here?

The Russia we confront today is in many respects like nothing we have known before. The last vestiges of the unique and nightmarish system of rule known as Stalinism are now disappearing. What we have before us is in many respects the freest period Russia has ever known, except perhaps for the few years of feverish change that just preceded the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

But we must be careful when we use this term “freedom.” This does not mean that Russia is becoming like us. This it is not doing, could not do, and should not be expected to do. Forms of government and the habits of governments tend over the long run to reflect the understandings and expectations of their peoples. The Russian people, like a number of other peoples of the Soviet Union, have never known democracy as we understand it. They have experienced next to nothing of the centuries-long development of the discipline of self-government out of which our own political culture has evolved. If you presented them tomorrow with our political system, most of them would not know what to do with it; and what they did do might be far from our expectations.

It is clear, then, that whatever happens, and whatever may be the fate of Gorbachev’s efforts at the restructuring of Soviet society, Russia is, and is going to remain, a country very different from our own. We should not look for this difference to be overcome in any short space of time.

Beyond which, Russia, as a great modern country in a unique geographic position, and the heir to extensive involvements flowing from that position, is bound to have political interests quite different from our own. These are, fortunately, for the most part, not ones that conflict seriously with ours. Such differences as remain are not ones that should preclude a normal relationship, particularly when leadership on the Russian side is in the hands of a man such as Gorbachev. But this disparity does mean that one should not look, over the long term, for quite the same sort of political
intimacy with Russian regimes that we might expect from a country that had inherited more of our own legacy of political outlooks and institutions.

All that being said, we are faced with the fact that Gorbachev has given every evidence, for his part, of an intention to remove as many as possible of the factors that have hampered Soviet-American relations in the past; and a number of bold steps he has taken in that direction do testimony to the sincerity of his effort. To the extent he is able to carry these efforts to conclusion (and that depends to some extent on the response from our side), they present the most favorable opportunity the United States has had in the last 70 years to develop a normal, constructive, and hopeful relationship with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev’s position is obviously an extremely difficult one. The burdens he has assumed are almost superhuman. His efforts at internal economic reform have served, thus far, mainly to reveal that the damages done to Soviet society, economically, socially, and spiritually, by 50 years of Stalinist terror and Brezhnevist corruption and stagnation are greater than any of us had supposed. It is going to take longer than anyone had realized to repair those damages and build a healthy society.

Whether Gorbachev will be given the time to do this, no one can say. His difficulties are heightened by the fact that his reforms have had the unintended and unexpected effect of inflaming nationalistic feelings in several of the non-Russian ethnic communities of the Soviet Union, thus rendering acute a political problem—namely the relations of the non-Russian periphery to the Russian center—which many of us had thought was only a problem of the more distant future. Particularly in the case of the three Baltic countries this has led to a situation of great potential instability; for what goes on in those parts of the Soviet Union interacts with what goes on in the so-called “satellite” countries of Eastern and Central Europe, farther afield; and if things get farther out of hand in this entire region, situations could be produced that would appear to threaten not just the political but also the strictly defensive military interests of the Soviet Union, which could have serious consequences.

How long Gorbachev will be able, or permitted by his colleagues, to bear these burdens, no one can say. His position has important elements of strength: his great reputation as a statesman, plus the fact that whoever might succeed to his powers would also have to succeed to his problems, something of which all his opponents must be painfully aware. The pressures, on the other hand, are cruel.

It is equally impossible to make predictions about what, were Gorbachev to be removed, would follow. That conditions could not revert to what they were before he took power is one of the few things on which almost everyone agrees. The intellectuals have been given their head; and it is unthinkable that this generation of them should ever again be bottled up as they were before. Not only that, but the Gorbachev economic reforms, unproductive as they may have been to date, have been formally accepted by the highest bodies of party and government; and this stamp of approval is not apt to be withdrawn until and unless someone can come up with a better alternative, which no one, as yet, has shown any sign of doing.

One must suppose, therefore, that whoever might replace Gorbachev would have to follow extensively in his footsteps, though possibly at a slower speed and without his boldness of leadership.

Particularly is this true in the field of foreign policy, which should be of greatest interest to us. Within Russia, this has been the least controversial of Gorbachev’s fields
of activity. Hard-liners, military and civilian, might like to retract, if they could, some of the more conciliatory steps he has taken in the area of arms control; but they would soon find that they faced the same financial stringencies he has been attempting to master, and they would presumably have little room, here too, to maneuver.

One must suppose, therefore, that a good portion of what Gorbachev represents would survive him, even if he were to be removed at an early date. Meanwhile, to our good fortune, he hangs on, suspended precariously in midair, to be sure, supported mainly by his incomparable qualities of insight, imagination and courage, and by the relative mediocrity and intellectual poverty of most of his opponents.

To the policy makers of a new administration, the Russian scene of this particular moment presents, then, a series of tremendous uncertainties—uncertainties greater than Russia has ever known since the fateful year of 1917. If one were to be asked, what is it that is most likely to happen in the coming period, one could say only—the unexpected.

These uncertainties are unquestionably reasons for great alertness, caution, and prudence in American policy toward that country. They are not, however, reasons for neglecting the opportunities offered by Gorbachev’s policies for the easing of military tensions and for improving the atmosphere of East-West relations generally. If realistic and solid agreements are made now, while the iron is hot; if these agreements, as is to be expected, are seen in Moscow as being in Soviet interest; if they are, as they should be, inherently self-enforcing; if, as is to be expected, they are sealed in formal undertakings—then they are not apt to be undone simply by changes in the Soviet leadership.

What, then, should be the objectives of American policy toward the sort of international partner Gorbachev is trying to make out of Russia? What could we, from our side, do to promote the normalization of this relationship and to shape its future in a manner commensurate with its positive possibilities?

It would seem obvious, to this writer at least, that our first concern should be to remove, insofar as it lies within our power to do so, those features of American policy and practice that have their origins and their continuing rationale in outdated cold war assumptions and lack serious current justification.

To some extent, this has already been done. Cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts are proceeding briskly, no longer seriously impeded from either side. The same may be said of scholarly exchanges. In all these areas, the initiative has normally and properly to come from private parties. The government’s task is primarily not to stand in the way, but to lend its support wherever this is really needed. That things have gone as well as they recently have in these forms of contact is encouraging testimony to the private demand for them and to their usefulness as components of normal relations between two great peoples.

In the commercial field, too, progress has been made; but here obstacles remain—obstacles for which there is no present justification and the removal of which should present no problems.

One hears a certain amount of discussion about whether we should not give aid to Gorbachev. The entire question is misconceived. One must bear in mind the difference between trade and aid. Gorbachev has not asked us for anything in the nature of loans or special credits or other abnormal forms of assistance; he is most unlikely to do so; and we would be ill advised to give it even if he did.

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What the Russians are asking for, and deserve to be given, are only the normal facilities for trade, facilities that include of course the extension of the usual commercial credits by both parties in specific business deals. Here, two needless obstructions persist, both dating from the 1970s, in the form of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments to the 1974 Trade Act, which in effect deny to the Soviet Union normal customs treatment and restrict the facilities for commercial credit. For these restrictions, which proved to be of little or no benefit to anyone at the time, there is no longer any justification at all; and the sooner Congress removes them, the better.

For the rest, once minimum security precautions have been observed, let Soviet-American trade proceed as it will. The prospects for it are not open-ended. The Soviet side has at this time little to offer in export items, and has sharply limited amounts of foreign exchange available for imports. But these prospects are also not insignificant; and they should not be curtailed by unnecessary official restrictions.

The most serious of the factors weighing on the Soviet-American relationship is unquestionably the problem of arms control, including the continuing competition in the development of strategic nuclear weapons and the standoff in conventional forces in Central Europe. This exorbitant confrontation of military strength, out of all reasonable proportion to the political differences that are supposed to justify it, constitutes an inexhaustible source of mistrust and suspicion between the two parties, distracts public opinion from more serious aspects of the relationship, and preempts vast quantities of resources that could well be used for more creative purposes.

What can be done about it?

Obviously, not everything depends on us. It takes two, at every point, to perform this tango. But since Gorbachev has given impressive signs of his intention to do his best in this respect, and has taken a number of conciliatory and even unilateral steps in that direction, this would be a good time for us to review our own record and to see whether it could not be improved.

We have, of course, had one significant success in recent years: the so-called INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) agreement, eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons from the forces of both sides stationed in Central Europe. This success was made possible by the willingness of both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev to override all the intricacies of negotiation at the technical-military level and to take the bold steps, each giving reasonable credit to the good faith of the other side. But it has carried us only a small distance along the path of general arms reduction. For the rest, our record may well stand questioning.

We could certainly have had by this time, had we wished to have it, a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and nothing, surely, could have gone farther to assure extensive, if gradual, reductions in nuclear weaponry. We do not have it.

We could in all probability have had by this time, had we wanted to, the 50-percent reduction in long-range nuclear missiles which both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev recognized as desirable and which, once achieved, would presumably have changed the whole climate of the arms control problem. We do not have it. We chose to give higher priority to the Strategic Defense Initiative, and to the modernization and consequent buildup of our strategic nuclear arsenals.

The maintenance of the present American conventional deployments in West Germany absorbs, we are told, some 40 percent of our great military budget. Nothing
within the realm of practical possibility could have contributed more directly and importantly to the reduction of the Federal budget than a significant reduction in these expenditures. For years we have been toying timidly with negotiations over the possible reductions of these forces, and have gotten nowhere. These negotiations having now been moved to a much wider forum (that of the Atlantic-to-Urals talks in Vienna, embracing a greatly expanded number of participants), the prospects for any success in the coming period would seem to have been diminished rather than improved.

Gorbachev, in the meantime, has announced important changes in Soviet doctrine affecting the mission and the composition of the Soviet forces in this region, changes envisaging in particular the removal from the forward positions of forms of weaponry that would lend themselves to employment for sudden aggressive purposes. This change of doctrine has been accompanied by a number of specific suggestions from the Soviet or Warsaw Pact side for confidence-building measures of one sort or another, and by extensive unilateral Soviet measures of restraint.

The responses by which these initiatives have been met on our side have been, for the most part, reluctant, embarrassed, and occasionally even surly. These responses have caused a great many people elsewhere in the world to wonder whether we really have any serious interest in arms control at all.

Can we not do better than that?

The hesitations that have underlain these unenthusiastic responses seem to have been largely connected with the impression, so frequently propounded and supported in official American circles, that there has been an “overwhelming” Soviet superiority in conventional forces in the Central European theater and that this situation would continue to prevail even after completion of the unilateral Soviet withdrawals Gorbachev has announced. There are many of us who would strongly dispute that thesis, and dispute it on the basis of statistics fully available to, and even recognized by, official Washington circles.

The confusion seems to arise from several more fundamental miscalculations. There has been the use of unrealistic and seriously misleading NATO-versus-Warsaw Pact comparisons for measuring Soviet and American forces in Central Europe. There has been the persistent assumption that the American tactical and short-range nuclear weapons in West Germany are an essential element of “deterrence,” without which there would be serious danger of a Soviet attack in that region. Finally, and in close connection with this assumption of aggressive Soviet designs, there has been the insistence of our military authorities that the extent of the “threat” presented to us by any foreign power must be measured solely by our estimate of that power’s capabilities, ignoring its interests and intentions.

A new administration in Washington owes it to itself to reexamine these assumptions, and others like them, and to ask itself whether, considering both the dangers and the expense of the maintenance by both parties of these enormous and inordinate arsenals, we could not find more realistic means of measuring the problem and more hopeful ways of promoting its solution.

If, in this way, some of the more obvious and extensive impediments to a better relationship with the Soviet Union could be overcome, the greater part of what needs to be done would have been accomplished. Bilateral relations between sovereign governments are not the area in which greater positive things are to be achieved, rather a way in which conflicts of interest are to be composed and negative things are to be
avoided. If we succeeded in doing no more than to eliminate the greatest sources of conflict prevailing between these two governments, this alone would have been a great accomplishment.

But this would not be the end of the story. There are limited possibilities for useful collaboration even between governments so different in traditional and in ideological inspiration as the Soviet and American ones. These possibilities relate to a number of fields; but the greatest and most important of these, without question, is that of environmental protection and improvement on the planetary scale.

There are no two countries that could, if they wanted to, contribute more by joint effort in this field than the United States and the Soviet Union. The same applies to the area of space research. If we could get over the idea that outer space is there primarily to be exploited by us for our military advantage, there would clearly be important possibilities for collaboration with the Soviet Union in the whole great field of space research.

All this collaboration would be justified if only by the direct effects it was designed to achieve. But the probability ought to be recognized that to the extent the two countries could join their efforts in this manner, the remaining impediments to a firm and useful relationship between them would be the more easily overcome: because in the very process of collaboration in a necessary and peaceful process, useful to all humanity, the neurotic impulses of military and political rivalry would be bound to be overshadowed; and the peoples might find, in the intermingling of their own creative efforts, a firmness of association which no other intergovernmental relationships could ever assure.

What we are seeing today is, in effect, the final overcoming of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The present Soviet leaders are the first of that sort who, in trying to shape the society of their country, will have to relate themselves not just to the post-1917 revolutionary period but to the entire span of Russian history. What they are creating, and what we must now face, is another Russia, entirely identifiable neither with the revolutionary period nor with the centuries of czarist power that preceded it.

Just as the designing of this new Russia calls for innovation on the part of those in Moscow who are responsible for it, so it calls for innovation on the part of an American government that, more importantly perhaps than in the case of any other of the world’s governments, has to relate to it.

This is the challenge those in the Bush Administration will have to meet. In their attempt to meet it, they will not be able to ignore the immediate past—but they cannot be successful if they allow themselves to be the captives of all its emotional traumas.

—George F. Kennan, during his long diplomatic career, served many times in Moscow, including as a member of the first American delegation to the Soviet Union, in 1933-1934; as minister-counselor in 1944, and as Ambassador in 1952. In 1947, he devised the “containment” strategy that was to underlie postwar American policy toward the Soviet Union. From 1961 to 1963, he was Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He is now Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J.
ON SPECIALISTS VS. GENERALISTS

To the Editor:

I found Tom Clancy's article in your March 1989 issue ("Look Who's Sinking Our Navy—And Our Army") both interesting and provocative. As I read the article I found myself wanting to agree especially with the author's assertion that military commanders should be specialists rather than generalists. However, after completely reviewing the article, thinking about it at length, and finally coming to my senses, my ultimate conclusion is that Mr. Clancy should stick to writing fiction.

As an active-duty Army officer for 12 years, with no naval experience, I will not claim to know what is best for the Navy as Mr. Clancy does. However, like Army commanders, I would think Navy commanders need to be greatly concerned and knowledgeable about logistical matters. A sub's nuclear reactor plant is the lifeline to the crew's existence and to the vessel's ability to maneuver and fight. If I were a ship commander, I surely would be interested in its power source. The author even states that officers aspiring to command should be trained to do one thing: operate the submarine and kill targets. Well, operating a nuclear sub without its reactor is like killing targets without torpedoes, missiles, or other such ammunition.

I do agree with Mr. Clancy that a generalist officer cannot know all aspects of his profession equally well. However, why does he think an officer who is a specialist in operating the submarine and killing targets will be any better as a commander? In the Army, it takes more than just command experience and training in tactics to prepare an officer for command. For instance, serving on the staff for another commander gives an officer a great deal of experience and insight into such areas as personnel, intelligence, and logistics, as well as operations—all important areas of concern to a commander. Even ROTC instructor duty contributes to an officer's ability to teach, coach, develop, motivate, and care for his subordinates—all essential tasks of a good commander.

The system of command in the British navy may work fine for them, but it is unrealistic to expect it to be appropriate in the American armed forces which are different in size, tradition, and history from those of Great Britain. Unlike the military services of many other countries, the effectiveness of US military organizations is based on teamwork: it is not determined solely by the commander. In my opinion, if mission accomplishment or functioning of a unit is overly dependent upon the commander or any other one person, the death or transfer of that individual can be devastating to the organization. Under such circumstances, the military unit would be only contingently effective, not reliably effective. Maybe the British command system is most efficient, but is it truly effective?

The British can have their specialist officers. I am proud and happy to be in the US Army where officers are generalists.

Major Ronald L. Bertha
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
The Author Replies:

Toynbee wrote that until 1840 or so it was possible for one man to comprehend all human knowledge. Today the professions are so flush with information that it requires a superior mind merely to keep pace with developments in an individual subset of, for example, medicine.

It would seem that the same is true of the military profession. All things being equal, it hardly needs saying that the more information a person has, the more useful that person will tend to be. But all things are not equal, and since we cannot train a generalist officer to know everything that pertains to his profession, value judgments must be made to determine what is vitally important and what is not. I do not claim to have the magic answer to that question; my article merely pointed out that other sea services have developed answers different from those of the United States Navy. It should also be obvious that it is incumbent upon a thinking man to examine the ideas of others and not to proclaim loudly, as many USN officers have done, that we are the best in the world in every way, and that we have little if anything to learn from other navies. That sort of egocentrism is dangerous.

On the question of relative importance between tactical operation of a warship and knowledge of the engineering plant, the proper area of emphasis was defined by the father of the US Navy, John Paul Jones. When Captain Jones expressed his preference for having a fast ship, his reason was not that he enjoyed sailing, but that he planned to sail in harm’s way. Contrast this dictum with a letter I received from a former submarine CO who stated that “the most sacred duty” of a sub skipper was to ensure that his reactor plant was operating properly. Then wonder who was, or is, right.

Tom Clancy

VIETNAM AND THE TYPOLOGY OF WAR

To the Editor:

In the June 1988 issue of Parameters, Timothy Lomperis presented a view of the Vietnam War that was inaccurate in at least four particulars (“Giap’s Dream, Westmoreland’s Nightmare”). First, he erroneously identified the group “bent on reunifying the country” as “North Vietnamese.” In fact, both the individuals fighting on the communist side and their leaders, including the leaders of the Vietnamese Workers Party and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, came from all sections of Vietnam. Throughout the war four of the 11 members of the Politburo came from south of the 17th parallel (36.4 percent), as did six of the Politburo’s 14 members (if one includes alternates) at the time of the communist triumph in 1975 (42.9 percent). In 1973, a majority of the nine-member VWP’s Secretariat came from the South, as did half of the members elected to the 1976 Council of Ministers whose place of birth can be determined (20 of 38). Vietnam’s communists took power in the South in 1975, but from its inception the Vietnamese communist movement was national, not regional.

Second, Lomperis erred when he wrote of “the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel as a result of the Geneva Accords of 1954.” The statement outlining the nature of the 17th parallel dividing line was crystal clear: “The military
demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.” Both the Geneva Accords and the 1973 cease-fire agreement recognized the provisional nature of the 17th parallel in exactly the same language, and Vietnam’s communists viewed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as “the revolutionary base for the whole country” rather than a complete nation in itself, to quote General Giap. Although communist wartime propaganda in the mid-1960s described the war as a revolution indigenous to the South, the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong were always agents of the Vietnamese Workers Party leadership in Hanoi. Given the communist commitment to a single, unified Vietnamese state, South Vietnam’s claim to nationhood was something to be won on the battlefield.

Third, Professor Lomperis erred when he implied that the use of guerrillas was the principal attribute of people’s war. That view contradicts the definition presented by the preeminent Vietnamese theorists of people’s war, General Giap and Truong Chinh. They both emphasized protraction and the coordination of all possible dimensions of revolutionary conflict (military, political, cultural, economic, and diplomatic). As they defined it, people’s war was much more comprehensive than Lomperis implied, with guerrilla warfare taking place in a context in which the goal was to move to “mobile warfare,” something the communists attempted unsuccessfully in 1964-65, 1968, and 1972 before their success in 1975.

Finally, Lomperis’s description of the final communist offensive as “conventional” contradicted a number of Vietnamese sources readily available in English. Generals Dung, Giap, and Tra, for example, all commented on the important role played by guerrillas and other irregular forces during the 1975 offensive. In American military parlance, a conventional attack does not anticipate reliance upon population within the enemy’s territory for logistical and combat support. It does not expect guerrilla units to fix the enemy, clear lines of communication, and maintain security in the rear. And it certainly does not expect enemy morale to be undermined by political cadres within the very heart of the enemy’s territory, cadres that will assume positions of political power as the offensive progresses. Yet available communist sources describe all of these things happening in South Vietnam during the final communist offensive. The 1975 Politburo description of the attack as one “striking from the outside in and from the inside out” was much more accurate than the Lomperis description of the attack as “conventional.”

The Lomperis argument may be acceptable to Americans with a bias toward conventional war, but it is not well supported by the available evidence. Readers who believe that the North Vietnamese conquered South Vietnam in a war of aggression through a conventional attack or assume that the essential element of people’s war is guerrilla warfare will find themselves ill-prepared to understand revolutionary conflicts elsewhere in the Third World.

John M. Gates
The College of Wooster (Ohio)

The Author Replies:

Professor Gates raises four objections to my article, “Giap’s Dream, Westmoreland’s Nightmare.” None of them is terribly troubling, but the implication

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behind them is more worthy of attention. It suggests that I may not have communicated my central message. Accordingly, I welcome the inspiration to try again to make myself "perfectly clear."

First, I am cited for erroneously identifying "the group 'bent on reunifying the country' as 'North Vietnamese.'" Professor Gates then lists the proportion of southerners in various communist ruling circles. Initially, I was prepared to counter statistically with relative proportions of southern versus northern communist forces before and after the 1968 Tet Offensive (with the war becoming almost exclusively a northern show afterwards), and to jab back with the historical observation that the southern communist movement was dealt a crippling blow as far back as 1940 in Tran Van Giau's suicidal uprising, making the revolution really from then on, perforce, a northern show. This imbalance persisted throughout the war against the French (1946-1954). Though some balance was restored in the early phases against the Americans, it was once again shattered in the Tet Offensive. But then I read the professor's next paragraph and found he had made my point for me: "The National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong were always agents of the Vietnamese Workers Party leadership in Hanoi."

Second, I am faced with Professor Gates's puzzling objection to my casual acceptance of the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. I don't know what my problem is, but I also casually accept the division of Korea at the 38th parallel and Germany into an East and West "pending their peaceful reunification." Interestingly, in this provisional period in Vietnam, some 60-odd countries extended full diplomatic recognition to the government in Saigon as did more than 30 to the regime in Hanoi. This "peaceful reunification" was precisely at the heart of both the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973. It would be news to the official positions of any of the participants to these conclaves that, in Professor Gates's words, "South Vietnam's claim to nationhood was something to be won on the battlefield." The designation of the 17th parallel as a demilitarized zone, it was hoped, would ensure that alterations to this provisional arrangement would only be by mutual political consent. Though the hope proved fond, in terms of whose forces were found well south of this line and who subsequently refused to leave, it did establish unequivocally who the aggressor was.

Third, Professor Gates asserts I was wrong to imply that "the use of guerrillas was the principal attribute of people's war." Elsewhere, as Professor Gates well knows, I have commented extensively on people's war (The War Everyone Lost—And Won [1984]). Like Professor Gates, I understand it to be a protracted form of revolutionary warfare moving through the three stages of guerrilla, mobile, and conventional war. "The principal attribute of people's war," I readily concede, is not the use of guerrillas per se, but the conduct of revolutionary warfare based on a political mobilization of the people concerned (in this case, the people of South Vietnam, since the authorities in Hanoi claimed that what was going on in the south was an indigenous revolution and chose to refer to themselves as "the great Socialist rear"). Thus, at the end, during its conventional phase, a people's war should still exhibit the fully mobilized support of the populace for this effort. This is best symbolized by the Vietnamese phrase for it, khoi nghia, or righteous revolt, which General Giap characterized as a General Offensive-General Uprising.
My argument is centrally this: the communists did try such a comprehensive political-military strategy in 1964-65 and again in 1968; but in 1968 the political side of this strategy (to say nothing of the military) was defeated with such devastation that it was virtually abandoned for purely military offensives in 1972 and 1975 conducted almost exclusively by the regular army of North Vietnam.

Fourth, I have committed the sin of “contradicting a number of Vietnamese sources” like communist “Generals Dung, Giap, and Tra” who “all commented on the important role played by guerrillas.” In the preparation of all my writings, I have read these and other communist writings with great care, but, if I may be forgiven, I do not approach communist texts as someone who stands in the presence of the Inerrant Word. In the midst of his self-congratulatory and thoroughly conventional military saga of 1975, General Dung does briefly comment on the help of guerrillas, but what is pronounced is just how brief these comments are. In fact, General Dung’s memoir has the effect of making it perfectly clear just how complete was the domination of the communist war effort by the north. Giap’s subsequent account in 1976 was, as I have written earlier, an embarrassed attempt to give more guerrilla credit to the victory. He is fulsome in his mention of splendid guerrilla activity, but, like Dung’s account, is disappointingly spare in specifics.

The implication of all of what Professor Gates objects to, I take very seriously. It is that I have blasphemed by trying to take some of the shine off the communist victory by asserting that as a revolution the victory was a fraud. I admit to this blasphemy. The problem with a victory, more than with a defeat, is that it has to be recognized to be seized. A victory unrecognized slips away. In Vietnam, though a war was lost, a victory was achieved over a revolution—a victory we let slip away in 1968, and are still letting slip away. The difference on this question between myself and Professor Gates, and others like him, is profound. Here I address my remarks more to the “others” than to John Gates, whom I know to be a charming and sincere man and who has written a good book on the Philippine Insurrection.

The “others” would have it that the liberation of Saigon in 1975 was the fitting keystone to a 45-year revolutionary arch. In this romantic sentiment, I feel they are utterly wrong. The revolution perished in 1968, and, had we the perspicacity to see what we had done, the war itself might not have been lost. In brief, we are not so bad at defeating Third World revolutions as they insist that we believe. The irony of the Vietnam War is that in going into the war, the dominant Korean War analogy was mostly wrong. After Tet, it was mostly right. Our judgment, however, became so terrorized by Tet’s truly revolutionary outburst that in finally seeing the Vietnam War as a revolution, we also failed to see how decisively we had just crushed it.

The famous Lawrence of Arabia, in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom, once lamented his military: “I weighed the English army in my mind, and could not honestly assure myself of them. The men were often gallant fighters, but their generals as often gave away in stupidity what they had gained in ignorance (p. 386).” In the United States, such ignorance is not so much the preserve of our military as it is of our politicians, professors, and pundits.

Timothy J. Lomperis
Duke University

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NOTHING WRONG WITH BEING A STRATEGIST!

To the Editor:

General John R. Galvin’s article, “What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist?” in the March 1989 issue of Parameters is right on the mark!

It caused me to reflect on the process we need to develop future military strategists. I concur that formal schooling, self-development, and in-unit education each has an important role to play. With regard to formal schooling and in-unit education, I’d like to suggest an interesting and highly effective approach I was exposed to as an exchange tactics instructor at the British Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) Centre in 1978.

A regular and much-anticipated feature of the Tactics School's program of instruction at the RAC Centre was an evening of formal presentations by small groups of junior officers with the Brigadier (Commandant) presiding. These sessions, normally lasting 30 to 40 minutes, focused on the lessons to be learned from specific historical battles and campaigns. An overview of the battle, with selected vignettes to illustrate key points, preceded the conclusions and lessons learned.

Each group of officers was assigned a topic two or three months in advance to allow time for research and preparation. The presentations often included the use of elaborate visual aids, sometimes with detailed terrain boards, as well as the use of period uniforms and the like. The only limitations were the imagination and ingenuity of the officers involved. When the presentations were done well, everyone, including the senior officers, learned from the experience.

The topics ranged from the campaigns of Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and Eisenhower to contemporary operations such as the Israeli raid on Entebbe. The only restriction was that the lessons learned had to have some potential relevance to modern-day warfare. The principles of war often were used as the vehicle for analysis.

A field-grade advisor was assigned to guide the group of officers in their preparations and rehearsals. Final rehearsals were often monitored by senior field-grade officers. Special emphasis was placed on the major commanders' decision processes at critical points in the battle or campaign.

At the conclusion of each presentation, pointed questions were asked by the Brigadier, as well as by other faculty and students, to promote discussion and highlight the salient tactical and strategic concepts that had been illustrated. The evening would culminate with observations by the Brigadier and announcement of his choice of the best presenting group (normally best of three groups) that evening. He would call forward the winning group of officers and present them each with a volume to add to their professional libraries. At that point, all concerned would adjourn for a drink and lively re-creation of history's desperate battles.

The substantial value of such an exercise to officers and students of the profession of arms is obvious. I commend it (or a local variation) to the consideration of all those who have an interest in and commitment to molding our tacticians and strategists of the future.

LTC Richard A. Williams
Headquarters, US European Command
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND THE DRUG WAR

To the Editor:

I applaud Colonel Abbott's excellent article “The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?” appearing in the December 1988 issue. It was an apt and timely contribution which should be recommended to the new members of the Bush Administration.

In support of his conclusions, it is worth noting that the April 1986 National Security Decision Directive cited by Colonel Abbott has been superseded by an even more powerful mandate, i.e. the “sword and shield” law enacted by Congress and signed by President Reagan on 18 November 1988. This new law calls for the death penalty for some drug-related killings, expands the funding for interdiction by $158 million this year, increases the civil penalties for possession to more than just a slap on the wrist, and even addresses the demand aspect in this country by expanding the funds for drug education.

Unfortunately, these new measures are not likely to have the effect we would all like. They are the latest in a series of incremental responses in a campaign that has served mainly to muddle through politically without really affecting the flow of or the demand for drugs. To quote the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency, “There are more drugs than ever coming into our country and they are cheaper than ever before.” He estimates that it would take three billion dollars per year to close the southern border of the United States to drug smugglers—a number that makes the $158 million dollar increase look rather pitiful by comparison. At a time when the federal deficit threatens to topple the US and the global economies, acquiring the separate anti-drug funding necessary to stem the flow doesn’t seem likely or even possible.

It might be feasible, however, to integrate our anti-drug effort with security assistance. The Security Assistance Appropriation for FY89 is 7.998 billion dollars. According to the State Department’s Office of Security Assistance and Sales, those funds are being used by the Administration to achieve three broad policy goals: (1) enhance cooperative defense and security; (2) deter and combat aggression; and (3) promote regional stability.

With the damage that drugs are causing to our nation, and the strain they place on our relations with our neighbors in this hemisphere, can anyone doubt that using security assistance funds to combat the flow of drugs would serve the three purposes set forth above? If even one-tenth of these security assistance funds could be used by the police and the military of our southern neighbors, like Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, to control the production and movement of drugs within their countries, we would dramatically increase our capability to interdict drugs. As Colonel Abbott pointed out, these countries simply don’t have the radar, the patrol boats, and the communications systems necessary to control the drugs flowing out of their countries and into ours. What’s more, given their faltering economies and their debt burden, these countries don’t have the incentive to expend their scarce resources on such equipment and such efforts. We could use some of the funds we have appropriated for security assistance to reduce the flow of drugs and increase our security by helping our neighbors increase theirs.

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For the Bush Administration to attempt such a plan would require the US Congress to change its approach to security assistance. Under the current system influential members of Congress logroll the appropriations for security assistance to earmark funds for their particular political purposes. The two largest, and most broadly supported, earmarks are for Israel and Egypt (three billion and 2.1 billion dollars respectively). These set-aside funds are redolent of Camp David and the continuing search for balance and stability in the Middle East. Other earmarks, while smaller, have much narrower congressional constituencies and significantly less credibility for supporting national security interests. (The 15 million dollars of assistance funds earmarked for Northern Ireland was called “Tip O’Neill’s Graduation Present” by Robert Driscoll, the former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Security Assistance. The ten million dollars in security assistance funds devoted to South African scholars was acknowledged by key congressional staffers as a sop to the Black Caucus, essentially unrelated to established security objectives.) There are 23 separate earmarks in the FY89 security assistance appropriations bill. Congress has earmarked 93.9 percent of the total security assistance funding for FY89 and 100 percent of all the Foreign Military Sales grants and credits—the funds that allow countries to buy US equipment. As it stands now, none of the countries cited by Colonel Abbott as the primary sources and conduits for drugs entering the United States will receive any FMS funds, grant or credit, in FY89. The Administration has almost no flexibility in reallocating these funds, and the Democratic Congress has no real incentive to suggest or allow a compromise on its earmarks.

To implement this idea would thus require cooperation—cooperation between Congress and the Executive Branch, and between the United States and its American allies, cooperation that just might be possible during the honeymoon of the Bush Administration. The implications of such cooperation could be far-reaching. Such cooperation would signal a recognition by the United States that it has limited options and limited influence over the problem of drugs. It would signal US intentions to move away from unilateral action on the part of the Administration and toward a bipartisan foreign policy and hemispheric multilateralism. It could even be read as posing an international solution for an international problem.

The measures suggested cannot stop the flood of drugs across our southern border. They can, however, help reduce the flow to a more manageable level—and make our hemisphere more secure in the process.

Captain Stephen C. Daffron
West Point, New York

The Author Replies:

Captain Daffron’s letter is a constructive contribution to the dialogue, since he also sees the need for a reevaluation of the priorities in our security assistance programs. Unfortunately, the drug problem is still inclined to be regarded as a social issue rather than a national security issue. As Captain Daffron points out, Congress must change its approach to security assistance. Combating the drug
problem on an international scale does indeed fall within the State Department’s three broad policy goals as he has outlined.

Since having written my article last year, several positive actions have been taken to address the drug problem. The appointment of William Bennett to a position designed to provide overall direction and coordination of our national efforts in combating drugs is a key step.

Within the Army, our leadership is beginning to take a more forthcoming approach to the problem, looking for effective ways to employ the unique capabilities of the Army. At least two-thirds of our states have developed contingency plans for employment of their National Guard units in counterdrug operations. Many of those states are actively using their Guard units now in a wide range of missions in support of US Customs and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

We can and should expect our Army to take on a more vital role in countering this cancerous attack against our national security.

Colonel Mike Abbott

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Annual subscriptions to Parameters are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. The current subscription cost is $7.00 for domestic or APO addresses, $8.75 for foreign addresses. Single copies are also available at a cost of $4.50 for domestic addresses, $5.63 for foreign addresses. Checks should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Credit card orders may be placed by calling GPO at (202) 783-3238 during business hours.
This collection of essays by diverse hands on military leaders and leadership is, on the whole, critical in tone. It features General (from 18 December 1944 General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur’s principal ground, air, and naval commanders, placing assessments of their campaigns in a context of narrative biography, including brief sketches of their careers before and after World War II.

The critical tone is set decidedly by the first—and generally most satisfactory—of the essays, Stanley L. Falk’s overview titled “Douglas MacArthur and the War against Japan.” Because the outline of MacArthur’s career is so well known, this essay contains less background information than the others and concentrates more completely on an evaluation of generalship. Its thrust is toward pushing MacArthur out from any pantheon of the great generals of history. Falk acknowledges that MacArthur possessed qualities of brilliance, and of course he has to note MacArthur’s ultimate success; but in the specifics of MacArthur’s campaigns against Japan, Falk finds little to praise.

Falk’s catalog of MacArthur’s shortcomings emphasizes a tendency toward self-delusion that ignored information contrary to his preconceptions. This tendency, for example, produced disaster at the very outset of the war in the destruction on the ground of most of MacArthur’s Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress fleet. The same tendency continued to flaw the remainder of MacArthur’s war effort, as in his refusal to acknowledge the full difficulties of close-quarter combat against the Imperial Japanese Army and his consequent incurring of high casualties in the strategically questionable mopping-up of islands that had previously been bypassed. Falk demolishes the myth that MacArthur’s generalship was sparing of lives in comparison with other leading American commanders. Similarly, MacArthur’s tendency toward strategic parochialism, that is, his unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the demands of theaters other than his own, just as consistently flawed his generalship. It did so from his initial unwillingness to accept the limitations of Washington’s capacity to reinforce and resupply the Philippines, which encouraged on his part unrealistic planning for the defense of the archipelago and eventually jeopardized even the defense of Bataan and Corregidor, through his efforts throughout the war to draw naval resources from the Pacific Ocean areas, where geography most favored their use, into the considerably less hospitable maze of larger islands in the Southwest Pacific.

After the first months of the war, MacArthur usually commanded resources superior to his enemy’s. Yet, as Falk puts it, “On those occasions when the Japanese faced him with equal or greater strength, he was unable to defeat them or to react swiftly or adequately to their initiatives.” Falk’s final verdict on MacArthur is thus
negative: “Despite his reputation for military genius, it is not at all clear that he displayed the attributes of a great commander.”

MacArthur’s possession of those attributes appears particularly questionable, also, in his relationships with his principal subordinates, whose own accomplishments he continually usurped in his passion for arrogating to himself all the glory available in his sphere of war. Such egotism is scarcely calculated to stimulate the best qualities in subordinate commanders. Nevertheless, the essays in We Shall Return! show that MacArthur’s lieutenants usually rose above their natural resentment of his monopolizing the limelight, and the very fact that his relationships with his lieutenants were so often vexed accounts for much of the interest and importance of this anthology.

Let us run through the essays in the book, not in the order in which they appear therein, but—to stimulate further interest and debate—according to this reviewer’s assessment of the abilities and achievements of MacArthur’s commanders, beginning with the most distinguished. It is the reviewer’s personal ranking of relative merit that frames the list, not that of the editor and contributors to the book; but the book has strongly influenced this particular game of rating the commanders.

Herman S. Wouk, in a chapter titled “George C. Kenney: MacArthur’s Premier Airman,” discusses the commander of the Allied Far East Air Forces. Lieutenant General Kenney grasped aerial superiority from the Japanese remarkably early in the conflict, at least by early 1943, and exploited that superiority strategically to assure the success of MacArthur’s amphibious offensives, tactically to support the ground and naval forces, and, perhaps most important, logistically to keep amphibious leaps forward adequately supplied. It is an indication of how much MacArthur had come to rely on Kenney’s land-based airpower that many of his most severe problems of command developed during the early stages of the liberation of the Philippines, when, because of distance from Kenney’s bases, tactical air support for the ground battles had to come from carrier aviation instead. Among his other virtues, furthermore, Kenney always contrived to get along well with MacArthur.

Jay Luvaas and John F. Shortal write the chapter, “Robert L. Eichelberger: MacArthur’s Fireman.” Rising to command the Eighth United States Army by 9 September 1944, Lieutenant General Eichelberger in his subsequent operations in the Philippines “conducted a clinic in amphibious warfare.” If MacArthur’s own reputation for striking the Japanese where they least expected it emerges from the book less than intact, certainly Eichelberger proved himself a master of operational and tactical deception. More than any other of MacArthur’s commanders, more even than Kenney, Eichelberger showed the kind of flair for generalship that suggests the adjective brilliant. And he often worked under adverse circumstances. Typically, MacArthur inserted Eichelberger’s Eighth Army into Philippine operations after the Sixth Army was close to bogging down. Specializing in that sort of role was what made Eichelberger “MacArthur’s fireman.”

If rating Kenney and Eichelberger at the top of MacArthur’s chieftains in ability is obviously a subject for debate, putting General Sir Thomas Albert Blarney in third place strikes this reviewer himself as venturing onto considerably more perilous ground. David Murray Horner, an Australian historian, writes the chapter, “Blamey and MacArthur: The Problem of Coalition Warfare.” Blamey was by no means universally respected even among his Australian countrymen, and while he was Commander, Allied Land Forces, under MacArthur through most of the war, his
authority was rarely much more than nominal. MacArthur felt no inclination to place American troops under Australian command and ceased doing so as soon as he could, but Blamey had contributions to offer nevertheless, and he offered them well. He was a courageous advocate of Australia’s national and military interests at a time when John Curtin, the Prime Minister, did not perform that function because he was uncritically adulatory of MacArthur. Blamey was also a tough, dauntless soldier in adversity, as demonstrated during the Buna campaign of 1942; and in more prosperous times he was a first-rate coordinator of land, sea, and air elements of amphibious warfare, as he demonstrated repeatedly along the north coast of New Guinea in 1943, particularly in the Lae landings of 4 September.

Gerald E. Wheeler is author of the chapter titled “Thomas C. Kinkaid: MacArthur’s Master of Naval Warfare.” Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, and commander of the Seventh Fleet, earned the encomium of Wheeler’s subtitle in numerous amphibious operations, notably in the landing on Los Negros in the Admiralty Islands on 29 February 1944, an operation hastily improvised to exploit aerial reconnaissance reports of an abrupt enemy withdrawal from the Admiralties. The operation was endangered by a stronger Japanese garrison than anticipated, and was carried through to success largely because Kinkaid—and MacArthur—went ashore on the first afternoon and resolved not to retreat. Kinkaid can be faulted, and Wheeler does so, for failing to order adequate surveillance of San Bernardino Strait and assuming too much about Admiral William F. Halsey’s dispositions to support him from Halsey’s Third Fleet in the prelude to the perilous Samar phase of the battle of Leyte Gulf on 25 October 1944; but Kinkaid did just about everything right in the desperate defensive action that ensued. Perhaps he earned his highest marks the following December when he clashed head-on with MacArthur to prevent a premature invasion of Mindoro that would have subjected his ships to the risk of insufficient air cover; he won a ten-day postponement, to 15 December, that may well have averted a serious setback.

Kinkaid was ably seconded by Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, Commander of the Seventh Amphibious Force in the major landing assaults under MacArthur. His contribution is chronicled by Paolo E. Coletta in the chapter, “Daniel E. Barbey: Amphibious Warfare Expert.” Again the subtitle is apt. Barbey was an expert in the sense of being a highly skilled, highly competent technician. Similar qualities marked Major General Ennis C. Whitehead, who on 25 June 1944 moved up from deputy commander to commander of the Fifth Air Force, as Kenney in turn advanced to head the United States Far East Air Forces, which included the Fifth and the Thirteenth. Whitehead is probably the least known of the leaders sketched in this book; Donald M. Goldstein authoritatively begins restoring him to the notice he merits in the chapter, “Ennis C. Whitehead: Aerial Tactician.”

The placement of Barbey and Whitehead near the bottom of this reviewer’s rankings reflects not so much any known limitations of their abilities as the limitations rather of their spheres of command. Leading largely at a tactical level, they did not have the opportunities to display the talents of a Kenney or an Eichelberger. But they do not complete the list. There remains to be noted the editor’s own essay, William M. Leary’s “Walter Krueger: MacArthur’s Fighting General.” Lieutenant General (from 3 March 1945 General) Krueger was through most of the war in fact what Blamey was in name, MacArthur’s chief ground commander, commanding the Sixth
United States Army. He had long been respected as one of the Army's best tacticians, and he may have remained until the end MacArthur's favorite ground commander. But a valiant effort by Professor Leary to make for Krueger the best case possible within the framework of a historian's objectivity cannot rescue him from a reputation as the Major General George B. McClellan of the Second World War: an intellectually sound, exceptionally well-schooled professional officer, but unable to disentangle himself from those details of command that can obscure operational judgment, and painstakingly—even painfully—cautious. It is no doubt significant that except for Falk's deliberately concise overview of MacArthur, Leary's essay on Krueger is the shortest of the collection, in spite of the importance of Krueger's position. It must have been a trial to write about this obviously decent, honorable, and within limits competent old soldier, in whom there is finally little to praise as an army commander.

The fact that MacArthur chose Krueger to be his principal leader of land forces and essentially kept him in that place—though Eichelberger was edging toward the forefront during the final year of the war—brings us back to the presence that permeates this book. Not least of MacArthur's flaws was his unwillingness to bring close to him officers who might conceivably become rivals for glory. Kenney and Eichelberger notwithstanding, as a group MacArthur's commanders would not seem to match in ability a similar galaxy that might be selected from the war against Germany.

Nevertheless, We Shall Return! certainly explodes one canard: the idea that what finally redeems MacArthur's own reputation from such criticisms as Falk's is that there was nobody else of much account commanding in the Southwest Pacific, so that the only one available to merit credit for the final victory was MacArthur himself. By assembling this anthology, William M. Leary has proven that there was somebody else there indeed, and a circle of senior officers of no mean abilities at that.


Since the end of World War II, the greatest weakness of the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy has been the lack of a comprehensive national strategy. David Abshire has attempted to fill this gap with a book based on much experience and study at the Washington level of government, and a three-year stint as US Ambassador to NATO. In many ways he has succeeded in designing a realistic grand strategy.

The book is divided into two parts: the world theater and the strategic elements included within the grand strategy he proposes. Abshire's proposal begins with a prologue: "We must ensure that war comes neither by calculation nor by mistake."

He tells us in Chapter 1 that any successful grand strategy must: be appropriate to the values of the society; be multidimensional; integrate the instruments of national policy and regulate their use; and be comprehensible and acceptable to the public. While explaining why compartmentalized and divided Washington has never had a comprehensive strategy, he never explains how the serious obstacles to such a desideratum can be overcome.

The next chapter, "How NATO Works," drawing upon Abshire's service as US Ambassador to the alliance, is excellent. After presenting the moral dilemma related to NATO's early reliance on nuclear weapons, Abshire deals with the concerns
of NATO’s European member countries and the American commitment of forces to
European defense. Next, he examines how terrorism has affected differently the
European and US leaderships, and then takes up the deterrence debate. The author’s
discussion of structural disarmament or defense stretch-out is the focus of a chapter
titled “What if War Comes.”

Next comes the US perspective of problems it faces elsewhere—in the
Pacific, the Persian Gulf, Latin America (inadequately treated), Canada, Japan, and
China. The survey ends by spotlighting Mr. Gorbachev’s USSR. He rightly concludes
that strategists of both East and West will be confronted with “continuing zig-zags
and greater unpredictability.”

Thus the stage is set for Part II, “The Strategies”: “A grand strategy must
harmonize our objectives with our means, equilibrating political, social, and eco-


ditional considerations as well as military ones.” To achieve this broad design, Abshire
recommends a grand strategy containing nine component elements, with each treated
in a short chapter. The nine are as follows:

• Political strategy must maintain unity in our relations with allies while
pursuing dialogue and negotiations with the Soviet Union.

• Credibility must lie at the heart of the construction of public strategy.

• We need to restore balance and flexibility in our deterrence strategy.

• Our negotiating strategy should focus on arms control—“We need equal-
ity of outcome [and] linkage between arms control and other issues.” (The author
neglects to discuss negotiations on human rights and Basket 3 of the Helsinki accords,
dealing with humanitarian cooperation.)

• NATO must develop an effective peacetime strategy to manage its resour-
ces, reverse structural disarmament, and reinforce deterrence and defense.

• An overall technology strategy is needed, since the effective management
of technology can serve not only to improve deterrence and defense but also to
promote political cohesion among the allies.

• We should avoid overcommitment in the Third World. (I disagree that we
were overcommitted in Vietnam. We lost in Vietnam because we lacked both a strategy
and a will to win. I also disagree with the author’s assertion that Central America
remains outside the superpower relationship.)

• There can be no grand strategy without the strong link of an economic
strategy. In such a strategy broad US-Japanese cooperation is essential.

• The government, principally through the Vice President, the National
Security Advisor, and the NSC staff, must be organized for strategy.

The latter point, organizing for strategy, is the indispensable core of this
book. I strongly support Abshire’s recommendation for splitting the National Security
Advisor’s function into two parts, with each assigned to a separate individual: “a
national security adviser who takes charge of day-to-day operations and coordination;
and ... a presidential counsellor for policy planning and long range planning.” If
Abshire’s book can persuade President Bush and Congress to make this split, a miracle
will have taken place at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

One final caveat. The world is round. Contrary to Abshire’s perspective, the
struggle in the Pacific region, Latin America, and the Middle East is as important as
the NATO-Pact competition. This skewed perspective aside, David Abshire has made
an important contribution to American strategic thinking.

Reviewed by Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret., author of The Superstrategists.

Beginning in 1977 with his excellent Supplying War: Logistics From Wal- lenstein to Patton, Martin van Creveld established himself as a military historian worthy of attention. His Command in War (1985) reinforced that reputation, yet simultaneously revealed his limitations—his chapter on the Napoleonic staff, for example, suffered from a strange confusion of French and German staff titles and functioning, and from a lack of any deep knowledge of the Napoleonic Wars. Creveld is, simply, a big-picture expert who follows Clausewitz in pondering war as a whole, without concerning himself with details overmuch.

Technology and War is a considerably more ambitious and complex work, which shows his strengths and weaknesses to an even greater extent. Many of the latter are minor bobbles that would bother only a historical purist, but they are plentiful. The shield (alleged) of Achilles which Alexander appropriated becomes a whole “suit of armor,” the 1815 USS Demologus an “ironclad.” We are given Machiavelli’s more-than-slanted version of the condottiere, and that old fable of the “salute” at Fontenoy which presents the gesture as a supreme act of military gentility rather than the actual crude posturing of an erratic (and apparently somewhat snookered) British officer, waving his pocket flask and brawling a challenge at the uncomprehending French. For the Crimean War the Kinburn forts are somehow shifted from Odessa to Sevastopol. In the Sudan, Winston Churchill leads the charge of the 21st Lancers, against General Kitchener’s wishes (Churchill was there, but not in command).

The main thrust of the book, however, is a reliable history of the interrelationship of war and technology. Creveld even gets into its “irrational” aspects, in which desires for impressive size, complexity, or aesthetic appeal may influence weapons development. (The US Navy should have some interesting reactions to this chapter!) The general coverage is—with a few exceptions—complete, sensible, thoughtful, and even sympathetic to us bewildered military practitioners. He understands the modern periods of computerized warfare, “management,” and game theory, as well as the American fascination with technology for technology’s sake. This leads to a brief but scalding consideration of the new American tendency to euphemisms, such as “hostilian” for “enemy.”

Creveld believes that, because of the risk of its developing into nuclear war (which he can visualize only as global suicide), conventional warfare may have come to a dead end—“an empty, hollow game.” At the same time he realizes that war takes many forms, of which terrorism may be the most threatening today.

One gap in his considerations is that technology may be used in different ways by different commanders. His statement that “it was not the intrinsic superiority of the longbow that won the battle of Crécy, but rather the way in which it interacted with the equipment employed by the French” thus is only partially true: had the French not insisted on a bullheaded frontal attack, the results could have been quite different—as they were after Du Guesclin and others taught their heavy cavalry to maneuver. And consider that the same military technology was available to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon for use in Vietnam, though with differing degrees of success. The
skill and determination with which any military technology is applied to a tactical/strategic problem is frequently as important as the capabilities of the technology itself. Creveld rather neglects that point.

His large service is to point out that "technology and war operate on a logic which is not only different but actually opposed." Technology seeks streamlined perfection. "Slack and waste must be eliminated, redundancy put aside," to produce a "perfectly controlled and perfectly stable ... artificial world." War being a matter of accident, uncertainty, and danger, a military system must be capable of functioning amid constant change. It must avoid overspecialization; in fact a "certain amount of redundancy, slack, and waste must not only be tolerated, but deliberately built in."
The latest technology is not as essential as one that "neutralizes the other side's strengths, even as it exploits his weaknesses."

It's a good book. Read it, even if you don't buy it.


$8.95. Reviewed by Fred Reed, columnist for the Army Times.

Not much of a book. The author tries to write about the politics and morals of the possession of nuclear weapons. General Johnson, former Chief of Chaplains, is a nice enough fellow who thinks that nuclear war is not a good idea, and he recognizes that "most" of the military agree. The trouble is that his understanding of politics blends the sophomore radical's distaste for authority with the professional cleric's dismal grasp of how the world works.

His fundamental thesis is the bulwark of post-adolescent thought, the notion that the people—one really ought to capitalize it: the People—are good and wholesome and loving, while their leaders are responsible for evil, particularly war. For example: "Much of the drama of history centers around the readiness of leaders and the reluctance of a people to go to war." While he says that the analysis is a bit too simple, he nonetheless insists that governments regard war as legitimate, and peoples want to stay home. Good people, bad leaders. The same view, incidentally, directed specifically at the military, can be seen in the overwhelming tendency of officers in war movies to be portrayed as fascist brutes, while the enlisted folk—the military’s "people" in the eyes of Hollywood’s producers—are veritable philosophers.

I wonder what "people" General Johnson knows. In my own experience, the public is every bit as warlike as our leadership, far less informed, and probably even less responsible. Go to any American Legion hall during a crisis—the hostages in Tehran, say—and you will find a majority favoring overwhelming retaliation. ("Nuke’em Till They Glow," said a bumper sticker then popular. T-shirts showed Marines bayoneting mullahs.) I knew plenty of privates in Vietnam who thought that exterminating whole villages was a reasonable way to reduce mine-laying. Lynch mobs do not consist of leaders, nor do the murderous rabble of the Cultural Revolution, nor all the other murderous rabbles of history.

Predictably Johnson believes that the war in Asia was a crime of leaders. "The difference between how a people and government leaders view war came to a head in the Vietnam conflict. But before the will of the people prevailed, the blood of almost sixty thousand young Americans" was shed.
Curious. I was all over the United States following my return from Da Nang in 1968, and found enormous support for the war in truck stops (maybe truck drivers are Leaders?), in the rural South and West, and even, although you wouldn’t have known it from the newspapers, in suburban Washington. There was also a lot of opposition, chiefly from college kids and their affluent parents (the People, if by this one means the lower classes, wanted to bomb Hanoi into the Stone Age). Remember the support for Lieutenant Calley? It didn’t come from Harvard.

Later, arguing that nuclear deterrence is immoral, Johnson says, “I agree with the conclusion reached by United Methodist bishops, that nuclear deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing.” In practical terms, this ultimately means that nuclear weapons must not be used or possessed. He says we live “in a terribly dangerous world where the major powers wrestle in the death struggle of a war system.”

Huh? I can’t see the slightest evidence that any of the major powers are about to go to war with each other. Weirdly enough, the possession of a large military is perfectly compatible with the lack of any intention of fighting big wars. If deterrence works, how can it be immoral? If the Soviets actually do pull in their horns and join the rest of the world, will it not have been precisely fear of nuclear war that provided the breathing space for them to realize they had to behave?


Like Verdun, the World War I battlefield through which all French units were rotated, the Pentagon normally looms on the assignment landscape at least once for most career military officers. The purpose of General Smith’s book, in part, is to provide informal advice for these officers as well as DOD officials who are embarking on their first Pentagon tour. Assignment Pentagon is also intended as a guide for those interested persons who have no expectations of serving in the building. Despite General Smith’s vast Pentagon experience (seven different jobs) and despite the laudatory blurbs on the dust jacket from former Service Chiefs and CINCs, as well as an introduction by a former Secretary of Defense, the book only partially succeeds in achieving these purposes.

For the new arrivals at any staff level, there are nicely written, insightful chapters on the work of action officers, branch and division chiefs, and senior military and civilian officials. These are complemented by a useful chapter on house-hunting, an excellent treatment of the art of giving and receiving briefings, and a humorous description of difficult bosses that is sure to strike responsive chords in any veteran of large bureaucracies. In addition, Smith has a sharp ear for Pentagon truisms (forgetting only the oft-proved Pentagon aphorism that you can’t kill a bad idea); and he provides a strong and perceptive closing analysis of likely Pentagon changes in the 1990s that examines subjects ranging from the electronic office to the role of the JCS Vice Chairman.
Unfortunately, all this is buried in a multitude of other chapters, many no more than two or three pages, that can only be described as fluff. Some chapters provide simplistic advice that would apply to any bureaucracy (answer your mail, return phone calls, know the location of the copy machine). Elsewhere, there are suggestions in preparation for a Pentagon assignment to purchase a wristwatch with alarms, to enroll in a speed-reading course, and to watch the first ten minutes of TV’s *MacNeil-Lehrer Report* every evening. An entire chapter (two pages) is given over to a discussion of six phrases to avoid using, the majority of which may strike the Pentagon veteran as being archaic (“I don’t get mad—I get even”). Finally, there is a chapter providing General Smith’s idiosyncratic guide to the Washington area that ranges from the ludicrous (recommended movie about Washington—Frank Capra’s 1939 *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*), to the mundane (recommended video store—Erols), to elitist nonsense (recommended tennis court—court six at the Army-Navy Country Club).

*Assignment Pentagon* is more successful in portraying a broad picture of how the building operates to someone who will never serve there. There are, for example, excellent general discussions on the interaction of organizations like the Joint Staff and OSD and processes like the PPBS, complemented by a perceptive examination of the pattern of rivalry and competition in the building and a fascinating look at the inner workings of the JCS conference room known as the Tank. The various chapters on the key Pentagon positions, as well as on the unique jargon and the realities and myths of the building, all add to the layman’s picture. Still, that picture is much too superficial to be of great use to all of General Smith’s target groups, most notably scholars and the media. Scholars, in particular, will be disappointed in a chapter, ostensibly designed for them, which centers on a discussion of the bureaucratic politics model that could be found in any Pol. Sci. 101 text.

Judging from the amount of perishable information such as names and telephone numbers of key personnel and recommendations of specific real estate agents, it would seem that there are plans to republish *Assignment Pentagon* periodically. If so, the book should be drastically reoriented and restructured. There is certainly something in the current edition for anybody interested in the Pentagon. But that is the major problem. In trying to reach such a wide variety of targets, General Smith has produced a helter-skelter smorgasbord that could have been better distilled into several useful articles. Instead, the reader is treated to a fairly entertaining and informative show, expanded to at least twice its needed length, which is not worth the price of hardcover admission.


The second day at Gettysburg, 2 July 1863, certainly merits detailed treatment. The action on the first day was a meeting engagement, bringing tactical advantage to the Confederates but reflecting no senior general’s concept for imposing his will on the enemy. On the second day General Robert E. Lee planned the Confederate attack and General George G. Meade was on the scene to orchestrate the defense. Participants on both sides looked back at the resulting clash of arms as one
of the truly memorable actions of the entire war. For most Americans, "Pickett's Charge" on the third day overshadows the action of the second, but students of military history know that "Longstreet's Attack" is far more interesting at the tactical level and encompasses at least as much drama.

Those who seek the full story of the second day in this thick volume will be disappointed to discover that General Ewell's attack on Culp's Hill is ignored. Since that Confederate supporting attack was integral to Lee's operational concept and compounded the difficulties confronting Meade, the omission results in a book that falls far short of the content promised in the title.

This new book joins Crisis at the Crossroads: The First Day at Gettysburg by Warren W. Hassler, Jr., and George R. Stewart's Pickett's Charge to give us a volume for each day at Gettysburg. Pfanz has incorporated some of the better features of both earlier books. He shares Professor Hassler's respect for primary sources and meticulous chronology, and he weaves in anecdotal material in the "Catton style" favored by Stewart. The combination results in a big book—perhaps a bit overinflated with anecdote—that could overwhelm most readers with detail.

It is difficult to imagine the reader Pfanz envisioned. Most serious students of the Civil War have had enough of Gettysburg when they finish a single definitive monograph such as Edwin B. Coddington's Gettysburg: A Study in Command. Perhaps there are some who can never get enough of Gettysburg. They might be interested in the use of this book by those who had an ancestor who fought in one of the regiments engaged on the second day. The details such readers would seek are here, the excellent index will aid the search, the maps will improve understanding, and the notes and bibliography will facilitate further research. Scholars expecting a broader utility will be disappointed. No new light is shed on the great old controversies of the second day, such as Longstreet's countermarch, Sickles' move to the advanced position along the Emmitsburg Road, or Meade's decision-making skill in his first action as an army commander.

I recommend this book for those who seek tactical detail on the fights between Little Round Top and the Codori Farm, but in retrospect I wish I had reread Coddington instead.


Reviewed by Colonel David T. Twining, Director of Soviet and East European Studies, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College.

Viktor Suvorov has given us another revealing book in the tradition of The Liberators, Inside the Soviet Army, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, and Inside the Aquarium. Like its predecessors, it contains views which surprise Western sensibilities and transgress our culturally based presumptions and expectations. Spetsnaz, because of its glimpse inside an enigmatic, non-Western milieu, is required reading for the military professional who, in the comfort of a heated GP medium tent or at a command and control console, understands war's purpose but may be complacent about its means.

Based upon his experience as a former Soviet intelligence officer and his continuing useful contacts, Suvorov examines a potent military force which has no
distinctive uniform or badges, is quartered with other troops whose uniform it adopts, is known by a variety of names, and claims no schools or academies. Nevertheless, the 30,000 or so individuals in the Soviet army and navy who comprise its ranks are the best soldiers of the Soviet state. They have the best special-purpose equipment, including mines—their favorite tool—minisubs, silent pistols and rifles, and chemical and bacteriological weapons; the most aggressive training regimen to condition them to be afraid of nothing; and their own form of fighting—sambo, combat without rules.

Spetsnaz are found in company-sized units at army level and brigades at front or fleet level. Other spetsnaz operate secret agent nets at the strategic and operational level. The elite of this elite, however, are the corps of professional athletes—both men and women—to whom the more dangerous tasks are entrusted. All are simultaneously targeted against what Suvorov terms the “teeth” of the enemy state, its nuclear might; the “brain” of that state, its political leadership; and its “nervous system,” the critical command and control networks.

Prior to the initiation of hostilities, spetsnaz forces enter an enemy’s territory by illegal and legal means. By the time larger Soviet formations initiate offensive operations, these special forces will have disrupted and destroyed communications, assassinated heads of state and senior commanders, poisoned water supplies, and left a wake of devastation deep within enemy lines. As Soviet units rapidly advance, spetsnaz will identify key targets and assist those forward detachments which race ahead of their parent formations to seize enemy territory and discourage recourse to nuclear weapons by an opponent forced to choose between defeat and the destruction of its own citizens. As a vital component of Soviet military razvedka, the intelligence and reconnaissance function of the General Staff’s main intelligence directorate, the spetsnaz “wolves” will have accomplished their tasks ruthlessly and without fear.

Or will they? Suvorov—a pseudonym taken from one of Imperial Russia’s most famous officers—is indeed keen to warn us that this capability, complemented by the chief directorate for strategic maskirovka, is a serious threat to the West. Soviet planners will use spetsnaz as a combat multiplier in a future war, and open societies, by their very nature, are vulnerable to special operations. But Western societies also have a special asset which Suvorov, James Adams (“Soviet Special Forces in America: The Day Before,” Orbis, Spring 1988), and others have used to advantage: a freedom of information which alerts us to unusual threats, unreal and bizarre to many, where knowledge itself is a powerful defense. Suvorov, in his typically assertive style, once again points the way in a book written for the general reader.


Colonel Warden, currently the Deputy Director for Warfighting Concepts Development in the Air Staff’s Directorate of Plans, has endeavored to come to grips with theory for employing air power at the operational level. The result is a thought-provoking book.
Warden’s primary focus is on air superiority, which he sees as essential to success at the operational level. He explains why in examining the benefits it provides and the penalties the lack of it imposes. To simplify analysis, he divides air superiority into five cases, defined mainly by air base vulnerability relationships between opposing air forces. In the case where bases on both sides are vulnerable, he recurs to General MacArthur’s campaign in New Guinea to show the advantage of offensive action employing ground forces to seize bases from which air forces can extend their reach.

Examining air interdiction, which he cautions against attempting without air superiority, Warden examines six categories to determine when air interdiction is most effective. Not surprisingly, he finds this to be when the enemy is under pressure from combat or his plans require mobility. Looking at distant, intermediate, and close interdiction to see where to interdict, Warden concludes that each can be decisive depending on the situation. When the battle is in progress, however, close interdiction will probably be the most useful.

Warden believes that “powerful forces are pulling the ground commander one way and the air commander another” over the issue of close air support. These forces result from the often different perspectives of the two commanders and the difficulties involved in displaying or comprehending the effects of air interdiction as opposed to close air support. To carry out a rational air campaign in the face of these forces, he thinks close air support should be defined in a way that avoids giving a ground commander effective control over large parts of the air force. Accordingly he proposes defining close air support as any air operation which theoretically could or would be performed by ground forces if sufficient troops or artillery were available.

Recognizing that it may make some uncomfortable, Warden sees the need for a theater commander to determine whether he should identify a key force (air, ground, or naval) so the other two can stand in support. Choosing between ground and air as the key force for a campaign poses the most difficulties and involves reassessing traditional assumptions regarding the importance of territory and time.

In summary, this is an important but frustrating book. It is important because so little has been written, especially by American airmen, about employing air power in a campaign. It is frustrating because the author’s many penetrating observations made this reviewer wish the book was more comprehensive. For example, despite his title, Warden never defines campaign, let alone air campaign. This is an important point because many do not believe there can be separate land, air, or naval campaigns.

Command and control also deserve more attention. Although Warden views the enemy’s command and control system as a center of gravity worthy of attack, this observation does not cause him to devote similar attention to our system. It would be interesting to hear his views on how our system should be structured to reduce its vulnerability and, in a dynamic environment characterized by uncertainty, help us integrate air and land power. While he does address the important role air bases play in a campaign, he does not explain how aircraft designs affect air base availability and survivability. Advancing forward today, as General Kenney and others did during World War II, would be far more difficult, if not impossible, given the sophisticated basing requirements of most of our current aircraft.

Despite these criticisms Colonel Warden is to be congratulated. He has written a book that should be required reading for all officers in all services who are looking for a theoretical framework on the employment of air power in a campaign.

September 1989
Off the Press...


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From the Archives

The Eagle Meets the Bear, 1946

"If there was little or no official contact between Americans and the Russian mission men in 1946 [during the occupation of Japan], the same could not be said of social contact. For almost a year after their arrival in Japan, the Russian majors and colonels were billeted together with Americans and sundry other nationalities... of equivalent military and civilian rank in the Daiichi Hotel in Shimbashi... For a short time in 1946, it was one of the unique hostelries of the world, unmatched in its concentration of governmental power, its clashing of national uniforms and outlooks, and the unorthodox sexual behavior of its residents....

"Most of the residents being Americans, the hotel had an unmistakable American flavor. The nightly American high-stakes poker game in one corner of the lobby, presided over by hard-bitten, laconic, cigar-smoking Regular Army colonels, lent a certain stability to the hotel's social life. The officers' club bar in the lobby, thronged before dinner by those trying to throw off the pressures of the day, was a clearing house of information on the day's events. But after dinner, the drinkers preferred the cellar bar, which also had a ping-pong table. The near silence of the lobby was then punctuated only by the occasional rustling departure of some officer's kimono-clad date slipping down the main stairway from the rooms above....

"Here the few Russians were in their element, congregating at the same tables every night and thoroughly enjoying themselves. To the Americans' songs—'Bluetail Fly' and 'Roll Me Over in the Clover'—the Russians would respond with the 'Volga Boatman.' One Soviet major delighted in holding the final bravura high note for an unbelievable ninety seconds, to the fervent applause of the Americans. In other ways, too, the Russians would concede nothing. One Soviet lieutenant colonel, watching a double-jointed American touch his forearm with his thumb bent backward, blurted out, 'Anything American can do, Russian can do.' He then slowly bent his thumb way back until, with a loud crack that startled everyone in the room, he broke his thumb.

"It was not only in the bar that Russians and Americans joined forces in drinking. At one notable party in the third-floor room of an American colonel, the American and two Russians took to parading up the hotel corridor in single file uproariously singing a martial tune that ended with the words that appeared to be 'On to Budapest!' Afterward, sitting relaxed at the open window, the American colonel, glass in hand, lost his balance and slowly toppled out into the night. 'He is my friend! I save him!' one of the Russians roared and promptly jumped out after the American. The American landed in a high hedge two floors below, momentarily unhurt, until an instant later the Russian crashed down on top of him, a boot heel in his friend's eye. Next morning at breakfast, the American sported a black eye, a plaster strip, a hangover, and a determined silence. The Russians were nowhere to be seen."