The terminal phase of the encounter between a radar guided missile and a highly maneuverable aircraft, which can employ also electronic counter measures, is formulated as an imperfect information zero-sum pursuit-evasion game played between the missile designer and the pilot of the target aircraft. For this scenario a new method of guidance law synthesis, based on the concept of optimal mixed strategies, is developed and implemented. The mixed guidance law design approach is based on a rigorous mathematical framework and leads to feasible solutions which guarantee that the single shot kill probability (SSKP) of the missile is higher than the value achievable by any other presently used guidance law.
Research Title: STOCHASTIC GAME APPROACH TO GUIDANCE DESIGN

PART II: THEORETICAL BASIS

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FINAL SCIENTIFIC REPORT

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Preface

This final scientific report summarizes a two-years investigation effort (1.9.1986-31.8.1988) sponsored by AFOSR Grant No. 86-0355. In order to enhance the usefulness of the report for individuals of different interests and responsibilities, it is divided into three parts.

The first part (I) outlines in generic terms the research concept which has lead to the development of an innovative approach for missile guidance law synthesis; it summarizes the main results achieved by the two-year effort and indicates directions deserving further investigation.

The second part (II), which can be used as an independent scientific document, concentrates on the theoretical aspects of the problem formulation and outlines the mathematical framework for the mixed guidance law synthesis.

The third part (III) is fully application oriented. It describes in detail the model used for the investigation and the process of interactive guidance law synthesis. Explicit guidelines for a potential user are given. Several examples, demonstrating the performance improvement which can be achieved by using the proposed approach, are also included in this part.
2.1 Introduction

In this part of the report, the terminal phase of a missile versus aircraft engagement in a noise corrupted environment is formulated as an imperfect information differential game. The pay-off of the game is the single shot kill probability of the missile, to be maximized by its designer and to be minimized by the pilot of the target aircraft. The optimal strategies in such a scenario can be mixed. This part of the report provides a vigorous mathematical framework for the analysis and outlines a constructive methodology for guidance law synthesis based on the concept of mixed strategies. Examples which demonstrate the applicability of the approach and demonstrate the improved performance are presented in part 3 of the report.

2.2 Problem's Formulation

2.2.1 Terminology

The terminology adopted in this work is as follows:

A pure strategy is a function which maps the information space into the control space. The pure strategy set of a player is the set which is formed by all the pure strategies of that player. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution on a pure strategy set.

A "guidance law" will be understood to be a function which maps the estimated state into acceleration commands, regardless of the form of the estimator used in the guidance loop. The combination of a guidance law and an estimator will be referred to as a "guidance policy" or a "pure guidance strategy". A "guidance
strategy" is a general name for a strategy which can be either pure or mixed.

2.2.2 Formulation of the Generalized Problem

In this section, the terminal phase of a future missile-aircraft encounter is formulated as a two-person, zero-sum, imperfect-information, differential game in which the allowable strategies of both players are mixed. The players are 1) the missile or the agent that fires it and 2) the pilot of the evading aircraft. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to them in the sequel as "the pursuer" and "the evader", respectively, and it will be understood that "the pursuer" also stands for the agent that fires the missile and that "the evader" includes the aircraft and its pilot, who makes the decisions.

In the formulation of the problem, the ECM capability of the evader, which may be necessary to enhance aircraft survivability, is taken into account in the form of "electronic jinking". This is a method which electronically generates an apparent motion of the aircraft's radar reflection center.

The state equation of the game is given by the nonlinear vector equation

\[ x = f(x,u,v) ; \quad x(t_0) = x_0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \) is the state vector, \( u \in U \) and \( v \in V \) are the control vectors of the pursuer and evader respectively. \( u \) represents the commanded normal acceleration vector of the pursuer and \( v \) represents the normal acceleration vector of the evader. The game starts at \( t_0 \) from initial conditions \( x_0 \) and terminates at an
unspecified time \( t_f \) which satisfies

\[
\dot{R}(t_f) = 0
\]

(2)

where \( R \) is the range between the pursuer and the evader.

The information structure of the game is given by:

\[
z_e = h_e(x, \eta)
\]

(3)

\[
z_p = h_p(x, w, \xi)
\]

(4)

where \( z_e \) and \( z_p \) are the measurement vectors of the evader and pursuer respectively. \( w \in W \) is an additional control vector at the disposal of the evader. It represents an intentionally introduced disturbance, i.e. electronic jinking. \( \eta \) and \( \xi \) represent the respective measurement noise vectors.

The admissible control sets \( U, V \) and \( W \) are defined by:

\[
U = \left\{ u(t) : \|u(t)\| \leq a_p^{\text{MAX}} \quad \forall t \in [0, t_f] \right\}
\]

(5)

\[
V = \left\{ v(t) : \|v(t)\| \leq a_e^{\text{MAX}}, \|\dot{v}(t)\| \leq \alpha_L \quad \forall t \in [0, t_f] \right\}
\]

(6)

\[
W = \left\{ w(t) : \|w(t)\| \leq w^{\text{MAX}} \quad \forall t \in [0, t_f] \right\}
\]

(7)

where \( (a_p^{\text{MAX}}) \) and \( (a_e^{\text{MAX}}) \) are the pursuer's and evader's maximum lateral accelerations, respectively, \( w^{\text{MAX}} \) is the maximum possible disturbance due to the electronic jinking, and \( \alpha_L \) is a parameter by which the roll dynamics of the evading aircraft are indirectly accounted for.

Let \( y \) be a random variable which takes the value of 1 in case the pursuer scores a kill and a value of zero in case it scores a
no-kill, then, the payoff function $J$ is defined by:

$$J = E(y) \triangleq 1 \cdot P(y=1) + 0 \cdot P(y=0) = P(y=1) = P_k$$

where $P(y=1)$ is the probability that $y=1$. In other words, $J$ is the single shot kill probability denoted by $P_k$.

Since the kill probability is a function of the miss distance, $R(t_f)$, $J$ can be presented by:

$$J = E\{E(y|R(t_f))\} = E\{P(y=1|R(t_f))\} \triangleq E\{P_k[R(t_f)]\}$$

where $P_k(\cdot)$ is a real valued function which describes the warhead lethality and which is subject to $0 \leq P_k(\cdot) \leq 1$.

The pursuer wishes to maximize $J$ while the evader wishes to minimize it. This payoff function, which is indeed the one of true practical interest, has not been used in previous works.

The pure-strategy set of the pursuer, $\Delta_p$ is defined as a countable set of "guidance policies" of a predetermined structure. The different guidance policies in $\Delta_p$ result from different assumptions made on the target maneuver model. In general, each assumption leads to a different guidance law and estimator. More explicitly, assuming $m_p$ different target maneuver models, $\Delta_p$ is given by

$$\Delta_p = \{\delta_p, j=1,2,\ldots,m_p\} \quad m_p \leq \infty$$

where each pure strategy $\delta_p$ is of the form

$$\delta_p = (a_p) \max \left( \frac{g_j(x'(j))}{(a_p)_{\max}} \right) \in U$$

where $g_j$ and $x'(j)$ are the $j^{th}$ guidance law and output of the $j^{th}$
estimator, respectively.

Equation (11) simply states that $\phi_{pj}$ is a mapping, subject to some constraints, from the estimated state space to the control space. It is a generalized form for the guidance policies considered, also covering proportional navigation and other guidance policies discussed in previous works\textsuperscript{2-6}.

As far as the general formulation of the problem is concerned, there is no need at this point to specify any further the detailed structure of the guidance laws and estimators. It should be pointed out, however, that in any practical attempt to actually solve the problem, these structures will have to be determined in a fairly specific and detailed form.

Note that $x'$ is the state vector required by the pure guidance strategy. $x'$ is generally not identical to $x$. Nevertheless, some of its elements are also elements of $x$.

The pure-strategy set of the evader, $\Delta_e$, is defined as a countable set of "actions" $\phi_{ei}$, each of which is composed of a maneuver sequence and an electronic counter-measures policy. In other words,

$$\Delta_e = \left\{ \phi_{ei} , i=1,2,\ldots , m_e \right\} , \quad m_e \leq \infty$$

where each pure strategy $\phi_{ei}$ is defined by the pair

$$\phi_{ei} = \{ v_i(t), w_i(t) \} \quad v_i(t) \in V , \quad w_i(t) \in W$$

The game is played as follows: at the beginning of the game, or shortly prior to it, each player "chooses", through a chance mechanism, one of its pure strategies and plays accordingly until the end of the game. The chance mechanism, which determines the
pure strategy to be played, is a mechanization of the player's mixed strategy.

The selection by each player of one pure strategy at the outset actually transforms the problem into a matrix game.

In a matrix game the evader's and pursuer's mixed strategies are determined by sequences of real numbers, \( \{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^m \) and \( \{\beta_j\}_{j=1}^m \), respectively, which satisfy

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i = 1, \quad \alpha_i \geq 0 \quad \forall \ i = 1,2,\ldots,m_e
\]

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{m} \beta_j = 1, \quad \beta_j \geq 0 \quad \forall \ j = 1,2,\ldots,m_p
\]

where \( \alpha_i \) determines the probability of "choosing" \( \delta_{ei} \) by the evader and \( \beta_j \) determines the probability of "choosing" \( \delta_{pj} \) by the pursuer. The payoff function, Eq. (9), in terms of \( \Delta_e, \Delta_p, \{\alpha_i\}, \) and \( \{\beta_j\} \) is given by

\[
J = J(\Delta_e,\{\alpha_i\},\Delta_p,\{\beta_j\}) = \sum_{i=1}^{m_e} \sum_{j=1}^{m_p} \alpha_i \beta_j P_{ij}
\]

\[
= J_{\Delta_e,\Delta_p}(\{\alpha_i\},\{\beta_j\})
\]

where \( P_{ij} \) is the SSKP for the case in which the pure strategies \( \delta_{ei} \) and \( \delta_{pj} \) are played, and it can be expressed by

\[
P_{ij} = \mathbb{E} \{ P_k[R(t_f)] | \delta_{ei}, \delta_{pj} \}
\]

Given the pure-strategy sets \( \Delta_e \) and \( \Delta_p \), the solution of the game is presented by a triplet: the optimal sequences \( \{\alpha_i^*\}, \{\beta_j^*\} \).
called the optimal mixed strategies of the evader and the pursuer respectively, and a real number \( 0 \leq V_m \leq 1 \), which is called the value of the game. The definition of \( V_m \) is

\[
V_m = J_{\Delta_e,\Delta_p}^* (\{\alpha_i^*\}, \{\beta_j^*\})
\]  

(17)

The value satisfies a saddle-point inequality

\[
J_{\Delta_e,\Delta_p}^* (\{\alpha_i^*\}, \{\beta_j^*\}) \leq V_m \leq J_{\Delta_e,\Delta_p}^* (\{\alpha_i\}, \{\beta_j^*\})
\]  

(18)

for every arbitrary sequence \( \{\alpha_i\} \) or \( \{\beta_j\} \) satisfying Eq. (14).

Obviously, \( \{\alpha_i^*\}, \{\beta_j^*\}, \) and \( V_m \) are functions of \( \Delta_e \) and \( \Delta_p \).

Thus,

\[
\{\alpha_i^*\} = \{\alpha_i(\Delta_e, \Delta_p)\}, \{\beta_j^*\} = \{\beta_j(\Delta_e, \Delta_p)\}
\]  

(19)

\[
V_m = V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p)
\]

Motivated by Eq. (19), the generalized problem is formulated as follows:

Given an imperfect information pursuit-evasion game in which both the pursuer and the evader "select" at the outset a strategy from pure-strategy sets \( \Delta_e \) and \( \Delta_p \) of the form of Eqs. (10),(11) and (12),(13), respectively, and in which the payoff function is the single-shot kill probability given by Eq. (9), find the optimal pure strategy sets \( \Delta_e^* \) and \( \Delta_p^* \) that satisfy the following saddle-point relationship:

\[
V_m(\Delta_e^*, \Delta_p^*) \leq V_m(\Delta_e^*, \Delta_p) \leq V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p^*)
\]

(20)

for every admissible \( \Delta_e \) and \( \Delta_p \).
2.2.3 Formulation of the Guidance Synthesis Problem

The mixed guidance strategy synthesis problem, which is the subject of the present study, is formulated as follows. For a given, but otherwise arbitrary pure strategy set of the evader, \( \Delta_e \), find the optimal pure strategy set of the pursuer \( \Delta_p \), which satisfies

\[
V(\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \geq V(\Delta_e, \Delta'_p)
\]

for every admissible \( \Delta_p \).

2.3 Mathematical Framework

2.3.1 New Notions

In this section the mathematical basis for the solution of the guidance strategy synthesis problem is laid down. First it is necessary to introduce several additional definitions that will be of use in the sequel.

A game in which the pure strategy sets of the pursuer and the evader are \( \Delta_p \) and \( \Delta_e \) respectively, will be referred to as a "pair \( (\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \)".

The entries of the payoff matrices and the corresponding optimal mixed strategies for the pairs \( (\Delta_e, \Delta'_p) \) and \( (\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \) will be denoted by \( P_{ij}, \{\alpha_i\}, \{\beta_j\} \) and \( \tilde{P}_{ij}, \{\tilde{\alpha}_i\}, \{\tilde{\beta}_j\} \) respectively.

A guidance policy \( \delta_p \) will be said to be "active" in the pair \( (\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \) iff \( \beta_j \neq 0 \).

\( \Delta_p^{(k)} \) will denote a pure strategy set of the pursuer which is composed of \( k \) elements.

The set of all sets \( \Delta_p^{(k)} \) will be denoted by \( D^{(k)} \), thus

\[
D^{(k)} = \{\Delta_p^{(k)}\}.
\]
The set \( D^{(k)} \) is defined by \( D^{(k)} = \bigcup_{j=1}^{k} D^{(j)} \).

The set \( \Delta_p^{(k)} \) which is composed of \( k \) active elements and which satisfies the inequality

\[
V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p^{(k)}) \geq V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \quad \forall \Delta_p \in D^{(k)}
\] (22)

will be called a "k optimal" set.

\( E^{(k)} \) and \( \tilde{E}^{(k)} \) are sets of real numbers defined by:

\[
E^{(k)} = \{ x : x = V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p^{(k)}) \quad \forall \Delta_p \in D^{(k)} \} \quad (23)
\]

\[
E = \{ x : x = V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \quad \forall \Delta_p \in D^{(\infty)} \} \quad (24)
\]

If \( \Delta_p^{(k)} \) and \( \Delta_p \) exist, it is clear that

\[
V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p^{(k)}) = \text{lub } E^{(k)} \quad (25)
\]

\[
V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p) = \text{lub } E \quad (26)
\]

(lub - the least upper bound).

The optimal mixed strategies and the entries of the payoff matrix for the pair \( (\Delta_e, \Delta_p^{(k)}) \) will be denoted by \( \{ \alpha_i^{(k)} \} \), \( \{ \beta_j^{(k)} \} \) and \( \tilde{p}_{ij}^{(k)} \) respectively.

2.3.2 General Solution

Throughout this section, it is assumed that \( \Delta_p \) as well as \( \Delta_p^{(k)} \) exist.

By definition, the value of the pair \( (\Delta_e, \Delta_p) \) is given by:

\[
V_m(\Delta_e, \Delta_p) = \sum_{i=1}^{m_e} \alpha_i \sum_{j=1}^{m_p} \beta_j P_{ij} = \min \sum_{i=1}^{m_e} \sum_{j=1}^{m_p} \beta_j P_{ij} \quad \text{for } i \leq m_e, j \leq m_p
\] (27)
Since $m_p$ is determined for each $\Delta_p$ and since $\{\alpha^*_i\}, \{\beta^*_j\}$ and $P_{ij}$ are
all functions of $\Delta_p$ for a given $\Delta_e$, Eq. (27) can be written as:

$$V_m(\Delta, \Delta_e) = \underset{1 \leq i \leq m}{\min} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{m_p(\Delta)} \beta^*_j(\Delta_p) P_{ij}(\Delta) \right]$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (28)

By rewriting Eq. (21) as:

$$V_m(\Delta, \Delta_e) = \max_{\Delta_p \in \mathcal{D}(\infty)} \{V_m(\Delta, \Delta_e)\}$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (29)

and by substituting Eq. (28) into Eq. (29) we obtain

$$V_m(\Delta, \Delta_e) = \max_{\Delta_p \in \mathcal{D}(\infty)} \left[ \underset{1 \leq i \leq m}{\min} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{m_p(\Delta)} \beta^*_j(\Delta_p) P_{ij}(\Delta) \right] \right]$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (30)

Thus,

$$\tilde{\Delta}_p = \arg \max_{\Delta_p \in \mathcal{D}(\infty)} \left\{ \underset{1 \leq i \leq m}{\min} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{m_p(\Delta)} \beta^*_j(\Delta_p) P_{ij}(\Delta) \right] \right\}$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (31)

Equation (31) is the formal solution of the mixed guidance
law synthesis problem (Eq. (21)), and it states that $\tilde{\Delta}_p$ is the
pure strategy set which maximizes the guaranteed single shot kill
probability.

Since $\beta^*_j(\cdot)$ and $P_{ij}(\cdot)$ are unknown implicit functions of $\Delta_p$,
and since the number of elements in $\tilde{\Delta}_p$ is not known in advance, it
is clear that $\tilde{\Delta}_p$ cannot be computed directly from Eq. (31). Thus,
some kind of iterative algorithm is necessary to obtain the
solution. In this paper an iterative algorithm, based on the
sequential computation of $\tilde{\Delta}_p^{(k)}$ with $k$ progressively increasing
from 1 (until the optimum is reached), is proposed.
2.3.3 Properties of \( \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \)

In this subsection it is proved that the set \( \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \), if it exists, must have the following properties:

**Property P1:** The requirement that \( \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \) be composed of \( k \) active elements in the pair \( (\Delta_{e}, \Delta_{p}) \) leads to:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \tilde{\alpha}_{i} \tilde{p}_{ij}(k) = \forall \left( \Delta_{e}, \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \right), \quad \forall i \leq j \leq k
\]  

(Property P1)

**Property P2:** \( \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \) must maximize, within the limitations imposed by \( D^{(k)} \), the guaranteed single shot kill probability, namely:

\[
\Delta_{p}^{(k)} = \arg \max_{\Delta_{p} \in D^{(k)}} \left\{ \min_{i \leq j \leq m} \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_{j}^{*} \left( \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \right) p_{ij}(k) \left( \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \right) \right\}
\]

(Property P2)

**Proof of P1:** Define \( C_{j} \) by:

\[
C_{j} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \tilde{\alpha}_{i} \tilde{p}_{ij}(k)
\]  

(32)

By substituting (32) into the left-hand side of the saddled point inequality (18) one obtains:

\[
\forall \left( \Delta_{e}, \Delta_{p}^{(k)} \right) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_{j}^{*} C_{j} \geq \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_{j}^{*} C_{j} \quad \forall \left( \beta_{j}^{*} \right)
\]  

(33)

If all the \( C_{j} \)'s are not equal, there must be a \( j^{*} \) such that

\[
C_{j^{*}} = \max_{i \leq j \leq k} C_{j}
\]  

(34)

Thus, since \( \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_{j}^{*} = 1 \) and since \( \beta_{j}^{*} \neq 0 \) \( \forall \neq j \) (which is necessary for \( k \) active elements), it is clear that
\[ C_j = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_j^{(k)} C_j \quad \text{(35)} \]

But, by selecting \( \{\hat{\beta}_j\} \) such that \( \hat{\beta}_{j^*} = 1 \) (and \( \hat{\beta}_j = 0 \) \( \forall j \neq j^* \)) and by substituting it into (33) we obtain
\[ C_{j^*} \leq \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_j^{(k)} C_j \quad \text{(36)} \]

which is a contradiction to (35). This leads to the conclusion that all the \( C_j \)'s must be equal, say \( C_j = C \forall j \). Thus, Eqs. (32) and (33) lead to
\[ V(\Delta, P) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \beta_j^{(k)} C = C = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i^{(k)} P_{ij} \star i \leq j \leq k \quad \text{(37)} \]

which concludes the proof.

**Proof of PZ:** By using the same steps which led to the definition of \( \Delta_p^* \) in Eq. (31) as the solution of the problem posed in (21), it can be shown that \( \Delta_p^* \) which satisfied (22) is given by:
\[ \Delta_p^{\star} = \arg \max_{\Delta_p \in \mathcal{D}(k)} \left\{ \min_{i \leq i \leq m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \beta_j^{\star} (\Delta_p) P_{ij} (\Delta_p) \right\} \quad \text{(38)} \]

But, since by definition \( \Delta_p^* \in \mathcal{D}(k) \) it is clear that
\[ \Delta_p^{\star} = \arg \max_{\Delta_p \in \mathcal{B}(k)} \left\{ \min_{i \leq i \leq m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \beta_j^{\star} (\Delta_p) P_{ij} (\Delta_p) \right\} \quad \text{(39)} \]

which concludes the proof.
2.3.4 Derivation of the Algorithm for Computing $\Delta_p^M$ (or $\Delta_p^\epsilon$)

This derivation is based on the following theorems:

**Theorem 1:** For every $\epsilon > 0$, there exists an integer $M(\epsilon)$ and a finite set $\Delta_p^M$ such that $V_m(\Delta_p^M) - V_m(\Delta_p) \leq \epsilon$.

**Proof:** Let us take a sequence $\{t_i\} \in \mathbb{E}$ such that $t_i = V_m(\Delta_p^{(i)})$. By virtue of (22) $\{t_i\}$ is monotonically increasing, and since $V_m(\Delta_p^{(i)})$ is bounded so is $\{t_i\}$. Therefore $\{t_i\}$ converges in $\mathbb{R}^1$.

Let's say $t_i \rightarrow t$. Let us take an arbitrary series $\{a_i\} \in \mathbb{E}$ such that $a_i = V_m(\Delta_p^{(i)})$. From (22) it is clear that $a_i \leq t_i$ for all $i$. Thus

$$a_i < t \quad a_i \leq t \quad i \quad (40)$$

therefore $t = \sup \mathbb{E}$. By making use of (26) we obtain

$$t = \sup \mathbb{E} = V_m(\Delta_p^M) \quad (41)$$

This means that $V_m(\Delta_p^{(i)}) - V_m(\Delta_p^M) \leq \epsilon$. Therefore, for every $\epsilon > 0$ there exists an integer $M=M(\epsilon)$ such that

$$V_m(\Delta_p^{(i)}) - V_m(\Delta_p^M) \leq \epsilon \quad (42)$$

This concludes the proof of the theorem.

**Theorem 2:** If $V_m(\Delta_p^{(k+1)}) > V_m(\Delta_p^{(k)})$, then for every $\{x_i\}$ there exists a strategy $\Delta_p^{(k)}$ such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{M} x_i P_i > V_m(\Delta_p^{(k)}) \quad (43)$$

**Proof:** Assume that

$$V_m(\Delta_p^{(k+1)}) > V_m(\Delta_p^{(k)}) \quad (43)$$
and that the theorem is not true. This means that there exists a mixed strategy \( \{ \alpha_1^{(k)} \} \) such that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_1^{(k)} p_i \leq \nu_{\mathbf{m}} (\Delta \epsilon \Delta) \quad \forall \quad \Delta_p \in \Delta_p
\]  

But because of the optimality of \( \{ \alpha_1^{(k)} \} \) it is also true that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_1^{(k)} p_{ij} \leq \nu_{\mathbf{m}} (\Delta \epsilon \Delta) \quad \forall \quad \Delta_p \in \Delta_p
\]

thus by combining (44) and (45) we conclude that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_1^{(k)} p_{ij} \leq \nu_{\mathbf{m}} (\Delta \epsilon \Delta) \]

for all admissible \( \Delta_p \). Since \( \nu_{m} (\Delta \epsilon \Delta) \) is the value of the pair \( (\Delta \epsilon \Delta) \) it satisfies the following (see, (15), (17), (18)):

\[
\nu_{\mathbf{m}} (\Delta \epsilon \Delta) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{k+1} \alpha_1^{(k+1)} \beta_j^{(k+1)} p_{ij} \leq \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{k+1} \alpha_1^{(k+1)} p_{ij} = (47)
\]

for every admissible \( \{ \alpha_1 \} \), and in particular for \( \{ \alpha_1^{(k)} \} \). By combining (46) and (47) we get:
\[ V_\text{m}(\Delta^e, \Delta_p^k) \leq \sum_{j=1}^{k+1} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_{ij}^k p_{ij}^{(k+1)} \leq \sum_{j=1}^{k+1} \beta_j^{(k+1)} V_\text{m}(\Delta^e, \Delta_p^k) = (48) \]

which contradicts (44). Thus the theorem is proved.

2.4 Iterative Design Algorithm

Based on the theorems presented previously, the following iterative algorithm is proposed for finding \( \Delta_p^k \).

Step 1 - Set \( k=1 \).

Step 2 - Find \( \Delta_p^k \) which satisfies P1 and P2.

Step 3 - Solve the pair \( (\Delta^e, \Delta_p^k) \) yielding \( \{\alpha_i^k\}, \{\beta_j^k\} \) and

\[ V_\text{m}(\Delta^e, \Delta_p^k) \cdot \{\alpha_i^k\}, \{\beta_j^k\} \text{ may not be unique.} \]

Step 4 - For every \( \{\alpha_i^k\} \) search for a strategy \( \sigma_{p_t} \neq \Delta_p^k \) such that

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_{1i}^k p_{1i} \geq V_\text{m}(\Delta^e, \Delta_p^k). \] If no such \( \sigma_{p_t} \) is found for every \( \{\alpha_i^k\} \) then \( \Delta_p^k = \Delta_p^{k-1} \) and go to Step 6, otherwise go to Step 5.

Step 5 - If \( k=1 \) set \( k=k+1 \) and go to 2, otherwise check if

\[ V_\text{m}(\Delta^e, \Delta_p^k) - V_\text{m}(\Delta^e, \Delta_p^{k-1}) > \delta \]

for a given \( \delta \). If so, set \( k=k+1 \) and go to 2, otherwise set \( M=k \) and go to 6.

Step 6 - Stop.
2.5 Concluding Remarks

This part outlines the mathematical framework for the synthesis of optimal mixed guidance strategies. The properties of the "k-optimal" strategy sets are derived and proven. It is also demonstrated that these sets converge to the optimal pure strategy set. This implies that even an infinite optimal strategy set can be approximated by a finite "k-optimal" set. Moreover, a constructive iterative procedure for finding the finite approximation of the optimal strategy set is presented. This procedure provides guidelines for the designer to develop improved missile guidance laws based on the mixed strategy concept. This procedure has been implemented in a set of examples for a first-order dynamics skid-to-turn missile in Part II of this report.
2.6 References


