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LIVING EXPERT SYSTEM

(LEXSYS)

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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UNCLASSIFIED
PROTOLEX SUBNET DISCUSSIONS

VOLUME VI

Pages

Attack Helicopter Operations (ATK.HEL.OPNS).............. 1 - 46

Low Intensity Conflict (PROTOLIC)......................... 47 - 160

Continuous Operations (CONOPS)......................... 161 - 179
Welcome to ARMY:ATK.HEL.OPNs (Attack Helicopter Operations)

The purpose of this subnet is to discuss and provide warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures for day and night Deep Attack/Cross FLOT operations utilizing the AH-64, Oh-58C or AH-58D attack scout mix.
ITEM 1 DELETED

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Item 2 09:25 Jan20/89 30 lines No responses
Rich Pomager
Attack Helicopter Problem Introduction

Deep Attack Helicopter Operations (ATK HEL OPNs)
This is a 1989 LEXSYS study group project that is being staffed for the Directorate of Combined Armed Tactics (DCAT), Ft. Rucker, Alabama. The following is a brief outline of the issue:

PROBLEM STATEMENT:
How best to determine the proper / correct aircraft type / mix of AH-64, OH-58C or AH-58D (Attack-Scout mix) to conduct a Deep Attack operation.

SCOPE & DEPTH:
Using the current technological advantages and maneuverability of today's weapon systems, explore and determine correct Tactics, Techniques and Procedures needed to fight and win in a European environment.

DESIGNED RESULTS:
Produce Doctrine that takes advantage of these systems and provide information necessary to publish current and future Army Aviation "How To" manuals.

Initial Discussion Items:
ITEM TOPIC
1 Administrative Information
2 Background Information
3 Assumptions
4 Task Organization & Scout-Attack Roles
5 Command, Control, Communications, & Intel (C3I)
6 Cross FLOT
7 Routes & Movement
8 Battle Positions
9 Target Engagement
10 Other Considerations....

Related items: 3

No responses on item 2
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Welcome to the LEXSYS (ATK HEL OPNs) subnet! We are glad that you have agreed to assist us with our project. We firmly believe that what we do here will have a direct and positive benefit to the Army. You are currently in Item number "1" the ADMIN item. Information that needs to be posted concerning this project will be placed here. Feel free, to add your own administrative comments.

Don't worry about typing errors. All of us are a bit sloppy (fat fingers) at first. As long as the word can be understood, no need to try to fix it for the net.

IMPORTANT

This is not a Field Manual exercise! The purpose of this issue is to share innovative thought and ideas while exploring the endless realm of possibilities inherent in new technology aircraft. Again, our focus will be to determine the proper / correct aircraft type / mix of AH-64, OH-58C, or AH-58D (attack-Scout mix) to conduct a deep attack operation. Current Army doctrine should help guide this effort but should not be allowed to impede the thought process.

Participants are ask to make comments on the various items very much like they would in a face-to-face meeting. If you do not agree or understand a comment, then you have the right to challenge the author. The better we understand the comment, the better our corporate response will be.

Discussion on the net can begin as soon as you have entered the net. I encourage your comments on items 2 thru 11 and welcome any comments concerning the possibility of adding additional items. Remember, all discussion on this topic will end 28 FEB 89.

Related items: 4

No responses on item 3
Deep operations are those activities which are directed against enemy forces not currently engaged in the close operations, but capable of engaging or influencing the division or corps close operations within the next 12 to 72 hours. Attack battalions conducting deep operations will normally operate at night, require 24 to 48 hours planning time, and require highly accurate and timely intelligence prior to and during the mission. Deep attack is characterized by high risk and high payoff...the successful results of which can alter the tempo and outcome of close operations.

The key elements of this discussion is that deep attack operations are a corps or Echelon Above Corps (EAC) mission, see assumptions located in Item 3. Do you agree with this premise and if not why not?

Related items: 5

15 responses
Jan24/89 16:22
4:1) Allen Whitley: yes
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Jan25/89 11:13
4:2) Ray Yount: Although a deep attack is generally considered to beyond a Division's area of influence, recommend addressing the feasibility of a Divisional Atk Bn conducting this mission as a contingency operation. Corps or EAC aviation may not be available to conduct a desired mission due to weather, rear opns, etc. See item 7 for comments on intel to support division level operations.
---
4:3) Clay Melton: I WANT to think about this some but my
immediated thought is that cross FLOT deep attack operations for
attack birds may be an event that has been overtaken by time. I
just don't know whether they can survive in that environment.
First, there are many assumptions prior to these type of
operations that must be met.

Jan25/89 22:18
4:4) Jack Maher: CLAY, SOMETHING HAPPENED WITH YOUR TRANSMISSION
AND I THINK SOME OF IT GOT LOST. PLEASE REENTER YOUR COMMENT.

Jan25/89 22:31
4:5) Bob Bailey: Ray and Clay, I am going to address part of the
logic of why the Division and corps commanders both need AH-64
attack battalions to perform this mission. My response can be
found under item number 5.

Jan26/89 07:13
you feel must be met. It seems that a commander who is intensely
involved in a defensive battle on the forward edge, will not be
able to plan and conduct a deep attack. This aspect can be
elevated up to the Corps Commander if his entire front area is
engaged. Is this the type of assumption you were referring.

Feb01/89 11:33
4:7) Butch Whitehead: DCAT, how does this mesh with J-SAK (joint
attack of second echelon) doctrine? J-SAK gives deep attack
responsibilities to the Air Component Commander. A complete
review of the J-SAK is necessary to insure that there is a good
lask up for deep attack at Corps or lower. DCAT, do you have a
copy of the J-SAK doctrine? If not, send a message to me and
I'll get a h send a message to me and I'll get a copy for you.

Feb02/89 11:53
4:8) Jack Clark: Jack Clark. The USAF view. It may be
important to consider the threat level you will be facing by
committing to cross flot ops. With the advent of good radar, IR
and ESM gear plus the pulse doppler radar on fighters, the threat
has gone way up. The real problem is avoiding detection because
they find you you have to deal with them, preferrably, in an
offensive mode. Can you detect the look down - shoot down
threat? Or deal with him? Because of your rotor blades, he can
most probably find you and has the capability to deal with you.
I realize the benefit of this concept but you start to really increase the support equipment (on the aircraft) required when you go into the Sov backyard. That's expensive. 2nd point. Are these forces going to be committed and controlled by corps? Or, are they going to be executed by a lower level? 3rd point. How are you going to coordinate with the air component commander to make sure we aren’t hitting the same targets and wasting attack assets?

Feb06/89 20:53
4:9) Bob Bailey: Jack, Can you tell us something about COMPASS CALL without getting classified? Will this have an impact on our ability to conduct a deep attack mission?

In response to your question about who's going to coordinate with the air component commander, Ft. Ho. Hood has developed something they call the corps troop operations cell (CTOC). This cell is part of the corps tactical operations center and serves as the operations center for all attack operations. It provides dedicated staff support consisting of an officer

Feb07/89 12:52
4:10) Jack Clark: BOB - COMPASS CALL IS CLASSIFIED BUT I'LL BE GLAD TO BRIEF WHAT I KNOW AT YOUR TIME AND PLACE. WILL CTOC COORDINATE WITH THE AIR CC? HOW? WHEN? IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE INFO SO OUR FRAG ORDER CAN BE DECONFLICTED AND SO OUR FIGHTERS WILL KNOW WHERE YOU WILL BE SO WE CAN HELP YOU/NOT SHOOT STRANGE HELOS WE RUN ACROSS.

Mar11/89 15:45
4:11) Joe Jenkinson: Ray Yount this is in response to 4:2. At III Corps during 1986 - 88, deep attacks were conducted by divisions out to 70 km. Beyond 70 km, the corps had responsibility to 150km. This was accomplished by AH-64 Squadrons.

Mar11/89 15:54
4:12) Joe Jenkinson: Jack Clark this is in response to 4:8. AH-64 cross FLOT operations are conducted at night, normally late hours. With exception one type of radar, the AH-64 has the capability to defeat radar & IR seekers. Enemy fast movers are not considered a threat at this time. The AH-64 can detect look down-shoot down capability and it is considered an advantage to the AH-64. AH-64 units are found at Division and Corps. Cross FLOT operations are normally quite detailed and will be coordinated with Air Force assets 24 hours prior-routes-target-etc... AH-64 has "Have Quick" capability to talk directly with fighter aircraft.
Mar14/89 10:03
4:13) Jack Clark: FOR JOE JENKINSON & ITEM4:12. I'M UNSURE WHY YOU WOULD NOT CONSIDER A FAST MOVER A THREAT UNLESS YOU ARE THINKING ABOUT THE FLOT AREA. AWAY FROM THE FLOT DEFENSIVE ARRAY FIGHTERS HAVE THE LUXURY TO FLY HIGHER, INCREASING THEIR RADAR COVERAGE AND DENYING YOUR EFFECTIVE USE OF MASKING. I WOULD AGREE THAT AROUND THE FLOT FIGHTERS ARE MOVING TO FAST AND WORRIED ABOUT OTHER THREATS TO A DEGREE THAT THEY WOULDN'T BE INTERESTED IN HELOS. ON THE OTHER HAND, AWAY FROM THE FLOT IS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT MATTER FOR AN AIR DEFENDER. NIGHT DOESN'T MATTER TO A SEMI ACTIVE OR ACTIVE RADAR MISSILE OR AN AL ASPECT IR MISSILE LIKE THE AIM 9L/M. UNLESS YOU CAN PRO ACTIVELY AVOID THE AIR DEFENDER YOU WILL HAVE TO JAM HIM OR KILL HIM. THERE ISN'T A JAMMER THAT I KNOW OF THAT GIVES 360 DEGREE COVERAGE IN AZMUTH AND ELEVATION - THEY GIVE A VERY SMALL WEDGE CONE OF COVERAGE THAT CAN BE NEGATED WITH ALTITUDE OR MANUVER. AS FOR THE MODERN IR MISSILE, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT AFTER IT COMES OFF THE RAIL, COUNTERMEASURES ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. IN DAYLIGHT, HIGH ANGLE STRAFE IS VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST HELOS BECAUSE THEY CAN'T SEE THE ATTACK UNTIL VERY LATE IN THE

Mar14/89 10:03
4:14) Jack Clark: GAME. AROUND THE FLOT I THINK HELOS ARE FAIRLY SAFE FROM FIGHTERS. IN FACT HELOS ARE A BIGGER THREAT TO FIGHTERS THAN FIGHTERS ARE TO THEM. AWAY FROM THE FLOT, IT'S A DIFFERENT STORY THAT REQUIRES DEDICATED SYSTEMS TO DEAL WITH. I THINK THE AH-64 ETAL WOULD BE BETTER USED TO CREATE A CORRIDOR FOR FIGHTERS SO WE CAN GO DO WHATEVER THE ARMY WANTS DONE IN THE BAI ARENA. YOU ALL CAN DO GREAT WORK AGAINST THE MOBILE SAMS AND GUNS THAT EAT MY LUNCH. IF WE COULD DEVELOP A COMBINED ARMS APPROACH TO BAI THE AIR FORCE COULD PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP AT LESS COST BECAUSE WE HAVE THE SYSTEMS NEEDED TO WORK AWAY FROM THE FLOT AREA AGAINST THE ALL ASPECT MISSILE SHOOTING AIR DEFENSE FIGHTER.

Mar14/89 22:34
4:15) Bob Bailey: Jack I agree with your response 4:14. DCAT needs to capture this idaea and explore the possibilities of having Division level Attack Battalion, working in close coordination with the Air Force, to open up corridors "In The FLOT" that woud allow the Air Force to penetrate successfully. Barney Jenkinson stated that good primary targets for the AH-64 are RAG's, DAG's & ADA systems. Currently, I am unaware of any agreement or doctrinal concept that links Army Attack assets with Air Force aircraft when crossing the FLOT. What do the rest of you think about this proposed new mission?
ASSUMPTIONS:
The European setting presents the most sophisticated Soviet array of weapons and is unquestionably the most difficult arena in which to conduct this type of operation. Therefore, it will be used to develop a defense plan that best optimizes the technological advantages and maneuverability of today's weapon systems. The following assumptions are not all inclusive, but are a good starting point for the resolution of this issue:

1. This mission should be conducted by corps level attack battalions or Echelons Above Corps (EAC). Corps is the lowest level to plan and execute this maneuver. This is because of the following capabilities/limited assets:
   a. Near real time intel from organic and national means.
   b. USAF interface for wild weasel, etc...
   c. Coordination and dedicated EW support.
2. The planning range for this mission (Army aviation) should be approximately 60-75 kilometers beyond the FLOT. This is based on one fuel load and dedicated flight envelope.
3. The night attack is the optimum choice. This severely limits the enemy's SHORAD system and optimizes surprise.
4. Aviation IPB's will be critical during the planning phases.
5.
6.
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO ADD ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS........

Related items: 6

18 responses
Jan25/89 11:34
5:1) Ray Yount: Ref assumption that mission is corps or EAC, see response 4.2. Ref near real time intel from organic means. Assume we are referring to Guardrail and Quicklook as Army organic assets; need some discussion on their significant limitations. Ref near real time intel from national means. In my opinion, there isn't any. There are some national intel systems that feed into Corps and EAC intel, but counting on these for near real time intel to support deep missions would be at some risk. Situation will improve with fielding of JSTARS AND JTF (see response to item 7). Ref ... dedicated EW support. For the record, not from the Army! First, Army has no radar jammers; secondly, corps and EAC have no voice jammers to support a deep mission. Division on the other hand has some jamming capability, but the only one that could conceivably have an impact is the heliborne jamming system, Quick Fix.
Bottom line is that any "dedicated EW Support" would almost invariably have to come from another service. Ref "Aviation IPB". Assume we are talking about such things as enemy target acquisition radar envelopes, analysis to determine areas that are masked from radar, etc. Tough, tough job with Army assets. Would have to be a combination of direction finding fixes from Quick Look (divisional assets are ground based line of sight and cannot reach deep enough to help) and map recon. We would be risking a lot based on some very "soft" data.

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Jan25/89 22:23
5:2) Jack Maher: RAY, WE MAKE A LOT OF TACTICAL DECISIONS AT DIVISION AND CORPS LEVEL NOW BASED UPON TEMPLATING. IS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO GET A PICTURE THAT IS 24 HOURS OLD AND BASED ON A GOOD INTEL OFFICER'S TEMPLATE PLAN AND LAUNCH A DEEP ATTACK WITH ATK HEL? UNDERSTAND RISK BUT ALSO APPRECIATE PAYOFF. IF THINGS GET TOO HOT OR THE ATK FOLKS RUN INTO SOMETHING UNEXPECTED THE MISSION CAN BE ABORTED.

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Jan25/89 22:40
5:3) Bob Bailey: There Ah-64 battalions at Ft. Hood Texas have solved this Intel problem. My POC at Hood is currently in the field. He should be on the net by the end of next week. Please file all your thoughts and concerns away until he comes up on the net. Thanks

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Jan25/89 22:43
5:4) Bob Bailey:

Item number 5 "ASSUMPTIONS" sets the logical framework for continued dialogue on this issue. I believe that only after identifying and agreeing on these assumptions can we as a corporate body recommend ways of changing or influencing the doctrine that dictates how to fight the AH-64 Attack Ballalion. This is only my opinion.... what are your comments?

For example, I suggested that Deep Attack is a Corps or Echelon Above Corps, AH-64 attack Battalion, mission and that Corps is the lowest level to plan and execute this maneuver. Deep attack operation at the Corps level will normally encompass those actions against combat and combat support elements that can affect the corps area of interest (0 to 150kms range). The prime objective in developing this mission are those forces that can affect the corps current or follow-on operations. Similarly, division level AH-64 attack battalions conducting deep attack missions will orient on enemy elements that can influence the brigades, and will likewise be used to sequence and delay enemy follow-on forces.
The trigger point for conducting deep attack missions at the both corps and division, is based on a careful analysis of the enemy (METT-T) and planned operations. Specifically, those enemy forces that will threaten or hinder the success of the units objectives should be prioritied for this mission based on the careful analysis of information available from all source intelligence.

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Jan25 89 22:43
5:5) Bob Bailey:

Having said all of that, I believe that our current Army Aviation Doctrine is lacking. That is to say, we need to define the roles and missions of what's expected of Division Verses a corps AH-64 attack battalion. We also need to come up with standard language that defines what is meant by Deep Attack or Deep Battle. "How deep is deep? Does a Division level AH-64 attack battalion have enough current & continuous intelligence information to execute this mission without excessive losses?

Now is the time to roll your sleeves up and seriously discuss this issue....so come on. Do you agree with my comments or not? What's your rational and opinion.

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Jan26/89 12:34
5:6) Ray Yount: Jack (5:2) and Bob (5:5): Yes, a good intel officer can take a valid picture that is 24 hours old and apply IPB, templating, etc. My biggest concern is the word "valid", especially as it applies to the intel picture available at the divisional level. My opinion is that you will not have a good picture at Division, even after 24 hours, and that the picture at Corps will only be marginally better. Rationale: Division has only ground based line of sight radar collectors (MSQ-103s). They are not state of the art; i.e. very limited accuracy and range. Corps has an airborne radar collector (Quicklook) but not very many, and their ability to paint an accurate picture is limited, especially in relation to the resources you are about to risk. National systems? Yes, they exist, but timeliness again is the key, as well as the actual interface from the national system into the tactical system. Most of these deficiencies will be significantly reduced with the fielding of JSTARS and JTF (see earlier response to item 7), but currently I say (my opinion) No, intel a division will not support Atk Hel deep attack missions, and at corps the risk would border on unacceptable.
5:7) Jack Maher: UNDERSTAND ALL ABOVE. THERE ARE RISKS TAKEN IN WAR! THAT HAS TO BE, ESPECIALLY IF WE UNDERSTAND THE SUPPORTABILITY/SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES. WHAT YOU NEED TO BE ABLE TO TELL US, RAY, YOUM BEING THE INTEL GUY, IS WHAT IS THE CHANCE OF SUCCESS VICE LOSING AN ATK BN. I AGREE THAT THE DEEP ATTACK AS DESCRIBED IN EARLIER ITEMS IS NOT THE FORTE OF THE DIVISION ATK BN. MOST DIVISION COMMANDERS BELIEVE THAT AIR LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE SUPPORTS A DEEP ATTACK BY THEIR ATK BN. CORPS NEEDS TO DO IT AFTER A CAREFULL EVALUATION OF WHAT AF ASSETS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME MISSION. THE BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF RISK VS PAYOFF. ATK BNS CAN HAVE THE SAME IMPACT ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD IF USED PROPERLY WITH GOOD INTEL ADVICE.

5:8) Jack Maher: My faculty instructors accuse me of making giant leaps in logic and as I reread my response at 5-7 I realized that I had done it again. What I was suggesting by referring to the Battle of the Ardennes was the fact the Germans took a great risk and the payoff was a gain in time of at least three months. Had they been a little closer to completing their work on the atomic bomb, that three months may have won them Europe, Britain, Russia et al. ATK BNS could have the same effect on the modern battlefield.

5:9) Bob Bailey: I believe the following assumptions should also be added to this issue:

1. Planning for the deep attack must be extensive. To the extent possible, units should plan for such contingencies before hostilities start using known and suspected enemy attack routes, assembly areas, etc... consistent with the corps plan.

2. The attack must be against the enemy in march column formation. A ddp attack against a deliberate defense that has the opportunity to optimize the ADA would be futile.

3. Trigger points for enemy movement within the corps area of interest must be established to initiate planning and execution in a timely manner.

4. Higher than normal losses of aircraft can be expected particularly where synchronization shortfalls occur.

5. The synchronization of jamming C3 nodes will provide more time in the objective area.
6. Downed aircrew recovery must be thought through in detail and plans fully understood prior to mission execution.

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Mar03/89 10:27

5:10) Mark Curran: In response to 5:9 concerning the synchronization of jamming C3 nodes.....I think that the Blackhawk version of the Quick Fix offers a platform jammer which can keep up with the AH-64. Unfortunately, the Army bought only a handful. Compass Call is also an asset that must be coordinate for this type mission. I would appreciate it if Jack Clark, Air Force, could share in information.

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Mar06/89 20:44

5:11) Bob Bailey: After an in-depth review of the deep attack issue ?, I believe the following assumptions will round-out this item:

1. Recovery of downed aircraft, particularly in the objective area, is unlikely.

2. Logistical support across the FLOT should not be attempted (refueling & rearming) on short duration missions.

3. Current intelligence dissemination methods are not adequate to meet the planning and execution requirements for the Combat Aviation Brigade in the ddp attack.

4. The corps commander must make a major effort to insure intelligence data is as near to real time and accurate as possible.

5. Aviation oriented IPB will be critical during the planning phases.

6. Some type of deception device (RPV) should be used to light up the enemy's radar systems so accurate information is available to plan flight routes around these areas.

7. As our discussion has shown in this sub-net, several systems are being developed or considered that are CRUCIAL for command & control intel support systems; all source analysis system, JSTARS, Guardrail common sensor, remote work stations for ASAS & JSTARS and MICRO fix.

8. The S2 in the Combat Aviation Brigade should be aviation qualified with aerial exploitation battalion experience.

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Mar09/89 07:24
5:12) Rich Pomager: Do we have a platform to Jam the enemy radar while we can still see? Who owns these jammers and who will allocate their use to this mission? How much reliability can we expect from such an operation and does it provide a planning factor for survivability?

Mar09/89 19:55
5:13) Bob Bailey: The following remarks are being submitted for LTC (P) Dan McGill, USAWC '89. Dan has approximately 19 years of Army aviation service and has commanded an Air Cav Troop and Squadron at the 82nd.

In response to Col Pomager's question.... The Blackhawk version of Quick Fix offers a platform jammer which can keep up with the AH-64. Unfortunately, the Army bought only a handful.

Mar11/89 16:00
5:14) Joe Jenkinson: This is in response to Rich Pomager's response. Cross FLOT operations are normally accomplished at Corps level for the reasons you state; however, the Division Commander can conduct X-FLOT operations out to a distance of 70 kms. The Ah-64 can conduct X_FLOT operations out to 150 kms and have sufficient fuel remaining. IPB's are critical to AH-64 units as you say....

Mar11/89 16:10
5:15) Joe Jenkinson: This is in response to Jack Maher's 5:2. Jack, with constant communications with Corps Hq's, available instant IPB can be known by the AH-64 X-FLOT unit.

Mar11/89 16:17
5:16) Joe Jenkinson: This is in response to Bob Bailey's response 5:5. Bob, the AH-64 is capable of ranging to 150 Kms cross FLOT. This can be accomplished at Division or Corps level. III Corps separate the level of X-FLOT missions by implementing a new control measure---the BCL (BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION LINE). Gen Saint used this control measure to distinguish Division from Corps level targets. The BCL was used was used to separate Division targets from Corps targets usually 70 Kms for Divisions.

Mar11/89 16:34
5:17) Joe Jenkinson: This is in response to 5:9 Bob, Targets selected for X-FLOT operations should be big pay off dividends. The risk are to great for anything less... Armor columns may not be the large dividends we are looking for. RAG's, DAG's and other Front Army artillery assets may be what we should look at for X-FLOT missions.
Lawrence Gillespie: Bob, I basically agree with all your listed assumptions. I also believe that when considering Deep Attack for helicopters, thought must be given to the HOW and WHY of conducting these operations. Today, through the introduction of advances in technology, the methodology for D Battle operations has been greatly enhanced. JSTARS, an airborne system incorporating a sophisticated radar system, can penetrate up to approximately 100 miles beyond the FLOT. This system provides a 3-D view of the battlefield, that permits location and identification of potential targets. This system can also keep friendly aircraft clear of hostile aircraft and could provide information for airborne intercepts.

The second device that will be on the Advanced Apache, the AHIP and the Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX) will be the E (EPLR). This system will allow aviators a safe corridor to transit friendly and enemy positions and provides real time exact location of all friendly units.

An additional system that will facilitate Deep Battle operations is the Global Positioning System (GPS). Weapon systems are key to helicopter Deep Battle operations. These systems must of the type that can cause more destruction with standoff capability and have the capacity to fire accurately in all types of weather and during the hours of darkness.
TASK ORGANIZATION & SCOUT-ATTACK ROLES
This item will be used to discuss the proper Scout
Attack mix (AH-64, OH-58C, or AH-58D) for deep attack operations.

Since this mission normally will be conducted during
the hours of darkness, compatibility between the AH-64 and its
scout becomes a critical planning consideration. Certainly,
the traditional METT-T factors are not to be overlooked, but
serious thought must be given to the following items:

a. Mixing aircraft types - One general rule normally
applies to night operations; that is, not to mix aircraft
types in the same flight, holding area, or battle position.
Does our current doctrine address this problem and is this a
problem?

b. Airspeed capability of the AH-64 - When the
situation dictates, greater speed can greatly reduce exposure,
increase surprise, and enhance survivability. This might not
be possible with the slower OH-58C. What are your comments?

c. Role of the Scout - Is the traditional role of
the scout (reconnaissance & security) still valid given the
limitations of the current scout aircraft? If not what then
becomes the scouts mission?

Coordinate Passage Points.
Rendezvous with returning AH-64's and lead
to FARP.

Downed Aviator pick-up.
FARP Control and Security.
Flank and Rear protection.
ETC...

Related items: 7

Related items: 7

4 responses
Mar09/89 20:18
6:1) Bob Bailey: This response is being made by LTC (P) Dan
McGill.

I don't believe OH-58's without viable ADA weapons (Stinger or
better) have a cross FLOT mission on a Deep Attack. They can't
keep up, can't see as well as AH-64 and can't destroy targets.
The AH-64's must be used in scout role if necessary. However the Blackhawk, because of its speed, has a mission as downed pilot aircraft that can accompany the attacking forces. I've used OH-58's to do Area, Route and Objective Recons on cross FLOT raids in LIC environment, but didn't send them with the attacking forces who went later.

In other environments, I don't believe we could send OH-58's over to Recon, because we risk losing the element of surprise. Even an ADA capable OH-58, because it flys slower than the AH-64, would have limited use unless your entire mission profile is Nap-Of-The-Earth (NOE).

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Marl1/89 00:47
6:2) Jack Maher: I WOULD NOT SACRIFICE SPEED FOR SECURITY. THAT IS WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE IF I READ THIS RIGHT.

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Marl1/89 16:05
6:3) Joe Jenkinson: This is in response to Ray Yount's response 5:1 Ray, the Army does possess Radar Jammers and Communications are capable between the X_FLOT AH-64 and Corps Hq's. The link is the Corps level Guardrail assets which AH-64's can talk to. Relay is accomplished from the AH-64 Squadron, X_FLOT, to Airborne U-21 with Guardrail relayed to Corps TOC.

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Marl1/89 16:28
6:4) Joe Jenkinson: This is in response to Rich Pomager's overall item 6.

The proper mix of Scout - Attack aircraft is a very important topic. AH-64 Bn's are currently fielded with the OH-58c. This aircraft does not possess the capability a Scout aircraft should have. The OH-58D is much better suited for the role, but Congress will not support the buy, so for now, we have the OH-58c.

At Fort Hood, we trained using only AH-64's to go X_FLOT; however, the Scouts did our coordination of passage points both egressing and ingressing. The Scouts maintained FARP control for Troop size units and provided security during the process.

The difference in night vision systems does present a problem, but can be overcome by training. I have conducted X_FLOT missions using OH-58C's and there are benefits, such as securing battle positions and providing security during AH-64 engagement timeframes. The slower speed of the OH-58C is again a problem, but current night vision systems do not allow speed at night much greater than a 100 Knts at 100 feet above the ground. It would be nice to have the OH-58D in the AH-64 Squadrons.
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C3I)

C3I is characterized by extensive / detailed planning and strict timing. Certainly, if the mission is to succeed it is imperative that we get inside the enemy's planning/decision cycle, make maximum use of electronic warfare & Intelligence (EWI), and know the location of the enemy's air defense weapons. The survivability of the crews and the accomplishing of the mission probably rest entirely on how well we understand and can define the answers to the following questions:

a. Critical to the mission will be the battalion commanders capability to communicate with his higher controlling headquarters and to be able to receive important Intelligence that may affect the mission. What technique(s) or procedures are available that would enhance this shortcoming?

b. What method or procedure will ensure that the attack battalion gets accurate, timely and continuous intelligence throughout the planning and execution phase of the mission?

c. What technique will ensure the ability to communicate during the deep attack mission?

d. What equipment is currently available that would ensure continuous communication throughout the mission profile?
   1. MTOE
   2. Using a mix of Army & Air Force equipment.
   3. Commercial equipment.
   4.

Related items: 8

13 responses
Jan25/89 12:03
7:1) Ray Yount: Admin note...recommend use of standard phrase and acronym Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) versus "EWI". Ref ... techniques to receive intel. If a Divisional Atk Bn was executing the mission, his Avn Brigade would get the intel directly from the CEWI battalion. Procedure would be slow since data would go through the brigade prior to being received at the Atk Bn TOC. In 1st Armored Div we ran a series of EAGLE STRIKE exercises wherein a radar collection and direction finding reporting team from the CEWI battalion was placed in the Atk Bn TOC. Fixes of enemy target acquisition radar were passed (FM) directly to the Atk Bn TOC. System worked well.
At Corps level, the Corps Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) (part of the Corps CEWI Brigade) can pass data from Quick Look (radar collection) and Guardrail (voice collection) to the Corps aviation asset.

At this point, recommend adding the following assumption to this study: Fielding of JSTARS and JTF will significantly enhance intel support to a Corps level deep attack mission, and will provide (for the first time) near real time intel to support division deep attack missions. ...JSTARS. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System will look up to several hundred miles beyond the FLOT to target enemy CPs, airfields, surface-to-air missiles, etc. intel, and allocate targets. NOTE. Data and intel from JSTARS and JTF will be available (near real

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Jan25/89 12:03

7:2) Ray Yount: time) to Division G2s through ASAS (All Source Analysis System). BOTTOM LINE (My opinion). Divisions do not currently have intel to support deep attack (Atk Hel Bn) mission, but will have this capability when JSTARS and JTF are fielded. Corps currently has extremely limited data/intel, which would place a corps Atk Hel deep attack mission at great risk; intel will be significantly improved (and risk reduced) with fielding of JSTARS and JTF. NOTE...Third, fourth, and fifth lines after "...JSTARS" (above) should read; ...JTF. Joint Tactical Fusion will process sensor data, collate it with other intel, and allocate targets.

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Jan25/89 22:49

7:3) Bob Bailey: Ray, Ft. Hood Texas Ah-64 attack battalions are conducting deep attacks out to 150 kms. They don't have JSTARS, yet they are able to communicate and relay real time intel back to the corps G-3. How are they able to do this?

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Jan26/89 12:43

7:4) Ray Yount: Bob, my biggest concern is telling you all where the enemy air defense radars are located, before you kick off your mission. I understand that once you are airborne there is a C2 system for communicating; my comments pertain to our current inability to paint an accurate and timely picture of enemy radar locations, and how JSTARS and JTF will improve that deficiency (we hope!).

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Jan26/89 20:59

7:5) Mike Graves: Reference the communications part of C3I. In the past, many said the solution for comm's between aircraft or between aircraft and the ground over distances beyond line of sight was high frequency. Although, this type of radio definitely can help solve this problem, the Army does not have the capability to secure an HF radio. Someone may say "why not Parkhill?", that won't cut it. Until thy Army gets into the secure voice business over HF, we must find another means.
I believe one solution is to put an aircraft (maybe C-12) at high altitude about 60 KM's behind the FLOT to act as a retrans. This may be the only solution; however, I would have to offer one other possible solution. The Army recently purchased about 12 new "high speed" aircraft consoles. The point is that someone decided to put single channel tactical satellite radios in the package. URC-110 and PSC-3 type TACSAT would have the capability to solve the comm's problem. I am not suggesting we buy the whole console, although that would be great, but just the single channel TACSAT radios. Someone will argue that this system is vulnerable too, but is available now and it is readily secured. Almost every division and corps uses this means now. Possibly some of these radios could be purchased for this type of mission.

Jan27/89 00:10
7:6) Jack Maher: THE PROBLEM WITH PURCHASING A COMMO SET UP FOR THIS TYPE OF MISSION IS THAT IT WOULD EITHER HAVE TO BE STANDARD, OR BE A PLUG-IN TYPE THING THAT COULD BE MOVED FROM CORPS TO CORPS TO DO THE DEEP ATK MISSION. THAT PUTS MISSION APPROVAL ON THE THEATER COMMANDER. THE DEEP ATK NO LONGER IS UNDER THE SOLE CONTROL OR DESIRE OF THE CORPS COMMANDER. MAYBE, IF IT DON'T COST TOO MUCH, WE COULD EQUIP ALL CORPS ATK BNS WITH THE URC-110 AND /OR PSC-3.

Jan31/89 22:51
7:7) Mike Graves: I omitted the INTEL portion of this issue. First, the new aircraft console mentioned in a previous response could be in one the Blackhawks to act as the NCS for the operation. I didn't mean to imply that ever UH-60 needs this new console. I personally think that TACSAT is the way to go for all over the horizon COMM'S. A PSC-3 with VINSON can handle the classified traffic. An airborne retrans many KM's behind the FLOT at altitude can provide a backup means.? Need to know if there is a requirement to pass hard copy or record data communications to helicopter. If so, then we must look at a couple of other means.

Feb06/89 20:5750
7:8) Bob Bailey: Mike,
I would agree that we in Army Aviation are in a transitional period stuck with communication systems that were designed for relatively high altitudes. These radios were designed to operate line-of-sight and usually only required low watts to complete the transmissions. The real travesty is that we are still using these systems and are in many cases still fielding them in our more advanced aircraft.
The threat now dictates that Army aircraft flying near and across the forward line of troops (FLOT) use nap-of-the-earth (NOE) techniques to survive.
This seriously restricts line-of-sight transmissions and increases the need for greater range & secure radios. Therefore, the following remarks will focus on some of the new and emerging communication systems and navigational equipment that hopefully will solve some of the near and far term commo problems.

NOE / Cross FLOT communications

Industry is currently working on fielding a Nap-Of-The Earth communications system that will have increased power output over the VHF-FM radios while providing non-line-of-sight High Frequency (HF) Single Side Band (SSB) capabilities at a much greater range.

- VHF-FM - SINCgars Ranges from 0 to 17 Km.
- HF-SSB Ranges from 0 to 50 Km.

NOTE: In my opinion these communication systems are not the answer.

Feb06/89 20:57 7:9) Bob Bailey: to the long term doctrinal and hardware problems of having to go and fight deep on the battlefield. The Directorate of Combat Developments at Ft. Rucker needs to put a realistic requirement out to Industry to correct this shortcoming. These systems can't be developed in a vacuum, but must be capable of talking to all services regardless of secure equipment and most importantly the ground commander. How long must we wait and how many times must we relearn the lesson that communications is the key that unlocks the door to success on the battlefield?

SECURE COMMUNICATIONS

SINCgars gives us a frequency hopping capability that will help with the Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM).

HAVE QUICK This is an improved, air-to-air, air-to-ground, frequency hopping (ECCM) UHF-AM voice communication radio. These radios are currently going into the OH-58C and UH-60 aircraft as they become available. Procurement started in FY 86.
NAVIGATION ENHANCEMENT

The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) is a multiservice and DOD agency effort, with the Air Force as the executive service. GPS is already available on some Army aircraft and gives the unit the capability to execute pin point navigation.

How about it DCAT, what's your opinion on the subject?

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Feb08/89 19:12
7:10) Mike Graves: I believe one of the radios under consideration is HAVE QUICK. As I recall it is an ARC-164 (V12) with about 100 watts on FM. It can be secured with VINSON. The HF radio may be helpful when close to ground, but to my knowledge, we do not have a COMSEC box to secure it. I don't think you can get by with a radio that is not currently securable.

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Feb08/89 21:01
7:11) Bob Bailey: I was talking yesterday with a LTC Dave Brown, Air Force who is working the deep battle issue at Ft. Leavenworth. He had the question? stated that the N Air Force do not have the requirement to have continuous commo with there units while operating cross FLOT or deep. He ask why do we in the Army have this requirement. I gave him a lot of the standard answers, but would be interested in hearing some justification from some fellow Army folk or Aviators.

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Feb09/89 22:30
7:12) Mike Graves: One last item on HAVEQUICK. There is an AM version as well as a FM model. As I recall, the ARC-164 (V12) is FM with the high power. I think that is the better radio. The problem is you all may light up the sky when you key it.

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Mar11/89 16:42
7:13) Joe Jenkinson: By virtue of Guardrail relay capability to a Corps TOC, current C3I information is possible. During Reforger 87, it was demonstrated AH-64's X-FLOT could communicate with the III Corps TOC; however, the best C&C capability is using the OH-58D. During Reforger 87, General Saint attached an OH-58D platoon to one of the Ah-64 Squadrons and it worked extremely well. The OH-58D has good communications capability, an accurate positioning system, and the Video display unit allows a commander to lay out the battlefield on screen within the cockpit.
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X CROSS FLOT OPERATIONS

The 6th Cav at Ft. Hood, T.x has done a lot of training on this topic. How about someone at Ft. Hood coming up on the net and discussing some of the following topics:

a. Additional planning considerations, coordination and firepower requirements.

b. Techniques/procedures for crossing. i.e., Blow a hole, end run (flank attack), or airspeed (low and fast), etc...

c. Control of passage points for ingress and egress.

How and when to use Artillery, SEAD and or Close Air Support (CAS), etc...

d. How best to employ Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). i.e. How best to use Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), etc...

Related items: 9

Mar 06/89 15:32

8:1) Joe Jenkinson: This response is being submitted for Ltc Jenkinson. ...The remarks really cover both Item 7 & 8. The success of any deep attack mission depends on an in-depth intelligence estimate of the situation. This estimate will provide the necessary analysis will provide the necessary analysis for selection of enemy engagement areas, battle positions, and kill zones. Initially corps G2 will select as many as 3 to 5 broad corridors into engagement areas to avoid concentrations of known and suspected enemy ADA locations. The movement corridor will maximize terrain masking, bypass built-up areas, avoid areas of NBC contamination and split enemy boundaries when possible. Critical to mission execution is the planning forthe attacking elements to penetrate the FLOT and return. The BOTTOM-LINE is that the success of this mission is making sure that it is integrated into both the corps and division's maneuver plan. There are a number of techniques for crossing the FLOT the following are just a few:

1. Penetration by using friendly fires, air assets and ground forces to create a safe corridor for the attacking elements. A good technique is to follow just behind advancing artillery fires. This technique
2. Ingress by stealth by using terrain, tactical deception, and electronic warfare measures.

3. Cross the FLOT at points already breached by attacking friendly forces or through existing gaps.

It is assumed that the following actions will take place when sending a force deep:

1. That if a force is penetrating the FLOT by fires, that the corps will include all available fire support to include the long range fires from the corps MLRS batteries.
2. All enemy ADA and electronic emitters effecting the mission will be included in the target list for the planned SEAD.

THE OVERALL SUCCESS OF THIS MISSION depends on the ACCURATE and TIMELY intelligence (this is crucial) available to the attack battalion planning the mission.

Mar06/89 20:29
8:3) Bob Bailey: Looks like the software has struck again!!!!!! We really need better software that has an edit mode that will allow someone to go back and correct their mistakes without resulting in a long stream of blank spaces and happy faces. This needs to be part of the LEXSYS after action report......
Movement Procedures

ROUTES & MOVEMENT
When planning a deep attack operation, what are some of the planning considerations/procedures that need to be taken into account?

a. Army Airspace Command & Control (A2C2).
b. Use of multiple routes Vs. one corridor.
c. What is the right definition of H-hour?
d. Maximum utilization of Artillery, SEAD, CAS, etc...
e. Night airspeeds. How fast is to fast?
f.

Related items:

8 responses
Jan21/89 16:27
9:1) Jack Maher: WOULD THE INSTALLATION OF PROXIMITY WARNING DEVICES HELP TO PRECLUDE MIDAIR COLLISIONS DURING NIGHT OPERATIONS?

9:2) Rich Pomager: Jack your question assumes that the movement will occur by massing helicopter as they cross the FLOT. I ahve some difficulty with that very issue and am looking for some discussion on the merits of a single movement pattern verses multiple routes across the FLOT. Also, what deception techniques should be used by the Helicopter force or ground forces to mask the movement?

9:3) Jack Maher: ARE YOU SUGGESTING SOMETHING LIKE A ONE MINUTE INTERVAL BETWEEN ACFT?

9:4) Jack Maher: Ref 9:1 The suggestion of PWD's was in recognition of the need to join up at a rally point prior to hitting a target or to keep from running into each other if there is a designated time interval between acft and one slows up for some reason. After further thought, the PWD's must transmit a signal and their use would be picked up by the bad guys. In terms of movement patterns--suggest that although multilpe routes across the FLOT would be the optimum in deception, it would also provide the most complexity cause of need to join up somewhere prior to hitting the target.
If each acft could mesh exactly on time in a moving daisey chain then continue on to target, multiple routes would be the best.

Mar09/89 20:27
9:5) Bob Bailey: The following comments are those of LTC (P) Dan McGill. The routes issue is one I had great problems with at Division level with my Long Range Surveillance Team's, (LRST). Since they operated beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) there had to be a method to insure Divisions/Corps/Air Force/Navy/other... friendlies weren't shooting into their box. Attack Helicopters are faced with the same problem.

Mar09/89 21:30
9:6) Bob Bailey: Dan, I'm glad you brought up the problem with trying to control all types of fires. I too have experienced the same problems.

The following is not an attempt to insult anyone's intelligence but I want to very briefly discuss existing & a few new "home grown" control measures that are currently working at Ft. Hood, Tx.

The fire control measures currently used are the Restricted Fire Line (RFL), the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL), BATTLE COORDINATION LINE (BCL), and the Reconnaissance and Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL). The RFL is established between two converging forces to ensure the coordination of fires between those forces. The FSCL is generally established by the corps commander to allow attacks by any means beyond his tactical operations without coordination. Attacks short of this control measure require the coordination with the establishing corps. RIPL is a NATO term with no U.S. equivalent. The Army group commander designates the RIPL which establishes the forward edge of the corps area of operations. The corps commander plans Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) up to the RIPL. The Army group commander plans Aerial Interdiction (AI) forward of the RIPL.

I believe that DCAT should take a few lessons learned by the folks at Ft. Hood and make sure we include in our manuals the definition of BATTLE COORDINATION LINE, (BCL) & even RIPL. The BCL line is used to delineate the responsibilities and focus between the division & corps in the Deep Battle. The BCL is established by the corps in the deep battle and follow-on operations. In either offensive or defensive scenarios the BCL could be placed to the rear of or forward of the FSCL. If the BCL is forward of the FSCL, the division is responsible for the scheme of maneuver between the FSCL and the BCL.

Mar09/89 21:30
9:7) Bob Bailey: Between the division & corps in the Deep Battle. The BCL is established by the corps in the deep battle and follow-on operations. In either offensive or defensive scenarios the BCL could be placed to the rear of or forward of the FSCL. If the BCL is forward of the FSCL, the division is responsible for the scheme of maneuver between the FSCL and the BCL.
Fires short of the BCL to include BAI are planned and coordinated by the division. Divisions must coordinate fires past the BCL. If the BCL is to the rear of the FSCL, the areas between the BCL and the FSCL are the responsibility of the corps commander.

BOTTOM-LINE... The best way to keep all of this straight is very simply to set the following responsibilities: Divisions are responsible for Deep operations out to the BCL, and the corps is responsible for the Deep Battle beyond the BCL to the RIPL.

Mar11/89 00:55

9:8) Jack Maher: WHEN I HAD MY CAV SQD IN A LIGHT ING DIV THE ADCO AND I GOT IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD PUT A NO FIRE CIRCLE AROUND THE LRS UNIT UNDER MY COMMAND. MY POSITION WAS THAT WE HAD TO DO IT--HIS WAS "BIG TURF, SMALL BULLETS". WE DISAGREED THEN AND PROBABLY STILL DO.
BATTLE POSITIONS
a. How is its selection made in the absence of a visual recon?
b. Are different tactics need in the movement of the light and heavy attack teams conducting a deep attack mission?
c. Are Release Points (RP's) and Rally Points still necessary?
d. Sector Security?
e.

Related items: 11

No responses on item 10
TARGET ENGAGEMENT
Is this the same as in close operations? If not, what are the significant differences?

Related items: 12

2 responses
Jan21/89 16:32
11:1) Jack Maher: SEEMS LIKE THAT DUE TO THE DISTANCE TO TARGET FROM THE AARP (ASSUMING THE FAARP IS AT THE DIVISION AIRFIELD) THERE WILL ONLY BE TIME TO ACQUIRE THE ENGAGEMENT AREA, DUMP THE ORDINANCE IN ONE OR AT MAX TWO PASSES, THEN RETURN TO HOMEBASE.

Jan23/89 12:15
11:2) Rich Pomager: It would appear that the target itself determines several factors. This makes a significant difference in the engagement process. A deep attack on a soft facility which is aimed at destroying a capability vice warfighting material or units is constructed and executed based on different assumptions, e.g. presence of enemy troops, intensity of enemy ADA fires over the target, attack vectors, etc. The on target time will be determined by the routes in and out, and the location of the final refuel point. While I am not certain we need to discuss the specific approaches, we should flush out the general planning guidance for a deep versus FLOT operations.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

What other considerations should be included for discussion? All considerations entered will be added as separate discussion items.

Related items: 14  15

12 responses
Jan23/89 12:31
12:1) Rich Pomager: When you consider the Corps area and the integration of all systems/units and services, I have to ask if we should use the Helicopter in the deep attack role. I believe that the helicopter will have enough to do that to plan for deep attack roles may be assuming too much and placing a valuable asset for front line support and rear battle in jeopardy. Can this capability be stretched to the deep battle? Other Army systems coming on board can fight the deep battle without exposing itself to destruction. The Air Force doctrinally is the key player in the deep attack role. They seem to hold the key to the problem. If doctrine is followed, then the helicopter's role in deep attack should be another capability in the Commander's bag of tricks should he decide to dedicate this critical resource to this mission.

Mar04/89 06:46
12:2) Rich Pomager: Where have all the aviators gone. I am still interested in your professional opinions about using the helicopter for the deep attack.

Mar04/89 12:03
12:3) Bob Bailey:

I would agree that if other Army systems continue to come on board like MLRS and ATCAMS then the need to send AH-64's is in question. However, the Corps commander needs to have available an asset that can respond immediately when he calls.

An obvious question at this point is why not use Air Force battlefield air interdiction (BAI) instead of attack helicopters in the corps deep battle? As I see it there are three things that should be considered when determining whether to use aerial interdiction or aerial maneuver. The first is environmental factors. The second is target posture and the third is BAI resource allocation.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS. These have a significant impact on deep attack planning and the forces capable of effectively executing them. When analyzing the movement of follow-on forces into the close battle, expect them to move as fast as possible on roads, rail, barges, etc... under an area air defense system and conduct that movement almost exclusively at night while taking advantage of adverse weather as much as possible. Current BAI assets available are ill equipped to seek out and destroy the enemy under these environmental conditions.

TARGET POSTURE. This refers to the mobility of a target considering the type and availability of air defense systems around it. Obviously, during daylight hours, enemy forces will probably occupy assembly areas, and will present the most difficult target array to attack.

BAI ASSETS. The final point is the responsiveness and sustainability of BAI assets. THIS IS A KEY POINT! BAI is programmed at levels above corps, can change on short notice, must be requested well in advance, and sustainment over long period of time cannot be assured. It becomes clear that maneuver with attack helicopters is the most responsive and sustainable means available to a corps commander for influencing the deep battle.

Mar04/89 12:03
12:4) Bob Bailey: The most difficult target arrays are those forces deployed in combat formations, while the most lucrative are those strung out in tactical and administrative marches, covered only by local area air defense systems. The BOTTOM-LINE is that if enemy follow-on forces are moving at night or in restricted weather, there is little or no ability to effectively engage them with BAI. Daylight target posture presents a costly option for engaging the enemy in terms of losses to friendly BAI aircraft.

Mar04/89 20:10
12:5) Jack Maher: I SAY AGAIN, I DON'T THINK THE CORPS ATK BN OR THE DIV ATK BN HAS ANY BUSINESS TRYING TO DO THE DEEP ATK MISSION. I DON'T FLY AH 64's BUT AM A LONG TERM COBRA GUY AND TO ME IT JUST DOESN'T SEEM FEASIBLE. AH 64's COST MORE THAN TANKS AND I THINK THE BEST YOU WILL GET IS A ONE FOR ONE TRADE. NOT A GOOD DEAL! CONVINCE ME!

Mar05/89 05:56
12:6) Rich Pomager: Some good points Bob. I would suspect that the CORPS commander will have a difficult decision on his hands at the point he must decide to employ the AH64's in this role. But your points support his choice.
Denny Crumley: I'm somewhere in between on the issue of whether the Corps Atk Bn has a role in the deep atk mission. I agree that at the Div level only the fool hardy would attempt such a mission. The major disconnect here is that the Div normally does not have the necessary supporting assets at his disposal to insure the JAAT and supression mission. Last I talked to the Avn Sch they were taking the same line. Corps level is another matter as long as the mission has all the necessary supporting assets. Even then it must be taken with great care or the limited asset will be lost. As an aside, I seem to remember back when the Army(speaking with one voice, of course!) was justifying these great systems in the program, that a good part of the position was the ability to go deep and take out enemy formations that would disrupt the enemy's timetable. Yes, kill tanks back there. Now the doctrine seems to be that would be the exception to the rule. Makes one wonder if we were being honest with ourselves, using the "kill tanks" mission to increase the bird's COEA payoff, or just had not thought out the cross FLOT mission very well in our haste to get the increased capability programmed!

Bob Bailey: Thanks for your response. I believe that the Division and Corps Commanders both need the capability at their finger tips to influence the Deep Battle. This is the only flying asset that they own that will be there when they call. This is not to say that the Air Force doesn't care, because they do, but they are also being jerked by a lot of other folks competing for limited assets. Throw in weather, maintenance, night, etc... and your back to Army Aviation.

Speaking as an Army aviator, I believe that if you can disrupt the enemy's Center of Gravity by hitting him with MLRS or ATCAMS then that's the way to do it. However, when everything else fails then both the Div & Corps Cdr's need something in their hip pocket. I would agree that until we get better, more accurate, timely, all source intelligence at the Division level then we ought to think twice about this mission. Additionally, this mission is possible at corps level (high probability of success) as long as the corps commander throws the weight of his intel community behind it.

In response to your point about "going deep & killing tanks" please don't forget that the Apache was only part of a much larger total Army picture. That is to say, that the Apache is not a stand alone system, but was designed to function in coordination with such things as SINGARS, ASAS, JSTARS, AHIP, and more. Some of these assets have either been cancelled or there availability has been significantly delayed. The good
12:9) Bob Bailey: news is that even without these other systems, units like the ones at Ft Hood, Texas, (Corps Atk Hel Bn's), are going deep and living to tell about it. How... good old "yankee ingenuity" is making it work. This not to say that we still don't need and must have the correct systems that will ensure the success of this mission during combat.

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Mar07/89 09:26

12:10) Bob Bailey: The following comments are being submitted for LTC J.B.Burns, 19 year armor officer who has served in varying command and joint/combined assignments. LTC Burns is currently a student at USAWC class of 1989. My comments are not about any particular item but are all inclusive. You have to assume the enemy will counter Deep Attack, manned aircraft (rotary and fixed wing), and that technology will make future prospects even more bleak! Hence, your plan must accommodate these prospects, near and long term. Second, there is no white washing the necessity to solve the Air Force - Ground problem. We (Army, USAF) all agree that the corps fights the Deep mission in more meaningful ways than any other ground echelon. In conclusion I want to make the following points:

a. The Deep Attack mission is, for now, an Air Force mission that they don't want and don't have the intell and C2 links to effectively coordinate with Army units.

b. Rotorheads have some "semi-deep" roles; but, the window is closing, as technology gives potential enemies counter measures.

c. Artillery (tube and missile) with effective intell and C2 links are the answer, and technology could truly make good on the promise of conventional weapons which exceed nuclear in destructiveness.

d. Rotary wing folks better get better at working with their brothers in the maneuver arms. Its time to work a lot harder on that! WE CAN DO THIS....by better defining our doctrine.

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Mar07/89 09:26

12:11) Bob Bailey:

e. Corps and Division AH-64 doctrine needs definition. We gotta get the doctrine ON THE STREET.

f. Targeting? Come on, guys! I am impressed with Gen Saint's stuff in M.R.

g. You've heard this before but the Deep Attack mission is only one part of the helo mission.

i. too much of everyone's attention. Objectively, you fellas are developing a separate "Air Force of our own" mentality.
h. Kill Russians!

P.S. The further back we attack, the less exact our targeting, and the more dangerous the enemy's defenses. PLUS, if we hit him TOO deep, he will have time to adjust his plans and his march columns--hence, compromising the effectiveness of the attacks.

Mar09/89 20:33
12:12) Bob Bailey: The following response is being made for LTC (P) Dan McGill. Helo's are commanders deep attack weapons of LAST resort. If the Air Force, long range missiles, SOF, or other means are available, then THEY ought to be used.
Bob Bailey, per your request we are sending you a message to verify the system works. Believe that we have broken the code on how it works and can down load now so that our SMEs can read data and provide responses. Additional attack helicop

1 response
Feb07/89 18:43
13:1) Bob Bailey: Great... Thanks for the quick response
Item 14  15:33 Mar08/89  10 lines  2 responses
Bob Bailey  Prime=12
Deep Targets

What targets are important enough to warrant sending an AH-64 "Deep" after? The answer to this question should be addressed from the following perspectives:

Division  0 - 70  kms
Corps      0 - 120  kms

If we can count on emerging systems like MLRS & ATCAMS, then is it not time to re-examine our Army Aviation "Deep Attack" doctrine?

2 responses
Mar09/89 07:41
14:1) Rich Pomager: Army aviation deep attack targets should be war stopping targets. Let's focus on the enemy's support and service support systems and C&C. My concern is the survivability of the Atk Hel. Hitting supply points can disrupt his advance and will most likely be less defended than other assets. Less soldiers in the area is one consideration and thus less bird killing weapons. The prime threat to the attackers becomes the crossing and recrossing of the FLOT. And possibly our SEAD operations can enhance success at these points. Supply points are soft and portable, which means they should be identifiable and without ADA assets in direct support.

Mar10/89 12:33
14:2) Ray Yount: Bob, Guardrail, Quicklook, Quick Fix, and JSTARS will give you probable target locations, to include enemy air defense. IPB will refine this data and increase the probability of pinpointing target locations. Given this high confidence in target locations, and given the capabilities of JTACMS and MLRS, I question the wisdom and/or advisability of any cross FLOT operations. The point is that you can put steel on target without risking multi-million dollar machines or pilots. This whole issue is further compounded by the survivability concerns addressed in my earlier responses.
What new items need to be defined in order to make sure our doctrine is current?

For Example:

1. Do you agree with all the assumptions listed in item 5? If not........why?
2. Do you agree with Fort Hoods addition of a Battle Coordination Line (BCL) that acts as a FSCL between Corps & Division, see item 12. If not.....why?
3. What needs to be re-addressed or relooked when evaluating Army Aviation doctrine?

THIS IS THE TIME TO PUT UP OR SHUT UP!!!!!!!

Related items: 16 17

No responses on item 15
SUMMARY. AH-64 Deep Attack Operations

This item is presented for the purpose of stimulating thought while capturing significant ideas. A number of salient points have been presented throughout the conduct of the Deep Attack Net which need your comments, (approval or disapproval). The following remarks are not intended to be the text book solutions, but represent a good starting point:

1. Our doctrine needs to draw a distinction between Division and Corps Attack Battalions. I believe a realistic distance for Division is 0 - 70 km, with Corps 0 - 120 km. The availability of Good, Accurate, and most importantly TIMELY Intel makes it almost impossible for Division Atk Bns to safely cross the FLOT. Once JSTARS comes on board this will greatly increase the success rate of the Deep Attack mission.

2. We must explore the coordination that needs to take place that will insure that the Air Force can successfully cross the FLOT on their Deep Attack missions. A definition of "Deep" to the Air Force should be 70 - +++ km. AH-64's would be very good at going after RAG's, DAG's, & Enemy ADA. Our doctrine is lacking in this area and needs to consider opening up windows along the FLOT that will assist the Air Force both egress and ingress.

3. Both Division and Corps need to establish a Command and Control Center that serves as the operations center for all deep operations. Its purpose would be to provide dedicated staff support, responsive communications, intelligence and fire support coordination. The recommended makeup would be G2, G3, and a fire support cell. The fire support representatives should be responsible for coordinating the six principals of the Corps fire support element, as currently practiced at Fort Hood. The six elements are:

- Fire support
- Tactical Analysis Coordinating Element
- Corps Airspace Element
  - Corps Airspace
  - Corps Air Defense Artillery
  - Corps Air Traffic Control
- Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
- Electronic Warfare
- Air Source Operations Center

When coordinated together, all these elements can rapidly develop the critical support actions, plans and steps that are keyed to the execution of the Deep Attack mission.
4. The idea about Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) used at Fort Hood to control both Division and Corps artillery, Air Force air and Attack helicopter Aircraft, deserves further consideration. THIS IS A GOOD IDEA!

5. Nowhere in or doctrine or "How To" manuals do we have a term that replaces the Battal Team Captain. Under AOE this term went away, but we still need a name for the leader in charge. It's not always the Company or Battalion Commander...

4 responses
Mar30/89 12:49
16:1) Jack Clark: RECOMMEND YOU CONSIDER THE AIR FORCE DEEP ATTACKS FOR TACTICAL AIR TO BE TO 250-300NM. AND I SAY AGAIN, THERE IS A REAL DIFFERENCE IN THE THREAT AT THE FLOT AND BEHIND THE FLOT FROM FIGHTERS. IN MY MIND IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO THINK THAT FIGHTERS DON'T POSE A THREAT TO HELOS AT THE FLOT, THEY WON'T THREATEN HELOS BEHIND THE FLOT. LOOK AT THAT ONE CLOSELY. A COMBINED ARMS APPROACH TO DEEP ATTACK USING ARMY AND AF ASSETS TO DO WHAT THEY CAN DO BEST MAY WELL PROVE TO BE A BETTER IDEA IF WE COULD EVER GET PAST THE TURF GUARDING STAGE AND CONSIDER REAL CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS VERSES TOA IN NEXT YEARS BUDGET.
Apr07/89 12:48

16:2) Rich Pomager: Bob I agree with your summation except for the range consideration for the Div and Corps. No doubt that terrain will be the onsite determiner of deep attack responsibilities. However, as I have already voiced a concern about the use of helicopter across the FLOT, I believe that the Corps Cdr should be the only guy to call this mission. Thus Army's deep attack outer boundary is the point at which enemy regiments breakout of march columns. Let the Air Force tear the enemy up in column. Let's concentrate all army systems on C&C, ADA, Supply points and Artillery. That may call for the combined employment of multiple systems against a specific targets. I want those helicopters to help me fight the rear battle. It may be the only mobile forces available in this congested area.

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Apr07/89 23:07

16:3) Jack Maher: RICH, IF I UNDERSTAND ALL I THINK I UNDERSTAND ABOUT SOVIET TACTICS, THEY DON'T BREAK OUT OF MARCH FORMATION UNLESS THEY CAN'T BREAK THROUGH THE COVERING FORCE. YOUR RESPONSE WOULD LIMIT ALL ATK HEL OPNS TO WITHIN 10 CLIC'S OF THE FLOT. I REALLY THINK CORPS CAN GO DEEPER THAN THAT AND BE SUCCESSFUL!

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Apr13/89 06:24

16:4) Rich Pomager: Your are right Jack, I am look at before they break out, not after and in the 60 Km range.
LEXSYS, Confer II, & ForumNet LESSONS LEARNED.

The purpose of this item is to record those lessons learned and or problems encountered while using the Confer II/ForumNet. The following comments are a good starting point, but need to be evaluated & corrected in order to make LEXSYS a more viable "Expert System". Please feel free to add to these:

1. The productivity of the group would be increased by conducting an "initial" face-to-face meeting either by telecommunications or in person once the subject matter experts have been selected to work on a particular issue or problem. This activity would tend to strengthen the "bond" that would make them a coherent team. An additional meeting should also be considered either at the end or in the middle of the project.

2. "Expert Systems", like LEXSYS will only work when the following criteria is met:
   a. The subject matter expert's entire chain-of-command accepts the importance of the issue or problem being resolved and provides its full support.
   b. Everyday priorities of the command don't take precedence over the subject matter expert's participation with LEXSYS. Remember, you have been asked to participate by either a three or four star general, so the issue is fairly important.

3. Information, standardization, and education about "Expert Systems" should be made available to all CGSC, SSC, AND CAS3 courses. Since this concept is relatively new, priority should be given to informing General officers, Colonels and Field Grade officers about the benefits available via any teleconferencing.

4. The hardware (computer) connectivity problems that currently exist within the Department of Defense have been greatly reduced because of current telecommunication software. As a result many different types of personal computers, such as, Apple, Leading Edge, Zenith, IBM, etc... incapable of integration are now compatible.

5. Even though a subject matter expert (SME) is adept, skilled, proficient, and might be the foremost leading authority in his/her field, every attempt must be made to eliminate those that are dilettante. Another category of potential SME is the "Computer Techie" or one who likes to pontificate. These two categories of individuals only add confusion and voluminous comments that have very little original or innovative thought concerning the issue being resolved.
17:1) Jack Maher: I DISAGREE WITH #5. SOMETIMES WISDOM COMES FROM THE MOUTH OF BABIES. POINT IS - EXPERTS CAN SOMETIMES USE AN UNEDUCATED TWIST TO ORIENT THEM IN A NEW, UNPLOWED FURROW; OR, ORIENT THEM IN AN OLD FURROW WITH A DIFFERENT PLOW. BOTTOM LINE IS--THE ISSUE FACILITATOR IS OR WILL BE PAYING THE BILL AND HE IS THE ONE THAT MUST MAKE THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SOMEONES BILL IS WORTH PAYING. IF IT ISN'T, DELETE THE PERMISSION OF THAT INDIVIDUAL FROM THAT NET.

17:2) Bob Bailey: I agree. Hopefully the Issue Facilitators of the future will be a group of highly charged up individuals that will monitor their subnet issues on a daily basis. If any "Expert System" is going to work it MUST have a sparkplug that answers questions or gets information for individuals when they ask. If the Proponent/Issue Facilitator fails to show interest then any subnet will die a slow death.... LEXSYS and other Expert Systems like it hold unlimited potential for private businesses, Industry, Department of Defense, Higher Education, and other governmental agencies. This is a very valid concept but its effectiveness depends on the Issue Facilitator.

17:3) Jack Maher: BOB, I AGREE TOTALLY! THE ISSUE FACILITATOR IS THE KEY. A COMMON DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM HELPS TOO.

17:4) Bob Bailey: roger

17:5) Jack Clark: I HOIE YOU RECOMMEND THAT THIS CONCEPT IS CONTINUED AT A GREATLY EXPANDED SCOPE. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE USA, USAF AND USN OPS UNITS, HEADQUARTERS OFFICES THAT DEAL WITH TACTICS AND DOCTRINE, TACTICAL/DOCTRINAL SCHOOL HOUSES AND SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS TIED INTO A NET SUCH AS THIS. MIGHT BE A REAL STEP IN A JOINT DIRECTION, A TOOL TO TEACH CAPABILITIES, TACTICS LIMITS, ETC BETWEEN SERVICES, PREVENT/AVOID MISCONCEPTIONS ON CAPABILITIES TACTICS, ETC, ETAL. PROBABLY WON'T HAPPEN BECAUSE IT HAS TOO MUCH POTENTIAL? BUT IF IT DOES, I'D LIKE TO PLAY.

42
17:6) Denny Crumley: Not sure I'm entering and responding to the right subject because I didn't go back and check the item, but after reading the last two comments on what makes a conference go I thought I might share with you the direction that Gen Thurman gave at Ft. L'worth two weeks ago. In essence, after hearing from a number of "experts" in the conferencing business, and a number of his own GO's like me who have been dabbling in a number of conferences, he directed each of his proponent chiefs to nominate to him what area they would like to establish a conference in an who the monitor of the effort would be. He suggested, for instance, that the Apache Bn Cdr's might be put on such a conference, with the CG, AC, or some "real expert" in the ops and tng of those units acting as the leader of the conference. In sum, there is some recognition at the highest levels of TRADOC of the potential to be gained. Not sure which net he would tag on to but ARMY TNG is the natural. As for ARMOR, I'm in the consideration mode right now. I'm also open to ideas. Whatever we decide on, it's most important that the conference not just become another E-Mail net. Substance is very important and the right monitor(organizer) is the key.

Apr02/89 23:03
17:7) Bob Bailey: Thanks for letting me know about General Thurman's comments. I'm glad you agree with my response 17:2 concerning the Proponent/Issue Facilitator. This individual must be the catalyst which keeps the issue on track. I believe the following qualities are needed by any successful Issue Facilitator: Mastery of item/issue being discussed, self-starter with tireless initiative, deductive reasoning ability coupled with innovative thought, and possess only a basic understanding/knowledge about computers.

Apr03/89 19:10
17:8) Denny Crumley: Bob: Target. In a nutshell, the facilitator has to have the same skills that any group facilitator needs to draw out the group and steer the conversation. It is, after all, another way of carrying on a conversation.
Apr03/89 22:01
17:9) Jack Maher: Many nets will take one other incentive and that is the presence of a senior leader. If the senior leaders will participate once in a while and comment on the direction of the discussion or the quality of the discussion or just say thanks to those who are participating then those participants who are trying to get their normal work done and work this as an additional duty will stay motivated. From my experience with Lexsys I cannot underestimate the importance of senior leader participation. To that end, we in Lexsys are very appreciative of your participation Gen Crumley!

Thanks!!
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Apr04/89 22:04
17:10) Bob Bailey: If the officer corps at Fort Knox, Kentucky knew they had one of their General's contributing to a Living Expert Net, there would probably be a lot more participation. I agree Jack that it's very important for the boss to occasionally let his presence be known. I believe that systems like the Living Expert System have tremendous potential as a decision support mechanism for the senior level military decision maker. The advantages of cost effectiveness, a large talent data bank, asynchronous dialogue, home station participation and joint applicability are all indicative of a system whose maturity and time for proliferation throughout the military services is near.

General Crumley, I too appreciate your continued support of this project.

Thanks!
Apr05/89 21:14
17:11) Denny Crumley: Last two responses noted. There is a flip side to the presence of a senior officer and that is some of the other participants might have a tendency to clam up and just "lurk". As in any endeavor, however, sometimes you just have to accept the risk. Interesting thing about this mode though is that the facilitator can pull the senior officer's plug if he thinks his presence is inhibiting others from speaking their mind! While we're handing out "kudos" I'd also like to tell you guys how impressed I've been with the quality of the conference. I'm among about 8 other GOs who have been enrolled in a civilian run computer conferenceing "continuing education" course, and what I see/ read on this net, Atk.Hel Opns, and Protolic match any of the discussions I'm a pa part of in WBSI.
In fact, its because of that, that I joined the effort to get Cdr TRADOC to support an establishment of "proponent" sponsored conference nets. At Knox, right now we are sorting through which subject areas or groups would offer the best return on the investment, and not the least of the considerations here is who do we have that can facilitate those conferences Keep Charging!
DVC
- - - -
Apr05/89 22:44
17:12) Jack Maher: SIR, UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SENIOR OFFICER ON THE NET CAN INHIBIT RESPONSES. MY COMMENT RELATED TO AN EXPERT NET WHERE WE ARE DEALING WITH FIELD GRADE OFFICERS, MOST OF WHOM ARE LTC' AND COL'S. IF YOU WANT TO GET THE MASTER GUNNERS TOGETHER THEN PERHAPS THE ARMOR SCHOOL CSM MIGHT BE THE RIGHT PERSON TO PASS OUT THE KUDOS ETC.
- - - -
Apr06/89 12:57
17:13) Denny Crumley: Jack: we're in tune. If we go with the master gunner conference we must select a leader from the nco ranks and he must be seen as highly creditable in the business that we charge master gunners to conduct. As an aside, there are few CSMs who are up to that degree of technical competence in my view. DVC
Apr06/89 22:30
17:14) Jack Maher: BECAUSE THIS MEDIUM IS ASYCHRONOUS AND NOT
FACE TO FACE, THE CSM COULD HAVE THE BRIGHT CLERK DOWNLOAD THE
DISCUSSION, WRITE OUT A RESPONSE, AND HAVE THE CLERK UPLOAD IT.
THE OTHER PROBLEM MIGHT BE THAT THE MASTER GUNNERS DON'T HAVE THE
KNOWLEDGE TO USE THE COMPUTER TELECONFERENCING MEDIUM. TRAINING
HELPS FOR THOSE WHO HAVE SOME COMPUTER LITERACY BUT IT IS REALLY
HARD TO GET SOMEONE UP ON THE NET WHEN THE FIRST STEP IN THE
TRAINING PROGRAM IS TO TEACH HIM HOW TO TYPE. NOT BEING
PEJORATIVE, JUST REALISTIC. THE SAME SYSTEM COULD WORK FOR THE
MASTER GUNNERS THAT I RECOMMENDED FOR THE CSM. THE YOUNGER
SOLDIERS HAVE, FOR THE MOST PART, SOME EXPOSURE TO COMPUTERS IN
THEIR HIGH SCHOOL YEARS. AS THEY GROW INTO MASTER GUNNERS, THE
PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED. UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE A MEDIUM THAT IS
EXPLOITABLE BUT TOO FEW OF THOSE IN A POSITION TO DO SO HAVE THE
TRAINING. IN A FEW YEARS THIS WILL NOT BE A PROBLEM.
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Apr08/89 11:54
17:15) Denny Crumley: ROGER DVC
Welcome to ARMY:PROTOCOL

NET ORGANIZER: Col Jack Maher
The purpose of this subnet is to discuss and provide considerations that DOD, JCS and the CINC's should evaluate as they formulate national/regional strategies for Low Intensity Conflict.
PREFACE

This is an Army War College 1989 Living Expert System (LEXSYS) Study Group project that is being staffed for SOCOM. Problem statement: What should DOD, JCS, and the CINC's consider as they develop national/regional strategies for low intensity conflict (LIC) in the areas of insurgency/counter-insurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingencies.

Scope and depth: Using doctrine contained in Draft FM 100-20 as a point of departure, explore and determine considerations to be used in strategy formulation in the four categories of low intensity conflict.

Desired results: Develop, with justification, appropriate considerations to be used by DOD, JCS, and the CINC's in their formulation of LIC strategies in the DRAFT FM 100-20 LIC categories of insurgency/counter-insurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingencies.

Related items: 2 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

3 responses

Feb07/89 15:15
1:1) Rich Cruz: Jack, you may know this already. However, while viewing the lastest Forumnet subnet listing, I saw a subnet called ARMY:LICNET. The net organizer is SFC Wagner from TRADOC, AV 552-4597/2172. The purpose of the subnet is for discussion of low intensity conflict doctrinal issues. You can see the subnet listing by typing VIEW ARMY:SUBNETS at the DO NEXT prompt. May be SFC Wagner can be of assistance concerning this issue.

Feb07/89 22:09
1:2) Jack Maher: Rich Cruz, thanks for the help. The net organizers from LICNET have been invited into this net and are up.

Feb28/89 19:43
1:3) Mike Malone: Good idea...upping LICNET folks. The speed and ease with which it was done suggests how quickly temporary adjunctive staffs and study groups can be put together with this medium...and we're just at the embryonic stage.
"LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IS A POLITICO-MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CONTENDING STATES OR GROUPS BELOW CONVENTIONAL WAR AND ABOVE THE ROUTINE, PEACEFUL COMPETITION AMONG STATES. IT FREQUENTLY INVOLVES PROTRACTED STRUGGLES OF COMPETING PRINCIPLES AND IDEOLOGIES. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT RANGES FROM SUBVERSION TO THE USE OF ARMED FORCE. IT IS WAGED BY A COMBINATION OF MEANS, EMPLOYING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INFORMATIONAL, AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS. U.S. POLICY Recognizes THAT INDIRECT--RATHER THAN DIRECT--APPLICATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY POWER ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE AND COST-EFFECTIVE WAYS TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL GOALS IN A LIC ENVIRONMENT."

"U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LIC FALL INTO FOUR BROAD CATEGORIES.
THE CATEGORIES ARE--
- INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY.
- COMBATING TERRORISM.
- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
- PEACETIME CONTINGENCIES."

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY. "U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS MAY LIE WITH AN INCUMBENT GOVERNMENT OR WITH AN INSURGENCY. AN INSURGENCY AND A COUNTERINSURGENCY SEEK TO ACHIEVE DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN INSURGENCY IS MOBILIZATION TO CAPTURE SUPPORT FOR A REVOLUTION. IN COUNTERINSURGENCY, THE OBJECTIVE IS COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY MOBILIZATION."

COMBATING TERRORISM. "THE AIM OF COMBATING TERRORISM IS TO PROTECT INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND INDIVIDUALS FROM THE THREAT OF TERRORISM. COMBATING TERRORISM INCLUDES BOTH ANTITERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIONS, THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT. THE COMBATING TERRORISM PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE COORDINATED ACTION BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER TERRORIST INCIDENTS."

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. "PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH MAINTAIN PEACE ALREADY OBTAINED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. A PEACEKEEPING FORCE SUPERVISES AND IMPLEMENTS A NEGOTIATED TRUCE TO WHICH BELLIGERENT PARTIES HAVE AGREED. THE FORCE OPERATES STRICTLY WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR), DOING NEITHER MORE NOT LESS THAN ITS MANDATE PRESCRIBES. A DISTINGUISHING FEATURE OF THESE OPERATIONS IS THAT THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS NORMALLY FORBIDDEN TO USE VIOLENCE TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION. IN MOST CASES, IT CAN USE FORCE ONLY FOR SELF-DEFENSE."
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. "PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS INCLUDE SUCH DIVERSE ACTIONS AS DISASTER RELIEF, CERTAIN TYPES OF DRUG INTERDICTON OPERATIONS, AND LAND, SEA AND AIR STRIKES. FREQUENTLY, THESE OPERATIONS TAKE PLACE AWAY FROM CUSTOMARY FACILITIES, REQUIRING DEEP PENETRATION AND TEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT OF LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs) IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS MAY REQUIRE THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT AND THE SELECTIVE USE OF FORCE OR CONCENTRATED VIOLENT ACTIONS."

Related items: 3

No responses on item 2
BACKGROUND.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS), JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS) AND JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS) ADDRESS WARFIGHTING AND DETERRENCE. LIC REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONSIDERED. U.S. VULNERABILITY TO STRATEGIC MATERIALS AND ENERGY PRODUCTS FROM THE THIRD WORLD IS CONSIDERABLE AND GROWING. CRITICAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION ARE CONTROLLED FROM THIRD WORLD LAND MASSES. POPULATION EXPLOSION, DEBT, DRUG EXPORT/NARCO- TERRORISM, AND ACTIVE INSURGENCIES CHARACTERIZE SEVERAL CENTERS OF VULNERABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. DOD MUST WORK WITH OTHER AGENCIES TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY AND PROACTIVELY.

Related items: 4

9 responses
Feb01/89 14:38
3:1) Rich Cruz: Today's guest speaker at the AWC indicated he was going to Ft Levenworth for a conference on LIC. He showed a slide with some LIC issues. As a suggestion, maybe we need to have a copy of his slide and information as it comes out of the Leavenworth meeting?

Feb01/89 20:05
3:2) Jack Maher: I have invited the LIC PRO folks from Leavenworth to come up on the net. Have done that by message and by phone. They are probably tied up with this conference but expect them up shortly.

Feb02/89 06:53
3:3) Rich Pomager: One point I noted in this presentation was the use of the term LOWER Intensity Conflict. I do not know if that was a slip or intentional. Is there another dimension?

Feb15/89 21:28
3:4) Steve Whitworth: I don't know if there was a slip, but in SOUTHCOM the term kept changing depending on who you are talking to. GEN Woerner's favorite term was High Probability Conflict coined from the expectation that LIC-type conflict was the most probable future warfare. Also HPC seemed to avoid the problem of confusing LIC with a low-resource conflict.
Mar13/89 00:08
3:5) Alex Wojcicki: I realize that this is late in the game, but what is being done to address the basic premise of the argument stated in the text of the item? "DOD AND JCS PPBS, JSPS, JOPS ADDRESS WARFIGHTING AND DETERRENCE. LIC REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONSIDERED."

I know from experience that trying to get Army force structure allocation rules in the TAA (Total Army Analysis) process (the main force structure driver) is practically impossible if the issue doesn't directly relate to either the "base case" (NATO scenario) or the two "excursions" (SWA and NEA). It's widely recognized at the action officer level that these scenarios do not necessarily address the "real world" as we deal with it on a daily basis, that is, the "real world" that has been the focus of our discussion in this conference.

Over the past 4 years at least, there has not seemed to be any moves to change the "system". I would postulate that this may be so because that would add immesurably to the complexity of an already *complex* system. However, merely because the issue is admittedly difficult, that should not deter the DOD/Services from addressing it in a timely fashion.

Perhaps there is movement that I am not aware of... Does anyone have a feel for what might be afoot to include the requirements for "other than major land combat" in the basic system of force development? (I'm not thinking of CINC planning to use war-allocated forces in LIC, but rather a


Mar13/89 00:08
3:6) Alex Wojcicki: structural overall to address LIC in the overall DOD/JCS planning process)


Mar13/89 09:34
3:7) Vern Humphrey: One of the things we're working on is an integrated, synchronized analysis system. One of the immediate benefits of such a system would be the ability to "edit" or "tailor" the basic scenario, then trace the effect of such tailoring through force structure, doctrine, and training.


Mar13/89 20:07


Mar13/89 21:40
3:9) Steve Whitworth: Wojo, the short answer from my experience is that your observations are correct. No one gets excited or wants to think about much other than the specific introduction of forces. The earlier phases are put in the "too hard" pile.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

WHAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY AS THEY RELATE TO THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND:
HOST NATION/OBJECT NATION?
HOST NATION/OBJECT NATION REGIONAL?
ALLIES?
USSR?
SOVIET BLOC?
THIRD WORLD?
OTHERS?

Related items: 5

26 responses
Jan26/89 07:42
4:1) Rich Pomager: Jack, it appears that the break out of power base countries can be group as follows; Host nation/Region, USSR/Communists Countries, Third world and US Allies. I would suggest that another consideration may be the regional power which is different then the region as a whole. For example, China must be addressed separately from the other Asian contries. Also, India is reaching a different independent status from the rest of the countries in the region. I make this distinction because each area has a different impact on how we do business in the region. We need to understand the real power brokers in the area and how that nation aligns itself with the insurgency. Then a political decision determines which way we respond. Most important is that our activities must be consistent with our policy and the interests, if possible, with the power base country.

Jan26/89 23:35
4:2) Jack Maher: WHEN WE TALK ABOUT HOST NATION WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A COUNTRY LIKE HONDURAS. AN OBJECT NATION COULD BE AFGANISTAN OR NICARAGUA. WHEN WE CONSIDER WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE IN NICARAGUA (HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR, ETC.) WE NEED TO LOOK AT THE WHOLE PICTURE. WHERE DOES MEXICO SIT IN THIS "THING"? IF WE HAD TO DEFEND THAT BORDER WITH CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE WE WOULD HAVE TO FULL TROOPS BACK FROM EUROPE TO DO SO.
A PERTINATE CASE STUDY MIGHT BE CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD THE BIG BOYS CONSIDER AS THEY DEVELOP LIC STRATEGIES FOR THAT REGION OF THE WORLD? DON'T LIMIT THE DISCUSSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA! WE ARE LOOKING FOR GENERIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS! ANYBODY GOT ANY IDEAS?

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Jan27/89 07:08
4:3) Vern Humphrey: One consideration is the Host Nation. In general, Host Nation internal politics drastically affects both the effectiveness of our actions (usually by draining off resources through corruption) and public support in the US. Hostile propaganda focuses on the corruption and undemocratic rule of the Host Nation and taints our aims by association. This leaves us in a quandary -- do we sacrifice our interests and pull out, or do we try to muddle through, or do we try to change the Host Nation government?

In most cases, we pick choice 3 -- and potential hosts know this, which makes them leery of US support.

The first consideration, therefore, would be the Host Nation government. Is it vulnerable to charges of corruption and tyranny? Can it stand up to an in depth hostile investigation by "anti-war" activists and newsmedia? If not, what can we do about it -- within limits acceptable to the Host Nation?

In Vietnam we really never found an answer. At the top, we permitted (encouraged?) a coup, and then became enmeshed in torturous internal politics. At the bottom, we tolerated corruption with a Catch 22 mentality -- I reported theft and sale of building materials and was told, "You can't say that if you can't prove it." But I couldn't prove it without an investigation, and I couldn't get an investigation without an accepted report, and couldn't get a report accepted without proof -- and so on, and so on.

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Jan27/89 14:28
4:4) Rich Pomager: The assessment that you are looking for includes every country in the region. Questions such as political lean, government stability, government type, regional influence with other governments, military power expansion of the governments under study, etc. Critical is alignment with the insurgent and any support he may be providing or is capable of providing.

Some countries can be coerced or encouraged to assist an insurgent. This can be accomplished by either the insurgent representatives or by a country government aligned with the insurgent. Each case is separate and requires different approaches to solving the problem.

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Jan29/89 18:20
4:5) Jack Maher: Regional politics are one aspect. The nest question is who (democratic or socialist governments) have the most influence in the region. Can we use the region's political leanings to assist us in achieving our goals in the host or object nation. What do we need to do in the region to make what we want happen politically? ---

Feb01/89 20:34
4:6) Jack Maher: Going back to 4:3--we as a nation trying to formulate a strategy for low intensity conflict in any nation has to sort out just how much corruption, violence etc. is too much. We can approach the issue from a puritanical perspective and say that even a little is too much but I think that is a naive approach. Whatever we will accept or not accept should certainly be thought out before we get involved and then agreed upon up front with the government of the nation we are trying to help. Then you have to remember the international watchdog organizations that report out on everything(true or not) to everybody who will listen. Can this approach work? Is it ethical? Would our people stand for it? How important does the host country have to be to U.S. interests to let us use this approach. Vern talked about Vietnam--was it important enough or were we just clumsy?
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Feb02/89 07:01
4:7) Vern Humphrey: It was both -- the issues of GVN corruption, reinforced by scenes of monks burning themselves in the streets -- were overwhelming to the home TV viewers. At the same time, the pervasive corruption almost paralyzed the SVN armed forces. For example, my counterpart would call an alert each payday. While the troops were held on the perimeter (and the perimeter was sealed, so their families couldn't get out) they would run out of food (they were on communted rations). However, just before calling the alert (and before paying the troops) he would bring in several duce-and-a-halves full of food -- which the troops could buy, from him. When the duce-and-a-halves sold out, he called off the alerts. You can imagine the effect this had on the battalion's combat performance.
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Feb02/89 07:05
4:8) Rich Pomager: Jack there are at least two kinds of corruption that may exist. First is the type in which US financial support in either $ or goods is manipulated for the personal benifit of government officials. Part of this is the Black Market Trading.
The other type and the most damaging to the efforts of the HN Govern't and the US interest is the internal power structure not formally recognized or established. From this power base of the wealthy Families stems the payoffs and positioning of individuals in a government which insures that the status quo remains over time. El Salvador may be an example; Duarte promised land and economic reform. The power base allowed the first or initial stages of these programs to become law. Some reforms occurred. But the later stages never came to pass. Not because Duarte did not try. He was prevented from changing to many things.

This is at the core of the country's insurgency problem and the one that must be corrected if stability is to occur over time. So,,,, any program the US sets in motion must deal with this treat to stability. The problem is compounded by the fact that the process must be accomplished by the established government. The US position is supportive, but not directly involved.

Feb02/89 08:23
4:9) Vern Humphrey: Precisely -- And in Vietnam, we did not fully understand this -- or if we understood it, we didn't know what to do about it. The fundamental paradox here is that in most cases of insurgency, unless the host government changes its ways (and as you point out, there are often powerful reasons WHY it can't change) -- the insurgency grinds on, despite all we can do. With all the propaganda and divisive home front effects in the US that that engenders.

At the same time, CHANGING the host government through US pressure or direct action is often even worse.

In general, it is a sa: but true statement that "people who have insurgency or terrorist problems usually EA:NED those problems."

Feb02/89 22:15
4:10) Jack Maher: Considering the last 3 or 4 responses--could our nation make the decision to attempt to satisfy the greed of the incumbent but friendly host nation government by closing our eyes to the misuse or misdirection of our aid money and supplies in order to keep them from ripping off their countrymen and adding fuel to the insurgency fire? How badly do we need to protect our national interests to do that? And if, by doing that, we satisfied the greed of the top 5 echelons of govt. would that prevent them from continuing to rip off their countrymen and prevent their subordinates from doing it also?
Feb03/89 06:55
4:11) Vern Humphrey: I don't have a good answer -- except to say that my experience is that greed and corruption are all pervasive. The top layers in a corrupt system depend on the lower layers for support. The real squeeze artists are the hamlet chiefs, cops on the beat, and so on. And if they aren't satisfied, then it does no good to satisfy the top -- look at Haiti. Dictators come and go, the Tonton Macout is forever.

I suspect that one approach might be to have a clear agreement within US agencies that we will NOT tolerate corruption, and a clear understanding with the Host Government.

A parallel might be the case of torture. As an advisor, what do you do when your counterpart tortures prisoners? If nothing else works, you call for a helicopter and leave. In cases of corruption, you should have the same power.

Feb10/89 17:44
4:12) Rich Pomager: I do not believe that we can allow corruption to exist. We weave a web that entangles the US personnel. Look at the Panama situation. It appears from this experience that one key point is that we ensure that a coordinated effort is undertaken. Thus we can prevent one agency of the US effort from working in a counter productive manner.

Now this will require some hard choices. But over the long haul will prove beneficial to our effort.

Any ideas on how to dismantle the informal power base?

Feb13/89 07:40
4:13) Vern Humphrey: The most effective way is to work at the actual level of execution -- you need a man who rides herd on the guy who does the squeeze (or his boss) -- AND has the power to do something about it. That's an American who works at the lower political/military level and controls the flow of US aid. If that sounds like an advisor -- well ....

You also need US personnel at higher levels who will NOT ignore the warnings that come from below.

Feb14/89 23:16
4:14) Jeff Mayo: Vern, your second caveat is 'interesting'. I know of not a single case where warnings by the expert on the ground was heeded by those above. It seems like there are distinct agendas at the two levels. What mechanism might we propose to keep the system honest? America has ALWAYS seemed to support the crook in choosing our 'friends'.

57
4:15) Vern Humphrey: I hate to say it, but part of the problem is the American Army's "class system" -- field troops (advisors, grunts, etc.) are definitely "lower class." Headquarters are "Upper Class" (there is no middle class). We need to put the higher staffnics into the field more often -- and by that, I mean humping-the-bush-sleeping-in-the-mud field, not occasional visits. Only by breaking down these "class distinctions" can we bring the advisors and the higher levels together.

We also need accountability. People in high places who commit offenses must be punished MORE harshly (not LESS) than lower ranking people who commit the same offenses.

And in a shooting war, we need to look at the casualty ratios. Leaders must share in full measure the dangers and hardships of the troops in the field -- and demonstrate that sharing by appearing on the casualty lists.

Some will say that we can't afford to let generals get killed -- but I never knew of a case where a general died or retired and at least 50 colonels didn't volunteer to replace him.

Feb15/89 18:40
4:16) Horace Hunter: Sorry for coming into this so late, but I believe the political factor is the key element in decision making. If I start sounding pontifical, bear with me. I am going to quote a few bits from a paper I just wrote to the point. "... revolution. ... If we ally ourselves to a ruling elite bent on rigidly preserving their perquisites and giving lip service to rectification, we are going to lose. ...Our support of the counterinsurgency efforts of other nations must be highly selective. In many cases the best course of action is to do nothing. If a government has been so out of line with its people that they felt rebellion certain conditions can be met: a. The threatened government must stand for values compatible with the people's aspirations and not incompatible with our own; b. There must be agreement among the power elites that change is mandatory; or, c. We must be ready to pressure the elites into making the changes demanded ....Actions must prove sincerity. Failure to get effective cooperation...will require us to reassess our interests and follow a damage limiting strategy which will entail withdrawal of assistance. The dangers... are great and obvious. ... An opponent is handed the two powerful causes of nationalism and anti-colonialism... ultimate success is questionable. Our system doesn't
Feb15/89 18:40
4:17) Horace Hunter: seem to advance the type of men capable of working these cross cultural puzzles." Etc. It is a sticky wicket. As long as we support folks with limited vision, we are going to be on the losing side. And those are the types we will normally - - - - -

Feb15/89 21:44
4:18) Steve Whitworth: I don't know if this answers your original question, but I hope it helps: One of the problems we ran into in SOUTHCOM was the lack of national guidance. This net and others speak often of "national interests", but I found no document that outlined what our national interests or strategy was. This led to some intricate wrangling between DOD and DOS agendas. We began a process to collect for the CINC all of the different sources that provided him missions, not just JSPS but a bunch of others as well. It was an impressive mission list of roughly 500 missions. This began a winnowing process to clarify what the CINC should focus his priorities on given limited resources. If this is useful I can probably dig up some POCs in SOUTHCOM that were the inspiration of this and possibly provide you the documents. If this is not germane, I apologize for the wordiness....Steve - - - - -

Feb16/89 01:40
4:19) Jeff Mayo: It seems that what we keep coming back to is the fact that nations involved as our allies in a LIC scenario have usually brought those insurgency woes on themselves. Countries possessing stable governments and a modicum of fairness to the ruled have little to worry about. On the other hand, the government of a nation bent on squeezing every last drop of its peoples' blood to line the pockets of the politicians will never be free of internal AND external strife. Why is it the USA always seems to support the Chang Kai Checks, Singman Rhees, Somozas, Batistas, Marcos', ad nauseum infinuitum and then expend our own resources (and soldiers lives) to support unfair and unpopular regimes. As for those O-5s and O-6s who can't or won't get out in the field with the troops, we would have to restructure the thinking of over 90% of the SENIOR Officer Corps. I sometimes think they don't WANT to know. Vern is certainly right on in his assessment of the 'class struggle'. - - - - -
Feb16/89 07:07
4:20) Vern Humphrey: Jeff, I think you've underlined the real
problem -- nations with insurgency problems DESERVE those
problems. We are fighting an uphill battle when we support
dictators -- and by supporting one, we are perceived as the bad
guys in other regions. Rarely do we back the forces of democracy
-- and have left the field open to the likes of Castro and
Ortega.

The key to most LIC is to solve the problem that caused the
conflict in the first place. In this, the Army can be only an
adjunct -- or perhaps may serve to stave off defeat long enough
to get a solution working.

Of course in a couple of instances (Afghanistan, Nicaragua,
etc.) we HAVE backed insurgents -- and wound up with politicians
making hay out of attacking our policy.

Feb16/89 21:31
4:21) Jeff Mayo: You don't suppose those politicians WELCOMED
the chance to attack their own government? Does anyone have a
handle on how we (the government—not the military) might approach
solving conflict/LIC problems from an EXTERNAL position? And how
might we convince our own legislators to pull together to
accomplish this task? There is ample evidence that our executive
and legislative branches, as well as partisan political parties,
are working at cross-purposes.....

Feb26/89 20:41
4:22) Jack Maher: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE ON
ITEM 4, POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY
POLICY FORMULATION. NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT NATION IS THE REAL
POWER BROKER IN THE REGION AND HOW IT ALIGNS ITSELF WITH THE
INSURGENCY. THE ASSESSMENT MUST INCLUDE EVERY COUNTRY IN THE
REGION. QUESTIONS SUCH AS POLITICAL LEAN, GOVERNMENT STABILITY,
GOVERNMENT TYPE, REGIONAL INFLUENCE WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS,
MILITARY POWER EXPANSION OF THE GOVERNMENTS UNDER STUDY, ETC.
MUST BE ANSWERED. CRITICAL IS ALIGNMENT WITH THE INSURGENT AND
ANY SUPPORT HE MAY BE OR IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING. NEXT QUESTION
IS WHO (DEMOCRATIC OR SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS) HAVE THE MOST
INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. WHO IS THE REAL POWER BASE IN THE HOST
NATION—MILITARY, RELIGION, WEALTHY FAMILIES, LABOR UNIONS, ETC.? HOST
NATION POLITICS DRASTICALLY AFFECT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S.
ACTIONS IN THAT COUNTRY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE U.S. HOSTILE
PROPAGANDA FOCUSES ON THE CORRUPTION AND UNDEMOCRATIC RULE OF THE
HOST NATION AND TAINS OUR EFFORTS BY ASSOCIATION. CAN THE HOST
NATION STAND UP TO AN IN-DEPTH HOSTILE INVESTIGATION BY "ANTI-
WAR" ACTIVISTS AND NEWS MEDIA? IF NOT, WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT--
WITHIN LIMITS ACCEPTABLE TO
THE HOST NATION? NATIONS THAT HAVE INSURGENCY PROBLEMS HAVE USUALLY EARNED THOSE PROBLEMS. THE KEY TO MOST INSURGENCIES IS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT STARTED IT. THE U.S. MILITARY CAN ONLY BE AN ADJUNCT. WE MUST HAVE A CLEAR AGREEMENT WITHIN U.S. AGENCIES

Feb26/89 20:41

4:23) Jack Maher: AND WITH THE HOST NATION THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE CORRUPTION. THE THREATENED GOVERNMENT MUST STAND FOR VALUES COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS AND NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN. THERE MUST BE AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE POWER ELITES THAT CHANGE IS MANDATORY. WE MUST BE READY TO PRESSURE THE ELITES INTO MAKING THE CHANGES DEMANDED—ACTIONS MUST PROVE SINCERITY. FAILURE TO GET EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WILL REQUIRE US TO REASSESS OUR INTERESTS AND FOLLOW A DAMAGE LIMITING STRATEGY WHICH WILL ENTAIL WITHDRAWAL OF ASSISTANCE. WE MUST HAVE A CLEAR NATIONAL STRATEGY THAT IS AGREED UPON BY BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

Mar04/89 17:24


Mar06/89 21:00

4:25) Jack Maher: What I'm trying to get a here is what risks do we the Army or we the JCS take when we take action against nonstate supported terrorism. An example of this might be the Red Brigade in Italy. Looking for the same for state supported terrorism--an example might be PLO elements. Examples of state sponsored terrorism could be the Iran-Rushdi (sp?) issue or certainly the antics of Libya. In some cases the entire world, with few exceptions, would support our actions. In others, we would not have the support of some, few, or many nations.

Mar07/89 07:27

4:26) Vern Humphrey: There appear to be three fundamental issues: Can we use facilities owned by a foreign nation in combating terrorism—and if so, how? For intelligence gathering? For staging? For active operations?

Can we conduct counter terrorist operations in a foreign nation? Unilaterally? Jointly?

Can we share intelligence? How reliable is such shared intelligence? What risks do we run?
WHAT ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY /COUNTERINSURGENCY AS THEY RELATE TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND: HOST NATION/OBJECT NATION?

HOST NATION/OBJECT NATION REGIONAL?

ALLIES?

USSR?

SOVIET BLOC?

THIRD WORLD?

OTHERS?

Related items: 6

19 responses

Jan29/89 18:29

5:1) Jack Maher: As with political considerations, it important look carefully at the economic base of both the host/object nation and the region wherein it lies. Who is the host nation's largest trading partner? Does the host nation have a viable economy? What would it take to make it viable if it isn't? In the case of a host nation--how much of its GNP is it using to fight the insurgency? In the case of an object nation, can we use economic sanctions to help the insurgents. Is that consistent with National policy in that area? Cuba is an example of where economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. cause the Soviets to assist to the amount of $5 Billion annually. That has to be a drain on their economy and although Cuba looks as if it is doing well, all third world countries know that they would fall flat on their face if they weren't getting the massive aid from the Soviets.

Jan30/89 07:04

5:2) Vern Humphrey: Cuba is also an example of "don't pray for what you want -- you may get it." By creating an unproductive client state which the Soviets have to support, we have done more for our side than if we had invaded or overthrown Castro.

Feb26/89 20:42

5:4) Rich Pomager: We need to keep a close watch on the outflow of $ from the country. This is a sure sign of a lack of confidence in the government and an indication to the US that the situation has deteriorated to a point of decision. It might be one of those indicators mentioned in discussion as the point of changing position relative to supporting the government.

5:5) Vern Humphrey: An additional consideration is the system of currency and import controls. Artificially high exchange rates and high import duties lead to black marketing -- especially in the poorer nations. Such an economy is very sensitive to being warped by the influx of US aid. Coupled with a highly stratified socio-economic system, the result is that the "haves" make money at the expense of the "have-nots" at an increasing rate.


5:7) Jack Maher: would seem that we, the U.S. could use the economic element of power against state supported and state directed terrorism. If we could convince the entire world or at least a large part of it to enter into a trade embargo against that state we might have some effect.

5:8) Rich Pomager: The basic problem is making the world community recognize the potential danger of terrorism and to flat condemn the terrorist acts. Asking for a total economic embargo may be more than many nations can accept. Then we become the real aggressor against the little guy and not the state supporting terrorism. World opinion and influence is the best we can hope to achieve and this is not a military responsibility.
5:9) Vern Humphrey: I suspect what we need to focus on is specific classes of acts. For example, we've been pretty successful in defining hijacking an airliner as a terrorist ACT (Castro sent back some American hijackers, and we've sent back Soviet Block hijackers). If on the other hand we define terrorism as "what people we don't like do," then we have little potential for international cooperation -- in fact, we've set the stage for international non-cooperation, since we've violated the Grotian principle, which is what undergirds all international law.

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5:10) Rich Pomager: Agree Vern, but I am still confused as to why the world reacts to a hijacking and not an airport slaughter. Guess we have to pick incidents and generate support. Of course it is difficult to get people to be concerned about airplane hijackings or airport incidents if the people are incapable of seeing this terrorist incident as a direct threat to them. The poor will never ride in an airplane for example. Regardless your point is valid.

The other side of the issue is that where the terrorist aligns with an ethnic, religious or national group which is dispersed in many countries, we will have little influence in generating public objection for the acts of this group.

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5:11) Vern Humphrey: That's why we have to have agreement on the ACT. Let the act, not the politics, define a terrorist. If we can do this, we can get action even from people who agree with the terrorist's politics.

The flip side, of course, is that we have to recognize that people who are engaged in political actions we disagree with have a legitimate right to make war -- as long as they keep to the rules.

The power of this approach is that it moves most insurgent groups toward legitimate methods of warfare, and away from proscribed methods.

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5:13) Dennis Crumley: No we don't expell all Iranian and muslim students any more than we'd consider expelling those who have taken up residence here and are contributing to our economy--not because of the economic impact but because our value system does not allow us to treat people that way( at least not since we sent all Japanese off to the camps in the early WWII years). What we can and should do though is press very hard to isolate the guilty persons and deal with them in the harshest ways our laws allow!

5:14) Vern Humphrey: I would think such action (expulsion of all Iranians and/or muslims) would probably be unconstitutional (and that's what we exist for -- to protect, not destroy -- the constitution). In addition, it would have a drastic impact on US foreign relations. How could we deal with not only muslim nations, but also non-muslim nations? Can you imagine us trying to end apartheid in South Africa after we had instituted mass discrimination against an entire religion?


5:16) Dennis Crumley: Responding to 5:15. Yes, same response. You don't go after all those of a particular nationality or religion just because the leader is a dirt bag. Must deal with the source of the pain and how you deal with him can run anywhere along the spectrum of political and military approaches. I almost hesitate to make the following comment for fear that tomorrow's headlines will make it OBE, but isn't it interesting that the call for Rashdie's(sp) death has taken a back seat to the pronouncements of late from Iran? You don't suppose that's because the free and not so free world leaders have let it be known that should anything like that occur, Iran would have to content with much of the civilized world, in an untold number of consquences? Remember what you've learded from that great Prussian, military force is but an extention of the political process, and preferably one of the last to be used.(Liberal translation comes with the grade and the longer you've been away from that institution!)
Vern Humphrey: I agree -- while it is essential to punish the guilty, there is no merit in punishing the innocent.

The best of all worlds would be to have the Islamic world reject Khomeni and his ideas -- but that certainly won't happen if we automatically assume all moslems are terrorists -- and treat them as terrorists!

Jack Maher: AGAIN, I AGREE! THE LARGER QUESTION THEN IS HOW DO WE COORDINATE OUR NATIONS EMPLOYMENT OF IT'S FOUR ELEMENTS OF POWER (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY) TO COMBAT TERRORISM? WHO, OR WHAT ORGANIZATION HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY? IS IT DONE WELL? IF NOT, WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?

Vern Humphrey: From an empirical standpoint, it probably is well done -- terrorist actions against the United States are comparatively few, given the size, leaky borders, and open society we have.

From a political standpoint, it probably isn't -- in the sense we haven't made the problem disappear.

It seems that the political aspect should define our national interests to minimize terrorist problems -- either avoidance or elimination. Then we should seek a "generic" or neutral definition of terrorism -- to avoid the "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" problem. It seems to me that this is our FIRST breakdown in a coherent anti-terrorist problem.

Once the political aspect is solved, the other elements of power should be much easier to apply -- if everyone agreed on terrorism, it would be easier to apply economic sanctions, for example.
WHAT SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD/JCS, AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTER-INSURGENCY? HOST/OBJECT NATION? REGIONAL?

Related items: 8 15

34 responses
Jan29/89 18:31
6:1) Jack Maher: By social considerations I'm trying to get at things like religion, democracy or socialism, corrupt or honest government, etc.

Feb01/89 13:45
6:2) Rich Pomager: Any operations in the LIC environment must recognize the power of the church in the country and region in general. For example just a few years back several priest in the catholic church developed Liberation Theology. The Basic tenent was that conditions were so bad under the existing government that change had to occur, even if it meant over throwing the political structure. Thus, we had and still have today priest supporting insurgent activities. They reach the people every day and carry a great deal of credibility. In the early days of the Sandinista Regime the church officials supported the Sandinistas' It appears that the church in third world countries and the US gov't have the same aims and objectives. So why can we not join our forces, at least in a sharing information and establishing a flow of communication. Have we left them out of the picture? Do we not want to recognize the power base they have? If the answer is yes, then we need to adjust our policy. I am not suggesting that we form battalions or companies in the churches or use the pastors, priest and ministers as military leaders. Let's use the power of the pulpit to work for social justice and stability in the country. Finally, I do not believe that we need to do this in a clandestine manner. Let's be open. Cardinal Obano, who was not aligned with the Contras and anti Sandinista policies, did a super job of letting the

Feb01/89 13:45
6:3) Rich Pomager: world know the true state of affairs. He was credible, unconnected and presented both sides pluses and minuses. He was an honest broker. I think that while he presented some negative points against the Contras, the Sandinistas loss more than the Contras.
Feb01/89 15:38
6:4) Vern Humphrey: same is true for Cardinal Jaime Sin in the Philippines. Also note how fundamentalist Moslems and orthodox Jews have created climates in the middle east and Southwest Asia. I think the point is that we Americans -- because of our clean separation of church and state -- tend to underestimate the power of religious leaders in other countries.

Feb01/89 20:10
6:5) Jack Maher: Whether it sits in our craw as an American or not, it appears very important that we consider the influence religion has on the people and the influence religious leaders have on the people. In addition to the above examples one must only look to Iran for another classic example. Buddhist Monks in Vietnam are yet another.

Feb02/89 07:20
6:6) Rich Pomager: Now that there appears to be some agreement on the need to consider the role of the churches in our policy. Ok, let's start discussing how we should accomplish same. What are our options? Can we work with radical religious groups? How about the world wide impact of working with a religious group that sponsors terrorism in another country or part of the world?

Feb02/89 08:28
6:7) Vern Humphrey: One point to consider is the structure of the church. A solidly hierarchical church (like the Catholic Church or the Latter Day Saints) is one proposition -- there is a central authority you can deal with. With other religions (such as Islam) -- this hierarchy doesn't exist (or isn't so powerful).

An analogy would be treaties with the Indians. We kept accusing them of breaking the treaties -- because we didn't understand that the chiefs who signed the treaties had little power to control the people they were representing. On the other hand, when we accuse the Soviets (for example) of violating a treaty, this is another matter -- we know any violations are at the behest of the central government.

When we deal with religious leaders, we need to ask ourselves -- are we dealing with indians or soviets?

Feb02/89 22:23
6:8) Jack Maher: There is another perspective on this issue and that is: How much control does the solidly hierarchical international church have or is willing to exert over the local diocese etc. of that church? I submit that if the Pope came down hard on the radical priests in Central America he would have a schism on his hands and that wouldn't solve anything.
If you break Islam down into its various sects I suspect Khomeni has a lot to say about what the Shiite(sp?) sect does regardless of their national origin, but he has no affect over the Sunni's(sp?).

Feb03/89 06:59
6:9) Vern Humphrey: In the case of the Pope, the Catholic Church has its own procedures, and it disciplines its own -- albeit in accord with its own imperatives. In the case of Shiites and Sunnis -- that is a split that is more emotional than the split between Protestants and Catholics. Shiites are predominantly non-Arabs, and the religious animosity is reinforced by ethnic animosity. As the infighting in Lebanon demonstrates.

Islam's decentralization and judge system also makes coordinated action or discipline difficult.

Feb03/89 12:38
6:10) Jeff Mayo: I think you will find that in cases where a hierarchal worldwide churches are concerned, the church has formulated their own well thought out policies that encompass fairly liberal rules to keep church doctrine and local/national politics from directly confronting each other. In many cases, centuries of experience and a group of fine minds has been brought to bear in problem areas. Another factor is the propensity of religions to become involved in local politics when it suits them; jumping back and claiming no responsibility when it is in the church's interest to do so. In any case it is essential that the impact of religious organizations be weighed when formulating LIC doctrine and responses in LIC situations. The other caveat is not to apply good 'ol USA standards in the assessment, but rather take a pragmatic and global view. Finding individual decision makers who can do this is DIFFICULT! While we would LIKE to imprint our morality and humanity on the rest of the world, it is likely to be done in many small increments rather than one fell swoop.

Feb03/89 14:05
6:11) Vern Humphrey: What you're saying is that religion also follows Michael's Iron Law of Oligarchy ("Who says organization says oligarchy"). Smaller, less powerful churches are more prone to radical approaches than older, more powerful ones. The reason is the larger, more powerful organization seeks to preserve itself -- and therefore enters confrontations only rarely. Smaller organizations have less to lose and are more likely to be strident, militant, and confrontational. Diffuse organizations are like small organizations -- decisions are made by individual congregations.
Feb05/89 20:18
6:12) Jeff Mayo: Your view is essentially correct Vern. There are many instances however, that the larger churches (read more powerful) do produce many radical clergymen who are all the above: strident, militant, and confrontational. The Catholic Church especially, is quick to utilize radical Priests to achieve a goal that might be difficult by contemporary church standards. The Holy See than says they are not in line with doctrine but their acts were not bad enough to get much in the way of punishment. The point of all this is to give the LIC planner food for thought during those times when impact of religion becomes a factor. The reality of smaller organizations is that they are not much of a factor unless they can get the press spotlight. Powerful Churches (even state r religion) have contact and control of the 'masses' (no pun intended) that influence many government decisions.
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Feb06/89 22:12
6:13) Jack Maher: Sounds like a discussion of "Liberation Theology".
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Feb07/89 03:10
6:14) Jeff Mayo: Hey, that's a pretty good term. Perhaps a subheading in areas of interest for LIC planners? Surely this matter deserves consideration in any LIC environment.....
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Feb07/89 22:12
6:15) Jack Maher: What other social considerations should DOD, JCS and the CINC's consider (evaluate) as they formulate national/regional strategies for Low Intensity Conflict? What about ethnic groups within the country? In Nam the 'Yards played a fairly large roll on both sides.
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Feb08/89 07:09
6:16) Vern Humphrey: As did other groups -- such as the Cambodians living in Vietnam, the Chinese (Nungs). What we learned about these ethnic groups is understudied in my opinion -- we made some serious mistakes, such as the Montagyard revolt, where WE won the loyalty of the 'Yards, and they wanted US to take over and run the Viets off.

We seem to think that ethnic and racial strife is a unique curse that only WE have -- but everywhere I've been, I've found such problems, with the only difference being that while we agonize over it and try to cure it, other peoples seem to regard it as natural.
In dealing with minorities, therefore, we need to recognize that we are entering a morass. We probably already have a situation where we are shoring up a corrupt society, and we now meddle with a racist problem as well. And attempts to solve either of those problems are likely to backfire.

Feb10/89 17:55
6:17) Rich Pomager: I understand the problem Vern, but not addressing the ethnic strife will leave a base of discontent. The basic problems usually stem from a couple of areas - language, culture, religion and rightfullaire to the land. Which sets up a catch 22 situation. Regardless of which group you support the other will resent the support. Sounds like the delima we face in a LIC environment.

We have to address ethnic problems/ clashes.
The question is how? Any ideas?

Feb13/89 07:43
6:18) Vern Humphrey: I don't know how. I DO know that transfering their loyalty from the host government to the US is a mistake.

I also know that we have done this on occasion, then left the minorities to swing in the breeze after we pulled out -- which leads me to believe that we probably shouldn't tinker with this problem unless we're sure we won't make it worse.

Feb14/89 17:45
6:19) Rich Pomager: Maybe part of the solution rests with a solid public affairs program - I do not like to use the term psyops. Some how we must work with the legitimate government and destroy the bases of basis that exists. If you can tear down the old prejudices and build on a relationship of good will between all peoples then possible the problem can be solved.

Of course, this is a difficult and time consuming process. A Madison Avenue campaign may be required. An one that attacks all educational groups.

Feb14/89 23:23
6:20) Jeff Mayo: The problem with Public Affairs/Civil Affairs/Psyop programs is that they take tremendous amounts of TIME. Unfortunately, we exist in an era that requires immediate and visible results. The other problem, even with a PA program, is trying to quantify the results so that the program can continue to exist and become more effective.

Feb15/89 09:44
6:21) Vern Humphrey: I favor more brutal and direct methods --
"If you want our support, here's what you gotta do." AND, having
made that clear, ENFORCE it! "The Umpty-umpth regiment ain't
gonna get another bean or cartridge until Colonel Whatzizface is
relieved and brought to trial."

6:22) Jeff Mayo: WHAT! And have the weenies at State going wee-
wee on themselves because we meddled in the internal affairs of a
"sovereign nation". Besides, in many of these client countries
Colonel Whatzizface would have his uncle as the judge and all his
cousins as the jury.

6:23) Vern Humphrey: This is what I call the LIC delimma --
because we shrink from the politically undesirable, we are driven
to attempt the militarily impossible. We lost a war that way --a
war that we could have won in less than two years.

6:24) Jeff Mayo: We, the unwilling-Led by the
unknowing...........Sound familiar?

6:25) Vern Humphrey: Jeff -- we WEREN'T unwilling. I saw an
interview of Westmoreland by William F. Buckley (Mister
Conservative). Buckley brought up one error after another --and
each time Westmoreland said "Well, I didn't like it, but the
President (Johnson) ordered it, and I'm a soldier and have to
obey orders."

Finally even Buckley couldn't take any more and said, "Well,
couldn't you have resigned in protest?"

Westmoreland appeared stunned, and finally said, "Well, I
thought there was an outside chance it would work."

In ARMY WITHOUT WINDOWS there is reproduced a message from the
Chief of Staff, Wheeler, to Westmoreland, which says, in effect,
"I've already given the President the low figures for enemy
strength, and I can't go back and tell him I was wrong. So don't
send me any higher figures."

I think we need another item on this, Jack -- "What moral,
ethical, and professional considerations should the JCS take into
account in planning for LIC?"
6:26) Jack Maher: VERN, CHECK ITEM 15!

6:27) Vern Humphrey: will do

6:28) Jack Maher: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE ON ITEM 6, SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY FORMULATION. WE MUST DETERMINE THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE PEOPLE. IS LIBERATION THEOLOGY A FACTOR? IS THE RELIGION A SOLIDLY HIERARCHICAL (CATHOLIC CHURCH OR LATTER DAY SAINTS), OR IS IT LESS SO (ISLAM)? WE MUST ADDRESS ETHNIC PROBLEMS/CLASHES. TRANSFERRING ETHNIC MINORITY LOYALTY FROM THE HOST NATION TO THE U.S. AS WE DID WITH SOME OF THE 'YARDS IN VIETNAM IS A MISTAKE.

Mar04/89 17:29

Mar06/89 21:08
6:30) Jack Maher: Draft FM 20-100 gives definitions of terrorist leadership, cadre, active, and passive supporters. Ethically or morally can we the U.S. take action against active and passive terrorist supporters? Can we kill them? Or do we just embarrass them in the media if we can.

Mar07/89 07:35
6:31) Vern Humphrey: In general, the mass of people support terrorism just as they support an insurgency -- because they believe they have reason to do so. If we imagine the population as a bell curve, under normal circumstances there will always be an extreme element -- but it will NOT always be violent. In an insurgency or terrorist situation, the entire curve is shifted -- usually for good reason -- to a less satisfied state, and the extreme fringe goes over the line into violent action. The less extreme groups are ALSO shifted -- and these form the various levels of support.

Our aim is to shift the main population group back -- the terrorist fringe may shift with it (as Menachem Begin and the Stern Gang did in '48), or may break off. In the latter case, they are isolated, and may be eradicated.
One more point -- we must carefully define terrorism. I have seen Army manuals that list "terrorist attacks" as a threat against military units. If we call people who attack soldiers on active service as "terrorists" we are creating terrorism (If you have the name, you might as well have the game).

Mar07/89 10:56
6:32) Jerry Thompson: This is a response to item 6:29 (DOD considerations in preparing a strategy (ies) for combating terrorism). That statement implicitly assumes DOD has or should have a prominent role in the national effort. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. Department of State and Department of Justice (FBI) are the lead agencies in this matter. DOD, like every other department, must plan for and execute actions to defend itself (people, equipment, facilities) ie, antiterrorism. Additionally, DOD must make available to the National Command Authority specialized forces for employment in the context of counterterrorism. The questions, as posed, would be apropos for planning an invasion or a combined defensive campaign, etc. but hardly for a terrorism suppression effort. We did not, for instance, bomb Bonn during the RAF's last violent episode or seize Sicily after the Dozier incident. In general, DOD assets are ill suited for counterterrorist purposes. (We saw how effective unobserved naval gun fire was in Lebanon). (Mr Vought - TC/A office)

Mar07/89 19:15
6:33) Jack Maher: Jerry, agree totally with your response at 6:32. I said some of the same things in a later item. In the event that DOD is asked to actively get involved in combatting a particular terrorist event then the question is valid. This brings up one of the internal to DOD issues that, as I recall, came out of the last conference held at Leavenworth on LIC and that is--is combating terrorism a subcategory of LIC in its own right, or would it be more properly included in Peacetime Contingency Operations? I would let those who like to categorize have at it but for purposes here I think it needs to be discussed. I do agree that DOD will seldom if ever have the lead in a combatting terrorism activity.

Mar08/89 07:19
6:34) Vern Humphrey: Given the likelihood of terrorist actions to occur or wind up in surprising locations (example -- the General Dozier kidnapping), I think we have to consider them Peacetime Contingency Operations. I base this on the grounds that we might have to carry out operations in unanticipated areas, where we have little or no forces in place -- or we might be invited at any time to provide assistance to allies or neutral nations for a sudden, one-shot rescue or similar operation.

74
As I signed on at ARMY:ENTRY for this session, I noticed that a new participant from the MI School (ILt ?) was the head of a study group for Military Intelligence planning and development for LIC. Could it be that MANY of the branch/force developers are INDEPENDENTLY forming groups to study and respond to emerging LIC doctrine? Wouldn't it be wise of us to identify where this is occurring and invite a representative from each organization to participate in PROTOCOLIC to give us depth? This effort might also have to effect of assisting coordination of effort. Perhaps the folks on LICNET could give us a list of which agencies are currently so engaged. I think CAC-Leavenworth is the focal point for doctrine and NetOrganizers for LICNET. Your responses:

Related items: 9

4 responses
Jan26/89 21:40
7:1) Mike Graves: When I worked in Cbt Dev at Ft Gordon, there were 2 people in my division that tracked and developed LIC COMM's concepts. My division was called Concepts and Studies. It wouldn't surprise me if most TRADOC Centers and Schools still had somebody identified for LIC issues.

Jan26/89 23:40
7:2) Jack Maher: JEFF, I SENT THE SAME MESSAGE TO LIC PRO (THE FOLKS AT LEAVENWORTH) THAT I SENT TO YOU. IF THEY DON'T ENTER THE NET BEFORE THIS WEEKEND I WILL CALL THEM ON 30 JAN AND ASK THEM TO CHECK THEIR MESSAGE FILE. AGREE! THEY SHOULD BE UP. I INVITED THE LT TOO.

Jan30/89 15:02
7:3) Jeff Mayo: Give COL Jerry Thompson a call. He practically started the thing. He is an Artillery guy, out of 82nd Abn, who wants to make it happen. I don't know how much is on their plates though. I noticed the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is on net. See if CLIC will participate instead of monitoring. They have some real experts there. The big problem I see in all of this is EVERYONE is jumping on the LIC bandwagon and is too busy getting set up with their own shop to care about policy formation. Many players are not accustomed to assisting in policy identification or formation, preferring instead to wait for 'the word' from on high.

Jan30/89 19:41
7:4) Jack Maher: In this subject area the waters seem to be a little muddy. If the efforts on this net are successful perhaps we can assist those on high!
Item 8 19:35 Jan29/89 11 lines 20 responses  
Jack Maher  Prime=6  
ENEMY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY  

WHAT ENEMY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's  
EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW  
INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTER  
INSURGENCY? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:  
POPULAR SUPPORT  
LOGISTICS SUPPORT  
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTROL  
LEVEL OF TRAINING  
SOLDIER PROFICIENCY  
UNITY  
WILL  

Related items: 11  

20 responses  
Feb01/89 20:23  
8:1) Jack Maher: In this one am trying to get at considerations  
like: Does the insurgency have the support of the people. If  
so, are they supported by all the people, only the rich, only the  
poor, poor in the cities, poor in the country, a minority ethnic  
group like indians in South America, etc. Where do they get their  
logistic support from? Food from the people, weapons from? What  
geography do the insurgents control? What geography does the  
country control because of its location in the world i.e. Panama  
and the canal. How well trained are the insurgents? Are they  
trained by foreign nationals? Who? What is their level of  
proficiency? Can they shoot, move and communicate as good as the  
armed forces of their country? Better? Do they have unity of  
command or are they splintered? Do they have the will to go the  
long haul or would they settle for agrarian reforms? Etc., etc.,  
etc.  

Feb02/89 07:26  
8:2) Rich Pomager: One of the key points that must be considered  
is Fear. I have over heard several times by regional experts who  
returned from a visit to a country that the people fear the  
government forces more than they fear the insurgent. The  
implications are far reaching. Fighting the insurgents is  
fighting a friend of the very people we are trying to save (?).  
Consider the following logic.... A friend of my friend is my  
friend, and enemy of my friend is my enemy. How does one win  
support in fighting an insurgency without changing the  
relationship between the government forces and the general  
population?

- - - - -
Feb02/89 08:32
8:3) Vern Humphrey: Equally, remember that the slogan "winning the hearts and minds of the people" is an empty slogan. Armies can lose the hearts and minds of the people, but only the government can win them. And the American Army -- being a foreign army -- can hardly hope to accomplish what an indigenous force cannot do.

In considering LIC, we need to keep in mind what an army can and cannot do. Remember the principle of the objective -- the final objective must not only be decisive, it must also be achievable.

Feb02/89 22:28
8:4) Jack Maher: Unfortunately, in many third world nations the Army is the only visible government representation. The local mayors etc. are not considered the government. Because of this we, the advisor, need to insure that the soldiers and small unit leaders of the host nation army are pressured by the government to treat the people decently. It went both ways in Vietnam and in those areas where the army respected the rights of the people there were fewer insurgent incidents and less support for them.

Feb03/89 07:05
8:5) Vern Humphrey: True -- but again, our actions were defensive in this arena -- we were taking actions to prevent government troops from ascerbating the situations, not positive actions to actually gain support.

Much of what we did was mistakenly launched under the misconception that we could build support through some sort of mystic linkage between military actions and support for political policies. In fact, all we could really do was provide security, provide some manpower and equipment for civic actions, and avoid getting people even more P.O.ed at the army than before.

In many cases, we attempted what we weren't qualified to do -- and some things that we were qualified to do (such as MEDCAPS) suffered because the people doing it were agents of the Army, not of the civilian government.

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78
Feb03/89 12:54
8:6) Jeff Mayo: Within your stated definition of LIC, there are more components to addressing LIC issues than just military. It might be helpful to identify which things cannot be done at all by military organizations, which we GI types can assist in, and those totally within our purview. The next step is to find where the cusp is when responsibility shifts partially or totally to us in all the issues thus identified. Then create a list of tasks and subtasks that will need to be carried out before, during, and after each changeover; along with the resources needed and funding required to maintain continuity of effort. Of course this presupposes that our own political system will steer a straight course, something never before experienced, and the military will not come off looking like buffoons trying to adjust. This LIC stuff is going to require some VERY FLEXIBLE soldiers, at ALL levels; something we are not currently teaching or requiring.

Feb03/89 14:13
8:7) Vern Humphrey: Within this framework, Northern Ireland is a perfect case study. BEFORE the British Army entered the picture, the IRA was a small group of old men, who had officially abandoned "military action." (and had sold most of their weapons to Welsh Nationalists).

NOW the IRA is a hard core group of young men, with sufficient support from the population to (in the opinion of the British Army) carry on operations indefinitely. They have the technology to manufacture some of the most sophisticated weapons (impact grenades, spigot mortars, electronic detonators) of any insurgency in history.

They went from almost zero to their current capabilities by using the British Army. As one observer said, "the British Army must love the IRA -- after all, they CREATED the IRA."

Historical aside -- the OLD IRA (which won the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1922) was created in the SAME way -- as a backlash over the British Army's mishandling of the (unpopular and unsupported) Easter Uprising of 1916.

Feb05/89 20:27
8:8) Jeff Mayo: Remember though, HM government gave the British Army a mandate to take MILITARY ACTION. Had the concept of LIC been established, then the government might have muted their response, used some political tactics, AND had military thinkers who understood the application of force in an insurgency........
Feb06/89 07:06
8:9) Vern Humphrey: Precisely. The point, I think, is that Northern Ireland shows how NOT to do it. For example, to open the "no go" areas (which were ghettos that had been barricaded in self-defense -- since the minority had virtually no weapons, and those attacking the ghettos had about 100,000 guns issued by the government), the army launched Operation Motorman -- an amphibious landing, with tanks!

Of course their turrets were reversed, and they were used only as armored bulldozers -- but they WERE tanks.

Again in a historical aside, most Psyops types recognize "Kevin Barry" as a great propaganda coup -- a song that mobilized people in support of the war of independence. The parallel coming from Operation Motorman was "The Men Behind the Wire" -- it's deja vu all over again!

Feb10/89 18:06
8:10) Rich Pomager: I need to think about these comments. There is a distinction between the IRA activity, the middle east Terrorism and insurgencies in third world countries. If we try to tie all these together and handle as one LIC we begin to mix oranges, grapefruits and tangerines. Alike in many respects but uniquely different in others. Thus, the approach must be tailored to counter each.

Over coming generations of inbred hatred requires one course of actions. Overcoming the conditions of poverty and abuse require another course of action.

I am considering the middle east incident as an insurgency war and not terrorist acts. The same is true for the IRA actions.

Feb13/89 07:45
8:11) Vern Humphrey: I agree that the situation in Northern Ireland is different (and probably more complex) than those in other areas where lines are more clearly drawn. If there is a parallel, it's probably with the the Intefadeh.

Feb26/89 20:44
HOW WELL ARE THEY EQUIPPED? DO THEY HAVE UNITY OF COMMAND OR ARE THEY SPLINTERED? DO THEY HAVE THE WILL TO GO THE LONG HAUL? IN MANY INSURGENCIES, PEOPLE FEAR THE GOVERNMENT MORE THAN THEY FEAR THE INSURGENTS. ARMIES CAN LOSE THE HEARTS AND MINDS BUT ONLY THE GOVERNMENT CAN WIN THEM. WE MUST KEEP IN MIND WHAT AN ARMY CAN OR CAN NOT DO. UNFORTUNATELY, IN MANY THIRD WORLD NATIONS THE ARMY IS THE ONLY VISIBLE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION. WE NEED TO INSURE THAT THE HOST NATION SOLDIERS AND SMALL UNIT LEADERS TREAT THE CITIZENS DECENTLY. OVERCOMING GENERATIONS OF INBRED HATRED (NORTHERN IRELAND) REQUIRES ONE COURSE OF ACTION. OVERCOMING THE CONDITIONS OF POVERTY AND ABUSE (EL SALVADOR) REQUIRES A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION.

Mar01/89 07:06
8:13) Rich Pomager: Jack, it would appear that if the questions presented above were asked in a systematic manner, then we could develop the total strategy to counter the appropriate group leaning to the rebels. This is different than establishing a plan to defeat the rebels. The latter implies a military solution whereas the former represents an integrated approach across the full spectrum of economic, social, political and military needs.

Mar01/89 11:19
8:14) Vern Humphrey: Rich, I agree. An army cannot defeat an insurgency -- unless you're willing to follow the Roman approach -- "They create a desert and call it peace."

An army CAN defeat insurgent units, provide security, and other services -- which -- if integrated into a full spectrum approach -- can contribute to success. BUT if we don't START with an integrated approach, we won't arrive at an integrated solution -- which is one of the key lessons learned from Vietnam: We didn't have an integrated strategy (or any strategy at all).

Mar04/89 06:34
8:15) Rich Pomager: Jack and Vern, I am not suggesting that this group develop the question list I believe that they may be the solution to coming up with a total approach to solving the different LIC environments. So, the LIC experts of the Army and State Department need to work that issue. Actually, I meant to say Defense and State.

Mar04/89 17:37
8:16) Jack Maher: WHAT TERRORIST FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE: POPULAR SUPPORT LOGISTICS SUPPORT LEVEL OF TRAINING PROFICIENCY UNITY WILL OBJECTIVES POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL TARGET(S) TACTICS
8:17) Jack Maher: Who supports them? Where do they get their weapons and plastique and money for that matter. Are they well trained and by who? Does the group have unity or are they splintered? Do they have the will to go for the long haul--the IRA might be an example of a group that has the will to go the long haul. What are their objectives? Do they want the British to leave Northern Ireland or a book to be taken out of print or are they just looking to enhance their reputation internationally? What type of targets does a particular terrorist group go after. Most nonstate sponsored groups only go after a few very specific targets and only use a few very specific set of tactics. In terms of tactics they are not trained across a broad spectrum of terrorist tactics but usually concentrate on one to three in which they have expertise and can get the supplies.

8:18) Vern Humphrey: The first point should be the aim of the terrorist group. In general, Nationalist organizations tend to be insurgencies, not pure terrorists. Such groups are amenable to "playing by the rules" -- they seek to take over the country, not to destroy it. In general, such groups are best dealt with by addressing the overall concerns of their supporters, and by establishing rules that both sides follow.

Nationalist organizations usually slip into terrorism because of individual acts (often motivated by revenge), coupled with the loose organization necessitated by their insurgent status. It's difficult to control small cells that -- by their very nature -- are designed for independent action. Nevertheless, experience indicates that such groups can influenced to move into legitimate insurgency tactics, and away from terrorism.

State sponsored groups are "free" organizations -- their limits are only those their sponsors accept -- and the reason for state sponsorship in the first place is for the sponsor to avoid the consequences of their actions. They are therefore limited only to the extent that the sponsor choses.
Mar08/89 10:03
8:19) Rich Pomager: What about religious fanatics who engage in terrorism? That's another consideration and may be the most difficult to eradicate.

I am convinced that we should fight terrorism with covert actions. The key is a successful intel operation and then elimination of the leadership and cadre structure to include the individuals providing support. I realize that such actions can easily run away with itself and that we can destroy the moral basis of our operations and purpose. Thus, only a trusted and morally strong individual must be selected to lead such an organization. The leader of such a group should be civilian.

Recognition of the differences between terrorist groups and their structure becomes important since each must be defeat/defused in a different manner. Problems such as the IRA and PLO are extremely difficult and reduction of effectiveness may be the best one could hope for.

Mar08/89 12:07
8:20) Vern Humphrey: Religious fanatics still fall into one of three categories --

Nationalists -- that is, with support from some identifiable segment of the population, and therefore susceptible to a rule-based system (i.e., fight fair, Guys -- no hitting below the belt or hijacking airliners).

State-sponsored -- that is, an instrument for clandestine projection of power.

Nihilists -- mad dogs WITHOUT real support (although some states may give aid to nihilists in order to cause trouble for other states).

To deal with nationalists, deal with the population from which they spring. Follow the most sophisticated document on insurgency ever written -- the American Declaration of Independence -- where it says "experience hath shewn that mankind is inclined to suffer when evils are sufferable." Moves in the direction of alleviating their grievances to the extent where they are sufferable.

Do deal with state sponsored terrorists, focus on the sponsor.

To deal with nihilists -- use police methods.
WHAT FRIENDLY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTER-INSURGENCY? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:

- TYPES OF UNITS REQUIRED
- NUMBERS OF UNITS OR SOLDIERS REQUIRED
- LOGISTICS
- BASING
- STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS

Related items: 10

21 responses
Feb06/89 22:18

9:1) Jack Maher: In this item I'm combining friendly force considerations of U.S. forces and host nation forces. Need to think about what capabilities the host nation forces have regards training, will etc. and what kind of and how much help they need from our forces in the area of training and equipment to do their job properly i.e. eliminate the insurgents. If we are considering an object nation then we need to take a look at the same areas as they apply to the insurgents (our allies).

Feb07/89 07:08

9:2) Vern Humphrey: This is a complex question -- almost all host nations will need training, but good training and employment implies an Advisor system (politically difficult, given the comparison with Vietnam). Yet a well-trained and run advisor system does several things for you.

1. It gives you a much clearer picture of the Host Nation military capability.

2. It permits much better US-Host Nation tactical and operational cooperation.

3. It inhibits practices like graft (the advisors control the supply system), torture (imbarassing if an advisor is on the spot), and so on.

In fact, I would say from experience that if you don't have advisors on the ground, down to battalion level, you'll have a hard time either assessing real host nation needs, or implementing them.
Feb07/89 22:17
9:3) Jack Maher: In our recent efforts in Honduras the country team was limited by Congress to 55 military. That means that if one more is inbound then one better be on the plane outbound. How do we get to battalion level with constraints like that. How do we convince Congress that we need to be involved at Battalion level. They will think Vietnam and say NO!. If we have to work within the 55 limit in another LIC situation, how do we do it and get the same or close to the same results as we achieved in Vietnam?

Feb08/89 07:14
9:4) Vern Humphrey: I think we need to attack the problem from both ends. We need to develop some system where our 55 people can spend as much time on the ground as possible -- and give them the power to withhold supplies in cases of corruption or inefficiency. At the same time, we need to explain to congress that it's crazy to sink money into an undertaking where you have limited accountability.

This isn't new -- I remember when it wasn't politically acceptable for advisors to get killed. So we had orders that we could only go out on operations of company level or higher -- and then only if the battalion commander went along. Try convincing your counterpart that he needs to put out squad-sized ambushes when he KNOWS your government thinks it's too dangerous for YOU to participate in such ambushes!

Feb10/89 18:13
9:5) Rich Pomager: Training of host nation forces must include Nation building forces. There are limitations on training of Judicial personnel, Administrative and Enforcement folks. These issues must be worked. But sanitations systems. medical systems, constructions systems all need to be included. What about public relations personnel, do not want to call them psyops because they should not have that ,mission.

Feb15/89 22:13
9:6) Steve Whitworth: This seems to assume that the host nation forces are on your side. May not be true using Panama as an example.

Feb21/89 07:08
9:7) Rich Pomager: Yours is a good point but is it applicable at this point. Let's work the issue as though the government is pro US support and it is legitimate. I would suggest that the Panama situation is entirely a different issue within the LIC environment and should be discussed separately later in this discussion item.
Feb22/89 03:05
9:8) Jeff Mayo: My guess is that EACH LIC situation will bring enough disparate issues into its scenario so as to make them ALL 'special' in some respect(s). Instead of trying to formulate tactics whilst splitting hairs, maybe we should look into basic policy issues that apply across the board (if indeed there is enough latitude to do so within such a broad spectrum) in formulation of national policy issues and the Army's responses (nay DOD's responses) to these broad issues. In fact, even "working an issue" while forming policy AND strategy could be harmful by narrowing the available responses. Low Intensity Conflict will prove to be so multi-faceted an entity that each action will exist almost solely within its context for that particular LIC.

Feb22/89 07:22
9:9) Vern Humphrey: Our first avenue of attack seems to ask "What is the friendly force supposed to DO?" Examples might be provide local security, provide population and resources control, conduct operations against main force units, build roads and public works, etc. What we have to do is first define the goals, then the objectives, then the tasks, and finally the force that will carry out the tasks.

Feb23/89 07:19
9:10) Rich Pomager: From the material I have seen, our position is that the friendly forces will fight the insurgent and we shall support without direct involvement. All of the tasks you described above Vern meet that criteria. US military forces attend to their own internal security. Now that that part of the equation is established, the hard part begins in supporting the friendlies on the tactical side as well as insuring the integration of the social, economic, human rights and politicals programs with the military effort.

Feb23/89 08:15
9:11) Vern Humphrey: Let me suggest that in many insurgencies, a key asset is transportation. Most Third World nations are strangled by a poor transportation net (rail, road, airfields, etc.) and have few transportation assets (trucks, trains, etc.) By improving the transportation system, you can:

1. Rapidly move and mass military forces (and deny the enemy the same facility if you ACTUALLY control the transportation system).

2. Move and mass other assets -- such as construction crews and building materials, MEDCAPs, etc.
3. Promote improved quality of life through the economic results of improved transportation.

I would therefore consider transportation (transportation and aircraft units, construction engineers, etc.) -- together with transportation security forces -- as a key factor in considering friendly forces in LIC. (This isn't a total answer, and isn't meant to be -- it's just a single element that's often overlooked.)

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Feb26/89 20:45
9:12) Jack Maher: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE ON ITEM 9, FRIENDLY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY FORMULATION. NEED TO THINK ABOUT HOST NATION FORCE CAPABILITIES AS REGARDS TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, WILL, ETC. TRAINING OF HOST NATION PERSONNEL MUST INCLUDE NATION BUILDING TRAINING IN AREAS SUCH AS SANITATION, MEDICINE, CONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC RELATIONS, ETC.

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Mar01/89 07:09
9:13) Rich Pomager: Any consideration of host nation forces must include the relationship the forces have with the civilian population. The government can not win the hearts and minds of the population, if the foot soldier, who represents the government, is abusing the people or their property. The old we had to destroy the houses to save the village routine.

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Mar01/89 11:21
9:14) Vern Humphrey: Rich -- that's not what happened. The NEWSMAN said "So you had to destroy the village to save it." and the major said, "we're drawing fire. Let's get the hell down from here." -- just a historical footnote.

But of course you're right. An Army cannot WIN hearts and minds -- but it can sure as hell LOSE them.

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Mar02/89 03:02
9:15) Jeff Mayo: In the vein of your last comments, there is an article in FOREIGN POLICY (Quarterly-Number 71-Winter 1988-89) titled "The Military Obstacle to Latin Democracy" which you might want to read. It is a litany of all the 'sins' the military on Latin America have committed—very informative.

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Mar02/89 06:56
9:16) Vern Humphrey: Yes. In fact, in most of the world, the military is not an instrument of defense from foreign invasion, it is an instrument of domestic oppression.
Mar04/89 17:38
9:17) Jack Maher: WHAT FRIENDLY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE: COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES TYPES OF UNITS REQUIRED LOGISTICS BASING LEGAL SPECIAL TRAINING/REHERSALS

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Mar06/89 21:22
9:18) Jack Maher: Which agency within our government has the lead on a particular case? For hijacking it is the FAA. For drug related terrorism it would probably be DEA. It is important that any agency that has any information needs to be coordinated with, and we have to realize that the military will probably never have the lead in combating terrorism activities. This is not to say that we won't be involved in taking those security precautions that we need to take for prevention. If we are asked to take an active role in combating terrorism then only a few specially trained units would be involved and then we would have to consider things like logistics, basing or overflight rights, international law, and special training or rehersals that might be required.

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Mar08/89 10:25
9:19) Rich Pomager: For domestic terrorism, the FBI has the lead and should retain the lead. Unless the US is approaching a state of chaos, the military should not be involved.

For international response to terrorism, several factors apply.

- Economy of force. We used the smallest force possible to accomplish the objective. Jointness applies in terms of efficiency, nor to preclude service rivalries.
- The US force acts alone. There should be no attempt to conduct a combined operation. The coordination and training requirements require time and jeopardize security.
- Where host nation or allied forces can play a role it should be in a supporting or diversionary role. No direct relationship with the actual incident.
- Speed or timeliness. Any terrorist act must be responded to in kind immediately after the terrorist incident. This indicates intent and strength of coviction.

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88
Mar08/89 12:10
9:20) Vern Humphrey: All of which requires human intelligence assets -- which are sadly lacking these days.

I'm not sure economy of force applies here -- at the critical point, the principle to use is Mass. When you use force, use overwhelming force. As one critic of the Teheran Raid put it, "These operations are so risky there is no sense in handicapping yourself by not using enough force."

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Mar10/89 07:03
9:21) Rich Pomager: We are not in disagreement on this. My concern is security. We use sufficient force to succeed. There should be no attempt to over kill the objective as mass in covert operations can jeopardizes security and timeliness.
WHAT GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S E
EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTER-INSURGENCY? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:

TERRAIN
LOC's ETC. INFLUENCED BY HOST/OBJECT NATION LAND MASS

Feb07/89 03:24
10:1) Jeff Mayo: All TACTICAL responses will involve geographical considerations; just as the METT formula requires. Since LIC is generally viewed as multi-dimensional, the implication is STRATEGIC responses would not be quite as impacted in this matter. That is not to say geography will play no part, rather that our general military thinking vis-a-vis geography and tactics need to be tempered with understanding of the role of LIC and its many faceted character.

Feb07/89 22:26
10:2) Jack Maher: Sometimes geographical considerations drive the train at the strategic level. As an example, we have been urging Japan to expand their self defense ring to a radius of 1000 nautical miles. The reason for this is to insure that the critical sea lines of communications southwest of Japan remain open to commerce for Japan, the Philippines, Korea, etc. How much havoc would it cause if an unfriendly nation occupied Gibraltar and used it to control the approaches to the Med? Each nation normally has key geography within their country and under their control. Air routes are included in this too. Understand METT is an important consideration too. Trying to get at both here plus things like who (enemy or friendly) controls the agricultural areas? The key land lines of communication (Route 4 in Nam)? What about key natural resources—who controls the area they are in? How important to the U.S. are those natural resources?

Feb10/89 18:17
10:3) Rich Pomager: Other than for military operations, the only geographical consideration we need to be concerned about would be a border dispute which we could become involved. Some pretty fancy maneuvering could drag old Uncle in on an innocent issue and all of a sudden we are supporting one side of a border dispute. Now the LIC support really becomes difficult.
Feb26/89 20:46
10:4) Jack Maher: THIS REPRESENTS A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE ON ITEM 10, GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY FORMULATION. WHAT LAND, SEA AND AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION DOES THE HOST/OBJECT NATION CONTROL OR INFLUENCE? THIS IS A STRATEGIC OR OPERATIONAL LEVEL CONSIDERATION. TERRAIN IN THE METTT FORMULA IS IMPORTANT AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL. WE NEED TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT BORDER DISPUTES WHEREIN WE COULD BECOME INVOLVED BECAUSE OF OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE HOST NATION.

Mar04/89 17:39
WHAT HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:

HAS INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN HOST/OBJECT NATION BEFORE? LESSONS LEARNED? HISTORICALLY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT? HISTORICALLY MILITARY GOVERNMENT?

5 responses
Feb09/89 21:33
11:1) Jack Maher: What I'm trying to get to here is what in the host/object nations history should be taken into consideration when developing LIC strategies. Any ideas?

Feb10/89 07:05
11:2) Vern Humphrey: In most Third World nations a critical historical factor is the power alignment. For example, in Nicaragua there have been "liberal" (Leon) and "conservative" power centers (Managua) for well over a century and a half. The identification of these power centers, their membership, and their current relations are of critical importance.

Feb10/89 08:10
11:3) A-af Clic: A meaningful response to this and your other items requires considerable study and analysis and cannot be given off the top of one's head. One source you might wish to explore is the CASCON project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies. CASCON stands for Computer-Aided System for Analysis of Local Conflicts and was developed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield. The latest version, CASCON III, contains 66 post-World War II local conflicts which can be compared and analyzed against each other or against current situations. More information about this technique can be obtained from Controlling Small Wars by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss (Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); "Computers and Policy-Making: The CASCON Experiment" by Bloomfield and Robert C. Beattie (Journal of Conflict Resolution, Spring 1971); and "Computerizing Conflicts," (Foreign Service Journal, June, 1988). Requests for permission to use CASCON III should be addressed to CASCON Project, ATTN: Mr. Robert Davine, MIT Center for International Studies, Room E38-664, 292 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. Hope this information helps in your study.
Feb26/89 20:47

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Mar04/89 17:40
INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY

WHAT INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY?

Related items: 13

14 responses
Feb09/89 21:35
12:1) Jack Maher: Expect this to cover the full gamut from strategic thru tactical intel from any source. How do we get it? Who do we share it with? What do we do with it?

Feb10/89 07:08
12:2) Vern Humphrey: The most critical intelligence is often combat intelligence -- information built up by units in the field. This information is often distorted, not properly disseminated, or ignored. Capturing the information in the first place often requires having Americans on the ground. Analyzing the information is often difficult, since it has no visible manifestation (unlike aerial and satellite photography), can be vague and contradictory (unlike SIGINT) -- and it's our greatest weakness.

Feb26/89 20:48
12:3) Jack Maher: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE ON ITEM 12, INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY FORMULATION. NEED TO ESTABLISH POLICY FOR SHARING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. NEED TO DEVELOP AN EXTENSIVE HUMINT NET. NEED TO EXPEDITE THE FLOW OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE. NEED A JOINT FUSION CENTER TO PUT IT ALL TOGETHER AND USE IT EFFECTIVELY.

Mar04/89 17:41
12:5) Rich Pomager: The police forces of ost nations are tied together through an intel exchange program. This works reasonably well for some crimes, but not for all. This is especially true when the passing of information may not be in the best interest of the police officials themselves. We can not expect a police official to release information that may jeopardize him personally or his family. In some situations, the security forces of a troubled area are compromised by agents of the terrorist so that any information passed is reported to the terrorist for retaliation. Look around the world at the different situations and try to understand how a police official would exchange information in; the middle east, Libya, The Americas, Iran, and Northern Ireland. Either Terrorist, the leadership the drug lords of ethnic and religious fervor act to restrain the police forces.

12:6) Vern Humphrey: In general, the intelligence we need is the sort of thing we lack -- HUMINT. And, as Rich points out, the compromised condition of most police forces means we must be very careful in using anything they give us, or in giving them anything that might leak back and compromise the source.

I'm afraid we need an independent source of human intelligence. That's a huge stumbling block.

12:7) Rich Pomager: Disagree Vern. We can work with the host nation police forces recognizing that they may be passing tainted information. You just have to be better at the game then they are. One can easily set another up using the informant properly. It is all a matter of using the informant properly. Sometimes you tell the whole story, and sometimes you don't. Then again there are times you only tell part of the story.

12:8) Vern Humphrey: Except that we are naive -- as a people. And the people we operate with are typically young and unsophisticated. If we had 50 year old narcotics and vice cops, we could do that. But harking back to how much we didn't understand about corruption, bribery, double dealing, etc., in Vietnam -- I doubt the Armed Forces ability to work effectively in a tainted atmosphere. If we are to do it, we need thorough training --training designed to instil cynicism and distrust, training to make us as convoluted and byzantine as the opposition -- AND we need long-term assignments. To be effective in this sort of work, you need to hold the same job for several years. We'd have to scrap our short tour policy.
12:9) Dennis Crumley: Vern Humphrey has hit on some keys to success but I'd suggest it might not be all that demanding to do the training he says all that hard to do the training he suggests. It might just be that we have to find ways to reward those who come by cynicism and distrust naturally. By doing that we may find there are quite a few more out there who have been suppressing their "skills" in these areas. The trick here, as in all other areas of training would be to harness those "skills" for use against the right targets.

12:10) Rich Pomager: How about another thought. Maybe the solution is not long term assignment but Short tours (6 months) by dedicated teams. The key here would be the overlap period of learning the area the mission and the contacts. The longer one stays in the country/environment the greater the possibility of becoming tainted. There is a definite loss of energy when a team is replaced however, this may be offset by remaining unbiased in addressing the problem. The details can be workout. It may be necessary to leave a couple of key individuals in place for continuity. These individuals should be in contact with the leadership and not the members of the new team. Trust is hard to build and a new guy mixed with a team can tear it apart.

12:11) Vern Humphrey: I think the evidence we have all points toward longer tours. We did not do well in Vietnam with six-months tours (which Special Forces used during the early years) -- and a tour in Korea today will convince anyone how much turbulence and amateurism is caused by short tours.

I would suggest that you are right about key personnel, though. An 18-month tour for most players would be sufficient, while key personnel probably ought to make it at least three years -- but I don't want to degenerate into a discussion on how long is long enough.

We also ought to relook our management style. Key slots should have plenty of overlap, and the commander in country should be able to adjust tour lengths as needed to prevent excessive turbulence -- either by speeding up replacements or stretching key personnel.
Rich Pomager: Vern, generally I agree with a long tour concept and definitely Korea could use longer tours. But we need to get families over there to support the soldier.

My thought here is that a small team to do special work be rotated in and out. This is a special team with special qualifications. A team that is independent normally of the host nation and operates on information with little coordination with the local authorities. Once they have done enough damage to the drug or terrorist group we take them out. When we consider the possibilities for these teams we must look at the problem with totally new insights. Original thought enters here.

Vern Humphrey: We really do have a problem with family separation. I don't have an answer for that -- maybe frequent (monthly?) visits home might help. I know the damage long separations do to families.

But the basic problem is that war (and other aspects of LIC short of war) is a business for professionals. And nobody who spends only six months on the job can be called a professional. You have only to look around and see the damage caused by turbulence in routine, peacetime jobs.

If we are talking about unilateral direct action -- and in and out raid, then the RAIDERS could come from the US, and be back home in a matter of days.

But the guys who gather the on-the-ground intelligence (which we'll have to have if we're operating without host nation support) will have to be pros who STAY -- long term men.

I'm almost tempted to suggest we try recruiting Maryknoll priests and nuns -- when they go on a mission they stay, live and die, and are buried there.

Vern Humphrey: Good points Vern and some considerations I did not think about. Somewhere between your ideas and mine may rest an answer.

I agree on the separation issue, I just learned that the military police units currently rotating to Panama are now rotating back about every 18 months. That not bad until one considers all the other field time required in the training cycle. That destroys home life.
WHAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) IN THE AREA OF INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY? SO FAR WE HAVE DISCUSSED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, ENEMY FORCE, FRIENDLY FORCE, GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, AND INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS.

9 responses
Feb09/89 21:38
13:1) Jack Maher: I ain't no expert in this area but most of you on the net are. What have I missed that the big boys should consider when formulating strategies for insurgency/counterinsurgency?

Feb10/89 18:33
13:2) Rich Pomager: The two issues/considerations we need to consider is legislative and Executive support and Sustainment for a LIC operation. No sense getting involved and doing half a job. We need commitment from the beginning. We need an agreement from Congress that regardless of the balance of Congress or change in administration, the LIC support will be continued.

That places a big requirement on us. Our responsibility is to provide a realistic assessment of just what we can do and how much it will cost. Included in this are the key decision points for reassessment. I would think these would be upfront public decision points. Now letting the insurgent know what our decision points are gives him an advantage since he now has the key to breaking off our support. On the other hand The government we are supporting knows the conditions for our support. He can choose to comply with these conditions or render his government over to another. This may be a method of controlling corruption as well.

At the very least we will have said up front....Here's how we are going to play ball.

Feb26/89 20:49
13:4) Jack Maher: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE ON ITEM 13, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY FORMULATION. WE MUST HAVE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH SUPPORT FOR AND SUSTAINMENT OF INSURGENCY/ COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. WE NEED THIS COMMITMENT FROM THE BEGINNING AND FOR THE DURATION.
Mar04/89 17:41
13:5) Jack Maher: WHAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM? SO FAR WE HAVE DISCUSSED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, TERRORIST GROUP, FRIENDLY FORCE, GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, AND INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS.

Mar07/89 03:29
13:6) Jeff Mayo: From a response I made earlier on LICNET: Throughout the discussion of LIC policies and issues I participate in both here and LICNET, I keep being reminded that (as in any successful insurgency) the support OF THE PEOPLE is an absolute necessity BEFORE embarking on any course in LIC. It is also woefully apparent that the American people have little or no idea what LIC is or how it fits into our national strategy. Terrorism, being a manifestation of LIC, would be a great place to start a PUBLIC EDUCATION campaign into the importance of LIC. Without support of the populace (and its attendant politicians) any long-term effort is bound to fail. The FIRST consideration DOD/JCS/CINC's should make is an evaluation to the mood of the people and methods to engender support. Since time is a factor in individual scenarios, a general education program stressing the importance of LIC to US security and interest is called for NOW.

Mar07/89 07:49
13:7) Vern Humphrey: I am not sure that terrorism can be countered by education -- there are lots of people shouting about "terrorism" and making good money in the process. One of the ways terrorism "works" is that it drives nations into a panic and they adopt measures that are worse than the terrorist attacks. We see England, for example, abolishing trial by jury, abolishing the right against self-incrimination, and instituting censorship in peacetime. In Israel, we see a democracy taking actions that if taken in the US would bring down the government (imagine the President urging the Army to "break the bones" of civil rights marchers).

If we are to have education, it should be real education -- not the sort of panicky, knee-jerk reactions we have seen to date. And the actions we take must be to preserve, not destroy or undermine, democracy.
Mar07/89 20:50
13:8) Jeff Mayo: Exactly Vern!!!!!! Terrorism cannot be countered by 'education' alone. The thrust of 13:6 was to urge education of OUR population as to the ramifications of LIC (and terrorism-by extension) INSTEAD of adopting panic approaches when an event occurs. One sure way to loose the war will be to react with our national gut instead of our well educated (if we start now!) head. The American people will accept many things of given a reasonable chance to understand the issues and choices that we must make. The 'bell curve' you spoke of in an earlier response applies to our population as well. We might as well start moving it in the proper direction now.
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Mar08/89 07:22
13:9) Vern Humphrey: Agree -- but we need to ensure that people understand that drunk drivers are more of a real threat than terrorists. We don't want to stampede the American people into throwing out the constitution. To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, "those who give up freedom to get security will have neither."
SEVERAL FOLKS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE LIC WARFIGHTING SEMINAR THAT TOOK PLACE AT LEAVENWORTH, 02-03 FEB. HERE'S MY REPORT. SOME OTHER FOLKS MAY NOT HAVE SEEN IT ALL THIS WAY. THE SEMINAR WAS RUN BY TRADOC DCSDOC AND THE CLIC PREPARED AND PRESENTED THE PROGRAM. HERE GOES...

ATZL-SWJ-CLP

10 February 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Warfighting Seminar VIII

1. Purpose. To provide information of the purpose, conduct and outcomes of Warfighting Seminar VIII (LIC), 02-03 Feb 89.

2. Discussion.

   a. TRADOC Warfighting Seminars are quarterly seminars hosted by CG, TRADOC for the benefit of the TRADOC leadership. Issues which impact on the doctrine, training, force structure, and materiel of the future Army are discussed. A focus topic is selected for each seminar.

   b. WFSVIII was focused on LIC. It was coordinated by TRADOC DCSDOC and the program was presented by the A/AF CLIC.

   c. Because of the interdepartmental/interagency nature of the subject matter a number of outside participants were invited. These included: Hon John Marsh, SecArmy; Amb Charles Whitehouse, ASD-SO/LIC; GEN James Lindsay, CINCSOCOM; GEN (ret) Paul Gorman; LTG John Foss, DCSOPS; Mr Charles Gutensohn, DEA; MG Bernard Loeffke, CG USARSO; and others.

   d. In general, the agenda was an examination of each of the four categories of military operations in LIC: insurgency and counterinsurgency; combatting terrorism; peacekeeping operations; and, peacetime contingency operations. Additional focus topics included presentations on chemical operations, experiences from El Salvador and SOUTHCOM, and the current state and expected evolution of Army involvement in drug interdiction operations.

   e. A major issue which was aired without resolution was, "Should the use of US combat forces in a combat role in support of counterinsurgency be included in our doctrine?"
(1) The DCSOPS position was that it should not, and that is the basis for his objections to approving the doctrine currently before him (FM 100-20/AFM 2-20). His rationale is that:

The proper role for US forces in counterinsurgency operations is in "Support" of the host nation, using CS and CSS assets. When US combat forces are employed, it is impossible for the US to remain in a supporting role.

(2) There was a solid consensus among participants that it should be included. Their rationale was:

(a) Policymakers have, historically, been unconstrained by the presence or absence of capabilities. However undesirable this sort of operation might be, it remains an option which policymakers have elected to pursue in the past and which they may reasonably be expected to pursue in the future. We are, therefore, obligated to provide some guidance for its execution.

(b) To omit the discussion of this option, or to renounce it, abandons a portion of the conflict environment to our enemies without contest. "The United States should never renounce any use of its combat force."

(c) The FM/AFM addresses this topic with appropriate warnings of the hazards, and cautions as to possible outcomes, and still provides constructive guidance how this difficult mission might be accomplished (best of bad choices). It is the first doctrine to do this.

f. Challenges for planners were discussed only peripherally. There was no specific discussion of joint planning requirements or of current approaches to planning which exist in some theaters (SOUTHCOM and PACOM).

3. CONCLUSIONS. (I am paraphrasing and inserting my own. The CG's summary should be out within a week/10 days).

a. LIC is only one of many pressures on Army force structure at the present time. Budget constraints, INF, conventional stability talks, burden-sharing, etc all combine to produce an environment ripe for change. More importantly, it is an environment in which the Army is in danger of being driven to change by outside forces, rather that changing to adapt along lines shaped by its own concepts of roles, missions, etc. An indication that innovative approaches are required. Also, an indication that concepts of roles and missions must change as well.
b. Drugs will get bigger.

c. There is a need for serious approaches to combat developments for LIC. In particular, we will have to resolve the force structure requirements in full consideration of the pressures noted above. There may be some advantage in this, though it can not be easy.

DISTRIBUTION: GERALD B. THOMPSON 
LTC, SF 
Chief, LIC Proponency Office 

SPECIAL LICNET 
PROTOLIC net 

6 responses 
Feb19/89 16:51 
14:1) Rich Pomager: Gerry, If the DCSOPS does not want combat forces included in LIC operations then what does he have in mind for those situations in which warriors are required. The second part of that question is what does he intend to call these little operations if not contingency operations under the LIC umbrella? 

Mar30/89 21:14 
14:2) Jack Maher: 
The following was sent to me by message from Jerry Thompson at LIC Pro. I am taking the liberty to share it because it captures most of what we have talked about in general terms and states it in a concise form. 

MISSION #1 - CONDUCT ASSESSMENT 

TASK #1-A: ANALYZE THE NATURE OF THE SOCIETY.*
TASK #1-B: ANALYZE THE NATURE OF THE INTERNAL THREAT.*
TASK #1-C: ANALYZE THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE.*

*SUBTASKS TO BE TAKEN FROM FM 100-20/AFM 2-20 (FINAL DRAFT)

APPENDIX C - INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY ANALYSIS.
TASK #1-D: ANALYZE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE.
1-D-1: ANALYZE US OBJECTIVES.
1-D-2: ANALYZE US RESTRICTIONS/CONSTRAINTS.
1-D-3: ANALYZE US RESOURCES AVAILABLE.
1-D-4: ANALYZE US STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES.
TASK #1-E: ANALYZE "THIRD PARTY" INFLUENCES AND ACTIONS.
1-E-1: DETERMINE INTERESTED "THIRD PARTIES."
1-E-2: ANALYZE "THIRD PARTY" OBJECTIVES.
1-E-3: ANALYZE "THIRD PARTY" RESTRICTIONS/CONSTRAINTS.
1-E-4: ANALYZE "THIRD PARTY" RESOURCES AVAILABLE.
1-E-5: ANALYZE "THIRD PARTY" STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES.

MISSION #2 - CONDUCT PLANNING

TASK #2-A: DETERMINE AIM. (STRATEGIC/POLICY LINKAGE)

Mar30/89 21:14
14:3) Jack Maher:

2-A-1: IDENTIFY APPROVING AUTHORITY.
2-A-2: ANALYZE GUIDANCE AND DERIVE AIM STATEMENT.
2-A-4: ANALYZE ONGOING PROGRAMS.
2-A-5: DETERMINE THE CONTRIBUTION/DETRACTION OF ONGOING PROGRAMS TO THE AIM.

TASK #2-B: DETERMINE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS.
2-B-2: RANK THESE GOALS IN PRIORITY RELATIVE TO THE AIM.
2-B-3: DEVELOP MID-TERM AND SHORT-TERM GOALS WHICH SUPPORT THE LONG-TERM GOALS.
2-B-4: DEVELOP SHORT/MID/LONG-TERM MILESTONES.

TASK #2-C: DETERMINE HOW EVENTS SHOULD BE SEQUENCED TO ACHIEVE GOALS.
2-C-1: DEVELOP ACTION STATEMENTS FROM MILESTONE GOALS.
2-C-2: DETERMINE THE CRITICALITY OF THE ACTION EVENTS.
2-C-3: DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF THE ACTION EVENTS.
2-C-4: PUT THE ACTION EVENTS INTO PRIORITY ORDER.

TASK #2-D: DETERMINE HOW RESOURCES SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT THE SEQUENCE OF THE ACTION EVENTS.
2-D-1: EVALUATE RESOURCE ALTERNATIVES.
2-D-2: DECIDE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR EACH EVENT.
2-D-3: DETERMINE AND ASSIGN TASKS.
2-D-4: DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE (RESTRICTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS).

MISSION #9 - EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS

TASK #9-A: EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OPERATIONS.

9-A-1: DEVELOP CRITERIA TO APPLY.**
9-A-2: ACQUIRE THE PERTINENT INFORMATION.
9-A-3: MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS.
9-A-4: IDENTIFY RESOURCE EXPENDITURE.

TASK #9-B: EVALUATE PROGRESS TOWARD GOALS.

9-B-1: DEVELOP CRITERIA TO APPLY.**
9-B-2: ACQUIRE THE PERTINENT INFORMATION.
9-B-3: MEASURE CHANGE (PLUS AND MINUS).

** CRITERIA ARE DEVELOPED BASED ON THOSE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS AND ACTION EVENTS WHICH MAKE THEM OBSERVABLE AND MEASURABLE.

TASK #9-C: COMPARE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF OPERATIONS TO THE MEASURED PROGRESS TOWARD GOALS.

9-C-1: ASSESS THE CONTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONS TOWARD THE MEASURED CHANGE.
9-C-2: REASSESS THE PLAN. MAHER BACK-THIS IS A FORMAT WITH WHICH TO APPROACH INSURGENCY/COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS FROM START TO FINISH. THANKS AGAIN TO JERRY THOMPSON AT LIC PRO!
MORAL, ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

What moral, ethical and professional considerations should the JCS take into account in planning for LIC?

16 responses
Feb21/89 07:17
15:1) Vern Humphrey: Since I started this, let me start a response. To begin with, there must be a firm commitment to telling the truth. Both the Imperial Japanese forces in WWII and the US Forces in Vietnam suffered from a refusal to tell themselves (and their political superiors) the truth. We must start NOW to create a climate in which the messenger bearing bad news is not shot -- even if he's the commander.

Feb21/89 19:38
15:2) Jack Maher: Promotion boards are given instructions to look for those who "have absolute integrity in word, deed, and signature". That should be the expected behavior at all levels and nothing less should be tolerated.

Feb22/89 07:28
15:3) Vern Humphrey: The problem seems to be this -- courage cannot be observed, except in the face of danger. The "danger" is a serious conflict with the boss. It's a little much to expect a boss who has had a major conflict with a subordinate to give the subordinate a high rating BASED on that conflict.

Boards can, no doubt, weed out those who have received Article 15s for dishonest acts, or convictions. But how do you locate the guy who stood for what was RIGHT in the face of a dishonest boss? Particularly when the boss had two layers of supervision above him who were also dishonest?

That's pretty much what happened in Vietnam -- so much so that in most cases it was never necessary to actually issue orders to someone to lie, or to shade the truth -- it's just that everyone knew what was expected, and that's what they did.

Feb23/89 00:42
15:4) Jeff Mayo: And the Army is STILL paying the price. We have not yet broken completely away from that cycle.
Feb 23/89 08:23
15:5) Vern Humphrey: Unfortunately true. Let me suggest this:

In none of the training I went through (language school, advisor training, in-country briefs and training) was corruption even mentioned (US or host nation). We need a training program for our people who will be working in the host nation -- to alert us to the problem, warn us of our OWN weaknesses (yes, we had US officers who were as corrupt as the Vietnamese), lay down rules for ethical and professional behavior, and provide us with some suggested solutions (What do you do if you find that .....

Next, we need channels for reporting corruption that are independent of the direct chain of command (this is no slur on anybody's integrity or prerogatives -- we've had such in the form of an IG for a couple of centuries). These channels should have independent investigating authority.

Finally, we need an audit system that works. Somebody has to keep track of the money and goods -- again, somebody outside the direct chain of command.

I suggest also that we need an independent check on our measures of effectiveness. We don't need any more inflated body counts, "agreements" on enemy "ceiling strength" among the intelligence types, and so on.

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Feb 24/89 07:10
15:6) Rich Pomager: The independent check can be a real problem. So long as the independent checker remains unbiased we should be OK. I am concerned about the unbiased agencies that exist such as the Internation Committee of the Red Cross. They met the criteria of independent, but are not unbiased. Our media is independent and so was Speaker Wright. But look at how they portray things. Even our own IG and AAA must find something wrong.

Any independent check of a program must deal at the Macro level -- the Ambassador. That is the point of integration. If we can focus up there I would be happy to take the couple of hits we, the Army, might get for a tactical, moral, of ethical screw up. But let's not focus all the scrutiny on the military portion because it is the most visible.

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Feb24/89 07:40
15:7) Vern Humphrey: I don't suggest a non-US check. I suggest that alternate sources of communication and confirmation. One of the ways we went wrong in Vietnam was when this approach broke down -- the Army in Vietnam and the CIA agreed not to disagree.

I agree the ambassadorial level is probably where they should come together.

My focus here is on the Army -- because that's the agency we're part of. The JCS can do something about the way the Armed Forces function -- but not much about how other government departments do business.

The point -- training is essential. Our people on the ground have to know what to expect, how to detect corruption and wrong-doing, and what to do about it when they do.

Then we need some alternative route when the primary doesn't work. What do I do when my boss is taking payoffs? (Yes, it happens!)

And we definitely need an independent audit of intelligence -- one that has it's loyalty to the same values we hold -- the US and the constitution.

Feb24/89 16:31
15:8) Jim Fletcher: Jim Fletcher: Agree with most of what has been presented. Think one question we need to ask is what is different about LIC? The importance of integrity and honesty in the Army is applicable in all conflicts as well as peace.

Following are some of the ways that LIC differs from other conflicts. 1. Center of gravity is, most often, legitimacy of the host nation government. If that govt is immoral or corrupt, then US support for that govt could be interpreted as US support to immorality and corruption. Is a corrupt govt friendly to the US more legitimate than a non corrupt govt that is not friendly to the US? Thus, in LIC planning, it is important determine if value gained in supporting corrupt govt is worth risk. 2. Support of the population has greater signficants in LIC than war. To gain and maintain support of populas, host nation armed forces must treat civilians and en prisoners properly. Unfortunately, some armed force as well as governments in underdeveloped countries do not have the same standards of respect for human rights and treatment of civilians and prisoners as the US. The impact on LIC planning this causes is trying to determine amount of emphasis and pressure to eliminate human rights violations vs need to establish rapport with host nation and other training priorities. The situation is often one.
Jim Fletcher: off trying to affect a cultural change as well as improving military capabilities. Which of these efforts should have priority, or is it counter productive to try to accomplish both of these actions? Lastly, LIV planning must consider what is ethical, moral and professional.

Who will establish the standards - US or host nation? What actions are to be taken if the standards are not maintained? How will violations be reported, to whom will they be reported? What will the penalties be? US withdrawal from the country because of human rights could be detrimental to the overall US interests. Perhaps what is needed in LIC are rules of Engagement (ROE) for ethics, moral and professional activities. It is the job of the planners to consider them in the same light as they do normal ROE. They must be coordinated not only the services and agencies of the US, but also the forces and agencies of the host nation. Sorry about all the mistakes in this response, but I can't get this computer to work right (write).

Rich Pomager: Good point Jim. My concern is the focus of the policy that gets us into the LIC environment. What was the political motivation behind our Contra support? Was it the overthrow of the Sandinista's or the bringing to power of the Contra's? The former I believe, which meant that we had a flawed policy from the start.

The problem with the Contra's was that there leadership did not represent the resistant elements of the country. There was no key leader, central figure to take the reigns of government.

This is important because it leads the US, and the army takes the hit into supporting the best of not so good alternatives and thus we are portrayed as supporting an illegitimate government or one that becomes corrupt. Thus, the Marcos problem.

Panama is another example. The president does not have any support in the country and no other leader of the opposition is strong enough to take charge.

Steve Whitworth: There was an article summarizing GEN Woerner's comments about the current Panama situation on Page 3 of Friday's New York Times. He seems disturbed by the Administration's lack of action. The pressure must be great to drive a CINC to such public remarks. I sometimes wondered (and wondered) while in Panama if when the Army discusses LIC it hasn't narrowed itself to only when U.S. forces are introduced.
Our J5 folks were adamant that in Latin American situations the US almost always waits too long to become involved and has too many distracting spokesmen of "official" policy. Many times the internal situation is grave (if not lost) by the time the U.S. gets concerned enough to do something, like in El Salvador or Nicaragua.

Maybe that's the fate of democracies and consensus building....

Feb27/89 07:38
15:12) Vern Humphrey: To deal with an earlier question -- what's different about LIC? Three things:

1. It has been an area of political disagreement internally -- hence great pressure from above to show we are winning -- which has historically been translated into "send me only good news."

2. It lasts a long time -- long enough for the slow corruption of small transgressions to become big ones.

3. It exposes many people to temptations they would never have encountered otherwise, and are not equipped to understand and deal with. Most don't succumb -- but a few do, and that's enough.

Mar07/89 20:49
15:13) Jack Maher: WHAT MORAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's CONSIDER IN PLANNING FOR THOSE RARE TIMES WHEN THE MILITARY WILL BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN COMBATTING TERRORISM?

Mar08/89 07:25
15:14) Vern Humphrey: First of all, I believe that we need to use the same basic approach as for LIC. We must be PARTICULARLY careful to avoid ethnic or racial prejudice, which can lead to criminal actions (example, the Gibraltar incident -- where the SAS executed IRA operatives). We have to remember that we are creating a force that can be used to stifle political dissent, or even to eliminate political opponents.
Mar24/89 08:06
15:15) Rich Pomager: The ethical considerations are great. However, the government is faced with the requirement to defend/protect its people. That may require conducting a raid or attack which may be objectionable under the rules of war. But any military response must have been preceded by a series of other measures to reconcile the situation. Once these reasonable actions have failed then a self defense act specifically at the responsible terrorist organization is appropriate. An act against the people of the state which is supporting terrorism is never ethically acceptable. Yes we are faced with a dilemma, but one responsible governemnt officials must make.

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Mar24/89 09:17
15:16) Vern Humphrey: Let's distinguish between acts of war, and acts of crime. We need to do two things -- eliminate terrorism (which I will define be ACTS, not by ideology) and to defend our interests. Those aren't necessarily the same things. For example, no one would call Robert E. Lee a criminal -- but the United States made war on his army. And that war was played by the rules (as much as any war is).

On the other hand, the Stern Gang bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, and massacred innocent Palestinian villagers to drive them out of territory that was to be incorporated in the new state of Israel. We favor Israel, but we must condemn acts of groups like the Stern Gang committed.

What we have to do is make the innocents safe from random violence which is inflicted for no other purpose than to terrify. We can do that. We cannot eliminate war, however. We can play it by civilized rules, and that's what we should do.

Remember, military benefit legitimizes acts that would otherwise be unacceptable -- bombing an antiaircraft battery that has been set up inside an orphanage is a legitimate military operation. Putting a car bomb against the wall of an orphanage that has no military or industrial connection is terrorism.
Jack,

I took the liberty of collecting all the responses you mentioned in your bulletin of 4 March and put them into a single item to focus the discussion. I hope this is OK with you... If not, just hit the delete key!

One of the major considerations I think we need to address in dealing with this new focus is SECURITY. It is very easy to step over the bounds of intellectual discourse into some very sensitive discussion about the US plans and deficiencies. I hope everyone keeps the security aspect uppermost in their minds as we proceed to discuss the issue on this UNCLASSIFIED network...

----------------- [Begin Relevant Responses]-----------------

Mar04/89 17:24

Mar04/89 17:25

Mar04/89 17:29

Mar04/89 17:37
8:16) Jack Maher: WHAT TERRORIST FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE: POPULAR SUPPORT LOGISTICS SUPPORT LEVEL OF TRAINING PROFICIENCY UNITY WILL OBJECTIVES POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL TARGET(S) TACTICS

112
9:17) Jack Maher: WHAT FRIENDLY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE: COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES TYPES OF UNITS REQUIRED LOGISTICS BASING LEGAL SPECIAL TRAINING/REHERSALS


13:5) Jack Maher: WHAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM? SO FAR WE HAVE DISCUSSED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, TERRORIST GROUP, FRIENDLY FORCE, GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, AND INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS.

I see all the aspects of terrorism counteraction issue to be quite closely related from the perspective of *outcomes*: (1) what do we do to prevent, react to, or limit terrorist acts; and (2) what do we want to do to change the environment that generates the development of groups willing to commit "terrorist" acts?
14 responses
Mar13/89 00:09
16:1) Alex Wojcicki: The "other" considerations must be a discussion of how all the stated considerations interact with each other. As I see it, none can be taken in isolation. How do the political, economic, social, and geographical factors relate to historical considerations? How do these relate these to US responses in the form of our intelligence and friendly force (national force/national power) responses?

Is there some sort of paradigm we can identify? What is an acceptable (read: good) method to relate these various factors? I'd suggest a further analysis using the analytical hierarchy process (AHP), identified as a mechanism for problem solving in the original LEXSYS concept paper. This is a way to establish relationships between courses of action and "criteria" (ie, those factors deemed important to the decision).

Seems that the national decision making process could use a good dose of goal and objective making, and a way to relate the "criteria" that Jack Maher has identified to the G&O accepted as the "gospel", (or at least a goodly part of the Koran [with no apologies to Salman Rushdie]).

Mar13/89 09:42
16:2) Vern Humphrey: Alex, it seems you've hit it. The primary questions seem to be:

1. What is terrorism? Do we define it in accordance with the Grotian principle, or in violation of that principle?

2. What are our national goals AS THEY RELATE TO TERRORISM?

3. What OTHER national goals impact on the terrorist problem? (Are we willing 'to support insurgents in X nation, even if they sometimes use terrorist tactics? Are we willing to support nation Y at the expense of generating and exacerbating a terrorist situation?)

Mar13/89 23:46
16:3) Alex Wojcicki: Jack, you didn't hit the "delete key", so I guess this item is OK. Vern, you got me... the reference to the "Grotian principle" is a bit too obscure... does that have anything to do with the old saw: "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"? [Which in itself is a corollary of "One man's religion is another's perversion". Hmmm, that may also apply to the current literary "crisis"]

In regard to your "2" above, that's a good question: What ARE our national goals as they relate to terrorism? We could all use a good dose of education in this area... Are they "don't do no terrorism to Americans"? How about allies? How about "enemies"?
Your "3" above are rhetorical questions, nicht wahr? 'course we'll support insurgents who sometimes use terrorist tactics; eg, Afgan rebels shooting rockets into cities, shooting prisoners, etc; Contras destroying the economic infrastructure, etc. And sometimes we DO support a nation at the expense of generating ... etc; eg; our support of Israel has certainly had that effect.

This all goes back to a discussion on the Army:SpecOps net about considering "terrorists" as military personnel. As long as they observed the laws of war, they got treated like enemy soldiers; when they violated these laws, they could be punished for them in appropriate tribunals.

Personal opinion, as long as one is dealing with "terrorists" who are not internal (national) "whackos" - who are a criminal problem - it might be

Mar13/89 23:46
16:4) Alex Wojcicki: best to consider (deal with) them as military forces. It would seem to clean up a lot of loose ends. On the other hand, it might also confer to them a sense of legitimacy that might otherwise not occur.

Jack, I hope this is keeping with the intent of your focussing attempt? Am I right in thinking that the national goals re: combatting terrorism are somewhat fuzzy? If I am correct, are we sending an appropriate message to "terrorists"? The only real message I can think of the we have "sent" is the 1986 bombing response against Libya for the Acchille Lauro/Berlin bar bombing? ...and that "message" was considered by millions in the Middle East as a terrorist act in itself...

Mar14/89 07:10
16:5) Vern Humphrey: The Grotian Priniciple (named for Hugo Grotius, 17th Century Dutch statesman) is best summed up as "If two people are fighting, neither of them is likely to abandon his cause simply because a third party says he's in the wrong."

The corollary is that the role of third parties (or international agencies) is to establish the rules for the fight (don't kill prisoners, don't hijack airplanes, etc.) The application of international pressure (diplomatic, economic, etc.) should be in this direction, not on the "main question" (as Grotius phrased it).

I should point out that in Grotius' day, each side in a war classed the other side as criminals -- and treated them as such. And of course, civilians who fed or supported these "criminals" were also criminals. The result was that the larger armies that were emerging in the 17th century were some of the most brutal armies seen in Europe in a long time.
The Grotian principle took away (eventually) that criminalization of armies and populations and established the basis of international law.

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Mar14/89 13:34
16:6) Jack Maher: WOJO, THE KEY TO COMBATTING TERRORISM IS TO, IN A COORDINATED MANNER, EMPLOY OUR NATIONS ELEMENTS OF POWER (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND MILITARY) IN SUCH A WAY THAT THAT EMPLOYMENT ACTS AS A DETERRENT. WHEN DETERRENCE FAILS THEN ALL FOUR AGAIN MUST BE EMPLOYED AS APPROPRIATE TO PUNISH THE TERRORISTS AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM. PUNISHMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL LAWS OR WE HAVE LOWERED OURSELVES TO THEIR LEVEL.

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Mar14/89 16:18
16:7) Vern Humphrey: Correct — the application of the Grotian Principle is that it allows us to define terrorism WITHOUT seeking to determine the rightness or wrongness of the "cause" the terrorist supports. People on opposite sides of an issue can agree on punishing terrorists — just as the US was able to court-martial Lt. Calley without accepting that the NVA were in the right on the overall issue of the war.

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Mar15/89 22:05
16:8) Alex Wojcicki: Vern, thanks for the short tutorial... it helped... (after I made my response above, I looked up Grotius in my EBr... "not what you know, but what you know where to look it up..." shoulda done that first, and given a greater impression of *wisdom*!!)

Jack and Vern, while I can't disagree with the propositions you stated above, I'd like to suggest that the US must take a step further and look to apply the elements of national power in a proactive sense (oh, NOooo!, there's that word again) to establish national goals and objectives that prevent or preclude the the *development* of conditions that lead to an active terrorist threat (to individuals... the national survival is not at stake.) That's probably worth its own Item, but I'll leave that to you all...

I still stand by my postulate to treat "terrorists" as "soldiers"... I think it meets the Grotian Principle, and would free up a lot of emotional baggage, both for the nation and for the military. For example, the seizure of LTC Higgens (and the *seizure* of William Buckley) might be treated as legitimate acts of "war"... The subsequent torture and death of Buckley is clearly was clearly in violation of "accepted practice" (that's a euphemism for #!!$#!@&^*$$ **murder**!!)

While the US publicly "stands ready to respond to terrorist acts", I'd also suggest that we are severely constrained in what can be accomplished. Each of the elements that Jack has proposed as a criterion may interact with
16:9) Alex Wojcicki: all the others to create the situation which makes us *practically* impotent to deal with a crisis. A last note: in simpler times, the "bi-polar world" of the 50-60's or the modern Imperial world of the 80-30's had relatively simple ways of dealing with these crises... use a bigger hammer. That no longer works in this multi-polar world where the interaction of religion, economics, military power, and politics... and a world-wide information system... (truth, half-truth, or "tell the lie long and loud enough...") has created an immensely complex decision matrix. We have reached a situation where simple cause-and-effect principles do not apply... and don't forget that the many US bureaucratic power bases may (do?) play a key role in the definition of US response! The above does not *answer the question, unfortunately... maybe it begging the question... I don't really have the answer... just more questions... Over!...

Marl6/89 00:55
16:10) Jeff Mayo: Hi Wojo. Reference your response 16:9; did it ever make you wonder if the politicians might be using the term 'terrorist' as propaganda? If the connotation 'soldier' is used, the military alone might be called to act. Again, the soldier performing an "act of war" could rile up the masses until we have a "violation of national honor" requiring stronger responses than we might want to use. The 'terrorist' is just branded as a nut, a political activist, or super criminal. We also seem to be careful when using the term 'state supported terrorism since it also requires an honor violation response. I agree that the decision matrix is impossible to manage; what's more, the decision makers rarely consider capability or consequences when doing so.

Marl6/89 07:34
16:11) Vern Humphrey: The essence of the Grotian principle is that if you take the position that you won't "treat terrorists as soldiers" -- then you wind up treating soldiers (and innocent civilians) as terrorists. Which is how you make terrorist problems worse.

This position leads to absolute intransegence, with total disregard for human rights. You wind up branding the PTA mothers "terrorists" when they try to petition for a new stoplight at the school crossing.
Mar16/89 21:32
16:12) Alex Wojcicki: Jeff, you may be right about the political use of the term "terrorist". I'd only say that we need to progress (as a nation) beyond the emotional problem of resolving "national honor" situations. Reminds me of the code duello on an international level (and also reminds me of all the wars that have been fought for that reason). As we continue to grow into a global society, we (as nation-states) are going to have to figure out a better way to interact than as small children might do...

Vern, I guess in my earlier ramblings that I wasn't clear enough. Sorry about that. My contention in treating terrorists as soldiers was not to suggest that we revert to an earlier definition of armies (a la the need to *have* a Grotian Principle), but rather to suggest that we place ourselves in the "other guy's shoes" and understand his operation paradigm. A lot of these "terrorists" think of themselves as soldiers... well, I was trying to say that we shouldn't automatically label people or groups as "terrorist", rather deal with **acts** as either militarily "legal" or in violation of the "accepted" (?) rules of practice. For example, the bombing of the Marine compound in Beirut in 1983 could be argued to be an act of war in legal context. The holding of civilian hostages in Beirut clearly does not!

Vern, if those PTA mothers you mentioned *acted* in a manner like throwing rocks thru the windows of drivers driving "too fast" thru a school zone, they *would* be guilty of a *terrorist act*. On the other hand, if they were parading in the road to protest speeding, they wouldn't...

My point was, and remains, we need to deal with "acts", and not with labels on people. We have enough laws to define unlawful acts, and international bodies to try the purpetrators(sp?) when we can catch them.

Many people consider the Israelis to be compleat terrorists, is that correct? Goes back to your earlier statement about the US vs Calley vs the operating principles of the Vietnam War...

Again, sorry to have been incoherent... I think we are really in agreement about the basic operating principles...

<whoa-joe>

Mar16/89 21:32
16:13) Alex Wojcicki: zone, they *would* be guilty of a *terrorist act*. On the other hand, if they were parading in the road to protest speeding, they wouldn't...

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<whoa-joe>

Mar17/89 07:14
16:14) Vern Humphrey: We're in total agreement. We MUST have a system that defines ACTS as the key to terrorism, not political orientation. We must not allow the way we view a particular cause to cloud our vision to the main aim, which is to eliminate illegal acts.
WHAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS?

15 responses

Mar27/89 20:02


Mar29/89 07:10

17:2) Vern Humphrey: I suggest that peacekeeping operations for US forces are a last resort. The Canadians, Irish, Indians, etc. -- people who are regarded as impartial or more or less neutral (I know no nation is neutral -- it's the perception I'm talking about) are more suitable candidates. For us to go in, we have to be invited in by both (or all) parties to the dispute. Otherwise, we're too lucrative a target.

Mar29/89 22:57

17:3) Jack Maher: FOLLOWING RESPONSE PROVIDED TO ME BY MESSAGE FROM A-AF CLIC. I AM TAKING THE LIBERTY TO ENTER IT HERE AS A RESPONSE. REALLY APPRECIATE A-AF CLIC INPUT!

PEACEKEEPING
The Interagency Approach

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Peacekeeping operations should be considered by United States policy-makers as a strategy that can support US policy objectives. The application of the elements of national power in a coordinated effort by all US agencies can greatly enhance the effectiveness and durability of these operations. These operations are now planned and coordinated by the US State Department and the Department of Defense but, other agencies of the US government can also contribute to peacekeeping efforts and to the accomplishment of US policy objectives.

The United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor of international peacekeeping operations. Regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted in similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions. Similarly, some nations have formulated multilateral agreements to create peacekeeping missions outside the auspices of any permanent international forum. While there have been instances of operations by single nations, these have usually been with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the United Nations. The US as a member of the UN Security Council will probability not provide forces for peacekeeping operations, but the US will provide financial and logistical support to peacekeeping efforts.

The importance of peacekeeping in the control o. conflict is important to the US because it supports the accomplishment of US policy. Peacekeeping differs fundamentally from internal security in that a peacekeeping operation does not act in support of one government; it acts as a entirely neutral third party. Once the peacekeeping effort loses its reputation for impartiality, its usefulness is destroyed. There are several conditions that must exist for a peacekeeping effort to be successful, they are:

- Consent of the belligerents.
- The political recognition of the peacekeeping operation by most if not all of the international community.
- A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.
- Sufficient freedom of movement for the force,
observers, to carry out their responsibilities.  
  o An effective, command, control and  
  communications (C3) system.  
  o Well trained, balanced, impartial, non-coercive  
  forces.  
  o An effective and responsive all-source  
  intelligence capability.  
  It is important to understand how political factors  
  influence the execution of peacekeeping efforts. Specifically,  
  rules of engagement (use of force), freedom of movement, and area  
  of operations (AO) are mandated by the political process.  

A consideration in planning for US participation in a  
peacekeeping operation is the question of fiscal responsibility.  
The United Nations has depended on contributions of  
member nations or voluntary contributions to meet its fiscal  
obligations. The US has provided supplies and transport at no  
cost to the UN, but it may not do so in the future. There must  
be consideration of the policy implications, if the US decides  
ot to provide support to a UN peacekeeping operation because of  
fiscal constraints.  

The peacekeeping mission will operate with a mandate  
which will describe the scope of operations for the mission. The  
sponsoring bodies usually consist of several countries. Although  
these countries are supposed to be impartial, each may have its  
own  
- - - - -  
Mar29/89 22:57  
17:6) Jack Maher:  
  idea of what the peacekeeping force should do. Also,  
the agreement should frame the mandate for the operation in such  
a way that it gives advantage to no side. For these reasons, the  
agreement may be imprecise and susceptible to different  
interpretations by the belligerent parties and all those  
countries contributing to the force as well. To establish an  
international peacekeeping operation, it is essential that a  
clear mandate exist from the outset. In the international arena,  
such a mandate usually will be difficult to achieve and may have  
to be updated periodically. However, so that further diplomatic  
and military action can proceed effectively, the mandate should  
include the following.  
  (1) The terms or conditions the host nations  
intend to impose on the presence of the force or mission.
(2) Clear statements of the rights and
immunities of force or mission members under jurisdiction of the
international agency, if any.

(3) Clear statement of the functions the
peacekeeping force is to perform. In a given situation, a number
of considerations will impact on the determination of whether the
United States provides peacekeeping resources, and, if US
participation is favored,

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Mar29/89 22:57
17:7) Jack Maher:

...will determine what those resources may be. These
factors include the following.

(1) National Policy. Public opinion, national
legislatures, pressure groups, and government executives
will react to the ideological, humanitarian, or other
issues in the conflict to produce a national policy of
participation or nonparticipation.

(2) Attitudes of the Disputing Parties.
Potential participants in international peacekeeping operations
will demand host nation(s) agreement to the operation.
Host nation agreement may, but will not always, indicate
the disputing parties' willingness to grant and respect
the privileges and immunities which participants will
need to accomplish their mission.

(3) Selection Criteria of the International
Agency. The international agency, or its assigned executive,
must balance numbers, skills, and a variety of other
considerations to form a balanced force which can appear
internationally to be impartial and can perform the
required task. Geography, race, language, ideology, and
perceived national interest will be contributing factors
in determining eventual force composition.

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Mar29/89 22:57
17:8) Jack Maher:

(4) Expected Duration. Many international
peacekeeping operations will be relatively open-ended with a
consequent impact on national resource and financial
requirements. However, it is important to try to
determine the expected duration of the mission.
(5) Legal Status and Control of the Intended Force Agreements will be necessary among host(s), contributors, and sponsors to establish an international status for the participating forces. The primary obligation of peacekeeping personnel must be to the international agency, if any.

(6) Financial Arrangements. The sponsor must establish, in conjunction with the host and the contributing nations, a cost-sharing agreement. This agreement must stipulate a budget slice for each nation. From these funds, the sponsor finances the operation. In addition, nations are credited with their "in-kind" contributions, such as, transport, rations, or communications equipment, which fulfill part or all of the general levy charged to them as the result of the cost-sharing agreement. Generally speaking, nations accept responsibility for their own "internal costs." Agreements on the financing of international peacekeeping operations may be more substantial in the Contributors should expect, however, considerable direct and indirect expense as a result of participation.

(7) Military Capabilities and Availability. It is unlikely that force contributors will ever have genuinely spare resources to allocate to an international peacekeeping force. However, it will be necessary at the time of the peacekeeping force's establishment to make judgments about the appropriate balance, or trade-off, between the strategic political requirement to contribute and the temporary reduction in force levels for national security.

Another political factor involves the rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE must be clearly stated in simple language. The two principal rules are minimum use of force and total impartiality. The use of deadly force is justified only under situations of extreme necessity (typically, only in self-defense), and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed to curtail the use of violence by the parties involved.
Peacekeeping operations demand a flexible but understandable administrative system because of their political sensitivity. Much of the basis for the system lies in three key administrative documents, which result from the peacekeeping mandate and the stationing agreement: terms of reference, follow-on command directives, and rules of engagement. Peacekeeping operations will normally require one of three structures.

(1) Peace Observation Mission. In the role of a supervisory commission, military personnel may be employed as impartial observers reporting directly to the sponsor or its executive agency.

(2) Internal Supervision and Assistance Missions. Military personnel or forces may be deployed to assist civil authorities in such functions as supervision of elections, transfer of authority, partition of territory, or temporary administration. Forces performing such assistance may have a conventional military command structure but are more likely to have a structure containing appropriate civilian agencies of both host and sponsor.

(3) International Peacekeeping Force. A force supporting an international agency will normally consist of multinational formations or units with a conventional military command structure. It will frequently need a large supporting staff and considerable technical and scientific capability.

From the US perspective, peacekeeping operations are one of the seven components of the US security assistance program. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, Chapter 6, as amended, authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations which further US national security interests. The United States participates in UN peacekeeping operations in accordance with Public Law 72-264 (United Nations Participation Act of 1945) and Executive Order 10206, Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes. When the decision is made by the appropriate political authority for the United States to support a UN sponsored peacekeeping mission, the following procedures apply.

(1) The US Mission at the UN consolidates requests for support and submits those requests to the Bureau of International Organizations at the US State Department.
Requests involving DOD support are coordinated through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) to the Chairman of the JCS. The Chairman of the JCS selects an appropriate Joint Staff Directorate to be in charge of organizing the necessary support.

(2) The designated Joint Staff Directorate forms a joint action cell. The joint action cell develops written taskings and coordinates these taskings with the affected Unified Commander, Services, and other agencies.

(3) A Service is assigned the responsibility to be Executive Agent for the specific operation. The Executive Agent provides administrative, personnel, operational, logistics, intelligence, and command, control, and communications support for committed US military forces. It may also assist forces of other nations when such support is in accord with diplomatic agreement.

(4) The Executive Agent interfaces with the appropriate Unified Command as specified in the terms of reference and in accordance with established procedures in JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. The Executive Agent coordinates the desired support and inform the joint action cell. The Chairman of the JCS replies to the ASD/ISA which in turn notifies the State Department.

(5) The US military units designated to participate in a peacekeeping operation are usually placed under the operational control of the commander of the peacekeeping force, upon entering his area of responsibility. Operational command of such US military units is retained by the appropriate Unified Command Commander as recommended by the Executive Agent and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of the US military units under the operational control of the peacekeeping force commander retain command of their subordinate or attached elements.

Outside the UN, the United States may participate in peacekeeping operations with regional organizations or in cooperation with other countries. Peacekeeping operations depend on the consent of the parties to the dispute, the host nation, and also on the agreement of other powers which perceive that their interests may be affected.
Consequently, the UN is not always an acceptable or feasible sponsor of peacekeeping operations. The decision to

conduct these operations will be made by the appropriate political authorities. Within the Department of State, the appropriate regional bureau coordinates desired support with the ASD/ISA. The procedures used within DOD and JCS to develop specific tasks and coordinate actions with the Services and Unified Commands would be the same as those of a UN sponsored peacekeeping mission.

Other Contributing US Agencies

The US Information Agency can in coordination with the parties to the dispute help provide information concerning the goals of the peacekeeping effort, the reason why military forces are going to be deployed into the disputed area, and the benefits of peace to all parties concerned. It can inform the indigenous people of the US involvement in the peacekeeping efforts and the benefits they can receive from the success of the operation. Agency coordination of public information on US involvement in peacekeeping operations enhances American and international public awareness of US efforts toward world peace.

The US Information Agency as lead agency for international information actions, working closely with DOD and State, employs public awareness tools to explain to the international community.

Additionally, it monitors public opinion to identify trends and/or negativism requiring explanation/clarification and, working with appropriate organizations within the dispute area, informs the indigenous people of the US involvement in the peacekeeping efforts and the benefits received from the success of the operation.

The US Department of Treasury, the Agency for International Development, and organizations such as; the Inter-American Foundation, and African Development Foundation can assist and support peacekeeping efforts through economic develop.
WHAT ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? HOW WOULD THE U.S. ARMY RECOMMEND THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT OF POWER BE USED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS?

3 responses
Mar27/89 20:10
18:1) Jack Maher: LETS CHANGE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS SLIGHTLY AND TALK ABOUT MARSHALL PLANS AND NATION BUILDING/HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS. MARSHALL PLANS ARE CLEARLY THE PROVINCE OF STATE BUT WHAT ABOUT NATION BUILDING OR HUMANITARIAN HELP. UNDER NATION BUILDING WE COULD CONSIDER ENGINEERS TO HELP BOTH SIDES CLEAN UP AND TO A LIMITED EXTENT REBUILD. HUMANITARIAN HELP COULD INCLUDE WATER PURIFICATION, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, ETC. SHOULD WE CONSIDER DOING THESE THINGS AT ALL IN A PEACEKEEPING MISSION? IF SO, HOW DO WE MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE PERCEIVED BY BOTH SIDES AS BEING IMPARTIAL IN OUR SUPPORT? HOW MANY EXTRA FORCES ARE WE WILLING TO COMMIT TO THIS EFFORT? EVEN THOUGH MARSHALL PLANS ARE THE PROVINCE OF STATE THE MILITARY COULD BE REQUESTED TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT BY INSURING THE SAFETY OF THOSE WHO DISTRIBUTE FOOD, MEDICINES ETC.

Mar29/89 07:15
18:2) Vern Humphrey: This may be our best bet in many areas. But we need to be not only impartial, but also cooperative. For example, high visibility may make us friends among the peasants -- but they aren't the decision makers. That same visibility may detract from the peasant's perceptions of their own government.

And we shouldn't be impartial -- if we are there, it's because we have interests, and we're supporting the side that supports out interests. Berlin is a case in point -- we supplied Berlin during the blockade, built it up, and it now stands as a monument to the free West, and a perpetual shame to the East.

When we start medical and road construction projects, we're sending a message -- "See how much better life is when you support the government (or whoever we're supporting)."

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127
Apr03/89 08:32
18:3) Rich Pomager: Agree with the concept of improving conditions in the country side. The political people need to look at how we do that without ticking off the other guy. Else we get set up for public abuse in the world media or become the target of physical violence.

Regardless of where we may be, the critical point is to insure that our soldiers present a fair and courteous relationship with the people. We can not afford to fall into the days of old where we refer to the locals in derogatory terms. Once that happens we have lost our impartiality.
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

WHAT SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD/JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? MORAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS?

No responses on item 19
OPPOSING FORCES CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

WHAT OPPOSING FORCES CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:

POPULAR SUPPORT
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
LEVEL OF TRAINING
PROFICIENCY
UNITY
WILL
OBJECTIVES
POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL TARGET(S)
TACTICS

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Mar27/89 20:15

20:1) Jack Maher: IN ANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION THEIR WILL STILL BE THOSE ON BOTH SIDES THAT ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE CURRENT SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEM. WE NEED TO KNOW WHO THEY ARE, WHAT THEIR POTENTIAL IS, WHAT THEIR TARGETS MIGHT BE, ETC. THEY MAY NOT EVEN ATTEMPT RENEWED MILITARY ACTIVITY BUT JUST BE CONTENT WITH A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. CAN THEIR OWN NATION WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT KEEP THEM UNDER CONTROL?

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Mar29/89 07:20

20:2) Vern Humphrey: I think one lesson is -- our own intelligence dissemination is poor. In Beruit, we had intelligence, but the message didn't get to the right people. This is not only a matter of communication, but also of analysis. For example in Vietnam, the S2 would predict every week the compound was going to be mortared. One week it happened, and he said "See? I predicted it." (not really true, just a typical anecdote to illustrate a point) -- In that kind of atmosphere, intelligence warnings are useless -- you can't separate the truth from fiction.

Again, the dangers from hooking into someone else's intelligence system are real. If we support the host nation with intelligence, we still need to run our own agents -- and that's our weak point.

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20:3) Rich Pomager: The key is using every available intelligence source. While not in military intelligence, I deal with criminal intel. We use every scrap of information and piece it together. One plus for us is the number of MP's on the street and there contacts 24 hours a day. We don't limit our info to these, but we depend on the troop info mation. Since we are an internal group and our info need is specific, our MP's relate information of value/usefull. The military Intell people deal over a broader spectrum than we and may not have access to the street info in as timely a manner. This should be the focus of the intel collection process. Get street info before it has been filtered.

Apr03/89 11:58
20:4) Vern Humphrey: You've put your finger on the problem. Our intelligence system relies heavily on electronic sources, and discounts human sources. At the same time, the disconnect between the human sources (which is often a unit) and the intelligence community often means that intelligence doesn't flow down the chain to the ultimate user. In Vietnam, you had to create your own intelligence system -- little of value came down from above, and when it did, it was often so cryptic, so hedged, so sanitized as to be useless.

Apr03/89 21:49
20:5) Jack Maher: IN A PEACEKEEPING SITUATION WE, THE MILITARY, CAN'T AFFORD TO HAVE OUR OWN HUMINT NET. IF IT WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED BY OUR CHARTER, THE KNOWLEGE OF IT BY THE OPPOSING FORCES WOULD ENDANGER THE TROOPS. IN A PEACEKEEPING SITUATION WE WILL HAVE TO RELY ON OTHER AGENCIES TO SET UP THE HUMINT NETS AND FEED THE INFO TO OUR HIGHERS SO THEY CAN PASS IT TO US. KEY HERE IS THE TROOPS ON A PEACEKEEPING MISSION HAVE A DEFINITE NEED TO KNOW!

Apr04/89 07:23
20:6) Vern Humphrey: Agreed. However, I've found that even a sergeant on patrol can gather information. And if he patrols the same area, he begins to have "friends" who will pass on an occasional warning.

Another point is that the commander (of the peacekeeping force) is responsible for all his troops do or fail to do. We rightly condemn a commander who is caught by surprise. We must therefore seek to ensure that the commander has the means at his command to avoid surprise. Anything else would be a violation of OUR professional ethics.
20:7) Jack Maher: AGREE WITH THE CASUAL OBSERVATIONS--JUST LIKE A COP ON A BEAT! WHAT I COULDN'T SEE WAS THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE COMMANDER GETTING INVOLVED IN SETTING UP HIS VERY OWN HUMINT NET TO GATHER INFORMATION. THAT KIND OF INVOLVEMENT WOULD JEOPARDIZE HIS MISSION AND HIS MEN. THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF HUMINT SHOULD BE THE OTHER AGENCIES THRU THE OFFSHORE COMMANDER. AT THE MORE SENIOR LEVELS WE NEED TO INSURE THAT THAT INFO IS NOT OVERLY OR UNNECESSARILY SANITIZED.

20:8) Vern Humphrey: Absolutely -- and we need a clear understanding of what our intelligence is FOR -- to be used. WE are targets. It's not too dramatic or profitable to kill a Fijian or Irish trooper -- but to kill an American is a different story. We can therefore fail in a peacekeeping mission simply by being sitting ducks. We need to take special measures to protect our forces.
WHAT FRIENDLY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:

- COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES
- TYPES OF UNITS REQUIRED
- LOGISTICS
- BASING
- LEGAL (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT)
- SPECIAL TRAINING

2 responses
Mar27/89 20:22

Mar29/89 07:25
21:2) Vern Humphrey: I think ROE are an unsolvable problem. We have to define the objective first -- is it to protect the force, to minimize casualties, to prevent loss of personnel as hostages, or to maintain order? Some of these are mutually incompatible. To use a police department as an example, if you're protecting civilians, you use less than potent weapons -- you'd rather risk a professional than kill an innocent civilian with a stray round. In combat, however, the fact that the enemy has put his artillery battery in the middle of an orphanage doesn't mean you can't fire counterbattery.

If the command authority defines the objective, and sets risk parameters, then we design ROE to accomplish those objectives and meet those parameters. Bottom line is vague missions result in disasters.
GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

WHAT GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:

TERRAIN
ENVIRONMENT
POTENTIAL CONFLICT AREAS
HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

WHAT HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE:
PRIOR CONFLICT LESSONS LEARNED?

No responses on item 23
WHAT INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? CONSIDERATIONS COULD INCLUDE: COORDINATION WITH U.S./FOREIGN POLICE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS? OTHERS?

2 responses
Mar27/89 20:28
24:1) Jack Maher: Do we get involved in setting up humint nets when on peacekeeping operations? Or does some other agency? Or do we stay blind and rely on the combatant nations to keep us informed about possible problems? If another agency does humint, how do we distance our peacekeeping forces from that effort? At what level does the information they obtain pass to the peacekeeping force's chain of command? How much and what kind of it is vital to the peacekeeping force commander?

Mar29/89 07:31
24:2) Vern Humphrey: Beirut showed us the dangers of poor intelligence processing and dissemination. I've found that the best source of intelligence is the man on the ground -- when you've got a mission, you've got to go out and get your own intelligence. As a company commander in Vietnam, I did that. A peacekeeping commander has to do the same -- it's inherent in the responsibilities of command.

At the same time, we need to look at the flow and analysis of other intelligence. I suggest that the US intelligence community needs to feed the on-the-ground peacekeeping force through the chain of command (at the offshore level, if necessary to keep a distance), but any threat to the peacekeeping force must be PIR for everybody.

For host nation, or combatants, we need formal, visible liaison -- this is a "good housekeeping seal of approval," and encourages people to work with us, no matter which side they're on.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

WHAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY DEVELOP NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS? SO FAR WE HAVE DISCUSSED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, OPPOSING FORCES, FRIENDLY FORCE, GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, AND INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS.
WE AT THE MP SCHOOL HAVE A GROWING INTEREST IN DEFINING OUR INVOLVEMENT IN VARIOUS LIC SCENARIOS. WE SEE OUR ROLE IN THIS ARENA LESS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF OTHER MILITARY UNITS, SUCH AS COMBAT ARMS. THE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ALL OBSERVERS IS BUILT UPON A BASIS THAT MP ARE QUALITY SOLDIERS, TRAINED IN A VARIETY OF TASKS SPANNING PEACEKEEPING TO DIRECT COMBAT, IF NECESSARY. MANY FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY OUR PERSONNEL ON A DAILY BASIS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH LIC ACTIVITIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE ONE FOUR STAR CINC RECENTLY TOLD AN AUDIENCE OF SOLDIERS THAT HIS FIRST CHOICE IN DEPLOYING FORCES TO CENTRAL AMERICA IS MP. I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN ANY POINTS OR COMMENTS ALONG THE SAME LINES FROM THOSE OF YOU ON THE NET.

5 responses
Apr06/89 22:33
26:1) Jack Maher: DICK, PLEASE TELL US MORE ABOUT WHY THE PREFERRED TYPE OF SOLDIER DEPLOYING TO PANAMA IS AN MP. IN THAT ENVIRONMENT I THINK I UNDERSTAND BUT AIN'T SURE. HELP!

Apr08/89 21:34
26:2) Steve Whitworth: It is for force protection. Forces in Panama were insufficient for security. Same is true in Honduras. Therefore most of the multi-service troops flown in and still on station were units to augment MP and signal capabilities.

Apr28/89 10:59
26:3) Richard Martin: JACK, MILITARY POLICE ARE TRAINED IN A WIDER APPLICATION OF SKILLS, AND ARE DISCIPLINED TO FUNCTION IN POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ENVIRONMENTS. THEIR MISSIONS PLACE THEM IN DAILY CONTACT WITH THE GENERAL POPULATION AND IN-PLACE POLICE, YET THEY ARE SKILLED ENOUGH TO CONDUCT THESE DAILY INTERACTIONS WITHOUT FURTHER EXASPERATING TENSE SITUATIONS. IN CONTRAST TO COMBAT FORCES THE MP ARE A MULTI-MISSION FORCE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING COMBAT, EPW/CIVILIAN DETAINEE OPERATIONS, INTERNAL SECURITY BASE DEFENSE, NEO, CIVIL DISTURBANCE, AREA SECURITY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS (EITHER AUGMENTING, TRAINING, OR REPLACING THE CIVILIAN POLICE STRUCTURE), ALL OF WHICH LENDS ITSELF TO A LIC ENVIRONMENT. WHILE MP UNITS CAN MORE EASILY ENTER THE ARENA WITHOUT LEGITIMIZING THE CRY OF INVASION, MP ARE VERY CAPABLE OF ASSUMING A COMBAT ROLE. MILITARY POLICE HAVE AN EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CAPABILITY GENERATED BY THEIR DAILY INTERACTION WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. THIS TRACKS WITH SOME OF THE DISCUSSION WHICH HAS ALREADY OCCURRED ON THE NET.
BECAUSE OF THE WIDE AREA IN WHICH MP OPERATE, TO INCLUDE THEIR CONNECTIVITY WITH THE POLICE OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, MP CAN ACQUIRE VITAL INFORMATION. IN ANY LIC ENVIRONMENT ONE MUST AT ALL TIMES REMAIN COGNIZANT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. FOR THIS REASON MP ARE EVEN MORE DESIRABLE THAN COMBAT ARMS FORCES. WHAT MESSAGE DO WE SEND WHEN MARINES OR THE 82 ND AIRBORNE ARE DEPLOYED, Versus sending in the military police? MP UNITS

Apr28/89 10:59

26:4) Richard Martin: DON'T PRESENT AS MUCH OF A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT, INSURGENTS OR THE GENERAL POPULATION AS DO COMBAT ARMS FORCES. USE OF MP ALSO ALLOWS THE NATIONAL COMMAND TO SEND A MESSAGE THROUGH GRADUAL ESCALATION OF ON GROUND FORCES WITHOUT HAVING TO IMMEDIATELY RESORT TO COMMITTING COMBAT FORCES.

Apr29/89 12:31

26:5) Jack Maher: HADN'T GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE UNIQUE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MP. THANKS FOR THE INSIGHT. I NOW UNDERSTAND WHY MP ARE THE DESIRED FORCE IN PANAMA.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS? DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS INVOLVE PROVIDING EMERGENCY RELIEF TO VICTIMS OF NATURAL OR MAN MADE DISASTERS ABROAD.

11 responses
Aprl0/89 07:15
27:1) Vern Humphrey: Clearly, the aim of disaster relief, as far as the Army (or National Guard) are concerned it to provide the basic necessities of life -- food, water, clothing, shelter, medical aid. So a primary concern should be to have either identified or prepackaged sets of support materiel and units to respond to disasters in various geographic areas.

Beyond this, we need transportation, engineering, and a practiced chain of command.

The last is critical -- look at the Exxon Valdez spill. The reaction to that disaster paralleled behavior of untrained units at the NTC or in combat -- right down to the rejection of help when offered (in what was clearly a desperate situation). We must not only have the materiel, units, transportation, and chain of command ready, we must exercise them frequently enough to ensure they function as professional military units when called.

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Aprl7/89 22:23
27:2) Jack Maher: VERN, AGREE WITH YOUR RESPONSE. THINK THAT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE IMPORTANT ALSO. HOW DO YOU GET PEOPLE TO EVACUATE THEIR HOME WHEN IT IS THREATENED BY FOREST FIRE OR FLOOD. HOW DO YOU KEEP A MOTHER FROM JUMPING INTO A FLOODED RIVER WHERE HER YOUNG SON OR DAUGHTER DISAPPEARED MOMENTS AGO. WILL CAVEAT MY AGREEMENT WITH YOUR RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT IT ISN'T THE MILITARY'S JOB TO STOCKPILE SUPPLIES FOR DISASTER VICTIMS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

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Apr18/89 07:05
27:3) Vern Humphrey: To answer the question, the usual approach is to amry military assets with civilian agents. For example, the Army shouldn't order people to evacuate their homes if they don't want to -- there should be a civilian policeman or deputy to do that. The army should supply the trucks, boats, helicopters, tents, etc., to assist.

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Apr18/89 21:52
27:4) Jack Maher: I AGREE. THEN WE COME UP TO THE LANGUAGE
BARRIER WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS WITH
THE OBJECTIVE OF HAVING SUFFICIENT LINGUISTS APPROPRIATELY PLACED
TO DEAL WITH SITUATIONS WHEREIN WE, THE U.S. MILITARY ARE WORKING
TO AID FOREIGN NATIONALS. WHERE DO WE GET THEM? CAN THE HOST
COUNTRY SUPPLY A PORTION OF THEM?

Apr19/89 07:05
27:5) Vern Humphrey: In general, we have difficulty with
linguists -- partly because we are traditionally monolingual. In
some areas (such as Latin America) we can hack it. In others, we
have problems.

The advantage to having the host provide the linguist is clear;
-- first of all, almost everywhere you can find SOMEONE who
speaks English. Second, in stress situations, it helps to have
orders and suggestions come from a local's mouth, not a
foreigner, and third, a local understands the geography, customs,
and so on better than any US-born linguist.

Apr25/89 21:00
27:6) Jack Maher: WHAT KIND OF TRAINING WOULD A UNIT THAT WAS
DESIGNATED AS PRIMARY FOR A DISASTER RELIEF MISSION NEED TO
ROUTINELY UNDERGO TO BE PREPARED IN THE EVENT THEY WERE DEPLOYED
FOR A DISASTER RELIEF MISSION?

Apr26/89 07:06
27:7) Vern Humphrey: I would suggest that we construct disaster
scenarios, based on historical disasters. We can refine that by
statistical probabilities -- the odds of a flood, versus an
earthquake in a given area, and so on.

From these scenarios, we can derive the supporting missions
(the variants of the main mission, Disaster Relief) and continue
to analyze for tasks. The scenarios also give us conditions and
some help with standards. From there, we design and construct
training activities in a progressive manner, aiming at a full-
scale simulation as a "capper" or external evaluation exercise.
27:8) Rich Pomager: I see two actions required to support the scenario concept. First, all of our plans should rely in part on the support of the services agencies within the US and international arena. The Red Cross, The Churches, Humanitarians, etc.

This insures that we do not overfund for things that are even harder to predict and plan for than War Time Contingencies. Who would have guessed that the next emergency the Army would respond to would be an oil spill in Alaska and how do you prepare for that emergency realistically.

Second, you prepare CPX's around emergency situations. For example, a couple of years ago the air force had a titan pop off in Arkansas. Look at the actions that an exercise could have assisted in in such an exercise. Local office coordination. Sealing off and area and the associated control points. Joint operations of control points. Handling of the media.

We have had several incidents of flood damage disaster in which military units have participated. From these after action reports the basis of a CPX can be developed.

My point is that a great deal can be accomplished without investing a lot of time and money. Sometimes just applying a thought process to one situation can benefit other situations.

Also, Jack, I am not sure that the language barrier is that critical. Certainly the senior leadership requires an interpreter. Most times two guys working side by side filling sandbags can accomplish the task by pointing or indicating.

Apr28/89 07:31
27:9) Vern Humphrey: Agree. One point -- we have no Front End analysis, no ARTEP or AMTP tasks or missions on disaster relief. Such training as we have is state-mandated in National Guard units. If we intend to get into this business, we have a lot of catch-up work.

May03/89 07:32
27:10) Rich Pomager: Vern do not forget that commanders have responsibilities for training down to company level. If a commander assesses his situation and environment he can develop a list of potential, but not all, emergency situations. From this list he can establish some map exercises or situational wargamming to develop the thought process for emergency actions. We do not always need top down guidance on how and what to train on. Commanders need to use their imagination to develop proactive training.
27:11) Vern Humphrey: Sure -- and he can also develop the Unified Field Theory, prove the existance of cold fusion, and learn to play the bagpipes. Virtually everything COULD be done by the commander in the field -- in between preparing for IGs, reviewing courts martial, and conducting his normal training.

The problem is -- without an FEA, how can our Einstein of a commander be sure that his training program will mesh with Buggins' training program when the two units get together to actually execute their disaster relief responsibilities for real?

And what basis does the commander have for modifying his MTOE for the extra equipment and supplies he may need, getting the extra training time and facilities, and so on?

And finally, WHY should he do it? If the Army doesn't care enough about this mission to carry out it's responsibilities in the form of conducting an FEA, developing leader and soldier tasks, reviewing his TOE -- why should he do it?
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-SHOWS OF FORCE/DEMONSTRATIONS

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-SHOWS OF FORCE AND DEMONSTRATIONS? AN EXAMPLE OF A SHOW OF FORCE OR DEMONSTRATION WOULD BE THE DEPLOYMENT FOR TRAINING OF THE TWO BRIGADES TO HONDURAS LAST YEAR.


28:2) Vern Humphrey: I recall the debate after Kent State -- can you send troops out without ammo, can you order them not to fire even when they feel their lives are threatened, and so on.

The final answer seemed to be -- have good junior leaders. There's no force to show if you don't have ammo (one of the reasons Kent State blew up was some teachers told the students the National Guard DIDN'T HAVE ammo!) So you need clear ROE and good leadership to make sure they're followed (and lots of training) -- but they have to be ready to fight. We learned an expensive lesson in Lebanon, and we ought to remember it!

It's difficult to imagine a show of force operation that doesn't have all the earmarks of serious determination. At the same time, it is the Armed Forces' job to respond when called upon -- and to anticipate that call. If we wind up in winter without adequate gear -- shame on us! That's a lesson we learned in Korea.
Apr18/89 22:01
28:3) Jack Maher: KENT STATE WAS A CASE WHERE THE MILITARY WERE CALLED TO THE AID OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT. THAT "EXERCISE" WAS NOT REALLY A DEMONSTRATION OR SHOW OF FORCE AS DEFINED IN DRAFT FM 100-20. THE TRAINING EXERCISE IN HONDURAS IS A BETTER EXAMPLE. IN THAT CASE WE WERE DEMONSTRATING A CAPABILITY AND DID NOT NEED TO GO PREPARED TO STAY FOR THE DURATION. THE SIGNAL BEING TRANSMITTED WAS "THIS IS WHAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF DOING ON SHORT NOTICE AND OBVIOUSLY WE CAN DO MORE IF AND WHEN NECESSARY".

Apr19/89 07:08
28:4) Vern Humphrey: I agree Kent state was not exactly a show of force -- but it IS an example of what happens when things get out of hand and there is no clear understanding on both sides as to what the troops have and under what circumstances they would use it.

Lebanon is an example of what happens when somebody calls our bluff and we aren't ready.

While you don't intend to shoot -- you can make a mess of things when they other guy isn't of the same mind.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY—NON COMBATANT EVACUATION OPS

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY—NON COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS?

19 responses
Apr17/89 22:36
29:1) Jack Maher: IN THIS CASE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE MILITARY HAVE SUPPLIES AVAILABLE AT THE COLLECTION POINTS TO FEED CLOTHE AND SHELTER NONCOMBATANTS UNTIL THEY CAN SAFELY BE TRANSPORTED FROM THE COUNTRY. WHERE ARE THE COLLECTION POINTS; EASY FOR GERMANY, HARD FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WITH LOWER DENSITIES OF NON COMBATANTS. ARE THE RUNWAYS AND SEAPORTS COMPATIBLE WITH THE PLANES AND SHIPS WE PLAN TO USE? CAN WE GET ADEQUATE SECURITY FORCES THERE IN TIME? CAN OR WILL WE PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FROM THE HINTERLANDS TO THE COLLECTION POINTS FOR SMALL GROUPS?

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Apr18/89 07:17
29:2) Vern Humphrey: My Father was evacuated from Alexandria, Egypt, during the Suez Crisis in '56. The US Consulate gathered the civilians (my mother, myself and my brother and system and grandmother had left earlier) at collecting points under Egyptian military protection -- with the promise/threat that Marines would be landed if necessary.

The operation went smoothly -- even if the USS Patch didn't have adequate facilities for washing and bathing. One thing Dad mentioned was that the strain made for a lot of dissatisfaction about that issue --civilians were not used to hardships, and with nothing to do, the problem was severe.

In areas (such as the FRG) where we have masses of civilians deep in the interior -- the only answer is to run an evacuation exercise. If we can't do that for political reasons, then we'd better come up with a better idea -- because we won't be able to extemporise an operation of that scale.

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Apr18/89 22:08
29:3) Jack Maher: EVACUATION BY NAVY SHIP IS NOT THE DESIRED METHOD UNLESS IT IS THE ONLY WAY AND THE ALTERNATIVE IS PHYSICAL OR MENTAL ABUSE OR DEATH. WOULD HOPE THAT NEO EVACUATION NOW WOULD BE BY AIR--LESS TIME IN TRANSIT, ETC. IF IT MUST BE BY NAVAL SHIP THEN THE SITUATION MUST BE SO BAD THAT THE MERE FACT THAT WE ARE GETTING THE NON COMBATANTS OUT SHOULD OFFSET ANY MINOR DISCOMFORTS THEY MIGHT EXPERIENCE DURING THE JOURNEY HOME.
Apr19/89 07:11
29:4) Vern Humphrey: Agreed -- it just happened to be the method selected in that historical example.

It is valuable, thought to show the kind of stress the evacuees are under. In large numbers, that's likely to be a huge problem. We have tiptoed around how our forces would behave in the midst of a war in Europe while their dependents were being evacuated -- but we haven't (to my knowledge) looked at the evacuees, themselves.

I don't think we know enough about this -- and won't unless we're willing to run at least one large-scale exercise.

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Apr19/89 21:48

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Apr21/89 07:24
29:6) Vern Humphrey: I agree that practice would be expensive -- but experience shows that the FIRST time you try a complex operation -- you flub it. That's why we have exercises for other missions. I suspect a large scale evacuation exercise would be highly instructive.

I also suspect that Team Yankee does not describe the conditions of a War in Europe very adequately -- for example, in the first (and several succeeding actions, only ONE team is fully engaged.

After eight years of experience at the NTC, if we've learned anything, it's that task forces that allow one team to bear the brunt of the action always get beaten. I suspect therefore that the evacuee scenes are equally unrealistic.

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Apr25/89 21:03
29:7) Jack Maher: IF THE BERLIN CRISIS WAS ONGOING I WOULD AGREE WITH A NEO PRACTICE ON A LARGE SCALE IN EUROPE; HOWEVER, THE WAY THINGS APPEAR TO BE GOING OVER THERE NOW I THINK IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF MONEY ALBEIT ENLIGHTENING.

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Apr26/89 07:08
29:8) Vern Humphrey: Could be. But if unnecessary, then we probably ought to make that policy -- say outright that we will NOT evacuate civilians. I'm reminded of how we lost the USS Pueblo -- there was a contingency plan if the Pueblo was attacked, but the people who drew it up knew it wouldn't work -- that was OK, though, since it was obvious the Pueblo would never be attacked, and the plan would never have to be executed.

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Apr30/89 13:27
29:9) Dennis Crumley: Maybe I've come in on this too late but did want to offer that there are, at least were, practices of the NEO plan in the part of FRG I was Bde Cdr in. We had a quarterly process drill, some of which were even up to Corps level. They took a number of volunteers, Around 100 as I remember, and exercised the procedures. The draw for the volunteers was a free trip to the R/M PX when it was all over. Yes, there were problems, and always will be, but as long as we continue to follow the assumption that there will be time to build up and back haul the non-combatants, we need to have such plans and practice them at affordable scales and draw lessons which will be valid should we have to do it full scale. DVC

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May01/89 07:00
29:10) Vern Humphrey: I don't question the value of small-scale exercises -- but there is a quantum difference when you go full scale. Look at the Exxon Valdez for an example.

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May01/89 19:09
29:11) Jack Maher: THE KEY TO NEO OPERATIONS SEEMS TO BE TO MAKE THE EVACUATION EARLY BEFORE IT GETS COMPLICATED BY HOSTILE FIRES.

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May02/89 07:02
29:12) Vern Humphrey: Absolutely. Of course, if one considers hostilities likely (but the time is unknown) then both scenarios -- early and emergency evacuation -- need to be considered.

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May03/89 00:58
29:13) Jack Maher: SOMEHOW I THINK THESE TYPE OF MAJOR SITUATIONS CAN BE FORECAST. I REALLY BELIEVE THAT WE CAN FIGURE OUT THAT SOMEBODY IS GOING TO CROSS A BORDER AND TRY TO DO US HARM. WHEN WE GET THOSE TYPES OF INDICATIONS, WE NEED TO9 REACT BY GETTING THE NEO's OUT. ONE OF THE MAJOR CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE THE POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT EVACUATION EFFORT MIGHT SEND. HOW LONG DO WE WAIT? OBVIOUSLY IF IT IS WE AND OUR FAMILIES THEN NOT TOO LONG, THE POLITICAL SIGNAL WE SEND IF WE MOVE OUR FAMILIES OUT IS REALLY SIGNIFICANT. HOW DOES THE CINC OR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF MAKE THE DECISION THAT MAY SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL BUT STILL TAKE CARE OF OUR FAMILIES AND THE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE IN THE THEATER?
May03/89 07:08
29:14) Vern Humphrey: I suggest that a careful review of the traffic problem would give an answer -- we have forces moving into country, as well as NOK moving out. To a certain extent, we can use the same transportation both ways -- but there will be conflicts. For example, the pickup point for the Xth Division's noncombatants will not be the debarkation point for the Yth Division troops.

By looking at the traffic pattern, we can identify conflicts and bottlenecks, and predict the time needed to evacuate NEOs AND reinforce. That will give us the minimum time to begin evacuation.

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May03/89 07:47
29:15) Rich Pomager: Some observations from a soldier very deeply involved in NEO. As an MP I look at the NEO very seriously since it will be my folks in many case who will be all alone with a contingent of non combatants that are stranded. He has to understand the plan and know the key nodes in the system. He also must know how to manuever around obstacles and damaged areas to reach the next node or a follow on node. This reuirs a comprehensive understanding of the secondary road network to include paths and dirt trails.

The plan is important and must be practiced. Even a small scale plan provides insight into potential problem areas. Once identified, the fixes must occur. Exercises of the plan are the manner to find the problems. No one should assume that because we can move 100 people in an exercise with local police support 200 miles without incident that the plan is perfect.

The plan and exercise do build confidence in the non combatants about our ability to evacuate. A real plus when and if the balloon goes up.

I would ask for Provost Marshals that you all remember to include the MP's in your planning and exercises. I have seen exercises conducted in which the MP role was not played but simulated. That is a gross tactical error. First it does not give the MP's a chance to exercise as they will have to perform in war. Second, you all will not get to understand the assistance that is available.

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May03/89 07:47
29:16) Rich Pomager:

You have referred to NEO exercises in FRG. I have participated in FRG and Korea. They are distinctly different with unique problems. All plans could be improved.
29:17) Vern Humphrey: Right. And one point should be made -- the perception of the plan is as important as the plan itself. What happens if the balloon goes up, and our troops BELIEVE that their families are being left to the Mongolian hordes? What happens if the newsmedia begin to report that the evacuation is all screwed up? Could the resulting heat distract theater commanders to the point that it interfered with their warfighting? I suggest it could.

29:18) Dennis Crumley: You're right in saying each situation is different--and while looking at the transportation situation might offer solutions in some areas, it won't in a number of others. Let me share with you a problem we wrestled with while I was Dep J3 at USCENTCOM. At a time when we thought Iran might fire off some silkworms at the escorts, we considered a number of reactions, as you might expect. The quickest did not involve deployment of ground forces, therefore, there were no "backhaul" flight available to get US citizens out of the gulf area. To complicate the consideration we had to consider that in at least a few of those countries, we may not get landing right and therefore, we might have to make enough of a forced landing to ensure the orderly withdraw of non-combatants. All this added up to a very tricky plan, which I'm very happy we did not have to try to pull off--rehearsals in this case were not feasible since the plan was really multiple plans keyed to a number of locations, each with its own unique set of circumstances. DVC

29:19) Vern Humphrey: Good point -- but while rehearsal is the best alternative, a full-scale simulation is also useful. If you can't actually pull people out of Abu Dhabi, for example, an exercise elsewhere, using the same forces, would be desirable -- just as the amphibious landings of WWII were exercised on an friendly island before the real landing.

Even beyond that, there is an institutional consideration -- for example, in Exercise Miki in '49, the 2nd Infantry Division tried -- and failed -- a battalion level amphibious landing. In just four short years, the Army that had brought the amphibious landing to a high art had lost its expertise.

Just a year later, of course, the US had to make a major combat amphibious landing. Thank God the Marines had kept up their skills through practice!
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS? AN EXAMPLE OF A RESCUE RECOVERY OPERATION WOULD BE THE IRAN HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION.

9 responses
Apr10/89 07:22
30:1) Vern Humphrey: Given the outcome of the Iran hostage mission, and the failures that occurred, and the military's claim that everything was done correctly (When I read the pentagon report, I looked around for the hostages -- because according to thed report, the mission couldn't possibly have failed), I think the JCS should command -- with the Chairman in overall command, and the service chiefs in command of their respective force contributions.

And the President should issue them a simple, mission-type order: "Rescue the hostages, or don't come back alive."

Shocking? Yes. Never happen? Probably. But given our record, and our unwillingness to improve, something like this has to be done to shock the system into a real -- not a cosmetic -- improvement. I see this as a parallel to Moshe Dayan's shock to the Israeli Defense Force, when he turned them around with orders that units should accept 50% casualties before considering abandoning a mission.

Apr11/89 21:12
30:2) Steve Whitworth: Give the mission to one Service and react fast.

Apr12/89 07:26
30:3) Vern Humphrey: The problem, Steve, is that one service can't handle it. The Teheran raid required long range Air Force C-130s, Marine Corps helicopters, Navy carriers, Army raiders, and so on.

When we try to put together a force that COULD handle it all, we run into problems -- some caused by parochialism, but some real: for example, could we afford to tie up a couple of carrier battle groups JUST for potential rescue operations? Doesn't make sense. We SHOULd be able to pull together the forces we need for ANY operation, and have them function smoothly.
That's why I made the shocking recommendation in response 1:

If we want professional military forces, we must hold ourselves to professional standards -- which means full accountability at the highest levels.

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Apr18/89 22:14

30:4) Jack Maher: THIS IS A TOUGH NUT TO CRACK! IF WE COULD ANTICIPATE EVERY SITUATION THAT WOULD REQUIRE THIS TYPE OF ACTION THEN WE COULD TASK ORGANIZE AND PRACTICE ALL THE NUANCES. IN REALITY, MOST OF THESE TYPES OF EVENTS COULD BE LUMPED INTO 5-8 GENERIC SITUATIONS REQUIRING A DIFFERENT MIX OF THE SERVICES AND THEIR UNIQUE TALENTS. MAYBE SOMEONE SMART SHOULD FIGURE OUT WHAT THOSE 5-8 OR SO SITUATIONS ARE AND DEVELOP GENERIC TRAINING EXERCISES BASED ON OPLANS. THE OPLANS COULD THEN BE DUSTED OFF AND ADJUSTED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE REAL SITUATION WHEN IT ARISES. OBVIOUSLY THE TROOPS THAT PRACTICED THE GENERIC TRAINING EXERCISE SHOULD BE THE ONE USED IN THE REAL SITUATION BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE WORKED TOGETHER BEFORE.

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Apr19/89 07:15

30:5) Vern Humphrey: No question that you must train on one field and play on another (although you'd like to have a model of the real target to practice on, once it's identified).

The problem is that we seem to have a lot of internal political considerations getting in the way of operations like this -- from the unwillingness of the Intel system to report the POWs seemed to have been moved at Son Tay, to the question of command of the helicopters at Tehran.

We need a major fix if we are to be successful in operations like this -- and remember that a single failure can be the disaster of the decade, so this is "a issue of "we'll get better after we've had a couple of bloody noses." We have to do it right the first time, every time.

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Apr25/89 21:07

30:6) Jack Maher: THE KEY IS TO HAVE JOINT TEAMS THAT ARE ACCUSTOMED TO WORKING TOGETHER. WE CAN MAKE THIS HAPPEN BY HAVING THOSE 5-8 GENERIC EXERCISES WITH THE SAME TEAMS EVERY YEAR. THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE TEAMWORK NECESSARY TO PULL A MISSION LIKE THIS OFF AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE LEARNING CURVE WHEN THE REAL MISSION COMES UP.

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Apr26/89 07:12
30:7) Vern Humphrey: I couldn't agree more. The ONLY way to train is to run exercises that mimic the real world as closely as possible --including working with the people you would work with on an actual mission.

As for anticipating the mission, philosophers say you can't put your hand in the same river twice -- but that doesn't mean that you can't get pretty good at building assault bridges if you build enough of them.

If you carry out enough rescue or direct action missions in training (under realistic conditions), you'll do Okay when the real mission comes along.

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May03/89 07:57
30:8) Rich Pomager: One consideration is accepting realistic missions and being a part of the decision process that leads up to a mission. The Iran raid stretched the limits of our capability. Consider distance, environment, training time, equipment reliability, and force integration and that does not build a warm fuzzy about success. We went high risk for high pay off and lost.

On the other hand the British adventure in the Falklands was another high risk venture. But they were successful. All the factors appeared to be against them. And I am not sure if the Brits had wargamed it, they would have taken on the mission.

Our aim in contingencies should be to reduce as much risk as possible and keep time of preparation to a minimum. A tall order I agree, but at least let's make it our goal. We are going to do as told regardless of the risk when it comes to contingencies. But let's at least lay the all the cards on the table.

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May03/89 08:42
30:9) Vern Humphrey: The Falklands operation had several things going for it. First of all, the time to mount the operation -- there was a long transit time that allowed for an assessment of the situation. And American TV broadcasts from the islands showed that the Argentinians were in no shape to fight (take a look at the stock shots of an Argentinian soldier "dug in" in a hole that was waist deep, with a 1X12 with a couple of sandbags on top for overhead cover).

The Falklands were not a penetration of enemy territory, either. Given the relative national resources, the Argentinians were stretched worse than the British.
The British used overwhelming force -- so much so that when the Welsh Guards broke down psychologically, it didn't affect the outcome.

And finally, the length of the operation gave the chain of command time to shake down and become functional.

None of these factors are likely to be present in a typical Direct Action scenario -- therefore we must compensate by better organization and training well before we are called upon to execute a DA mission.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-STRIKES AND RAIDS

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-STRIKES AND RAIDS? AN EXAMPLE OF A STRIKE OR RAID WOULD BE THE STRIKE IN LIBYA.

2 responses

Apr25/89 21:10
31:1) Jack Maher: WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE RAID ON LIBYA--A WHOLE LOT OF FOLKS FROM A LOT OF DIFFERENT PLACES ARRIVED AT THE IP AT THE SCHEDULED TIME AND THEN WENT ON TO DO THEIR THING. THEY HAD THE SUPPORT THEY NEEDED FROM ALL POSSIBLE PLAYERS. THEY WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL! WHAT MADE THIS MISSION GO SO WELL?

Apr26/89 07:17
31:2) Vern Humphrey: First of all, it was a relatively simple, structured operation. No disrespect meant, but naval and air operations are a lot less difficult than ground operations.

Secondly, it was carried out by the Services that tie training to readiness -- they use flying hours and steaming hours as a measure -- which means they actually have to fly, to steam, to launch and recover aircraft. In the case of the Navy, they have to maintain a certain degree of operational security when at sea. This stood them in good stead.

Compare a similar Army operation -- how many brigade commanders have ever actually executed a deliberate attack under realistic conditions with their brigades?

In other words, we used forces that had done this sort of thing (or something very like it) dozens of times before.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-PEACE MAKING? THE PURPOSE OF A PEACEMAKING OPERATION IS TO STOP VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FORCE RETURN TO POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MEANS OF ISSUE RESOLUTION.

2 responses
Apr 25/89 21:11
32:1) Jack Maher: OBVIOUSLY THE LEBANON PEACEKEEPING MISSION DID NOT TURN OUT WELL. WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO TO MAKE THE NEXT ONE TURN OUT BETTER?

Apr 26/89 07:23
32:2) A-af Clic: First of all, let's face up to the fact that this was not a peacekeeping operations. We did not go in there with the consent of all the belligerent parties, and then we really screwed it up by taking sides (trying to blow a mountain away with a battelship). Here are a few of the preconditions that must be present at the time a peacekeeping force is established and during the life of its operation: (1) the consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute, (2) political recognition of the peacekeeping force by a portion of the international community, (3) a clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission, (4) sufficient freedom of movement for the force, or observers, to carry out their responsibilities, (5) an effective command, control, and communications system, (6) well-trained, balanced, impartial, and noncoercive forces, and (7) an effective and responsive, all-source intelligence capability.
WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC'S EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE? THIS INCLUDES GUERRILLA WARFARE, EVASION AND ESCAPE, SUBVERSION, SABOTAGE, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF A LOW VISIBILITY, COVERT OR CLANDESTINE NATURE.

1 response
Apr25/89 21:13
33:1) Jack Maher: ANY SNAKE EATERS OUT THERE WANT TO COMMENT ON THIS ONE?
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES? AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WOULD BE THE INCREASED LEVEL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO ISRAEL DURING THE '73 WAR.

1 response
Apr25/89 21:15
34:1) Jack Maher: WHAT KIND OF PLANNING AND PREPARATION DO WE NEED TO MAKE A SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGE HAPPEN ON SHORT NOTICE? WE DID WELL DURING THE 73 WAR. WHY? WHAT DID WE LEARN? WHAT DON'T WE WANT TO DO AGAIN THAT WE DID THEN?
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DOD, JCS, AND THE CINC's EVALUATE AS THEY FORMULATE NATIONAL/REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY-SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES? THIS INCLUDES THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES FOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE, TO QUELL CIVIL DISORDER, TO ATTENUATE THREATS TO FEDERAL PROPERTY, AND TO PREVENT DRUG TRAFFICKING, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS.

7 responses
Apr10/89 07:27
35:1) Vern Humphrey: One consideration should be that, while armies have managed to quell riots, they have never succeeded (in modern times, at least) in prolonged police type roles.

This is in line with something I've remarked earlier -- Armies cannot "win the hearts and minds of the people" -- only the civil government can do that. But Armies can LOSE the hearts and minds of the people.

The first consideration therefore should be to use the military only in the most extreme emergency, and then only for a limited period of time in the police role.

Apr18/89 22:31
35:2) Jack Maher: VERN, THIS IS WHERE YOUR KENT STATE EXAMPLE FITS IN. AS YOU SO APTLY STATED, THE KEY INGREDIENTS TO SUCCESS IN SITUATIONS LIKE KENT STATE ARE SOLIDLY DEFINED AND WELL PUBLICIZED ROE COUPLED WITH SOLID TRAINING FOR JUNIOR LEADERS.

Apr19/89 07:18
35:3) Vern Humphrey: Beyond that -- at Kent State the college administration failed. It was THEIR responsibility to maintain law and order on campus. THEY let things get out of hand. THEY refused to allow local police to act when their actions could still have quelled the situation.

We have to look at ways to get local authorities to do THEIR jobs before we send in the Army (which at Kent State was National Guard under state -- not federal -- command).
Apr19/89 21:53
35:4) Jack Maher: UNFORTUNELY, MOST LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE OVER THEIR HEADS WHEN IT COMES TO A SITUATION LIKE KENT STATE. THERE ARE HOWEVER A FEW THAT ARE IN THAT AND OTHER TYPES OF THINGS ALL THE TIME. THEY ARE NORMALLY EXMILITARY AND WORK IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OFFICES IN ALL MAJOR CITIES AND MOST COUNTIES IN THE U.S.

Apr21/89 07:25
35:5) Vern Humphrey: I suggest we study Canada. A friend of mine was assigned to "provide armed assistance" at a prison riot. The working relationship between his unit and civil authorities was much different from the US system, with its hodge-podge of city, county, state, and federal authorities.

Apr25/89 21:17

Apr26/89 07:22
35:7) Vern Humphrey: To begin with, the action was a FEDERAL action -- with local forces under national command (and this includes the police, etc.) Second, the lines of authority were clearly drawn -- when armed force was used, the military commander assumed command (of everything). Short of that, the warden (who was the overall commander) controlled -- in principle, it resembled the command of an amphibious landing. Finally, the ROE were established on the ground -- by the warden.

In a typical US operation, we have to plan for such things as a county judge issuing habeas corpus to free Federal Prisoners, we have to coordinate state, city, county, FBI, etc., etc., and NOBODY is really in charge.
WE HAVE JUST BEEN ADVISED THAT FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, HAS FINALLY PASSED MUSTER AT ARMY DCSOPS. THIS MEANS THAT ALL THAT STANDS BETWEEN US AND AN APPROVED ARMY DOCTRINE FOR LIC IS A DECISION BRIEF TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, TO BE SCHEDULED. THEN, WE WILL HAVE TO REESTABLISH COORDINATION WITH THE AIR STAFF TO SEEK THEIR APPROVAL OF THE MANUAL AS AN AFM. THIS MAY NOT BE AS EASY AS IT SOUNDS. ONE STEP AT A TIME. FOR NOW, ITS MILLER TIME!! GBT.
Welcome to ARMY: CONOPS

NET ORGANIZERS: Mike Graves and Rich Cruz

Welcome to the Continuous Operations 2004 study. The purpose of this project is to determine: How to achieve continuous operations capability on the mid to high intensity conventional battlefield with the total (RC and AC) Army. Identify the impacts on doctrine, organization, equipping, training and leader development. Methodology will address the areas of C2, maneuver, mobility and survivability, INTEL, ADA and fires.
BACKGROUND
The Continuous Operations 2004 (CONOPS 2004) is sponsored by DA, DCSOPS-FD. Students at the Army War College Class '89 were asked to conduct the study and there are currently 12 students assigned to the CONOPS team. Through discussions between members of the Living Expert System (LEXSYS) and CONOPS teams, it was agreed to use a LEXSYS sponsored sub-net to support the CONOPS effort.

Marl0/89 09:05
1:1) Bill Mathews: I trust that sustainment of the force is an essential part of the Continuous Operations study. If so, we should dialogue the often neglected portion of the warfighting effort--providing for replacement operations on the modern battlefield. With the envisioned intensity of war, planners must consider how we will replace our casualties. Large unit replacements, small team replacements and individual replacements, or combinations thereof, encompass the range of responsibilities. What can I provide to your team from my 19 years of manning and distributing the force, with an emphasis on replacement operations?

Marl0/89 14:17
1:2) Robert Leonhard: I'd be interested also in whether we can talk robotics. We are developing rather substantial concepts regarding the application of robotics to the future battlefield, and one of our principles is that robotic systems will greatly enhance the force's ability to conduct ops.

Marl1/89 00:22
1:3) Jack Maher: REF 1:1 AND 1:2 THE KEY TO REPLACEMENT IN ANY CONFLICT IS TO BRING FOLKS IN THAT HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON. TALKING COHORT! DON'T CARE IF IT IS A BN OR A PLT OR A SECTION. GOT TO HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH REPLACEMENTS AND THEY MUST BE LEAD BY BATTLE HARDENED SOLDIERS. IF THE LAST STATEMENT APPEARS TO BE A QUANTUM LEAP IN LOGIC PLEASE COME BACK.
Mar15/89 08:37
1:4) Bill Mathews: The soldiers' commonality is basic training, military discipline, standards during first unit of assignment and motivation to be a part of the Army team. Ultimately, self respect, self worth, and helping your buddy give soldiers that glue that sustains them through conflict. Building squads, crews and teams at CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) by like skills adds to the afore mentioned unity and cohesion for deployment into battle.
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Mar20/89 08:58
1:5) Bill Mathews: FOR DAVE SPRACHER; Since you're a member of the CONOPS team and working on CSS issues, what are your thoughts on sustainment of personnel and logistics.
Item 2  22:12 Feb28/89  13 lines  3 responses
Mike Graves  Prime=1
SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF CONOPS

The CONOPS 2004 Study is oriented at Corps and below with emphasis at the battalion level. Continuous operations differs from sustained operations in that CONOPS involves cyclical or varying levels in the intensity of a particular activity or activities (not 0 state) during combat operations that are normally sustained over a period of days. Sustained operations on the other hand involves a constant or near constant level of activity over a period of hours. The mission of the CONOPS team is to identify ways and means to maintain the efficiency and reliability of soldiers, systems and equipment during continuous operations and identify the impact doctrine, organization, equipping, training and leader development. See Item 3 for a brief discussion on the METHODOLOGY.

Related items:   3

3 responses
Mar10/89 09:08
2:1) Bill Mathews: If the scope of your effort will include casualty reporting operations, including graves registration, (and I suggest that it should), I'm prepared to dialogue this aspect of personnel operations with a member of your team on this net. I understand that LtCol Dave Spracher is working this portion of project.

Mar31/89 13:14
2:2) Dave Spracher: Bill, we want to include anything that will have a significant impact on our capability to operate continuously. I can see how casualty reporting will affect replacement operations, but have no idea what to do differently in 2004 that would be significant. Any ideas?

Apr06/89 14:23
2:3) Bill Mathews: I believe that the current concepts for casualty reporting will prevail in the year 2004 during continuous operations. We rely on automated systems currently, with backup manual modes, and should be able rely on automated systems with greater confidence next century. I believe that the backup manual system should continue to be trained to and available, however.
The CONOPS Study Team is concentrating on 7 Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) which are C2, MANEUVER, MOBILITY & SURVIVABILITY, INTEL, ADA, CSS AND FIRES. As referenced in Item 2, the team is charged with identifying innovative methods to improve the combat effectiveness of units during continuous operations and resultant impact on doctrine, organization, equipping, training and leadership. Particular interest will be placed on THE IMPLICATIONS of CONOPS with regard to INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS, COMBAT POWER AT CO THRU DIV and UNIT EFFECTIVENESS.

Related items: 4 6

5 responses
Mar10/89 09:11
3:1) Bill Mathews: Individual effectiveness in tank crews, infantry squads, fire teams, etc. can be improved if the Theater Commander replaces casualties by small teams rather than by individual replacements. Teams should be assembled at the theater level and then transported to the Corps rear area for allocation to the forward forces.

Mar11/89 00:28
3:2) Jack Maher: AGREE TOTALLY WITH 3:1. THE ONLY SUGGESTION I WOULD MAKE IS THAT THE NEW CREW HAVE SOMEONE IN IT THAT IS BATTLE WISE. NOT SAYING THAT SOMEONE WHO FOUGHT IN VIETNAM SHOULD BE INSERTED--SAYING THAT SOMEONE WHO HAS PARTICIPATED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT SHOULD BE INSERTED INTO THE NEW CREW. EXPERIENCE SAVES LIVES!

Mar15/89 08:41
3:3) Bill Mathews: Agree with Jack Maher, but I must add that this fusing of experienced and nonexperienced must be accomplished on the battlefield, probably in the Corps/Division rear area. The Theater Repalcement Operation Group (TARG) commander wouldn't be able to see deep enough to do the job at this level.
Mar31/89 13:22
3:4) Dave Spracher: We have not really come up with any brilliant ideas on individual replacements. Most of our effort concerns multiple crewing/crew rotations(Item 5). I would appreciate any new ideas on this subject for the 2004 battlefield.

Apr06/89 14:27
3:5) Bill Mathews: We need some dialogue by combat arms battalion or brigade commanders on this issue of multiple crewing---rotations---since this is a personnel utilization issue. The Theater AG works for the CINC and the chain of command and should not develop personnel utilization policy in isolation.
This item primarily impacts on organizations and force structure. It has been suggested that units that live and train together will longer and more effectively than those units that do not live and train together. An expansion of this concept would logically include the combat support and combat service support slice. If this concept is generally supported, then the following questions must be addressed: "Should TOE's be developed that reflect a combined arms approach and if so, at what organizational level?". For those that agree with the above approach, please offer comments, especially concerning the impact on doctrine, organization, training equipping and leader development.

Related items: 5

2 responses
Mar10/89 09:15
4:1) Bill Mathews: Each Battle Group should include an integral, repeat an integral Admin Co. to provide for essential personnel and admin support to the forward elements of the fighting force. Further, this Admin Co. is the essential linkage to Corps, Theater and Army personnel and administrative data and information systems that sustain our force.

Mar20/89 09:02
4:2) Bill Mathews: FOR MIKE GRAVES: What's your experience with the 25th Division based on your background with combat developments? Do you support the combined arms approach in TOE development?
The CONOPS team has discussed multiple crewing and 2nd in command (2IC) has a means to improve the efficiency of soldiers and leaders during continuous operations on a mid to high intensity battlefield. The response to this idea is normally on the negative side due to man power ceiling constraints; however, if multiple crewing and a 2IC approach has the potential to sustain combat efficiency during CONOPS, then it probably deserves further discussion. As example, could reserve component (RC) soldiers be used to provide the necessary augmentation for multiple crews and 2IC leadership? Is it possible for the RC soldiers to habitually train with the active unit they augment? What type of RC force structure is required to augment a tank battalion, for example? If the RC approach is not satisfactory, are there other alternatives that will support multiple crewing and a 2nd in command capability? It is essential that all 7 BOS's (C2, MANEUVER, MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY, INTEL, CSS AND FIRES be considered and the impact on doctrine, organization, equipping, training and leader development.

Related items: 7

17 responses
Mar01/89 21:42
5:1) Jack Maher: I'M NOT A FAN OF MULTIPLE CREWING. ON A TANK THERE IS NO ROOM TO KEEP TWO CREWS SO THE ONE THAT IS RESTING IS RESTING SOMEPLACE ELSE AND WILL PROBABLY NEVER GET LINKED UP WITH THE OTHER CREW IN TIME TO INFLUENCE THE CURRENT SITUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOST ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ENOUGH BACKUP FOR C2 SO THAT REST FOR THE COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS IS NOT LLERY FALLS INTO THE SAME CATEGORY AS TANKS. MAYBE TOWED ARTILLERY DOESN'T. PARDON THE GARBAGE BUT THERE IS A LOT OF TRASH ON THE LINE TONIGHT.
Richard Pomager: I am not sure the answer is multiple crews. Maybe the answer rests in the rotation of units at the critical points or between points. And if that is possible we do it by exchanging equipment - so long as the equipment is the same. Now this sounds easy, but will require a great deal of coordination and practice during peacetime training exercises. It would appear to me that both commanders would have to think alike. This is accomplished by training together. Even the crews would have to be associated with specific crews so that commonality of effort occurs. Each crew is unique as to how it does its business. The back up unit coming into relieve a front line unit in defense must know exactly how the original crew established it's final protective fires etc. else problems and loss of combat power.

The unit replaced becomes the reserve with the equipment of it's sister unit. It is important that we consider bringing both equipment and personnel if our assessment is correct about the lethality of the battlefield.

No doubt CONOPS must be considered for the short war and as a measure of stopping the PACT from reaching the ocean. Once the fight becomes prolonged, then other factors play indetermining how to do business.

Based on the flow of the battle, that is how rapidly or slowly the PACT is advancing, replacing units should be employed at recognizable defensive positions. Thus the forward units would fight back to the next.
Mar05/89 05:50
5:5) Richard Pomager: Understand your concern Jack, but we are looking at possible solutions. I am not sure there are any great options short of a new Convention On War which limits fighting to between the hours of 0800 and 1700 (club opening time).

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Mar10/89 09:25
5:6) Bill Mathews: In an era of austere budgets, cost reductions and escalating costs of high technology, the concept of shared equipment has an element of validity that we cannot discount. Training on standard equipment has been enhanced through the use of simulators, video training devices, and mockups. Further, the stark facts reveal that we will run short of personnel replacements much sooner than we will run out of equipment. Therefore, multiple crewing will allow us to reduce our inventory of equipment and focus on the critical resource—soldiers, and perhaps avoid personnel reductions in the ensuing search for dollar savings.

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Mar10/89 14:24
5:7) Robert Leonhard: Crews will get worn out and become candidates for replacement only when the battlefield intensity is high, as during an extended attack or arduous defense. Unfortunately, these are the times when moving personnel forward into the fight to replace folks is most dangerous and foolhardy. I submit a more rational answer lies in automating crew functions, but keeping the man in the loop. This practice would minimize risk and extend the robustness of the force.

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Mar19/89 15:33
5:8) Richard Pomager: We have talked about automating crew functions with the purpose of reducing crew size or providing a break guy. Since we are in a defensive posture, what is the possibility of developing expendable main items. Sort of fire and forget systems. This allows a team to more to the next prepositioned equipment and rejoin the fight. What has been eliminated to improved CONOPS is the requirement to relocate equipment by fighting forces. Thus displacement is much easier. This would require a radical change in our thought process and concept of employment. Consider dropping in preloaded auto reloading Artillery pieces. Crew runs up to equipment and fires the missions until ammo runs out. Team then moves to new recently employed artillery piece and rejoins the fight.

171
This concept could be adapted to other combat equipment pieces. For example, the initial defensive line could be throw away equipment, with the second line the same. The third line of defense incorporates the real M-1, M-2 teams. We have depleted the enemy forward troops, without risking any of our mobility. As time progresses, the expandable equipment is either consumed or the battle determines that prepositioning is not practicable. Only, equipment that is 100% mobile is necessary.

The gain in incorporating the above concept is a reduction in cost for maintaining the war reserve, and reduction of battlefield work load for

Mar19/89 15:33
5:9) Richard Pomager: repositioning of forces. This concept falls back on the old Pilbox Syndrome of other wars, but where it differs is that the equipment is abandoned once the ammo is expended. The pilbox was designed as the fixed line of defense.

Mar20/89 16:09
5:10) Robert Leonhard: Rich, disagree with both your premise and conclusion.

1. We are not in a defensive posture. Such a statement is in contradiction both with our current doctrine (AirLand Battle) and with our future concept (AirLand Battle - Future). We must not confuse national aims (which may be defensive in nature) with our fighting doctrine (which correctly defines the attack as the decisive form of combat in maneuver warfare).

2. I don't believe in "throw-away" equipment. I don't understand how your soldiers get to the fight, how they exploit successes (rather than simply attriting the enemy), how they get out of the fight, or how they train for the fight. I submit that your "throw-away" concept confers about as much flexibility to the commander as a 100 megaton nuke. You allow him only the option of prosecuting attrition warfare rather than maneuver warfare.

Mar24/89 07:42
5:11) Richard Pomager: Thanks for the comment. In further explanation, in Europe we have already defined our forward areas of defense in the event of a Warsaw thrust. It is in these forward defenses that I would suggest we use the throw away equipment. If I understand the nature of our business we would be maneuvering from one position to another in fighting the battle. AirLand Battle doctrine is still valid with a defense in depth. Artillery has to move after several rounds, else counter battery fire may locate the position. So in effect every piece of equipment on the battle field must relocate.

172
I am suggesting that the initial pieces be employed, where ever that may be be equipment that does not have to be relocated by the crew. The team can move high speed in a Hummer or what ever, maybe a helicopter if practical. Suggest we at least explore the concept before throwing it away.

Mar31/89 14:25
5:12) Dave Spracher: Appreciate all the inputs on this item to date. Now I need to give you an idea of what the study group has been considering. We believe our equipment is much more capable of CONOPS than are the crews that operate it. This will be even more true in 2004. Our discussions with labs, schools, and senior leaders indicate we will probably be operating pretty much the same in 2004 as today. Our equipment, and thus the battlefield, will be more lethal, but man will still be operating the equipment. Robotics is on the way, but probably not significant by 2004. Man is the key.

The Soviets can echelon their forces to keep up pressure. We don't have that luxury. What we need is some means to take advantage of the capability of our machines to operate more or less continuously. If we stay with the current force structure, we will have to pull units and their equipment off-line for rest. We seek a solution to keep the equipment on-line. This does not mean it is engaged 100% of the time, but that is possible if the situation warrants.

We considered multiple crewing as employed by the Air Force. Air Force units are manned with something more than one crew per assigned aircraft. The ratio varies from 1.25 for some fighters all the way to 4.0 for strategic airlift. This allows for crew rotation and keeps able aircraft from sitting on the ground because the crew is sick or injured. Such a system could be used in the Army.

The obvious solution is to simply increase the crew ratios to say 1.25 to 1.5, depending on the system. When the weapon system is pulled off-line for refueling/rearming, the crew could be changed as well. Such a system would require the commander to fit a rotation scheme into his battle plan. Since a force structure increase for the active duty is likely to be rejected, we considered other alternatives for the answer.
The reserve component offers some possibilities. The Air Force uses reserve crews to provide about half the manning for strategic airlift and KC-10s. The reserve units are stationed at the same bases as the active duty and train on the active duty aircraft. After mobilization, they simply become part of the crew force flying the same aircraft and missions as the active duty. Such a system could work for the Army. For instance, CONUS active duty brigades could have a RC battalion stationed with them. This unit would not have its own major end items, but would train on the active duty equipment. In times of crisis, the RC unit will mobilize, perform essential training, and deploy as quickly as possible to join the active brigade. The brigade commander would integrate the unit into his organization giving him the capability to rotate crews.

Another possibility is for RC brigades to have an extra battalion which possesses no major end items. This battalion would train during CONUS active duty, but would deploy as above to join an active duty brigade with which it has had an affiliation.

Still another possibility is a new use for the RC as it is currently configured. A great deal of the time required to get the RC to the battle is caused by the shortage of strategic lift for large equipment. We could mobilize the unit, perform essential unit and individual training, and deploy the unit to the theater ahead of its equipment. We could then use the unit in the same type of rotation scheme mentioned above. This would allow us to have the extra crews to perform continuous ops early in the conflict when it is most essential. When the equipment arrives, it could either be issued or placed in the theater reserve depending on the situation and the length of the war.

We are still considering these alternatives and would appreciate your ideas.

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5:14) Dave Spracher: on the brigade's equipment, but would deploy as above to join an active duty brigade with which it has had an affiliation.

5:15) Bill Mathews: The concept of deploying RC units and particularly NG units to the theater and then employing the soldiers as small teams or crews, throughout the battlefield

5:16) Bill Mathews: has significant merit as the Active Army progresses towards replacing soldiers as small packages. There is considerable political interest with the NG, however.
Apr 25/89 21:26
5:17) Jack Maher: IN MY LAST JOB I WAS THE MOBILIZATION ASSISTANCE TEAM CHIEF AT A MOB STATION DURING A MAJOR EXERCISE. HAD TWO GUARD ARMORED BNS REPORT IN--ONE WAS AT ABOUT 95% STRENGTH, THE OTHER AT 60% STRENGTH. THE BNS WERE FROM TWO DIFFERENT STATES. WHEN I MADE THE DECISION TO CROSS LEVEL THE TWO BNS SO THAT BOTH OF THEM WERE AT DEPLOYABLE STRENGTH YOU SHOULD HAVE HEARD THE UPROAR! HAD DIVISION ADC'S QUESTIONING MY JUDGEMENT AND MY PARENTAGE IN THE SAME BREATH. IT REALLY IS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN PEACETIME. I HOPE THAT IN WARTIME THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE PREVAILS. THE KEY IS TO CROSS LEVEL TEAMS SO THAT YOU RETAIN COHESION OF SMALL SECTIONS OR TEAMS, PLATOONS IF POSSIBLE.

May 05/89 10:37
5:18) Dave Spracher: Thanks for your comments. We are going to press with CONOPS 2004 and will be briefing the DCSOPS and maybe the CSA. Multiple crewing and use of the RC will be among our main points. Watch the news for the fireworks.
Future battlefield environment assessments address a non-linear, porous battle area that may range from the FLOT to the Corps rear boundary. With a doctrine of moving supplies as far forward as possible, Combat Service Support soldiers may be defending themselves throughout the depth of the AO. Can logistical units adequately protect LOC's and continue to provide support functions? What equipment, weapons, organizational enhancements can be implemented to assist in LOC security.

6 responses
Mar01/89 21:46
6:1) Jack Maher: THE TAIL HAS BEEN REDUCED TO THE POINT NOW THAT THEY CAN HARDLY PERFORM THEIR CSS MISSION LET ALONE DEFEND THEMSELVES. WE TOOK ALL THE TROOPS OUT OF CSS TO BUILD SOME LIGHT DIVISIONS AND DO SOME OTHER THINGS. THE SOLUTION HERE IS TO STRENGTHEN THE RANKS OF THE CSS UNITS IF THEY ARE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES TOO. SAME IS TRUE OF AVIATION UNITS. JUST AIN'T ENOUGH FOLKS LTO DO AI' THAT HAS TO BE DONE. IN THESE TYPE UNITS.

Mar10/89 09:30
6:2) Bill Mathews: I believe that Jack is on target. Besides the significant reduction in CSS force structure, the mix of male/female soldiers and the modern battlefield without a specific identifiable rear area, protection of the CSS creating area becomes even more essential. Bottom line is that protection of the CSS AO will require support from the CA or CS forces.

Mar11/89 00:42
6:3) Jack Maher: BILL, MY EXPERIENCE IS IN LIGHT DIV. AVN. I ALWAYS REQUEST SECURITY SUPPORT AND NEVER GET IT. I MAKE SURE THAT MY SOLDIERS CAN DEFEND THEMSELVES. THE DIV CDR MUST MAKE THE DECISION BASED UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION. DECISION TO BE MADE IS HOW BADLY DO I NEED THE AVN BDE VS HOW BADLY DO I NEED AN INFANTRY BN. WHEN I USE MY MAINTAINERS TO DEFEND THE DIVISION AIRFIELD I LOSE AVN CAPABILITY. THAT IS A DIV CDR CALL. MOST DIV CDR's DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT FOR TODAY I WANT MAX AVN AND YESTERDAY OR TOMORROW I DON'T NEED IT. THE MAINTENANCE CYCLE DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY!
Mar19/89 15:44
6:4) Richard Pomager: Protecting the LOC's is one of the capabilities of the military police. There are several reasons for this alignment of mission which include:
- MP's work in three man teams independently or in conjunction with other assets/forces.
- The military police have tremendous mobility and communication capability.
- The arrival of the MARK 19 will add to the fire power of the Team and give it the capability to engage enemy mounted infantry vehicles.

These capabilities permit the MP's to maintain movement and observation of the brigade and division rear areas along selected routes and to report enemy movements in the sector. Delaying actions and engagements are part of this capability. Channelling of the enemy force to avoid areas or into strong positions provides the flexibility to keep the rear areas open to continue resupply operations to maintain the battle at the front.

Note that I did not say the MP forces would solve your problem, but used properly and capitalizing on the independent operations will enhance a commander's flexibility in rear area operations.

Mar20/89 08:56
6:5) Bill Mathews: Reducing CSS functions on the battlefield to essential missions will reduce the requirement for protecting the rear area and the LOCs. Significant personnel, administrative, finance, supply accountability and maintenance administration functions can be accomplished outside the theater with our current state of the art computer support and communication capability. We need to streamline the CSS forces to provide only the minimum essential support, on location, required to sustain the force.

Mar23/89 01:35
6:6) Mark Wilkins: Agreed. Worked on the staff of a MP Bn. The chaos in the corps rear area (with all the CSS units) was difficult to keep track of and control, much less being able to coordinate any type of response to rear area incursions. Add the very real problem of large numbers of civilian refugees in a high intensity conflict and the MP capabilities mentioned in 6:4 are greatly reduced.

Mar24/89 11:55
6:7) Bill Mathews: Most CSS units have zero or minimal mobility. During peacetime operations they survive by borrowing from CA or CS units that they provide direct support to. This false mobility will be a significant liability on the battlefield so the CSS that must remain must be mobile.
I have just read, for the first time, all the CONOPS traffic to date. I offer the following thoughts for your consideration:

1. Most CONOPS approaches end up in a circular argument. For example-- "We need more people for CONOPS. True, but in HIC they will be vulnerable without their equipment and besides, how will they get to the battlefield? Okay, I guess the additional people need to come with their own equipment, ..." The point is that once you argue to bring more people AND equipment you are really saying more UNITS. We don't need a special study to tell us that we can do better on the battlefield with more units. So...what is the appropriate issue?

2. It seems to me that our charter contains two major missions, one specified and one implied. The specified mission is to PRODUCE A LIST OF COST-EFFECTIVE ACTIONS OR CHANGES THAT COULD BE TAKEN IN THE SHORT TERM GIVEN OUR CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE. Examples might be improved reload/rearm techniques, revised fighting vehicle crew duties, innovative sleep plans (perhaps involving use of a sleeping pill), minor equipment changes to enhance ability to rest and/or perform duties with less energy, better definition of work hours per day for CS/CSS units, etc.

3. The implied CONOPS mission, as I see it, is to GENERATE SOME INNOVATIVE IDEAS WHICH HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT BUT MAY INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES OR DOCTRINAL CHANGES. One example I found in the message traffic is Rich Pomager's "throw-away" weapon systems (Item 5). That is a concept worth exploring. It does NOT necessarily imply a defensive employment. Throw-away MLRS/ATACMS pods could be used in conjunction with throw-away sensors and "smart/wide area mines" (which already ARE a throw-away weapon system) in an economy of force role to allow tank/mech crews to rest or to mass for an attack. They could be used for flank protection, either. They could be repositioned. Crews could move from site to site in armored transport vehicles (tanks?) or, when feasible, by truck or copter. On the defense, selective detonation of pipe explosives (instant tank ditches) could channel enemy attacks into areas where throw-aways could kill them. Smart mines could even be emplaced beyond the FLOT under some circumstances e.g. concurrent with a cross-FLOT copter strike. Some of this sounds pretty farout --sort of like the white smock approach to warfare, but I think this is the kind of innovation we should be exploring.
7:1) Richard Pomager: Rich, I was interested in your comment about sleeping pills. Mr Gabriel in his book "No More Heros" addresses the chemical soldier. His point is that it may be possible to create a drug soldiers could take on the battle field which will reduce fatigue and maintain mental and physical alertness. He further discusses being able to use drugs to control fear and thereby increase the fighting power of each soldier and unit. The draw back of course is that we may be reducing the human demensions of combat and war fighting. The greatest short fall is the lost of a value system when under the influence of drugs. My point is that drugs will challenge our moral and ethical standards, but the price of failure in war may justify for a short period of time, immoral acts. A difficult trade off.

7:2) Robert Leonhard: Two comments. First, I would like to suggest a refinement of the methodology. Would it not be appropriate to focus the CONOPS study along strategic, operational, and tactical lines? For example, strategic considerations might examine replacement issues, inter-theater lines of communications, etc. Operational CONOPS might look at how units transition from successful battles to vigorous pursuits quickly. This study would impact force structure, C2 issues, etc. Tactical CONOPS would examine how the soldier and small unit fights up to 96 hours engagements and battles. Here we would look at automation, battlefield sensors, etc. My impression is that heretofore we have been talking across the whole spectrum.

Secondly, I'd like to mount the soapbox for the last time concerning robotics. I'm surprised that more of you don't leap to the implications vis a vis CONOPS suggested by robotic devices. It seems to me that robots offer the very best potential for executing this type of warfare...far better than adulterating the body and soul with drugs, or wastefully throwing away expensive equipment!