ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN OF LIGHT FORCES: A STRUCTURE FOR ALL SEASONS

A Monograph
by
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Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited
This monograph examines whether or not the structure of the current U.S. Army Light Infantry Division is consistent with the demands presented by deployment and employment across the broad spectrum of conflict.

The U.S. Army has expended a significant amount of its constrained resources to build the light infantry divisions. Research clearly indicates that the divisions are becoming "all purpose" forces, and are being simultaneously challenged with missions in the Low-, Mid-, and High- intensity Conflict (LIC, MIC, HIC) arenas. At the same time, they are the target of considerable debate because of a multitude of concerns. They are often viewed as too light, dependent upon tremendous amounts of augmentation and support, not survivable, and the cause of reduced capability in other sectors of the Army's force structure.

This paper concludes that there is a valid need for rapidly deployable light infantry forces in all levels of the spectrum of conflict, but that the appropriate structure is a "separate infantry brigade (light)" capable of absorbing (continued on other side of form).
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The methodology includes the following: A brief overview of the Army 86, AOE, and AirLand Battle Future contributions to the development of the present light infantry division. An analysis of the missions that the force is expected to perform. A proposed force design based upon the mission analysis. A look at the historic use of light forces in less than division packages from World War II to the present. Finally, a presentation of several hypothetical scenarios employing separate infantry brigades (light) that represent LIC, MIC, and HIC.
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"During World War II, our experimental light divisions were abandoned, largely because deficiencies were considered signs of failure rather than challenges to be overcome. We will not allow that to happen this time." —General Wickham

I. Introduction

Since the adoption of the present Light Infantry Division structure in the early 1980s, there has raged a continuous debate concerning the validity of the concept. There is no shortage of published opinion concerning its roles, strengths, weaknesses, utility, and necessary fixes.

In my view, the majority of the arguments and ideas in writing, both pro and con, have focused upon the challenge of American light forces in the context of the existing divisional structure. This monograph looks at the situation from the perspective of an alternate force design.

My research question is as follows: Is the structure of the current U.S. Army Light Infantry Division consistent with the demands presented by deployment and employment across the broad spectrum of conflict?

The following assumptions are cogent to this study because they illuminate my commitment to the concept of highly trained and rapidly deployable light infantry forces:

- The most probable situations requiring the deployment of U.S. forces in the foreseeable future will fall in the category of "operations short of war" or low-intensity conflict.
Low-intensity conflict takes many forms each requiring a unique packaging of forces and resources. We will proceed into the next century with significant constraints placed upon the U.S. Army's fiscal and manpower resources.

These constraints will not allow us to have standing organizations designed for each possible contingency. Though the probability of mid- to high-intensity warfare may be diminished, our constraints dictate that we find effective roles for our light forces in these environments as well.

Light infantry forces with specialized training have utility throughout the spectrum of conflict.

This monograph examines the research question through the following methodology: First, the need for light forces is affirmed, and the development of the present light infantry division is briefly traced. Second, the missions facing the light forces throughout the spectrum of conflict are introduced and examined in the context of the unique requirements that they imply. Third, the existing structure of the light infantry division is compared to the tasks, and, from that evaluation, an alternate approach to light force design is presented. Fourth, historical evidence is offered of light force employment from World War II to the most recent deployment to Honduras illustrating its demonstrated utility and varied configurations. Finally, hypothetical examples are
developed that examine the manner in which the proposed force structure would be used in the low-, mid-, and high-intensity (LIC, MIC, and HIC) arenas.

The question of light infantry doctrine and "how to fight" material is highly complex, and not within the scope of this project. "Heavy/Light" doctrine is a priority issue in the Army today, but this addresses only one of many areas requiring attention. The problem is compounded by the wide variety of missions our light forces must prepare to encounter. It is most important to bear in mind the doctrinal implications of this study.
"Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS): The process for determining the Army's future warfighting requirements through the development and analysis of operational concepts. These requirements, when analyzed, provide the documentation leading to the development of doctrine, training, organization, and material."

—TRADOC Regulation 11-15

II. Development of the Light Division

There are many articles, reports, and studies that attempt to capture all or part of the story of the development of the light infantry division. It is necessary to briefly revisit this subject because it is important to understand how we arrived at the present division structure before proposing an alternative.

Many individuals considered the light infantry division to be the product of a hasty Army of Excellence (ACE) decision, but it is in fact the result of a series of events that have taken place since the late 1970s. The next few pages examine that series of events.

The evolution of the light infantry division was a part of Army 86, Army of Excellence, and the ongoing AirLand Battle Future concept. It was a complex evolution representing international threats, inter-service rivalry, budget and manpower issues, high-technology developments, strategic mobility, the traditional European focus of the Army, and other significant elements.

Army 86

As the 70s came to a close, it was evident that the United States faced many diverse challenges in addition to the threat of a conventional or nuclear confrontation with
the Soviet Union in Europe. There was a need to develop a force projection capability that could represent American resolve through rapid worldwide deployment.

"The eventful year, 1979, marked the onset of the Iranian hostage crisis as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and during 1979-1980, the Carter Administration and the Department of Defense policymakers became alert to the need for flexible contingency forces, including rapidly deployable light infantry divisions." [1]

As Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer directed the development of concepts for light infantry divisions under the Army 86 Studies. Key players in this effort included General Donn A. Starry, Commanding General, TRADOC, and Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, Commanding General, Combined Arms Center.

During a one year period, four designs were presented to General Meyer, and each was significantly different. The final design (Appendix A), was approved by the Chief of Staff, but it was never fielded.

The initial guidance specified that the division's equipment must be transportable by C-141 aircraft, and established the personnel limitations based upon the eight critical functions that follow:

<table>
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<th>Function</th>
<th>Limitation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence - Surveillance - Target Acquisition</td>
<td>840</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdiction, Counterfire</td>
<td>2,105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstitution, Battle Support</td>
<td>1,820</td>
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<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>Target Servicing</td>
<td>6,930</td>
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<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>560</td>
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<td>700</td>
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\[14,140\]

It appears that even though the concerns of the
Administration and the Department of Defense were focused upon contingency missions, the Army was intent upon preserving the NATO mission as its primary concern. This is significant because each proposal presented to General Meyer seems to have been evaluated in the light of effectiveness and survivability on the conventional armored battlefield.

"On 28 September 1979, General Starry met with General Meyer to discuss initial concepts for the light division. They agreed to a statement that spelled out a clear dual mission. The light division should be able to rapidly reinforce forward forces in NATO. It would conduct worldwide contingency operations to destroy enemy forces and to control land areas, including population and resources."

Though there was a thrust toward using high technology weapons and equipment to enhance strategic mobility and lethality, the force designers had to work with systems that were either on hand or soon to be fielded. The studies show that the proposed force designs for the "light infantry division" included 155mm and 203mm howitzers, MLRS, Vulcans, Chaparrals, FIREFINDER radars, various helicopters, tanks, CEVs, bridging, and other systems that are not normally associated with light forces. The development of Light Armored Wheeled Combat Vehicles (LAWCV) was also considered.

The proposed strengths were 14,140, 15,593, 12,664, and 17,773 troops respectively. It is interesting to note that the third design (12,664) was based upon the division receiving substantial augmentation from corps. General Meyer rejected the notion of a corps slice.
"Meyer said force packaging — that is the dedication of corps units to division functions — was not an adequate substitute for building the required strength into the division...Significantly, Meyer also directed on 1 August that the size of the light division be determined by the capabilities it had to have, not the other way around."

The former CSA appears to have been so focused upon the higher spectrum of conflict that it may have been impossible to convince him of the need for a force design tailored to any other environment. The 17,773 soldier design that he approved on 18 September 1980 was larger than the H-series TO&E infantry division, and only 2,082 men smaller than the Army 86 Heavy Division.

The Army of Excellence (AOE)

"Army leadership is convinced, based on careful examination of studies which postulate the kind of world in which we will be living and the nature of conflict we can expect to face, that an important need exists for highly trained, rapidly deployable light forces. The British action in the Falkland Islands, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and our recent success in Grenada confirm that credible forces do not always have to be heavy forces."

During General Wickham's tenure as the CSA, it became more evident that the challenges of the future were to be found in the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The national interests of the U.S. were being threatened in such third world areas as Central America, Southwest Asia, the Middle East. Terrorism, insurgency, peacekeeping requirements, and a wide variety of other situations loomed ahead of us. The competition between the Armed Services for appropriate shares of the defense budget and manpower authorization was tied to their ability to respond to the perceived threat. The Army had to develop a flexible rapid
deployment capability that differed in scope from the traditional NATO orientation. The CSA responded rapidly.

"In August 1983, the CSA, General Wickham, directed TRADOC to develop a light divisional design... On 20 October 1983, the CSA approved the TRADOC design for a Light Infantry Division of 10,023 soldiers; on 30 November 1983, he approved a revised design of 10,212 soldiers."  

The development of the Army of Excellence light infantry divisions as they exist today (Appendix B) stems from General Wickham's direct guidance, and, as with the Army 86 design, was based upon strategic mobility employing the C-141 airframe. The guidance included the following:

"a. The division will contain about 10,000 soldiers.
  b. The division will have nine maneuver battalions.
  c. The division will be deployable in 400-500 aircraft sorties.
  d. One half of the division will be infantry."  

When one compares and contrasts the light infantry division of Army 86 with that of the Army of Excellence, several significant differences surface.

- General Meyer's design was the product of a detailed study requiring more than one year. The AOE design was the product of a hasty four month process.
- The Army 86 design emphasized NATO's conventional mission, and produced a large organization. The present light infantry division design emphasizes low-intensity conflict, and is a bare bones structure.
- Heavy systems including 155mm howitzers, Chaparral missile systems, and MLRS were included in the 1980 TO&E, but the AOE design is primarily limited to the lightest systems in the inventory.
Army 86 designers looked to the future of high technology systems to enhance the mobility and quality of the light infantry division. Present efforts in the area of advanced technology seem to be focused upon the systems that would be found in heavy divisions.

General Meyer would not approve any Army 86 proposal that depended upon corps packages to accomplish the mission. AOE sought to draw a line between constant and mission peculiar needs, and acknowledged the essential role of the corps or Joint Task Force (JTF).

"In all cases, the prevailing guidance was that the proponents should make organic those assets and functions that would always be needed. Those assets and functions which would be only occasionally required were passed to corps or echelons above the corps (EAC)."

In the Army 86 concept, the only strategic mobility requirement was that the division's equipment be air transportable by C-141s. The AOE concept went beyond this requirement by locking any force design to a limit of 500 C-141 aircraft.

At the beginning of this section, TRADOC Regulation 11-15 which deals with the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) was quoted. It is noteworthy that the AOE design was the product of an extremely accelerated and compressed version of CBRS. The initial guidance provided by the CSA proved to be locked in concrete, unlike the initial guidance provided for the Army 86 project.

"A General Officer Workshop (GOW) was held at CAC in September 83. Commander CAC (Lt. Gen. Vuono) presented guidance to the school and center commanders, and notified them that the normal study time-lines would be severely shortened for the effort."
Schools and centers were directed to provide same-day response to taskings from CAC when possible and take no longer than two days to respond. This requirement proved to be crucial to completion of the effort since it permitted the project to meet its abbreviated time-line."

Since the AOE force design was approved, the U.S. Army has begun to field the light divisions in the active and reserve component force. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) participated in a Department of the Army Certification process, and deployed elements to Honduras during Operation Golden Pheasant. Though the issue of light infantry forces has been subjected to heated debate, the Army has indicated its continued support for the concept.

**AirLand Battle Future**

AirLand Battle Future is the Army's current effort to look to the needs of the Nation and the Service in the year 2004 and beyond. Its assessment of the broad challenges facing America's military in the 21st Century emphasizes the need for rapidly deployable forces that can be tailored to meet the demands of a broad spectrum of conflict. LIC and MIC continue to be the most likely confrontations.

"The Army is a demonstratable deterrent to war and operations short of war by having forces in being with the requisite capabilities to meet our global missions. The Army's worldwide commitment consists of maintaining forward deployed forces geared to the geographical threat and also maintaining forces which can be tailored to all other applications of military power."12

General Carl E. Vuono, the present CSA, played a key role in the development of the light infantry divisions, and continues to support the validity of the concept. They are the kind of deployable force referred to above, and are responsible for the missions that will now be addressed.
The light infantry division rapidly deploys to conduct contingency operations which range from show-of-force operations to full combat operations against a hostile force. Whether indigenous or externally driven, these conflicts occur worldwide and range from various levels of guerrilla warfare to Soviet or Soviet proxy limited conventional war to world war.\textsuperscript{13} 

---FC 71-101

III. Missions

The designers of General Meyer's "Infantry Division 86", the Light Division, had contingency missions in mind, but it is clearly evident that the emphasis was placed upon the NATO reinforcement and mid-intensity missions. The light division that emerged from the Army of Excellence reversed the trend, and focused primarily upon the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

In his 1984 "White Paper", General Wickham attempted to present his vision of the new light infantry division. Key elements of that document include:

- An offensive orientation that is responsive to a wide range of worldwide missions, particularly where "close fighting terrain exists."
- Rapidly deployable from bases in the United States, and capable of reinforcing forward deployed forces in Europe and the Far East as well as operating in an underdeveloped contingency setting.
- Prepared to receive appropriate augmentation from corps units in mid- and high-intensity situations.
- Capable of operating independently at the brigade, battalion, and company level.
- Enhanced "lightness" generated by the development of systems to support the force.
- Elite nature of the force promoted through 100% manning, rigorous training, high quality leadership, and the regimental and COHORT systems.\textsuperscript{14}

It can be argued that no specific mission was visualized during the development of the light division. Some critics claim that it was rapidly designed to convince the Congress that the Army could fill a necessary requirement given a fair share of the defense budget. Others claim that the issue of 500 C-141 sorties "drove the train", and that the concern for strategic mobility exceeded the concern for combat capability and sustainment.

The final report pertaining to the AOE light infantry division initiative indicates that the normal CBRS Mission Area Analysis was not conducted due to time constraints.

"While the normal design process identifies the requirement for a force design through analysis of threats and construction of a Battlefield Development Plan (BDP), the initial impetus for the Light Infantry Division requirement was provided as a result of the August 1983 Army Commander's Conference (ACC) ... A key difference in the division's design process and concept based methodology was the absence of a formal analytical effort in assessing the design. The truncated methodology did not provide time for formal analysis/assessment."\textsuperscript{15}

Given the broad vision of the former CSA, and the contingency and operations plans that presently involve the new light infantry divisions, it is clear that the U.S. Army has attempted to field a kind of "all purpose force". The divisions are expected to contribute to strategic, operational, and tactical objectives that span the entire spectrum of conflict. The remainder of this section examines the missions in the context of these three levels.
Strategic and Operational

At the strategic and operational levels, the missions of the light infantry forces can be reviewed under the headings of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), Mid-Intensity Conflict (MIC), and High-Intensity Conflict (HIC).

**LIC.** This area of the spectrum of conflict represents the environment in which the designers of the AOE light infantry division saw its greatest utility. It is also the most probable source of challenges that the U.S. military will confront in the future. It does not include protracted engagements or confrontation with heavily armed conventional forces.

The final draft of FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict,* divides LIC into four general categories: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Combating Terrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacetime Contingency Operations.\(^\text{16}\)

These four categories can take on an almost infinite number of individual complexions that involve conventional and unconventional forces augmented with special assets. Peacetime Contingency Operations are, for example, subdivided into the following missions: disaster relief, shows of force and demonstrations, noncombatant evacuation operations, strikes and raids, peacemaking, unconventional warfare, security assistance programs, and support to U.S. civil authorities, including drug interdiction.\(^\text{17}\)

The wide variety of potential tasks that the light
forces must consider with respect to LIC pose significant challenges.

"What is a good working definition of a low intensity conflict?...units with the same mission have two very different training objectives. There is real concern over their (the light infantry division's) responsibilities with regard to CA (civic action), etc. involving stability operations. One division said that they were experiencing problems when designing exercises to cover this lower end of the LIC spectrum requiring missions such as crowd control and noncombatant evacuation."

MIC. Light infantry forces have also been directed to prepare to conduct combat operations in the middle of the spectrum of conflict. Under these circumstances, the division will require significant levels of augmentation and support.

"Mid-intensity warfare is characterized by limited use of force for political purposes by nations or organizations to gain permanent or temporary control of territory through the use of regular armed forces." It does not include the use of nuclear weapons, and can employ methods found in LIC.

Because of its rapid strategic mobility and the limited numbers and locations of forward deployed forces, it is obvious that light forces will be introduced into this level of warfare. Threats to U.S. national interests in South Korea, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Middle East could trigger such an application of force.

MIC. "High-intensity conflict is characterized by the unlimited use of force by one or more nations to gain or protect territory." It may include the use of nuclear weapons and the techniques found in LIC and MIC.
The mission of rapidly reinforcing the forward deployed forces in NATO has always been a part of the light force charter. The issue of "heavy/light" operations in Europe is presently receiving a great deal of scrutiny. The methods of employment and expectations of the force will be addressed later. For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge this mission, and point out that with proper augmentation there are many roles envisioned for the light soldiers.

One strategic view of the deployment of light forces to Europe in time of crisis is that it can be done without a further escalation of tensions. The light characteristics of the force should generate a view by the Warsaw Pact that the deployment is purely a defensive measure.21

The wide scope of these strategic and operational missions present a significant challenge to the light infantry division. The Army Training Board conducted visits to the light infantry divisions in 1986 and found one division with "war plans that equally emphasize the entire spectrum of conflict."22 These diverse requirements place a strain upon the planners and trainers within the divisions.

Tactical

"Light infantry is specialized for rapid air transportation, clandestine insertion, very rugged terrain, night operations, infiltration, raids and ambushes; it gives off small tactical signatures. This kind of infantry complements other forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels."23

At the tactical level, mission analysis becomes a function of identifying the requirements and mechanical capabilities of a force design centered around the light
infantryman. The following excerpt from FM 100-5, Operations, captures these issues:

"Light infantry can operate effectively in most terrain and weather. Light infantry may be the dominant arm in low-intensity conflicts, particularly given their strategic deployability. In such cases, they can take the initiative from light regulars and insurgents by fighting them on equal terms. Heavier or more mobile units can support light infantry in large battles or engagements. In operations where armored forces predominate, light units can:
- Capitalize on natural obstacles such as wetlands, forests, and mountains and occupy strongpoints in close terrain as pivots for operational and tactical level maneuver.
- Make initial penetrations in difficult terrain for exploitations by armor and mechanized infantry.
- Attack over approaches that are not feasible for heavy forces.
- Capture and defend forested and built-up areas.
- Control restrictive routes for use by other forces.
- Follow and support exploiting heavy forces when augmented with transportation.
- Conduct rear area operations, capitalizing on air mobility."

Light infantry forces are a combat multiplier if employed properly. This requires an understanding of their strengths, such as capitalizing upon adverse terrain and weather, and weaknesses, such as lack of antiarmor weapons. Within these limitations, light forces can expect to be assigned tactical missions including: air assaults, amphibious insertion, night operations, patrolling, reconnaissance, MOUT, stay-behind operations, raids and ambushes, directing of precision munitions, securing key facilities such as bridges and airfields, rear area security, economy of force actions, relief in place operations, establishing defensive positions, screening, and counter-guerrilla/counterinsurgency operations.

Indeed, the plate of missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels for light forces is full.
"...one (light infantry) division stated that their ability to conduct operations is directly driven by their (corps support plugs) ability to support. The division's ODP operations are characterized by independent small unit operations over widely dispersed areas. Each one of these must be supported, but due to their wide dispersion the DISCOM cannot function in a traditional role and there are just not enough people to support each unit individually...They believe that it is inextricably tied to the augmentation they require to fight effectively in a mid to high intensity environment. (i.e., armor, artillery, as the situation dictates)."

—U.S. Army Training Board

IV. Organizational Design

The concern about light force operations in mid- to high-intensity warfare expressed above is equally disturbing at the low-intensity end of the spectrum of conflict. Operations tend to be dispersed and mission unique augmentation of the force is essential. All of these requirements have serious command and control implications.

As was previously mentioned, General Wickham wanted the design of the AOE light infantry division to contain only those elements that would always be needed to perform the mission. Having examined the extensive variety of missions confronting the light force, I contend that the divisional structure itself is inappropriate for our light infantry. I believe that a "separate brigade" structure designed to receive appropriate levels of support would provide the strategically mobile nucleus that the former CSA sought. This section is an analysis of my proposition.

The reality of light force operations indicated by current mission analysis is one of dispersed and often small unit operations under a combined, joint, corps, or
heavy division commander. Examples of these missions are battalion sized peacekeeping forces, brigade minus show of force operations in Central America, limited attacks to rescue American citizens in hostile territory, training activities under security assistance programs, security forces for strategic locations such as airfields, brigade sized operations on restricted and urban terrain in Europe, and many others.

More than two dozen monographs pertaining to U.S. light forces were reviewed in preparing this study. All of them attempted to highlight certain strengths and weaknesses of the light infantry division. Six of these documents proposed specific improvements for the organization to make it more effective and potent. They dealt with increases in manpower and equipment in the areas of ADA, armor, field artillery, engineering, logistics, and reconnaissance. These improvements do not appear to have a substantial effect upon strategic mobility when considered individually, but if the recommendations are applied in a cumulative manner, the division would probably grow to the size of the H-series or Army 86 TO&E. Furthermore, the mission analysis in this document clearly suggests that many of the recommended changes would be inappropriate in the most likely scenarios. All of the monographs try to come to terms with the light force controversy in the context of the division structure, and do not challenge the necessity for the division to be the basic building block.
Separate brigades and regimental combat teams are not foreign to the U.S. Army. Section V of this monograph highlights some historical examples, but it is prudent to simply acknowledge the existence of these organizations at this point, as they provided a nucleus around which mission oriented task organizations were built.

The U.S. Marine Corps provides a similar concept in its Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). These two task force designs (Appendix C) are built around a battalion landing team or a regimental landing team respectively, and are augmented with a headquarters, aviation element, and service support group "formed to accomplish specific missions". They vary in size from approximately 2,000 to 15,700 Marines and sailors, and the MEB is commanded by a brigadier general.27

The 5th Infantry Brigade (Worldwide Tasks) of the United Kingdom provides another example of the separate brigade approach to meeting diverse contingencies (Appendix D). The force consists of approximately 4,500 troops including two parachute battalions, and is employed in a fashion similar to that of our light forces. The Brigade participated in the Falkland Islands conflict.

"The organization shown for this unit (5th Infantry Brigade) may not in fact be the organization deployed for contingency operations. The history of the UK expeditionary forces shows that seldom is a standardized organization deployed because of simultaneous commitments. Instead, ad hoc forces drawn from the 5th Inf Bde, the Commandos, and even home defense forces or garrison forces worldwide are thrown together, often under an ad hoc HQ. The fact remains, however, that the British have a great deal of experience at this type of operation and have done well in the past."28
The fundamental principal of CBRS is to field units that are configured to meet mission requirements. The absence of a clear mission statement combined with the abbreviated CBRS process used under the AOE initiative gave the Army a division structure for our light forces. In my view, the product would look much differently if the deliberate process had been applied.

**Strategic Airlift**

The AOE requirement for 500 C-141 sorties is not relevant in any real world scenario. Several facts support this charge. First, the division can only sustain itself for 48 hours; after that, additional sorties will be needed to provide necessary CSS. This will be also be true where host nation support is available. Second, in recent peacekeeping, rescue, security assistance, and show of force missions, we have yet to employ more than a reinforced brigade. Third, most contingencies will require varying levels of mission specific combat, CS, and CSS assets not envisioned in the original concept. Fourth, many hostile and underdeveloped nations do not have adequate airfield facilities to handle a large volume of C-141s. Lastly, the light forces will normally be under the command and control of an external organization such as a combined or joint task force headquarters, and these elements are not part of the 500 airframe figure.

**Employment, C2, and Packaging**

The Army's concern for reinforcing NATO is warranted, and there is great debate on the subject of the proper use
of light infantry forces. In this theater, as with many others, the greatest contribution of light forces is seen in dispersed small unit tactical capability. The demographics of Europe provide for the use of light infantry in built up areas and restricted terrain, but the majority of the likely areas of employment are too small for an entire light infantry division.

"To the extent that division sized defensive areas employing these (light) tactics are not available, these techniques can be scaled down to brigade sized missions. Brigade sized areas for employing these tactics are numerous."29

There is utility in Europe for the attachment of light brigades to heavy divisions. They can supplement the needs of mechanized forces in numerous ways that have been previously discussed. The logistics implications of attaching a light brigade to a heavy division seem to be tolerable, and the greatest requirement is for engineer and transportation support. Conversely, attaching mechanized units of any size to the light infantry division is more complex, and will require more involvement from corps.

"The other major challenge remains: how to arrange support for cross attached brigades. As stated earlier, rarely will there be enough contiguous "light infantry country" to employ an entire division in one sector, and it will often be wise to provide a heavy brigade and attach a light brigade to another division. In some instances it will be possible to draw support from parent DISCOMs, but in most instances corps augmentation and additional support will be required."30

The dispersion of light forces on the European and other battlefields may impose an unacceptable strain upon the division's command and control system. If the subordinate units were involved in rear area, covering force, stay behind, MOUT, or airmobile operations
throughout the entire corps area, the division would be severely pressed to provide responsive C2, fires, and logistics support. The attachment of highly mobile mechanized forces to a light division could become even more difficult in this respect. It appears that the corps or heavy division headquarters is better equipped to effectively provide this function for light infantry brigades.

Because of the diverse requirements associated with each contingency mission, the light force must be carefully task organized. The terms "augmentation" and "support" are used frequently in most documents pertaining to light forces. They deserve brief definitions because of their significance.

The term "augmentation" is not found in FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, but it is often used synonymously with the term "command relationships". These relationships include assigned, attached, and OPCON; all of which have special significance with respect to administration, C2, and logistics.

"Support" is "the action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another unit. A supporting unit remains under the command of its parent headquarters; however the supporting unit is authorized and required, within the context of the directive establishing the relationship, to respond directly to the supported unit's request for support." Support relationships include direct support (DS), reinforcing (R), general
support (GS), and general support-reinforcing (GSR).

Establishing a direct command relationship between a separate light infantry brigade and a combined/joint task force, corps, or heavy division may be more realistic and responsive in terms of C2, fire support, logistics, and other essential needs. If the most common employment of light forces is in brigade size packages or smaller, and if the present structure requires significant augmentation and support in most theaters, it would appear that the division must further suballocate the additional assets. Given this reality and the previously mentioned C2 problems, the division headquarters may be an unnecessary level that further complicates force employment.

The Separate Infantry Brigade (Light)

My proposal for a separate infantry brigade (light) (Appendix E) is an attempt to outline an organization that meets five criteria: First, it consists of elements that have utility in any of the missions discussed in this paper. Second, it is organized to facilitate decentralized operations at the level that capitalizes upon the strengths of light infantry—the brigade and below. Third, it possesses a headquarters capable of receiving substantial augmentation and support. Fourth, it facilitates decentralized operations within an army or corps area of operations. Fifth, it provides the essential nucleus for the most likely strategic deployments under LIC scenarios.

The proposal must be considered as a general outline. A detailed TO&E is beyond the scope of this monograph.
Providing more specific data without applying the complete CBRS process would be a repeat of a significant shortfall of the 1983 AOE effort.

The separate infantry brigade (light) would be commanded by a brigadier general, and consist of a headquarters (with general staff), three battalions of light infantry soldiers, a light field artillery battalion, a support battalion, and minimal combat support assets. It is similar in design concept to previous U.S. Army separate brigades and regiments, Marine expeditionary forces, and the British 5th Infantry Brigade.

The following comments address the peculiarities of the envisioned organic combat, combat support, and combat service support elements:

- The antitank company in each battalion returns some of the antiarmor punch lost in the AOE design. Most countries now possess a variety of armored vehicles that threaten the light force. In an environment where this is not a problem, the company provides the battalion with additional troops and vehicles.

- The artillery battalion provides conventional fire support that is airmobile and suitable to any terrain. The battalion headquarters can facilitate coordinated fire support when reinforced by other cannon units. As with the antitank company, it provides additional troops and vehicles to the brigade in support of non-combat missions.
- The support battalion provides the essential services for the organic elements, and its headquarters is designed to receive substantial augmentation and support. The supply and transportation company and the aviation company are designed to enhance the mobility of the brigade.

- The signal company must have a satellite communications capability, and be equipped with long range systems that are lightweight and secure.

- Air defense and engineer systems must be lightweight and general purpose in nature. As with many other systems, the conditions of METT-T will dictate the kinds of CS plugs required from higher echelons.

A fundamental principle of this paper is that the light force missions are so varied that it is impossible to have one standing organization that does it all. Some theaters will require light forces to receive a mix of tanks, TOWs, AH-64s, engineer battalions, civil affairs units, medical units, ground and air transportation units, logistics units, military police, or other assets. In some LIC scenarios the separate brigade (light) will require minimal assistance, while in others it will require a great deal more. The keys are flexibility of the brigade's design and detailed planning at the combined, joint, and army levels.

Miscellaneous Implications

The comments that follow highlight some additional implications of my proposal to replace U.S. Army light infantry divisions with separate infantry brigades (light).
AirLand Battle doctrine espouses four tenets: agility, initiative, synchronization, and depth. The separate brigade approach enhances each of these tenets, but particularly agility and synchronization.

By designing a structure that provides a nucleus for mission specific force packaging at the most likely level of employment, we improve our strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. This strength offers us the necessary agility to apply light infantry skills in a decentralized manner before the enemy has time to react.

The absence of an additional layer of command and control (division), and the design of a potent separate brigade headquarters facilitates a more synchronized and responsive application of light infantry combat power. This will be true in LIC or MIC under a combined or JTF commander, or in MIC or HIC under the control of a corps or heavy division.

If the separate brigades are formed from existing active forces alone, they will provide us with the highly trained and strategically responsive light infantry that force designers have sought since the 1970s. The required number of separate infantry brigades (light) must be determined by CBRS, but I suspect that the current active component light infantry divisions would provide sufficient assets.

The present CONUS stationing plan for the light divisions may satisfy stationing requirements for the separate brigades. Perhaps two brigades could occupy each...
installation where full divisions now stand.

Combat, CS, and CSS assets taken from the existing divisions by the reorganization could be used to form active component units at the levels of corps and echelons above the corps (EAC). An example would be the creation of additional corps aviation groups. The majority of the CS and CSS units at these levels are found in the reserve component force structure, appear on numerous contingency plans, and are, to a certain extent, less proficient and responsive than active duty elements. The light infantry concept is built upon rapid deployment, yet without plugs from above that are equally responsive, it is impotent.

Since we live in a world of ever-increasing constraints on manpower and resources, it is prudent to maximize our productivity. The adoption of the separate infantry brigade (light) would give us a force structure "for all seasons", while releasing other assets to fill multiple needs. The corps aviation group mentioned above could be stationed near the light brigades to provide them with training and contingency support while simultaneously serving other needs of the Army. This rationale could apply to most other types of organizations. Such decentralized force structuring could enhance the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) by making more autonomous and digestible units readily available for contingency planning.

In his article entitled "Three Kinds of Infantry", Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, USA, suggests that we have
a gap in our infantry structure that must be filled. He points out the value of "armored infantry" working with the M2 Bradley system, and "light infantry" performing highly decentralized operations. The gap is a lack of "regular infantry" operating in M113s with the capabilities that the previous H-series TO&E units possessed.\textsuperscript{32} Perhaps a restructuring of our light infantry into a select quantity of active component separate brigades would reduce the number of light infantrymen, and free some active and reserve manpower to offset this gap. Analysis of the proposal could indicate that we need fewer light brigades than AOE divisions require, and the reserve component could become the primary source of "regular infantry".

The separate infantry brigade (light) concept could be integrated into the programs that preposition theater specific equipment. This would enhance strategic mobility and responsiveness. If certain brigades were given a theater orientation, they might take advantage of the Maritime Prepositioning or POMCUS programs.

Finally, General Wickham's 1984 \textit{White Paper} emphasized the special need for light infantry forces to build unit cohesion through rigorous training, quality leadership, and personnel programs such as the COHORT system. He encouraged recurring assignments within the light community.\textsuperscript{33} Limiting the force design of light infantry forces to separate brigades containing only those elements common to the wide variety of mission requirements could complement the goals of the COHORT and regimental systems.
The verdict of this study is that infantry has played a more significant role in twentieth-century warfare than has hitherto generally been realized and that foot soldiers will likely continue to occupy an extremely important place in any future conflict.34

—English, A Perspective on Infantry

V. Historical Perspective

This section offers historical examples from World War II to the present that support my proposition that light infantry forces are best organized as separate brigades. The intent is not to present a detailed analysis of the conduct of each operation, but simply to expose operations at the brigade level and below that represent the kinds of missions our light infantry can expect. The focus will be upon the situation, mission, organization, and command and control. Each example represents a specific theme.

World War II

The employment of Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) with substantial mission specific augmentation and support was common in WW II. These RCTs support the proposition that brigade level organizations can be designed that independently command and control diverse force packages in the HIC environment. This was particularly true of the Pacific Theater where decentralized island operations often required the use of infantry centered forces. The invasion of Corregidor in the Philippines is a classic example.

On 5 February 1945, the 503rd RCT was alerted for the mission by the VIII Army, and conducted the operation during the period 16 February through 2 March 1945. The battle included airborne and amphibious assaults, naval and
air force support, and native efforts. The RCT received substantial augmentation (Appendix F--Task Organization), was commanded by a colonel, and, as a nondivisional force, reported directly to the XI (U.S.) Corps. The enemy was defending from a network of extensive underground positions that required systematic reduction by light infantry. Of a Japanese garrison of 5,500 soldiers, 4,506 were KIA and only 19 POWs were taken. The RCT headquarters coordinated all combat and logistical actions.\(^\text{35}\)

**Korea**

The introduction of U.S. ground forces into Korea in 1950 was a landmark event with significant implications for future force design, readiness, and strategic mobility. This was our first "come as you are" war, and the state of the post WW II Army was not up to the task. The proposed separate infantry brigade (light) acknowledges the need for rapid strategic deployments into a MIC theater, and attempts to provide a force that is highly trained, effectively tailored, and realistically transportable.

Task Force Smith was "a delaying force of two rifle companies, under a battalion commander, reinforced by two platoons of 4.2 inch mortars and one platoon of 75mm recoilless rifles."\(^\text{36}\) The nucleus of the force was the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division on occupation duty in Japan, and was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith. It was alerted on 30 June, deployed by air on 1 July, and in contact with the enemy on 5 July. It deployed rapidly in advance of the
division, but it failed to accomplish its mission:

"Advance at once upon landing with delaying force, in accordance with the situation, to the north by all possible means, contact enemy now advancing from Seoul towards Suwon and delay his advance."

**Vietnam**

The conditions of METT-T dictated that light infantry would play a dominant role in Southeast Asia. Several light combat units in country operated under the control of MACV or a corps headquarters, and were deployed in less than division strength. The 82nd Airborne Division maintained one brigade; the 101st initially sent one brigade with the remainder of the division following later in the war, and separate brigades such as the 196th Light Infantry Brigade participated in combat operations. The success of independent infantry brigades in this theater demonstrate the flexibility and utility of the proposed light force structure. They received and employed diverse augmentation and support, and conducted decentralized operations as dictated by the situation.

From 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967, The 196th conducted three brigade, 14 battalion, eight company, 26 platoon, and 317 small unit actions. These included airmobile, search and destroy, ambush, local government support, security, and night operations. The brigade frequently received substantial augmentation. Appendix G shows the Task Organization for Operation JUNCTION CITY.

The Marines in the battle for Hue during Tet'68 offer an example of light forces in the MOUT environment. During
the 25 day fight for the city, the 1st Marine Regiment committed two battalions. The regiment was augmented with "Ontos" self-propelled recoilless rifles, tanks, and 40mm "Dusters" (Army), and received support in the form of 203mm howitzers, naval gunfire, close air support (limited due to bad weather), helicopters, and landing craft. Operations were complicated by the presence of South Vietnamese units in Hue, and the civilian residents. Progress against the determined enemy was slow, consumed substantial amounts of ammunition and explosives, and, like Corregidor, required a systematic reduction by infantrymen. 39

Peacekeeping in the Middle East

Today, U.S. forces are deployed in the Sinai as visible symbols of our effort to promote peace in the Middle East. This force is the product of a 1981 agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the UN, and the United States is required to provide one battalion, observers, and logistics support as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). A civilian Director-General is responsible for the supervision of the force to include appointing the Force Commander. 40 It has been a sensitive, yet highly successful effort, and the Army has provided the U.S. contingent in the Sinai.

The proposed separate brigade would be well suited for this LIC task. It is a small, self-contained, and highly trained force with an independent command and control element, and can execute the mission without being a major distraction for a division sized organization.
Grenada

The 1983 Operation URGENT FURY was a contemporary rapid deployment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) on a contingency mission. The manner in which it was conducted has been subjected to significant criticism, but the mission of rescuing U.S. citizens, expelling Cubans, and restoring political order in Grenada was accomplished. Official reports on the operation are still classified, and available information is sketchy.

"U.S. forces used during this four day period consisted of a Marine Amphibious Unit (battalion size), two Ranger Battalions (-), some Special Forces, and a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division which deployed during the 25 through 27 October period. An additional brigade of the 82nd Airborne division closed Grenada on the 28th to participate in mop-up operations."

Honduras

The first strategic employment of an AOE light infantry force occurred in the 1988 Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT. This successful mission was a show of force in response to an incursion by Nicaraguan troops into Honduras. It represents the rapid deployment contingencies that our light forces face involving relatively small units working under a JTF or theater commander to accomplish a strategic mission. Most related reports are still classified.

"On 17 March, 1988, the initial elements of a combat ready force boarded transport aircraft and headed to Pamerola, Honduras. The lead battalions of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Ft. Ord, Calif., and the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, N.C., were "wheels up" in less than 18 hours after being alerted by the National Command Authorities. Within slightly more than 30 hours, 52 Air Force sorties delivered 2,950 soldiers and ai men and hauled more than 890 short tons of equipment."

Separate infantry brigades (light) under a JTF would have been responsive in both Grenada and Honduras.
"The role of the light division, when we initially developed the concept, was based on using them in crisis and pre-crisis environments—low-intensity—with their capability augmented for mid- to high-intensity. Now, I think that role is still very applicable, and gives the National Command Authority a flexibility they didn't have before...The capabilities that the light division give us for mid- to high-intensity conflicts, particularly used in conjunction with heavy forces, gives us an increased response capability." —General Vuono

VI. Hypothetical Scenarios

This paper agrees with the above comment that was recently made by the CSA to the extent that light forces have utility in any environment. They offer the NCA and the U.S. Army numerous options in a world of constrained resources and limited response time. The only departure from the statement is with respect to the divisional structure of the light force.

This section addresses the employment of the proposed separate infantry brigade (light) in hypothetical scenarios. The scenarios represent missions across the entire spectrum of conflict that light forces might be called upon to perform. They are addressed in general terms, and focus upon the situation, mission, and major augmentation/support.

In the few instances where a light force larger than a brigade might be required (Southwest Asia—MIC), additional brigades could be committed to the fight under the command and control of a JTF, land component, or corps commander. Higher echelons of command and control and their respective CS and CSS packages would surely be required in a theater where large formations of U.S. combat troops are present.
Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines

**Situation.** The U.S. must be prepared to deploy forces to safeguard facilities of strategic interest. Such deployments may not involve active combat operations.

In this hypothetical scenario, the Government of the Philippines, involved in its counterinsurgency operations, is concerned about the security of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, and has asked the U.S. to provide additional security forces for the facilities. Consistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, the force is restricted to the bases, and does not participate in combat operations.

**Mission.** The U.S. Army deploys a separate infantry brigade (light) to provide security at Clark Air Base. The brigade commander coordinates the effort through the U.S. commander at Clark Air Base.

**Augmentation/support.** Given the mission, the existing infrastructure, and the presence of the airfield, minimal external requirements exist. This is a low-intensity situation, and the package must not give the insurgency an opportunity to generate propaganda about a U.S. invasion. The proposed structure is ideal for the mission because of its size, C2, and internal organic assets.

Iceland

**Situation.** AirLand Battle Future studies are concerned with a multitude of scenarios facing us in the year 2004 and beyond. One scenario addressed is the deployment of a brigade to Iceland to provide base defense for U.S. Air Force assets during a war with the Warsaw Pact.
**Mission.** A U.S. Army separate infantry brigade (light) conducts an unopposed deployment to Iceland to establish a defense of U.S. facilities. The brigade commander is the task force commander.

**Augmentation/support.** Though this mission is similar to the Philippine scenario, the conditions of METT-T require a substantially larger force package. The environment is austere, and a significant logistics base must be established. Additional air defense artillery, attack helicopter, chemical, combat engineer, and signal assets are required in this high-intensity mission. The proposed organization would be suited for this mission because of its ability to operate independently and absorb substantial augmentation and support.

**Central America**

**Situation.** A country in the region is suffering from economic and insurgency problems, and is threatened by a neighboring country. U.S. military assistance is requested, and a package is designed to provide assistance.

**Mission.** A separate infantry brigade (light) is deployed to conduct training with the host nation, conduct a show of force/support, assist in limited civic action efforts, establish a secure area for follow-on forces, and prepare to assist in noncombatant evacuation operations. The brigade commander reports to an established JTF.

**Augmentation/support.** A logistics package must be designed for the brigade based upon the existing infrastructure. Attack helicopter, civil affairs, military
police, engineer, medical, signal, and psychological operations units are also provided to the brigade. As with previous scenarios, the proposed separate brigade can be deployed to the theater without having to decimate an entire division to meet mission requirements.

Middle East

Situation. The United Nations has successfully negotiated a cease-fire involving two states in the region. The agreement provides for a multinational peacekeeping force, and the U.S. is designated as a participant.

Mission. A U.S. separate infantry brigade (light) rotates battalion size forces into the region in accordance with the specifications of the agreement. The battalion commander reports to a U.S. military liaison officer who is subordinate to the force commander appointed by the U.N. director of the multinational peacekeeping force.

Augmentation/support. Each nation provides support for its own forces. Because the commitment is for an extended period of time, the U.S. establishes a logistics, medical, and training base under the command of the U.S. military liaison officer (possibly the brigade commander). The proposed organization is ideally suited for the mission. It rotates its three infantry battalions integrated with troops and vehicles from the field artillery battalion and a platoon of the aviation company.

Europe

Situation. There is much debate in the U.S. Army concerning the employment of light infantry in Europe.
During exercises conducted at Fort Leavenworth, it has been difficult to commit the light infantry division in CENTAG without breaking it down into brigade size units with mission specific augmentation. This monograph has alluded to the difficulties with span of control, demographics, armored threat, cross-attachment, transportation, and logistics when employing a light division in the theater.

In this situation, a corps commander is given two separate infantry brigades (light) to operate in his area during hostilities with the Warsaw Pact. Two missions in this high-intensity scenario are presented.

**Mission 1.** A separate infantry brigade (light) provides rear area security for the corps during its deep attack. The brigade disperses infantry and artillery units on key terrain along the MSRs, escorts convoys as directed, conducts patrolling, provides a battalion size reaction force within a specified time, and provides security for corps Class III and V points along the routes.

**Augmentation/support.** Signal support must be provided to enhance the dissemination of information. Additional attack and lift helicopters must be identified and placed on call for the reaction force mission. A TLAT battalion can assist in neutralizing bypassed enemy armor. CH-47s can lift the units to their initial positions, and insert 105mm howitzers in restricted terrain, thus reducing their vulnerability to bypassed armor. Engineer support will help prepare selected positions, and repair damage to roads and bridges as it is reported by the light forces. Corps
MPs in the area can be OPCON to the brigade. The proposed separate brigade structure provides the appropriate nucleus and C2 for this dispersed mission, and eliminates an unnecessary headquarters between itself and corps.

Mission 2. The second separate infantry brigade (light) is attached to the heavy division designated as the corps main attack. It is assigned several missions: Two battalion size airmobile operations are conducted to secure critical bridges along the axis of advance. Elements of the remaining battalion are infiltrated during the night before the attack to conduct reconnaissance, attack selected C2 targets, and direct precision guided munitions.

Augmentation/support. Additional lift helicopters are required to conduct simultaneous air assaults. Elements of a TLAT battalion can be inserted at the bridge sites to enhance the defense. The heavy division support command must work with the light brigade's support battalion to insure that logistic, medical, and transportation requirements are met.

An advantage of the separate brigade structure over the light infantry division structure is a properly designed support battalion. The light infantry division support command is not divisible by three, and cannot support three brigades that are spread throughout a corps sector. If the light infantry forces are normally committed in brigade or smaller packages, the support battalion concept enhances flexibility, and facilitates the attachment of the brigade to another unit--Army, Marine, or Allied.
"It (Operation Golden Pheasant) demonstrated the capability to fuse dispersed units—home-based on opposite coasts—into an effective fighting force. We gained this flexibility by developing a common how-to-fight doctrine, by building units with AOE-standard components, by fielding quality equipment and by conducting realistic training to pull it all together.46

—LTG Schwarzkopf

VII. Conclusion

This monograph is an attempt to assess whether or not the structure of the current U.S. Army Light Infantry Division is consistent with the demands presented by deployment and employment across the broad spectrum of conflict. In doing so, an examination of the division's origins and missions is presented, and the reorganization of light forces into separate infantry brigades (light), based upon historical experience and anticipation of future requirements, is proposed.

Light infantry forces orient upon small unit skills, and will usually be employed at the brigade level or below in most LIC, MIC, and HIC scenarios. The present division is not self-sufficient in any environment, cannot divide its DISCOM by three, and would be hard pressed to provide effective C2 when its assets are spread over a large area, such as that of a corps. Is it not then appropriate to structure the unit as it will operate, and give it the capability to absorb mission specific augmentation/support?

We live in a world of constrained resources, and must synergize our potential through responsible and responsive force development. The AOE initiative served the Army well by focusing upon our most likely threats, but, in its haste, it produced an inappropriate design.
Appendix B: Army of Excellence--Light Infantry Division
**MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (MEU)**

**NOTIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION**

**APPRAO PERSONNEL**

USMC 1400
USN 100

- HEADQUARTERS
- ATTACK SQUADRON
- AIRLIFT LANDING TEAM
- NAVAL SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP

**AIRCRAFT/LAUNCHERS 1/**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Aircraft/Launcher</th>
<th>Major Ground Combat Equipment</th>
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<tr>
<td>4 CH-53D/E</td>
<td>5 TANKS 8 155MM HOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 CH-46</td>
<td>8 BMIM MORTARS 9 60MM MORTARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 UH-1</td>
<td>12 DRAGON TRACKERS 20 50 CAL MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 AH-1</td>
<td>8 TOW LAUNCHERS 60 M-60 MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 STINGER TEAMS</td>
<td>12 AAV 26 Mk-19 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHERS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual task organization formed to accomplish specific missions may vary from the organization shown.

1/ The ACF could be reinforced by 1 VMA DET (6 AV-8) as the tactical situation dictates.

**MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB)**

**NOTIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION**

**APPRAO PERSONNEL**

USMC 15,000
USN 700

- BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
- REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM
- BRIGADE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP

**AIRCRAFT/LAUNCHERS 1/**

<table>
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<th>Aircraft/Launcher</th>
<th>Major Ground Combat Equipment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 AV-8B or 19 A-4N</td>
<td>17 TANKS 24 155MM HOW (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 F/A-18 or 24 F-4</td>
<td>24 BMIM MORTARS 6 155MM HOW (SP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 A-6</td>
<td>8 CH-53D 96 DRAGON TRACKERS 6 8&quot; HOW (SP)</td>
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<td>4 EA-6</td>
<td>20 CH-53D 48 TOW LAUNCHERS 27 60MM MORTARS</td>
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<td>4 RF-4B</td>
<td>48 CH-46 47 AAV 133 50 CAL MG</td>
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<td>5 OA-4N</td>
<td>12 UH-1 36 LAV 255 M-60 MG</td>
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<td>6 KC-130</td>
<td>12 AH-1 114 Mk-19 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 OV-10</td>
<td>6 HAWK LAUNCHERS 15 STINGER TEAMS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual task organization formed to accomplish specific missions may vary from the organization shown.

1/ The aviation force shown, when added to an MFS force list, equals approximately 1/3 of the total active aviation force assets. This force is not ideal (for example, 24 attack helicopters are the recognized minimum to properly support a MAB).
Appendix D: 5th Infantry Brigade (Worldwide), U.K.
Appendix E: Proposed -- Separate Infantry Brigade (Light)
Appendix F: 503rd Regimental Combat Team, "Rock Force"--
Task Organization (16 Feb. - 2 Mar. 1945)

2. Commander: Colonel George M. Jones
3. Organic Units:
   Headquarters and Headquarters Co, 503rd Inf. Rgt
   1st Bn, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment
   2nd Bn, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment
   3rd Bn, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment
   462nd Parachute Field Artillery Bn
   C Co, 161st Parachute Engineer Bn
4. Attachments:
   3rd Bn, 34th Infantry Regiment
   18th Portable Surgical Hospital (Reinforced)
   3rd Plt, Antitank Co, 34th Infantry Regiment
   3rd Plt, Cannon Co, 34th Infantry Regiment
   3rd Plt, C Co, 24th Medical Bn
   Detachment, Service Co, 34th Infantry Regiment
   A Btry, 950th AAA (AW) Bn
   174th Ordnance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal)
   Detachment, 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment
   Detachment, 98th Signal Bn
   Detachment, 1st Plt, 603rd Tank Co
   Detachment, 592nd Joint Assault Signal Co
   Detachment, 6th Support Air Party
   Combat Photo Unit A, GHQ Signal Section
   Combat Photo Unit Q, GHQ Signal Section
Appendix G: 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep), "Chargers"--Task Organization (21 Feb. - 9 Apr. 1967)


2. Commander: Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles

3. Organic Units:
   - Headquarters and Headquarters Co, 196th Lt. Inf. Bde (Sep)
   - 2nd Bn, 1st Infantry
   - 3rd Bn, 21st Infantry
   - 4th Bn, 31st Infantry
   - 3rd Bn, 82nd Field Artillery
   - F Troop, 17th Cavalry
   - 196th Bde Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment
   - 48th Infantry Scout Dog Plt
   - 175th Engineer Co
   - 8th Support Battalion

4. Attachments:
   - 1st Bn (Mechanized), 5th Infantry
   - 2nd Bn, 34th Armor
   - Btry C, 1st Bn, 8th Field Artillery
   - Btry D, 2nd Bn, 35th Field Artillery
   - Btry C, 7th Bn, 11th Field Artillery

1. GEN John A. Wickham, Letter to Light Infantry Division Commanders from the Chief of Staff of the Army, Spring 1985.


4. Ibid., p. 28.

5. Ibid., p. 25.


10. Ibid., p. 1-5.


17. Ibid., p. 5-5.
18. U.S. Army Training Board, Memorandum for the Commanding General, Subject: Feedback from Visits to United States Army Light Infantry Divisions, (Fort Eustis, VA, 15 October 1986), p. 2.c.(1)


20. Ibid., p. 2-5.


22. U.S. Army Training Board, Memorandum for the Commanding General, p. 2.a.


25. U.S. Army Training Board, Memorandum for the Commanding General, p. 2.b.(1).


30. Ibid., p. 5.


35. 503rd Regimental Combat Team Unit Report, Corregidor Operation (Operation #48), Regimental S2, (5 March 1945), Inclosure #2.

37. Ibid., p. 59.


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