THE FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER: CAN A BETTER FORMAT BE FOUND TO TRANSMIT COMBAT INFORMATION TO SMALL TACTICAL UNITS?

A Monograph

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This monograph attempts to determine whether the current US five paragraph field order is the best format to use when transmitting the commander's intentions, combat information and tasks to battalions of smaller tactical units. Historical research was conducted concerning the current US five paragraph field order to determine its foundation, how the format evolved throughout 20th century, the formats' key points, and the lessons learned concerning order formats. After completing the historical research, additional research was conducted to identify current order formats used by other nations and to determine their strengths and weaknesses. The formats researched are those used in Israel, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. The final part of the study compared formats with the aim of determining if a better format exists or could be synthesized. This study concludes that a better

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ABSTRACT

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This monograph attempts to determine whether the current United States (US) five paragraph field order is the best format to use when transmitting the commander's intentions, combat information and tasks to battalions of smaller tactical units.

Initially, historical research was conducted concerning the current US five paragraph field order to determine its foundation, how the format evolved throughout 20th century warfare and its strengths and weaknesses. The products of the historical research are the presentation of formats used by small tactical units prior to and during each major US warfighting experience of the 20th century, the formats' key points, and the lessons learned concerning order formats. After completing the historical research, additional research was conducted to identify current order formats used by other nations and to determine their strengths and weaknesses. The formats researched are those used in Israel, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. The final part of the study compared formats with the aim of determining if a better format exists or could be synthesized.

This study concludes that a better format than the current US format is not in use and that a better format can be synthesized from the strengths of all the formats studied. This synthesized format is developed and presented in Section 4 of this study. Also, this study finds that the entire order process needs to be sped up and that a mission-type order format for use by high speed armor and cavalry units needs to be developed.
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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

"The order in the field is issued under peculiar conditions of emergency and inconvenience. It is received sometimes in the midst of great excitement and danger; perhaps it must be read in a rain storm where no shelter is near, or at night by a poor light. Every care must be taken to make it brief, in plain phrase and short sentence." Eben Swift, 1897.

A field order's purpose is threefold; to ensure subordinate units function in a coordinated manner towards achieving the commander's will, to limit and determine what information is transmitted to subordinate units, and to format the transmission of information in a standard sequence to facilitate its development and understanding.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the current United States (US) five paragraph field order is the best format to use when transmitting the commander's intentions, combat information and tasks to battalions or smaller units. The five paragraph field order has been used for decades to transmit critical information needed by US ground forces to coordinate movement, fires, and support. Its foundation lay in 19th century German military experiences and was introduced to the US military by Captain Eben Swift in 1897. The US order format has evolved throughout 20th century warfare with the aim of keeping pace with changes in weapons, tactics, and the tempo of modern combat.
This study is important because US ground forces will initially fight the next war using methods and techniques taught at its service schools and established in its doctrine. The current five paragraph order is embedded in US doctrine, with every level doctrinal manual from platoon through corps devoting annexes to explain how orders should be written and what information should go in each paragraph and subparagraph of the order. Current tactical doctrine stresses that the modern battlefield will require the use of orders that enable the commander to transmit to his subordinates "what to do" versus "how to do" concerning operations. Three out of four of the AirLand Battlefield tenets (agility, synchronization and initiative) establish the need for ground forces to move and deploy rapidly, in a coordinated manner, sometimes without the benefit of orders but based only on a higher commander's intent or vision of the battlefield. Doctrine concerning communications emphasizes the need to properly sequence information to facilitate its understanding and stresses the need to put the "bottom line" or most important part of the transmission up front. In addition to the doctrinal emphasis, the relativity factor plays a significant part in deciding the victor in battle. In the next war, US personnel, weapons systems, doctrine, and techniques will be pitted against its enemy's. Even if US ground forces currently employ a good system or technique, they still could lose a battle if the enemy employs a better or faster system or technique. This
The study will examine the doctrinal foundation of the US's current five paragraph field order to help determine its battlefield functionality and worth, and it will compare the US order format with order formats used by other nations in an attempt to determine if it is the best format for transmission of information and tasks to battalions and smaller tactical units.

This work is limited to the study of battalion and smaller unit operations. The following methodology was used in an attempt to answer the research question.

- Initially, historical research was conducted concerning the current US five paragraph field order to determine its foundation and to examine how the format evolved throughout 20th century warfare. The product of this research is the presentation of formats used by small tactical units prior to and during each major US warfighting experience of the 20th century (World War I, World War II, and Vietnam). In addition to the formats, the research aimed at discovering the key points for an order format's use and also lessons learned concerning the order formats.

- After completing the historical research, additional research was conducted to identify current order formats used by other selected nations and to determine their strengths and weaknesses. The formats researched are those used in Israel, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The final part of the study compared formats with the aim of determining if a better format exists or could be synthesized. The criteria used for the comparison was:

* Battle tested.
* Critical information content.
* Brevity (elimination of redundancy or unnecessary information).
* Sequencing of information (Is the bottom line up front?).

The study concludes with an answer to the research question and comments on its significance.

SECTION 2. THE U.S. FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER

Prior to World War I (WWI) several different formats were used to transmit information and tasks to subordinate units. During the American Civil War, commanders sent letters of instruction that varied in detail, content, and length. Oral orders were the norm, with written orders serving as follow-on instructions.2

In 1897, Eben Swift introduced a format in an article published in the Cavalry Journal. Swift's order format consisted of a caption, body and ending. The body of the order was divided into five paragraphs (see figure 2.1). The
THE BODY OF SWIFT’S FORMAT

1. Information of the enemy and general situation.
   -This paragraph included information on the enemy’s location and what the higher commander thought the enemy’s intentions were.
   -In absences of information it was the higher commander’s best guess or idea.

2. Your own plans.
   -This paragraph contains an intimation of the end in view.
   -It gave only so much of the general plan as would enable the subordinates to carry out the operations in hand.

3. Your dispositions.
   -This paragraph described the manner in which troops were distributed and assigned tasks to the various fractions of command.
   -It established the method of enumerating troops apart from the text, in the left margin, in a column headed "Distribution of Troops."
   -Most important distribution of troops is stated first to better impress themselves upon the memory.
   -Designates a start point and time.

4. Destination of trains.
   -Addresses the need to separate light and heavy baggage.
   -Contains all the orders needed for the trains, ammunition columns and sanitary troop.

5. Position of the commander.
   -Gives position of commander.
   -Gives hour for staff officers to report for orders.

FIGURE 2.1 - SWIFT’S FORMAT
foundation of Swift's format was the German format developed by Moltke's general staff.  

Swift's format had several key points. The paragraph concerning enemy intent/locations served as the foundation for the development of the rest of the order. The higher commander's end state or "intimation of the end in view" was transmitted to subordinates along with the commander's location during the battle. Swift's format established the practice of listing the distribution of troops in the left margin separate from the body of the order. Finally, Swift's format established the use of separate orders for each fraction of command (i.e. advanced guard, main body, rear body) and limited the information transmitted to subordinates to only that which they needed to know to carry out their individual parts of the operation.

In general terms, Swift's orders were clear, short, precise, and complete. They avoided every form of expression that could have been misunderstood because experience showed that such orders had invariably been misunderstood. Swift's order format used positive terms so that responsibility could be placed with ease. Orders were complete in form and legible even by a bad light. They avoided conjectures, expectations, reasons or apologies for measures taken. No order was given for things which would ordinarily be done without special instructions. A sample brigade order, written by Captain Swift, is presented in figure 2.2. In 1906, Swift's order
FIELD ORDERS
No. 1

Distribution of Troops
11-21

Advance Cavalry:
1 sq. 6 Cav. less 2 Plat.

Advance Guard (Col. A)
1/2 platoon of Cav.
1 Inf. Regt. less 1 bat.
1/2 Company Engineers

Detachment of Bearer Co.

Main Body and Order of
March (at 1,000 yds.)
Staff of 1 Brigade
1/2 Platoon of Cav.
III Battalion 1 Inf.
Battery A, 1 Art.
2 Inf. Regt.
3 Inf. Regt. less 2 Cos.

Det. of Bearer Co.
1/2 Amb. Co.

Rear Guard (at 500 yds.)
1 platoon of Cav.
2 companies 3 Inf.

I. The enemy is reported at Winchester advancing on Leavenworth.

II. The brigade will seize the line of the Big Stranger Creek tomorrow.

III. a. The cavalry will find the enemy and screen the march. The bridges will be held until the arrival of the infantry when cavalry will go to the flanks.
b. At 6 A.M. the brigade (except as above) will assemble near Frenchmans and will march by the road Frenchman's 8 mile House.
c. The rear guard will send a detachment to guard the train.

IV. The heavy baggage will be parked at West End parade until 12 o'clock noon, when it will follow troops.

V. I will be with the main body until 8 A.M. and with the advance guard after that hour.

B. Brigadier

General
Dictated to Staff.
Copy by orderly to Squ., on, Battery, and Regimental Commanders.”

FIGURE 2.2 - SAMPLE FIELD ORDER
format was approved by the War Department and incorporated into US Army Field Service Regulations. *

The order format used initially in WWI was Swift's modified format. As the war progressed, Swift's modified format was found to be unsatisfactory. The reasons for its failure were threefold: platoons in WWI had a greater variety of armament than regiments in past warfare (rifles, machine guns, hand and rifle-grenades, and small flexible groups working in cooperation with each other, but separately); unlike open warfare, in which the commander told his subordinates what he wished done, but not how it was done, trench warfare methods of execution had to be prescribed and rehearsals conducted for the purpose of perfecting their execution on the part of every one from the private up; and lastly, large numbers of citizen soldiery required commanders to prescribe for their subordinates the mode of execution, and the details of preparation, formation, execution, and supply. Subordinates were not left to exercise their own judgment, for it would result in too great a variation in execution which meant incoherence and weakness. The bottom line was that small unit trench warfare in WWI demanded the most detailed and exact form of orders, a long order filled with minute instructions on every point was vital to a well-knit coordinated effort.
New order formats were developed to compensate for the shortcomings in the pre-war format. Two sample formats, representative of the newly developed formats, are presented in figure 2.3 and figure 2.4. Many lessons were learned during WWI concerning small unit operation orders.

The pre-WWI format was based on "Open Warfare" and was not specific enough for trench warfare. The intense nature of trench warfare demanded a perfection in order preparation and execution that only the most detailed and exact form of orders could satisfy. Great emphasis was put on presenting every essential matter in a clear and explicit manner to ensure that it would not be neglected or misunderstood; these qualities were not sacrificed for brevity.

The battalion commander was the lowest commander who issued a formal written field order. Once orders were issued, they were not changed at the last minute; this helped to avoid misunderstanding and failure.

Speed, in order development and issuance, had to improve and was more important than technique. Orders habitually failed to reach troops in time for their issuance and understanding. No less than 24 hours were required between the time the order left division headquarters and the hour fixed for the operation to commence. It took, ordinarily, six hours for an order emanating from division headquarters to reach the platoons. It took at least the following period of
WVI BATTALION ORDER FORMAT

1-Information of the enemy.
   Our supporting troops.
   Our flanking troops.
   General plan for our forces.

2-Mission of the battalion.
   Zero day and hour.
   Limit of the zone of operations.
   Objectives.

3-(a) Artillery support.
   Time of its opening.
   Rate of advance of barrage.
   Where and when barrage will settle.
   (b) Orders to each company, as to sector or direction of
       advance, information, objective, distance, and intervals.
   (c) Cleaning up parties. - Composition, mission of each.
       Disposition of prisoners. Mission after cleaning up.
   (d) Machine guns.
       Position.
       Objectives.
       Mission.
   (e) One-pounder gun or 37mm gun or mortar.
       Position in the advance.
       Mission.
       Objectives.
       Position and duties in occupation.
   (f) Outlining of front.
       On request of Aeroplanes.
       Hour each line will signal lights.
   (g) Liaison.
       With the artillery.
       Within the battalion.

4-Plan for occupation of captured ground. Order to each
   company as to:
   Organization of ground to be held.
   Reconnaissance.
   Contact with the enemy.
   Further objectives.
   Patrols.
   Outposts.

FIGURE 2.3 - WVI DEVELOPED FORMAT (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
Liaison.
   Within the battalion.
   With neighboring troops.
   With colonel.
   With artillery.

Machine guns.
   Mission.
   Sites.

One-pounder guns or 37mm guns or 3" Stokes mortar.
   Sites.
   Objectives.

Service of observation.
   Enemy's line.
   Observation posts.

Reports.
   Munition.
   Materiel.
   To whom sent and hour.

5. (a) Supply. Individual equipment and supplies. Additional communication trenches to be dug or connections to be made with trench system of old positions.

   Munitions.—Depots to be established in jumping-off trench and by whom.
   Designate carrying parties.
   Materials. Point where depot will be established and the materials to be assembled.
   Carrying parties and command.
   Ration and water. Amounts other than that carried by individual soldier. For use preceding the advance and to be subsequently carried forward.
   Carrying parties.
   (b) Circulation. Designating of communicating trenches for "forward" and "rear" traffic.
   For evacuation of wounded.
   (c) First aid stations. Location of.

6. Position of battalion commander and his headquarters during the advance and in the conquered position.
   Name and rank of the Battalion Commander.
   How and to whom issued.

FIGURE 2.3 - WWI DEVELOPED FORMAT (CONTINUATION)
Wwi Battalion Order Format

1. Information of the Enemy.
   Phases and objectives. Commander's intent.
3. Limits of the Front.
5. Attack Formation of the Battalion.
6. Formation Prior to the Assault.
8. Advance. How it will take place, the barrages
   use of signals.
9. Machine gun company. Mission, route of advance,
   position, the objectives.
10. One-pounder guns/mortars. Positions; route of advance and
    objectives.
12. Tanks. Missions.
13. Liaison. with the battalion, neighbors, with
    artillery.
14. Marking out the Front. Arrangements for indicating the
    front when halted or on the request of an aviator.
15. Organization of the Captured Ground.
17. Supplies. Organization, location of depots,
    munitions and fire-works. Rations, water, other
    materiel (tools, barbed wire, sand bags).

Figure 2.4 - Wwi Developed Order Format
time for a complete distribution of formal orders to reach the lowest unit concerned:

For a regiment - 1 1/2 hours
For a brigade - 3 hours
For a division - 6 hours

Time was figured from the hour the order was signed and included the time required at brigade, regimental, battalion, and company headquarters for each to read and digest the order from the next higher commander and to prepare its own order.

Battalions initially fought World War II with three order formats established in doctrine; developmental order format, attack order format, and defense order format (See figure 2.5 for attack order format and 2.6 for defense order format).

The emphasis concerning orders was placed in the following areas. Order format and preparation were made uniform throughout the service to promote clarity and prevent misunderstanding. Orders avoided the use of technical expressions if there was any danger of misunderstanding. In the interests of simplicity and clarity the affirmative form of expression was used. Orders were concise and gave subordinate units only so much detail or method of execution as was necessary to insure their conformity with the plan for the force as a whole. Orders prescribed the tactical plan only so far as reasonable estimates for hostile resistance could be expected. Brevity in orders preparation was deemed to be unit training level dependent.
BATTALION ATTACK ORDER

1. (a) Information relative to the enemy.
   (b) Situation and missions of friendly troops; adjacent units; supporting artillery, tanks, and aviation; covering troops.

2. Battalion plan of action, objectives, zone of action, line of departure, direction of attack, hour of attack.

3. Tactical missions for subordinate units.
   (a) Base of fire: general position area of heavy weapons; target areas or sectors of fire.
   (b) Assignment of rifle companies to attacking echelon and reserve; objectives and missions.
   (c) Antitank measures; mission of antitank units.

4. Administrative matters.
   (a) Supply: disposition of company carriers and unit trains; establishment of initial ammunition point; method of distribution of ammunition and other combat supplies.
   (b) Initial location of aid station; distribution of medical section.

5. Communications; initial command and observation posts and message center; telephone and radio; light wire local systems; panel stations and dropping grounds; signal light conventions.

FIGURE 2.5 - WWII BATTALION ATTACK ORDER
1. Information relative to the enemy and friendly troops including the mission of the regiment, units on the flanks of the battalion, covering forces, artillery, antitank and aviation support.

2. General plan of defense; boundaries of battalion defense area; exact course of the main line of resistance; distribution of rifle units to combat echelon, reserve and where necessary, the combat outpost; any attachments to rifle companies.

3. Defensive areas (boundaries) of rifle companies of the combat echelon; mission and location of reserve; departure positions for counterattack; positions for flank defense.

4. Missions and distribution of heavy machine guns; emplacements and target areas of battalion mortars; emplacements and sectors of fire of antitank weapons.

5. Security elements; location and mission of combat outposts and advance detachments.

6. Supply: location of battalion ammunition point; aid station; arrangements for ammunition distribution, including amount to be dumped on the position if required; disposition of carriers and unit trains.

7. Communications: location of battalion command and observation posts and message center; telephone and radio, light wire local systems, panel stations and dropping grounds, signal light connections.

FIGURE 2.6 - WWII BATTALION DEFEND ORDER
After three years of fighting, battalions still employed three order formats but their content and degree of specificity were greatly increased (see figure 2.7 and 2.8 for modified attack and defense formats). The WWII lessons learned concerning small unit operation orders were numerous and diverse.

The battalion order had to be complete, covering all details of the operation. At battalion level, mutual understanding and coordination were assured by issuing oral orders to assembled subordinate commanders. Oral orders were considered standard. Written orders were seldom employed below regiment or combat command. Simple, clear, concise language was used when issuing an oral order.

When time permitted, oral orders were supplemented with written orders of the overlay-type. In an overlay-type order, both the written portion of the order and the graphic portion were placed on an overlay.

WWII orders were brief as clarity permitted, but clarity was not sacrificed for brevity. The use of short sentences made orders more easily understood. Clarity was more important than technique. Detailed instructions for a variety of contingencies, that were a matter of training did not inspire confidence and had no place in an order.

Orders had to be issued in sufficient time to allow subordinate commanders to make their reconnaissance and prepare plans for combat.
BATTALION ATTACK ORDER

1. a. Information of the enemy.
   b. Information of friendly troops.
      (1) Situation and mission(s) of the regiment and adjacent units.
      (2) Supporting fires of artillery, cannon, antitank, tank, and aviation units.
      (3) Security elements in vicinity.

2. Mission(s) and general plan of the battalion.
   a. Plan of maneuver including objective(s).
   b. Formation.
   c. Line of departure.
   d. Zone of action.
   e. Time of attack.

3. Instruction to subordinate units.
   a. Specific instruction to each rifle company in attacking echelon.
      (1) Zone of action.
      (2) Objective(s).
      (3) Security mission(s).
   b. Instruction to the heavy weapons company.
      (1) Plan of supporting fires.
      (2) General position area(s).
      (3) Targets or sectors of fire.
      (4) Conditions or time for opening fire.
      (5) Conditions or time for forward displacement if that can be foreseen.
   c. Instructions to the antitank platoon.
      (1) Uncoupling areas.
      (2) Firing position area(s).
      (3) Sector of responsibility and principal direction of fire.
      (4) Conditions for opening fire.
      (5) If guns are to be held mobile, platoon location and mission(s).
      (6) Special instructions concerning coordination with other antitank units.

FIGURE 2.7 - MODIFIED ATTACK FORMAT (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
d. Instructions to the reserve.
   (1) Initial location.
   (2) Contemplated employment, if determined.
   (3) Security or other special missions.
e. Instruction applicable to more than one unit of the command.
   (1) Alterations or additions to standing operating procedure.
   (2) General security measures.
   (3) Provisions for secrecy.

4. Administrative instructions and information.
   a. Ammunition supply.
      (1) Initial location of ammunition supply point.
      (2) Route of ammunition advance.
      (3) Alterations or additions to standing operating procedure for ammunition supply.
   b. Instructions relative to company transport and the battalion train.
   c. Initial location of aid station.

5. Communication instruction.
   a. Index to signal operations instruction in effect.
   b. Restrictions, if any, on use of radio.
   c. Special pyrotechnic signals.
   d. Locations and times of opening of battalion and company command posts; alternate locations of battalion command posts; location of battalion observation post.
   e. Axis of signal communication.
   f. Location of battalion commander.
BATTALION DEFEND ORDER

1. a. Information of the enemy.
   b. Information of friendly troops.
      (1) Situation and mission(s) of the regiment and adjacent units.
      (2) Supporting fires of artillery, cannon, anti-tank, tank destroyer, chemical mortar, rocket, and aviation units.
      (3) Covering forces and other security elements in vicinity.

2. Battalion general plan of defense.
   a. Boundaries of defense area.
   b. General course of main line of resistance.
   c. Limiting points.
   d. Distribution of rifle companies.
   e. Formation of rifle companies.

3. Instructions to subordinate units.
   a. Specific instructions to each rifle company on main line of resistance.
      (1) boundaries and limiting points.
      (2) Security mission(s).
      (3) Conditions or restriction on opening fire.
   b. Specific instructions to the heavy weapons company.
      (1) Mission and distribution of machine guns, both heavy and light.
      (2) General firing positions and missions for 81-mm mortars; primary target areas and areas for the massing of fires.
      (3) Conditions or restrictions on opening fire.
   c. Instruction to the antitank platoon and attached tank destroyers.
      (1) Firing position area(s).
      (2) Sector of responsibility and principal direction of fire.
      (3) Conditions for and restriction on opening fire.
      (4) Special instructions concerning coordination with other antitank units.
      (5) Location of mine fields and obstacles.
d. Instructions to the reserve (counterattacking forces).
   (1) Composition.
   (2) Mission(s).
   (3) Location.
   (4) Priority for planning counterattacks against assumed penetrations.

e. Instructions to attached tank units.
   (1) Mission(s) (direct fire supporting or reinforcing artillery fires, and supporting counterattacking force).
   (2) Position(s) to be occupied.
   (3) Route(s) to attack position(s).
   (4) Conditions or restrictions on opening fire.
   (5) Location of mine fields and obstacles.

f. Instructions to attached chemical mortar and rocket units.
   (1) General firing positions and missions.
   (2) Primary target areas and areas for the massing of fires.

g. Instructions applicable to more than one unit of the command.
   (1) Alterations or additions to standing operating procedure.
   (2) Organization of the ground, to include priorities
   (3) Composition, location, and mission of the combat outpost.

4. Administrative instructions and information.
   a. Ammunition supply.
      (1) Location of battalion ammunition supply point.
      (2) Arrangements for distribution of ammunition, including amount to be placed on position.
      (3) Alterations or additions to standing operating procedure for ammunition supply.

   b. Instructions relative to company transport and battalion train.
   c. Location of battalion aid station.
   d. Instructions for feeding.

5. Communication instructions.
   a. Index to signal operations instructions in effect.
   b. Restrictions, if any on use of radio.
   c. Special pyrotechnic signals.
   d. Location and times of opening of battalion and company command posts.
   e. Alternate locations of battalion command post.

FIGURE 2.8 - MODIFIED DEFEND FORMAT (CONTINUATION)
The operation order format, content, and specificity differed based on the unit type (armor, cavalry or infantry), the unit's mission, and the situation. Armor and cavalry commanders normally were issued mission-type orders telling the commander what to do but not how to do it. Mission-type orders stated the mission clearly but gave the recipient maximum latitude in execution. Mission-type orders encouraged initiative by subordinates and required minimum time for issuance. The reasons for the use of mission-type orders were the speed of armor actions, the rapidly changing tactical situation during mobile warfare, the need for freedom of action to take advantage of favorable changes in the situation and the battlefield was more complex and unpredictable than in past warfare and required decentralized responsibilities. Mission-type orders were a requirement if the most was to be obtained from a command. They provided the following information to subordinate commanders:

* They clearly stated what the commander issuing the order wanted to accomplish.
* They pointed out limiting or controlling factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes.
* They allotted the resources and support for subordinate units.
While the use of mission-type orders had the potential to improve a unit's combat effectiveness, they required initiative, promptness, and resourcefulness from small unit leaders and staff officers which was not always forthcoming. Operation orders developed based on a mission to attack a fortified position normally were issued in great detail. The night attack operation order went into much greater detail than for a day attack order.

Between WWII and the Vietnam Conflict, the use of separate formats for developmental, defense and attack operations ended. The US ground forces fought the entire Vietnam Conflict with a single operation order format established in their doctrine (See figure 2.9).

The emphasis concerning orders was placed in the following areas. An order had to convey the exact meaning and intentions of the commander. Subordinates were told in unmistakable terms exactly what their commanders wanted them to do. Orders were always issued following a prescribed format which facilitated completeness and note-taking. An operation overlay or map complemented the order and promoted clarity, accuracy, and brevity by conveying information and instructions graphically. An overlay was prepared to portray graphically those instructions that could be represented pictorially by the use of conventional symbols. If the written part of the order was brief, it was also written on the overlay (overlay-type order).
1. SITUATION

   a. Enemy forces: Information of the enemy pertaining to
      the operation, such as locations, dispositions, strength,
      activities, and capabilities.
   b. Friendly forces: Mission of next higher unit, location
      and missions of adjacent units, and missions of nonorganic
      supporting elements which may affect the actions of the units.
   c. Attachments and detachments: Elements attached to, or
      detached from, the unit for the operation, including the
      effective time of attachment or detachment.

2. MISSION

   A clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished
   by the unit.

3. EXECUTION

   a. Concept of operation. In the concept of operation, the
      commander states his scheme of maneuver—as derived from his
      estimate of the situation (his decision) and his use of fire
      support for the operation. "Concept of operation," is used to
      convey the tactical concept and missions of major maneuver
      units. This technique permits mentioning units in order of
      importance to the role they are to play, without regard to
      numerical designation: e.g. in an attack situation the unit
      making the main attack is mentioned first, followed by
      supporting attack(s), then the reserve. Thus, in oral orders,
      subordinates may grasp readily the overall scheme of maneuver
      while at the same time receive their specific missions or
      instructions. When missions for the maneuver units are
      clearly stated in the "concept of operation," they need not be
      repeated in the subparagraph for that unit.
   b. Unit missions or tasks not stated in the "concept of
      operation" may be specified to units concerned after the
      concept is stated. These would include contingency or "be
      prepared" instructions to the maneuver units, as appropriate,
      and missions for the combat support units. In assigning an
      element its mission, attachments or detachments are indicated,
      unless specified in the task organization.

FIGURE 2.9 - VIETNAM ORDER FORMAT (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
c. The final subparagraph of paragraph 3 is entitled "Coordinating instructions" and contains tactical instructions and details of coordination and control applicable to two or more units. (For example: line of departure, final coordination line, boundaries, provisions for troop safety, control measures for assault, or restrictions.) Full use of the subparagraph, together with the task organization and paragraph 3a, will expedite issuance of oral orders and facilitate understanding on the part of recipients.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

This paragraph contains information or instructions pertaining to rations, ammunition; location of distribution points, company trains, medical support, and prisoner-of-war collecting point; transportation; and other administrative and supply matters. Only necessary information is included.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Special signal instructions, which include such items as prearranged signals and restrictions on the use of radio or other plans of communication.

b. Location of the commander and command post during the operation.

FIGURE 2.9 - VIETNAM ORDER FORMAT (CONTINUATION)
Orders were clear, concise and timely. Clarity was not sacrificed for brevity. It was the first essential with partially trained troops and staffs; the use of technical expressions in operation orders was avoided if there was any chance of misunderstanding. Expressions like, "attack vigorously", "secondary attack", "try to hold", and "as far as possible" were avoided. Words of common understanding were used even at the sacrifice of brevity. The positive form of expression was used throughout the order in the interest of simplicity and clarity. Abbreviations were used to save time and space.

Orders giving missions to subordinate units prescribed only those details that were necessary to insure the actions of the subordinate unit conformed to the overall plan of operations. If an order was too detailed, important directions were lost in the mass of unimportant data; if too brief, essential information was omitted.

The lessons learned in Vietnam concerning small unit orders were as follows. The use of the five paragraph format was cumbersome to small units. In small unit operations, the mission was the first and primary requirement and should be listed first in an operations order. A three-paragraph format was developed and used instead of the five-paragraph format. The three-paragraph order consisted of the following paragraphs:
* The unit mission and the concept of operation complete in all available detail.

* Additional essential information to include enemy, support available, terrain, and command and communication details.

* Essential supply and evacuation details.

In summary, the historical look at the US battalion order format reveals;

- The US began fighting in WWI with a single, brief, simple format that proved to be unsatisfactory due to the need to coordinate weapons and movement, lack of skilled soldiers and leaders, and the need for a detailed and rehearsed plan to overcome fortified enemy positions. As WWI progressed, long, detailed order formats were developed that eliminated the deficiencies of the pre-war format.

- Unlike pre-WWI’s single order format, the US entered WWII with three brief simple formats (developmental, attack, and defend). These brief simple formats again proved to be unsatisfactory for reasons similar to WWI and longer, more detailed formats were developed to eliminate the deficiencies. In addition the requirement for a mobile warfare order format was identified and mission-type orders were developed for use by high speed armor and cavalry units.

- The Vietnam Conflict was fought using a single long detailed order format and the WWI/WWII deficiencies (not
enough information or detail and not geared to a semi-trained citizen army) did not appear. In addition the need for a mission-type order format was reenforced and a three paragraph mission order format was developed and used by some units.

The current US battalion operation order format reflects its historical evolution and is presented in Figure 2.10."

The emphasis concerning the current US battalion operation order is placed in the following areas. An order should be clear (use accepted military terminology), and complete. Orders should reflect the commander's intention and will. Subordinates should be told in direct and unmistakable terms exactly what the commander wants them to do, but they are not normally told how to accomplish it.

The order should emphasize the authoritative expression. Indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language should be avoided because it leads to uncertainty.

Orders must be issued in a timely manner. The battalion commander should issue warning orders and observe the one-third - two-thirds rule (The higher commander uses only one-third of the available time for his order planning, development and issuance, thus leaving two-thirds for his subordinate units to plan, develop and issue their orders)."

The strengths of the US format are as follows. The format has evolved through nearly a century of warfare, it has been modified based on lessons learned, and it can be considered battle tested. The order format requires that
CURRENT US ORDER FORMAT " BODY"

1. Situation.
   (a) Enemy forces. This subparagraph contains enemy information.
   (b) Friendly forces. This subparagraph contains the verbatim mission statements of higher, adjacent, and supporting or reinforcing units, and the brigade commander's intent for the operation.
   (c) Attachments and detachments.

2. Mission - clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be accomplished and its purpose. Addressed the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY of the operation.

3. Execution.
   (a) Concept of operation. Expands on the why of the mission statement to explain the "big picture" or master plan. Commander's concise personal summary of intent.
      * Maneuver. Describes the movement or placement of all major subordinate maneuver elements. Discusses the battle from start to finish, and describes HOW the operation will progress.
      * Fires. Integrates tasks for fires with the scheme of maneuver.
      * Obstacles, mines and fortifications.
      * Intelligence and electronics warfare.
   Commander's intelligence collection priorities and electronic warfare priorities.
   * Other support activities. Concept of enemy air defense, air defense fires, and rear area combat operations.
   (b) Subordinate unit subparagraphs. The specific tasks to be accomplished by each subordinate element.
      * Fire support. Discussion of air support, chemical operations, field artillery, naval gunfire, and nuclear fires.
      * Air defense, aviation, engineer, and military intelligence.
      * Reserve.
   (c) Coordinating instructions. Details of coordination and control applicable to two or more elements.

4. Service support. Contains combat service support instructions and information relating to the operation. The administrative/logistics order format is recommended.
   (a) Materiel and services.
   (b) Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
   (c) Personnel.
   (d) Civil-military cooperation.
   (e) Prisoner of war procedures.

FIGURE 2.10 - CURRENT US ORDER FORMAT (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
5. Command and signal.
   (a) Command includes the initial location of the commander; includes the command post location and the CP axis of displacement.
   (b) Signal lists the SOI index in effect for the operation as well as any changes; list alternate or emergency signals; and signal restrictions.
detailed information and instructions be transmitted to subordinate units concerning the enemy, maneuver, support, services and the nuclear/chemical threat. This information allows the commander to coordinate movement, the fight, supporting fires, and sustainment. The commander's intent is included in the order.

The weaknesses in the US format are as follows. The order format is very long (The explanation in FM 71-2 of what goes in each paragraph is over four typed pages long). The sequence of the order is flawed. Current US communications doctrine stresses putting the "bottom line" or most important information of a transmission up front. The US format leads with the "enemy situation." The enemy situation, due to its fragile and ever changing nature, should not be considered the most important information. The only reason found for leading with the "enemy situation" is that the original 19th century German order format (adopted and modified over time and experience by US ground forces) began with the enemy situation. The most critical information in the order, learned through actual combat experience, is the commander's intent or purpose. The US order format de-emphasizes the most important information in the order by addressing commander's intent as part of a subparagraph in paragraph 3 of the order.
SECTION 3. OTHER NATIONS’ FORMATS

The US is not alone in its need to transmit information and tasks to small tactical units. Many modern armies today have this requirement and have developed and use standard formats to meet these requirements. This chapter will present two formats, the Israeli and the Soviet. These formats will be compared later in the study with the US format to determine the best format or to create a synthesized format. The Soviet Union's format was chosen because they are the US's primary threat. The Israeli format was chosen because of their worldwide recognition for excellence in mobile warfare. The West German format was researched, but found to be nearly identical, by agreement with STANAG 2016, to the US format.

The current Israeli format is presented in figure 3.1.  

The Israeli format has the following strengths. The "bottom line" or most important information in the order is up front. The Israeli format emphasizes the higher commander's intent. The Israelis believe a detailed plan is only good until the first bullet is shot. After that changes to the plan will have to be made based on the current situation. The one element of the plan that should not change is the higher commander's intent or aim. This is why the Israelis regard this as the most important element of the order. The first information passed to subordinates is exactly what the higher
THE CURRENT ISRAELI FORMAT

1. Friendly forces.
   (a) Intent or aim of the higher.
   (b) Unit's mission.
   (c) Adjacent forces missions.
   (d) Additional forces missions.
      1) Engineers.
      2) Artillery.
      3) Direct support.
      4) General support.

2. Terrain.
   (a) General description.
   (b) Axis.
   (c) Main obstacles.
   (d) Trafficability/deployment areas.
   (e) Key terrain and vital terrain.
   (f) Summary of effects of terrain on friendly plan.

3. Enemy.
   (a) Intentions.
   (b) Deployment and strength.
   (c) Most probable course of action.


5. Method.
   (a) Scheme of maneuver and fire support.
   (b) Time phasing and objectives.

6. Forces and tasks.

7. Combat support (general).

8. Administrative and logistics (general).

9. Control.
   (a) Location of CP's by stages.
   (b) Radio procedures.

FIGURE 3.1 - CURRENT ISRAELI FORMAT
commander wants the subordinates to achieve (the commander's intent or aim of the operation). The commander tells his subordinates what is to be done and where, establishes time limits, and reservations concerning the method of operation.

The Israeli format contains a paragraph addressing terrain. The terrain paragraph is developed with the overall intent of providing information on how dominating terrain features can affect the operation. Also, information about terrain that the higher commander determines as key or vital (terrain that has to be controlled in order to win) is provided to the subordinates.

The Israeli order format requires the commander to time-phase his scheme of maneuver and task accomplishments to better coordinate the combat, combat support and service support elements. This time-phasing greatly aids supporters and maintainers in their assistance efforts. The Israeli order was battle tested in the 1973 October War and deemed functional.

The Israeli format contains the following weaknesses. The format is long, consisting of nine paragraphs. The Israelis allot four hours for the battalion to develop and issue orders down to the platoons. The format lacks information needed to fight on an integrated nuclear and chemical battlefield. No mention is made of MOPP levels, dosage rates, or risk factors.
The format lacks information needed to coordinate the following combat support elements or functions.

*Intelligence
*Air defense
*Engineers

Some general points concerning the Israeli order format and orders issuance are as follows. Israeli company commanders attend the brigade level orders briefings. Their platoon leaders attend the battalion orders briefings. The company commander's order is the lowest level order issued. No platoon order is given. The complete company attends the company order.

The current Soviet format is presented in figure 3.2."

Soviet format strengths are in the following areas. The format contains a detailed discussion of the enemy:

*In the attack order, enemy units are identified, located, and strongpoints and nuclear prepared positions are analyzed. Also enemy reserves actions and locations are factored in."

*In the defense order, the composition, position, and the nature of the enemy attack, his main thrust, nuclear targets and probable time frames for going over to the offensive are provided.

The Soviet format provides detailed information on how weapons from higher units are going to be deployed in the
THE CURRENT SOVIET FORMAT

1. Assessing the enemy.
   -to his front.
   -to adjacent unit’s front.
   -information varies with mission assigned.

2. Unit’s mission assigned by senior commander.

3. Senior commander’s employment of weapons within units zone.

4. Unit commander concept of operation.
   -which enemy to rout and in what sequence.
   -main effort sector.
   -enemy targets to destroy by weapons.
   -combat formation and nature of maneuver.

5. Task to subordinate units.
   -varies offense/defense.
   -the "I order" paragraph listing tasks for subordinate units.

6. Readiness time for action.

7. Command posts.
   -place and time for deployment of CP’s.

8. Chain of command.
   -names deputy commander.
   -who assumes control in event the commander is put out of action.

FIGURE 3.2 - CURRENT SOVIET FORMAT
subordinates zone or sector. This allows subordinate commanders to take into account how the senior commander's employment will affect the accomplishment of their missions. This paragraph is needed due to the centralized control of combat support elements.

The Soviet format requires a detailed listing of tasks to be accomplished by subordinate units;

* In the attack order, subordinate units are told axis of attack, which enemy to rout, axis of subsequent advance, who supports, the boundary lines, times for crossing following lines/points and reinforcements.

* In the defense order, subordinate units are told the areas to strongpoint, where to position security and composition of security, how flanks are supported and who is doing the support, axis for deployment of counterattack forces, and firing lines for repelling tank attacks.

When developing an order, the Soviets stress that consideration for the level of unit training, experience, and the subordinate commanders' skills must be taken into account. Commanders are required to inspire confidence in subordinates for his plan through his external appearance, behavior, and diction when giving the order. The old saying, "Tell me how you give your order and I will tell you how it will be executed." is stressed. Commanders are required not to vacillate, appear nervous, or use rough tones.
At battalion and lower echelons, written or graphic operations documents are not used. The only document produced is the working map. Biblical warfare and lower echelons issue only oral operations orders, which are recorded in a notebook by the battalion commander or battalion chief of staff. After the Soviet battalion commander issues his order, he or the battalion chief of staff personally check their subordinates' notes and maps for corrections.

The format for the oral order is the same as the written order. Standard forms have been developed and are used to facilitate the development and writing of the operation order. Biblical warfare and battalion commander and battalion chief of staff can issue orders.

The Soviet format contains the following weaknesses. The order format's content and sequence are flawed. The Soviet format does not provide the senior commander's intent or "big picture" of how he sees the battle being fought and won. The order is based on centralized control and employment of combat support and service support assets. In a rapidly changing environment, the battalion commander lacks the abilities and information needed to understand the coordination, control, and interaction of artillery, antitank, air defense, and engineer systems not organic to the battalion. The order fails to coordinate the fight with supply, maintenance and personnel functions. The format contains no personnel or logistical information.
The order format sequence seems flawed due to the separation of the unit's mission and concept of the operation, by the "Senior commander's employment of weapons within units zone" paragraph. This separation hinders understanding and order clarity.

SECTION 4. COMPARISON OF THE FORMATS

In this section the formats will be compared using the following criteria;

- Battle tested
- Information content
- Brevity
- Sequencing of information

The product of this comparison will be the selection of the best format or the synthesis of a new format that maximizes the studied formats' strengths, while minimizing their weaknesses.

Battle Tested

The formats that can be considered battle tested are the Israeli and US formats.

The Israeli format was tested during the 1973 October War. It is established in Israeli doctrine and taught at their company commanders' training course. Additionally, the
Israeli format is put through numerous combined arms live fire exercises during training.

The current US format is considered battle worthy due to the changes made based on the lessons learned from WWI, WWII, and Vietnam. During those wars, formats similar in content and detail to the current US format were used and found to be satisfactory. The requirements for detailed orders in past battles were to coordinate the effects of a multitude of weapon systems, to compensate for the lack of trained and skilled soldiers, staff officers and commanders, and to have units fight as cohesive elements instead of as independent agents. These three requirements or conditions will exist in tomorrow's mobilized and expanded US army, thus requiring the need for long detailed orders at the level of command that coordinates systems, men, movement, fighting, fires and support.

The Soviet Union's format is considered not battle tested because the entire Soviet method of fighting battalions has changed since WWII with the requirement of battalions to be innovators and planners instead of just implementors of regimental written field orders (The Soviet experience in Afghanistan has not been included in this study due to lack of research material). The current Soviet format still contains many of the WWII centralized control features that may no longer be functional on the future, rapidly changing, battlefield.
Information Content

All three formats are deficient in critical information content. The US format lacks any mention of terrain and also fails to establish a time phasing or time relationship with the maneuver elements and their support and service support elements. This lack of basic time information, such as how long the commander thinks it should take for his maneuver units to move from position to position, seize an objective, or hold a defensive position, could significantly affect the combat supporters' and service supporters' abilities to assist in or maintain the fight. The Israeli format lacks information in several areas concerning combat support and survival on an integrated nuclear and chemical battlefield. No mention of MOPP levels, dosage rates, electronic warfare, or intelligence priorities are made. The Soviet format, while detailed in some areas, lacks the ability to coordinate the interactions of a variety of forces and weapons, artillery, antitank, air defense, and engineer systems not organic to the battalion.

Brevity

All three formats are long and detailed with brevity playing second fiddle to the need to coordinate a multitude of different weapon systems, personnel, fires, movement and
sustainment efforts against an equal multitude of threats.
The shortest format appears to be the Israeli's; next is the
US and then the Soviet Union.

Sequencing of Information

The best format for sequencing is the Israeli's. They
initiate the order with the most important information, the
commander's intent and the unit's mission. It is followed by
terrain and then the enemy, concept of operation, support,
logistics and control. Having personally developed, briefed
and observed numerous orders using the Israeli format, I found
the sequence to be very logical and functional.

The US format's sequence is flawed because it fails to
address the most important information of the order, the
commander's intent and the unit's mission, in the first
paragraph. Additionally, the sequence of briefing the mission
and then the commander's intent is flawed because the
"mission" is a part of the whole, the commander's intent.
Logic dictates that it is better to brief the whole first,
then the part.

The Soviet format's sequence is flawed similarly as the
US's concerning the commander's intentions and the unit
mission. In addition, the repeated jumping from "Senior
Commanders" portions and "Unit" portions tends to confuse and
could lead to misunderstanding.
Synthesized Format

The comparison of formats revealed enough deficiencies with the three formats to determine the need to synthesize a format. The synthesized format is presented as the best format to use when transmitting information and tasks to battalion or smaller units.

SYNTHESIZED FORMAT

1. Friendly forces.
   (a) Intent or aim of the Higher Commander.
   (b) Unit's mission.
   (c) Adjacent forces missions.
   (d) Additional forces missions.
      1) Engineers.
      2) Artillery.
      3) Direct support.
      4) General support.

2. Terrain.
   (a) General description.
   (b) Axes.
   (c) Main obstacles.
   (d) Trafficability/deployment areas.
   (e) Key terrain and vital terrain.
(f) Summary of effects of terrain on friendly plan.

3. Enemy.
   (a) Intentions.
   (b) Deployment and strength.
   (c) Most probable course of action.

4. Execution.
   (a) Concept of operation.
      * Commander's intentions (expands on the when, what, and why of the mission statement to explain the "big picture" or master plan).
      * Maneuver. Describes and time-phases the movement or placement of all major subordinate maneuver elements. Discusses and time-phases the battle from start to finish, and describes HOW and HOW LONG the operation will progress and take to accomplish.
      * Fires. Integrates tasks for fires with the scheme of maneuver.
      * Obstacles, mines, and fortifications.
      * Intelligence and electronics warfare.
      Commander's intelligence collection priorities and electronic warfare priorities.
      * Other support activities. Concept of enemy air defense, air defense fires, and rear area combat operations.
   (b) Subordinate unit subparagraphs. The specific tasks to be accomplished by each subordinate element.
* Fire support. Discussion of air support, chemical operations, field artillery, naval gunfire, and nuclear fires.
* Air defense, aviation, engineer, and military intelligence.
* Reserve.
  (c) Coordinating instructions. Details of coordination and control applicable to two or more elements.

5. Service support. Contains combat service support instructions and information relating to the operation. The administrative/logistics order format is recommended.
  (a) Material and services.
  (b) Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
  (c) Personnel.
  (d) Civil-military cooperation.
  (e) Prisoner-of-war procedures.

6. Command and signal.
  (a) Command includes the initial location of the commander; includes the command post location and the CP axis of displacement.
  (b) Signal lists the SOI index in effect for the operation as well as any changes; list alternate or emergency signals; and signal restrictions.
The synthesized format incorporates the strengths of the Israeli format (sequencing, terrain information, and time-phasing) and the strengths of the US format (detailed instructions, integrated battlefield information, and combat support and service support coordination information) and eliminates the respective individual format weaknesses. The end product is a format that can be considered battle tested, complete (contains all necessary information), and with information sequenced in order to put the most important information up front.

SECTION 5. CONCLUSION

The research question asked if the current US five paragraph operation order format was the best format to use when transmitting information and tasks to battalions or smaller combat units. After researching the historical foundation of the US order format and after examining the current US battalion operation order format and order formats from several other nations it was determined that the current US format was not the best format to use. A synthesized format was developed incorporating the studied formats' strengths and eliminating the studied formats' weaknesses and the synthesized format was determined to be the best format for use when transmitting small unit information and tasks.
This study is important because a better order format has been synthesized and is available for use by US ground forces. The synthesized format incorporates battle tested strengths and eliminates deficiencies. If the synthesized format was adopted and established as doctrine it could improve the fighting effectiveness of small tactical units through its prioritized sequencing of information, its inclusion of terrain information, and its time-phasing of maneuver and task accomplishments.

Due to the need to transmit long detailed orders, this study recommends that further research be conducted with the aim of speeding up the entire order process through the use of standard order format forms, small unit playbooks or drills, or technological aids (computers, reproduction machines and televisions). A standard order format form that provides a "fill in the blank" order production capability could significantly cut down on the time required to produce an order. Small unit playbooks or drills could reduce or even eliminate the need for commanders to issue or produce lengthy explanations concerning how he wants his subordinate units to maneuver or to react given a combat situation. The use of technological aids to reduce or eliminate the need to manually write, draw and reproduce orders and graphics would greatly reduce the time required to produced an order, thus significantly speeding up the entire order process.
In addition, this study supports the need to develop a mission-type order format for use by high speed armor and cavalry units conducting pursuit or reconnaissance missions. That order would be an abbreviated version of the recommended format. It would look like this:

MISSION-TYPE ORDER FORMAT

1. Friendly forces.
   - Intent of the higher commander.
   - Unit's mission.
   - Adjacent forces' missions

2. Terrain.
   - Key and vital terrain.

3. Enemy.
   - Intentions.
   - Deployment and strength.

4. Execution.
   - Brief concept of the operation highlighting unit commander's intent.
   - Limiting or controlling factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes.
   - Combat support resource allocation.

5. Service Support.
   - Essential supply and evacuation details.

- SOI index in effect for the operation, emergency signals and signal restrictions.


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"FM 7-20, p. 21.


"FM 17-1, p. 55.
20FM 17-33, p. 160.


22FM 7-20, p. 21.

23FM 17-1, p. 55.

24Ibid, p. 18.


27FM 17-33, p. 382.

28FM 7-20, p. 146.


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"Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, (June 1986), p. 3.


Clarke, p. 24.

Marshall, p. 36.

"All information concerning the Israeli order format and order issuance procedures were obtained from my personal notebook that was compiled while attending the Israeli Company Commanders' Course in the spring of 1981. No other research material could be found to support my notes or update any changes that may have been made since 1981.

"Ibid, p.239.


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