NAVY AVIATION
MOBILIZATION PLANNING

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Alfred H. Beyer
Brian E. Mansir

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LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
6400 Goldsboro Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886
This report examines mobilization planning within the Navy aviation community; identifies several areas in need of improvements; describes how many of those shortcomings will be corrected with implementation of the planning structure presented in the soon-to-be-published Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), Annex B; and presents, in a Mobilization Planning Guide, detailed guidance for implementing the thrust of the NCMP planning structure in Navy aviation.
Executive Summary

MOBILIZATION PLANNING FOR AVIATION MAINTENANCE

In the event of mobilization, the Navy aviation community would need to rapidly alter its peacetime operations. Such alterations would include relocating large numbers of forces ashore, realigning rework and procurement priorities, and activating reserve units.

Accomplishing mobilization activities quickly and effectively during times of stress requires integrated, comprehensive, action-oriented plans. Such plans do not exist in the Navy today, nor could the Navy’s current mobilization planning process produce them. This situation is not without promise, however.

The revised and soon to be published Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), Logistics Annex, prescribes a common framework, including policy, assumptions, structure, and procedures, for conducting mobilization planning. When implemented, that framework will result in the development of mobilization plans that address the tasks to be accomplished, the individuals responsible, the time within which each task needs to be completed, the resources required for each task, and the actions to be taken to reduce or eliminate mobilization shortfalls. To aid implementation of that framework within the aviation community, we provide a Mobilization Planning Guide that details, step by step, a structured, comprehensive, and integrated mobilization planning process.

To assure that mobilization planning occurs as prescribed in the NCMP, additional changes are still required. Mobilization planning needs to be resourced, accomplished, and evaluated as a priority effort. It also needs to offer better training and career opportunities to individuals assigned to planning billets. We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations elevate the importance of the mobilization planning function by initiating these changes. Only then will mobilization plans be developed that satisfy the broad objectives of the revised NCMP.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

A nation's transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a warfighting posture is a complex process that can reasonably be expected to occur in a stressful environment and within a compressed timeframe. The United States calls that process "mobilization" and its success depends on nothing less than sound planning by knowledgeable, dedicated professional planners.

The concept of mobilization is a critical element of our National Defense Policy. However, mobilization is not a single, concentrated event wherein we focus our manpower and material resources on responding to a sudden national emergency; rather, it is a continuing process born of detailed, integrated, comprehensive planning during peacetime and reaching fruition in a state of maximum readiness and capability to meet any threat to our national security stemming from war, other national emergency, or contingency.

Peacetime mobilization planning was first mandated on a continuing basis by the National Defense Act of 1916 and subsequently reconfirmed and strengthened with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Although the Act of 1947 established both civil and military mobilization planning functions in the Executive Branch, the popularity of the "short war" scenario in the 1960's led to a steady decline of mobilization planning throughout the Federal Government. Planners at that time rationalized that mobilization planning and emergency preparedness are unnecessary if any conflict is going to be over before mobilized assets can be brought to bear. As a result of that thinking, the capability to mobilize was severely diminished during the mid-1970's.

The deteriorated state of our mobilization capability was highlighted during a series of national mobilization exercises (MOBEX-76, NIFTY NUGGET-78, and PROUD SPIRIT-80); by two Defense Science Board reports (published in 1976 and 1980); and by a 1980 House Armed Service Committee (Defense Industrial Base Panel) report. In addition, by 1981, defense planners had shifted their strategic
orientation from a short- to a long-war scenario. These activities set the stage for the establishment of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board in 1981. The Board’s charter required it “to produce a Presidential Statement of national policy on emergency mobilization” and “to develop a plan of action to improve emergency mobilization preparedness consistent with this policy.”

The result of the Board’s actions on the first portion of its tasking was the issuance, by President Reagan, of National Security Decision Directive No. 47, “Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,” on 22 July 1982. The Directive reads:

It is the policy of the United States to have an emergency mobilization preparedness capability that will ensure that government at all levels, in partnership with the private sector and the American people, can respond decisively and effectively to any major national emergency with the defense of the United States as the first priority.

That Directive establishes a clear policy statement regarding the maintenance of an emergency mobilization preparedness capability whose highest priority is national defense. Not specifically stated but intrinsic to the maintenance of such a capability is the requirement to plan for mobilization. That planning, specifically as it is accomplished within the Navy’s aviation community, is the focus of this report.

**IDEAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING - A SNAPSHOT**

The mobilization planning process consists primarily of an analytical, comprehensive review of future possibilities and the development of plausible means for dealing with them. Experience, however, has shown that many mobilization events and procedures are the same as, or similar to, the events and procedures of peacetime operations; they simply occur in a compressed timeframe and in conjunction with many other actions demanding quick decisions and responses.

Although each of the Military Services employs a unique methodology in developing its mobilization plans, the underlying process should yield plans that bridge the gap between requirements and capabilities and that ensure the ability to acquire the identified resources when needed. Stated another way, mobilization planning must answer three questions:

- What material, personnel, facilities, and services are needed?
- Who is responsible for providing them?
• How, when, and where will they be provided?

In the context of these fundamental questions, mobilization planning can be described as a structured process that identifies, documents, examines, and assesses the adequacy of actions and resources to bring about mobilization.

Regardless of the methodology employed, mobilization can only be executed efficiently and effectively if the planning for it has been proper and thorough, the steps for mobilization execution are clearly defined, and the resources required to accomplish it are provided.

NAVY LOGISTICS PLANNING

The Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP) is the basic Navy planning document for allocating naval forces in support of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-approved Operation Plans (OPLANs). It translates the JSCP, which sets forth the overall military strategy and specific tasks for the Unified Commands, into Navy guidance and provides direction and guidance to all operating force and Shore Establishment Echelon II Commands, including the U.S. Coast Guard when operating as an element of the Navy. The NCMP’s Annex B (recently extensively revised and soon to be published) serves as the Navy’s key logistics planning document, linking the approved program with operational planning. That annex contains policy, planning assumptions, planning guidance, and direction for the development of OPLAN-independent Logistics Support and Mobilization Plans (LSMPs) by all Echelon II Commands. It also provides mobilization planning guidance to lower-level mobilization-planning elements; the only Navy document that does so.

The hierarchy of Navy OPLAN-independent deliberate logistics planning is portrayed in Figure 1-1. That hierarchy is designed to identify and address all Echelon II Commands’ mobilization actions and resource requirements and shortfalls. It also is designed to assure adequate planning and sufficient Navy logistics capability and readiness to support most OPLANs. Finally, it is structured to produce integrated supporting plans that are action oriented and executable, identify resource shortfalls and initiate remedial action, work together in a logical way, and provide a flexible capability to respond to and support other OPLANs.
Although initiated by the military strategy and taskings contained in the JSCP, detailed logistics planning actually begins with the NCMP. That document establishes the planning requirements, tasks selected Echelon II Commands to develop plans to support operating forces in wartime, and provides a scenario and the assumptions upon which to base the development of plans.
Navy OPLAN-independent support plans include, but are not limited to, the NCMP; LSMPs from selected Echelon II Commands; and, if directed by the Echelon II commanders, LSMPs and Mobilization Plans from subordinate Commands.

The remainder of this report provides an overview of mobilization planning practices in the Navy aviation community, presents observations on their clarity and thoroughness, and identifies opportunities to vitalize and strengthen them. Although we single out the Navy aviation community, the observations and recommendations we present are directly applicable to other Navy organizations.

The appendix presents a synopsis of mobilization, identifying the authorities for mobilization, the reasons for mobilizing, and the agencies responsible for its planning and execution.
CHAPTER 2
AVIATION MOBILIZATION PLANNING

The Navy aviation community's current mobilization planning practices and procedures, although adhering to the hierarchy and deliberate logistics planning structure described in Chapter 1, suffer from a number of shortcomings that render the results of the planning efforts somewhat ineffective. Most of the shortcomings can be categorized into two areas: one is related to the personnel doing the planning and the other is the mobilization planning process itself.

PLANNING PERSONNEL

Military and civilian Navy personnel throughout the aviation community view mobilization planning as essential, but it has low priority when compared with the multitude of other tasks. Most individuals assigned to mobilization planning billets have neither the proper experience nor the training for the position. Upon arrival at their stations of assignment, they find that their planning responsibilities are a collateral rather than a primary or sole duty. Furthermore, a lack of emphasis on mobilization planning at the higher levels results in a perception at the lower levels that mobilization planning assignments are not career enhancing. Although many planners are enthusiastic, dedicated, and professional, the community suffers from an often stated view that a requirement to mobilize is only a remote possibility and, since it probably will never happen, minimal planning effort is sufficient.

PLANNING PROCESS

Mobilization planning is, for the most part, accomplished according to each planning element's perception of how it should be done. In one Echelon II Command, for example, responsibility for mobilization planning is restricted to the headquarters level; at another, it is delegated to subordinate elements. The latter Navy Command identified its mobilization planning requirements and then tasked its subordinate elements to prepare mobilization plans to satisfy those requirements. Such effort, while commendable, is the exception. For the most part, the Commands
either fail to prescribe the format, content, orientation, and integration of mobilization planning or offer minimal guidance.

In addition, none of the plans we examined provide a capability to evaluate or measure its ability to support mobilization requirements. Yet, such a capability should be fundamental to any mobilization planning process.

FINDINGS

Underlying the entire aviation mobilization planning process are two shortcomings that, because of their potential impact on existing plans' ability to satisfy mobilization requirements, we deem to be the most serious. They are the failure of the plans to identify specific mobilization actions and their failure to specify the general level of resources required to accommodate those actions. Instead, the plans provide general statements that are geared more to additional planning than to specific actions. For example, statements such as "be prepared to accommodate incoming Reserve Component personnel," or "plan to initiate multiple work shifts" provide little guidance to individuals responsible for executing the plan upon the initiation of mobilization and little information on the resources needed to support mobilization's increased requirements. As a result, many of the Navy's mobilization plans will be difficult, if not impossible, to implement.

These characteristics of the Navy's approach to mobilization planning differ markedly from that of one major U.S. Army Command, which has an integrated structure, both vertically and horizontally, and develops plans that contain sufficient detail to permit rapid implementation should they need to be executed. Specifically, the Command has:

- Integrated the planning process, from the Command down to the base, highlighting actions, resources, responsibilities, and timeframes at each level of command. That integration ensures that conflicts among actions or resources are identified and resolved. Similar attention given to horizontal integration of the planning effort further ensures that the resources needed to execute all mobilization actions are addressed and coordinated, particularly at the lowest operational level.

- Developed mobilization plans that are highly detailed, with action-oriented inputs from every base functional element having a mobilization responsibility. Those plans leave very little to chance. If key, experienced officers are not available at the time the plan is implemented, their subordinates or
replacements will have little difficulty determining what needs to be done, who is responsible for doing it, and when it needs to be done.

The characteristics described above are the result of the Command's recognition of and commitment to the importance of mobilization planning. They led to the evolvement of a structured, integrated planning process, which in turn provided the foundation for the production of effective mobilization plans. The Navy needs to follow suit.

SUMMARY

Mobilization planning in today's Navy aviation community falls short of what would be required to accomplish the enormous scope and variety of mobilization actions should the plans ever be initiated. The shortcomings, however, cannot be attributed solely to a lack of interest or effort. The primary causative factor is the absence of planning direction and process definition. As noted earlier, the single Navy document requiring mobilization planning is the NCMP's Logistics Annex, the latest edition of which is dated 1984. That edition, comprising primarily a catalog of baseline data and statistics, directed Echelon II Commands to prepare LSMPs but provided little further guidance and direction for planning policy, assumptions, scenarios, or other methodology to facilitate such planning. These vital missing links caused planners either to seek out or develop their own planning parameters, resulting in plans that are not aligned, standardized, or integrated; or to abandon the planning effort because of the perception that it is too difficult a task.

Many of these process-related shortcomings are now on the verge of being overcome. The NCMP's Logistics Annex has been completely revised and will soon be published as NCMP, Annex B. The planning policy, process guidance, and essential planning base provided in the new Annex B should alleviate most of the process-related shortcomings that have in the past contributed to ineffective mobilization planning. Our recommendation for overcoming the balance is provided in the following section.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW DIRECTION

Today's mobilization planning environment offers a variety of opportunities to vitalize and strengthen mobilization planning in the Navy's aviation community—and, indeed, throughout the Navy. Although those opportunities demand commitment, time, and resources, the result can only be the production of more
meaningful and executable mobilization plans, neither of which is routinely produced today. In short, mobilization plans must be implementable, they must specify what actions are required, and who has responsibility for seeing to their accomplishment. Plans that treat mobilization requirements as generalities and as areas for additional planning will fail to fulfill their purpose when mobilization is directed.

The challenges offered by the environment in which Navy aviation mobilization planning is performed today are substantial, but they can also be met in a reasonable and timely manner. The key to improved mobilization planning is the revised and soon to be published NCMP, Annex B. That annex prescribes a common framework, including policy, assumptions, structure, and procedures, for conducting mobilization planning. When implemented, that framework will result in the development of mobilization plans that address the tasks to be accomplished, the individuals responsible, the time within which each task needs to be completed, the resources required for each task, and the actions to be taken to reduce or eliminate mobilization shortfalls. To aid implementation of that framework within the aviation community, we provide a Mobilization Planning Guide that details, step by step, a structured, comprehensive, and integrated mobilization planning process.

To assure that mobilization planning occurs as prescribed in the NCMP, additional changes are still required, however. Mobilization planning needs to be resourced, accomplished, and evaluated as a priority effort. It also needs to offer better training and career opportunities to individuals assigned to planning billets. We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations elevate the importance of the mobilization planning function by initiating these changes. Only then will mobilization plans be developed that satisfy the broad objectives of the revised NCMP.
APPENDIX
A MOBILIZATION OVERVIEW

This appendix presents the concept of mobilization and the planning necessary for its successful execution. It defines related terms, highlights the legal and regulatory authorities involved in the execution of mobilization, describes the underlying purpose of mobilization, and addresses the structure of mobilization planning.

DEFINITIONS

The Department of Defense (DoD) Master Mobilization Plan, 1985, defines mobilization as

...the process whereby a nation makes the transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a warfighting posture. It involves the assembly, organization, and application of the nation's resources for national defense. The mobilization process encompasses all activities necessary to systematically and selectively prepare for war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in its Publication 1, narrows the focus of that broad definition to accommodate the role of the Armed Forces in mobilization, so that in JCS Pub 1 mobilization is defined as:

1. The act of preparing for war or other emergency through assembling and organizing national resources.

2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

The JCS further defines the mobilization process by four levels of response. Generally, the level of response is governed by the nature and imminence of the emergency or threat facing the nation; they do not occur in any set sequence. The four levels are selective, partial, full, and total mobilization. Table A-1 provides the characteristics of each of the four levels and describes each level's call-up eligibility criteria, the numbers of personnel involved, the authority for effecting the call-up, and the methods used to notify the units or individuals selected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>General description</th>
<th>Persons or units eligible</th>
<th>Numbers involved</th>
<th>Who calls up</th>
<th>Method of call-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>For a domestic emergency, the President (or Congress upon special action) may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) units and/or individual reservists to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, or Federal property and functions or to prevent disruption of Federal activities. A selective mobilization normally would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.</td>
<td>RC units and/or individual reservists.</td>
<td>As determined by units selected</td>
<td>President/Congress</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense announcement. (Alert notification in writing to individuals and units.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>To meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) and mobilization of up to 1 million men of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to 24 months. The Congress can increase the numbers and duration by separate action.</td>
<td>Ready Reserve units and individuals. Retired members of the Regular Forces. Fleet Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve.</td>
<td>Up to 1,000,000 (all Services) for up to 2 years. Can be increased by Congressional action.</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation of a national emergency and an executive order. Act of Congress.</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full mobilization requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for the expanded force structure.</td>
<td>All of the above, plus national conscription as determined by the Congress and President.</td>
<td>Up to the strength of the approved force structure of the Armed Forces.</td>
<td>Public law or joint resolution by Congress declaring war or national emergency.</td>
<td>As above (Notice from local draft board for those conscripted.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved force structure to respond to requirements beyond the capability of existing force levels, and the mobilization of all additional resources needed, to include production facilities, to create and sustain such force.</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Strength levels beyond full mobilization as determined by the President and approved by the Congress.</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additional options not falling within any single level of mobilization are available. For example, the President may augment the active Armed Forces by calling to active duty units of the Selected Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentees, totaling up to 200,000 individuals, for a maximum period of 90 days. Also, Military Department Secretaries may recall any number of military retirees (those retired with 20 or more years of active service) when they are required for national defense purposes.

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY

Authority to initiate mobilization is grounded in U.S. Code and Public Law. Existing legal authorities categorized as being available in peacetime, after declaration of a national emergency by the President or the Congress, and in wartime authorize Federal officials to take certain actions during circumstances deemed sufficiently critical to warrant the exercise of extraordinary measures. Standby legal authorities may be, and routinely are, prepared during peacetime for enactment as needed during a period of rising tensions, national emergency, or war.

A national emergency can be declared by the President, the Congress, or both. Before passage of the National Emergencies Act in 1976, such a declaration was a decisive turning point; prior to the declaration, no preparatory actions were taken, while subsequent to it, all actions needed to prepare for war were undertaken. The National Emergencies Act, however, mandated that the President, upon declaring a national emergency, specify which authorities he was invoking, thereby removing the declaration from the realm of an "all or nothing" situation to one wherein the construction of national emergency powers was necessary. In addition, the Act enables the Congress to terminate the President’s declaration of a national emergency at any time by concurrent resolution; the Congress also retains the authority to review the declaration and situation every 6 months.

Within the defense environment, the mobilization process is governed by the following three levels of authority.

National

The President and the National Security Council establish national mobilization policies and objectives, with responsibility for planning, testing, and executing
mobilization extending from the DoD and its staff elements to the Military Departments.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance to the Unified and Specified commanders and to the Military Services concerning mobilization requirements and assumptions for operational planning. It also prepares integrated plans for military mobilization, assesses mobilization plans, develops mobilization preparedness actions, and plans and conducts mobilization exercises.

Military Services

The Military Services' mobilization planning and method of implementation are driven by the requirements of approved Operation Plans (OPLANs). Most of the differences among the Military Services reflect their varying missions and organizations, and the particular relationships and roles of their active and reserve forces. Each Military Service is responsible for its own mobilization planning and for the execution of its plans, even those considered essential supporting arms of joint OPLANs.

THE PURPOSE OF MOBILIZATION

As is evident from its definition, the mobilization process encompasses many civil, military, and industrial actions serving to transition the United States from a peacetime to a wartime environment. However, an understanding of "what" constitutes mobilization does not also impart knowledge of "why" national authorities may see fit to initiate the process.

The mobilization of our national resources, regardless of the extent of such mobilization, meets a variety of national security needs that individually and collectively underscore the importance of maintaining a strong, viable mobilization capability. Among the more significant national security needs that mobilization fulfills are the following:

- It is a powerful deterrent and simultaneously transmits a message of national resolve to our allies.

- It supports a rapid response to meeting a threat in the event deterrence fails.
• It assures the availability of war materiel within a shortened lead-time.
• It permits the build-up of the national force structure to meet one or more contingencies.
• It facilitates the deployment of forces to an area of conflict or wherever national security requirements dictate their need.
• It serves to enhance internal security.
• It expands the range of response options available to the National Command Authorities.

MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

The mobilization continuum conceptualized in Figure A-1 clearly shows that the responsibilities for conducting mobilization planning and for executing mobilization actions exceed the authority and capability of the DoD. As shown in Figure A-1, the transition from a peacetime to a full wartime posture involves mobilization of the nation’s industrial base as well as support and sustainment of allied resources. In addition, the Congress and diverse Federal agencies play vital roles in both mobilization planning and execution. Those Federal agencies and their mobilization responsibilities are identified in Table A-2. The overall coordinator of mobilization and civil defense matters is the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which works with a variety of other agencies at the national and regional levels and with emergency planners in each of the states through regional offices.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, primary responsibility for the functional aspects of mobilization rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel [specifically, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Mobilization Planning Policy]. The DASD’s principal staff element for mobilization matters is the Director for Mobilization Planning and Requirements. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also plays a key mobilization role through his responsibility for issuing defense guidance for emergency planning.

Within the office of the Director for Logistics (J4), JCS, mobilization takes on a mantle of specificity. Mobilization-related responsibilities in peacetime, periods of crisis, and wartime are resident within that office. Not the least of these are the provision of guidance to the Unified and Specified commanders on military and industrial mobilization assumptions for operational planning and the review of

**FIG. A-1. CONCEPTUAL MOBILIZATION CONTINUUM**
## TABLE A-2

### FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH MAJOR MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Prepares and implements noncombatant evacuation plans worldwide, with certain exceptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labor</td>
<td>Supervises mobilization of the national work force, allocates and distributes the civilian work force among nonmilitary claimants, and uses the public employment service system to meet defense and essential civilian needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
<td>Manages mobilization of civilian health work force; provides advice and recommendations on priorities and allocations of the civilian health work force between civilian and military requirements; and manages the reception and onward movement aspects of noncombatant evacuation operations during declared national emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
<td>Manages the Federal work force for mobilization and emergencies and establishes emergency employment, recruitment, and management policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
<td>Manages emergency production, processing, and distribution of materials, facilities, and services of manufactured goods and controls priorities for industrial production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
<td>Provides emergency policy direction, including establishment of priorities and allocations to all forms of civil transportation services to meet military and essential civilian needs. Through the Maritime Administration, administers priorities and allocations of ocean transportation services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
<td>Acquires, constructs, maintains, and manages civilian housing incident to mobilization, including accommodation of relocated and expanded work force and of noncombatants evacuated to the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Science and Technology Policy</td>
<td>Serves as Federal resource agency for claims against national telecommunications resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Administration</td>
<td>Serves as primary Continental United States health care resource for military casualties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Service-prepared mobilization plans to ensure that they support OPLANs. In that regard, JCS is tasked by the Secretary of Defense “to coordinate the mobilization plans of the Services and to insure the interface of these plans with deployments.” (JCS Pub 21).
It is at the Military Service level, however, that the entire matter of defense mobilization receives its sharpest focus. As stated in JCS Pub 21:

Mobilization Plans of the Services provide the details for assembling the Reserve Component forces; moving those forces from home station to mobilization station (station of initial assignment) when required; and stationing, equipping, and training the Reserve Component units and individual reservists to bring these forces to operationally ready status. In addition, Service mobilization plans provide guidance to their existing infrastructure support agencies to meet the surge and sustain wartime requirements of the total force.