PROSPECTS FOR AN INCREASED NAVAL ROLE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY

By

EDWARD A. OLSEN

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This report was prepared by:

Edward A. Olsen
Professor

Reviewed by:

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Commander, U.S. Navy
Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

Released by:

KNEALE T. MARSHALL
Dean of Information and Policy Sciences
The Republic of Korea's robust economy and diverse global interests are encouraging ROK officials and scholars to contemplate a broader range of security interests than they have in the past. ROK naval options are included in that spectrum. Though the ROK remains preoccupied by a continental orientation, focused on the North Korean threat, defense intellectuals in South Korea are interested in the following broader security themes: SLOC defenses, regional naval security, industrial cooperation in naval areas, and the possibilities of a Korean maritime strategy. The ROK seems interested in expanding its naval horizons and capabilities, but those aspirations may be tempered by changes in Northeast Asia which may alter the context in which Seoul must implement its policies.
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EDWARD A. OLSEN
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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This study shall assess the present and future situation faced by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy in an area and era -- Northeast Asia in the 1990s -- which is widely considered dynamic. Pacific dynamism is on the verge of becoming a cliched concept because it is now so widely recognized. Precisely what that dynamism entails is, however, far less well understood. Many on both sides of the Pacific are intrigued by the possibilities and risks of a shift in power relationships. Most evident to Americans are the tangible economic changes occurring in US-Japanese relations.\(^1\) Comparable changes are transpiring on a smaller scale in U.S. relations with the so-called "new Japans."\(^2\) Americans tend to react to these shifts with some ambiguity and trepidation, but also with a sense of equanimity generated by the feeling that such changes are occurring within an extended family of allies and trade partners. Though Paul Kennedy's best selling *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*\(^3\) has drawn considerable criticism, he at least helped raise a warning flag that historical cycles and patterns may be valuable in terms of averting fatalism and not succumbing to the inevitability of processes which can be altered by appropriate policy adjustments. This aspect of Pacific dynamism is crucial to the evolving Northeast Asian context in which the ROK Navy operates. For better or worse, Northeast Asia today is dominated by US-Japan interaction. For the foreseeable future, this is likely to remain a constant of Northeast Asian affairs. None of Japan's neighbors relish the prominence Tokyo once again
enjoys in Asian-Pacific affairs, least of all the Koreans, South or North. Nonetheless, this is a situation to which all parties seem capable of adapting.

Much less obvious to most Americans are the superpower shifts occurring in Asia. Mikhail Gorbachev's vaunted glasnost and perestroika have caught the American public's attention in no uncertain terms. Clearly there is popular fascination with the processes of change and potentials for true reform in the Soviet Union. The impact of those processes and potentials on Soviet policy toward NATO and on Western European reactions to Moscow's policy seem nearly as prominent in the popular consciousness of Americans. The influence of Soviet domestic policy changes on Asia is, relative to changes in US-Asian relations, much less noticed in the United States. Normally only specialists in Asian affairs pay much attention to this issue. Precisely where the Gorbachev era in Asian affairs will lead is impossible to predict. Some conservative analysts do not find such estimation very difficult and warn against being deceived by a Soviet peace offense. They detect no meaningful positive changes in Soviet objectives in Asia, remind us that the Soviet bear still packs potent claws, and argue that the United States and its allies must maintain a high state of readiness to deter (and -- if necessary -- wage) conflict. Such caution is warranted in the sense of worst case assumptions. In these terms, Americans concerned with U.S. strategy in the Pacific should heed voices of prudence and not get carried away with their hopes that tensions will be so reduced that the Cold War can be relegated to history. Nonetheless, Soviets in Asia are speaking more pleasantly, behaving more politely, and suggesting
that their future actions will fulfill the promise of their contemporary rhetoric. Those promises remain largely unfulfilled, but more action has occurred (in Mongolia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan) than most observers would have imaged feasible just a couple of years ago. In short, Western prudence and pragmatism notwithstanding, the Gorbachev era has introduced a second crucial facet of dynamism in Asia that is paralleling the US-Japan facet.

China, and its great potential for change that could influence not just regional -- but global -- affairs, also looms as a third facet of dynamism. The Chinese factor is, however, not an inminently casual one. China's impact almost certainly will be felt much more gradually than the Japanese and Soviet factors. It is the US-USSR-Japan triad which most seriously influences Pacific dynamism. This is the contemporary context in which the ROK Navy contemplates its options.

The ROK Navy: Domestic Context

When one considers the contemporary arms balance in Asia, several states' forces loom large. Among them is the Republic of Korea. Its armed forces have achieved warranted acclaim for their professional development since the Korean War. They also have earned considerable notoriety for their involvement in South Korean politics. The Seoul governments produced by South Korean Army elites -- under Presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were well known for their harsh authoritarianism. They received much foreign criticism in that regard. Fortunately, the current
government under President Roh Tae-woo -- although also drawing from a military elite -- has achieved greatly enhanced political legitimacy through seriously contested presidential and legislative elections in 1987 and 1988.

Throughout the Park and Chun years it was extraordinarily difficult for South Korean domestic critics of those regimes' military roots to openly express their views about the political, economic, or cultural roles of Army elites. As a result of the political upheaval experienced in South Korea from the spring of 1987 through the spring of 1988, which produced a de facto institutional revolution and a rapid expansion in political pluralism, great strides have been made toward real democracy. One dramatic result of this domestic transformation of South Korea has been a remarkable increase in freedom of the press and intellectual expression. This has unleashed a wave of articles on formerly taboo or tightly controlled subjects. Included in this surge of glasnost-like criticism were analyses of the still-sensitive and delicate topic of the military's influence. Evident in all this analyses is a new willingness to confront popular South Korean antipathy toward the ROK military without cloaking it as much in anti-foreign (Japanese or American) sentiments as was common under Park and Chun. Anti-Americanism and anti-Japanese sentiments flourished, too, in the new freedom but on their own merits, not as a veneer for attacks on the military elites. In short, the South Korean masses' longstanding doubts about the proper role of the military in their culture, has gone public with a vengeance.
This has shaken thoroughly the once firm grip of the ROK Army on political power.

It must never be forgotten, however, that those same armed forces -- now often maligned -- are responsible for preserving the security of South Korea and enabling that country to prosper sufficiently so that it could sustain sizeable armed forces. In effect, those successes were what provided the ROK with the time and resiliency necessary to wage the political struggles that yielded the reform-minded Roh Tae-woo government. All too easily forgotten, or ignored, amid this tumultuous situation and intense emotion are the various non-Army roles and missions played by the ROK armed forces. Neither the ROK Air Force nor Navy have played major political roles in their societies. The primary reasons for these relatively minor political roles pertain to their sizes, military roles, and budgets. Measured by all three criteria the ROK Army is dominant. It is by far the largest of the services with 542,000 personnel as of 1987. In comparison, the ROK Air Force only has 33,000 personnel and the ROK Navy only 29,000 personnel. With so large a share of the personnel pie, it is no surprise that the ROK Army has the lion’s share of the budget pie. Neither comparison comes as any news to anyone remotely familiar with the security situation on the Korean peninsula since the late 1940s. Neither are Korean affairs specialists surprised by data which show the ROK expend a large share of its GNP, and its budget, on defense versus other social needs. Ever since the formation of the Republic of Korea in the south, and its rival Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north, threat perceptions in the eyes of the Seoul
leadership have been overwhelmingly land-based and tangible. Few in Seoul have been overly concerned about a North Korean air assault and virtually no one has been fearful of South Korean subjugation by North Korean naval assault. Whether security analysts focused on deterrence or actually waging war, the name of the game in Korea long has been army versus army.

Over the years that Army-orientation yielded some ground to recognition that the ROK Air Force and Navy also play important roles in South Korean security. That recognition grew apace with two parallel developments. Firstly, numerical and technological improvements in the North Korean Air Force and Navy, aided especially by the Soviet Union in the mid-to-late 1980s, drew attention to the heightened sophistication of the North Korean threat. Secondly, massive growth in the South Korean economy during the 1960s, '70s and '80s enabled Seoul to greatly enlarge the defense budget "pie," thereby facilitating more funds for the ROK Air Force and Navy in absolute and relative terms. Throughout these decades both the ROK Air Force and Navy have grown in capabilities and professionalism. Of the two, however, the ROK Air Force's presence in Korean and regional security affairs has become more evident. Clearly lagging behind is the ROK Navy. Although its stature has grown, that growth has not been so extensive as its sister services. As important, the ROK Navy's image has changed least. It is still seen as essentially a coastal navy with occasional big ideas about moving a little bit off shore.

Most analyses of the Korean naval scene understandably focus on the inter-Korean balance. These analyses commonly, and
accurately, stress the gains South Korea has made in naval equipment, training, and strategy as a result of the ROK's major economic lead over the DPRK and because of much more harmonious U.S. Navy and ROK Navy cooperation compared to the more uneven relationships the DPRK Navy has had with its allies' navies. Though contemporary security analysts, especially those from South Korea, hasten to add that the ROK Navy still needs the U.S. Navy's support in South Korea's defense, the common wisdom justifiably holds that South Korea is increasingly able to hold its own against North Korea. Certainly this is the prevailing view in ROK Navy circles. The focus of this study is the ROK Navy's future strategic prospects, not its present (or future) hardware, but published data on the balance of naval forces provides a sense of the strengths and weaknesses of the ROK compared to the DPRK.

On the face of it North Korea's Navy, formally called the "Navy of the Korean People's Army," still appears to be superior to the South Korean Navy. It has many more vessels and more personnel. Moreover, North Korea has a formidable (in the Korean context) force of out-date Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines. North Korea also has an edge in fast-attack categories and landing craft. North Korea's assets are appropriate for its presumed missions, assaulting the South. The ROK Navy's assets emphasize stymying such North Korean objectives. The ROK Navy does not possess a submarine force remotely comparable to North Korea's numbers. A debate has tugged ROK Navy and defense planners in different directions for years. Some in South Korea, hoping to keep up with the northern Kims,
pressed for a ROK counterpart submarine force. In the face of arguments that the ROK should not enter a arms contest of this sort largely for prestige sake, and should focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW), leaving serious submarine activity to the U.S. Navy, a compromise of sorts was struck. Rumors persist that the ROK Navy contemplates purchasing French or German submarines, but such speculation must be judged against the reality of South Korea's indigenously produced submarine. Although essentially tilting in favor of the ASW rationale, the ROK Navy also has developed, built, and deployed three indigenous 175-ton submarines. These submarines, called tolgorae (dolphin), engaged in a well-publicized exercise in June 1987. There also have been press reports that the ROK Navy bought two West German submarines in 1987.16

Overall, however, the contemporary ROK Navy clearly is strongest when deployed to counter North Korean coastal incursions and is developing added strengths in ASW capabilities. In doing so it adheres to recent and past expectations.17 Consequently, the present goals of the ROK Navy emphasize improvements on the margins of what it now does. In other words, the working assumption of the ROK Navy in 1988-89 is that it should strive to become a more capable coastal navy, enhancing its ability to conduct ASW, provide interdiction and coastal defense, and escort vessels aiding South Korea's defense or constituting its logistics pipeline. These are roles and missions that South Korea's economic and technological edge over North Korea readily sustains. As important, they are roles and missions that are sellable to the ROK Army and Air Force because they are compatible with the latter two services' view of Korean
security. In short, the ROK Navy's ongoing, and successful, efforts to improve itself have been accepted because they are consistent with a limited frame of reference. Professor J. K. Park succinctly expressed the prevailing Korean view of such inherent constraints when he wrote.

South Korea can never afford to overlook the importance of the sea. But despite the importance of the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea, it cannot allocate an extremely large portion of resources to the naval force. They will have to contend for resources with other military services as well as civilian sectors of the economy.18

There is no doubt that these constraints loom large in the eyes of the ROK Navy and South Koreans who think about its place in their country's security. In the various studies to which this analysis subsequently will refer there are abundant references, explicit and implicit, to these apparent limitations, but there also is a major -- if diffuse -- effort to expand the horizons of naval thinking in South Korea.

This has not been an easy task because of the strategy which underlies South Korea's defenses. Partly because of Korea's continental orientation historically, and partly because North Korean ground and air forces pose the major threat, South Korea does not possess a robust naval tradition. Unlike neighboring Japan, but akin to China, Korea's culture has not esteemed the military's social
standing. Its few historical military heroes were overwhelmingly from ground forces. There was only one truly notable naval figure in Korea's martial pantheon, Admiral Yi Sun-shin, famous for disrupting Japan's 16th century invasion of Korea. There is a beautiful shrine (Hyon chung sa) to his memory in Onyang, which helps bolster the naval tradition, but -- on balance -- Admiral Yi's legacy is much greater as a focus of anti-Japanese patriotic resolve than as a naval hero. Though the ROK Navy manfully tries to cultivate Korea's historical naval tradition, it offers thin support upon which to foster a broader vision of naval roles and missions. For better or worse, most of Korea's scanty naval traditions are more appropriate to a limited, off-shore-focused, naval image. Despite all these inhibitions, there have been serious efforts to "think big" or at least bigger than most observers deem practical. These efforts have focused on raising new approaches to defense of sea lanes of communications (SLOCs); new thinking about far off-shore waters that South Korea shares with its neighbors (other than North Korea): Japan, China, and the Soviet Union; Korean interpretations of legal aspects of maritime issues; the industrial implications of increased naval cooperation with allies; and forecasts of new directions in ROK "maritime strategy." Each of these categories will be explored prior to examining the impact they seem to be having on Seoul's policy.

SLOC DEFENSES

Without question the issue of SLOC defense has gained great visibility in South Korean security circles. The most centralized forum for this issue is the SLOC Study Group, headquartered at Yonsei
University where its Executive Director, Dr. Kim Dalchoong, is a faculty member. The study group is composed of prominent South Korean scholars, officials, and businessmen who share a common concern with defense of sea lane security. Many of the studies cited in this analysis were prepared by members of the study group which is in the forefront of those in Korea who are pressing for new visions regarding Korean security. A large number of the studies done in Korea on SLOC security are basic examinations of what "SLOC" means in the abstract and specifically for South Korea. Dr. Kim has presented three successive evolutions of an analysis of South Korea's seaborne trade and the SLOC issue which collectively show a comprehensive grasp of the broad economic, political, and security dimensions of important trade routes in the Western Pacific and beyond, and how disruption of these trade routes might become as serious a threat to the ROK's national well being as an assault by North Korean forces.

Concurrent with Dr. Kim's 1982 analysis were three other basic descriptive papers. One by Sogang University Professor Rhee Sang-woo threats the same maritime framework as the Kim papers, but does so with an firmer eye on the implications for South Korea's role in collective security. Another by two professors at the Korean National Defense College, Drs. Lee Sun-ho and Kim Young-hoon, was published at almost the same time as the 1982 conference papers. Their analysis, is more specific than those just cited. It attempts to spell out what the authors think Seoul should have the ROK Navy do in defense of off-shore sea lanes -- guarantee sea lane security between major South Korean ports, develop appropriate bases on
Ciaeju, Ullung, and Paekryong Islands, and increase cooperation between the three Korean service branches to achieve the first two goals. It also examines the prospect of the ROK playing a serious role in "defense of the sea lanes on the high seas" by means of increased cooperation with the United States and Japan. In addition, it responds favorably, but cautiously, to conservative American proposals for the creation of a sea lane protection arrangement that would include Taiwan. The third study was by Commodore Kim Yon-shik (ROKN) who also advocates a three-fold approach: bolster the storage of war materiel; reinforce escort capabilities as a means toward building a "sanitized" zone off-shore Korea in the key straits between the peninsula and Japan, and the peninsula and Chejudo; and prepare to assist the U.S. Navy by contributing two destroyers to a U.S. led combined fleet composed of US, Japanese, and ROK vessels.24 An additional contribution during this seminal period was the conference luncheon speech presented by Dr. Min Kwan-shik which underlined the linkage in the security arrangements the United States has with South Korea and other regional actors and stressed the importance of South Koreans not thinking excessively in parochially Korean peninsula terms.25

All those papers must be understood in the context of their time. In the late 1970s - early 1980s time frame South Koreans were experiencing a convergence of unsettling developments. Their confidence in the United States commitment had been severely shaken by the American reverses in Vietnam, the Carter administration's maladroit efforts to cut U.S. forces levels in Korea, and the growth of Soviet armed power (especially naval power) in
the Asia-Pacific region. Although the Carter and Reagan administrations took steps to reassure Seoul, the seeds of doubt had been sown in fertile soil because many South Koreans harbored longstanding concerns about the seriousness of the United States' commitment to Korea. Part of the modern folklore of US-Korea relations, created by late 19th and early 20th century U.S. policy shifts and the ambiguousness of U.S. policy toward Korea in the late 1940s, is a pronounced skepticism among South Koreans about the reliability of American promises. In short, there is a barely latent readiness to not trust Americans. Compounding this sense of uncertainty were the successive waves of "oil shocks" which jolted the South Korean economy and made politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, and businessmen hypersensitive to the reality that their country, its economy, its raw materials, its exports, and its military logistics pipeline are -- all -- extraordinarily vulnerable to seaborne disruption. In short, South Korean defense intellectuals and policymakers were rapidly becoming sensitized to the fragility of the economic and logistical infrastructure over which the ROK government had minimal influence. They were beginning to ask what good it would do to be able to protect themselves against North Korea, and to work diligently in the private sector, if events far over the horizon could prove as devastating. All of these considerations were reinforcing factors to a growing number of South Koreans that the concept of collective security had implications for the ROK well beyond the context of the Korean peninsula.

In subsequent years other South Korean defense intellectuals developed these ideas further. The year 1984 proved to be an
important one in Korea's concern over SLOCs. Although there had been one previous attack on South Korean shipping in the Persian Gulf (in 1982), that had seemed like a fluke event. In 1984, however, two ROK merchant ships were attacked in the Gulf. This caused South Korean businessmen and officials to become much more concerned about sea lane security. As an issue, it was taken off the back burner and became "hot" -- the subject of serious debate by defense intellectuals, officials, and (to a lesser extent) the media.26 There are a number of notable examples. Kyung-hee University Professor Kim Chan-kyu in 1984 explored the relationships between SLOC defenses, maritime strategy in general, and how each fit into the development of geopolitical theory -- especially in an Asian context.27 Such analysis may not be groundbreaking in the U.S. context, but it made a valuable contribution to Korean understanding of how the ROK's security is related to non-continental, maritime security issues. Also in 1984 a ROK government researcher, Dr. Choi Young of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, examined what SLOC defense might require of the ROK in the future and concluded that Northeast Asian security would probably compel South Korea to cooperate at sea with the United States and Japan. He also suggested that South Korean concerns about the SLOCs in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean would compel the ROK to seek naval cooperation from Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Dr. Choi, too, accepted the argument of some conservative American analysts that naval cooperation with Taiwan probably should be part of broader collective security arrangements designed to defend SLOCs.28 Lastly, in 1984, Dr. Choi's
Institute held a wide-ranging symposium that examined the transitional security period the ROK was experiencing, the importance of seaborne transportation to the ROK, and the implications of these factors for Japanese-Korean military cooperation.  

In 1985 one of Korea's most insightful defense analysts, Dr. Cha Young-koo of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses tackled, for the SLOC Study Group, the relevance of SLOC defenses in a changing world. He prudently called for much increased consultation among allies concerned over the SLOCs so that collectively we might fashion a coherent view of threat perceptions. Dr. Cha accurately noted the enormous difficulty of defending SLOCs by any naval forces and suggested fostering forums which might produce tension reduction, thereby reducing or obviating the need to defend SLOCs. Also in 1985 a senior Korean naval officer, Commodore Choi Deug-lim, offered his analysis of SLOCs in a way that tailored the issue for several long-standing ROK Navy goals: playing catch-up versus North Korea's submarines and fleshing out the ROK Navy's coastal defense roles. Reminiscent of the analysis by Professors Lee and Kim, Choi seeks to enlarge the ROK's responsibilities for sea lane defense by incremental upgrades from its existing peninsular focus. Commodore Choi would develop "high seas corridors" in the Korean and Cheju straits, coupled with enhanced ASW and mine-laying capabilities. Looking toward the day when Korea can uphold a fair share of mutual burdens at sea, Choi advocated major increases in ROK Navy capabilities.
In 1986-87 the levels of analytical sophistication by Korean scholars seemed to increase, presumably because they were building upon the work that went before. For example, Dr. Rhee Sang-woo expanded upon his earlier argument, and advocated: working toward a pact mandating non-aggression in the SLOCs (guaranteed even in time of war), and -- as an interim measure to secure the Northeast Asian SLOCs -- pursue naval cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The latter would entail a joint military command system modeled after the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, a division of labor among the three countries in accord with their capabilities, shared use of each other's bases, cooperation in production and management of military equipment, joint exercises, and sharing of SLOC-related intelligence. In June 1987 the SLOC Study Group held its most recent conference which contained two noteworthy Korean contributions. Dr. Chee Choung-il prepared a fairly orthodox paper on the rationale for the ROK Navy to enhance its coastal defense missions in a way that would be integrated in SLOC defense concepts, but injected into his thesis two provocative arguments about the unlikelihood of SLOC conflict in the two war scenarios of most concern to South Korea. Firstly, he observed, in the event of nuclear war, SLOC interdiction or trade disruption are not likely to be of great concern to South Koreans in such a catastrophic context. Secondly, in the event war in Korea breaks out again, Dr. Chee assumes most expectations that the war will be of short duration (i.e., about ten days) are accurate and that such a war will not be long enough for disruption of supply lines to matter very much. In a somewhat similar vein Dr. Lee Seo-hang, a
Senior Research Fellow at the Korean Ocean Research and Development Institute, argues that the SLOCs vulnerability -- while crucial to the ROK -- is also crucial to all sorts of other states, including the Soviet Union. He further argues that arrangements should be pursued that will assure that the SLOCs will not be disrupted by any party.37

What has been the impact of all this argumentation? It would be inaccurate to make sweepingly positive judgements about the impact. The ROK Navy does not yet have a mandate to assume major new defense roles. On the other hand, however, progress has been made in getting national recognition of the importance of naval defenses. Some of this no doubt was stimulated by the increases in Soviet-North Korean armed cooperation in the mid-to-late 1980s which certainly sensitized Seoul to the potential direct threat the USSR could pose to the ROK and reinforced Seoul's fears of Pyongyang-Moscow machinations. A great deal of that motivation was ameliorated by the appearance of improved Soviet policy toward Asia since the Gorbachev era began. Regardless of the ephemeral qualities of such South Korean concerns, they did help to promote a new sensitivity to the sorts of maritime security interests discussed in all the studies assessed here. One result of this ongoing process was the pronouncement by then President Chun in April 1987 that sea lane defense was "vital" to ROK security and economic well being, and that the importance of the ROK Navy to South Korean security "cannot be overemphasized."38 This marked a change of tone, at the very least.
New Thinking About Northeast Asian Security

In no area has there been more "thinking big" than in contemporary South Korea's prospective security relations with its three large neighbors: Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Each will be examined here, but in a very different light. As is indicated in the previous section, Japan enters into much of the thinking that occurs in South Korea about its future security. To put it mildly, there are many South Koreans who are nervous about what Japan may do in the future about its national security, how it may choose to approach regional security, what sort of impact the changing roles of the two superpowers may have on the strategic thinking going on in contemporary Japan, and the ways in which resurgent Japanese nationalism could influence these matters. Some of this South Korean concern can be chalked up to longstanding paranoia among some Koreans whose view of Japan was indelibly warped by their horrendous experiences under Japanese colonialism. Although their emotional fears are understandable, they rarely are based on an effort to be objective about contemporary Japan's security interests and policies. Fortunately, there are a large cadre of scholars, government officials, and businessmen whose professions require them to focus on the real Japan -- not one visualized in the popular imagination shaped by the bitter legacy of colonialism. By and large these individuals develop an accurate sense for what Japan's interests and policies really are. Unfortunately (from a U.S. or Japanese perspective), such South Koreans, too, often remain concerned about Japan's security prospects and options. Their informed concerns revolve around the uncertainties enveloping
Tokyo's security policy. They tend to be wary of Japan's true commitment to its relatively benign "comprehensive security" doctrine, uneasy about the United States' confidence in Japan as a security partner, anxiety-ridden about the prospect that Washington will share so many burdens with Tokyo that the Japanese will end up running the security arrangements in Northeast Asia, and very ambiguous about Japan's relatively more flexible foreign relations with the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. In short, few South Koreans trust Japan to hew to the path it has carved out for itself in the postwar era under the auspices of the United States. They much prefer to keep Japan constrained by the de facto leash formed by the US-Japan security relationship.

Such South Koreans have spoken and written extensively about the pros and cons of the ROK-Japan security environment and the ways in which it has been influenced by the three other major powers, especially the United States. There are many analyses of the prospects for a triangular US-Japan-ROK security relationship. The great majority of those analyses are critical of that prospect and warn South Koreans to be extraordinarily cautious about being trapped by Washington and Tokyo into an arrangement considered to be widely unpopular in South Korea. Political leaders, too, recognize that this is not an issue around which there is any ground swell of support. Many prominent Seoul leaders have disavowed the entire approach to regional security. Nonetheless, there is a clear trend emergent among South Korean defense intellectuals that some variant of trilateralism may be desirable under certain
circumstances. That trend encompasses views that treat prospective ROK-Japan security cooperation more broadly than naval-related issues, but here the focus shall remain on Korean views of the prospective naval component.

The naval aspect of Northeast security, and its bearing on Japanese policy, was made vivid for South Koreans by the 1983 decision of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to assume a larger role in Japan's self-defense that would entail the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) protecting the key navigable straits that link the main Japanese islands together, and to the Korean peninsula and the Soviet Union. Tokyo's intentions to use its navy, the Maritime SDF (MSDF), to control those straits by blockades drew major attention in the Korean press and stimulated ROK naval interest in precisely what the Japanese were up to off Korean shores. Both the Japanese and Koreans have a cultural predilection to view foreign problems as very foreign until brought home to them in an intrusive manner. This is what Koreans call "fire in another's house" (nam ui jib ui bul) and Japanese call "fires on a distant shore" (kaigan no kasai). In the case of the strait between the Korean peninsula and Kyushu, the maritime stakes of the ROK and Japan are inextricably intertwined. Threats to that body of water (the Korean strait/Tsushima strait) are phenomena that both Korea and Japan must confront. As long as Japan did nothing serious to cope with potential threats, and left those responsibilities to the U.S. Navy, the ROK could afford to be cavalier about its own interests and options. Seoul merely assumed that the United States would cope without the help of allies. The pressures the United States exerted on Japan to assume more naval
responsibilities (i.e., the much vaunted plans to protect a thousand miles of sea lanes) produced results that took many South Koreans relatively unawares. An estimate of what Japan has accomplished and contemplates doing regarding Korean security will be offered in a subsequent section, but for now it can be noted that the achievements in Japan's defenses -- especially the growth of the MSDF -- made a pronounced impression on many South Korean defense intellectuals, policymakers, and citizens concerned with ROK security.

Like it or not, many such South Koreans recognized that the conditions off-shore near the peninsula would be massively influenced by Tokyo's maritime policies. Simply put, these Koreans decided the ROK would have to respond and offered suggestions on how to do so. There were, of course, new warnings along the old lines about becoming gratuitously entangled in US-Japan naval matters that should be left beyond South Korean purview. All the analysis that emanated from North Korea strongly and vociferously reinforced those warnings. Nonetheless, there were some strikingly forward looking analyses and policy moves during the mid-to-late 1980s. Facilitated by the smoother relations brought about the by the 1983-84 exchange of visits by President Chun and Prime Minister Nakasone, and the semi-apology of Emperor Hirohito for Japan's colonial excesses, small scale ROK-Japan naval cooperation began. Exchanges of fleet visits was agreed upon in mid-1985. More important, the two Asian navies expanded their participation in exercises with the United States in ways that overlapped in a functional sense. They also, of necessity, had to engage in so-called
"pass-ex" (passing exercises) cooperation. These may be small steps, but as both nations' philosophical tradition advises them, that is how one starts long journeys.

One 1984 paper cited previously by Dr. Lee Ki-taek,47 pointed in that direction. Although he noted all the orthodox disclaimers about the unlikelihood of near-term Japan-ROK cooperation to defend the sea-lanes, and cautioned South Korea about the impact moves in that direction could have on the United States' willingness to keep its existing commitments to the ROK, he also acknowledged as "inevitable" future direct bilateral military cooperation at sea because of Japan's certain role in maintaining sea-lane security in Northeast Asia which is, in turn, "vital" for South Korea. Dr. Lee recognized the differences in Japan and the ROK's threat environment and advocated a larger role for Seoul in consultation with Tokyo and Washington over regional security, cautioning that it would be better for Seoul to participate in such consultations than to stay out of them and leave it to the United States and Japan to devise a strategy which would directly effect Korea's security. Dr. Lee is a professor at a mainstream university (Yonsei) giving his views broader credibility.

Others who have staked out affirmative positions on the potential for Japan playing a positive role in maritime security around or near Korea have had more conservative institutional affiliations. For example, in 1986 Commander Jung Chang-shik (ROKN) -- after making the obligatory cautionary remarks about Japan getting out of control militarily and politically, the U.S. proving a fickle partner, and (somewhat contradicting his apprehension about Japan becoming too powerful) Japan abstaining from conflict in or
near Korea -- argues for an innovative approach. First, he explained in detail what Japan's SLOC defense plans might mean for ROK maritime security. Based on that, his approach is three-tiered. He advocates a significant expansion of the ROK Navy, making it -- in the near term -- unilaterally capable of protecting SLOCs close to Korea, but with a longer term objectives of creating a much larger "blue water" navy. He further argues that the ROK should seek indirect and secret naval cooperation with Japan to protect the broader SLOCs under the leadership of the United States. Finally, Commander Jung argues that this attenuated naval triangle with two strong and visible legs and one (ROK-Japan) leg that is viable but not so obvious should be capable of being transformed into a trilateral cooperative system in time of war, providing joint capability to protect the sea-lanes. Also in 1986 a much more conservative researcher, Dr. Kang Byung-kyu (a Board Member of the "International Security Council," a spin-off of the Rev. Moon Sun-myung's organization), offered an articulate argument for the ROK cooperating closely with the United States and Japan to protect Asian SLOCs. Though his arguments are likely to appeal to many Americans, Japanese, and South Korean conservatives, his institutional ties do not bolster what is otherwise a worthwhile argument and that argument, in turn, is not appreciably helped by being identified with very conservative causes.

More in the conservative mainstream again were two 1987 analyses. National Defense College professor Lee Mang-sug also raises other obligatory cautionary notes about Japan being
vulnerable to North Korean spying, the danger of the ROK becoming
too dependent on Japanese military technology and information, and
the risks that the U.S. might use Japan-ROK military cooperation as a
pretext to cut its commitments, perhaps egged on by the increased
North Korean criticism likely to emerge from closer Japan-ROK
cooperation. On balance, however, Dr. Lee favors a gradual increase
in quasi-military cooperation between South Korea and Japan,
leading to real military cooperation as the ROK's national power
becomes sufficient to not be vulnerable to Japanese advantages. The
other analysis was far more provocative than the others. Commander
Lee Chang-geun (ROKN) wrote that the ROK should expand its navy
to avoid "inferiority." He suggested this larger navy could be ready to
cooperate with presently friendly states against contemporary
adversaries, but also should be prepared to cope with states that also
could become "potential enemies," i.e., China and Japan. His new
approaches, however, focused on cultivating naval cooperation
between the ROK, the United States, and Japan, to include routine
naval exercises. Commander Lee also pressed for a changed US-ROK
naval relationship, calling for the integration of the ROK Navy into a
cooperative relationship with the U.S. Seventh Fleet through a joint
command system, the establishment of a Seventh Fleet base in Korea,
and expanded regional interaction based on such a reinforced US-
Korea naval system.

There is little doubt that much new thinking has occurred in
South Korea regarding the possibility of closer military/naval
cooperation between the ROK and Japan. The old shiboleths about the
impossibility of such bilateral cooperation no longer so automatically
apply in the Korean context. The Japanese context will be surveyed below. For all that progress, however, it must be emphasized that there is still a deep reservoir of suspicion in Korea about Japan when it comes to security issues. There is no rush to embrace Japan too closely. Such an embrace is somewhat more comfortable when the United States also links arms. There is a very strong desire even among South Koreans who support closer naval (and other military) cooperation with Japan to retain the United States as a buffer. Complicating this entire situation is the emergence of two other major trends in ROK perceptions of the world. Since 1984 the ROK openly has been experimenting with flexible relations with communist countries, other than North Korea. Prior to that there had long been reports of covert or indirect ROK trade contacts with a variety of communist states. Initially this open move was a transparent ploy to undermine North Korea's position in the contest the two Korean states were waging. As the 1980s progressed, however, the economic advantages of these steps quickly became evident.

Not even events like the 1983 Soviet attack on KAL 007 or the North Korean bombing in Rangoon were able to seriously impede Seoul's desires -- bolstered by the 1988 Olympic spirit -- to expand its diplomatic and trade horizons. Smaller scale examples of this trend are evident in ROK overtures toward various Eastern European states and Vietnam. Perhaps the foremost success of that subset of relationships was the growth of ROK-Hungarian trade relations. Far more significant for the overall directions of ROK foreign and security policy were the initiatives Seoul has taken regarding the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. Once implacable adversaries and critics of the ROK, and steadfast supporters of the DPRK, both Beijing and Moscow have mellowed toward Seoul under Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev. ROK ties with the PRC once were spoken of only in hushed tones lest North Korea react so adversely that the fledgling relations be upset. Made possible by the normalization of US-PRC diplomatic relations, the partial convergence of US-PRC strategies which yielded significant complementarity of interests, changes in China's worldview and economic priorities, and a sense among South Koreans that they, too, might get a share of the "great China market," ROK-PRC contacts have blossomed. Nudged on strongly from behind the scenes by business leaders such as the Daewoo Group's Kim Woo-Choon, bilateral trade has grown from 1985 estimates that ranged from $300 million to $800 million to 1988 estimates of $3 billion which is about six times the estimate for trade between China and North Korea.

The main impact of that growing trade relationship has been on the overall diplomatic and security tenor of ROK-PRC relations which are clearly improved, despite a concentrated effort by Beijing to maintain its ties with North Korea. There is no sign that Seoul is insensitive to the utility for ROK policy of the PRC maintaining a dual policy toward the divided Korean nation. Seoul is being eminently pragmatic in this regard. Its pragmatism is most glaring in regard to the once solid ROK relationships with the "Republic of China on Taiwan," which have been adversely influenced by improved ROK-PRC ties. This shift has more than symbolic importance because it has a direct impact on ROK naval options in the Western Pacific. Despite
the sympathy some South Korean analysts discussed here have displayed for conservative American analysts' suggestions that Taiwan be incorporated into any future non-communist sea-lane defense alliance, the ROK is moving in diplomatic and economic directions that are antithetical to such proposals. Contemporary Seoul-Taipei relations are not good, and specifically there have been negative repercussions on ROK-Taiwan naval interaction symbolized by Taipei's veto of the Taiwanese navy's plans to buy more than $1 billion worth of frigates from South Korean shipyards. More than any other factor, however, there seems to be an overriding private sector impetus behind many of the ROK foreign policy shifts toward communist/socialist states which is dramatically different in nature from the anti-communist geopolitical motive which for so long drove Seoul's leaders. Commercial drives now seem to have reached a significant level of parity with once dominant security drives.

In no area is this more evident than in South Korea's policy toward the Soviet Union. The ROK long has been somewhat ambivalent toward the USSR. Seoul treated the Soviet Union as an adversary because of the ways it backed North Korea, it was the clear adversary of South Korea's essential ally in the Cold War, and it was the ideological fount of a belief system most South Koreans learned to abhor. As the ROK's global trade interests grew, South Koreans also became sensitive to the threats that a growing Soviet Navy might pose to narrow ROK sea-lane security interests and to the much broader network of interests expressed by South Korea's trade partners. On balance, however, the prevailing attitude among concerned South Koreans long seemed to be that such problems are
best left to the superpowers and that the United States can cope alone. At the same time as years of U.S. pressure for "burden-sharing" and "cost-sharing" seem to be bearing some fruit worldwide (including Korea), a countervailing tendency emerged as a result of affirmative South Korean responses to Moscow's overtures to Asia in the Gorbachev era.

These are not truly surprising, despite the public indications of South Korean animosity toward the USSR. South Koreans' ambiguity toward Russians is partly historical, in the sense of memories of Czarist Russia's supposedly better intentions toward Korea than many other Westerners (including Americans) and of conveniently short memories about how much responsibility each superpower should bear for Korea's postwar division. As important, there are some South Korean scholarly and official observers of world affairs who think the Soviet Union pays more attention to Korean issues than the United States does and resent this perceived situation.62 All these feelings, compounded by the emotions of radical anti-Americanism and pro-Soviet sentiment during the 1988 Seoul Olympics, have made it easier for Seoul to open up to Moscow in pursuit of reduced tensions and improved economic relations. Moves in this direction are not new. They can be traced back to open expressions of interest in the late 1970s.63 By 1983 then Foreign Minister Lee Bum-suk was able to announce the ROK's adoption of a "Nordpolitik" policy toward the Soviet Union and other communist states, signaling Seoul's flexibility.64 The Gorbachev era in Moscow seemed to unleash Seoul's willingness to be flexible regarding the Soviet Union. By 1987 Seoul openly proclaimed its intention to
pursue improved ROK-USSR ties to counterbalance what the then Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo described as improved US-North Korean ties. The Olympics accelerated these processes greatly, producing in October 1988 an agreement to exchange formal trade offices between Moscow and Seoul. Earlier in 1988 Japanese sources suggested that ROK-USSR trade was nearly $1 billion per year.

Soviet objectives in this regard are not difficult to discern. Moscow wants trade, access to technology, and anything that might weaken the ROK's ties with allies or friends which do not suit Soviet purposes. In short, the Soviet Union hopes to get from South Korea approximately what it hopes to get from Japan, merely on a smaller scale. If one were to base one's estimate of the Soviet Union achieving such goals vis-a-vis South Korea on the last forty years of ROK history with the USSR, the probability would be very low to nil. There is, however, one trait in the tradition of Korea's foreign relations which is reason not to make such a facile judgment. There is a tendency toward love-hate bonds. One can see that in Korea's past and present ties with China, Japan and the United States. Some Koreans fawn over their protector-benefactor while others castigate them for their toadyism.

This big-power phenomenon is called "flunkeyism" (sadaejui). In its negative aspects, it suggests too much willingness to find Korea's identity and stature only by basking in the radiance of another power's greatness. Individual Koreans who are accused of such obsequious behavior are criticized for seeking the approval (real or apparent) of foreign leaders by making a hat-in-hand trip to
their big power's capital. South Koreans in the past accused Pyongyang's leaders of behaving this way toward Moscow and/or Beijing. North Koreans, and South Korean critics of Seoul's military-backed governments, have often accused South Korean leaders of doing this toward Washington in order to gain some legitimacy. Those styles of behavior are relatively well known. What is different in contemporary South Korea is a rush to make the "trip" to Beijing or Moscow so as to show that one is on the new wave of foreign relations. Some of this is mere infatuation with trendy and faddish politics and economics, but beneath that veneer is the possibility of something more profound. If Seoul continues along the foreign policy path it now trods, and receives sufficient rewards for the ROK's improved relations with China and the Soviet Union, there is a real chance that some of the sadaejui behavior will be transferred to Beijing and Moscow. This is a potentially destabilizing factor.

In addition to Seoul's changing views of communist states -- the primary new trend in South Korea's worldview -- it also appears to be shifting a bit in its views of Japan. For most of the postwar era the ROK has put some distance between itself and the Japanese when it comes to security affairs. Seoul is fond of reminding Americans of how close -- in contrast to Japan -- the ROK's security instincts are to those of the United States, how much more reliable the ROK is as an ally, and how much more willing the ROK is to spend money on defense. South Korean leaders often seem to consider themselves virtually ideal allies, while the Japanese are denigrated as waffling, wimpish, and spendthrift. Many Americans, while being careful not to offend the Japanese, appreciated what their South Korean friends
were saying. This is illustrated well by the American attitudes toward the comparative forthcomingness of South Koreans versus Japanese on burdensharing issues when one compares the potentials of each society to contribute to mutual security.

Over the years, however, there has been a subtle shift in South Korean attitudes. There does not seem to be the same degree of readiness to put down Japan. Instead, there seems to be an appreciation that Seoul's willingness to criticize the Japanese proclivity to be out of step with its allies and the rest of the world -- or to march to the beat of a different drummer -- may have been a misjudgment. As the United States and the Soviet Union move toward reevaluation of their defense and budget priorities, many Japanese are comforted by the sense that the superpowers may start to get into step with Japan, rather than the other way around. Watching these possible changes, South Koreans are no longer so quick to disparage what Japan has done. Though on a much smaller scale, one can detect parallels between recent ROK foreign policy changes and Japan's past and present flexibility, recent ROK international economic programs and Japan's precedents, and -- perhaps most radical -- Seoul's new caution about defense spending, a grudging respect for Japanese relatively low defense spending (as a percentage of GNP), and the advantages this provides to the Japanese economy. South Koreans are not very open about any of these views, but they are evident between the lines.
Legal Aspects of Maritime Issues

This is an area where a handful of South Korean scholars have done some careful work that lays the foundation for a broader ROK interest in the seas and their defense. A leading specialist in this area is Dr. Park Choon-ho, of Korea University's College of Law, who wrote several important analyses in the early 1980s coinciding with the growth of South Korean concern over maritime security. Other notable scholars also contributed to this literature, including the late Dr. Hahm Byong-choon. All these early works are notable for their caution, stressing to South Koreans that the ROK should have its legal homework done before it proceeds very far in proclaiming the rights to defend, or lay claims to, maritime transportation routes and resources. The latter became more important to Seoul as its concerns with seabed mining and oil exploration on the continental shelf grew in the early 1980s. There have been numerous legal studies throughout the 1980s pertaining to these issues, fleshing out ROK interests. By 1988 such studies had become more specific in nature, asserting strong ROK interests off-shore.

On balance, these studies do not advance precise strategic goals of the ROK in maritime areas, but they do put those goals on a steadier course and give them enhanced intellectual credibility in Korean society where legal scholarship enjoy great esteem (despite the fact that the political culture is not a legalistic one). It is significant that the ROK Navy chose for the organizer and Director of its Center for Maritime Strategic Study (Haegun Daehak Haeyang...
Junryag Yunguso) one of its own legal scholars already cited here, Dr. Kim Young-Koo. Starting from scratch this competent officer, with solid academic credentials in legal studies, was tasked with creating a vehicle for educating ROK Navy officers in the subtleties of naval strategy, not merely tactics. This is a formidable assignment, but it seems to have been entrusted to a person capable of fulfilling it. As important, it signifies the seriousness with which the ROK Navy is approaching the creation of a larger force manned by officers who will know what to do with a meaningful navy when they have it. Whether this is a measure of their farsightedness or simply unwarranted optimism remains to be seen, but the odds seem to favor the former.

ROK Naval Growth and South Korean Industry

Essential to the prospects for ROK Naval growth is an industrial base capable of supporting an enlarged navy. There are four levels at which this is important. The most profound and pervasive is the relationship between the overall industrial base and the ROK's maritime needs and security. As one of the postwar era's most famous economic success stories, the ROK now possesses a world-class industrial base. It, in turn, is heavily dependent on shipping to and from Korea of raw materials and finished goods. Because of the ROK's location at the tip of a peninsula, and the lack of continental access to the north because of frictions with the DPRK, South Korea is for all practical purposes as much an island as the Japanese islands. The South Korean economy and its logistics network are almost
totally dependent on seaborne transport. This dependency and vulnerability underlies the South Korean recognition emphasized previously in this study that the ROK now is a maritime country and must think and act like one.

The second and third levels of analysis are related to South Korea's consciousness of its maritime-oriented industries: shipping and ship-building. South Korea's shipping industry has a mixed track record. The ROK government (like most) treats the South Korean merchant marine as an adjunct to its security apparatus. At times it has been a strong backer of various shipping companies, has guided the composition of the merchant marine fleet to regulate competition (though the 1983 Sea Transportation Nationalization Plan [Haeun Sanup Hapri Hwa Keiwhoek]), and protects it as a vital industry for a still developing country with maritime vulnerabilities. The shipping industry grew rapidly in the 1970s, probably too quickly, leading to major debts and the acquisition of many poor quality vessels from abroad. As of late 1987 the ROK merchant marine had 436 ships. The ROK also faced pressures from abroad (including the United States) to allow foreign shipping competition within South Korea, not just for foreign products. Cumulatively, this led to major business problems which subsequently contributed to well known scandals that helped shake the political power structure in 1987. The South Korean ship-building industry also confronted certain economic problems related to the companies' heavy debt-burden, expensive financing, relatively low productivity, and foreign competition. Despite all that, there are expectations in South Korea that the 1990s
will be profitable. Compared to the shipping industry, however, South Korea's ship-builders are doing better.

There are four major ship-builders in South Korea, which account for about 94 percent of the ships built there. They are in rank order: Hyundai Shipbuilding, Daewoo Shipbuilding, Samsung Shipbuilding, and Chosun Shipbuilding and Engineering. While Korean shipyards were a commercial presence (significant in the Far East) as far back as the 1940s, they did not become a major factor in global shipbuilding until the 1970s when the ROK's overall economic boom, and Seoul's encouragement of shipbuilding as one leg of the heavy industrial portion of that boom, propelled South Korean ship-building toward the center of the world stage, rivaling Japan. During 1988 the big three (Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung) experienced a variety of labor problems and customer complaints. These, plus accumulated economic problems, were severe enough in Daewoo's case to warrant a move to rescue it by Seoul. The government's motivation for helping such companies is exactly the same as it was when it initially reinforced them in their growth stage: they are closely related to national security. There is a real danger that Korea's shipbuilders could be outpaced by up-and-coming competition. Though still a relatively young industry in Korea, without adequate nurturing these firms could face tough times ahead. Addressing those times leads to the fourth level of analysis.

In contemporary South Korea there is a concerted effort being made to ingratiate and integrate the ROK defense industrial base with their counterpart industries in the United States. South Korea's defense industries got their first major boost from the frictions
between the United States and ROK in the mid-to-late 1970s, during the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the aborted Carter administration troop cutback effort in Korea. Both events shook the Park government, already nervous about the United States because of political and human rights pressures. One result of these frictions was the emergence of high level South Korean doubts about the durability of the United States commitment to Korea, the reliability of American promises, and the wisdom of depending on the United States as South Korea's main defense materiel supplier. After behind the scenes wrangling, Seoul essentially opted for a three-fold posture. It decided to retain its overt interdependent relationship with the United States, but supplement it slightly by other foreign purchases (i.e., hedging the ROK's interdependence) and, in a major way, by cultivating a substantial interdependent domestic arms production capability.

Most of that endeavor concerned equipment for the ROK Army and Air Force, but the shipyards had their role in support of indigenous supplies for the ROK Navy. Since the mid-1980s there have been many examples of South Korean suggestions that the ROK can be a major defense industrial asset for the non-communist world, and especially for the United States, by functioning as an arsenal for Asia. Some have gone further and suggested that the ROK should be counted as part of the United States' arsenal. Seoul clearly is pushing these arrangements for the commercial, technological, and strategic benefits that will accrue to the ROK if it can foster a truly tight bilateral bond, sufficient to wed the United States so firmly to South Korea that Koreans need no longer be seriously concerned
about the possibility that American will prove fickle again and confirm their worst expectations. There is little doubt that the ROK would like to broaden any cooperative defense industrial arrangements it can devise with the United States to include a major role for its shipyards in support of the U.S. Navy and other allied Asian (or other) navies.

The massive ROK shipyards are capable -- in theory -- of building or repairing anything that floats if they have access to the technology and materials. Some of the largest vessels in the world have been built or repaired in South Korea. It is only logical, therefore, for South Korea to want to help sustain its shipbuilding industry through contracts for its own naval expansion and by offering their repair services for U.S. and allied navies. Though made somewhat problematic by South Korean interest in Soviet inquiries about a joint venture in shipbuilding, it is conceivable that the facilities in Ulsan (Hyundai) and on Kirjae Island (Daewoo and Samsung) might become as crucial to allied security in the Pacific as Subic Bay and Sasebo now are. Should the latter become politically less tenable, South Korean facilities might loom still larger. This prospect has appeal to the ROK as an approach to burden-sharing, as an economic asset, as a way to help ensure the United States will remain committed to Northeast Asian maritime security, and as a way to enhance the economies of scale and technology sharing that will enable the ROK Navy to create larger forces. After all if the ROK is able to provide ship repair and supply facilities on a par with Japan, has access to the technologies necessary to deal with virtually all categories of naval vessels, and develops the experience required
to instill confidence in its ability to sustain a major naval fleet, what would prevent Seoul from harnessing that know-how to its aspirations for a larger navy? Given the right combination of conditions and aspirations -- internationally, economically, and strategically -- the ROK Navy could use the South Korean industrial base as a platform to launch a major growth phase.

New Directions for the ROK Navy

The ROK Navy seems to be dealing with the future on two levels. Within the parameters of its accepted coastal defense roles and, by extension, missions to defend those portions of the SLOCs and straits which are near Korea, it is engaged in a gradual, but relatively small scale, increase in its forces and projected goals for their use. This approach appears to be eminently feasible, facing no insurmountable obstacles. On another, more innovative level, there is broader thinking going on about what the ROK Navy might do in the future. Some of this thinking is in response to U.S. analysts speculation about such roles, including some of the author's previous work. There is a small risk that such analysis will contribute to South Korean thinking and, in turn, be unknowingly reacted to by the same group of U.S. analysts. This could become cyclical and self-fulfilling. There is, however, little real danger of this because South Korean analysts are too knowledgeable about the diversity of American viewpoints to be misled by a mere handful. Most American analysts of Korean affairs are sufficiently familiar with the Korean scene not to be similarly misled by only listening to the views of
those South Koreans who agree with US positions. More important, there are larger factors in ROK political, economic, and security calculations than the opinions or desires of Americans.

ROK policies are driven by those factors, not by US-ROK relations. So, as long as U.S. analysts and policymakers are aware of the pitfalls of rereading their own views regurgitated for American consumption, there is minimal risk of being deceived by South Korean new thinking about broader ROK security goals. Some of this new thinking about potential ROK naval roles really seems to be a recycling of what most observers hope is "old thinking." Because of the probability that another Korean War (or, more accurately, a new outbreak in the long stalemated 1950s Korean War) would wreak unacceptable levels of destruction on both Koreas, there is a widespread hope that the leadership in Seoul and Pyongyang will consider such hostilities almost literally unthinkable. The economic achievements of both Koreas would be devastated in such a war. The nuclear and superpower ramifications of it also are widely assumed to be major factors contributing to the reasons both sides in Korea should not seek war. Collectively, all this contributes to deterrence.

It is natural that military officers and security officials should speculate about improvements in war-fighting capabilities. Such speculation is widespread in the ROK armed forces. Equally widespread is a degree of rhetoric about defeating North Korea and rescuing the North Koreans from their bitter fate. Similar sentiments in the North are voiced about the ROK. Most of that is chalked up by outside observers as bravado necessary to keep the morale of the forces high. Every now and then, however, one hears wishful
thinking, hoping for the day that South Korea will enjoy so much superiority that the opponent cannot conceivably wage an effective defense. One can hear such views in US-Soviet relations, too, where they are a virtual impossibility. Consequently, they can be either dismissed entirely or relegated to extremist circles. Similar assumptions operate regarding North Korean views of that sort. South Korea, however, might actually achieve great superiority over the North in the not too distant future. This keeps "march north" thoughts alive in some South Korean circles that should know better, and gives Americans reason for concern.

In any event, there are sentiments of that sort in South Korea which occasionally find expression in naval matters by analysts who want a stronger ROK Navy so that it will be part of the overwhelmingly superior forces capable of subduing the North and contributing to unification by force of arms. In short, such analyses want the ROK Navy to be more offensive oriented, capable of retaliating and taking the battle to the North Korean enemy. Though done by respected analysts, these studies seem to have taken a leaf out of the U.S. "Maritime Strategy" and adapted it to long standing South Korean desires to take the battle to the enemy and go on the offensive instead of being so passive in defense and deterrence. Planning and implementing the means toward such roles also is feasible in the South Korean context. It may well happen in the 1990s, but prudence dictates that it not go beyond the planning and creating equipment stage. Actually, foregoing a deterrence-based strategy versus North Korea would be an incredibly risky notion. Fortunately, there is not much sign that this variant of "new
thinking" is spreading very far, but it should be watched closely in case it spreads.

Much more interesting, and less risky, are those who contemplate what the global shifts in power between the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan may mean for the ROK Navy. There are many South Korean scholars and officials interested in the former, but relatively few who make the connections with the ROK Navy. Fortunately, those who do, have shown considerable insight and appear to be in positions where their influence will be felt. For example, Dr. Park Jae-kyu, President of Kyungnam University and well connected to Seoul political elites, suggests that the importance of South Korea's maritime identity will be recognized by the ROK as the global power balance shifts, simultaneously making the major powers less capable of controlling the security of the seas and South Korea more capable of lending a greater hand in maritime defenses. Another prime example is the initial effort by the head of the ROK Navy's Center for Maritime Strategic Study to define what South Korea's "Maritime Strategy" means in contrast to a generic maritime strategy globally and in Asia, to the John Lehman version in the United States, and to the specific naval postures of South Korea's neighbors. Though preliminary, it shows an understanding of the forces at work in and around Korea which could reshape the ROK Navy in the next couple of decades.

Perhaps the most balanced, yet forward looking, South Korean assessment of the ROK Navy is contained in a conference paper on US-ROK Navy interaction by an up-and-coming ROK Navy officer, Dr. (Capt.) Cho Doug-woon, while attached to ROK Navy Headquarters. Dr.
Cho notes, inter alia, that the ROK Navy "needs to grow from the present coastal defense posture vis-a-vis [the North Korean Navy] into a blue water navy capable of protecting its own SLOC." He further notes, "A bigger share in defense investment cake needs to be allotted for naval force acquisition toward a stronger, blue-water navy. Such a quest is the biggest task that the ROKN leadership faces." (sic) Dr. Cho also includes many caveats about South Korean economic, political, and security constraints evidently to be sure that he does not lead Americans astray or to calm South Korea's neighbors' apprehensions about any such grandiose new thinking. Nonetheless, his ideas do seem reflective of the new ROK Navy leadership generation's thinking about where their service should try to go in the future. Precisely what the ROK Navy leadership may be thinking should be more clear by the summer of 1989 because the ROK Navy plans to host its first major open conference in July (co-sponsored by the SLOC-Study Group, Korea) entitled "The First International Sea Power Symposium." The preliminary planning for this conference indicates it will be an influential gathering which could help shape the course the ROK Navy will pursue in the future.

**ROK-Japan Naval Interaction**

It is impossible to assess the future of the ROK Navy in Northeast Asian security affairs without also addressing the naval status and prospects of the other U.S. ally in the region: Japan. This study is not about the MSDF, of course, so only brief attention will be
paid to its contemporary status except in the ways that it relates to Korea and security issues that are important to the ROK. The same applies to prospects for the MSDF. In addition to those themes, this portion of this study shall address what a cross-section of Japanese have been saying in recent years about either Korean security or related issues.

The Japanese MSDF is a very different organization from the ROK Navy. To begin with it is not a "navy," as its name connotes. Legally Japan does not have armed forces but "self-defense" forces. For some in Japan this is merely a euphemism. Certainly many SDF personnel feel a sense of duty and tradition that is in keeping with Japan's long martial legacy. That sense probably is strongest in the MSDF which benefits from a very strong naval heritage. Consequently, there are two basic -- and very perverse -- differences between the MSDF and the ROK Navy: one is a navy with a relatively short history and fragile tradition, the other is a quasi-navy with a long history and proud tradition that helps maintain its esprit. Others perversities abound. The ROK Navy exists in a society that generally recognizes an imminent threat, is strongly committed to national defense, and spends a large share of available resources on defense yet knows its role is low on the nation's list of security priorities. The MSDF, on the other hand, exists in a society that is not very sensitive to external threat perceptions, does not feel very endangered, and tries to keep defense spending as low as it can get away with, yet it finds itself ranked fairly high on Japan's list of security priorities.
The ROK Navy does not get nearly as much attention or respect in South Korea as the MSDF does in Japan. Consequently, the contemporary ROK Navy can only hope to attain the size and capabilities of the JMSDF. The list of ironies goes on. United States pressures on Tokyo to develop its SDF to defend Japan and cooperate with the United States in Japan's defense, have been reluctantly accepted by most Japanese. They generally are not enthused about such burdensharing. Many are uncertain about the wisdom of the entire security relationship with the United States, doubt it will make Japan more secure, and oppose serious burdensharing. Nevertheless, the MSDF -- partly under U.S. pressure and guidance -- has created formidable forces that are fully capable of playing a major role in Japan's defense and, under certain circumstances, could play a role in the defense of Japanese interests further afield.

The MSDF, like the other branches of Japan's services, sometimes is viewed as weak. This is a misconception. Americans who criticize Japan for not doing enough often overstate or misstate their case, not giving Japan full credit for what it has accomplished. While there is room for complaints regarding Japan's relatively small goals, it generally has met its goals and -- in the process -- has created forces that are very sizeable. Whether they are sufficient for Japan's present and future needs is another matter, but today they are significant. That certainly is true of the MSDF. While this is not the place to engage in bean counting of the MSDF, or to engage in a detailed assessment of those "beans," it is worth comparing gross figures cross-nationally. Japan is likely in 1989 to meet its 1985-89 mid-term plans, giving it 62 major surface combatants This is up in
numbers (and quality) from 35 about ten years ago. To put that number in a meaningful context, it is more than the U.S. 7th fleet. It also is more than the combined major surface combatants of both Koreas (the ROK and the DPRK), Taiwan, the PRC, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia. Of course, such comparisons are somewhat misleading because the MSDF does not have the diversity of either the 7th Fleet or that combination of Asian-Pacific navies. The MSDF's greatest assets are in ASW. The point here is not to make the MSDF appear to be a bogeyman, but to note how much the Japanese have achieved in their "navy" without a major national commitment of will, money, or budgetary efficiency.

Were that commitment to be made by Tokyo, there is little doubt that the MSDF -- presumably renamed a Navy -- could readily be transformed into a force to be reckoned with by any potential adversary in Asia or, for that matter, globally. The MSDF already has a solid track record in submarines (16) which enjoy a good reputation. They act as a force multiplier for the MSDF. Furthermore, there are persistent rumors that the MSDF aspires to small carriers, probably for VSTOL (vertical take-off and landing) aircraft. While the author was lecturing throughout Japan for the U.S. Information Agency in July 1988 about prospects for US-Japan defense cooperation, one frequent question from audiences was why the United States was preventing Japan from building whatever weapons systems it might want -- including aircraft carriers and nuclear systems. That misperception aside, there clearly is some popular interest in Japan about such defense alternatives.
The chances of Japan pursuing such options in the short-run are not high because Tokyo does not see any need, but over the longer run -- as conditions at home and abroad change -- it is impossible to be so sanguine. National pride and altered threat perceptions could nudge Japan toward creating a still more significant naval force. Unlike the ROK case, all Tokyo needs to do is make the decision. Though ROK Navy personnel would never admit it (for reasons of their own national pride), they are very likely envious of what the MSDF now has, can do, and could develop if Tokyo had the desire. In short, the MSDF -- even with a fairly limited strategic mandate and no formal ability to engage in collective security -- has the wherewithal to do what the ROK Navy can only dream about. Rubbing this in still more, the MSDF's ASW and submarine capabilities are vital parts of the Northeast Asian SLOC defenses on which U.S.-R.O.K. security depend and of which the ROK Navy would like to become a greater part.

Moving on to what some in Japan have said about the importance of Korea-related security issues to the defense of Japan, there has been remarkable candor. Starting in the early 1980s the Japanese government became a bit blunter about the potential threat North Korea might pose to Japan. Tokyo also was uncharacteristically blunt in 1983 about its willingness to consider blockading the straits between Japan and Korea and to mine areas to stop Soviet submarines. These were the sorts of Japanese views that contributed so greatly to an increased South Korean awareness of the ROK maritime security concerns in Northeast Asian affairs which might be shaped by Tokyo's defense policy. In addition, there
were a number of Japanese analyses presented that more specifically addressed the naval aspects of Korea-related security which are important to Japan. Some were translated into Korean, but that usually is not necessary for South Korean defense analysts because many have a solid command of Japanese and/or English giving them ready access to what is written about Korea by Japanese and Westerners. Consequently, the writings of Japanese analysts are frequently noted by South Korean defense specialists.

South Korean analysts are well aware that their Japanese counterparts often speak out on much broader security issues that are well beyond the narrow confines of Japanese "self-defense." Less frequent, but more pointed from a Korean vantage point, are those Japanese who speak out on Korean or Korea-related security issues. This is an emotional area in both Japan and Korea, because of the colonial legacy, but fairly strong views are nonetheless expressed. In 1983, when SLOC defenses became more sensitive in both countries, Kitamura Kenichi, of the Japan Center for Strategic Study, wrote a tough-minded analysis of the significance of maritime threats to Japan and noted "the defense of a line connecting Japanese islands and the Southern half of Korean peninsula is the key to the security not only of the SLOC in the Pacific basin but also of East Asia as a whole." Another analyst from the same center, Oga Ryohei, pointed out explicitly one way that Japan's cooperation with the United States in the defense of the Tsushima strait contributes to South Korean naval security vis-a-vis North Korea. Oga correctly noted that North Korea is compelled to divide its naval power between its Yellow Sea and Eastern Sea fleets because Pyongyang
must expect to be denied transit access around the tip of the peninsula. Consequently, the ROK's naval security is enhanced by the proximity of US-Japan naval interaction focused on the Soviet Union. Oga suggested "the operation to secure SLOCs to Japan will be borne by Japan and Korea," but did not specify how they might be accomplished. In more recent years, other Japanese have been much more explicit in recommending far closer and direct ROK-Japan naval cooperation. Among them are Diet member, Horie Masao; a former Japanese Military Attache to the ROK, Lt. General Tsukamoto Katsuichi (GSDF, Ret.); a former Chief of Maritime Staff, Admiral Yoshida Manabu (MSDF, Ret.); and Vice Admiral Hozumi Toshihiko (MSDF, Ret.).

Such Japanese views strike a responsive chord among some Americans and South Koreans who think Japan should show more willingness to cooperate in collective security. Even a cursory review of these Japanese writings, however, indicates that they are considerably to the right of the center-left mainstream of Japanese society's security orientation. There may be enormous logic behind such views, but it is not a logic that the majority of Japanese share. Even these conservative analysts are careful to note the constraints that operate in Japanese society which are likely to inhibit Japan-ROK naval cooperation, or any other forms of security interaction. This does not necessarily mean that advocates of such cooperation in the ROK, Japan, or the United States must cease their advocacy as a lost cause, but they must recognize the hurdles in the way and try to address them in ways that have some appreciation for the diversity of views in all three states. Even in their private views Japanese
conservative analysts -- who have considerable sympathy for South Korea's predicament, and for the parallels between ROK and Japanese maritime interests -- are extremely cautious about the constraints which they think will prevent Japan from going very far or very fast toward Japanese regional security cooperation.

South Korean analysts seem to cultivate conservative Japanese views, but also are very well aware that they are hearing a minority viewpoint. As much as the ROK appears to like the conservative approach from Japanese defense analysts, there seems to be a strong degree of ambiguity about such Japanese that -- prudently and wisely -- leads most South Korean analysts to avoid falling for the enticement of harmonious rhetoric from Japan. On balance, South Korean analysts are sufficiently apprehensive about Japan and cognizant of where the mainstream of Japanese security thinking flows, to understand that enhanced bilateral naval cooperation almost certainly will be a slow and tenuous process. It is not impossible for the Japanese anymore than it is for the South Koreans, but both seem set to make haste slowly.

Policy Implications for the ROK

The Republic of Korea's primary security concern remains, and is likely to remain for the short- to mid-term, focused on the threat from North Korea. Consequently, anything which reinforces that threat also magnifies its significance to Seoul. Prior to Gorbachev's more moderate policy pronouncements regarding Asia, and specifically South Korea, there was a major surge in South Korean
concern about burgeoning DPRK-USSR military cooperation. That concern seemed to peak in 1985 when reports were publicized about 101 Soviet submarines at North Korean bases and elements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet visiting the North Korean port of Wonsan with much ballyhooing of the event by Pyongyang.102 In subsequent years the cultivation of Soviet-North Korean naval ties by Moscow and Pyongyang, exemplified by a July 1986 ceremonial visit by a flotilla of the Navy of the Korean People's Army to Vladivostok (commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Soviet-DPRK security treaty) and a May 1987 visit to Pyongyang by Admiral Vladimir Chernavin (Soviet vice minister of defense and head of the Soviet Navy),103 continued to cause concern in Seoul. Considerable anxiety persists in the ROK leadership about the purposes of enhanced USSR-DPRK security cooperation, but the post-Olympics improvement in ROK-USSR relations seems to have mitigated much of Seoul's nervousness. For years South Korean official rhetoric about the dangers of the "bear" in the backyard of the ROK and Japan strongly empathized with the views of the United States. Throughout most of those years, however, the rhetoric had no possibility of being translated into policy actions because the ROK lacked the wherewithal and most South Koreans -- including diehard anti-communists -- did not consider their country capable of doing anything to help the United States versus the Soviet Union that would be of serious value to the ROK's American allies. All that changed in a significant way as a result of U.S. pressures for Northeast Asian burdensharing and a growing sense of confidence on the part of ROK officials that South Korea actually might be able to
lend a hand in a meaningful way. Such considerations produced the growing interest in SLOC defenses and other regional security issues which already have been described in this study.

Contemporary ROK officials are, indeed, more capable, interested, and enthusiastic about dong more for their own defenses and to cooperate with the United States in regional security. They also might be ready to explore certain types of indirect security interaction with Japan as long as the United States remains an intermediary and does not attempt to dump responsibility for Northeast Asian security upon the Japanese. Were the Soviet Union still led by a Breshnev, Andropov, or Chernenko, there is every reason to believe that South Korea would be firmly on a course leading to greatly enhanced regional security cooperation with its main ally and that ally's friends and other allies. This course may yet be followed, but the policy pronouncements of the Gorbachev government appears to be causing serious hesitation in Seoul. Most South Koreans -- like many others in the non-communist world -- are inclined to wait for Moscow's rhetoric to be fulfilled by verifiable actions before embracing the "new" Soviet Union. They, too, are cautious and prudent. In the process of waiting, however, Seoul is exploring its foreign policy options in a much more fundamental way than the ROK ever has in its forty year history.

Many South Koreans are hoping that the relatively progressive economic proposals raised by Gorbachev in his 1986 Vladivostok speech, and subsequent elaborations, will bear fruit. Similarly, they hope that Soviet force cutback proposals in Europe will be echoed in Asia. They also hope that Soviet efforts to put a more benign facade
on its Pacific fleet by declaring it "defensive," and to stress that an economically active Soviet Union has as much interest in freedom of the seas as other Pacific countries, will be borne out by concrete Soviet steps. All of this, of course, remains to be seen. Like Americans many South Koreans harbor a healthy skepticism about Gorbachev's ability to deliver on such promises, or perhaps remain in office long enough to assure that they will not be reversed. In the mean time, however, they are in no rush to do anything that might provide the USSR with a pretext to not pursue such policies. Seoul also harbors hopes that a more friendly and peacefully engaged Soviet Union might play a positive role in tension reduction in and around the Korean peninsula that could improve the prospects for peaceful unification of Korea. The net result of all these concerns and hopes is a sense of ambiguity and policy limbo.

Contemporary South Korea is not as certain of where it is heading internationally as it was in the early- to mid-1980s. Its horizons have been broadened considerably by changes in US-USSR relations in the second Reagan administration, greatly improved ROK relations with the PRC and USSR, and the on-again/off-again gains in the ROK-DPRK dialogue. Those foreign policy horizons also are being recast by the emergence of the ROK as a major actor in global economic affairs, and by the emergence of the Japan-centered Pacific trading block as a powerful factor in international affairs. This is a heady period for the ROK. South Korean pride and confidence are in rapid ascendance. Simultaneously, however, certain verities in previous ROK experience are being questioned -- namely the long-term durability of the United States in its regional roles associated
with Japan and the Philippines. US-ROK trade frictions also inject new uncertainties for Seoul. Compounding these uncertainties are much longer term questions about the future role of Japan in Asia economically, politically and militarily. Many South Koreans wonder how Japan will react to the perceived "decline" of the United States. It is one thing for South Koreans to be the "little brother" of Americans from far away, it would be entirely different if the ROK ever had to face the reality of becoming the "little brother" of Japan once more in order to preserve its security. With such diverse and erratic considerations, hopes, and fears being influenced almost daily by rapidly shifting circumstances, it is no surprise that Seoul is wary.

How does all this effect the prospects for the ROK Navy? Its responses seem likely to be opportunity-dependent. If the ROK Navy is destined to remain an expanded coastal force, its understandably modest contemporary goals are entirely appropriate. As important, they are fully feasible. Because there is a small but significant chance that the ROK Navy will be influenced by domestic new thinking and by nationalistic pressures stemming from South Korea's hubris, its leaders are likely to contemplate what they would have to do in order to make a serious contribution to SLOC defenses, to aim at the creation of a "blue water" navy (one of only a handful worldwide), to create a national mandate necessary to carve out a share of the ROK defense budget commensurate with such grandiose goals, and -- simultaneously -- to devise a national strategy that would be appropriate to such ends. Neither separately nor collectively are these simple objectives. Should the Gorbachev era produce tangible reductions in superpower and regional tensions, all such thoughts
might be obviated. Since the latter is not likely to happen quickly -- if at all -- there is reason to think the ROK Navy may indeed think big.

In that light, there are several key factors which probably will help the ROK Navy make a stronger case for a larger national role and appropriate capabilities. The combination of relatively reduced United States naval influence in Asian security and an increased role for the Japanese MSDF, is likely to strengthen ROK Navy arguments that South Korea cannot afford to lag too far behind. Those arguments are likely to be buttressed by a navy's ability to "show the flag" in ways armies and air forces cannot. Partly a reality and partly a pretext, such symbolism is likely to be influential in a South Korea which increasingly must come to grips with its maritime role in the world. Whether or not inter-Korean and regional Northeast Asian tensions are reduced, this expression of increased national power and prestige may remain attractive. If the ROK economy continues to grow rapidly, as is widely expected, Seoul will have the financial resources enabling it to build a truly larger navy, and even more reason to be proud of its economy and the navy that economy might build to help ensure economic security. Though some movement in that direction could be considered a mere sop to American pressures for increased burdensharing, there seems to be ample reason for the ROK to pursue such goals for indigenous rationales.

South Korean security encompasses two basic options: should it remain essentially ground-based and continental in nature or should it explore its maritime options? Common wisdom holds that
continentalism will prevail because of the Korean nation's division. Even if Korea were united as one state, most analysts assume it would remain continentalist. Perhaps so; history certainly suggests this will be the case. There is, however, no logical reason why the ROK (or some future unified Korean state) would not attempt to follow both strategies. Almost certainly Korea will seek to retain sufficient ground and air forces for its territorial security. That, however, is not likely to be sufficient for providing real security for a wealthy nation which is so heavily engaged in global trade. In that sense there is an excellent chance that the ROK will, over time, develop a view of its security which closely parallels that of Japan and that it will assign much more value to the diverse contributions naval forces can make to national defense and deterrence. Should that occur, one can expect to witness the growth of the ROK Navy well beyond the coastal roles and missions usually assumed to be its fate.

NOTES


5 Solid examples of such attention include: Donald S. Zagoria, Editor. Soviet Policy in East Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982; John J. Stephan


8 The author's *US Policy and the Two Korea*, op. cit., pp. 24-29 briefly encapsulates that year of turmoil.

9 One of the most thorough was Cho Kap-che's "Korea's Military" in *Wolgan Choson*, June 1, 1988, pp. 188-221.

10 For an insightful analysis of the Confucian values that give rise to Korean antipathy toward the military injecting itself in politics, see Gregory Henderson's *Korea, The Politics of the Vortex*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.


Park, op. cit., p. 39.

Cho, op. cit., pp. 4-5, refers to the ROK Navy's "heritage of a long history and brilliant accomplishments," concluding that "with such a fine naval heritage it was only natural that the Korean naval tradition be renewed and reborn after the nation's liberation."

Study Group members and their affiliations are: Dr. Kwan Shik Min, Director Asian Institute for Public Policy, Advisor and Member of Steering Committee; Admiral Maengkee Lee (Ret.), President Korea Line Corporation; Amb. Sang Yong Park, Dean, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Dalchoong Kim, Professor, Director, Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University; Dr. Choon-ho Park, Professor, Korea University; Dr. Young-Kyu Park, Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Dr. Seo-Hang Lee, Research Associate, Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute; Dr. Young-Koo Cha, Research Director, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses; Dr. Choung-II Chee, Former Lecturer, Seoul National University; Dr. Chang-Yoon Chol, Vice Minister, Ministry of Culture and Information; Dr. Young Chol, Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; V. Adm. Won Min Chong (Ret.), President, Dai Han Coal Corporation; Hon. Hyun-Kyung Chung, Member of the National Assembly, Democratic Justice Party; Mr. Tae-Youl Hahn, Deputy Administrator, Korea Maritime and Port Administration; Dr. Seung-Soo Han, Professor, Seoul National University; Dr. Moon Shin Hong, President, Korea Institute for Economic and Technology; R.Adm. Si Hak Hyun (Ret.), Advisor, Ssangyong Oil Refining Company Ltd.; Mr. Byung Kyu Kang, Secretary-General, Korea-Japan Cooperation Council; Mr.
Young Min Kang, Reporter, Korea Maritime Research Institute; Gen. Chang-Kyoo Kim (Ret.), President, Honam Ethylene Co., Ltd.; Dr. Chong Whi Kim, Professor, Korea National Defense College; Dr. Chum-Kon Kim, Professor, Kyung Hee University; Dr. Dook-Joo Kim, Professor, Korea National Defense College; Dr. Hak-Joon Kim, Professor, Seoul National University; Mr. Ill Sang Kim, Professor, Naval Command & Staff College; Dr. Young-Koo Kim, Professor, Naval Command & Staff College; Dr. Jong Ryool Lee, Chief Press Secretary and Spokesman for the President, Office of President; Dr. Jung-Ha Lee, Senior Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute; Dr. Ki-Tak Lee, Professor, Yonsei University; Cmdr. Chong-Sik Moon, Director-General, Office of the Law of the Sea, Navy Headquarters; Amb. Jay Hee Oh, Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Hyon Kyu Park, President, Korea Maritime Research Institute; Hon. Kyung-Suk Park, Member of the National Assembly, Democratic Justice Party; Dr. Sang-Seek Park, Assistant Dean for Research, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Dr. Yong-Ok Park, Professor, Korea National Defense College; Dr. Yong-Sub Park, Professor, Korea Maritime University; Dr. Sang-Woo Rhee, Professor, Director, Institute for Asian Studies, Sogang University; Hon. Kun-Hwan Ryu, Member of the National Assembly, Democratic Justice Party; Dr. Euisoon Shin, Professor, Yonsei University; V. Adm. Tea O Won (Ret.) President, Pusan Corporative Fish Market; Hon. Heung-Soo Yoo, Member of the National Assembly, Democratic Justice Party; Gen. Seung Kuk Yoon (Ret.), Director, North Asia-Pacific Office, The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association; Dr. Sang Song Youn, Chairman, Korea Institute Research, Institute. List quoted from (pamphlet) *The SLOC Study Group, Korea.* 1987. Seoul: Yonsei University, Institute of East and West Studies.


28. Choi Young, "Hangook ui haesang kyotong ro anjun hwagbo ae kwanhan yongu" (How to Secure the SLOCs of Korea), Kyaegan kyunghyang (Kyunghyang Journal) January 1984, pp. 121-130.

29. 1984 Nyundo hangook haesang kyotong ro aniun yunguhwae (1984 Korean SLOC Research Society Seminar Proceedings). Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1985. This volume contains four useful analyses: Choi Youn, "Kuhanmal hangook ui gookjae chungchi kujo bikyo wa Han-Mi-Il samgook anbo hyubryug ui tadang sung kum to" (The end of the old Korea era: A comparison of Korea's international political structure and an examination of the appropriateness of US-ROK-Japan security cooperation) [an elaboration of his analysis, Ibid]; Lee Ki-taek, "Han-Il kan ui Sea Lane ae kwanhan gunsa hyubryug kwa hangook ae dachan yunghyang" (Military Cooperation regarding Sea Lane and Japan, and its influences on Korea); Park Choon-ho, "Hae ro tonghang anjun ui haeyang bu chug chugmyun" (Profile of Maritime Law and Security of Sea Transportation); and Bae Byung-tae, "Hangook haeun ui hyunhwang kwa haeun habrihwa jungcheg ui bunsug pyungka" (Analysis and evaluation of current Korean sea transportation and its rationalization policy).


32. See note 23.

33. See note 22.

35. This conference received significant press coverage. The Korea Herald, June 18, 1987, p. 3.


38. The Korea Herald, April 2, 1987, p. 3.


42. For an excellent and supportive overview of those broader prospects, see Cha Young-koo, Northeast Asian Security. Washington: CSIS, 1988. Another solid analysis of how South Korean reactions to Japan have evolved in recent years is Hong Sungbok, [Research Institute on National Security Affairs, ROK National Defense College], "Trends and Scope in Japan's Role in the Security of South Korea," paper presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Council of US-Korean Security Studies, November 15-18, 1988, Honolulu. Still another supportive article is Lee Ki-taek (Yonsei University Professor) "Han-Il gan ui

43 For reportage, see Chosun ilbo, January 26, 1983, p. 3 and Kyonghyang Shinmun, January 26, 1983, p. 2. For coverage of ROK Foreign Ministry caution in addressing this issue, see Chungang Ilbo, January 26, 1983, p. 2.

44 See, for example, the translation from Japanese into Korean of Okamura Kazuo's "Ilbon ui samhaehyub bongswae jagjon" (Japan's blockade of the three straits), Haegun bonbu kisul jongbo (Navy Headquarters Technical Information), July 1983.


46 The Korea Herald, June 12, 1985, p. 5; June 14, 1985, p. 1; and June 16, 1985, p. 1.

47 See note 29.


52. Hanguok Ilbo, June 24, 1984, p. 1 reports on Seoul's opening of the ROK's door to economic contacts with communist states.


61. For examples of South Korea's growing awareness of the Soviet naval presence near Korea and what it could mean to ROK security, see FBIS, IV, December 31, 1985, p. E2; and The Korea Herald, January 1, 1985, p. 3 and May 13, 1987, p. 1.
Peter Berton refutes such perceptions and suggests the Soviet Union does not have a very good record regarding its attention to Korea: "The Soviet Union and Korea: Perceptions, Scholarship, Propaganda," the Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1986, pp. 3-28.

FBIS, IV, February 28, 1978, p. E5 contains the views of President Park's advisor Kim Kyung-won (later ROK Ambassador to the United States) warning that Moscow may be the key power in Asia's future. FBIS, IV, September 7, 1979, p. E1 and The Korea Times, September 11, 1979, p. 7, describe the early levels of ROK indirect trade with the Soviet Union in optimistic terms.


FBIS, EAS, February 23, 1988, p. 16.


In addition to numerous South Korean businessmen and officials who have made the rounds in Beijing or Moscow, and returned home to flaunt the new status, the opposition party leaders are getting in on the act too. See, for example, Kin Dae-jung's possible trip to Moscow, FEER, November 17, 1988, p. 13.


The Korea Herald, May 15, 1984, p. 5.
See, for example, Yug Young-soo, "Hangook gwa guh jubyun gookka ui haeyang bubchaedo wa haeyang jungchaek ui baljun banghyang" (The Sea Law and Maritime Policy of South Korea and its Surrounding countries) Haeyang jumryag (Maritime Strategy), February 1988, pp. 24-80; and Kim Jung-gun "New Ocean Regime and the Passage through International Choke Points: Cases of the Malacca and the Korea Straits" presented at a Conference on Global Ocean Politics: Major Issues and Areas, SLOC Study Group, Korea, Seoul, June 13-14, 1988.

Correspondence from Dr. Kim, December 26, 1987; conversation with him at a Pusan National University Conference on Korean Unification, May 7, 1988, and an unpublished 1988 manuscript by Dr. Kim, "Hangook ui haeyang jumryag" (The Maritime Strategy of South Korea) provided at that conference.


82 For examples of the former see the treatment of Library of Congress Analyst Larry A. Niksch's article "South Korea in Broader Pacific Defense" (Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, March 1983) in Ibbub gunsa wolbo (Legislative Military Monthly), November 12, 1983, pp. 94-103; and of International Security Council Director Joseph Churba (an affiliate organization of the Rev. Moon) "Chejudo nun chimmol haji annun hanggong moham" (Cheju. island is an unsinkable aircraft carrier) in Gwangjiang, March 1987, pp. 50-52. For examples of the latter which have contributed to the debate in South Korea, see the author's US Policy and the Two Koreas, op.cit.; "Nichi-bei-kan sogo anpo taisei o nozomu" (Desiring a Japan-US-Korea mutual defense system) in Chuo Koron, February 1983; "Security in the Japan Sea" in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Winter 1986; and "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific" in Naval War College Review, Autumn 1987.

83 See, for example, Dr. Kim Doo-hee, "Hangook anbo ae issuh suh haeyangryug ui joong yo sung" (The Importance of Sea Power in Korea's Security) Haeyang junryag, (Maritime Strategy) March 1984, pp. 25-48; and Col. (Dr.) Park Young-ok (ROK Army), "90 nyundae i hu dojunjug junryag sanghwang gwa hangook haegunryug" (The challenging strategic conditions after the 1990s and South Korea's naval power), Gookbang yungu (National Defense Studies), December 1986, pp. 243-265.

84 Park Jae-kyu, "Hangook anbo wa haeyangryug" (South Korea's security and maritime power) Hangook kwa gookjae jungchi (Korea and International Politics) Spring 1987, pp. 21-36.

85 Capt. (Dr.) Kim Young-koo, Hangook haeyang junryag dangmyung gwajae (Confronting the task of South Korean Maritime Strategy), unpublished 35 page paper provided to the author at Pusan Conference, May 7, 1988.

87 Discussions November 17, 1988, and correspondence November 28 and December 3, 1988, with members of the Sea Power Symposium Committee.

88 In a fairly typical poll, only 16% of the respondents thought the US-Japan security treaty was "greatly important for peace," 59% thought "not much at all." In the same poll only 19% thought the United States would protect Japan, 26% thought it would not, and 49% doubted the United States would. Also in the same poll only 5% thought Japan should go along with U.S. pressures for burden sharing, while the great majority (85%) had reservations or totally opposed the idea, Yomiuri Shimbun, August 1, 1988, p. 1.


91 See, for example, the candid views of Okazaki Hisahiko, then the Counselor at the Defense Agency, Asahi Shimbun, October 29, 1980, p. 3.

92 See, for example, the statements of Defense Agency head Natsume Haruo and Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro, in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 25, 1983, p. 2 and March 11, 1983, p. 5.

93 For example, Okamura's piece previously cited.


The author made one such attempt in his U.S. Policy and The Two Koreas, op. cit.

A research assistant, Mr. Katsuhisa Nakamura (now with Hiroshima University) interviewed in mid - 1988 three fairly prominent and conservative officials or former officials [LDP conservative leader Kamei Shizuka, Defense Academy President Natsume Haruo, and MSDF Admiral Takayama Masashi] who hewed closely to the cautious orthodoxy about Japan's security limitations. The author also found comparable views in July 1988 conversations with conservative members of the Japan Sea Power Association, including: Arai Shojiro, Hamada Yusuke, Somura Yasunobu, and Retired JMSDF/CNO Admiral Uchida.


FBIS, IV, August 15, 1985, p. 20; Yomiuri Shimbun, August 24, 1985, p. 1; The Korea Herald, September 24, 1985, p. 3; and FEER, August 29, 1985, pp. 22-23.


FEER, December 22, 1988, p.30
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Andrew Marshall</td>
<td>Director, Net Assessment</td>
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<td>OSD/NA Room 3A930</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Roger Brooks</td>
<td>Director, Asian Studies Center</td>
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</table>
11. Dr. Janet Wall  
Director, Research Administration 
SAIC  
205 Montecito Avenue  
Monterey, CA 93940

12. Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Attn: Director, East Asia and Pacific Region  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1155

13. Head, Strategic Concepts Branch  
OP-603, Pentagon Room 4E486  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington, DC 20350

14. Head, East Asia/Pacific Plans and Policy Branch  
OP-612, Pentagon Room 4E475  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington, DC 20350

15. RADM James Dorsey, USN  
ADCCNO Plans, Policy and Operations  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington, DC 20350

16. Chief, Pacific East Asia Division  
AF X0XXP, Pentagon Room 4D1034  
Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff  
Washington, DC 20330

17. East Asia and Pacific Region  
OSD/ISA/EAP Room 4C839  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301

18. Far East/South Asia Division  
OJCS-J5 Room 2E973  
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Washington, DC 20301

19. Asia Pacific Branch  
DIA-DB-2C  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20301-6111

20. Far East Regional Desk  
DAMO-SSM Room 3B545  
Office of the Army Chief of Staff  
Washington, DC 20310

21. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
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<td>New York, NY 10021</td>
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<td>Mr. James H. Riddle</td>
<td>Teledyne Industries</td>
<td>Room 403, Nam Song Building Seoul, Korea</td>
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<td>Office of Korean Affairs</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State</td>
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<td>Dr. John Merrill</td>
<td>JNR/OAP</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State Washington, DC 20520</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Dr. Robert Scalapino</td>
<td>Institution of East Asia Studies</td>
<td>2223 Fulton Street University of California Berkely, CA 94720</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Dr. John W. Lewis</td>
<td>ISIS/Stanford University</td>
<td>320 Galvez Street Stanford, CA 94305</td>
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<td>Dr. Kevin Lho</td>
<td>ISIS/Stanford University</td>
<td>320 Galvez Street Stanford, CA 93405</td>
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<td>Dr. Kenneth Quinones</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>Office of East Asia and Pacific Regional Affairs Department of State Washington, DC 20520</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Dr. Nat White</td>
<td>429 N. Lincoln Street</td>
<td>Arlington, VA 22201</td>
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</table>
34. Representative Robert Mrazek  
U. S. House of Representatives  
306 Cannon Building  
Washington, DC 20515

35. Representative Patricio Schroeder  
U. S. House of Representatives  
2410 Rayburn Building  
Washington, DC 20515

36. Mr. Stan Roth  
House of Representatives  
Subcommittee on Asian Affairs  
707 House Annex 1  
Washington, DC 20515

37. Mr. Hank Kenny  
U. S. Senate  
Subcommittee on Asian Affairs  
419 Dirksen Building  
Washington, DC 20510

38. Mr. Larry Niboch  
Congressional Research Services  
Library of Congress, Room 315  
James Madison Building  
Washington, DC 20540

39. LTCOL Yoshihisa Nakamura  
National Defense College  
2-2-1 Nakameguro-ku  
Meguro-Ku, Tokyo 153  
Japan

40. Mr. Katsuhisa Nakamura  
c/o Professor Yoneshige  
Sogo-Kagaku Department  
Hiroshima University  
Tokyo, Japan

41. Mr. Seung-Ho Joo  
Burrowes Building  
Department of Political Sciences  
Pennsylvania State University  
State College, PA 16902