Reconstitution of a fighting force is a subject of tremendous importance, especially in light of current AirLand Battle doctrine. The tempo and the lethality on the AirLand Battlefield will be such that brigade, division and even corps size units can expect to be significantly degraded in equipment, supplies and personnel in a very short period of time. Once this happens, the unit must be reconstituted in order that it can reenter the battle as an effective fighting force. The fact that reconstitution is widely misunderstood...
20. ABSTRACT--continued.

is due largely to the lack of doctrine on the subject. The purpose of this article is to focus attention on reconstitution as a combat force multiplier and to urge the immediate promulgation of clear and concise doctrine for the commander in the field. In the meantime, it is imperative that commanders seize the initiative by incorporating reconstitution into their OPLANS and to vigorously exercise it at every opportunity.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

RECONSTITUTION: A COMBAT FORCE MULTIPLIER

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Johnson

Colonel Leonard D Hardy, Jr., FA
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
20 March 1989
Reconstitution of a fighting force is a subject of tremendous importance, especially in light of current AirLand Battle doctrine. The tempo and the lethality on the AirLand Battlefield will be such that brigade, division and even corps size units can expect to be significantly degraded in equipment, supplies and personnel in a very short period of time. Once this happens, the unit must be reconstituted in order that it can reenter the battle as an effective fighting force. The fact that reconstitution is widely misunderstood is due largely to the lack of doctrine on the subject. The purpose of this article is to focus attention on reconstitution as a combat force multiplier and to urge the immediate promulgation of clear and concise doctrine for the commander in the field. In the meantime, it is imperative that commanders seize the initiative by incorporating reconstitution into their OPLANS and to vigorously exercise it at every opportunity.
Reconstitution is a subject which has generated a great deal of interest as well as confusion during the past couple of years. The tremendous utility of reconstitution in fighting and winning the AirLand Battle cannot be overstated; however, the Army has not yet developed clear-cut doctrine to support it. A reconstitution field manual was sent in draft form to major commands for comments two years ago, but to date, no doctrine exists. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC PAM 525-51 entitled "US Army Operational Concept for Reconstitution on the AirLand Battlefield", more than three years ago. This pamphlet represents emerging doctrine, but little progress has been made in validating the concept of reconstitution as stated in that document. It is time to recognize the importance of reconstitution as a force multiplier, and it is time to provide the commander in the field with the operational and tactical principles required to train for and execute a full scale reconstitution.

In a recent article, entitled "Sustaining Combat Power", Chief of Staff Carl Vuono points out that "planning for and executing the demanding requirements for the reconstitution of units, for unit replacement, or for interunit redistribution of soldiers, fuel, equipment, or transport is a training challenge of some magnitude." (1) General Vuono challenges us to tackle this battlefield requirement at all levels and to actively discuss the conditions under which we would undertake reconstitution.
RECONSTITUTION ON THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD

The lack of adequate doctrine has resulted in confusion as to what reconstitution actually is. This is complicated by the fact that although the notion of reconstitution is addressed in several current field manuals, each defines it somewhat differently. The definition found in the Army's keystone warfighting manual, FM 100-5, simply states:

"Reconstitution is focused action to restore ineffective units to a specified level of combat effectiveness."

It further explains that this may include replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment; reestablishment or reinforcement of command and control; and conduct of mission-essential training.

In reality, reconstitution is neither a new term nor a new concept. As long as there have been wars, units have been reconstituted in some form or another, so how does the modern battlefield differ from those of the past? AirLand Battle doctrine recognizes the importance of the increased mobility of forces and the resultant capability to exploit enemy vulnerabilities immediately upon the start of hostilities. Coupled with the ever increasing sophistication of modern weapons, it becomes imperative that we seize the initiative early on and exercise it aggressively. Should we fail at the onset, our forces stand the chance of being attrited in large numbers in a very short period of time. These technological advancements will so dramatically increase the tempo and lethality of future battles that units could rapidly be reduced to less than 50% strength in both men and equipment. The future airland integrated battlefield will not afford the luxury of long personnel and materiel pipelines, withdrawal and rehabilitation of
decimated forces or the opportunity for leisurely reorganizations. (2)

Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, LTG Benjamin Register Ret., states that the importance of reconstitution to modern warfare cannot be overemphasized, and highlights the lack of adequate doctrine as just one of many reasons that this subject demands attention at all levels within the Army: (3) Other reasons cited by General Register include:

-the impact on logistical resources of the commander several echelons above the affected unit.
-the tactical environment faced when a major reconstitution is required.
-the need for training, exercises, and involvement of tactical commanders in the reconstitution process.
-the roles and missions of major logistical forces and functional elements to support a reconstitution effort and still maintain logistical support of committed forces.
-the interface with rear area security in a tactical environment that requires a major reconstitution effort. (4)

METHODS OF RECONSTITUTION

Some of the confusion which revolves around the term reconstitution is the fact that there are two separate and distinct methods of reconstituting a unit - reorganization and regeneration. Relatively speaking, reorganization is by far the simpler of the two, requiring the shifting of assets within a unit to increase its combat effectiveness level. Reorganization can also be accomplished by shifting resources between committed units and
reserve units. There are two methods of reorganization - immediate and deliberate. Immediate battlefield reorganization should be quick and is accomplished to meet the commander's near-term requirements; as such, it is normally accomplished in or near the unit's battlefield position. Deliberate reorganization normally takes place farther to the rear and is conducted if and when time and resources are available. This type of reorganization will allow more time for equipment repair and crossleveling and may permit replacement of limited resources. (5) Because of its limited scope, reorganization is normally approved by the commander one echelon above the unit involved, but is controlled by the commander of the unit being reorganized.

Regeneration, on the other hand, is comprehensive in scope, and demands detailed planning and coordination prior to execution. Regeneration entails the large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; reestablishment of essential command and control; and the conduct of mission-essential training, all of which are directed toward restoring the unit's cohesion, discipline and fighting effectiveness. (6) This is an extraordinary measure requiring significant involvement at all levels within the regenerated unit as well as from parent units which will regenerate the units involved.

The intensive nature of regeneration dictates that it is best accomplished in a rear area which is protected from enemy interdiction and harassment. A unit undergoing regeneration will be involved in accepting new equipment, supplies and personnel; repairing organic equipment; training; and restoring command and control. Because of the broad implications of regenerating a unit,
the decision to regenerate is approved and controlled by the commander with the resources to perform the task, normally two echelons above the unit being regenerated, i.e., a corps regenerates a brigade, a division regenerates a battalion.

WHO IS IN CHARGE OF WHAT?

Added to the confusion as to what reconstitution is, is a basic misconception as to who is in charge. To some, reconstitution is strictly a logistics term and consequently the purview of the logistician. While it is true that the actual execution of getting the required beans, bullets, fuel, etc., to the unit will rest with the logistician, it is also true that a great deal of planning and coordination must be accomplished before this is possible. Every single staff element must be involved in reconstituting the force. The decision to reconstitute and the determination of method is clearly the responsibility of the commander; however, the overall control and coordination of that effort is the responsibility of the Operations Officer. The S3/G3 is in charge! He has a lot to do; among other tasks he will:

- align reconstitution efforts in accordance with the tactical situation
- identify critical equipment, supply and personnel shortfalls
- coordinate the reconstitution location
- recommend method of reconstitution
- ensure a coordinated flow of replacement personnel and equipment
- plan for the security of the reconstitution site
- identify training requirements and assist in execution of the
training program
This job cannot be accomplished in a vacuum; he must work with the entire staff to ensure mission accomplishment.

WHEN TO RECONSTITUTE

The commander's decision to reconstitute is somewhat subjective in nature. One unit might still be considered combat effective at only 65% strength, while another unit may have lost its effectiveness with the elimination of only a few key leaders. FM 100-5 says that the commander's decision will normally be based on personnel losses, equipment status, psychological condition of the unit, and the impact of releasing the unit on the operations of the parent force.

Broad guidelines provided to the commander in FM 63-3J, Corps Combat Service Support Operations, suggest that a reconstitution assessment should be made when personnel strength approaches 60%, or when major item availability approaches 70%. This in no way should be considered sacrosanct, for many other factors such as battle fatigue, morale, and expectations of the soldiers in continued combat should be considered before a commander makes this decision. The final decision should be based on the unit's ability to perform its assigned mission, coupled with availability of the required time and assets to return it to an effective fighting force. This decision should NOT be based solely on an isolated unit status report, but rather a continuous assessment of the unit's condition.

WHAT HAS TO BE DONE
The regeneration of any unit is a complex operation requiring the simultaneous execution of many divergent tasks. Given adequate time and resources, a Casualty and Damage Assessment Element (CDAE) should be formed to assess the status of the unit and the scope of regeneration required. (8) The CDAE should consist of representatives from each staff section from the headquarters two levels above the unit being regenerated. Its assessment will include not only personnel, equipment and supply shortfalls, but also requirements relating to training necessary to restore combat effectiveness.

The CDAE is primarily the planning element for unit regeneration. Actual execution is accomplished by an ad hoc Assessment and Recovery Team (AART) which is formed by the CDAE to ensure that regeneration activities comply with the plans and priorities of the commander directing regeneration. (9) The AART operates the regeneration site and directs the distribution of equipment and supplies as they become available. Additionally, the AART will process incoming personnel and provide preliminary training relating to assigned jobs.

Practically speaking, it would be overly optimistic to think that a major regeneration of even a battalion sized unit could be accomplished without assistance from units at corps and echelons above corps. This is especially true in the areas of transportation and maintenance, where requirements are sure to exceed capabilities. One of the primary functions of both the CDAE and the AART is to identify those tasks which cannot be accomplished with internal assets. The faster this can be done, the more likely required assets can be made available.
WHERE TO REGENERATE?

One of the most important elements in both the planning and execution phases of any regeneration is selection of an appropriate site. Key to this question is where the regenerated unit is likely to reenter the fight. This of course will be a command decision; consequently, it is imperative to understand the commander's intent prior to identifying an appropriate site. Time is of the essence; it would be foolhardy to evacuate to a position which would necessitate a lengthy road march to the next projected battle position.

Another consideration is the amount of time available. The realities of the battlefield may dictate that the commander can afford only 24-48 hours before he will again need to employ the regenerated unit. In severe cases, regeneration might have to be accomplished in place, but it is best accomplished in the rear, away from enemy contact.

Regenerating a unit is a major operation which requires a large amount of real estate. Both the regenerated unit and CSS elements involved should be dispersed and concealed in order to minimize the threat of enemy interdiction. It is paramount that the site be adjacent to an adequate rail and road network, in order to expeditiously and efficiently bring forward the required resources. The more that can be forwarded by host nation rail, the less that ground transportation resources will have to be relied upon. The proximity to a useable airstrip should also be a key consideration. As a minimum, there should be an adequate landing area for rotary wing use or an area suitable for air delivery of supplies. Depending on the type and intensity of training to be conducted, an
adequate training area must be included in determining an appropriate site. Other considerations include sufficient space for storage areas and distribution points of the various classes of supply, the most critical of which, with respect to the amount of space required, is Class III (POL).

Finally, it is critical to evaluate the need for decontamination. All, or a portion of the unit may require deliberate decontamination PRIOR to entering the regeneration site. A separate location must be established enroute to the regeneration site in order to prevent contaminated units from mixing with "clean" units.

REGENERATING A DIVISION

Regeneration of a battalion sized unit, although requiring a comprehensive plan and extensive coordination, is, at the very least, executable. Depending on the severity of losses, major end items will be required from corps, and perhaps, theater war reserve stocks. The real problem is that the mid- to high-intensity battlefield will be so lethal that brigades, divisions, and even corps may quickly be rendered ineffective and require regeneration.

Consider our forward deployed forces in Europe. It doesn't take a mathematician to realize the tremendous numerical advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact forces. Yes, NATO has better equipment, better soldiers, and a more viable command and control system; but when one is outmanned 2 to 1, and outgunned by as much as 3 to 1, there is a point when quality loses to quantity. A full-scale invasion of West Germany would undoubtedly result in devastating losses on both sides during the first few days. Front line units
stand the chance of being significantly degraded before deploying units have arrived in theater.

In this type of high intensity conflict, the requirement for regeneration won't be for just one or two battalions; instead, divisions will need to be regenerated. Hopefully, deploying units will arrive in time to replace decimated units, which can then fall back to be regenerated; however, the magnitude of equipment, personnel and supplies required to regenerate an entire division is enormous.

For the sake of discussion, let us assume that an Armored Division was degraded to 60% of its authorized personnel and equipment strength across the board. This, of course is unrealistic, in that a unit will never be equally degraded, but it aids in identifying the scope of the problem. Table 1 lists the division's personnel and key equipment authorizations. It also depicts its strength after suffering a 40% loss, what the strength would be at 90%, and the resultant requirement to return the division from 60% to 90% strength.

Standing alone, this information requires further analysis. Sheer numbers are important, but it is equally important to evaluate what the numbers mean. This is especially relevant when looking at personnel losses. Not only do personnel have to be replaced, but they have to be the right personnel, by MOS/specialty and grade. To bring the division back to 90% of its authorized strength requires more than 6,500 replacement personnel. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there are almost 300 different specialties spread over 17 ranks in a division.

Now consider equipment shortfalls. Excluding radios, there are
still more than 2,000 major pieces of equipment, by type and model, required to regenerate the division to 90% equipment strength. Obviously, prestocked war reserves will be used to fill as much of the shortfall as possible, but current world wide stockage levels of major end items is only 23% of Defense Guidance (DG) objectives. (10)

How does this affect our ability to regenerate division-sized units? A major regeneration early in the battle will significantly reduce, and in many cases deplete, war reserve stocks. Commanders at corps and theater levels might have to consolidate two or more depleted units in order to form a single fighting unit. Should, however, regeneration not be required until later in the war, adequate personnel and equipment replacements might be available from CONUS to fill shortages. In either case, our fighting units of all sizes, must be fully prepared to pull back, reconstitute, and reenter the battle.

HISTORICALLY SPEAKING

History provides some meaningful examples of the importance of reconstitution that are worth noting. Most relevant to AirLand Battle doctrine is the reconstitution of the 28th Infantry Division after the Battle of Schmidt in November, 1944. During the first week of November, the 28th had been involved in a major offensive at Schmidt, Germany, and had suffered more than 5,000 losses. (11) The overwhelming majority of these losses were riflemen, which almost completely depleted its fighting strength. Unfortunately, the number of losses was not known to the division commander, due in part to a time lag in casualty reporting, and worsened by false
reporting by some commanders who were afraid to admit the severity of their losses.

In one of the division's units, the 110th Infantry Regiment, some companies had been reduced to subplatoon strength, and the morale and strength of the remaining men were greatly diminished. After personally visiting the 110th's lines, the assistant division commander cancelled all further offensive actions. The regiment alone had suffered more than 1,500 battle casualties and another 544 nonbattle losses. (12) Despite the fact that huge numbers of replacements were being sent to the regiment, the influx within the receiving units was so great that it adversely affected combat effectiveness. Due to the massive number of casualties, command and control within the 110th had become virtually nonexistent.

What lesson can we learn from the experiences of the 110th? First and foremost, is the absolute necessity for accurate and timely data. Had the division commander known the extent of the losses in the 110th earlier, he could have taken it out of the battle to reorganize or regenerate, rather than infusing it with a continuous flow of personnel and equipment replacements. The policy in the European Theater at that time was that the immediate replacement of casualties could be accomplished without a degradation to combat effectiveness. Unfortunately, the experience of the 110th proved this policy to be invalid.

On the other hand, the 112th Infantry Regiment of the 28th, had been pulled back to be regenerated prior to reaching such desperate levels, while their sister units continued the fighting. For a few precious days the men were able to rest, take showers and revive themselves as the unit was being regenerated. The regiment continued extensive training and dispatched small assault groups
from each battalion to seek and destroy German pillboxes, in an effort to restore individual and unit confidence. While still undergoing regeneration, the 28th was hit head-on by the major German counteroffensive, known to us as the Battle of the Bulge. The success of the reconstitution can be measured by the fact that although being totally combat ineffective a month earlier, the division fought a determined defensive action, despite being outnumbered and outgunned. (13) The lesson? Reconstitution, when executed properly, works.

The Vietnam conflict offers a different view of reconstitution. The nature of the fighting and enemy guerilla tactics did not require a major reconstitution effort for US units. With few sustained battles, units requiring reconstitution could be moved to relatively safer areas easily, without excessive security problems. Division base areas served as the center of the personnel reconstitution effort. Overall division strength was kept high, and never did a unit suffer the amount of massive surge casualties that was experienced in World War II. (14)

The US Army's experience in Vietnam does not lend itself to current reconstitution questions; however, it is appropriate to highlight the significant reconstitution effort of the Vietnamese Army (ARVN). Early in 1975, the military situation in South Vietnam had become desperate. The United States had long since removed its fighting force, but was still providing extensive monetary assistance. After being driven from the northern most regions of South Vietnam, the need to successfully defend Saigon was to become the South's last chance for freedom. In a last ditch effort, the ARVN, at the urging of the US Defense Attache Office
(DAO), submitted a plan to completely reconstitute its forces.

As documented in the US DAO Army Division Final Report, the plan focused on the immediate reconstitution of combat and combat support units using a building block concept of battalion-sized units. Reconstituted units would be attached to existing divisions to reduce the need for additional command and control. All efforts were made to maintain tactical integrity, but the condition of the force made this difficult to achieve. The final plan consisted of four phases which included the equipping and staffing of 18 infantry battalions and three artillery batteries; the organization of four new infantry divisions; the reconstitution of 12 ranger groups into four division-sized units; and the reconstitution of 27 Regional Forces mobile groups into 27 separate infantry regiments.

Priority went to units returning with sufficient integrity to be reconstituted principally by equipping and manning. A look at the major equipment requirements to carry out this plan demonstrates the enormity of its scope: (15)

- 124,395 M16 rifles
- 33,596 .45 cal pistols
- 17,536 M79 grenade launchers
- 34,094 radios, all varieties
- 14,865 trucks, all varieties
- 240 aircraft

Information available to the DAO prior to evacuation from Saigon was that the following units were reconstituted and deployed: 7 Infantry Brigades, 3 Ranger Groups, 4 Artillery Battalions, and 2 Artillery Batteries. Although this represented a major reconstitution effort, the request for assistance came too
late to prevent the overthrow of Saigon. The reconstitution of ARVN forces was limited not only by resources, but even more so by the lack of aggressive leadership and timely recognition by tactical planners and operations personnel of the requirement to reconstitute forces. (16)

The experience in Vietnam points out the necessity for continuous evaluation of the situation. The call to reconstitute the depleted Vietnamese Army came too late to change the course of history; the Vietnamese leadership failed to properly assess the gravity of the situation. This failure resulted in losing the war and the loss of their country. Had this plan been developed months earlier, perhaps the outcome would have been different.

EXERCISING RECONSTITUTION IN PEACETIME

The lack of reconstitution doctrine must not disuade commanders from incorporating reconstitution into their OPLANs, nor should it preclude aggressive reconstitution exercises. Innovation is the name of the game. Plan it, try it, refine it, and try it again. Exercises can be accomplished at all levels, and are limited only, by imagination and budget.

The 1st AD, for example, exercised a partial regeneration of a tank battalion by replacing key members of the chain of command and all of its main battle tanks during REFORGER 85. The battalion was pulled back to its home station and its organic tanks were replaced by tanks drawn from theater reserves. These tanks were offloaded from rail cars, deprocessed, and turned over to the tankers for training. Play included the replacement of the battalion commander, principal staff officers, and company commanders. The
Division G1 assumed command of the battalion and was given the latitude to pick his staff and commanders from the division staff. After some initial coordination with the newly formed staff, the commander lead the battalion on a 100 mile road march to test the reliability of the new tanks, as well as the effectiveness of command and control. As ambitious as this exercise was, it only scratched the surface of a total regeneration.

On a much grander scale, the 3D Corps Support Command, V Corps, planned and executed what is probably the largest peacetime regeneration exercise ever conducted by US Army forces. As an active participant in this exercise, I was able to witness first-hand the complexities of planning and executing a major regeneration. Subsequent to V Corps Exercise Caravan Guard, conducted in February 1988, 3D COSCOM was given the mission to regenerate the 11th ACR and to restore as much of its combat effectiveness as possible within the 48 hour time period allotted by the Corps Commander. The 11th conducted its own reorganization in an intermediate assembly area subsequent to the passage of lines and then proceeded to the assigned reconstitution site, where it was regenerated by 3D COSCOM.

Although the exercise was somewhat limited due to the artificiality of peacetime constraints, it approximated the enormity of a major regeneration. All classes of supply were exercised. Extensive recovery and maintenace operations were conducted. Field services, to include hot showers, laundry, water purification, and graves registration were provided. Transportation was provided utilizing corps aviation and COSCOM ground assets, as well as theater rail and air.
Due primarily to fiscal limitations, regeneration was limited to a single ground squadron, and elements of the aviation squadron. The ground squadron continually cycled through all support points, thus simulating the entire regiment. To preclude extensive site preparation, and thereby most accurately portray the realities of reconstitution, the Corps Commander prohibited 3D COSCOM elements from entering the site until 72 hours prior to the exercise. The site itself encompassed hundreds of square kilometers on three separate German training posts. A reconstitution task force (RTF), consisting of more than 700 personnel, was tailored to accomplish the mission. Although personnel from almost every unit within the COSCOM were incorporated into the RTF, the nucleus was centered around one of the organic COSCOM maintenance battalions, which provided the primary command and control element for the exercise. Extensive planning and coordination preceded the exercise and proved fundamental to the overwhelming success of the operation.

Elements of the RTF began arriving at the reconstitution site exactly 72 hours prior to the reception of the 11th ACR. Whereas some units were able to be operational in a matter of hours, others required much more time to become fully functional. This was especially true of the Supply and Service Company which set up a fully camouflaged Fuel System Supply Point (FSSP), consisting of six 10,000 gallon collapsible fuel tanks. Because of the need to build berms around each bag to protect against spillage and fire, it took 48 hours around the clock operations before the FSSP was ready for business.

Theater reserve stocks, consisting of 62 major end items including tanks, APCs, engineer equipment and trucks, were railed
to the site. All items were offloaded, deprocessed, fueled, armed and issued to the 11th in a ready-to-fight configuration. A suitable training area was identified early in the planning process, in order that the soldiers of the 11th could train with their new equipment prior to reentering the battle. It is important to note that all equipment received from theater reserves was not only operational, but in excellent condition. In addition to the extensive use of organic COSCOM transportation assets, the RTF also relied on C-130s to deliver fuel, and to airdrop 4,000 sets of NBC suits, which were subsequently delivered to the reconstitution site by CH-47. Table 2 provides a complete listing of equipment and services provided.

Not only did this exercise prove invaluable for both 3D COSCOM units and the 11th ACR; it also was extremely beneficial to hundreds of commanders and senior logisticians throughout USAREUR who were briefed at the site and given a tour of the entire operation. This exercise points out the necessity for practicing reconstitution at all levels. It is increasingly more difficult to get the training dollars required to exercise at this level of magnitude; however, portions of the total reconstitution effort can and must become part of a commander’s training program.

RECONSTITUTION FOR THE FUTURE

The importance of reconstitution to current AirLand Battle doctrine demands attention at all levels throughout the Army. At the highest level, clear and concise doctrine must be written for the commander in the field. TRADOC PAM 525-51 provides the
framework for that doctrine; however, there are some major changes being proposed relating to who should be responsible for reconstitution. A draft TRADOC concept entitled "Logistics Command and Control on the AirLand Battlefield", assigns the role of reconstitution/regeneration exclusively to the Area Support Group (ASG) within a theater of operations. This would be executed by a subordinate Area Support Battalion (ASB) whose primary function would be unit regeneration. (18)

This concept represents a significant shift from current thinking, which keeps the responsibility for reconstitution/regeneration within command channels. The concept has merit in that it establishes a unit whose sole mission is regeneration, but it also raises questions as to the ability of a single unit to conduct the regeneration of two or more geographically dispersed units simultaneously. This potential problem might necessitate that those units being regenerated fall back to the corps rear area, or even the COMZ. Although a central location would most certainly enhance the regeneration process, a lengthy road march to the rear would adversely affect any war-weary unit, and prevent it from reentering the battle for an extended period of time. This new concept offers both advantages and disadvantages to the way we currently plan to regenerate units, and warrants our attention and critical evaluation before becoming part of our reconstitution doctrine.

The need for reconstitution in a mid- to high-intensity conflict will likely be continuous. The US Army Logistics Center has determined by evaluating lessons learned from major exercises such as REFORGER and LOGEX that at least one brigade will be
undergoing regeneration at all times during a high-intensity conflict. In light of the tremendous impact this has on the tactical operation, the Logistics Center has recommended that a reserve component battalion be used to provide regeneration services during the next REFORGER. (19) If approved, this would assist in evaluating the concept of utilizing a separate unit for the regeneration mission.

Although there currently exists a doctrinal void, we must not fail to vigorously exercise reconstitution and to incorporate it into our OPLANS. Reconstitution is a complex operation which requires extensive planning and coordination, but if it is going to be effective as a force multiplier, it must have command involvement at all levels. Ideally, reconstitution should be incorporated into all Field Training Exercises (FTX); however, fiscal and time constraints, coupled with peacetime realities, will probably prevent a full-blown reconstitution simulation. With a little innovative thinking, portions of the reconstitution operation can be exercised during each FTX.

Likewise, Command Post Exercises (CPX) should also incorporate reconstitution into the scenario. As long as it is played aggressively and realistically, and the problems are not wished away by "tooth fairy logistics", a CPX can be invaluable in identifying the many challenges and constraints associated with reconstitution. A computer program being developed by the Logistics Center called SABRE (System to Assist with Battlefield Reconstitution) will assist commanders and planners at all levels in identifying and solving problems relating to reconstitution.
Reconstitution is a subject of vital importance to all of us. We must know what it is, and how to optimize its execution in order to affect the outcome on the battlefield. The foreward of TRADOC Pam 525-51 says it best: "the lethality of the AirLand Battlefield demands a well thought out reconstitution plan that is well coordinated and executed so that maximum combat power is maintained within situational and resource constraints." In order to be fully prepared for the next war, we must develop doctrine, incorporate reconstitution into our OPLANs, and exercise it at every opportunity. To do otherwise, is a prelude to failure.
ARMORED DIVISION
TO&E 87000J430

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>@60%</th>
<th>@90%</th>
<th>Rqd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>15,263</td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>13,737</td>
<td>6,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,785</td>
<td>8,545</td>
<td>15,107</td>
<td>6,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, M1</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Vehicles, M2/M3</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, 155mm</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters, all</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks, all</td>
<td>3,507</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>3,156</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers/Vans, all</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators, all</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios, all</td>
<td>4,351</td>
<td>2,611</td>
<td>3,916</td>
<td>1,305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1**
Reconstitution Task Force Operations

SUPPLY SUPPORT

Class I
- 8 mobile kitchen units provided hot meals (B-MRE-B)
- 71 pallets of MREs issued to replace ACR UBL

Class II/IV
- 4,000 NBC suits airdropped by C130
  -- slung to site by CH-47
- 400 sets OCIE/TA-50 available at exchange point
- 7 S&P loads of class IV available for issue

Class III
- Fuel Service Supply Point (80,000 gallon capacity) installed
  -- bulk issue to ACR & RTF
- 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel delivered by C130
  -- transshipped by POL tankers
- Limited packaged POL products available

Class V
- Ammunition Transfer Point established
  - Major weapons systems uploaded
  - Dummy ammo boxes used to replenish ACR UBL

Class VI
- Sundry packs issued at the shower point

Class VII
- 62 major end items shipped, deprocessed, uploaded, tested and issued
  -- included: tanks, ITV's, personnel carriers, engineer equipment, trucks

Class VIII
- Handoff of medical supplies simulated
- First aid supplies available

Class IX
- Major Assembly Supply Point (MASP) established
  - Corps Exchange Point (CEP) established
  - ASL provided by RTF Supply Support Activity (SSA)

SERVICES
- Water production point established
- Shower point installed
  -- capacity of 3,500+ personnel per day
- Field laundry service provided
- Graves registration transfer point established

DECONTAMINATION
- Deliberate contamination of a Cav Troop

MAINTENANCE
- Ground, missile and aviation Direct Support (DS) maintenance provided
- Recovery and evacuation as required

PERSONNEL
- Newly arrived personnel processed and distributed to ACR

TRANSPORTATION
- Red Ball express used to receive critical items
- Corps aviation assets available for high priority shipments
- Theater rail and aviation used to ship classes I, II, III, IV, VII and IX.

TABLE 2

23
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid.

5. U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-51, p. 4.

6. Ibid.


8. TRADOC Pam 525-51, p. 13.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. US Defense Attache Office Army Division Final Report, Volume IX - "Reconstitution of Forces".

16. Ibid.

